Improved Alternating Moduli PRFs and Post-Quantum Signatures

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\textbf{Abstract.} We revisit the alternating moduli paradigm for constructing symmetric key primitives with a focus on constructing highly efficient protocols to evaluate them using secure multi-party computation (MPC). The alternating moduli paradigm of Boneh et al. (TCC 2018) enables the construction of various symmetric key primitives with the common characteristic that the inputs are multiplied by two linear maps over different moduli, first over $\mathbb{F}_2$ and then over $\mathbb{F}_3$.

The first contribution focuses on efficient two-party evaluation of alternating moduli PRFs, effectively building an oblivious pseudorandom function. We present a generalization of the PRF proposed by Boneh et al. (TCC 18) along with methods to lower the communication and computation. We then provide several variants of our protocols, with different computation and communication tradeoffs, for evaluating the PRF. Most are in the OT/VOLE hybrid model while one is based on specialized garbling. Our most efficient protocol effectively is about $3\times$ faster and requires $1.3\times$ lesser communication.

Our next contribution is the efficient evaluation of the OWF $f(x) = B_3(A_2 x)$ proposed by Dinur et al. (CRYPTO 21) where $A \in \mathbb{F}_2^{m \times n}$, $B \in \mathbb{F}_3^{t \times m}$ and $\cdot_p$ is multiplication mod $p$. This surprisingly simple OWF can be evaluated within MPC by secret sharing $[x]$ over $\mathbb{F}_2$, locally computing $[v] = A_2 [x]$, performing a modulus switching protocol to $\mathbb{F}_3$ shares, followed by locally computing the output shares $[y] = B \cdot_3 [v]$. We design a bespoke MPC-in-the-Head (MPCitH) signature scheme that evaluates the OWF, achieving state of art performance. The resulting signature has a size ranging from 4.0-5.5 KB, achieving between $2-3\times$ reduction compared to Dinur et al. To the best of our knowledge, this is only $\approx 5\%$ larger than the smallest signature based on symmetric key primitives, including the latest NIST PQC competition submissions. We additionally show that our core techniques can be extended to build very small post-quantum ring signatures for small-medium sized rings that are competitive with state-of-the-art lattice based schemes. Our techniques are in fact more generally applicable to set membership in MPCitH.\textsuperscript{4}

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1 Introduction

We revisit the line of work on building cryptographic primitives such as one-way functions (OWFs) [Lev85], pseudorandom generators (PRGs) [BM82, Yao82], and pseudorandom functions [GGM84] that can be evaluated efficiently in a distributed setting. Traditionally, instantiations of these primitives have taken two approaches as described in [ABG+14]. The first is the reductionist approach where the security of the construction can be reduced to a “standard” set of well-studied computational assumptions such as the hardness of factoring, discrete logarithm, or learning with errors. The second is a direct construction approach where the construction itself is considered to be the computational assumption. Indeed, many of today’s most widely used primitives follow the direct approach (e.g., AES, SHA).

The reductionist approach comes with several benefits—it improves our theoretical understanding of how various computational hard problems are related and allows the cryptographic community to focus its cryptanalytic efforts on a small set of assumptions. With the test of time, newer assumptions become widely accepted and eventually considered standard by the community. Unfortunately, the benefit of this approach often comes at a large cost to efficiency: often resulting in orders of magnitude worse efficiency compared to the direct construction approach (consider the efficiency gap between SHA-256 and discrete-logarithm-based hash functions). Moreover, with the looming threat of quantum computers, many of the existing standard assumptions are at risk of becoming insecure which, in turn, motivates the investigation of new cryptographic assumptions.

The security of the direct or new constructions, while often not reducible to a standard assumption, are often based on a set of principles that are developed and refined as the problem is studied. The canonical example of this is linear and differential cryptanalysis of symmetric key cryptography. Other examples include early lattice-based construction such as NTRU [HPS98]. In many cases, these schemes first developed security principles which, in time, were refined into a small set of underlying (standard) assumptions.

An additional benefit of direct constructions is that it allows for an added degree of flexibility to conform to a changing set of requirements. This is particularly true in this work where we are focused on designing and using symmetric key primitives that are extremely efficient to evaluate in the secure multi-party setting. Indeed, it seems highly unlikely that assumptions and constructions designed for a wildly different set of constraints would be ideal for this setting. An added advantage of the direct approach is that this flexibility often allows the construction to lack the algebraic structure that a quantum computer could exploit. This is contrasted by traditional assumptions such as factoring or discrete logarithm.

With the increased use of secure multi-party computation (MPC) and the looming approach of quantum computers, there has been a need to consider a new set of assumptions that meet a new set of requirements. In particular, primitives such as ring signatures [RST01], oblivious pseudorandom functions
OPRFs [NR97, FIPR05], verifiable random functions (VRFs) [MRV99], blind signatures [Cha82], and more lack efficient constructions that meet one or more of these requirements. This work is focused on using new symmetric key techniques and novel protocol designs to implement these applications using secure multi-party computation, or the zero-knowledge compiler known as MPC-in-the-head.

**MPC-friendliness.** There are two main categories of concretely efficient MPC protocols—garbling-based (round optimal but large communication overhead) and linear secret sharing-based (communication efficient but round complexity grows with the depth of the circuit). Garbling-based approaches are typically thought to have prohibitively high overheads making them impractical for most applications as also noted in [DGH+21]. Ideally, we want to design primitives that can be evaluated in just one round trip (the minimum required) using linear secret sharing-based protocols.

There has been a long line of work in this direction, with a focus on modifying existing symmetric key primitives to make them *MPC-friendly* [ARS+15, GRR+16, DEG+18, AGP+19]. Despite making progress towards MPC-friendliness, these constructions still suffer from a large round complexity and/or large communication overhead (see [BIP+18] for a discussion). To understand the reason behind the unsatisfactory progress in building MPC-friendly symmetric key primitives, it helps to understand the high-level strategy underlying the cryptanalysis of symmetric key primitives. A popular approach is differential cryptanalysis [BS91] for block ciphers which analyses the effect that a change in the input has on the output. By making sufficiently many queries, one may be able to later distinguish the output from a uniformly random string. The depth of the function is correlated with the difficulty of building a distinguisher and low-depth functions are expected to be insecure—conflicting with the goal of MPC-friendliness.

**Deep yet shallow.** A key observation made by [BIP+18] is that the notions of depth required by MPC and security against cryptanalysis are in fact very different. Starting with this observation, they propose the alternating-moduli paradigm which mixes linear functions over different moduli. One can build concretely efficient MPC protocols to evaluate such functions, where the number of rounds needed only depends on the number of piecewise linear functions. The same function when expressed as a polynomial over a single modulus has a much higher degree, making it resistant to cryptanalysis. This key observation allowed them to build a depth-2 weak PRF which can be evaluated in just one round trip, given a preprocessing phase. Their construction has mostly resisted initial cryptanalysis, with some (easily fixable) attacks requiring a large number of samples found in [CCKK21]. This work was followed by Dinur et al. [DGH+21] who proposed a new OWF, PRG, and a weak PRF based on the same paradigm and showed that one could construct efficient MPC protocols to evaluate them leading to a very efficient round-optimal oblivious pseudorandom function. They also showed that the OWF could be used to build a post-quantum signature...
scheme with good concrete efficiency albeit still larger than the state-of-the-art using symmetric-key primitives.

*Good but not Great.* While prior work designed efficient protocols around the OWF/wPRFs that were proposed, they still either fell short of beating the state-of-the-art or suffered from other limitations. Despite being able to design cryptographic primitives from the ground up, it is unsatisfactory that these protocols are not “the best”. In particular, the signature scheme from [DGH+21] has a much larger size than the state-of-the-art 4-7 KB. More advanced primitives such as ring signatures and verifiable random functions have remained relatively unexplored. Moreover, the 2PC protocols for evaluating these symmetric key functions required significant time to generate the required correlated randomness while the main phase of these protocols have more communication than one would hope for.

