Paper 2000/015

Identification Protocols Secure Against Reset Attacks

Mihir Bellare, Marc Fischlin, Shafi Goldwasser, and Silvio Micali

Abstract

We provide identification protocols that are secure even when the adversary can reset the internal state and/or randomization source of the user identifying itself, and when executed in an asynchronous environment like the Internet that gives the adversary concurrent access to instances of the user. These protocols are suitable for use by devices (like smartcards) which when under adversary control may not be able to reliably maintain their internal state between invocations.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Extended abstract appeared in proceedings of Eurocrypt 2001. This is the full version.
Keywords
identificationentity authenticationresetconcurrencyzero-knowledgesignaturesencryption
Contact author(s)
mihir @ cs ucsd edu
History
2000-04-28: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2000/015
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2000/015,
      author = {Mihir Bellare and Marc Fischlin and Shafi Goldwasser and Silvio Micali},
      title = {Identification Protocols Secure Against Reset Attacks},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2000/015},
      year = {2000},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2000/015}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2000/015}
}
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