

# Multiple Differential Cryptanalysis: A Rigorous Analysis

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## Abstract

Statistical analyses of multiple differential attacks are considered in this paper. Following the work of Blondeau and Gérard, the most general situation of multiple differential attack where there are no restrictions on the set of differentials is studied. We obtain closed form bounds on the data complexity in terms of the success probability and the advantage of an attack. This is done under two scenarios – one, where an independence assumption used by Blondeau and Gérard is assumed to hold and second, where no such assumption is made. The first case employs the Chernoff bounds while the second case uses the Hoeffding bounds from the theory of concentration inequalities. In both cases, we do not make use of any approximations in our analysis. As a consequence, the results are more generally applicable compared to previous works. The analysis without the independence assumption is the first of its kind in the literature. We believe that the current work places the statistical analysis of multiple differential attack on a more rigorous foundation than what was previously known.

**Keywords:** multiple differential cryptanalysis, Chernoff bounds, Hoeffding bounds.

## 1 Introduction

One of the basic techniques for attacking a block cipher is differential cryptanalysis [3]. In its basic form, it considers the difference after applying several rounds of the encryption function to two plaintexts which themselves differ by a fixed string. A pair of such input and output differences is called a differential. Initially, differential cryptanalysis was considered with respect to a single differential. Later work considered several differentials where either all the input differences are the same or all the output differences are the same. In its most general form, there are multiple differentials with no restrictions on either the input or the output differences.

Cryptanalysis of block ciphers has two conceptual phases. The first phase consists of a detailed study of the structure of the block cipher to discover some property which can be distinguished from randomness. Obtaining one or more differentials is one such property that a cryptanalyst looks for. The second phase involves using statistical methods to exploit such a property for deriving a portion of the secret key. Over the years, the second phase has received increasing focus [14, 11, 12, 13, 1, 5, 23, 10, 8, 6, 7].

To mount an attack, a cryptanalyst requires a number of plaintexts and the corresponding ciphertexts encrypted with the same secret key. In a key recovery attack, the goal is to obtain the correct value for a subset of the key bits. This subset is called the target sub-key. Suppose  $m$  bits of the key are to be recovered. Processing the obtained plaintext-ciphertext pairs will provide the cryptanalyst with a list of candidate values for the target sub-key. The attack is successful if the correct value is in the list of candidate values. The other parameter of

interest is the size of the candidate list. If for some  $a$ , this list is of size  $2^{m-a}$ , then the attack is said to have advantage at least  $a$ . A statistical analysis tries to determine the number  $N$  of plaintext-ciphertext pairs such that the attack is successful with probability at least  $P_S$  and has advantage at least  $a$ . The parameter  $N$  is called the data complexity of the attack. The goal of a statistical analysis is to obtain an expression for  $N$  in terms of  $P_S$  and  $a$ .

Statistical analysis of the most general form of multiple differential cryptanalysis was considered by Blondeau and Gérard [6]. Building on prior work [8], the paper provided two separate expressions for the data complexity and the success probability. The expression for the data complexity holds for success probability close to 0.5 and so for example, it cannot be applied to attacks with success probability close to 1 (say 0.95). The expression for success probability, on the other hand, is complicated and does not directly involve the data complexity. Further, the analysis used several approximations involving the Poisson distributions and also required the approximations of tails of binomial distributions used in an earlier work [8]. The errors in such approximations, however, have not been rigorously analysed. Another feature of the analysis in [6] is that it is based on an independence assumption. Whether the assumption holds in general is not clear and the authors remark [6]: “This hypothesis is not so far to being true.”

## Our Contributions

As in [6], the setting of our work is multiple differential cryptanalysis without any restrictions on the input or the output differences. We perform a new statistical analysis of this kind of attack. This analysis involves using the Chernoff and the Hoeffding bounds. These techniques have been earlier used in the context of block cipher cryptanalysis [20].

We build the statistical analysis in several steps. The first step considers the basic scenario where there is only one single input difference while there can be several output differences. In the second step, we extend this to the general scenario of multiple differentials without any restriction on the input or the output differences. This step, however, utilises the independence assumption used in [6]. In the third step, we do away with the independence assumption. So, the analysis of the third step is the most general. The analysis of the first two steps uses the Chernoff bounds while the third step uses the Hoeffding bounds.

**Rigorous closed form upper bounds:** There are two common features to all the three steps of our analysis.

1. Nowhere do we make any kind of approximation. So, the analysis holds for all settings.
2. In each case, we obtain explicit closed form bounds for the data complexity in terms of the success probability and the advantage. These expressions can be evaluated to obtain the data complexity for any values of the success probability and the advantage.

Both of the above are to be contrasted with the results in [6] which are approximations with the error in approximation being hard to assess. Further, [6] does not provide any closed form expression (approximate or otherwise) for the data complexity which can be evaluated for any values of the success probability and the advantage.

**Computational results:** A set of multiple differentials were provided for a 64-bit toy cipher SMALLPRESENT in [6]. For these differentials, we compare the concrete values of the data complexities provided by our analysis with earlier works [6, 7]. It turns out that in all cases, the data complexities obtained by our methods is higher than what has been previously reported. For the analysis with the independence assumption, the data complexities are close, while for the analysis without the independence assumption, the new data complexity turns out to be significantly higher. There are several take-aways from these computational results.

1. The previously reported expressions for data complexities [6, 7] are approximations where the error in approximation is not known. Consequently, by looking only at the approximate values obtained from such expressions, it is not possible to decide whether they are over or under estimates. In comparison, the values of data complexities obtained from our expressions are upper bounds. So, by comparing the previously obtained approximate values to the upper bounds reported here, one can obtain an idea about efficacy of such approximate values. In particular, we emphasise that there is no basis for assuming that the approximate values are the correct ones and then viewing the upper bounds to be over estimates.
2. If one does not want to rely on a somewhat ad-hoc independence assumption, then one will have to be prepared for handling a much higher data complexity. It is possible that the higher values of data complexity obtained without the independence assumption is due to the use of the Hoeffding bound and that using more sophisticated methods will bring down the upper bound. On the other hand, it is also possible that in reality, the data complexity is actually higher. Further work is required to determine which of these two cases is true.

We note that there is nothing special about considering SMALLPRESENT. Our results can be applied to any cipher (toy or real-life) for which appropriate multiple differentials are available. We took the example of SMALLPRESENT, since this is the only one that we know of for which multiple differentials are available.

A related issue is that of actually implementing an attack and then estimating the amount of data required for different values of the success probability and advantage. Comprehensively carrying out such an exercise would be of independent interest. This work, though, is peripheral to the main point of the paper which is to base the statistical analysis on a more rigorous foundation. In particular, we do not make any claims that the data complexity expressions that we obtain are the best possible. Further, by looking at any one particular cipher, it is not possible to make a general statement regarding the tightness of the upper bound which holds for all ciphers. There is a possibility that there are two ciphers such that the upper bound is tight for one but loose for the other. Exploring such issues can form possible future research problems.

**Success probability:** We would like to further highlight an important aspect of our analysis. From the viewpoint of a cryptanalyst, an attack with 10% (or even lower) success probability should be considered to be successful. The analysis in [6], however, does not allow estimating the data complexity for such a value of the success probability. It also does not allow estimating data complexities for attacks with high success probabilities. In contrast, our analysis allows estimating the data complexity for any value of the success probability. This is an advantage of the generality of our approach which is over and above the issue of not using any ad-hoc approximations.

**The statistical framework:** We use the hypothesis testing framework. For each choice of the sub-key, a test of hypothesis is carried out to either keep it in the list of candidate values or to reject it. The null hypothesis is that the choice is the correct value of the sub-key while the alternate hypothesis is that the choice is an incorrect value. The test statistic follows different distributions under the null and the alternate hypotheses.

Type-1 error occurs when the correct value is rejected while Type-2 error occurs when an incorrect value gets listed as a candidate value. The probabilities of these two events are essentially tail probabilities of the test statistic under the corresponding distributions.

The test statistic itself turns out to be a sum of independent and identically distributed random variables each of which take values from a set with  $\rho$  elements. Our idea of avoiding approximations is to use known rigorous bounds on tail probabilities of such distributions. In the case where  $\rho = 2$ , the test statistic is a sum of independent Bernoulli distributed random variables, and the Chernoff bound applies. While for the case of  $\rho > 2$ , we use the more general Hoeffding bound.

**Can even better bounds be obtained?** The answer to this question lies in obtaining improved bounds for the above mentioned tail probabilities. The theory of large deviations is concerned with the probability of rare events and so tail probabilities can be handled by this theory. It can be shown that the tail probability is upper bounded by an exponential in  $N$  times a function called the rate function. This rate function is the Legendre transform of the moment generating function of the corresponding random variable.

In theory, it is indeed possible to express the tail probabilities in terms of the rate function. However, this does not automatically provide meaningful bounds for the data complexity. There are several difficulties involved. For a more detailed discussion of these difficulties, we refer to [22].

**Previous and Related Works:** Differential cryptanalysis was first proposed by Biham and Shamir in [3] for cryptanalysis of DES. Later in [4], the same authors improved upon the earlier version by considering multiple differentials with the same output difference. Knudsen [15] introduced truncated differential cryptanalysis. Other variants of differential cryptanalysis have been proposed. These include higher order differentials [16], cube attack [9], boomerang attack [25], impossible differential attack [2] and the improbable differential attack [24].