### 1.1 Our Contributions

We emphasize that the goal of this work is to revisit the alternating-moduli paradigm and show that when protocols are carefully designed, such that they exploit the structure of alternating-moduli primitives, they indeed achieve state-of-the-art performance. In light of the limitations discussed above, we make the following contributions:

- **New candidate wPRF.** We investigate bottlenecks in the (weak) PRF candidates and propose a new candidate in Section 5. Our wPRF requires less communication and effectively a third of the number of OTs when evaluated in MPC. While prior work [DGH+21] propose a protocol with good performance for the main phase, they omit their relatively large cost of generating correlated randomness. The careful design of our new wPRF optimizes the end-to-end cost of the protocols while at the same time achieving better performance in the main phase. Our construction allows one to instantiate it with $O(\lambda)$ amortized evaluation time while prior works [BIP+18, DGH+21] mandated $O(\lambda^2)$ time.

  While previous work [BIP+18, DGH+21] has primarily focused on using linear secret sharing, and dismissed garbling-based approaches, we show that using specialized garbling schemes leads to competitive protocols that offer an interesting trade-off between the computation and communication.

- **New cryptanalysis & generalized wPRF candidate.** Section 5 continues where we present new cryptanalysis of our construction and the prior art. We show that the hardness of this class of wPRFs is connected to the hardness of solving sparse multivariate polynomials over $\mathbb{F}_3$ or, in its dual form, the hardness of interpolating sparse multilinear polynomials. This analysis suggests a generalized construction based on solving a system of sparse multilinear equations over a small finite field (or the dual) and might, with time, form the basis of an underlying cryptographic assumption.
Fastest OPRF and wPRF protocols. In Section 6 we describe our wPRF protocols and report their performance metrics in Section 12. When compared to the prior alternating-moduli wPRF of [DGH+21], our implementation is an order of magnitude faster, due in part to the implementation itself and the structure of the new wPRF. Compared to commonly used LowMC construction, we observe that our protocols have far fewer rounds of interaction (2 vs. 14 to 88) and are 3 to 20 times faster. Indeed, even compared to DDH-based OPRF protocols, our protocols are an order of magnitude faster and require only slightly more communication. Concretely, our fastest protocol requires just 2 rounds, 8.3 microseconds, and 100 bytes of communication in the amortized setting.

Small pq-signatures from symmetric-key assumptions. We begin Section 8 by revisiting the digital signature scheme from [DGH+21] and build a specialized MPC-in-the-Head (MPCitH) protocol targeting the same OWF, giving us signature sizes ranging from 4.0-5.5 KB. To the best of our knowledge, this gives the second smallest signature (only 5% larger than the smallest) based on symmetric-key/MPCitH techniques. This also addresses an implicit open question in [DGH+21] about whether a specialized proof system for the AM-OWF can lead to better performance. In this process, we also offer additional insights into the security of the AM-OWF, which serves as a useful guideline when introducing additional structure in B.

Smallest pq-ring signatures. In Section 9, we extend our digital signature scheme to a ring signature scheme by introducing a simple yet powerful technique to prove disjunctions of the same relation in MPCitH. Our ring signature grows linearly in the size of the ring, but for small to medium-sized rings, we are concretely smaller than the state-of-the-art. For larger rings, most MPCitH-based signatures, including ours, can be combined with the compiler by Goel et al. [GGHAK22] to build ring signatures whose size only grows logarithmically in the ring size.

2 Overview

MPC-friendly wPRF. We propose a new weak PRF in the alternating-moduli paradigm [BIP+18]. For \( n, m, t = O(\lambda) \), our construction is defined as

\[
F(k, x) := \mathbf{B} \cdot_3 \left( \mathbf{A} \cdot_2 [k \cdot_2 x] \right)
\]

where \( x, k \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \) are the input and key, \( \mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{F}_2^{m \times n} \) is a random matrix, \( \mathbf{B} \in \mathbb{F}_3^{t \times m} \) is a compressing random matrix, and \( \cdot_p, \cdot_\circ_p \) are multiplication and component-wise multiplication modulo \( p \). This differs from the prior constructions [BIP+18] which can be defined as \( F(\mathbf{A}, x) := \mathbf{B}(\mathbf{A}x) \) where the matrix \( \mathbf{A} \) is interpreted as the key.

Compared against submissions to the most recent NIST call for additional post-quantum digital signature schemes. See Post-Quantum signatures zoo for easy comparison.
We conjecture that the core hardness of these constructions stems from three components.

1. The input and key are non-linearly combined modulo 2.
2. Modulo 2 summations of subsets are taken.
3. Modulus conversion is followed by a public linear map $B$.

Observe that both our construction and the construction of [BIP+18] follow these three phases. In particular, the matrix-vector multiplication of [BIP+18] can be viewed as performing (1) component-wise multiplication with each row of the matrix, followed by (2) summation. When viewed this way, observe that the summations in (2) are over disjoint sets, i.e., $\sum_j (A_i \odot x)_j$. This is in contrast with our construction where we take random summations over a common combined input vector $(k \odot x)$. In a sense our construction is reusing the hidden variable of $k_i x_i$ many times while [BIP+18] uses it in a single term.

When interpreted in the MPC context, recall that linear operations are essentially free while multiplications require communication. The number of multiplication terms of [BIP+18] is proportional to the size of $A$, i.e., $O(\lambda^2)$, and as such, $O(\lambda^2)$ communication is required. [DGH+21] gave specialized protocols for the wPRF of [BIP+18] which reduced the communication complexity to $O(\lambda)$ in the amortized setting. In particular, [DGH+21] proposed modifying the key matrix $A$ to be circulant, i.e., each row is a shift of the previous, which allows one efficiently multiply $K \cdot x$ for many $x$ with an amortized $O(\lambda)$ communication overhead. However, we show that the process of generating the correlated randomness for this multiplication still requires $O(\lambda^2)$ work with relatively high constants.

In contrast, our construction only performs $n = O(\lambda)$ multiplications in step (1) and therefore can completely sidestep the need for this expensive correlated randomness. Moreover, we show how the parties can use the fact that the key is typically static to generate reusable correlated randomness (i.e., $n$ OTs) to compute shares of $(k \odot x)$ for an unbounded number of $x$. The main complexity of our protocols is how shares of $A(k \odot x)$ are converted from modulo 2 to modulo 3. We show that this can be done with $m = O(\lambda)$ communication and $m$ OTs which can be generated with sublinear communication using pseudorandom correlation generators [BCG+19b,RRT23]. Compared to [DGH+21], our techniques require less correlated randomness and therefore are more efficient. The final setup of our protocol is for the parties to locally apply the $F_3$ linear map $B$ to their $F_3^n$ secret sharing of $(A \cdot (k \odot x))$. To improve efficiency, we propose instantiating $A, B$ such that multiplication can be done in linear time while maintaining their desired security properties.

We give two additional variants of this protocol. The first switches the order of the moduli. That is, the wPRF is defined as $F(k, x) = B \cdot_2 (A \cdot_3 [k \odot_3 x])$. The resulting protocol is conceptually similar. The primary advantage of this

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6 That is, given a modulo $p$ secret sharing of $v \in F_p^n$ and public $M \in F_{p \times n}$, the parties can compute $M \cdot_p v$ without any communication. However, multiplication of two secret shared scalers requires communication.
protocol is for MPC applications where the output should be in binary secret sharing format [MRR20, BDG+22]. Our second variant is based on a specialized garbling scheme. The main advantage of this protocol is that it does not require any OT correlations when performing modulus conversion. However, it comes at the expense of requiring $O(\lambda^2)$ communication to compute $(k \odot x)$. We believe this construction is interesting when only a few evaluations are performed. For details on our protocols we refer to Section 6.

We implement our MPC protocols and report their performance in Section 12. Overall, we observe a 3 to 20 times reduction in running time compared to alternatives such as [DGH+21, ARS+15] while substantially reducing the communication overhead. Indeed, compared to the DDH OPRF protocol [Mea86], our construction is an order of magnitude faster with comparable communication.

