Paper 2004/089
Security of Random Key Pre-distribution Schemes With Limited Tamper Resistance
Mahalingam Ramkumar and Nasir Memon
Abstract
Key pre-distribution (KPD) schemes, are inherently trade-offs between security and complexity, and are perhaps well suited for securing large-scale deployments of resource constrained nodes without persistent access to a trusted authority (TA). However, the need to offset their inherent security limitations, calls for some degree of tamper - resistance of nodes. Obviously, if absolute tamper-resistance is guaranteed, KPD schemes are rendered secure. In practice, however, tamper-resistance will have some limitations which will be exploited by attackers. In this paper, we analyze the security of deployments of random key pre-distribution schemes based on some assumptions on the "extent of tamper-resistance." We argue that a "limited extent of tamper resistance" when used in conjunction with a mechanism for "periodic key updates," drastically improves the security of (especially random) KPD schemes.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. This is an expanded version of a paper submitted to USMA 2004
- Keywords
- Key ManagementKey Pre-distribution
- Contact author(s)
- ramkumar @ cse msstate edu
- History
- 2004-04-07: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2004/089
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/089,
author = {Mahalingam Ramkumar and Nasir Memon},
title = {Security of Random Key Pre-distribution Schemes With Limited Tamper Resistance},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2004/089},
year = {2004},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/089}
}