A statistical analysis of multiple differential attack with a single input difference was given in [19]. Selçuk [23] derived an expression for the data complexity of single differential cryptanalysis using the ranking methodology. The technique used by Selçuk was subsequently used by Blondeau et al. in [7] to derive data complexity of differential cryptanalysis using the log-likelihood (LLR) and chi-squared test statistic.

As mentioned earlier, the most general framework for differential cryptanalysis was analysed in [6], where differentials were considered without any restrictions. The work proposed a new test statistic and showed that the distribution of the test statistic can be approximated by a Poisson distribution. It was subsequently pointed out that the Poisson approximation is not good for the tail probabilities and hence the technique of [8] was used to approximate the tail probabilities.

The task of deriving data complexity expressions without using approximations was carried out in [20] for several types of block cipher attacks. Chernoff bounds and the Hoeffding bounds were used for this purpose. The present work employs these techniques to analyse the tail probabilities of the test statistic proposed in [6]. This leads to the aforementioned results on data complexities obtained here. For problematic issues regarding the use of approximations in cryptanalysis we refer the reader to [21].

## 2 Background

Let  $E : \{0, 1\}^k \times \{0, 1\}^n \mapsto \{0, 1\}^n$  be a block cipher so that for each  $K \in \{0, 1\}^k$ , the function  $E_K(\cdot) \triangleq E(K, \cdot)$  is a bijection. Here  $K$  is called the secret key, the  $n$ -bit input to  $E_K$  is called the plaintext and the  $n$ -bit output of  $E_K$  is called the ciphertext.

We consider iterated block ciphers which are constructed by composing round functions. Let  $R_{k^{(0)}}, R_{k^{(1)}}, \dots$  be the round functions, where  $k^{(0)}, k^{(1)}, \dots$  denote the round keys. These round keys are produced by applying an expansion function on the secret key  $K$ , called the key scheduling algorithm. For a fixed key, the round functions are also bijections.

Denote by  $K^{(i)}$ ,  $i \geq 1$ , the concatenation of the first  $i$  round keys, i.e.,  $K^{(i)} = k^{(0)} \parallel \dots \parallel k^{(i-1)}$  and by  $E_{K^{(i)}}^{(i)}$  the composition of the first  $i$  round functions, i.e.,

$$E_{K^{(1)}}^{(1)} = R_{k^{(0)}}^{(0)}; \quad E_{K^{(i)}}^{(i)} = R_{k^{(i-1)}}^{(i-1)} \circ \dots \circ R_{k^{(0)}}^{(0)} = R_{k^{(i-1)}}^{(i-1)} \circ E_{K^{(i-1)}}^{(i-1)}; \quad i \geq 1.$$

Consider an attack on the first  $(r+1)$  round of the block cipher  $E_K$ . For a plaintext  $P$ , denote by  $B$  the output after  $r$  rounds, i.e.,  $B = E_{K^{(r)}}^{(r)}(P)$  and by  $C$  the output after  $r+1$  rounds, i.e.,  $C = E_{K^{(r+1)}}^{(r+1)}(P) = R_{k^{(r)}}^{(r)}(B)$ .

## 2.1 Differential Cryptanalysis

Let  $\delta_0$  and  $\delta_r$  be  $n$ -bit strings where  $\delta_0$  is not the all-zero string. For a plaintext  $P$ , denote  $P' = P \oplus \delta_0$ . Since  $\delta_0 \neq 0^n$ ,  $P' \neq P$ . Let  $B$  and  $B'$  denote the output after  $r$  rounds corresponding to  $P$  and  $P'$  respectively. From the bijectivity of the round functions, it follows that  $B \neq B'$ . For a fixed  $K$ , the quantities  $P'$ ,  $B$  and  $B'$  are completely determined by  $P$ .

Let  $P$  be chosen uniformly at random and let  $p$  be such that  $p = \Pr[B \oplus B' = \delta_r]$ . On the other hand, if  $B$  and  $B'$  are chosen uniformly and without replacement from  $\{0, 1\}^n$ , then  $\Pr[B \oplus B' = \delta_r] = 1/(2^n - 1)$ . Let  $p_w = 1/(2^n - 1)$ . The first and a non-trivial step of a differential cryptanalysis is to make a detailed study of the block cipher to unearth  $\delta_0$  and  $\delta_r$  such that  $p$  is ‘significantly’ different from  $p_w$ .

**Target sub-key:** Suppose there are  $m$  bits of the key such that knowledge of these  $m$  bits is sufficient to invert the last round and obtain  $B$  from  $C$ . These  $m$  bits could be a subset of bits of the last round key. If it turns out that  $m < n$ , then a differential cryptanalysis can be attempted. We will call this set of  $m$  bits as the target sub-key. There are  $2^m$  possible choices of the target sub-key out of which only one is correct. We will denote the correct choice of the target sub-key as  $\kappa^*$ . The goal of the attack is to find  $\kappa^*$ .

The attack will proceed by testing each possible value of the target sub-key. If the choice of the target sub-key is correct, then  $\Pr[B \oplus B' = \delta_r]$  will be equal to  $p$ . On the other hand, if the choice of the target sub-key is incorrect, then it is conventional to assume that the block cipher behaves like a random permutation and so in this case,  $\Pr[B \oplus B' = \delta_r]$  will be equal to  $p_w$ .

**Multiple differentials:** We follow [6] in considering multiple differentials. Our notation, though, is somewhat different.

In the above, we have considered a single pair  $(\delta_0, \delta_r)$ . More generally, one can consider a set  $\Delta$  of such pairs. An attack which aims to utilise such a set of differentials is called a multiple differential attack. Let  $\nu = |\Delta|$ . Define  $\Delta_0 = \{\delta_0 : \text{there is a } \delta_r \text{ such that } (\delta_0, \delta_r) \in \Delta\}$ . In other words,  $\Delta_0$  consists of the set of all  $n$ -bit strings which occur as the first component of some pair in  $\Delta$ . These are all the distinct input differences. Let  $\nu_0 = |\Delta_0|$  and enumerate the input differences in  $\Delta_0$  as  $\Delta_0 = \{\delta_0^{(1)}, \dots, \delta_0^{(\nu_0)}\}$ . For  $\delta_0^{(i)}$ , define  $\Delta_r^{(i)}$  as  $\Delta_r^{(i)} = \{\delta_r : (\delta_0^{(i)}, \delta_r) \in \Delta\}$ . The set  $\Delta_r^{(i)}$  consists of the set of all possible output difference corresponding to the input difference  $\delta_0^{(i)}$ . Let  $\nu_i = |\Delta_r^{(i)}|$  and enumerate the set  $\Delta_r^{(i)}$  as  $\Delta_r^{(i)} = \{\delta_r^{(i,1)}, \dots, \delta_r^{(i,\nu_i)}\}$ . Then the set of differentials can be written as

$$\Delta = \{(\delta_0^{(i)}, \delta_r^{(i,j)}) \mid i = 1, \dots, \nu_0 \text{ and } j = 1, \dots, \nu_i\}.$$

Suppose  $P$  is chosen uniformly at random. For a particular choice  $\kappa$  of the target sub-key and  $\delta_0^{(i)}$ , let  $S_{\kappa,i}$  be the following random variable.

$$S_{\kappa,i} = \left(R_{\kappa}^{(r)}\right)^{-1} \left(E_{K^{(r+1)}}^{(r+1)}(P)\right) \oplus \left(R_{\kappa}^{(r)}\right)^{-1} \left(E_{K^{(r+1)}}^{(r+1)}(P \oplus \delta_0^{(i)})\right). \quad (1)$$

Here  $\left(R_{\kappa}^{(r)}\right)^{-1}$  refers to the inversion of the  $r$ -th round using  $\kappa$  as the value of the target sub-key.

Extending the probability notions from the case of a single differential, for  $i = 1, \dots, \nu_0$  and  $j = 1, \dots, \nu_i$ , we define

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr \left[ S_{\kappa,i} = \delta_r^{(i,j)} \right] &= \begin{cases} p_{i,j} & \text{if } \kappa = \kappa^*; \\ q_{i,j} & \text{otherwise;} \end{cases} \\ q_{i,j} &= 1/(2^n - 1); \\ p_i &= \sum_{j=1}^{\nu_i} p_{i,j}; \\ \hat{p} &= (\sum_{i=1}^{\nu_0} p_i) / \nu_0; \\ q_i &= \sum_{j=1}^{\nu_i} q_{i,j}; \\ \hat{q} &= (\sum_{i=1}^{\nu_0} q_i) / \nu_0. \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

We note that the analysis of the block cipher will provide the set  $\Delta$  and also the probabilities  $p_{i,j}$  for  $i = 1, \dots, \nu_0$  and  $j = 1, \dots, \nu_i$ . These form the starting point of a statistical analysis.

**Setting of the attack:** Suppose that  $P_1, \dots, P_N$  are chosen independently and uniformly at random from  $\{0, 1\}^n$ . For each  $\eta = 1, \dots, N$ , the adversary obtains the ciphertext  $C_\eta$  corresponding to the encryption of  $P_\eta$  under some key  $K$ . Further, for each input difference  $\delta_0^{(i)} \in \Delta_0$  the adversary obtains the encryption of  $P \oplus \delta_0^{(i)}$  under the same key  $K$ . So, in total the adversary has  $(\nu_0 + 1)N$  pairs of plaintext and ciphertexts. Therefore,  $N$  denotes the number of independently and uniformly chosen plaintexts whereas the number of encryptions required is  $(\nu_0 + 1)N$ . By data complexity we will denote  $N$ .