Beyond proposing the new wPRF and the associated MPC protocols, we adapt existing cryptanalysis techniques to determine parameters for the wPRF. Compared to [BIP+18, DGH+21], we observe the the $n, m, t$ parameters must be increased a moderate amount. However, we give techniques to mitigate this increased parameter size, and in some cases even allow for less communication overhead. Our analysis suggests that the most relevant attack on the construction is a reduction to subset sum. In particular, given an input output pair $(x, y = F(k, x))$, one can define the intermediate vector $w := A(k \odot x)$. Viewing $A$ as a linear code and letting $P$ be the associated parity check matrix, the adversary has the constrains that $Pw = 0$ and $Bw = y$. One can solve for $w$ using subset sum solvers which have running time $O(2^{0.33m})$. For some of our parameters regimes we show that the adversary must consider multiple samples and present a new extension of subset sum to this setting. We refer to Section 5.4 for details.

Lastly, we show that the hardness of our construction along with the other alternating-moduli constructions can be reduced to the hardness of solving sparse multivariate polynomials. In particular, we show that our wPRF is equivalent to $F'(k, x) = \sum_{i=1}^m \prod_{j=1}^m k_{ij}^x \mod 3$. Therefore, a key recovery attack for the construction directly corresponds to solving a system of sparse multilinear equations over $\mathbb{F}_3$. This leads us to a generalized framework for instantiating alternating-moduli weak PRFs. In particular,

$$F(k, X) = \sum_{i=1}^m \prod_{j=1}^m k_{ij}^{x_{ij}} \mod p$$

where the distribution of $X$ can be varied to capture the various constructions.

**Signatures.** Given that the alternating-moduli OWF (AM-OWF) was designed with the efficient evaluation within MPC in mind, i.e., low non-linear depth but high algebraic degree, it is natural to try to build a signature scheme using the MPC-in-the-head paradigm. In particular, the AM-OWF of [DGH+21] is defined as

$$F(x) := B \cdot_3 (A \cdot_2 x)$$

for some $n, m, t \in O(\lambda)$ where $x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$ are the input, $A \in \mathbb{F}_2^{t \times m}$ is an expanding random matrix, $B \in \mathbb{F}_3^{m \times n}$ is a compressing random matrix, and $\cdot_3, \odot_3$ are
multiplication and component-wise multiplication modulo $p$. The hardness of inverting this function stems from the non-linearity of changing the modulus between multiplying by $A$ and $B$. One interpretation of this problem is $Be$ is an LPN instance with correlated noise vector $e = Ax$.

To build a signature in the MPC-in-the-head paradigm, the public key is the output $y = F(x) = B(Ax)$ on some uniformly random input $x$, and a signature is simply a proof of knowledge of a pre-image $x$. Indeed, this was the exact approach taken in prior work [DGH+21], where they used the KKW proof system [KKW18] resulting in signatures with sizes ranging from 10.3-13.3KB, which are still 2-3× larger than the best known signatures from symmetric-key assumptions. The issue is that the KKW proof system has a generic way of handling the pre-processing material needed for the MPC, that is oblivious to the function being evaluated. These checks on pre-processed material account for a significant chunk of the overall proof size.

The MPCitH protocol that we design is very close the KKW proof system, except for the way in which we handle preprocessing checks. Instead of using a cut-and-choose strategy, we use an idea from [CCJ23], that has the prover first commit to the inputs, and (possibly maliciously generated) preprocessing material. The verifier then permutes the preprocessing material and forces the prover to use this ordering when executing the online phase of the MPC protocol. We then show that for any choice of (incorrect) preprocessing material, a malicious prover who does not know a valid pre-image, has a very low-probability of producing an accepting proof. Although the high level ideas are borrowed from prior work, the concrete hard problem that we consider is very different and hence demands a completely separate, non-trivial analysis. Instead of using a ball-and-bins analysis as done in [CCJ23], we view the problem through the lens of Error Correcting Codes, which enables us to give much cleaner bounds in comparison to prior work which relied on conjectures that were confirmed for their parameters by explicitly computing them via python scripts (Section 7.2).

**Ring Signatures.** A ring signature allows a party to sign a message, while remaining anonymous amongst a chosen set of $\ell$ (say) parties. Given a signature scheme, there is a generic way to build ring signatures by providing a zero-knowledge proof for the statement:

"I know a signature $\sigma$, on the message $m$ that verifies under a public key $\text{pk}_i$ for some $i \in [\ell].""

The challenge, however, lies in minimizing the concrete overhead introduced on top of a single signature, when trying to prove membership of the public key $\text{pk}_i \in \{\text{pk}_1, \ldots, \text{pk}_\ell\}$. The state-of-the-art in post-quantum ring signatures are lattice-based schemes [LNS21, ESZ22], which build concretely efficient zero-knowledge proofs for set-membership adapted to the lattice setting.

The only competing alternative appears to be based on MPCitH [GGHAK22], where the ring signature size grows as $O(\log \ell)$ but they are concretely worse than [LNS21, ESZ22]. This can be attributed to two main factors:
First, they use Picnic [CDG+17] as the core signature scheme which is quite large $\approx 42$ KB when instantiated with NIST L5 parameters.\footnote{https://microsoft.github.io/Picnic/}

Second, although the signature size is only $O(\ell)$, the concrete constants are still quite high for small-medium sized rings.

The former issue can be handled easily by replacing Picnic with either the signature scheme we propose or one of the other newer, smaller, MPCitH based signature schemes (see Figure 6). This would yield concretely good signatures, that are competitive with lattice-based schemes at large ring sizes. However, we observe that in practice, small-medium sized rings are used. For instance, in the ring signatures protocol used by Monero as part of RingCT, the number of public keys used in the anonymity set was only very recently upgraded from 11 to 16.\footnote{https://github.com/monero-project/research-lab/issues/79}

We close this gap in the literature for small-medium sized rings using a simple yet powerful idea (Section 9). When combined with our signature scheme described above, this yields competitive post-quantum ring signatures for rings of size $<32$.

At a high-level, our strategy is to interpolate a polynomial $Y(X)$ such that $Y(i) = pk_i$ for $i \in [\ell]$ and have the prover show that the public key they know $(i, pk_i, Q(X))$ satisfies $Y(X) - pk_i = Q(X)(X - i)$ for some degree $\ell - 2$ polynomial $Q(X)$. The verifier then checks that this equation holds at a random point $r$ in the field. With overwhelming probability, we are then guaranteed that the claimed polynomial and public key indeed satisfy the relation above. However, this is not sufficient by itself, as the prover has to now show that $i \in [\ell]$. We obtain this for free when the public keys can be interpreted as field elements in $\text{GF}(p^t)$ for some prime $t$. This is indeed the case for the AM-OWF and other MPCitH signatures based on AES/LowMC/Rain etc. Instead of secret sharing $i$ over $\text{GF}(p^t)$, the prover shares it over $\text{GF}(\ell)$, and if $\ell$ is a power of $p$, the parties in the MPC, can locally embed their shares in $\text{GF}(p^t)$ by appending 0s. Note that this immediately guarantees that $i$ can be expressed using $\log_\ell p$ digits and this also does not leak any information about $i$ as the verifier already knows that any honest prover uses an $i \in \text{GF}(\ell)$.

