Abstract

A number of existing cryptosystems use the well-known LSAG signature and its extensions. This article presents a simple logarithmic-size signature scheme LS-LSAG which, despite a radical reduction in size, retains the basic code block of the LSAG signature. Therefore, substituting LS-LSAG for LSAG requires minimal changes to almost any existing coded LSAG extension, making it logarithmic instead of linear.

1 Introduction

The design of LSAG signature [6] is linear in the anonymity set size, and this linearity persists in the solutions extending LSAG. A number of existing anonymous blockchains are based upon the Cryptonote protocol [9] and thus inherit LSAG. For example, the CLSAG signature [3] of the Monero blockchain [7] optimizes the LSAG size while still remaining in the linear class. It also enhances LSAG so that 'hinged equipment', e.g., hidden wallet balance equations, can be 'mounted'.

At the same time, there already exist logarithmic signatures based on the same cryptographic assumptions as LSAG. Some of their concepts are presented in [4, 8], [1], [10]. In addition to the logarithmic size, they open a possibility for efficient batch verification which is not available in LSAG. However, if you have a working software using LSAG/CLSAG, then moving to a logarithmic scheme raises a question of compatibility. That is, how much of LSAG’s hinged equipment has to be unmounted, reconsidered and, finally, how much code needs to be rewritten.

We propose LS-LSAG which allows for a smooth solution to this problem. LS-LSAG is a logarithmic-size signature that retains the base code block of LSAG/CLSAG, and thus does not require a major replacement of equipments. However, due to the retained block, batch verification is not included. That’s the compromise. The only prerequisite for LS-LSAG is a logarithmic-size inner-product argument module, which is typically already installed in LSAG-based systems with hidden balances.

2 LSAG code block

Assuming that the reader is aware of the LSAG, CLSAG, and Cryptonote design, let’s go directly to what they have in common. For a ring of \( n \) public keys \( P \) and a key image \( I \), there are \( n \) systems of Schnorr-like equations

\[
\begin{aligned}
T_i &= r_i^* G + c_i^* P_i \\
V_i &= r_i^* H_p(P_i) + c_i^* I
\end{aligned}
\]  

(1)

Here, \( \{c_i^*\}_{i=0}^{n-1} \) and \( \{r_i^*\}_{i=0}^{n-1} \) are some scalars that are either randomly sampled or transmitted in the signature, divided respectively into the challenge and reply parts. Specific methods for obtaining these scalars vary in different LSAG-based schemes, we will sample and generate them in our own way.
In general, each equation in the systems (1) adheres to the Schnorr signature pattern. That is, its left-hand side gets evaluated after the challenges and replies are inserted in the right-hand side, and signer can successfully sign only knowing the left-hand side ahead of time.

In the LSAG-based schemes, the scalars \( \{c_i^{n-1}\}_{i=0}^n \cup \{r_i^{n-1}\}_{i=0}^n \) are chosen in such a way as to allow accepting verification only if the left-hand side of at least one of the systems (1), say at index \( i = s \), is known to signer before querying the random oracle. By the same reason as in the Schnorr scheme, this knowledge of the left-hand side implies knowledge of a private key \( x \) such that \( \tilde{P}_s = xG \) and \( I = xH(P_s) \). Our LS-LSAG signature will follow the same principle.

As an extension, composite keys can be used. For instance, CLSAG operates with keys represented as vectors. They move into our scheme unchanged, along with the corresponding random weights. For simplicity, we denote them as \( P_i \)'s, implying that instead of \( G, P_s, H(P_s), I \) in (1), for LS-LSAG, there will be some expressions from the original scheme. Furthermore, there may be additional equations in (1), e.g., related to wallet balances. They come from the original scheme to LS-LSAG in the same way as the considered ones. We omit explicitly showing these composite keys and additional equations to avoid cluttering.

Taking all of the above into account, we define ‘LSAG code block’ as the following set of equations, which corresponds to \( n \) systems (1).

\[
T = \{rG + cP_i\}_{i=0}^{n-1} \\
V = \{rH(P_i) + cI\}_{i=0}^{n-1}
\]

(2)

In this block we instantly reflect the fact that, in LS-LSAG, there will be only two scalars \( r \) and \( c \) such that \( \{c_i^{n-1}\}_{i=0}^n = \{c_i^{n-1}\}_{i=0}^n \) and \( \{r_i^{n-1}\}_{i=0}^n = \{r_i^{n-1}\}_{i=0}^n \).