Recall that  $\kappa^*$  is the correct choice of the target sub-key corresponding to  $K$ . The goal of the adversary is to obtain  $\kappa^*$ .

We extend the definition of  $S_{\kappa,i}$  in the following manner. For a choice  $\kappa$  of the target sub-key,  $i = 1, \dots, \nu_0$  and  $\eta = 1, \dots, N$ , define

$$S_{\kappa,i,\eta} = \left(R_\kappa^{(r)}\right)^{-1} \left(E_{K^{(r)}}(P_\eta)\right) \oplus \left(R_\kappa^{(r)}\right)^{-1} \left(E_{K^{(r)}}(P_\eta \oplus \delta_0^{(i)})\right). \quad (3)$$

Since  $P_1, \dots, P_N$  are independent, the random variables  $S_{\kappa,i,1}, \dots, S_{\kappa,i,N}$  are also independent and each of these is distributed as  $S_{\kappa,i}$ .

Define a binary valued random variable  $T_{\kappa,i,\eta}$  as follows:  $T_{\kappa,i,\eta} = 1$  if  $S_{\kappa,i,\eta}$  is in  $\Delta_r^{(i)}$  and it is 0 otherwise. It follows that  $T_{\kappa,i,1}, \dots, T_{\kappa,i,N}$  are also independent. For a fixed  $\kappa, i$  and  $\eta$ , the random variable  $S_{\kappa,i,\eta}$  can take at most one value in  $\Delta_r^{(i)}$ . As a result,

$$\Pr[T_{\kappa,i,\eta} = 1] = \begin{cases} \sum_{j=1}^{\nu_i} p_{i,j} = p_i & \text{if } \kappa = \kappa^*; \\ \nu_i / (2^n - 1) = q_i & \text{if } \kappa \neq \kappa^*. \end{cases} \quad (4)$$

From the  $(\nu_0 + 1)N$  plaintext-ciphertext pairs; for  $i = 1, \dots, \nu_0$ ; and for each choice  $\kappa$  of the target sub-key; the adversary can compute the values of  $T_{\kappa,i,1}, \dots, T_{\kappa,i,N}$  in time  $N\nu_0 2^m$ .

**The test statistic:** For a choice  $\kappa$  of the target sub-key and  $\eta = 1, \dots, N$ , define

$$T_{\kappa,\eta} = \sum_{i=1}^{\nu_0} T_{\kappa,i,\eta}. \quad (5)$$

For a choice  $\kappa$  of the target sub-key, the test statistic is defined to be

$$T_\kappa = \sum_{\eta=1}^N T_{\kappa,\eta} = \sum_{i=1}^{\nu_0} \sum_{\eta=1}^N T_{\kappa,i,\eta}. \quad (6)$$

**Success probability and advantage of an attack:** An attack will ultimately provide a list of candidate values of the target sub-key. The attack is said to be successful, if  $\kappa^*$  is in the list and the probability of this event is said to be the success probability. This probability is denoted as  $P_S$ . The size of the list is another factor which determines the efficacy of an attack. The attack is said to have advantage  $a$ , if the size of the list is  $2^{m-a}$ .

The goal of a statistical analysis is to obtain an expression for the data complexity in terms of the success probability and the advantage of an attack.

## 2.2 Summary of the Blondeau-Gérard Analysis

In [6], Blondeau and Gérard provided a statistical analysis of multiple differential attack as outlined above. Their analysis used the following assumption.

**Assumption 1** ([6, Hypothesis 2]). *For any sub-key  $\kappa$  (including  $\kappa^*$ ) and for any  $\eta = 1, \dots, N$ , the random variables  $T_{\kappa,1,\eta}, \dots, T_{\kappa,\nu_0,\eta}$  are independent.*

Based on this assumption and using an asymptotic result it was shown that each of the random variables  $T_{\kappa,\eta}$  follow a Poisson distribution with parameter  $\lambda = \sum_{i=0}^{\nu_0} p_i$  for  $\kappa = \kappa^*$  and follows a Poisson distribution with parameter  $\lambda = \sum_{i=0}^{\nu_0} q_i$  for  $\kappa \neq \kappa^*$  [6, Theorem 1]. Since  $T_\kappa = \sum_{\eta=1}^N T_{\kappa,\eta}$  and  $T_{\kappa,1}, \dots, T_{\kappa,N}$  are independent,  $T_\kappa$  also follows a Poisson distribution with parameter  $N\lambda$ . It was further mentioned that this approximation does not give a good estimate of the tails of the cumulative distribution function of the test statistic  $T_\kappa$ . Hence, they used another approximation to get the tail of the distribution. Eventually, the full distributions for both the correct and the incorrect choice of the target sub-key were given. It was found that these distributions are similar to the distributions of [8]. Therefore, the framework from [8] was used to estimate the data complexity and the success probability of the multiple differential cryptanalysis. We restate the results here.

**Corollary 1 of [6].** The data complexity of multiple differential cryptanalysis with success probability close to 0.5 is given by

$$N = -2 \cdot \frac{\ln(2\iota\sqrt{\pi}2^{-m})}{\nu_0 D(\hat{p} \parallel \hat{q})}; \quad (7)$$

where  $\iota$  is the size reduced list of the candidate keys and  $D(\hat{p} \parallel \hat{q})$  is the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the distributions  $(\hat{p}, 1 - \hat{p})$  and  $(\hat{q}, 1 - \hat{q})$ . Typically,  $\iota = 2^{m-a}$  for an attack with  $a$ -bit advantage. Putting  $\iota = 2^{m-a}$  in (7), we have

$$N = -2 \cdot \frac{\ln(2\sqrt{\pi}/2^a)}{\nu_0 D(\hat{p} \parallel \hat{q})}. \quad (8)$$

**Corollary 2 of [6].** Let  $G^*(x)$  (resp.  $G(x)$ ) be the estimate of the cumulative distribution function of  $T_{\kappa^*}$  (resp.  $T_\kappa$ ) defined by [6, Proposition 1]. The success probability,  $P_S$ , of a multiple differential cryptanalysis is given by

$$P_S \approx 1 - G^* \left( G^{-1} \left( 1 - \frac{\iota - 1}{2^m - 2} \right) - 1 \right); \quad (9)$$

where the pseudo-inverse of  $G$  is defined by

$$G^{-1}(y) = \min\{x : G(x) \geq y\}. \quad (10)$$

### Limitations of the expression given by (7).

1. The success probability  $P_S$  does not appear in the expression for the data complexity in (7). As mentioned above, (7) holds only for  $P_S$  close to 0.5 and *cannot* be evaluated for any other value of the success probability. For example, it is not possible to use (7) to compute the data complexity either for  $P_S = 0.1$  or for  $P_S = 0.9$ . From a cryptanalytic point of view, both of these are valid values for the success probability. Later in the paper, the authors mention that it has been conjectured in [8] that taking  $N$  of the form  $N = -2c \cdot \frac{\ln(2\iota\sqrt{\pi}2^{-m})}{\nu_0 D(\hat{p} \parallel \hat{q})}$  should lead to a success probability of about 50% for  $c = 1$ ; 80% for  $c = 1.5$ ; and 90% for  $c = 2$ . Some experimental evidence is provided in support of this conjecture. There is, however, no proof of this statement and neither is the dependence of  $N$  on  $P_S$  made clear.
2. From (8),  $N > 0$  only for  $a > \lg(2\sqrt{\pi}) = 1 + \lg \sqrt{\pi}$ . So, the data complexity expression given by Equation (7) (and (8)) is not meaningful for small values of ‘ $a$ ’.

### Limitations of the expression given by (9).

1. In the expression for  $P_S$  given by (9), the data complexity does not appear explicitly. Instead, [6] provides plots of  $P_S$  as a function of  $N$ .
2. The expression given by (9) is not useful in evaluating the data complexity in terms of the success probability  $P_S$  and the advantage  $a$ . To do this, it is required to work out the expressions for  $G^*$  and  $G^{-1}$  which depends on  $N$  and then solve the resulting equation for  $N$ . The difficulty of carrying out this task is further discussed in Appendix B. It should be noted that the paper [6] uses (9) only for computing success probability. None of the data complexity computations in [6] use (9). This indicates that the authors of [6] did not themselves consider (9) to be useful for computing data complexity.
3. The relation given by (9) is only an approximation and not an accurate expression. The  $\approx$  sign in (9) has been used in the original paper [6] itself indicating that the authors themselves did not consider this to be an accurate expression. The reason being that the expression in (9) is arrived at using several approximations. The errors in such approximations are variously expressed in the big-oh and the little-oh notation making it difficult to determine the actual error for a set of concrete values of the parameters.

## 3 Hypothesis Testing Framework

We briefly outline the hypothesis testing framework that we use to perform the statistical analysis of multiple differential attack.

The test statistic is  $T_\kappa$ . Let  $\mu_0 = E[T_{\kappa^*}]$  and  $\mu_1 = E[T_\kappa]$  for  $\kappa \neq \kappa^*$ . Assume that  $\mu_0 > \mu_1$  and consider the following test of hypothesis.

