Paper 1998/021

Relations among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes

Mihir Bellare, Anand Desai, David Pointcheval, and Phillip Rogaway


We compare the relative strengths of popular notions of security for public key encryption schemes. We consider the goals of indistinguishability and non-malleability, each under chosen plaintext attack and two kinds of chosen ciphertext attack. For each of the resulting pairs of definitions we prove either an implication (every scheme meeting one notion must meet the other) or a separation (there is a scheme meeting one notion but not the other, assuming the first notion can be met at all). We similarly treat plaintext awareness, a notion of security in the random oracle model. An additional contribution of this paper is a new definition of non-malleability which we believe is simpler than the previous one.

Available format(s)
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Appeared in the THEORY OF CRYPTOGRAPHY LIBRARY and has been included in the ePrint Archive.
Encryptionsemantic securitynon-malleabilitychosen ciphertext attackplaintext awareness.
Contact author(s)
mihir @ cs edu
1998-06-17: received
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Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Mihir Bellare and Anand Desai and David Pointcheval and Phillip Rogaway},
      title = {Relations among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 1998/021},
      year = {1998},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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