In all other respects the expressions in (2) are assumed the same as in the source LSAG-based scheme. The omitted components implicitly move into (2). If besides the set \( \{r_i^{n-1}\}_{i=0}^n \) another scalar set \( \{\tilde{r}_i^{n-1}\}_{i=0}^n \) is used in the additional equations of the source scheme, then it can be replaced by a corresponding scalar \( \tilde{r} \). The replacement principle will be the same as for \( r \).

3 Signature LS-LSAG

Setup procedure for LS-LSAG is simple. It creates a set of \( n+3 \) linearly independent generators, one of which is the predefined group generator \( G \). This set is used in all instances of the signature.

\[
\text{Setup}(G \in \mathbb{G}, n \in \mathbb{N}) \\
B \leftarrow G^n, \ D, H \leftarrow \mathbb{G} \\
cgen = \{B, D, H, G\} \in G^{n+3} \\
\text{return } cgen
\]

The LS-LSAG scheme is presented in the common prove-and-verify notation on the next page. The random oracle is modeled by the hash function \( H_s \). When input to the random oracle is the entire transcript created up to the point of querying, then the oracle output is denoted, as usual, as a challenge.

To obtain linearly independent group elements, the standard second-preimage resistant hash-to-curve function \( H_p \) is used. It is assumed, as usual, that \( H_p \) deterministically models a random oracle on the curve, and thus there is no winning adversary in the DL assumption game for \( H_p \) image of any set.
At the final step, the zk-WIP\textsubscript{1}n inner-product argument procedure from the Bulletproofs-plus paper \cite{bulletproofs-plus} is played, with \( \lambda = 1 \). However, any other zero-knowledge inner-product argument implementation can be used instead.

The linking procedure is assumed to be the mere comparison of key images, it is not shown.

Signature LS-LSAG\((m \in \{0, 1\}^*, \ P \in \mathbb{G}^n; \ x \in \mathbb{F}, \ s \in [0, n - 1])\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prover ( \mathcal{P} )</th>
<th>Verifier ( \mathcal{V} )</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>\textbf{Step 0:} ( \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V} ) validate the ring. \textbf{Step 0:} ( \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V} ) validate the ring.</td>
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\begin{align*}
\text{assert} & \forall i,j,i \neq j : P_i \neq 0, P_i \neq P_j \\
\text{assert} & P_s = xG \\
I &= xH_p(P_s) \\
t, \alpha &\gets \mathbb{F} \\
T &= tG, \ V = tH_p(P_s) \\
A &= H_p(c_{\text{gen}} || m || P || I || T || V) + \alpha H
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\text{Step 1:} \mathcal{P} & \text{ builds the key image } I \text{ and commits to } (T, V) \text{ at the index } s \\
I, A &\gets \mathbb{F} \\
r &= t - cx
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\text{Step 2:} \mathcal{V} & \text{ receives } I, A, \text{ makes a challenge } c \text{ and gets a reply } r \\
I, A &\gets \mathbb{F} \\
r &\gets \mathbb{F}
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\text{Step 3:} \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V} & \text{ calculate the LSAG code block} \\
[T &= \{rG + cP_i\}_{i=0}^{n-1} \\
[V &= \{rH_p(P_i) + cI\}_{i=0}^{n-1}
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\text{Step 4:} \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V} & \text{ calculate hashes of all } (T_i, V_i) \\
A &= \{H_p(c_{\text{gen}} || m || P || I || T_i || V_i)\}_{i=0}^{n-1}
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\text{Step 5:} \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V} & \text{ build the commitment } W \text{ using one more challenge} \\
e &\gets \mathbb{F} \\
W &= A + e \cdot (1^n, B) + eD
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\text{Step 6:} \mathcal{P} & \text{ builds one-hot vector } a \text{ s.t. } A \text{ is a commitment to } a \text{ over } A \\
a &= \{ \begin{array}{c}
a_s = 1 \\
\forall i \in [0, n - 1], i \neq s : a_i = 0
\end{array}
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\text{Step 7:} \mathcal{P} & \text{ convinces } \mathcal{V} \text{ that } \langle a, e1^n \rangle = e \text{ using Bulletproofs-plus} \\
\text{play} & \text{ zk-WIP}_{\lambda n}(A, B, D, H, W; a, e1^n, \alpha)
\end{align*}

Informally speaking, in this scheme the prover randomly generates the left-hand side \((T, V)\) of the system \((1)\) under the signing index \(s\). Then, the prover commits to \((T, V)\) by hashing it to a point on the curve. The resulting commitment \(A\),
which is sent to verifier, is blinded with the randomn $\alpha H$. The verifier makes a challenge $c$, and the prover replies with $r$, so that now the left-hand sides of all $n$ systems (1) can be computed. Specifically, for the $s$-th system, its left-hand side turns out to be the opening of the commitment $A$, that is, $(T_s, V_s) = (T, V)$.

