Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2003/129
Attack on Han et al.'s ID-based Confirmer (Undeniable) Signature at ACM-EC'03
Fangguo Zhang and Reihaneh Safavi-Naini and Willy Susilo
Abstract: At the fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
(EC'03), S. Han, K.Y. Yeung and J. Wang proposed an ID-based
confirmer signature scheme using pairings (actually, this is an
ID-based undeniable signature scheme). However, in this paper, we
will show that this signature scheme is not secure. The signer can
deny any signature, even this signature is his valid signature and
any one can forge a valid confirmer signature of a signer with
identity ID on an arbitrary message and confirm this signature to
the verifier.
Category / Keywords: Confirmer signature, Undeniable signature, Attack, Bilinear pairings, ID-based cryptography.
Date: received 29 Jun 2003, last revised 11 Aug 2003
Contact author: fangguo at uow edu au
Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation
Version: 20030812:022254 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2003/129
[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]