3 Preliminaries

We use $[n]$ to denote the set $\{1, 2, \ldots, n\}$. The computational and statistical security parameter is denoted by $\lambda, \sigma \in \mathbb{N}$. A function $f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ is said to be polynomial if there exists a constant $c$ such that $f(n) \leq n^c$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$, and we write $\text{poly}()$ to denote such a function. A function $f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow [0, 1]$ is said to be negligible if for every $c \in \mathbb{N}$, there exists $N \in \mathbb{N}$ such that for all $n > N$, $f(n) < n^{-c}$, and we write $\text{negl}()$ to denote such a function. A probability is noticeable if it is not negligible, and overwhelming if it is equal to $1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$ for some negligible function $\text{negl}(\lambda)$. For a set $\mathcal{S}$, we write $s \leftarrow \mathcal{S}$ to indicate
Lemma. Let $t$ be a uniform distribution over $[0,1]$. For a random variable $D$, we write $d \leftarrow D$ to indicate that $d$ is sampled according to $D$. An algorithm $A$ is PPT (probabilistic polynomial-time) if its running time is bounded by some polynomial in the size of its input. We use $\Delta(X,Y)$ to denote the statistical distance between two random variables $X$ and $Y$ and $\Delta_H(x,y)$ to denote the Hamming distance between two vectors $x, y \in \{0,1\}^k$. For two ensembles of random variables $\{D_0,\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}, \{D_1,\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$, we write $D_0 \approx D_1$ to indicate that for all PPT $A$, it holds that

$$\left| \Pr_{d \leftarrow D_0,\lambda} [A(d) = 1] - \Pr_{d \leftarrow D_1,\lambda} [A(d) = 1] \right| \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

We use $\mathbb{[x]}$ to denote an additive sharing of $x$ and overload this with arithmetic operations such as multiplication and addition to show operations applied on individual shares by the parties in the MPC. We will also write $\mathbb{[x]}_i$ to denote the share of the $i$-th party. When useful, we will explicitly state the field $\mathbb{F}_p$ that is being secret shared over as $\mathbb{[x]}_p$. We use $\langle a, b \rangle$ to denote the inner product of two vectors $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_p^n$ and $\odot$ to denote the Hadamard product of two vectors.

We recall the definition of universal hash families and the Leftover Hash Lemma. Let $H_\infty(X)$ denote the min-entropy of a random variable $X$ and $U_n$ denote the uniform distribution over $\{0,1\}^n$.

**Definition 1 (Strong Extractors).** A function $f : \{0,1\}^n \times \{0,1\}^d \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$ is said to be a strong extractor if, for all random variables $X$ on $\{0,1\}^n$ independent of $U_d$ with $H_\infty(X) \geq k$, $\Delta(f(X, U_d), U_m) \leq \varepsilon$.

**Definition 2 (Universal Hash Families).** A family $\mathcal{H}$ of hash functions of size $2^d$ from $\{0,1\}^n$ to $\{0,1\}^m$ is said to be universal if, for every $x, y \in \{0,1\}^n$ with $x \neq y$,

$$\Pr_{h \in \mathcal{H}} [h(x) = h(y)] \leq 2^{-m}.$$

**Definition 3 (Leftover Hash Lemma [HILL99]).** Let $X$ be a random variable with $H_\infty(X) \geq k$, and $\mathcal{H} : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$ be a universal hash family of size $2^d$. If $m = k - 2 \log \frac{1}{\varepsilon^2}$, then $h(x)$ is a strong $(k, \varepsilon)$ extractor, with seed length $d$ and output length $m$.

**Lemma 1 ([LN17]).** If at least one of $(\mathbb{[x]}, \mathbb{[y]}, \mathbb{[z]})$ or $(\mathbb{[a]}, \mathbb{[b]}, \mathbb{[c]})$ is an incorrect multiplication triple, then the parties output ACCEPT in the above protocol with probability at most $1/2^2$.

**Definition 4 (q-ary entropy).** For any integer $q \geq 2$ and real $x \in [0,1]$, the $q$-ary entropy function is defined as $H_q(x) = x \log_q (q-1) - x \log_q (x) - (1-x) \log_q (1-x)$

**Definition 5 (Volume of Hamming Ball [GRS12]).** Let $q \geq 2$ and $0 \leq r/n \leq 1 - 1/q$. Then the volume of a Hamming ball of radius $r$ in $\mathbb{F}_q^n$ is $q^{H_q(r/n) - o(n)} \leq \text{Vol}_q(r, n) \leq q^{H_q(r/n)n}$. 


We refer to Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge Argument of Knowledge as HVZKAoK and define it below. Given a two-party interactive protocols between PPT algorithms $A$ with input $a$ and $B$ with input $b$ where only $B$ gets an output, we introduce two random variables: $(A(a), B(b))$ denotes the output of the protocol, and $\text{View}(A(a), B(b))$ denotes the transcript of the protocol.

**Definition 6 (HVZKAoK).** An HVZKAoK with soundness error $\varepsilon$ for an NP language $L \subset \{0,1\}^*$ and corresponding relation $\mathcal{R}_L \subset \{0,1\}^* \times \{0,1\}^*$ is a two-party interactive protocol between a prover $P$ and verifier $V$ that satisfies the following properties:

- **Perfect Completeness.** For every $(x, w) \in \mathcal{R}_L$, the verifier always accepts the interaction with an honest prover $\Pr\left[\langle P(x, w), V(x) \rangle = 1 \right] = 1$.

- **$\varepsilon$-Soundness.** For every PPT algorithm $\tilde{P}$ such that $\Pr\left[\langle \tilde{P}(x), V(x) \rangle = 1 \right] = \tilde{\varepsilon} > \varepsilon$, there exists an extractor algorithm $\text{Ext}$ which, given rewindable black-box access to $\tilde{P}$, outputs a valid witness $w'$ for $x$ in time $\text{poly}(\lambda, 1/(\tilde{\varepsilon} - \varepsilon))$.

- **Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge.** An argument of knowledge is (computationally, statistically, perfectly) HVZK if there exists a PPT simulator $\text{Sim}$ such that for every $(x, w) \in \mathcal{R}_L$, $\text{Sim}(x) \equiv \text{View}(P(x, w), V(x))$, where $\equiv$ denotes computational, statistical, or perfect indistinguishability between the distributions.

**Gap-HVZK.** A gap honest-verifier zero-knowledge argument of knowledge [CKY09] with gap $L'$, where $L' \subseteq L$ is an NP language with relation $\mathcal{R}_{L'}$, is defined as a honest-verifier zero-knowledge argument of knowledge, with the following relaxation of $\varepsilon$-soundness: the extractor $\text{Ext}$ is only guaranteed to output a witness $w'$ such that $(x, w') \in L'$.

**Weak Pseudorandom Function (wPRF).** A function $F : K \times X \rightarrow Y$ with key space $K$, domain $X$ and output space $Y$ (implicitly parameterized by security parameter $\lambda$) is said to be a Weak Pseudorandom Function if

$$\{(x_i, F(k, x_i))\}_{i \in [q]} \approx_c \{(x_i, y_i)\}_{i \in [q]}$$

where $k \leftarrow K, x_i \leftarrow X$ and $y_i \leftarrow Y$.

That is, when $F$ is evaluated using a secret key, for random inputs the input-output pairs look uniformly random. This differs from a [Strong] PRF in that the adversary is not allowed to specify the inputs. In more detail.

**[Strong] Pseudorandom Function (PRF).** A function $F : K \times X \rightarrow Y$ with key space $K$, domain $X$ and output space $Y$ (implicitly parameterized by security parameter $\lambda$) is said to be a [Strong] Pseudorandom Function if for all polynomial time distinguishes $A$ with oracle access to $F(k, \cdot)$, it holds that

$$\left| \Pr_{k \leftarrow K}[A^{F(k, \cdot)}(\cdot) = 1] - \Pr_{f \leftarrow \{X \rightarrow Y\}}[A^{f(\cdot)}(\cdot) = 1] \right| \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

This definition differs from the weak variant is that the adversary $A$ is allowed to adaptively query the the PRF at its chosen inputs (but without knowing the
key). \( F \) is pseudorandom if it can not be distinguished from a truly random function \( f \).