Now, both the prover and the verifier hash all the left-hand sides $(T_i, V_i)$ into a point vector $A$ of length $n$. Clearly, $A$ is a blinded version of $A$. Considering $A$ as a basis, the prover convinces the verifier that $A$ is a linear combination of the points from $A$ and that $A \neq 0$.

To accomplish this, the prover creates the one-hot vector $a$ where $s$-th element is hot, and using the inner-product argument shows that $\langle a, e1^n \rangle = 1$ holds. Concretely, the prover shows that the element $W = A + e(1^n, B) + eD$ is a commitment to the vectors $a$ and $e1^n$ over $A \cup B \cup \{D\}$ such that $\langle a, e1^n \rangle = e$.

Here, $D$ is a separate generator for inner-product, as required by the inner-product argument, and $e$ is an auxiliary randomness which prevents the prover from cheating with $A$ by adding to it some points not from $A$.

**Theorem 1** (Completeness, linkability). LS-LSAG is complete and linkable.

**Proof.** Follows trivially from the scheme.

**Theorem 2** (Anonymity). LS-LSAG is anonymous.

**Proof.** (Sketch) The transcripts of LS-LSAG and LSAG differ only in the commitment $A$ and sub-transcript of zk-WIP $\vec{1}_n$. The scalar challenges and the replies $r, \{r_i^*\}_{i=0}^{n-1}$ are not counted, as they are independent and uniformly distributed.

As the commitment $A$ is hiding, and as zk-WIP $\vec{1}_n$ is zero-knowledge, anonymity of LS-LSAG reduces to the anonymity of LSAG.

To understand soundness of the scheme, let’s rewind it. At the end, verifier is convinced that the commitment $A$ is a known to the prover linear combination of points from $A$ with at least one non-zero coefficient. Rewind to the moment of the challenge $c$ and repeat with a different random value $c'$.

For the case, if at least one of $n$ systems (1) has its left-hand side remaining the same for $c$ and $c'$, the private key can be recovered from it the way this is usually done for Schnorr-like schemes.

Consider the opposite case, where none of the systems (1) has its left-hand side for $c$ equal to its left-hand side for $c'$. It’s easy to see that left-hand sides at distinct indexes cannot match. Thus, there are no equal entries in the combined set of $2n$ left-hand sides for $c$ and $c'$.

Now consider the two respective sets $A$ and $A'$ of $H_p$ images of these left-hand sides, for $c$ and $c'$. The images are all different, otherwise a collision for $H_p$ is found. For each of the sets $A$ and $A'$, the point $A$ is a non-trivial linear combination of its elements. Eliminating $A$, we get a non-trivial sum of hash-to-curve images that equals to zero. This implies existence of a winning adversary for the DL assumption game.

Thus, only the first case is possible, where for one of the systems (1) its left-hand side is preserved, and the private signing key is recovered from it. The key image is properly built in this case as well.

**Theorem 3** (Unforgeability). LS-LSAG is unforgeable.

**Proof.** (Sketch) Following the definition and theorem for unforgeability in [3], we only need to show that an adversary has only a negligible probability to successfully sign with an alien key image.
Suppose that an adversarial signer knows a private key $y$ such that $yG \notin P$, and produces an acceptable signature with the ring $P$ and key image $I_A = yH_p(yG)$. We will show that this signer becomes a successful adversary for the DL game.

We assume that $H_p$ models a random oracle on the curve and is second-preimage resistant, e.g., follows the idea of [5]. It should be noted that, since $yG$ is also a signing key for another successful signature, it holds that $y \neq 0$ due to the validation at Step 0.

As zk-WIP$_{\tau_n}$ has witness-extended emulation, the signer has an non-negligible probability of rewinding the forged signature to the challenge $c$ and obtaining another successful forgery for another independently and uniformly sampled value $c'$, for the same $P, I_A, A$.

Let $F = \{T_i, V_i\}_{i=0}^{n-1} = \{rG + cP_i, rH_p(P_i) + cI_A\}_{i=0}^{n-1}$ be a set of the left-hand sides of $n$ systems (1) for the transcript with $c$. The ring is validated for $\forall i, j, i \neq j : P_i \neq P_j$; this implies $T_i \neq T_j$, and hence $\forall i, j, i \neq j : F \ni (T_i, V_i) \neq (T_j, V_j) \in F$. That is, all elements in $F$ are distinct. The same holds for the set $F'$ related to $c'$.

