Paper 2001/031
Efficient Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Using Human-Memorable Passwords
Jonathan Katz, Rafail Ostrovsky, and Moti Yung
Abstract
We present an efficient password-authenticated key exchange protocol which is secure against off-line dictionary attacks even when users choose passwords from a very small space (say, a dictionary of English words). We prove security in the standard model under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, assuming public parameters generated by a trusted party. Compared to the recent work of Goldreich and Lindell (which was the first to give a secure construction, under general assumptions, in the standard model), our protocol requires only 3 rounds and is efficient enough to be used in practice.
Note: Revised to indicate that this is an expanded version of the paper that will appear at Eurocrypt 2001.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Eurocrypt, 2001.
- Keywords
- key exchangediffie-hellmanpassword
- Contact author(s)
- jkatz @ cs columbia edu
- History
- 2001-04-27: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2001/031
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2001/031,
author = {Jonathan Katz and Rafail Ostrovsky and Moti Yung},
title = {Efficient Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Using Human-Memorable Passwords},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2001/031},
year = {2001},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2001/031}
}