### Hypothesis Test-1:

$H_0$ : “ $\kappa$  is correct” versus  $H_1$ : “ $\kappa$  is incorrect.”

Decision rule: Reject  $H_0$  if  $T_\kappa \leq t$ , where  $t$  is a value in  $(\mu_1, \mu_0)$ .

**Note:** If  $\mu_0 < \mu_1$ , then the decision rule is to reject  $H_0$  if  $T_\kappa \geq t$  for some  $t$  in  $(\mu_0, \mu_1)$ . The analysis of this case is similar to the case of  $\mu_0 > \mu_1$  and provides the same expression for the data complexity. So, we do not consider the details of this case.

The Type-1 error probability is defined to be  $\Pr[\text{Type-1 Error}] = \Pr[T_\kappa \leq t | H_0 \text{ holds}]$  and the Type-2 error probability is defined to be  $\Pr[\text{Type-2 Error}] = \Pr[T_\kappa > t | H_1 \text{ holds}]$ . We obtain (upper bounds) on the Type-1 and Type-2 error probabilities which are denoted as  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  respectively. These expressions involve both  $t$  and  $N$  and it turns out to be possible to obtain expressions for  $t$  and  $N$  in terms of  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ .

The test is applied with all the  $2^m$  values of the target sub-key and a list of values of  $\kappa$  for which  $H_0$  is not rejected is returned. If a Type-1 error occurs, then the list does not contain the correct value of the target sub-key and so the success probability of the attack is  $1 - \Pr[\text{Type-1 Error}]$ . In particular, we set  $P_S = 1 - \alpha$  so that if  $\alpha$  is an upper bound on the Type-1 error probability, then  $P_S$  is a lower bound on the success probability.

Each Type-2 error results in classifying an incorrect value of  $\kappa$  as a candidate key. Since the tests with the  $2^m - 1$  incorrect choices of the target sub-keys are independent, the expected number of wrong keys returned is  $(2^m - 1) \times \Pr[\text{Type-2 error}]$ . If  $\beta$  is an upper bound on  $\Pr[\text{Type-2 Error}]$ , then the expected number of misclassifications is at most  $(2^m - 1)\beta < 2^m\beta$ . For an attack with advantage  $a$ , the size of the returned list is  $2^{m-a}$ . Setting  $2^m\beta = 2^{m-a}$  gives  $\beta = 2^{-a}$ . So, if the Type-2 error probability is at most  $2^{-a}$ , then the attack has expected advantage at least  $a$ .

**Upper Bounds:** The hypothesis test is applied to a particular test statistic. The corresponding data complexity obtained is a lower bound on the number of plaintexts to achieve specified (upper bounds on the) Type-1 and Type-2 error probabilities, *if* the particular test statistic is used. This leaves open the possibility that there may be other test statistics for which the (lower bound on the) data complexity required to achieve the same Type-1 and Type-2 error probabilities is lower. So, the expressions that we obtain are upper bounds on the minimum possible data complexities to achieve specified error probabilities.

## 4 Single Input Difference

In this section, we analyze the particular case of  $\nu_0 = 1$ , i.e., the case where all the differentials have the same input difference. The number of differentials in  $\Delta$  can be 1 or more, i.e.,  $\nu \geq 1$ , but, for all of these the input difference will be the same. This case is the same as the one studied in [7] and later in [20].

Since  $\nu_0 = 1$ , it follows that  $\nu_1 = \nu$ . So, for every  $\kappa \in \{0, 1\}^m$  and  $\eta = 1, \dots, N$ , there is a single random variable  $T_{\kappa,1,\eta}$ . This variable takes the value 1 if  $S_{\kappa,1,\eta} \in \Delta_r^{(1)}$  and 0 otherwise. As mentioned earlier,  $\Pr[T_{\kappa,1,\eta} = 1] = p_1$  if  $\kappa = \kappa^*$  and  $\Pr[T_{\kappa,1,\eta} = 1] = q_1 = \nu/(2^n - 1)$  if  $\kappa \neq \kappa^*$ . Further, for any fixed  $\kappa$ , the random variables  $T_{\kappa,1,1}, \dots, T_{\kappa,1,N}$  are independent. Being independently distributed binary valued random variables, these can be considered the outcomes of Poisson trials.

The test statistic  $T_\kappa$  in this case becomes

$$T_\kappa = T_{\kappa,1,1} + \dots + T_{\kappa,1,N}. \quad (11)$$

We define

$$\begin{aligned} \mu_0 &= E[T_\kappa] = Np_1 \text{ if } \kappa = \kappa^*; \\ \mu_1 &= E[T_\kappa] = Nq_1 \text{ if } \kappa \neq \kappa^*. \end{aligned}$$

Suppose  $\mu_0 > \mu_1$ . Hypothesis Test-1 is applied with the test statistic  $T_\kappa$  as described in Section 3. For the analysis of Hypothesis Test-1, we need to determine the Type-1 and Type-2 error probabilities. Since  $T_\kappa$  is the sum of independent Bernoulli distributed random variables, the Chernoff bounds can be used to obtain bounds on the tail probabilities of  $T_\kappa$  for both correct and incorrect choices of  $\kappa$ . We refer to Appendix A.1 for the precise statement of the Chernoff bounds. We have the following result.

**Proposition 1.** *Suppose that  $\nu_0 = 1$ , i.e., there is only a single input difference. Let  $0 < \alpha, \beta < 1$  and  $N$  be such that*

$$N \geq \frac{3 \left( \sqrt{p_1 \ln(1/\alpha)} + \sqrt{q_1 \ln(1/\beta)} \right)^2}{(p_1 - q_1)^2}. \quad (12)$$

*Then the probabilities of the Type-1 and Type-2 errors in Hypothesis Test-1 are upper bounded by  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  respectively. Putting  $\alpha = 1 - P_S$  and  $\beta = 2^{-a}$ , it follows that for*

$$N \geq \frac{3 \left( \sqrt{p_1 \ln(1/(1 - P_S))} + \sqrt{aq_1 \ln 2} \right)^2}{(p_1 - q_1)^2}. \quad (13)$$

*the success probability will be at least  $P_S$  and the advantage will be at least  $a$ .*

*Proof.* Recall that  $t \in (\mu_1, \mu_0)$  and  $H_0$  is rejected if  $T_\kappa \leq t$ . Let  $\gamma_0 = 1 - t/\mu_0$  and so  $\gamma_0 \in (0, 1)$ .

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pr[\text{Type-1 Error}] &= \Pr[T_\kappa \leq t \mid H_0 \text{ holds}] = \Pr[T_\kappa \leq (1 - \gamma_0)\mu_0] \\
&\leq \exp(-\mu_0\gamma_0^2/2) \leq \exp(-\mu_0\gamma_0^2/3) \\
&= \exp\left(-\frac{(\mu_0 - t)^2}{3\mu_0}\right) = \alpha; \text{ (say)} \\
\Rightarrow t &= \mu_0 - \sqrt{3\mu_0 \ln(1/\alpha)}.
\end{aligned} \tag{14}$$

Similarly, define  $\gamma_1 = t/\mu_1 - 1$  so that  $\gamma_1 \in (0, 1)$ .

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pr[\text{Type-2 Error}] &= \Pr[T_\kappa > t \mid H_1 \text{ holds}] = \Pr[T_\kappa > (1 + \gamma_1)\mu_1] \\
&\leq \exp(-\mu_1\gamma_1^2/3) = \exp\left(-\frac{(t - \mu_1)^2}{3\mu_1}\right) = \beta; \text{ (say)} \\
\Rightarrow t &= \mu_1 + \sqrt{3\mu_1 \ln(1/\beta)}.
\end{aligned} \tag{15}$$

Eliminating  $t$  from equations (14) and (15) and using  $\mu_0 = Np_1$ ,  $\mu_1 = Nq_1$ , we obtain an expression for  $N$  which is given by the right hand side of (12). For any  $N$  greater than this value, the probabilities of Type-1 and Type-2 errors are at most  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  respectively.  $\square$   $\square$

## 5 Multiple Input Differences Under Assumption 1

Under Assumption 1, for each  $\kappa$  and  $\eta$ , the random variables  $T_{\kappa,1,\eta}, \dots, T_{\kappa,\nu_0,\eta}$  are independent. If we further consider the values of  $\eta$  from 1 to  $N$ , we get that the following sequence of binary valued random variables are independent:

$$\begin{array}{cccc}
T_{\kappa,1,1} & T_{\kappa,2,1} & \cdots & T_{\kappa,\nu_0,1} \\
T_{\kappa,1,2} & T_{\kappa,2,2} & \cdots & T_{\kappa,\nu_0,2} \\
\cdot & \cdot & \cdots & \cdot \\
T_{\kappa,1,N} & T_{\kappa,2,N} & \cdots & T_{\kappa,\nu_0,N}.
\end{array} \tag{16}$$

So, these can be considered as the outcomes of  $N\nu_0$  Poisson trials. The test statistic  $T_\kappa$  is the sum of the above random variables and hence the Chernoff bounds can be applied to  $T_\kappa$ . Let as before  $\mu_0 = E[T_\kappa]$  when  $H_0$  holds and  $\mu_1 = E[T_\kappa]$  when  $H_1$  holds. Then, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
\mu_0 &= E[T_\kappa \mid H_0 \text{ holds}] \\
&= E\left[\sum_{\eta=1}^N \sum_{i=1}^{\nu_0} T_{\kappa,i,\eta} \mid H_0 \text{ holds}\right] \\
&= \sum_{\eta=1}^N \sum_{i=1}^{\nu_0} E[T_{\kappa,i,\eta} \mid H_0 \text{ holds}] \\
&= \sum_{\eta=1}^N \sum_{i=1}^{\nu_0} p_i = \sum_{\eta=1}^N \nu_0 \hat{p} = N\nu_0 \hat{p}; \\
\text{Similarly, } \mu_1 &= E[T_\kappa \mid H_1 \text{ holds}] = N\nu_0 \hat{q}.
\end{aligned} \tag{17}$$

We obtain the following result.

