Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2003/033

Integral Cryptanalysis on reduced-round Safer++

Gilles Piret and Jean-Jacques Quisquater

Abstract: In this paper we describe an integral distinguisher over 2 rounds of Safer++. It allows a practical attack against 3 rounds of Safer++128, as well as attacks on 4 rounds of Safer++128 and Safer++256, under the chosen-plaintext hypothesis. These results achieve much lower complexity than the currently known best attacks on Safer++, namely weak-key linear cryptanalysis by Nakahara. As a side result, we prove that the byte-branch number of the linear transform of Safer++ is 5. We also discuss a way for further research in order to extend integral cryptanalysis.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / block ciphers, integral cryptanalysis

Date: received 16 Feb 2003, last revised 17 Feb 2003

Contact author: piret at dice ucl ac be

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Version: 20030218:144644 (All versions of this report)

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