Paper 2002/134
Asynchronous Verifiable Secret Sharing and Proactive Cryptosystems
Christian Cachin, Klaus Kursawe, Anna Lysyanskaya, and Reto Strobl
Abstract
Verifiable secret sharing is an important primitive in distributed cryptography. With the growing interest in the deployment of threshold cryptosystems in practice, the traditional assumption of a synchronous network has to be reconsidered and generalized to an asynchronous model. This paper proposes the first \emph{practical} verifiable secret sharing protocol for asynchronous networks. The protocol creates a discrete logarithm-based sharing and uses only a quadratic number of messages in the number of participating servers. It yields the first asynchronous Byzantine agreement protocol in the standard model whose efficiency makes it suitable for use in practice. Proactive cryptosystems are another important application of verifiable secret sharing. The second part of this paper introduces proactive cryptosystems in asynchronous networks and presents an efficient protocol for refreshing the shares of a secret key for discrete logarithm-based sharings.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Extended abstract appears in ACM CCS-9.
- Keywords
- threshold cryptographybyzantine agreement
- Contact author(s)
- cachin @ acm org
- History
- 2002-08-29: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2002/134
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2002/134,
author = {Christian Cachin and Klaus Kursawe and Anna Lysyanskaya and Reto Strobl},
title = {Asynchronous Verifiable Secret Sharing and Proactive Cryptosystems},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2002/134},
year = {2002},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2002/134}
}
