The Knowledge-of-Exponent Assumptions and 3-Round Zero-Knowledge Protocols

Mihir Bellare; Adriana Palacio

Paper 2004/008

The Knowledge-of-Exponent Assumptions and 3-Round Zero-Knowledge Protocols

Mihir Bellare and Adriana Palacio

Abstract

Hada and Tanaka showed the existence of 3-round, negligible-error zero-knowledge arguments for NP based on a pair of non-standard assumptions, here called KEA1 and KEA2. In this paper we show that KEA2 is false. This renders vacuous the results of Hada and Tanaka. We recover these results, however, under a suitably modified new assumption called KEA3. What we believe is most interesting is that we show that it is possible to ``falsify'' assumptions like KEA2 that, due to their nature and quantifier-structure, do not lend themselves easily to ``efficient falsification'' (Naor).

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF PS
Publication info: Published elsewhere. A preliminary version appeared in Crypto 2004. This is the full version.
Keywords: zero-knowledge foundations assumptions discrete log
Contact author(s): mihir @ cs ucsd edu
History: 2004-05-24: revised; 2004-01-11: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2004/008
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/008,
      author = {Mihir Bellare and Adriana Palacio},
      title = {The Knowledge-of-Exponent Assumptions and 3-Round Zero-Knowledge Protocols},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2004/008},
      year = {2004},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/008}
}