Paper 2001/069

On the (Im)possibility of Obfuscating Programs

Boaz Barak, Oded Goldreich, Russell Impagliazzo, Steven Rudich, Amit Sahai, Salil Vadhan, and Ke Yang

Abstract

Informally, an {\em obfuscator} $O$ is an (efficient, probabilistic) ``compiler'' that takes as input a program (or circuit) $P$ and produces a new program $O(P)$ that has the same functionality as $P$ yet is ``unintelligible'' in some sense. Obfuscators, if they exist, would have a wide variety of cryptographic and complexity-theoretic applications, ranging from software protection to homomorphic encryption to complexity-theoretic analogues of Rice's theorem. Most of these applications are based on an interpretation of the ``unintelligibility'' condition in obfuscation as meaning that $$ is a ``virtual black box,'' in the sense that anything one can efficiently compute given $$, one could also efficiently compute given oracle access to $$. In this work, we initiate a theoretical investigation of obfuscation. Our main result is that, even under very weak formalizations of the above intuition, obfuscation is impossible. We prove this by constructing a family of functions $$ that are {\em \inherently unobfuscatable} in the following sense: there is a property $$ such that (a) given {\em any program} that computes a function $$, the value $$ can be efficiently computed, yet (b) given {\em oracle access} to a (randomly selected) function $$, no efficient algorithm can compute $$ much better than random guessing. We extend our impossibility result in a number of ways, including even obfuscators that (a) are not necessarily computable in polynomial time, (b) only {\em approximately} preserve the functionality, and (c) only need to work for very restricted models of computation ($$). We also rule out several potential applications of obfuscators, by constructing ``unobfuscatable'' signature schemes, encryption schemes, and pseudorandom function families.