Relations among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes

Mihir Bellare; Anand Desai; David Pointcheval; Phillip Rogaway

Paper 1998/021

Relations among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes

Mihir Bellare, Anand Desai, David Pointcheval, and Phillip Rogaway

Abstract

We compare the relative strengths of popular notions of security for public key encryption schemes. We consider the goals of indistinguishability and non-malleability, each under chosen plaintext attack and two kinds of chosen ciphertext attack. For each of the resulting pairs of definitions we prove either an implication (every scheme meeting one notion must meet the other) or a separation (there is a scheme meeting one notion but not the other, assuming the first notion can be met at all). We similarly treat plaintext awareness, a notion of security in the random oracle model. An additional contribution of this paper is a new definition of non-malleability which we believe is simpler than the previous one.

Metadata

Available format(s): PS
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Appeared in the THEORY OF CRYPTOGRAPHY LIBRARY and has been included in the ePrint Archive.
Keywords: Encryption semantic security non-malleability chosen ciphertext attack plaintext awareness.
Contact author(s): mihir @ cs edu
History: 1998-06-17: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/1998/021
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:1998/021,
      author = {Mihir Bellare and Anand Desai and David Pointcheval and Phillip Rogaway},
      title = {Relations among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 1998/021},
      year = {1998},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/1998/021}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/1998/021}
}