Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/099
Can NSEC5 be practical for DNSSEC deployments?
Dimitrios Papadopoulos and Duane Wessels and Shumon Huque and Moni Naor and Jan Včelák and Leonid Reyzin and Sharon Goldberg
Abstract: NSEC5 is a new proposal for providing authenticated denial of existence for DNSSEC, i.e., for securely responding to DNS queries for names that do not exist in a zone. NSEC5 simultaneously guarantees two security properties: (1) privacy against zone enumeration, and (2) integrity of zone contents, even if an adversary compromises the authoritative nameserver responsible for responding to DNS queries for the zone. By contrast, today's DNSSEC protocol can guarantee one of these properties, but not both. This paper argues that NSEC5 not only improves DNS security, but is also practical and performant.
To that end, we present a new version of NSEC5 that uses elliptic curve cryptography to achieve small DNSSEC responses and fast query-processing times. We also extend widely-used DNS software to present the first implementations of NSEC5 for an authoritative nameserver and a recursive resolver. We believe that our performance results indicate that NSEC5 can be a practical solution for DNSSEC deployments.
Category / Keywords: applications / Internet protocols, verifiable random functions, zone enumeration
Date: received 8 Feb 2017, last revised 29 Mar 2017
Contact author: goldbe at cs bu edu
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Note: Added proof of security for RSA VRF.
Version: 20170329:164745 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2017/099
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