Paper 2004/011

Known-Plaintext Attack Against a Permutation Based Video

Adam J. Slagell

Abstract

One of the approaches to deliver real-time video encryption is to apply permutations to the bytes within a frame of a fully encoded MPEG stream as presented in [2]. We demonstrate that this particular algorithm is vulnerable to a known-plaintext attack, and hence its use should be carefully considered. We also discuss modifications that can make the algorithm resistant to our attack.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Contact author(s)
slagell @ ncsa uiuc edu
History
2004-01-21: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2004/011
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/011,
      author = {Adam J.  Slagell},
      title = {Known-Plaintext Attack Against a Permutation Based Video},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2004/011},
      year = {2004},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/011}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/011}
}
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