Paper 1999/015

Interleaved Zero-Knowledge in the Public-Key Model

Oded Goldreich, Shafi Goldwasser, and Silvio Micali


We introduce the notion of Interleaved Zero-Knowledge (iZK), a new security measure for cryptographic protocols which strengthens the classical notion of zero-knowledge, in a way suitable for multiple concurrent executions in an asynchronous environment like the internet. We prove that iZK protocols are robust: they are ``parallelizable'', and preserve security when run concurrently in a fully asynchronous network. Furthermore, this holds even if the prover's random-pads in all these concurrent invocations are identical. Thus, iZK protocols are ideal for smart-cards and other devices which cannot reliably

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Publication info
Published elsewhere. Appeared in the THEORY OF CRYPTOGRAPHY LIBRARY and has been included in the ePrint Archive.
Zero-KnowledgeConcurrent Zero-KnowledgeWitness-Indistinguishable ProofsParralel CompositionSmart CardsIdentification SchemesCommitment SchemesThe Discrete Logarithm Problem.
Contact author(s)
oded @ wisdom weizmann ac il
1999-07-09: revised
1999-06-26: received
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Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Oded Goldreich and Shafi Goldwasser and Silvio Micali},
      title = {Interleaved Zero-Knowledge in the Public-Key Model},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 1999/015},
      year = {1999},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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