COS Ciphers are not "extremely weak"! - The Design Rationale of COS Ciphers

Eric Filiol; Caroline Fontaine

Paper 2001/080

COS Ciphers are not "extremely weak"! - The Design Rationale of COS Ciphers

Eric Filiol and Caroline Fontaine

Abstract

This note summarizes the results of Babbage's cryptanalysis of COS ciphers and shows that in fact COS ciphers are not weak as claimed. These ciphers have been designed according a novel concept of encryption directly determined by the context of use. This concept is here more precisely defined.

Metadata

Available format(s): PS
Category: Secret-key cryptography
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: stream cipher cryptanalysis COS Non Linear Feedback Shift Registers copyright protection
Contact author(s): Eric Filiol @ inria fr
History: 2001-09-17: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2001/080
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2001/080,
      author = {Eric Filiol and Caroline Fontaine},
      title = {{COS} Ciphers are not "extremely weak"! - The Design Rationale of {COS} Ciphers},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2001/080},
      year = {2001},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2001/080}
}