**Proposition 2.** *Suppose that  $\nu_0 \geq 1$  and Assumption 1 holds. Let  $0 < \alpha, \beta < 1$  and  $N$  be such that*

$$N \geq \frac{3\left(\sqrt{\hat{p} \ln(1/\alpha)} + \sqrt{\hat{q} \ln(1/\beta)}\right)^2}{\nu_0(\hat{p} - \hat{q})^2}. \tag{18}$$

Then the probabilities of the Type-1 and Type-2 errors in Hypothesis Test-1 are upper bounded by  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  respectively. Putting  $\alpha = 1 - P_S$  and  $\beta = 2^{-a}$ , it follows that for

$$N \geq \frac{3 \left( \sqrt{\hat{p} \ln(1/(1 - P_S))} + \sqrt{a \hat{q} \ln 2} \right)^2}{\nu_0 (\hat{p} - \hat{q})^2}. \quad (19)$$

the success probability will be at least  $P_S$  and the advantage will be at least  $a$ .

*Proof.* In this case,  $\mu_0 = N\nu_0\hat{p}$  and  $\mu_1 = N\nu_0\hat{q}$ . The rest of the argument is similar to the proof of Proposition 1. From the hypothesis test condition, we have  $t \in (\mu_1, \mu_0)$  and  $H_0$  is rejected if  $T_\kappa \leq t$ .

Let  $\gamma_0 = 1 - t/\mu_0$  so that  $\gamma_0 \in (0, 1)$ ; and  $\gamma_1 = t/\mu_1 - 1$  so that  $\gamma_1 \in (0, 1)$ . Let

$$\alpha = \exp\left(-\frac{(\mu_0 - t)^2}{3\mu_0}\right) \Rightarrow t = \mu_0 - \sqrt{3\mu_0 \ln(1/\alpha)}; \quad (20)$$

$$\beta = \exp\left(-\frac{(t - \mu_1)^2}{3\mu_1}\right) \Rightarrow t = \mu_1 + \sqrt{3\mu_1 \ln(1/\beta)}. \quad (21)$$

Following the calculation of the probabilities of Type-1 and Type-2 errors given in Proposition 1, we have  $\Pr[\text{Type-1 Error}] \leq \alpha$  and  $\Pr[\text{Type-2 Error}] \leq \beta$ . Eliminating  $t$  from equations (20) and (21) and using  $\mu_0 = N\nu_0\hat{p}$  and  $\mu_1 = N\nu_0\hat{q}$  we obtain an expression for  $N$  which is given by the right hand side of (19). For any  $N$  greater than this value, the probabilities of Type-1 and Type-2 errors are at most  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  respectively.  $\square$   $\square$

For  $\nu_0 = 1$ , Proposition 2 reduces to Proposition 1. Note that for  $\nu_0 = 1$ , Assumption 1 is vacuous.

## 6 Multiple Input Differences Without Independence Assumption

It is not clear that Assumption 1 holds in general. In this section, we consider the problem of deriving an expression for data complexity without using Assumption 1. Without this assumption, we can no longer assume that the rows of (16) are independent and so  $T_\kappa$  cannot be written as the sum of outcomes of Poisson trials. This, in particular, means that we cannot apply the Chernoff bounds to bound the tail probabilities of  $T_\kappa$ .

To tackle this situation, we use Hoeffding's inequality as was earlier utilised in [20]. Appendix A.2 gives the proper statement of Hoeffding's inequality. The test statistic is still  $T_\kappa$  and Hypothesis Test-1 is applied. The analysis of Type-1 and Type-2 error probabilities change.

**Proposition 3.** *Suppose that  $\nu_0 \geq 1$ . Let  $0 < \alpha, \beta < 1$  and  $N$  be such that*

$$N \geq \frac{\left( \sqrt{\ln(1/\alpha)} + \sqrt{\ln(1/\beta)} \right)^2}{2(\hat{p} - \hat{q})^2}. \quad (22)$$

Then the probabilities of the Type-1 and Type-2 errors in Hypothesis Test-1 are upper bounded by  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  respectively. Putting  $\alpha = 1 - P_S$  and  $\beta = 2^{-a}$ , it follows that for

$$N \geq \frac{\left( \sqrt{\ln(1/(1 - P_S))} + \sqrt{a \ln 2} \right)^2}{2(\hat{p} - \hat{q})^2}. \quad (23)$$

the success probability will be at least  $P_S$  and the advantage will be at least  $a$ .

*Proof.* Since the computation of the expectation of a sum of random variables does not depend on whether these random variables are independent, the values of  $\mu_0 = E[T_\kappa | H_0 \text{ holds}]$  and  $\mu_1 = E[T_\kappa | H_1 \text{ holds}]$  are still given by (17).

Recall that for  $\kappa \in \{0, 1\}^m$  and  $1 \leq \eta \leq N$ ,  $T_{\kappa, \eta} = \sum_{i=1}^{\nu_0} T_{\kappa, i, \eta}$ . Note that  $T_{\kappa, \eta}$  takes values from the set  $\{0, \dots, \nu_0\}$ . Also,  $T_{\kappa, \eta}$  are independently and identically distributed. This implies, that for  $\eta = 1, \dots, N$ ,

$$0 \leq T_{\kappa, \eta} \leq \nu_0.$$

Therefore we can apply Hoeffding's inequality (see Appendix A.2) over the sum of the independently random variables  $T_\kappa = \sum_{\eta=1}^N T_{\kappa, \eta}$ ; where  $D_N = \sum_{\eta=1}^N \nu_0^2 = N\nu_0^2$ .

Without loss of generality, assume  $\mu_0 > \mu_1$ . The other case, i.e.,  $\mu_0 < \mu_1$ , can be handled similarly. In this case, the null hypothesis is rejected if  $T_\kappa < t$ , for some  $t \in (\mu_1, \mu_0)$ , to be determined later. Then,

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\text{Type-1 Error}] &= \Pr[T_\kappa \leq t \mid H_0 \text{ holds}] \\ &= \Pr[T_\kappa - \mu_0 \leq -(\mu_0 - t) \mid H_0 \text{ holds}]. \end{aligned}$$

By applying Hoeffding's inequality (see equation (31)) on  $T_\kappa$ , we get

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\text{Type-1 Error}] &\leq \exp\left(-\frac{2(\mu_0 - t)^2}{N\nu_0^2}\right) = \alpha \text{ (say)} \\ \Rightarrow \sqrt{2}t &= \sqrt{2}\mu_0 - \nu_0\sqrt{N \ln(1/\alpha)}. \end{aligned} \tag{24}$$

Similarly,

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\text{Type-2 Error}] &= \Pr[T_\kappa > t \mid H_1 \text{ holds}] \\ &= \Pr[T_\kappa - \mu_1 > t - \mu_1 \mid H_1 \text{ holds}]. \end{aligned}$$

Again applying Hoeffding's inequality (see equation (30)) on  $T_\kappa$ , we get

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\text{Type-2 Error}] &\leq \exp\left(-\frac{2(t - \mu_1)^2}{N\nu_0^2}\right) = \beta \text{ (say)} \\ \Rightarrow \sqrt{2}t &= \sqrt{2}\mu_1 + \nu_0\sqrt{N \ln(1/\beta)}. \end{aligned} \tag{25}$$

Eliminating  $t$  from equation (24) and (25) and using  $\mu_0 = N\nu_0\hat{p}$ ,  $\mu_1 = N\nu_0\hat{q}$  gives the expression in the right hand side of (22). For any  $N$  which is at least this quantity, the Type-1 and Type-2 error probabilities are at most  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ .  $\square$

## 7 Comparison and Experimental Results

From a theoretical angle, our analysis provides the following advantages over the previous work of Blondeau and Gérard [6].

**No use of approximations:** The analysis of [6] is based on several approximations. One place where this issue shows up is in the non-applicability of the data complexity expression in (8) for small values of  $a$  as has been discussed in Remark 1. Further, the accuracy of the estimate for other larger values of  $a$  has not been theoretically studied. Some experimental evidence of its accuracy has been provided in [6] for a particular toy cipher. Whether this extends to other real-life ciphers is not known.

Our analysis, on the other hand, does not make any approximations for the statistical analysis. As such, the data complexity expression applies to all ciphers and for all values of  $a$  and  $P_S$ .

