An Attack on A Traitor Tracing Scheme

Jeff Jianxin Yan; Yongdong Wu

Paper 2001/067

An Attack on A Traitor Tracing Scheme

Jeff Jianxin Yan and Yongdong Wu

Abstract

In Crypto'99, Boneh and Franklin proposed a public key traitor tracing scheme~\cite{Boneh}, which was believed to be able to catch all traitors while not accusing any innocent users (i.e., full-tracing and error-free). Assuming that Decision Diffie-Hellman problem is unsolvable in , Boneh and Franklin proved that a decoder cannot distinguish valid ciphertexts from invalid ones that are used for tracing. However, our novel pirate decoder manages to make some invalid ciphertexts distinguishable without violating their assumption, and it can also frame innocent users to fool the tracer. Neither the single-key nor arbitrary pirate tracing algorithm presented in~\cite{Boneh} can identify all keys used by as claimed. Instead, it is possible for both algorithms to catch none of the traitors. We believe that the construction of our novel pirate also demonstrates a simple way to defeat some other black-box traitor tracing schemes in general.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Technical Report No. 518, Computer Laboratory, University of Cambridge, 2001
Keywords: black-box traitor tracing copyright protection
Contact author(s): Jeff Yan @ cl cam ac uk
History: 2001-08-22: revised; 2001-08-13: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2001/067
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2001/067,
      author = {Jeff Jianxin Yan and Yongdong Wu},
      title = {An Attack on A Traitor Tracing Scheme},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2001/067},
      year = {2001},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2001/067}
}