**Low-MC PRP.** To date, one of the popular constructions has the Low-MC block cipher [ARS⁺15] which follows a similar structure as standard block ciphers such as AES. Unlike our constructions, Low-MC is a permutation and therefore faces additional constraints that all operations must be invertible given the key. In addition, Low-MC is a PRP which implies that it is a strong PRF and must be secure for adaptively chosen \( x \), not just random. For an input \( x \in \mathbb{F}^n \), Low-MC \( f(k,x) \) is computed iterative using the round function \( s_{i+1} := f_{i}(k_i, s_i) \) for \( i = 1, ..., r \) where \( s_1 = x, f(k,x) = s_{r+1} \). Typically, \( r \in [14, 2\lambda] \). The round function \( f_{i}(k_i, s_i) \) can be computed in three phases. First, a non-linear and invertible \( \mathbb{F}_2 \) transformation is applied to the state. In particular, the current state \( s_i \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \) is reinterpreted as \( g_{i} \in \mathbb{G}^m \) where \( \mathbb{G} = \mathbb{F}_2^3, m = n/3 \). Let \( \mathbb{P} \) be the permutation group over \( \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{G} \). A constant element \( c \in \mathbb{P} \) is multiplied with each \( \mathbb{G} \) element in \( g_{i} \), i.e. \( g'_{i} := c \cdot g_{i} \). \( g'_{i} \) is then reinterpreted as a \( \mathbb{F}_2^3 \) vector \( s'_i \). Next, a linear and invertible \( \mathbb{F}_2 \) transformation is applied, \( s''_i := \mathbf{A}_i \cdot s'_i \) for a public \( \mathbf{A}_i \in \mathbb{F}_2^{n \times n} \). Finally, the round key \( k_i \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \) is added to the state which defines the output of the round,i.e. \( s_{i+1} := s''_i + k_i \). When implementing Low-MC, typically addition by \( c \in \mathbb{P} \) is implemented in MPC as a binary circuit over \( \mathbb{F}_2^3 \). The authors give a specific value of \( c \) which can be implemented as \( (\alpha, \beta, \gamma) \rightarrow (\alpha \oplus \beta \gamma, \alpha \oplus \beta \oplus \alpha \gamma, \alpha \oplus \beta \oplus \gamma \oplus \alpha \beta) \) using three parallel AND gates and six “free” XOR gates.

As with the hardness of alternating moduli paradigm, the security Low-MC stems, in part, from the fact that the two operations that are each non-linear with respect to the other, matrix multiplication \( \cdot : \mathbb{F}_2^{n \times n} \times \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n \) and the permutation group action \( \cdot : \mathbb{P} \times \mathbb{G}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{G}^m \). Unlike the alternating moduli paradigm, only a single element \( c \in \mathbb{P} \) is multiplied with the state as opposed to, for example, a matrix \( \mathbf{B} \in \mathbb{P}^{m \times m} \). However, multiplying by such a \( \mathbf{B} \) appears to necessitate significant work in the MPC setting due to not being linear over the secret sharing group \( \mathbb{G} \). To mitigate the minimal use of operations in \( \mathbb{P} \), Low-MC apply many iterations of the round function.

The primary short of Low-MC is the necessity of \( r \approx 14 \) invocations of the round function, each of which requires 2 rounds of communication, \( O(n) \) OT correlations, and \( O(n^2) \) work. Ideally, this could be reduced to effectively only performing the round function once.

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a large enough $t$ to have exponential security in practice, the concrete efficiency is unlikely to be competitive with alternatives.

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$$f(A, x) = B \cdot 3 (A \cdot 2 [G \cdot 2 x])$$

where $G$ is the generator matrix. This could be implemented in the MPC context with no communication and very little overhead. Unfortunately this approach does not work as this can be viewed as a transformation on only the key, i.e.

$$f(A', x) = B \cdot 3 (A' \cdot 2 x)$$

where $A' = A \cdot 2 G$. Therefore the same on their wPRF apply to this construction. [BIP+18] goes on to show that the adaptive attacks on their wPRF can be extended to a relatively large class of multiplicative depth-2 circuits. This suggests that significantly new techniques are required if it possible to construct a depth-2 strong PRF.

Given this negative result, [BIP+18] turn their attention to depth-3 circuit. They conjecture that performing the linear code over a different modulus does result in strong security and propose

$$f(A, x) = B \cdot 3 (A \cdot 2 [G \cdot 3 x])$$

where $x \in \mathbb{F}_3^n$ and $G \in \mathbb{F}_3^{s \times n}$.

### 4 Insecure Plus/XOR Construction

As a starting point we first introduce a candidate construction that is ultimately determined to be insecure. The aim of this example is to demonstrate how subtle changes to the construction can result in significant security ramifications. Moreover, we believe it is instructive to know what does not work as well as what does. For the ease of notation, we sometimes view key/input for a (weak) PRF as vectors and we denote them by lowercase bold letters.

Given the advancements of $f(x) = B \cdot 3 (A \cdot x)$ being a OWF, a natural question to ask is whether it possible to use $f$ to construct another, more efficient, weak PRF. From the efficiency perspective, such an $f$ can be evaluated in the plain two party setting with linear communication due to the only nonlinear step
consisting of $O(n)$ modulus conversion gates since $A$ is now public. Arguably the simplest candidate would be

$$F(k, x) = B \cdot_3 (A \cdot_2 (k \oplus x)),$$

where $k$ and $x$ are binary vectors and $\oplus$ denotes addition over $\mathbb{F}_2$. To attack the candidate above, it is not hard to see that it suffices to provide an attack for the following single-bit output variant where

$$F(k, x) = 1^t \cdot_3 (A \cdot_2 (k \oplus x))$$

We now show that this function is indeed learnable. It will be useful for us to represent $F_3$ as the set $\{-1, 0, 1\}$ in the natural way. A simple observation is that one can emulate addition over $\mathbb{F}_2$ using multiplication over $\mathbb{F}_3$ by relying on the mapping $\phi(x) = x + 1$ (arithmetic in $\mathbb{F}_3$), which maps $0 \to 1$ and $1 \to -1$. Let $y = F(k, x)$ be an input-output pair from the wPRF candidate above. It follows by inspection that if we use the notation $\bar{x}_j = \phi(x_j)$ and $\bar{k}_j = \phi(k_j)$ for $j \in [n]$, we can write the following relation for $(x, y)$

$$y = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \phi\left( \prod_{j=1}^{n} (\bar{k}_j \bar{x}_j)^{a_{ij}} \right)$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^{m} \phi\left( \left( \prod_{j=1}^{n} \bar{k}_j^{a_{ij}} \right) \cdot \left( \prod_{j=1}^{n} \bar{x}_j^{a_{ij}} \right) \right)$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^{m} \phi\left( \prod_{j=1}^{n} T_i^{a_{ij}} \right) \in \{-1, 1\}^m,$$

where arithmetic operations are done over $\mathbb{F}_3$. Since input is known in the wPRF game, by plugging in the input values we can compute each $T_i$. Moreover, each $S_i$ is a monomial over $\bar{k}$ where the subset only depends on $A$ (and is independent of $x$). We can now recover the key in two steps. First, given that $\phi$ is a linear function, after gathering enough samples we can use Gaussian elimination to recover each $S_i \in \{-1, 1\}^m$. In the next step, we use $S_i$ to recover the key. To do so, recall that each $S_i$ is a monomial of components of $\bar{k}$ where the subset only depends on $A$ (and is independent of $x$). Because multiplication over $\mathbb{F}_3$ (for the set $\{-1, 1\}$) is isomorphic to addition over $\mathbb{F}_2$, it follows that

$$A \cdot_2 k = (\phi^{-1}(S_1), \ldots, \phi^{-1}(S_m)) \in \{0, 1\}^m.$$

Since $A$ is a random expanding matrix we can recover $k$ by Gaussian elimination, as desired.

**Remark 1.** We remark that one can rely on a similar argument to show that the following candidate is secure, which is obtained by replacing the XOR operation in the plus construction with concatenation (and appropriately modifying the row dimension of the public matrix $A$).

$$F(k, x) = B \cdot_3 (A \cdot_2 (k \| x)),$$
5  AM-Based Pseudorandom Functions

We now move on to the design, analysis, and implementation of our new weak PRF and the associated MPC protocols. To better understand our new construction we first review closely related MPC-Friendly (weak) PRFs [GGM84].