**Generality of the expression for data complexity:** In [6], separate expressions for the data complexity and success probability is obtained. The data complexity is stated to hold for success probability close to 0.5 and the expression for the success probability is quite complicated. In contrast, our analysis results in a single expression for the data complexity which is explicitly expressed in terms of the success probability and the advantage. No such expression for the data complexity is provided in [7]. For example, if one were to require the success probability to be 0.95, then the corresponding data complexity cannot be derived from the analysis in [7].

**Analysis without independence assumption:** Assumption 1 is used for the analysis in [7]. We also use Assumption 1 for one of our analysis. Whether Assumption 1 holds in general is not known. We show how to obtain an expression for the data complexity without using Assumption 1. There is no previous work in the literature which does this.

## 7.1 Experimental Comparison

We provide an experimental comparison of the data complexities obtained using our method and the methods available in previous works.

The experiments have been conducted using the set of differentials of the 64-bit toy block cipher SMALLPRESENT [8], that was given in [6, Table 6]. The table gives 3 estimates of the probabilities for the same input and output differences, namely, theoretical, 40-bit key schedule and 80-bit key schedule. In our experiments, we have made comparisons for each of these 3 probability estimates. The target sub-key size was 32 bits. So,  $n = 64$  and  $m = 32$ .

## 7.2 Comparison when $\nu_0 > 1$

The only prior work which analysed this case is [6] and the data complexity expression obtained in [6] is given by (7). This expression holds for success probability close to 0.5. Denote by  $N_{BG}$  the data complexity given by (8).

For  $\nu_0 > 1$ , we have obtained two expressions for the data complexity. One using Assumption 1, based on the Chernoff bound and is given by the right hand side of (19). The other does not require Assumption 1, is derived using the Hoeffding bound and is given by the right hand side of (23). Denote the data complexity given by (19) as  $N_{Cher}$  and the data complexity given by (23) as  $N_H$ . The expressions for  $N_{Cher}$  and  $N_H$  do not require  $P_S$  to be necessarily 0.5. However, since  $N_{BG}$  requires this, we set  $P_S = 0.5$  for these expressions.

Table 1 gives a comparison between the data complexities  $N_{BG}$ ,  $N_{Cher}$  and  $N_H$  for  $a = 20$  and  $P_S = 1 - \alpha = 0.5$ . From the table one can see that  $N_{Cher}$  is only slightly greater than  $N_{BG}$ . So, if Assumption 1 can be assumed to hold, then it is better to use the data complexity given by  $N_{Cher}$  since it is more generally applicable. On the other hand, if Assumption 1 cannot be assumed to hold, then one has to use  $N_H$  and the corresponding bound on the data complexity is much higher.

## 7.3 Comparison when $\nu_0 = 1$

In this case, there is only a single input difference. The data complexity expression from [6] given in (8) can be specialised to the case  $\nu_0 = 1$ . As before we denote by  $N_{BG}$  the data complexity arising from (8) by setting  $\nu_0 = 1$ . Also, let  $N_{Cher}$  denote the data complexity given by (13).

Table 6 in [6] provides six groups of differentials with each group having the same input difference. We separately consider each of these six groups for the three probability estimates. This leads to 18 cases. For each of the 18 cases, we compare  $N_{BG}$  and  $N_{Cher}$ . Since  $N_{BG}$  requires  $P_S = 0.5$  we have computed the data complexities for all the cases with this value of  $P_S$ . The advantage  $a$  was varied from 1 to 32. In each case, the

Probability Estimates	$N_{BG}$	$N_{Cher}$	$N_H$
expressions	$\frac{2a \ln 2 - 2 \ln 2 \sqrt{\pi}}{\nu_0 D(\hat{p}  \hat{q})}$	$\frac{3 \ln 2 (\sqrt{\hat{p}} + \sqrt{a\hat{q}})^2}{\nu_0 (\hat{p} - \hat{q})^2}$	$\frac{2 \ln 2 (1 + \sqrt{a})^2}{(\hat{p} - \hat{q})^2}$
theoretical	$2.51 \times 10^7$	$4.65 \times 10^7$	$1.87 \times 10^{17}$
40-bit	$1.77 \times 10^7$	$3.32 \times 10^7$	$9.531 \times 10^{16}$
80-bit	$6.66 \times 10^6$	$1.30 \times 10^7$	$1.46 \times 10^{16}$

Table 1: Table showing the comparison between the data complexities  $N_{BG}$ ,  $N_{Cher}$  and  $N_H$ . For compatibility with  $N_{BG}$ ,  $P_S$  has been taken to be 0.5 in  $N_{Cher}$  and  $N_H$ .

comparative nature of the three data complexities are similar and so we report only the data complexities for  $a = 20$ . These are shown in Table 2. From the table, one can see that the data complexities are close and so, there is not a significant penalty for working with a data complexity expression which applies more generally.

Probability Estimates	Input Difference	$N_{BG}$	$N_{Cher}$
Theoretical	0x3	$2.01 \times 10^8$	$3.68 \times 10^8$
	0x7	$1.09 \times 10^8$	$2.04 \times 10^8$
	0xD	$1.54 \times 10^8$	$2.87 \times 10^8$
	0x5	$1.86 \times 10^8$	$3.42 \times 10^8$
	0xB	$1.99 \times 10^8$	$3.65 \times 10^8$
	0xF	$1.13 \times 10^8$	$2.11 \times 10^8$
40-bit	0x3	$1.32 \times 10^8$	$2.45 \times 10^8$
	0x7	$8.22 \times 10^7$	$1.56 \times 10^8$
	0xD	$1.08 \times 10^8$	$2.03 \times 10^8$
	0x5	$1.29 \times 10^8$	$2.40 \times 10^8$
	0xB	$1.27 \times 10^8$	$2.37 \times 10^8$
	0xF	$8.40 \times 10^7$	$1.59 \times 10^8$
80-bit	0x3	$1.42 \times 10^8$	$2.63 \times 10^8$
	0x7	$8.90 \times 10^6$	$1.84 \times 10^7$
	0xD	$1.20 \times 10^8$	$2.25 \times 10^8$
	0x5	$1.28 \times 10^8$	$2.39 \times 10^8$
	0xB	$1.39 \times 10^8$	$2.58 \times 10^8$
	0xF	$8.56 \times 10^7$	$1.62 \times 10^8$

Table 2: Table showing the comparison between the data complexities  $N_{BG}$  and  $N_{Cher}$  for SMALLPRESENT with  $\nu_0 = 1$ ,  $P_S = 0.5$  and  $a = 20$ .

The case  $\nu_0 = 1$  was earlier studied in [7]. Two approaches were used. One was based on the log-likelihood ratio (LLR) and the other on the chi-squared statistic and corresponding expressions for data complexities were obtained. We tried to compare these data complexities with those in Table 2. However, this turned out to be problematic. For both the LLR and the chi-squared approaches from [7], the values obtained for the data complexities turned out to be meaningless. We further investigated the reasons for this and came to the following conclusions.

**Non-applicability of the chi-squared based data complexity from [7] to SMALLPRESENT:** For the chi-squared based approach in [7], certain conditions are required to hold for the approximations to be valid [21]. For the distributions of SMALLPRESENT, these conditions are violated and so the applicability of the data complexity expression becomes invalid. We provide more details from [21].

Consider two distributions  $\tilde{p} = (p_0, \dots, p_\tau)$  and  $\tilde{q} = (q_0, \dots, q_\tau)$ . In the context of multiple differential cryptanalysis using the chi-squared approach, the test statistic follows a non-central chi-squared distribution for the correct choice of the target sub-key. Following the chi-squared approach, for the non-central chi-squared approximation to hold, it is necessary that for each  $\eta = 0, 1, \dots, \tau$  both the following two conditions are satisfied. We refer to [21] for details.

1.  $|p_\eta(1 - p_\eta) - q_\eta(1 - q_\eta)| \leq p_\eta(1 - p_\eta)$ .
2.  $|p_\eta(1 - p_\eta) - q_\eta(1 - q_\eta)| / (p_\eta(1 - p_\eta)) \approx 0$ .

It was experimentally verified that for all the 18 distributions for  $\nu_0 = 1$  arising from SMALLPRESENT  $|p_\eta(1 - p_\eta) - q_\eta(1 - q_\eta)| \leq p_\eta(1 - p_\eta)$  but  $|p_\eta(1 - p_\eta) - q_\eta(1 - q_\eta)| / (p_\eta(1 - p_\eta)) \approx 1$ . As a consequence, the data complexities computed from these distribution give meaningless results, i.e., in all the 18 cases the values of the data complexities are less than 1.

**Comparison to the LLR based data complexity from [7]:** The problem with the LLR-based approach from [7] is different. It turns out that putting  $P_S = 0.5$  in the LLR-based data complexity expression given in [7] leads to meaningless values, while the expression provides meaningful values of data complexity for higher values of  $P_S$ . This indicates that the data complexity expression obtained from the LLR-based approach is invalid for  $P_S = 0.5$ . An earlier LLR-based data complexity expression for linear cryptanalysis [10, Theorem 2] had explicitly required  $P_S > 0.5$ . Though this is not mentioned in the analysis in [7], it seems that this condition still applies. We investigate this issue in further details.

Table 3 compares the data complexity given in [7] to the one given by (13) for  $P_S = 0.1, 0.2, \dots, 0.9$ . The other settings of the experiment remain the same as before, i.e., we consider the same 18 distributions and fix the advantage  $a = 20$ . In the table,  $N_{LLR}$  denotes the data complexity that was given in [7, Theorem 1].

