Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2001/008

Fully Distributed Threshold RSA under Standard Assumptions

Pierre-Alain Fouque and Jacques Stern

Abstract: The aim of the present article is to propose a fully distributed environment for the RSA scheme. What we have in mind is highly sensitive applications and even if we are ready to pay a price in terms of efficiency, we do not want any compromise of the security assumptions that we make. Recently Shoup proposed a practical RSA threshold signature scheme that allows to share the ability to sign between a set of players. This scheme can be used for decryption as well. However, Shoup's protocol assumes a trusted dealer to generate and distribute the keys. This comes from the fact that the scheme needs a special assumption on the RSA modulus and this kind of RSA moduli cannot be easily generated in an efficient way with many players. Of course, it is still possible to call theoretical results on multiparty computation, but we cannot hope to design efficient protocols. The only practical result to generate RSA moduli in a distributive manner is Boneh and Franklin protocol but this protocol cannot be easily modified to generate the kind of RSA moduli that Shoup's protocol requires.

The present work takes a different path by proposing a method to enhance the key generation with some additional properties and revisits the proof of Shoup to work with the resulting RSA moduli. Both of these enhancements decrease the performance of the basic protocols. However, we think that in the applications that we target, these enhancements provide practical solutions. Indeed, the key generation protocol is usually run only once and the number of players have time to perform their task so that the communication or time complexity are not overly important.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Threshold cryptography

Date: received 8 Feb 2001

Contact author: Pierre-Alain Fouque at ens fr

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Version: 20010208:185149 (All versions of this report)

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