Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/901
Distance Bounding based on PUF
Mathilde Igier and Serge Vaudenay
Abstract: Distance Bounding (DB) is designed to mitigate relay attacks. This paper provides a complete study of the DB protocol of Kleber et al. based on Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs). We contradict the claim that it resists to Terrorist Fraud (TF). We propose some slight modifications to increase the security of the protocol and formally prove TF-resistance, as well as resistance to Distance Fraud (DF), and Man-In-the-Middle attacks (MiM) which include relay attacks.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / distance bounding
Original Publication (with major differences): CANS 2016 (LNCS vol. 10052)
Date: received 15 Sep 2016, last revised 18 Oct 2016
Contact author: serge vaudenay at epfl ch, matyldeigier@gmail com
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Note: This version is the full version. It includes proofs, figures, tables, best found attacks, and treatments on impersonation attacks and distance hijacking.
Version: 20161018:145623 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2016/901
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