Paper 2003/056

Computing of Trust in Distributed Networks

Huafei Zhu, Bao Feng, and Robert H. Deng

Abstract

In distributed networks, a target party $T$ could be a person never meet with a source party $S$, therefore $S$ may not hold any prior evaluation of trustworthiness of $T$. To get permit to access $S$, $T$ should be somewhat trusted by $S$. Consequently, we should study the approach to evaluate trustworthiness of $T$. To attack the problem, we view individual participant in distributed networks as a node of a delegation graph $G$ and map a delegation path from target party $T$ to source party $S$ in networks into an edge in the correspondent transitive closure of graph $G$. Based on the transitive closure property of the graph $G$, we decompose the problem to three related questions below: -how to evaluate trustworthiness of participants in an edge? -how to compute trustworthiness of participants in a path? -how to evaluate the trustworthiness of a target participant in a transitive closure graph? We attack the above three questions by first computing trustworthiness of participants in distributed and authenticated channel. Then we present a practical approach to evaluate trustworthiness by removing the assumption of the authenticated channel in distributed networks.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Applications
Publication info
Published elsewhere. new report
Contact author(s)
huafei @ i2r a-star edu sg
History
2003-03-31: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2003/056
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/056,
      author = {Huafei Zhu and Bao Feng and Robert H.  Deng},
      title = {Computing of Trust in Distributed Networks},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2003/056},
      year = {2003},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/056}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/056}
}
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