Paper 2001/095

Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust

Helger Lipmaa, N. Asokan, and Valtteri Niemi


We argue that threshold trust is not an option in most of the real-life electronic auctions. We then propose two new cryptographic Vickrey auction schemes that involve, apart from the bidders and the seller $S$, an auction authority $A$ so that unless $S$ and $A$ collude the outcome of auctions will be correct, and moreover, $S$ will not get any information about the bids, while $A$ will learn bid statistics. Further extensions make it possible to decrease damage that colluding $S$ and $A$ can do, and to construct $(m+1)$st price auction schemes. The communication complexity between the $S$ and $A$ in medium-size auctions is at least one order of magnitude less than in the Naor-Pinkas-Sumner scheme.

Note: Final version, the changes are minor and mainly cosmetical. More information on this paper is available at

Available format(s)
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Published in Financial Cryptography 2002.
cryptographic auction schemeshomomorphic encryptionrange proofsVickrey auctions
Contact author(s)
helger @ tcs hut fi
2002-05-03: last of 6 revisions
2001-11-13: received
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      author = {Helger Lipmaa and N.  Asokan and Valtteri Niemi},
      title = {Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2001/095},
      year = {2001},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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