Paper 2001/108

Design and Analysis of Practical Public-Key Encryption Schemes Secure against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack

Ronald Cramer and Victor Shoup

Abstract

A new public key encryption scheme, along with several variants, is proposed and analyzed. The scheme and its variants are quite practical, and are proved secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack under standard intractability assumptions. These appear to be the first public-key encryption schemes in the literature that are simultaneously practical and provably secure.

Note: This paper is a significantly revised and extended version of the extended abstract "A practical public key cryptosystem provably secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack" [R. Cramer and V. Shoup, Crypto '98], and also includes results originally presented in the extended abstract "Using hash functions as a hedge against chosen ciphertext attack" [V. Shoup, Eurocrypt 2000].

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Contact author(s)
cramer @ brics dk
sho @ zurich ibm com
History
2001-12-17: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2001/108
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2001/108,
      author = {Ronald Cramer and Victor Shoup},
      title = {Design and Analysis of Practical Public-Key Encryption Schemes Secure against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2001/108},
      year = {2001},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2001/108}
}
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