Paper 2004/139

New Notions of Security: Achieving Universal Composability without Trusted Setup

Manoj Prabhakaran and Amit Sahai

Abstract

We propose a modification to the framework of Universally Composable (UC) security [Canetti'01]. Our new notion, involves comparing the protocol executions with an ideal execution involving ideal functionalities (just as in UC-security), but allowing the environment and adversary access to some super-polynomial computational power. We argue the meaningfulness of the new notion, which in particular subsumes many of the traditional notions of security. We generalize the Universal Composition theorem of [Canetti'01] to the new setting. Then under new computational assumptions, we realize secure multi-party computation (for static adversaries) without a common reference string or any other set-up assumptions, in the new framework. This is known to be impossible under the UC framework.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Published elsewhere. STOC 2004
Keywords
Environmental SecurityMulti-party computation
Contact author(s)
mp @ princeton edu
History
2004-06-16: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2004/139
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/139,
      author = {Manoj Prabhakaran and Amit Sahai},
      title = {New Notions of Security: Achieving Universal Composability without Trusted Setup},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2004/139},
      year = {2004},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/139}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.