### Chosen-Ciphertext Security from Identity-Based Encryption

Ran Canetti, Shai Halevi, and Jonathan Katz

##### Abstract

We show how to construct a CCA-secure public-key encryption scheme from any CPA-secure identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme. Our conversion from IBE to a CCA-secure scheme is simple, efficient, and provably secure in the standard model (i.e., security of the resulting scheme does not rely on the random oracle model). In addition, the resulting scheme achieves CCA security even if the underlying IBE scheme satisfies only a weak'' notion of security which is known to be achievable in the standard model based on the bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. Thus, our results yield a new construction of CCA-secure public-key encryption in the standard model. Interestingly, the resulting scheme avoids any non-interactive proofs of well-formedness'' which were shown to underlie all previously-known constructions. We also extend our technique to obtain a simple and reasonably efficient method for securing any BTE scheme against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks. This, in turn, yields more efficient constructions of CCA-secure (hierarchical) identity-based and forward-secure encryption schemes in the standard model. Our results --- building on previous black-box separations --- rule out black-box constructions of IBE from CPA-secure public-key encryption.

Available format(s)
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
identity-basedchosen-ciphertext attacks
Contact author(s)
jkatz @ cs umd edu
History
2003-12-23: last of 2 revisions
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2003/182

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/182,
author = {Ran Canetti and Shai Halevi and Jonathan Katz},
title = {Chosen-Ciphertext Security from Identity-Based Encryption},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2003/182},
year = {2003},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/182}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/182}
}

Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.