Tripartite Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols from Pairings

Sattam S.  Al-Riyami; Kenneth G.  Paterson

Paper 2002/035

Tripartite Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols from Pairings

Sattam S. Al-Riyami and Kenneth G. Paterson

Abstract

Joux's protocol is a one round, tripartite key agreement protocol that is more bandwidth-efficient than any previous three-party key agreement protocol. But it is insecure, suffering from a simple man-in-the-middle attack. This paper shows how to make Joux's protocol secure, presenting several tripartite, authenticated key agreement protocols that still require only one round of communication. A pass-optimal authenticated and key confirmed tripartite protocol that generalises the station-to-station protocol is also presented. The security properties of the new protocols are studied using provable security methods and heuristic approaches. Applications for the protocols are also discussed.

Note: Revision to earlier version of paper to include more detailed security analysis and analysis of confirmed protocols.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF PS
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: Secure protocols key agreement authentication pairings
Contact author(s): kenny paterson @ rhul ac uk
History: 2003-04-16: revised; 2002-03-20: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2002/035
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2002/035,
      author = {Sattam S.  Al-Riyami and Kenneth G.  Paterson},
      title = {Tripartite Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols from Pairings},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2002/035},
      year = {2002},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2002/035}
}