### Public Key Steganography

Luis von Ahn and Nicholas J. Hopper

##### Abstract

Informally, a public-key steganography protocol allows two parties, who have never met or exchanged a secret, to send hidden messages over a public channel so that an adversary cannot even detect that these hidden messages are being sent. Unlike previous settings in which provable security has been applied to steganography, public-key steganography is information-theoretically impossible. In this work we introduce computational security conditions for public-key steganography similar to those introduced by Hopper, Langford and von Ahn for the private-key setting. We also give the first protocols for public-key steganography and steganographic key exchange that are provably secure under standard cryptographic assumptions. Additionally, in the random oracle model, we present a protocol that is secure against adversaries that have access to a decoding oracle (the steganographic equivalent of CCA-2 adversaries).

Available format(s)
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Contact author(s)
hopper @ cs cmu edu
History
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2003/233

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/233,
author = {Luis von Ahn and Nicholas J.  Hopper},
title = {Public Key Steganography},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2003/233},
year = {2003},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/233}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/233}
}

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