Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/901

Distance Bounding based on PUF

Mathilde Igier and Serge Vaudenay

Abstract: Distance Bounding (DB) is designed to mitigate relay attacks. This paper provides a complete study of the DB protocol of Kleber et al. based on Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs). We contradict the claim that it resists to Terrorist Fraud (TF). We propose some slight modifications to increase the security of the protocol and formally prove TF-resistance, as well as resistance to Distance Fraud (DF), and Man-In-the-Middle attacks (MiM) which include relay attacks.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / distance bounding

Original Publication (with major differences): CANS 2016 (LNCS vol. 10052)

Date: received 15 Sep 2016, last revised 18 Oct 2016

Contact author: serge vaudenay at epfl ch, matyldeigier@gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: This version is the full version. It includes proofs, figures, tables, best found attacks, and treatments on impersonation attacks and distance hijacking.

Version: 20161018:145623 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2016/901

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