5.1 Prior Constructions & Their Shortcomings

**Low-MC PRP.** To date, one of the popular constructions has the Low-MC block cipher [ARS+15] which follows a similar structure as standard block ciphers such as AES. Unlike our constructions, Low-MC is a permutation and therefore faces additional constraints that all operations must be invertible given the key. In addition, Low-MC is a PRP which implies that it is a strong PRF and must be secure for adaptively chosen \( x \), not just random. For an input \( x \in \mathbb{F}_n \), Low-MC \( f(k, x) \) is computed iterative using the round function \( s_{i+1} = f_i(k, s_i) \) for \( i = 1, ..., r \) where \( s_1 = x, f(k, x) = s_{r+1} \). Typically, \( r \in [14, 2\lambda] \). The round function \( f_i(k, s_i) \) can be computed in three phases. First, a non-linear and invertible \( \mathbb{F}_2 \) transformation is applied to the state. In particular, the current state \( s_i \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \) is reinterpreted as \( g_i \in \mathbb{G}^m \) where \( \mathbb{G} = \mathbb{F}_2^n, m = n/3 \). Let \( \mathbb{P} \) be the permutation group over \( \mathbb{G} \to \mathbb{G} \). A constant element \( c \in \mathbb{P} \) is multiplied with each \( \mathbb{G} \) element in \( g_i \), i.e. \( g'_i = c \cdot g_i \). \( g'_i \) is then reinterpreted as a \( \mathbb{F}_2^n \) vector \( s'_i \). Next, a linear and invertible \( \mathbb{F}_2 \) transformation is applied, \( s''_i := A_i \cdot s'_i \) for a public \( A_i \in \mathbb{F}_2^{n \times n} \). Finally, the round key \( k_i \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \) is added to the state which defines the output of the round, i.e. \( s_{i+1} := s''_i + k_i \). When implementing Low-MC, typically addition by \( c \in \mathbb{P} \) is implemented in MPC as a binary circuit over \( \mathbb{F}_2^n \). The authors give a specific value of \( c \) which can be implemented as \( (\alpha, \beta, \gamma) \to (\alpha + \beta \gamma, \alpha \cdot \beta + \alpha \gamma, \alpha + \beta + \gamma + \alpha \beta) \) using three parallel AND gates and six “free” XOR gates.

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where \(x \in \mathbb{F}_3^n\) and \(G \in \mathbb{F}_3^{s \times n}\).

**Boneh et al. weak PRF.** Boneh et al. [BIP+18] propose a weak PRF with exponential security that can be computed by depth 2 circuits with mixed moduli. In particular, they consider the function \(f(K, x) = g(K \cdot_2 x)\) where \(g(w) = \sum_i w_i \mod 3\) and the matrix \(K\) is viewed as the key. \(w := K \cdot_2 x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n\) is a binary vector that is embedded into \(\mathbb{F}_3^n\) component-wise in the natural way. As discussed later, [BIP+18] proposes to restrict \(K\) to being a circulant (or toeplitz) matrix, that is, each row is a shift of the previous. [BIP+18, DGH+21] show that various types of learning algorithms provably cannot learn this function by showing that there are no fixed function families of exponential size that is correlated with it. They additionally show that it can not be approximated by any low-degree polynomial.
This result follows from the result of Razborov-Smolensky [Raz87,Smo87] showing that MOD_q can not be approximated by any low depth mod q circuit, where p, q are distinct primes. [DGH+21] proceed to give several extensions to their core construction. The first is support for multiple output bits. The function is defined as \( f(K,x) := B \cdot_3 (K \cdot_2 x) \) where \( K \) is a square matrix and \( B \) is a compressing matrix. In particular, one can view \( B \) as a generator matrix for a linear code that has high minimum distance. The best-known attacks for this construction attempt to distinguish by detecting a linear bias in the output. However, these attacks scale exponentially in the minimum distance of \( B \) [BIP+18]. We note that the structure of this PRF is identical to the aforementioned OWF. Indeed, [DGH+21] based the OWF on the PRF construction of [BIP+18] where the key \( K \) is replaced with a public random matrix. [DGH+21] also conjectures that the \( \mathbb{F}_2, \mathbb{F}_3 \) can be replaced by any distinct prime fields \( \mathbb{F}_p, \mathbb{F}_q \). The core hardness of the problem appears unaffected with all known attacks performing equally poorly on larger moduli. However, \( \mathbb{F}_2, \mathbb{F}_3 \) and \( \mathbb{F}_3, \mathbb{F}_2 \) appear to be the most efficient choice due to yielding more efficient modulus conversion protocols.

[BIP+18] suggests choosing the key \( K \in \mathbb{F}^{m \times n} \) to be a square circulant matrix, i.e. choose \( K_1 \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \) uniformly and define the remaining rows as a rotation by one of the previous. Choosing \( K \) with this distribution allows one to express \( K \) in \( O(\lambda) \) space and, as we will see below, enables efficient matrix vector products, i.e. \( x \cdot K \), in the two party setting[DGH+21]. With some exception that we will discuss later, choosing \( K \) with this distribution does not appear to degrade security for the parameters used by [BIP+18,DGH+21], i.e. \( n = m = 2\lambda, t \approx 0.6\lambda \).

Previous works [DGH+21,BIP+18] on implementing this PRF in MPC have considered two settings. Honest majority three-party and two-party semi-honest setting with both follow a similar structure. First the \( \mathbb{F}_2 \) secret shared inputs \( \|K\|^2 \) and \( \|x\|^2 \) are multiplied\(^9\) together to obtain \( \|w\|^2 := \|K\|^2 \cdot \|x\|^2 \). The exact method used to compute this depends on the setting and is discussed below. Once the sharing of \( w = K \cdot x \) is computed, the parties perform a modulus switching protocol where the shares \( \|w\|^2 \) are converted into \( \|w\|^3 \). [DGH+21] suggests that one can preprocess a random double sharing \( \|r\|^2, \|r\|^3 \) for a uniform \( r \in \mathbb{F}_2 \) using some protocol and to reveal \( w' := \|r\|^2 + \|w\|^2 \). Using \( \|r\|^3 \), it is then possible to subtract off \( r \) from \( w' \) to obtain \( \|w\|^3 \). The final step of the protocol is to locally compute \( \|f(K,x)^3 := B \cdot_3 \|w\|^3 \). See Section ?? for a discussion of the strong PRF extension of Boneh et al[BIP+18].

The outline above requires two missing steps, efficiently computing a sharing of \( x \cdot K \) and generating random modulus conversion double sharings \( \|r\|^2, \|r\|^3 \). Next we discuss how [DGH+21] suggests this be done.

**Honest Majority Three Party Setting.** In the honest majority setting, the inner product between two vectors can be computed with \( O(1) \) communication [AFL+16] which implies that \( \|w\|^2 = \|x\|^2 \cdot \|K\|^2 \) can be computed with linear communication overhead, i.e. \( O(n + m) \). Similarly, it is possible to have one of the parties

\(^9\) When the inputs are plaintext, more efficient multiplication can be used.
generate $\|v\|^2, \|v\|^3$ locally and then only reveal $w'$ to the other parties, i.e. $O(m)$ communication.

Two Party Setting. The two party setting the situation is more complicated due to not having a $O(1)$ communication inner product protocol. However, when evaluating the wPRF for a fixed key $K$ for many inputs, one can amortize this cost. In particular, for bits $b_1, ..., b_q \in \mathbb{F}_2$ and a fixed vector $\Delta \in \mathbb{F}_{2^m}^n$, one can use correlated OT protocols, e.g. IKNP [IKNP03], SoftSpoken [Roy22] or Silent OT [BCG+19a, RRT23], to generate the secret sharings $J_{b_i \Delta}^2$. Moreover, Silent OT can achieve this with an amortized cost of $q^2$ communication when $q$ is sufficiently large, alternatively, SoftSpoken achieves $q^c$ communication for any constant $c$, e.g. $c = 4$. Specially, this corresponds to a subfield VOLE protocol with $\mathbb{F}_2$ as the subfield and $\mathbb{F}_{2^m}$ as the extension. When $K$ is circulant, one can set $\Delta := K_1 \in \mathbb{F}_{2^m}$ and generate sharings of $J_{x(i)}^2 \cdot \Delta^2$ and locally rotate these to obtain $J_{x(i)}^2 \cdot K_2^2$ and sum them to compute $J_{x(i)}^3$ as desired. We note that [DGH+21] only mentions the technique above in passing and does not implement or report on its performance. Instead, they focus on the setting with (free) preprocessed correlated randomness where $J_{x(i)}^3$ can be computed using other methods (which also leverage the fact that $K$ is circulant).

