Paper 2001/010

How to achieve a McEliece-based Digital Signature Scheme

Nicolas Courtois, Matthieu Finiasz, and Nicolas Sendrier


McEliece is one of the oldest known public key cryptosystems. Though it was less widely studied that RSA, it is remarkable that all known attacks are still exponential. It is widely believed that code-based cryptosystems like McEliece does not allow practical digital signatures. In the present paper we disprove this belief and show a way to build a practical signature scheme based on coding theory. It's security can be reduced in the random oracle model to the well-known {\em syndrome decoding problem} and the distinguishability of permuted binary Goppa codes from a random code. For example we propose a scheme with signatures of $81$-bits and a binary security workfactor of $2^{83}$.

Note: Updated version, to appear in ASIACRYPT'2001

Available format(s)
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. ASIACRYPT'2001
digital signatureMcEliece cryptosystemNiederreiter cryptosystemGoppa codessyndrome decodingshort signatures
Contact author(s)
Nicolas Sendrier @ inria fr
2001-10-19: revised
2001-02-17: received
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Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Nicolas Courtois and Matthieu Finiasz and Nicolas Sendrier},
      title = {How to achieve a McEliece-based Digital Signature Scheme},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2001/010},
      year = {2001},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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