Paper 2002/170

An Analysis of RMAC

Jack Lloyd

Abstract

A recent trend in message authentication is the use of a randomizing parameter, such that the authentication tag is based not only on the message and the key, but a public nonce which is changed for every authenticated message. This generally affords a better security proof. However, several new classes of attacks are made available by these techniques. We examine these attacks, and apply some of them to RMAC, a recently published MAC mechanism.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PS
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
message authentication codescryptanalysis
Contact author(s)
lloyd @ acm jhu edu
History
2002-11-18: revised
2002-11-12: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2002/170
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2002/170,
      author = {Jack Lloyd},
      title = {An Analysis of {RMAC}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2002/170},
      year = {2002},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2002/170}
}
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