[DGH+21] does not explicitly state how to generate modulus conversion double sharings and again assumes (free) preprocessing for $J_r^2, J_r^3$. A natural choice would be using oblivious transfer or the more recent work of [IKNZ23]. Looking forward, we will offer improvements to these technique in Section 6.

5.2 Our PRF Constructions

An Alternative View of [BIP+18]. We now move on to our main construction defined in Definition 8. Leading up to this, let us reconsider the PRF of Boneh et al. [BIP+18] $f(K, x) := B \cdot_3 (K \cdot_2 x)$ where $x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$ is the input, $K \in \mathbb{F}_{2^m}^{n \times n}$ is the key (typically square & circulant), and $B \in \mathbb{F}_3^{t \times m}$ is a public compressing matrix. Observe that this function can be computed as $f(K, x) := B \cdot_3 [A \cdot_2 (k \odot_2 x')]$ where for $n' := nm, k', x' \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$ are the appropriately unrolled version of $K, x$. In particular, let $k'_{m+j} := K_{i,j}$ and $x' := xx...x$ be $m$ copies of $x$. Computing the component-wise product of these two vectors provides all of the terms required to compute $K \cdot_2 x$. All that remains is to perform the summations corresponding to the rows of $K$. This can be achieved using an appropriately defined public matrix $A \in \mathbb{F}_2^{n \times nm}$. In particular, $A$ will be the (compressing) repetition code, or equivalently it will look like a staircase with consecutive runs of $n$ ones in each of the $m$ rows.

We argue that this formulation more explicitly describes the construction as it separates the additive and multiplicative steps. An additional benefit of the explicit formulation is that the $n' = nm = O(\lambda^2)$ scalar multiplications between secret vectors $k', x'$ are apparent.

Our Weak PRF. Instead of asking if we can reduce the overhead of the Boneh et al. construction, it will be more instructive to ask if there are any meth-
Observe that each \( \text{bit} \) \( \text{w} \) \( \text{tation} \), each \( \text{place} \) \( \text{A} \) \( \text{the constraints on} \) \( \text{x} \) \( \text{disjoint sets where} \) \( \text{x} \) \( \text{having small linear dependency}. \) We have now defined our new \( \text{(Definition 7. \text{Let})} \) \( \text{we} \) \( \text{F} \) \( \text{to any prime fields}. \) That is our \( \text{w} \) \( \text{(Definition 8 (Generalized Weak PRF). \text{Let})} \) \( \text{polynomials over} \) \( \text{F} \) \( \text{option is to remove all structures from} \) \( \text{k}' \), \( \text{x}' \), \( \text{A} \). If \( \text{A} \) is the repetition code of \( \text{[DGH}^{+21}, \text{BIP}^{+18}] \), then \( \text{w} \) \( \text{is the sum} \) \( \text{\sum}_{i \in [n]} (j-i) m x^j \cdot k \) \( \text{is the summation of} \) \( \text{O} \) \( \text{i.e. each input bit} \) \( \text{x} \) \( \text{of our weak PRF is connected to the hardness of solving sparse multivariate polynomials over} \) \( \text{F}_3 \). Indeed, in \text{Section 4} we present a weakened variant of our construction that can be broken when viewed as a problem over polynomials. Recall that for \( \text{t = 1} \) our construction is \( \text{F}(k, x) = b_1 \cdot 3 (A \cdot 2 [k \odot_2 x]) \). Observe that one can emulate addition over \( \text{F}_2 \) using multiplication over \( \text{F}_3 \) by relying

\[ (\lambda_2 \cdot 3 \cdot k) \]
on the mapping $\phi(x) = x + 1$ (arithmetic in $\mathbb{F}_3$), which maps $0 \to 1$ and $1 \to -1$ (we also use the notation $\bar{x} = \phi(x)$ and $\bar{k} = \phi(k)$ for $j \in [n]$). Then, $F(k, x)$ can be rewritten as
\[
\sum_{i=1}^{m} b_i \cdot \phi^{-1} \left( \prod_{j=1}^{m} \bar{k}_{ij}^{a_{ij}x_j} \right) = \sum_{i=1}^{m} b_i \cdot \left( \prod_{j=1}^{m} \bar{k}_{ij}^{a_{ij}x_j} - 1 \right) = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \prod_{j=1}^{m} \bar{k}_{ij}^{a_{ij}x_j} - \sum_{i=1}^{m} b_i.
\]

The term $P$ is public and hence can be computed by the adversary. Thus, the hardness of our weak PRF construction boils down to the pseudorandomness of the following: $F'(k, x) = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \prod_{j=1}^{m} \bar{k}_{ij}^{a_{ij}x_j}$, where operations are done over $\mathbb{F}_3$. For any input $x$, the weak PRF output is simply a sparse multilinear polynomial over $\mathbb{F}_3$ (where the polynomial is defined by the input and public parameters), so a key recovery attack for the construction directly corresponds to solving a system of sparse multilinear equations over $\mathbb{F}_3$.

**A Generalized Construction.** Building upon the idea above, we now describe a simple framework to instantiate new weak PRFs based on the hardness of solving a system of sparse multilinear equations over a finite field of (small) size. First, we fix a finite field $\mathbb{F}_p$ and two dimensions $m$ and $n$. Let $\mathbb{F}_p^n$ be the key space and let $\mathcal{D}$ be a distribution over $m \times n$ binary matrices. The construction can be succinctly described as follows: $F(k, X) = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \prod_{j=1}^{m} k_{ij}^{x_{ij}}$, where all operations are done over $\mathbb{F}_p$. Note that $m$ is the number of terms in the polynomial and the $ith$ term in the polynomial simply corresponds to a subset product over the components of the key $k$ according to the $ith$ row of the input $X$. For instance, the preceding construction (with public matrix $A$) is an instantiation of the framework above with the field $\mathbb{F}_3$ and the distribution $\mathcal{D}$ is obtained by sampling $x \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ and setting the $ith$ row of $X$ as $A_i \odot x$.

**On the Duality of Polynomial Representation.** We remark that in the polynomial representation outlined above, one can alternatively put $\bar{x}_j = \phi(x_j)$ in the base and obtain the following representation of $F'$ (a similar representation can be found for $F$ as well): $F'(k, x) = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \prod_{j=1}^{m} \bar{x}_{ij}^{\bar{a}_{ij}k_j}$. Note that in this representation, a key recovery attack would correspond to interpolating sparse multilinear polynomials. While the connection between AM-based symmetric primitives and the hardness of interpolating sparse multilinear polynomials has already been observed by [BIP+18], neither of [BIP+18] or [DGH+21] consider the dual problem of solving a system of sparse multilinear polynomial equations for their constructions.

Following the same analysis as [BIP+18], we conjecture that our depth-2 weak PRF can be compiled into a strong PRF by first encoding the input using an error correcting code with a different modulus than the key. In particular, we conjecture that **Definition 9** is a strong PRF for appropriately chosen $n, m, t, d$.

