Paper 2003/129
Attack on Han et al.'s ID-based Confirmer (Undeniable) Signature at ACM-EC'03
Fangguo Zhang, Reihaneh Safavi-Naini, and Willy Susilo
Abstract
At the fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce (EC'03), S. Han, K.Y. Yeung and J. Wang proposed an ID-based confirmer signature scheme using pairings (actually, this is an ID-based undeniable signature scheme). However, in this paper, we will show that this signature scheme is not secure. The signer can deny any signature, even this signature is his valid signature and any one can forge a valid confirmer signature of a signer with identity ID on an arbitrary message and confirm this signature to the verifier.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- Confirmer signatureUndeniable signatureAttackBilinear pairingsID-based cryptography.
- Contact author(s)
- fangguo @ uow edu au
- History
- 2003-08-12: last of 2 revisions
- 2003-07-03: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2003/129
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/129,
author = {Fangguo Zhang and Reihaneh Safavi-Naini and Willy Susilo},
title = {Attack on Han et al.'s {ID}-based Confirmer (Undeniable) Signature at {ACM}-{EC}'03},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2003/129},
year = {2003},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/129}
}
