Stronger Security Bounds for OMAC, TMAC and XCBC

Tetsu Iwata; Kaoru Kurosawa

Paper 2003/082

Stronger Security Bounds for OMAC, TMAC and XCBC

Tetsu Iwata and Kaoru Kurosawa

Abstract

OMAC, TMAC and XCBC are CBC-type MAC schemes which are provably secure for arbitrary message length. In this paper, we present a more tight upper bound on ${\tt Adv}^{\sf mac}$ for each scheme, where ${\tt Adv}^{\sf mac}$ denotes the maximum success (forgery) probability of adversaries. Our bounds are expressed in terms of the \textit{total length} of all queries of an adversary to the MAC generation oracle while the previous bounds are expressed in terms of the \textit{maximum length} of each query. In particular, a significant improvement occurs if the lengths of queries are heavily unbalanced.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF PS
Category: Secret-key cryptography
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: modes of operation message authentication codes block cipher provable security.
Contact author(s): iwata @ cis ibaraki ac jp
History: 2003-04-30: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2003/082
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/082,
      author = {Tetsu Iwata and Kaoru Kurosawa},
      title = {Stronger Security Bounds for OMAC, TMAC and XCBC},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2003/082},
      year = {2003},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/082}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/082}
}