Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2004/105

Receipt-Free Homomorphic Elections and Write-in Ballots

Alessandro Acquisti

Abstract: We present a voting protocol that protects voters' privacy and achieves universal verifiability, receipt-freeness, and uncoercibility without ad hoc physical assumptions or procedural constraints (such as untappable channels, voting booths, smart cards, third-party randomizers, and so on). We discuss under which conditions the scheme allows voters to cast write-in ballots, and we show how it can be practically implemented through voter-verified (paper) ballots. The scheme allows voters to combine voting credentials with their chosen votes applying the homomorphic properties of certain probabilistic cryptosystems.

Category / Keywords: applications / Electronic Voting, Receipt-Freeness, Uncoercibility, Write-In Ballots, Voter-verified Ballots, Homomorphic Encryption, Paillier cryptosystem.

Date: received 4 May 2004

Contact author: acquisti at andrew cmu edu

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Version: 20040507:080259 (All versions of this report)

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