Public Key Steganography

Luis von Ahn; Nicholas J.  Hopper

Paper 2003/233

Public Key Steganography

Luis von Ahn and Nicholas J. Hopper

Abstract

Informally, a public-key steganography protocol allows two parties, who have never met or exchanged a secret, to send hidden messages over a public channel so that an adversary cannot even detect that these hidden messages are being sent. Unlike previous settings in which provable security has been applied to steganography, public-key steganography is information-theoretically impossible. In this work we introduce computational security conditions for public-key steganography similar to those introduced by Hopper, Langford and von Ahn for the private-key setting. We also give the first protocols for public-key steganography and steganographic key exchange that are provably secure under standard cryptographic assumptions. Additionally, in the random oracle model, we present a protocol that is secure against adversaries that have access to a decoding oracle (the steganographic equivalent of CCA-2 adversaries).

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF PS
Category: Foundations
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Contact author(s): hopper @ cs cmu edu
History: 2003-11-08: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2003/233
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/233,
      author = {Luis von Ahn and Nicholas J.  Hopper},
      title = {Public Key Steganography},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2003/233},
      year = {2003},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/233}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/233}
}