Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2009/044

Un-Trusted-HB: Security Vulnerabilities of Trusted-HB

Dmitry Frumkin and Adi Shamir

Abstract: With increased use of passive RFID tags, the need for secure lightweight identification protocols arose. HB+ is one such protocol, which was proven secure in the detection-based model, but shown breakable by man-in-the-middle attacks. Trusted-HB is a variant of HB+, specifically designed to resist man-in-the-middle attacks. In this paper, we discuss several weaknesses of Trusted-HB, show that the formal security proof provided by its designers is incorrect, and demonstrate how to break it in realistic scenarios.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / RFID, LPN, HB+, Trusted-HB

Date: received 26 Jan 2009

Contact author: dmitry frumkin at gmail com

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Version: 20090129:151539 (All versions of this report)

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