Paper 2016/901
Distance Bounding based on PUF
Mathilde Igier and Serge Vaudenay
Abstract
Distance Bounding (DB) is designed to mitigate relay attacks. This paper provides a complete study of the DB protocol of Kleber et al. based on Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs). We contradict the claim that it resists to Terrorist Fraud (TF). We propose some slight modifications to increase the security of the protocol and formally prove TF-resistance, as well as resistance to Distance Fraud (DF), and Man-In-the-Middle attacks (MiM) which include relay attacks.
Note: This version is the full version. It includes proofs, figures, tables, best found attacks, and treatments on impersonation attacks and distance hijacking.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Major revision. CANS 2016 (LNCS vol. 10052)
- Keywords
- distance bounding
- Contact author(s)
-
serge vaudenay @ epfl ch
matyldeigier @ gmail com - History
- 2016-10-18: last of 2 revisions
- 2016-09-15: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/901
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/901,
author = {Mathilde Igier and Serge Vaudenay},
title = {Distance Bounding based on {PUF}},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/901},
year = {2016},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/901}
}
