Paper 2015/174

A Practical Chosen Message Power Analysis Approach Against Ciphers with the Key Whitening Layers

Chenyang Tu, Lingchen Zhang, Zeyi Liu, Neng Gao, and Yuan Ma

Abstract

The key whitening is a technique intended to enhance the strength of a block cipher. Although some research work involves DPA attacks against the key whitening layer in the compact architecture, there are no literatures dedicated in the influence of the key whitening layers in the loop architecture from the standpoint of DPA. In this paper, we propose a practical chosen message power analysis approach against the loop architecture of ciphers with the key whitening layers, thus proving that the key whitening technique does not enhance the security of ciphers regard to DPA. Our approach follows a reduction strategy: we recover the whitening key in the general cipher with the key whitening layer and reduce other complicated key whitening layers to the general case. In order to further manifest the validity of the new approach, we carry extensive experiments on two ISO standardized ciphers CLEFIA and Camellia implemented in loop architecture on FPGA, and the keys are recovered as expected.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Published elsewhere. ACNS 2017, LNCS 10355
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-61204-1 21
Keywords
DPAKey whiteningChosen messageLoop architecture
Contact author(s)
tuchenyang @ iie ac cn
History
2017-07-27: last of 3 revisions
2015-02-28: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2015/174
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/174,
      author = {Chenyang Tu and Lingchen Zhang and Zeyi Liu and Neng Gao and Yuan Ma},
      title = {A Practical Chosen Message Power Analysis Approach Against Ciphers with the Key Whitening Layers},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/174},
      year = {2015},
      doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-61204-1 21},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/174}
}
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