Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2009/044
Un-Trusted-HB: Security Vulnerabilities of Trusted-HB
Dmitry Frumkin and Adi Shamir
Abstract: With increased use of passive RFID tags, the need for secure lightweight identification protocols arose. HB+ is one such protocol, which was proven secure in the detection-based model, but shown breakable by man-in-the-middle attacks.
Trusted-HB is a variant of HB+, specifically designed to resist man-in-the-middle attacks. In this paper, we discuss several weaknesses of Trusted-HB, show that the formal security proof provided by its designers is incorrect, and demonstrate how to break it in realistic scenarios.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / RFID, LPN, HB+, Trusted-HB
Date: received 26 Jan 2009
Contact author: dmitry frumkin at gmail com
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Version: 20090129:151539 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2009/044
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