Paper 2001/107
Parallel Coin-Tossing and Constant-Round Secure Two-Party Computation
Yehuda Lindell
Abstract
In this paper we show that any {\em two-party} functionality can be securely computed in a {\em constant number of rounds}, where security is obtained against malicious adversaries that may arbitrarily deviate from the protocol specification. This is in contrast to Yao's constant-round protocol that ensures security only in the face of semi-honest adversaries, and to its malicious adversary version that requires a polynomial number of rounds. In order to obtain our result, we present a constant-round protocol for secure coin-tossing of polynomially many coins (in parallel). We then show how this protocol can be used in conjunction with other existing constructions in order to obtain a constant-round protocol for securely computing any two-party functionality. On the subject of coin-tossing, we also present a constant-round {\em perfect} coin-tossing protocol, where by ``perfect'' we mean that the resulting coins are guaranteed to be statistically close to uniform (and not just pseudorandom).
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. An extended abstract appeared at CRYPTO 2001.
- Keywords
- Secure two-party computationconstant-round protocolscoin-tossing
- Contact author(s)
- lindell @ wisdom weizmann ac il
- History
- 2003-10-09: last of 2 revisions
- 2001-12-13: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2001/107
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2001/107,
author = {Yehuda Lindell},
title = {Parallel Coin-Tossing and Constant-Round Secure Two-Party Computation},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2001/107},
year = {2001},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2001/107}
}
