Paper 2009/034

On a Conditional Collision Attack on NaSHA-512

S. Markovski, A. Mileva, V. Dimitrova, and D. Gligoroski

Abstract

A collision attack on NaSHA-512 was proposed by L. Ji et al. The claimed complexity of the attack is $2^{192}$. The proposed attack is realized by using a suitable differential pattern. In this note we show that the correct result that can be inferred from their differential pattern is in fact a conditional one. It can be stated correctly as follows: A collision attack on NaSHA-512 of complexity $k=1,2,\dots,2^{320}$ can be performed with an unknown probability of success $p_k$, where $ 0\le p_1\le p_2\le p_{2^{320}}\le 1$. Consequently, the attack proposed by L. Ji et al. can be considered only as a direction how a possible collision attack on NaSHA-512 could be realized. The birthday attack remains the best possible attack on NaSHA-512.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Cryptografic hash functionNaSHA
Contact author(s)
aleksandra mileva @ ugd edu mk
History
2009-01-17: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2009/034
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/034,
      author = {S.  Markovski and A.  Mileva and V.  Dimitrova and D.  Gligoroski},
      title = {On a Conditional Collision Attack on NaSHA-512},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2009/034},
      year = {2009},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/034}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/034}
}
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