We note an anomalous behaviour for  $N_{LLR}$ . It is clear that the data complexity should be a non-decreasing function of the success probability, i.e., if the value of  $P_S$  is increased, then the amount of plaintext-ciphertext pairs required should not be lesser. To take an example, the data complexity required to ensure success probability at least 0.2 also ensures that the success probability is at least 0.1. However,  $N_{LLR}$  does not follow this behaviour. From Table 3 it can be noted that as  $P_S$  increases from 0.1 to 0.9, the data complexity first decreases reaching its minimum at  $P_S = 0.5$  and then again increases. This phenomenon is possibly due to unexplained error in the normal approximation used in [7]. In contrast, we note that  $N_{Cher}$  is a monotone increasing function of  $P_S$  as is to be expected.

It is interesting to note that between the different approximate data complexity expressions, the one in [6] requires  $P_S$  to be close to 0.5; the LLR-based data complexity expression in [7] requires  $P_S > 0.5$  and the chi-square based data complexity expression does not apply to SMALLPRESENT. This indicates various troublesome issues in using approximations. As mentioned earlier, the analysis of the data complexity carried out in this paper does not require any approximations and applies for all values of  $P_S$ .

## 8 Conclusion

This work considered multiple differential cryptanalysis without any restrictions on the input and the output differences. Expressions for data complexities were derived. These are obtained as closed-form formulas in terms of the success probability and the advantage of an attack. A main point of the work was to avoid making any

approximation. As a result the obtained expressions are generally applicable. Another important advantage of the new analysis is that it is possible to estimate the data complexity for any value of the success probability.

## A Concentration Inequalities

### A.1 Chernoff Bounds

We briefly recall some results on tail probabilities of sums of Poisson trials that will be used. These results can be found in standard texts such as [18, 17] and are usually referred to as the Chernoff bounds.

**Theorem 4.** *Let  $X_1, X_2, \dots, X_\lambda$  be a sequence of independent Poisson trials such that for  $1 \leq i \leq \lambda$ ,  $\Pr[X_i = 1] = p_i$ . Then for  $X = \sum_{i=1}^\lambda X_i$  and  $\mu = E[X] = \sum_{i=1}^\lambda p_i$  the following bounds hold:*

$$\text{For any } \gamma > 0, \Pr[X \geq (1 + \gamma)\mu] < \left( \frac{e^{-\gamma}}{(1 + \gamma)^{(1+\gamma)}} \right)^\mu. \quad (26)$$

$$\text{For any } 0 < \gamma < 1, \Pr[X \leq (1 - \gamma)\mu] \leq \left( \frac{e^{-\gamma}}{(1 - \gamma)^{(1-\gamma)}} \right)^\mu. \quad (27)$$

These bounds can be simplified to the following form.

$$\text{For any } 0 < \gamma \leq 1, \Pr[X \geq (1 + \gamma)\mu] \leq e^{-\mu\gamma^2/3}. \quad (28)$$

$$\text{For any } 0 < \gamma < 1, \Pr[X \leq (1 - \gamma)\mu] \leq e^{-\mu\gamma^2/2}. \quad (29)$$

### A.2 Hoeffding Inequality

we briefly recall Hoeffding's inequality for sum of independent random variables. The result can be found in standard texts such as [17].

**Theorem 5** (Hoeffding Inequality). *Let,  $X_1, X_2, \dots, X_\lambda$  be a finite sequence of independent random variables, such that for all  $i = 1, \dots, \lambda$ , there exists real numbers  $a_i, b_i \in \mathbb{R}$ , with  $a_i < b_i$  and  $a_i \leq X_i \leq b_i$ . Let  $X = \sum_{i=1}^\lambda X_i$ . Then for any positive  $t > 0$ ,*

$$\Pr[X - E[X] \geq t] \leq \exp\left(-\frac{2t^2}{D_\lambda}\right), \quad (30)$$

$$\Pr[X - E[X] \leq -t] \leq \exp\left(-\frac{2t^2}{D_\lambda}\right), \quad (31)$$

$$\Pr[|X - E[X]| \geq t] \leq 2 \exp\left(-\frac{2t^2}{D_\lambda}\right); \quad (32)$$

where  $D_\lambda = \sum_{i=1}^\lambda (b_i - a_i)^2$ .

## B On the Expressions for Data Complexity in [6]

The work by Blondeau and Gérard [6] provides expressions relating success probability, advantage and the data complexity of a multiple differential cryptanalysis. These are given in Corollaries 1 and 2 of [6] and have been earlier stated in this work as Equations (7) and (9). In this section, we consider these expressions further.

The expressions for  $G(x)$  (and  $G^*(x)$ ) required for (9) are given in Proposition 1 of [6]. We reproduce these expressions below.

**From Proposition 1 of [6].** Let  $G_{\mathcal{P}}(\tau, q)$  be the cumulative distribution function of the Poisson distribution with parameter  $qN_s$ . Let  $G_-(\tau, q)$  and  $G_+(\tau, q)$  be as defined in [6, Theorem 3]. Define  $G(\tau, q)$  as

$$G(\tau, q) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{cases} G_-(\tau, q) & \text{if } \tau < q - 3 \cdot \sqrt{q/N_s}, \\ 1 - G_+(\tau, q) & \text{if } \tau > q + 3 \cdot \sqrt{q/N_s}, \\ G_{\mathcal{P}}(\tau, q) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (33)$$

The functions  $G$  and  $G^*$  are defined as follows.

$$G^*(\tau) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} G(\tau, p_*) \quad \text{and} \quad G(\tau) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} G(\tau, p), \quad (34)$$

where

$$p_* = \frac{\sum_{i,j} p_*^{(i,j)}}{|\Delta_0|}; \quad \text{and} \quad p = \frac{\sum_{i,j} p^{(i,j)}}{|\Delta_0|} \approx \frac{|\Delta|}{2^m |\Delta_0|}.$$

The functions  $G_-(\tau, q)$  and  $G_+(\tau, q)$  used in the above definition of  $G(x)$  and  $G^*(x)$  are given in [6, Theorem 3] as follows:

$$\left. \begin{aligned} G_-(\tau, q) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} e^{-N_s D(\tau||q)} \cdot \left[ \frac{q\sqrt{1-\tau}}{(q-\tau)\sqrt{2\pi\tau N_s}} + \frac{1}{\sqrt{8\pi\tau N_s}} \right], \\ G_+(\tau, q) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} e^{-N_s D(\tau||q)} \cdot \left[ \frac{(1-q)\sqrt{\tau}}{(\tau-q)\sqrt{2\pi N_s(1-\tau)}} + \frac{1}{\sqrt{8\pi\tau N_s}} \right]. \end{aligned} \right\} \quad (35)$$

In the above,

$$N_s = \frac{|\Delta_0|N}{2} \quad (36)$$

where  $N$  is the data complexity and  $D(\cdot)$  is the Kullback-Liebler divergence.

It is required to combine (9), (10), (33), (34), (35) and (36) to obtain a single expression involving  $N$ ,  $P_S$  and  $a$ . Then, it is required to solve this expression for  $N$  in terms of  $P_S$  and  $a$ . It is not possible to obtain any meaningful closed form expression for  $N$ . Numerical methods to solve for  $N$  may be possible, but, even this is not clear.