If $\exists i, j \in [0, n-1] : F \ni (T_i, V_i) = (T_j', V_j') \in F'$, then $V_i = V_j'$ implies that, in the case of $i = j$, it holds that $(r - r')H_p(P_i) + (c - c')I_A = 0$, and hence, as $I_A = yH_p(yG), y \neq 0, yG \neq P_i$, the signer wins the DL game.

For the opposite case of $i \neq j$, the equality $rH_p(P_i) - r' H_p(P_j) + (c - c')I_A = 0$ follows from $V_i - V_j'$. As $P_i \neq P_j, P_i \neq yG, P_j \neq yG, I_A = yH_p(yG), y \neq 0$, the signer wins the DL game again. As a result, since the DL assumption still holds, all elements of the set $F \cup F'$ are distinct with overwhelming probability.

In both transcripts, for $c$ and $c'$, at the Steps 5, 6, 7, the verifier is convinced that the commitment $A$ is a non-trivial linear combination of the $H_p$ images of $F$ and $F'$, respectively. By equating these two linear combinations to each other and thus eliminating $A$, the signer obtains a non-trivial linear combination of the $H_p$ images of the elements from $F \cup F'$. Since, by the above, all the elements in $F \cup F'$ are different, their images are independently and uniformly sampled from $\mathbb{G}$. This means that, again, the signer wins the DL game.

Thus, if the signer successfully signs with $I_A$, then it wins in the DL game, which is what we meant to prove. Therefore, by the theorem about equivalence between non-slanderability and unforgeability in [3], our signature is unforgeable.

\[ \square \]

4 Efficiency

Size of the zk-WIP$_{\tau_n}$ argument is $2\log_2(n) + 5$, therefore size of LS-LSAG is $2\log_2(n) + 8$. For instance, for a ring of 32 addresses, LS-LSAG takes 576 bytes. For a ring of 512 addresses, its size is 832 bytes.

Let’s compare verification complexities of LS-LSAG and LSAG. Since there is only one response $r$, LS-LSAG requires $n$ fewer scalar-element multiplications. However, zk-WIP$_{\tau_n}$ performs in a time approximately equal to $2n/\log_2(n)$, and also there is a time needed to hash $n$ left parts.

For a ring of 32 addresses, these times should nearly compensate each other, making the verification complexities roughly equal. Although we have not conducted such tests. As $n$ increases, verification of LS-LSAG is likely to become comparatively faster.

5 Design summary and post-quantum notes

In a nutshell, the proposed scheme is made up of two parts. The first of them, which follows the LSAG concept, is a set of $n$ Schnorr-like systems (1) where the
left-hand side can be guessed ahead of time only by knowing the private key. The second part contains hash images $A$ of all $n$ left-hand sides and a commitment $A$ to one of them, specifically the one for which the preimage is known in advance. For its main role, the second part provides a zero-knowledge proof that an opening of $A$ belongs to $A$.

In this design, the second part can be varied by changing the hash function and alternating the zero-knowledge proof. Beside this, the linearly independent generators $B, D, H$ can obviously be generated on the fly, in which case the scheme does not require its own setup.

Another feature of this design is that the second part is connected with the first one only through the hashes. This allows the parts to be implemented under different cryptographic assumptions, stronger ones for the first and weaker for the second part.

For example, imagine a setting where the DL problem on a curve is solvable by a quantum computer in a time less than lifetime of a blockchain, e.g., in a decade. Nevertheless, for each newly sampled point there is still a decent amount of time, say a week, to believe that its logarithm is unknown.

In this setting, the first part for sure needs to be quantum-resistant. Let us assume that it is implemented using some of the existing (or future) post-quantum homomorhic (or partially homomorhic) commitment schemes, e.g., on a lattice.

The second part, on the other hand, can be left on the curve almost as is. The only newly required thing will be a guarantee that, prior to submitting the proof to the blockchain, the signer has not discovered any linear dependency between points it uses in the proof. That is, between the $2n + 2$ sampled and one predefined points of the set $A \cup B \cup \{D, H, G\}$.

Such a guarantee can be obtained by letting all of the sampled points expire in a week. This can be done in the blockchain by concatenating their preimages with the block height at the moment of sampling.

References


