Paper 2001/095
Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust
Helger Lipmaa, N. Asokan, and Valtteri Niemi
Abstract
We argue that threshold trust is not an option in most of the real-life electronic auctions. We then propose two new cryptographic Vickrey auction schemes that involve, apart from the bidders and the seller $S$, an auction authority $A$ so that unless $S$ and $A$ collude the outcome of auctions will be correct, and moreover, $S$ will not get any information about the bids, while $A$ will learn bid statistics. Further extensions make it possible to decrease damage that colluding $S$ and $A$ can do, and to construct $(m+1)$st price auction schemes. The communication complexity between the $S$ and $A$ in medium-size auctions is at least one order of magnitude less than in the Naor-Pinkas-Sumner scheme.
Note: Final version, the changes are minor and mainly cosmetical. More information on this paper is available at http://www.tcs.hut.fi/~helger/papers/lan02
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Published in Financial Cryptography 2002.
- Keywords
- cryptographic auction schemeshomomorphic encryptionrange proofsVickrey auctions
- Contact author(s)
- helger @ tcs hut fi
- History
- 2002-05-03: last of 6 revisions
- 2001-11-13: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2001/095
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2001/095,
author = {Helger Lipmaa and N. Asokan and Valtteri Niemi},
title = {Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2001/095},
year = {2001},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2001/095}
}
