Paper 2002/060

A Forward-Secure Public-Key Encryption Scheme

Jonathan Katz


Cryptographic computations are often carried out on insecure devices for which the threat of key exposure represents a serious and realistic concern. In an effort to mitigate the damage caused by exposure of secret data stored on such devices, the paradigm of \emph{forward security} was introduced. In this model, secret keys are updated at regular intervals throughout the lifetime of the system; furthermore, exposure of a secret key corresponding to a given interval does not enable an adversary to ``break'' the system (in the appropriate sense) for any \emph{prior} time period. A number of constructions of forward-secure digital signature schemes and symmetric-key schemes are known. We present the first construction of a forward-secure public-key encryption scheme whose security is based on the bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model. Our scheme can be extended to achieve chosen-ciphertext security at minimal additional cost. The construction we give is quite efficient: all parameters of the scheme grow (at most) poly-logarithmically with the total number of time periods.

Note: Superseded by the version appearing in Eurocrypt 2003 (a full version of which is available at

Available format(s)
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Contact author(s)
jkatz @ cs umd edu
2003-05-02: last of 2 revisions
2002-05-24: received
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      author = {Jonathan Katz},
      title = {A Forward-Secure Public-Key Encryption Scheme},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2002/060},
      year = {2002},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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