Paper 2003/121
A Cryptographically Sound Security Proof of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe Public-Key Protocol
Michael Backes and Birgit Pfitzmann
Abstract
We present the first cryptographically sound security proof of the well-known Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol. More precisely, we show that the protocol is secure against arbitrary active attacks if it is implemented using provably secure cryptographic primitives. Although we achieve security under cryptographic definitions, our proof does not have to deal with probabilistic aspects of cryptography and is hence in the scope of current proof tools. The reason is that we exploit a recently proposed ideal cryptographic library, which has a provably secure cryptographic implementation. Besides establishing the cryptographic security of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol, our result also exemplifies the potential of this cryptographic library and paves the way for cryptographically sound verification of security protocols by means of formal proof tools.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- PS
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- cryptographic protocolsformal methodsuniversal compositionNeedham-Schroeder
- Contact author(s)
- mbc @ zurich ibm com
- History
- 2003-06-10: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2003/121
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/121,
author = {Michael Backes and Birgit Pfitzmann},
title = {A Cryptographically Sound Security Proof of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe Public-Key Protocol},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2003/121},
year = {2003},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/121}
}
