Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2003/037

Strengthening Zero-Knowledge Protocols using Signatures

Juan A. Garay and Philip MacKenzie and Ke Yang

Abstract: Recently there has been an interest in zero-knowledge protocols with stronger properties, such as concurrency, unbounded simulation soundness, non-malleability, and universal composability. In this paper, we show a novel technique to convert a large class of existing honest-verifier zero-knowledge protocols into ones with these stronger properties in the common reference string model. More precisely, our technique utilizes a signature scheme existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks, and transforms any $\Sigma$-protocol (which is honest-verifier zero-knowledge) into an unbounded simulation sound concurrent zero-knowledge protocol. We also introduce $\Omega$-protocols, a variant of $\Sigma$-protocols for which our technique further achieves the properties of non-malleability and/or universal composability.

In addition to its conceptual simplicity, a main advantage of this new technique over previous ones is that it avoids the Cook-Levin theorem, which tends to be rather inefficient. Indeed, our technique allows for very efficient instantiation based on the security of some efficient signature schemes and standard number-theoretic assumptions. For instance, one instantiation of our technique yields a universally composable zero-knowledge protocol under the Strong RSA assumption, incurring an overhead of a small constant number of exponentiations, plus the generation of two signatures.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / zero knowledge, digital signatures

Publication Info: Extended abstract in Eurocrypt 2003

Date: received 27 Feb 2003, last revised 15 Aug 2003

Contact author: philmac at lucent com

Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: This version contains minor revisions and corrections.

Version: 20030815:163543 (All versions of this report)

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