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$P_S$	Input Difference	Data Complexities for Theoretical Probability Estimates		Data Complexities for 40-bit Probability Estimates		Data Complexities for 80-bit Probability Estimates	
		$N_{LLR}$	$N_{Cher}$	$N_{LLR}$	$N_{Cher}$	$N_{LLR}$	$N_{Cher}$
0.1	0x3	$2.91 \times 10^8$	$5.60 \times 10^7$	$1.94 \times 10^8$	$3.73 \times 10^7$	$2.08 \times 10^8$	$4.00 \times 10^7$
	0x7	$1.61 \times 10^8$	$3.10 \times 10^7$	$1.23 \times 10^8$	$2.36 \times 10^7$	$1.46 \times 10^7$	$2.80 \times 10^6$
	0xD	$2.27 \times 10^8$	$4.36 \times 10^7$	$1.60 \times 10^8$	$3.09 \times 10^7$	$1.78 \times 10^8$	$3.42 \times 10^7$
	0x5	$2.70 \times 10^8$	$5.20 \times 10^7$	$1.90 \times 10^8$	$3.65 \times 10^7$	$1.89 \times 10^8$	$3.64 \times 10^7$
	0xB	$2.88 \times 10^8$	$5.55 \times 10^7$	$1.88 \times 10^8$	$3.61 \times 10^7$	$2.03 \times 10^8$	$3.92 \times 10^7$
	0xF	$1.67 \times 10^8$	$3.21 \times 10^7$	$1.25 \times 10^8$	$2.41 \times 10^7$	$1.28 \times 10^8$	$2.46 \times 10^7$
0.2	0x3	$1.25 \times 10^8$	$1.19 \times 10^8$	$8.35 \times 10^7$	$7.90 \times 10^7$	$8.96 \times 10^7$	$8.47 \times 10^7$
	0x7	$6.94 \times 10^7$	$6.56 \times 10^7$	$5.30 \times 10^7$	$5.01 \times 10^7$	$6.29 \times 10^6$	$5.93 \times 10^6$
	0xD	$9.77 \times 10^7$	$9.24 \times 10^7$	$6.92 \times 10^7$	$6.54 \times 10^7$	$7.66 \times 10^7$	$7.24 \times 10^7$
	0x5	$1.17 \times 10^8$	$1.10 \times 10^8$	$8.18 \times 10^7$	$7.73 \times 10^7$	$8.15 \times 10^7$	$7.71 \times 10^7$
	0xB	$1.24 \times 10^8$	$1.17 \times 10^8$	$8.09 \times 10^7$	$7.65 \times 10^7$	$8.77 \times 10^7$	$8.29 \times 10^7$
	0xF	$7.19 \times 10^7$	$6.79 \times 10^7$	$5.41 \times 10^7$	$5.11 \times 10^7$	$5.51 \times 10^7$	$5.21 \times 10^7$
0.3	0x3	$4.87 \times 10^7$	$1.90 \times 10^8$	$3.24 \times 10^7$	$1.26 \times 10^8$	$3.48 \times 10^7$	$1.35 \times 10^8$
	0x7	$2.69 \times 10^7$	$1.05 \times 10^8$	$2.06 \times 10^7$	$8.00 \times 10^7$	$2.44 \times 10^6$	$9.48 \times 10^6$
	0xD	$3.79 \times 10^7$	$1.48 \times 10^8$	$2.69 \times 10^7$	$1.05 \times 10^8$	$2.98 \times 10^7$	$1.16 \times 10^8$
	0x5	$4.53 \times 10^7$	$1.76 \times 10^8$	$3.18 \times 10^7$	$1.24 \times 10^8$	$3.17 \times 10^7$	$1.23 \times 10^8$
	0xB	$4.82 \times 10^7$	$1.88 \times 10^8$	$3.14 \times 10^7$	$1.22 \times 10^8$	$3.41 \times 10^7$	$1.33 \times 10^8$
	0xF	$2.79 \times 10^7$	$1.09 \times 10^8$	$2.10 \times 10^7$	$8.17 \times 10^7$	$2.14 \times 10^7$	$8.32 \times 10^7$
0.4	0x3	$1.14 \times 10^7$	$2.71 \times 10^8$	$7.57 \times 10^6$	$1.81 \times 10^8$	$8.11 \times 10^6$	$1.94 \times 10^8$
	0x7	$6.29 \times 10^6$	$1.50 \times 10^8$	$4.80 \times 10^6$	$1.15 \times 10^8$	$5.70 \times 10^5$	$1.36 \times 10^7$
	0xD	$8.85 \times 10^6$	$2.11 \times 10^8$	$6.27 \times 10^6$	$1.50 \times 10^8$	$6.94 \times 10^6$	$1.66 \times 10^8$
	0x5	$1.06 \times 10^7$	$2.52 \times 10^8$	$7.41 \times 10^6$	$1.77 \times 10^8$	$7.39 \times 10^6$	$1.76 \times 10^8$
	0xB	$1.13 \times 10^7$	$2.69 \times 10^8$	$7.33 \times 10^6$	$1.75 \times 10^8$	$7.95 \times 10^6$	$1.90 \times 10^8$
	0xF	$6.51 \times 10^6$	$1.56 \times 10^8$	$4.90 \times 10^6$	$1.17 \times 10^8$	$4.99 \times 10^6$	$1.19 \times 10^8$
0.5	0x3	0.35	$3.68 \times 10^8$	0.15	$2.45 \times 10^8$	0.18	$2.63 \times 10^8$
	0x7	0.12	$2.04 \times 10^8$	0.07	$1.56 \times 10^8$	0.00074	$1.84 \times 10^7$
	0xD	0.19	$2.87 \times 10^8$	0.09	$2.03 \times 10^8$	0.11	$2.25 \times 10^8$
	0x5	0.30	$3.42 \times 10^8$	0.15	$2.40 \times 10^8$	0.15	$2.39 \times 10^8$
	0xB	0.34	$3.65 \times 10^8$	0.14	$2.37 \times 10^8$	0.17	$2.58 \times 10^8$
	0xF	0.13	$2.11 \times 10^8$	0.07	$1.59 \times 10^8$	0.07	$1.62 \times 10^8$
0.6	0x3	$1.14 \times 10^7$	$4.87 \times 10^8$	$7.57 \times 10^6$	$3.24 \times 10^8$	$8.12 \times 10^6$	$3.48 \times 10^8$
	0x7	$6.29 \times 10^6$	$2.69 \times 10^8$	$4.80 \times 10^6$	$2.06 \times 10^8$	$5.70 \times 10^5$	$2.43 \times 10^7$
	0xD	$8.86 \times 10^6$	$3.79 \times 10^8$	$6.27 \times 10^6$	$2.69 \times 10^8$	$6.95 \times 10^6$	$2.97 \times 10^8$
	0x5	$1.06 \times 10^7$	$4.53 \times 10^8$	$7.42 \times 10^6$	$3.18 \times 10^8$	$7.39 \times 10^6$	$3.16 \times 10^8$
	0xB	$1.13 \times 10^7$	$4.82 \times 10^8$	$7.33 \times 10^6$	$3.14 \times 10^8$	$7.95 \times 10^6$	$3.41 \times 10^8$
	0xF	$6.51 \times 10^6$	$2.79 \times 10^8$	$4.90 \times 10^6$	$2.10 \times 10^8$	$4.99 \times 10^6$	$2.14 \times 10^8$
0.7	0x3	$4.87 \times 10^7$	$6.40 \times 10^8$	$3.24 \times 10^7$	$4.26 \times 10^8$	$3.48 \times 10^7$	$4.57 \times 10^8$
	0x7	$2.69 \times 10^7$	$3.54 \times 10^8$	$2.06 \times 10^7$	$2.70 \times 10^8$	$2.44 \times 10^6$	$3.20 \times 10^7$
	0xD	$3.79 \times 10^7$	$4.98 \times 10^8$	$2.69 \times 10^7$	$3.53 \times 10^8$	$2.98 \times 10^7$	$3.91 \times 10^8$
	0x5	$4.53 \times 10^7$	$5.95 \times 10^8$	$3.18 \times 10^7$	$4.17 \times 10^8$	$3.17 \times 10^7$	$4.16 \times 10^8$
	0xB	$4.83 \times 10^7$	$6.34 \times 10^8$	$3.14 \times 10^7$	$4.12 \times 10^8$	$3.41 \times 10^7$	$4.48 \times 10^8$
	0xF	$2.79 \times 10^7$	$3.67 \times 10^8$	$2.10 \times 10^7$	$2.76 \times 10^8$	$2.14 \times 10^7$	$2.81 \times 10^8$
0.8	0x3	$1.25 \times 10^8$	$8.55 \times 10^8$	$8.35 \times 10^7$	$5.69 \times 10^8$	$8.96 \times 10^7$	$6.10 \times 10^8$
	0x7	$6.94 \times 10^7$	$4.73 \times 10^8$	$5.30 \times 10^7$	$3.61 \times 10^8$	$6.29 \times 10^6$	$4.28 \times 10^7$
	0xD	$9.77 \times 10^7$	$6.66 \times 10^8$	$6.92 \times 10^7$	$4.72 \times 10^8$	$7.67 \times 10^7$	$5.22 \times 10^8$
	0x5	$1.17 \times 10^8$	$7.95 \times 10^8$	$8.18 \times 10^7$	$5.58 \times 10^8$	$8.16 \times 10^7$	$5.56 \times 10^8$
	0xB	$1.24 \times 10^8$	$8.47 \times 10^8$	$8.09 \times 10^7$	$5.51 \times 10^8$	$8.78 \times 10^7$	$5.98 \times 10^8$
	0xF	$7.19 \times 10^7$	$4.90 \times 10^8$	$5.41 \times 10^7$	$3.69 \times 10^8$	$5.51 \times 10^7$	$3.76 \times 10^8$
0.9	0x3	$2.91 \times 10^8$	$1.22 \times 10^9$	$1.94 \times 10^8$	$8.15 \times 10^8$	$2.08 \times 10^8$	$8.73 \times 10^8$
	0x7	$1.61 \times 10^8$	$6.77 \times 10^8$	$1.23 \times 10^8$	$5.17 \times 10^8$	$1.46 \times 10^7$	$6.12 \times 10^7$
	0xD	$2.27 \times 10^8$	$9.53 \times 10^8$	$1.60 \times 10^8$	$6.75 \times 10^8$	$1.78 \times 10^8$	$7.47 \times 10^8$
	0x5	$2.70 \times 10^8$	$1.14 \times 10^9$	$1.90 \times 10^8$	$7.98 \times 10^8$	$1.89 \times 10^8$	$7.95 \times 10^8$
	0xB	$2.88 \times 10^8$	$1.21 \times 10^9$	$1.88 \times 10^8$	$7.89 \times 10^8$	$2.03 \times 10^8$	$8.56 \times 10^8$
	0xF	$1.67 \times 10^8$	$7.01 \times 10^8$	$1.25 \times 10^8$	$5.27 \times 10^8$	$1.28 \times 10^8$	$5.37 \times 10^8$

Table 3: Table showing the comparison between  $N_{LLR}$  and  $N_{Cher}$  for SMALLPRESENT with  $\nu_0 = 1$ ,  $P_S = 0.1, 0.2, \dots, 0.9$  and  $a = 20$ .