Paper 2003/183
Certificate-Based Encryption and the Certificate Revocation Problem
Craig Gentry
Abstract
We introduce the notion of certificate-based encryption. In this model, a certificate -- or, more generally, a signature -- acts not only as a certificate but also as a decryption key. To decrypt a message, a keyholder needs both its secret key and an up-to-date certificate from its CA (or a signature from an authorizer). Certificate-based encryption combines the best aspects of identity-based encryption (implicit certification) and public key encryption (no escrow). We demonstrate how certificate-based encryption can be used to construct an efficient PKI requiring less infrastructure than previous proposals, including Micali's Novomodo, Naor-Nissim and Aiello-Lodha-Ostrovsky.
Note: This is a version of the Eurocrypt 2003 paper, identical except for this comment and a correction in Section 3.2. I'm posting it online to make it more widely available, particularly since a couple of recent works propose essentially the same idea.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Eurocrypt 2003
- Contact author(s)
- cgentry @ docomolabs-usa com
- History
- 2003-09-06: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2003/183
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/183,
author = {Craig Gentry},
title = {Certificate-Based Encryption and the Certificate Revocation Problem},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2003/183},
year = {2003},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/183}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/183}
}
