Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2002/169
Theoretical Use of Cache Memory as a Cryptanalytic Side-Channel
D. Page
Abstract: We expand on the idea, proposed by Kelsey et al, of cache memory being
used as a side-channel which leaks information during the run of a
cryptographic algorithm. By using this side-channel, an attacker may
be able to reveal or narrow the possible values of secret information
held on the target device. We describe an attack which encrypts
$2^{10}$ chosen plaintexts on the target processor in order to collect
cache profiles and then performs around $2^{32}$ computational steps
to recover the key. As well as describing and simulating the
theoretical attack, we discuss how hardware and algorithmic
alterations can be used to defend against such techniques.
Category / Keywords: DES, cache memory, side channel analysis, smart cards, cryptanalysis
Publication Info: University of Bristol Technical Report CSTR-02-003, Sumbitted to TISSEC
Date: received 11 Nov 2002
Contact author: page at cs bris ac uk
Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation
Version: 20021112:075744 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2002/169
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