**Definition 9 (Generalized Strong PRF).** Let $n, m, t, d \in \mathbb{N}$ and distinct primes $p, q$, our $(\mathbb{F}_p, \mathbb{F}_q)$-strong-PRF construction is $F(k, x) := B_q(\mathbb{A}'_p[k \odot_p (G_q, x)])$ where $x, k \in \mathbb{F}_p^n$ and $G \in \mathbb{F}_q^{m \times d}, \mathbb{A} \in \mathbb{F}_p^{m \times n}, B \in \mathbb{F}_q^{l \times m}$ are uniformly distributed.
The core intuition behind this construction is that known attacks against our weak PRF and the weak PRFs of [BIP+18] in the strong setting heavily rely on PRF evaluations for highly correlated inputs, e.g. having small hamming distance. [BIP+18] proposes a compiler that they define as encoded input. The core idea is to restrict the adversary’s choice of inputs to the underlying weak PRF so that highly correlated inputs are not allowed. A natural example of such an encoding is encoding the input using a linear error correcting code, i.e. G. The most efficient option for doing this is to perform the encoding in $F_p$. However, [BIP+18] shows that this does not work as one can recast this encoded input function as a new instance of the underlying weak PRF with a different A matrix. This recasting crucially relies on the fact that A and G are over the same modulus and therefore compose into a new matrix $A'$. Given this observation [BIP+18], suggestions that G is uniformly sampled over a different modulus, e.g. $q$, and performing an additional round of modulus conversion of $G \cdot qx$ from $F_q$ to $F_p$ before multiplying it with the key. We defer to [BIP+18] for a more detailed analysis of relevant learning algorithms for alternating moduli weak PRFs in the strong PRF setting.

5.3 Optimizations

We consider two optimizations to our construction PRF with the aim of improved efficiency when evaluated in the two party setting where the key $k$ is fixed for many inputs $x^{(1)}, ..., x^{(q)}$. Due to the generality of our construction, both can be framed as changing the distribution of the key $k$ or PRF input $x$.

**Structured input $x$.** For now, let us focus on the $(\mathbb{F}_2, \mathbb{F}_3)$-wPRF where $x^{(i)}, k \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$. We consider the general methods for computing $x^{(i)} \odot k$, i.e. component-wise multiplication.

**Reusable Key OTs.** Given that $k$ is fixed, a natural protocol for computing $[k \cdot x^{(i)}]$ is to preprocess a random OT for each bit $k_1, ..., k_n$ of the key. These can then later be derandomized using standard technique to generate the sharing $[k \cdot x^{(i)}]$ using only $O(n)$ communication and minimal computation. The advantage of this approach is that no per evaluation OTs are required. When combined with our OT based modulus switching, we will show we need only $m = 2\lambda$ OTs per evaluation. Alternatively, when combined with our custom garbled circuit modulus switching protocols, no per evaluation OTs are needed at all. However, we will see that the disadvantage of this approach is that it requires $n = 4\lambda$ bits of communication and as a result this approach will have more communication (but few OTs) compared to the protocol of [DGH+21] with $n = 2\lambda$ bits of communication.

**Nonreusable Input OTs.** To bring down the overall communication, we make the observation that the input $x$ can have an smaller “effective” size of just $\lambda$ bits. First we change the distribution of $x$ such that for some $\hat{x} \in \mathbb{F}^\lambda$, one can express $x$ as $s$ copies of $\hat{x}$, i.e. $x = (\hat{x}||\hat{x}||...||\hat{x})$. We will then be able to efficiently
multiply each bit of \( \hat{x}_i \) with the bits of the key that corresponds to, i.e. \( k_i, k_{i+n/s}, \ldots \), using subfield VOLE. In particular, when using Silent VOLE in the amortized setting, the communication complexity is essentially independent of \( s \). As a result, the total amortized communication for computing \( x \odot k \) with \( s = 4 \) is just \( \lambda = n/s \) bits, a 4 to 2 times reduction depending on the protocol. However, this change implies that \( n/s = \lambda \) additional VOLE correlations will be consumed per evaluation. We note that for small \( s \), these Silent VOLE correlations can be packed together such that computing \( \lambda/s \) of them can be computed at the effective computational cost of a single random OT.

Finally, we note that for \([\text{BIP}^{+18}, \text{DGH}^{+21}]\), applying a similar optimization results in their schemes being insecure due to certain weaknesses associated with the use of the circulant key \( K \), see below for details.

**Structured \( \mathbb{F}_3 \) key \( k \).** In the case of \((\mathbb{F}_3, \mathbb{F}_2)\)-wPRF it will be advantageous for us to consider a key to restrict the key \( k \) which would typically be in \( \mathbb{F}_3^n \) to lay in the binary subset. The operations of multiplying \( A \cdot_3 (k \odot_3 x) \) will still be performed modulo three. We conjecture that this variant is as secure given that \( n \) is increased to compensate for the loss of entropy in the key. When combined with the Reusable Key OTs optimization above, this enable \( x \odot k \) to be computed with \( n/2 \) bit of communication as opposed to \( n \log_2(3) \).

**Implementation.** See Section 6 for a detailed description of our protocols and Section 12 for the performance evaluation of them and a comparison to related works.

### 5.4 Parameter Selection

We present several possible parameterizations of our wPRF. The most efficient known attacks\([\text{DGH}^{+21}]\) are based on a reduction to solving subset sum\([\text{HJ10, BCJ11, BBSS20}]\). We will review the core reduction which focuses on the AM-OWF. We then discuss how this applies to the wPRF where the key is effectively the AM-OWF input.

**Subset Sum Attack.** At a high level, the main idea to attack the AM-OWF can be described in two steps. In the first step, inverting the OWF is reduced to a specialized subset-sum problem. In the second step, modern subset-sum solving algorithms such as \([\text{HJ10, BCJ11, BBSS20}]\) are modified in a way that they enable us to solve the resulting specialized subset-sum problem and invert the OWF. We focus on the first step, as the modification can be done via standard algebraic and combinatorial techniques.

Let \( y \in \mathbb{F}_3^n \) be an output of the OWF on an input \( x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \), and let \( w = A \cdot_2 x \) be the intermediary evaluation. Observe that there is an \((m-n) \times m\) parity check matrix \( P \) such that \( w = A \cdot_2 x \iff w \) lies in the kernel of \( P \). So, for any intermediary evaluation \( w \) we have \( P \cdot_2 w = 0 \) and \( B \cdot_3 w = y \). We now aim to find \( w \) by a reduction to subset sum. Denoting the \( i \)-th unit vector by \( e_i \), note that if we can find a set of indices \( I \subseteq [m] \) such that \((\sum_{i \in I} P \cdot_2 e_i, \sum_{i \in I} B \cdot_3 e_i) = (0, y)\), then we can invert the OWF simply be solving \( A \cdot_2 x = \sum_{i \in I} e_i \). Therefore, we have
a reduction to the subset problem with the target \((0, y) \in \mathbb{F}_2^{m-n} \times \mathbb{F}_3^n\) and \(m\) variables \(\beta_1, \ldots, \beta_m\), where we associate \(\beta_i = 1\) with \((P \cdot 2 \epsilon_i, B \cdot 3 \epsilon_i)\). We point out that this problem can also be seen as a special case of generalized knapsack problem for the additive group \((\mathbb{F}_2^{m-n} \times \mathbb{F}_3^n, +)\), for which search-to-decision reductions with different parameter setting have been proposed by [MM11].

As mentioned in [DGH+21], a slightly modified version of [HJ10] needs \(2^{0.337m}\) time and \(2^{0.256m}\) space (ignoring polynomial factors in \(m\)) to invert the OWF. In addition, the algorithm of [BBSS20] (with slight modification) runs in \(2^{0.283m}\) time and space. Overall, to achieve \(s\)-bit security one needs to set \(m \geq 3.53s\). Thus, a suggested choice of the parameters \((n, m, t)\) in terms of \(\lambda\) for the AM-OWF would be \((\lambda, 3.53\lambda, \lambda/\log_2 3)\).\(^\text{10}\)

**One-to-One Parameters.** We now present a conservative parameter set for our wPRF constructions given the subset sum attack. One can rely on the OWF attack described above to break our \((\mathbb{F}_2, \mathbb{F}_3)\) wPRF. Consider fixing some input-output pair \((x, y = F(k, x))\) and observe that this can be viewed as an instance of the OWF applied to the key \(k\). For each \(x_i = 0\), it is clear that \(k_i\) does not have any impact on the output of the wPRF. Thus, on average, one needs to double the key/input size to prevent the subset-sum attacks attack from recovering \(k\) given a single \((x, y)\) sample.

We propose the following parameter setting for our \((\mathbb{F}_2, \mathbb{F}_3)\)-wPRF to get \(\lambda\) bits of security: \(n = 2\lambda, m = 7.06\lambda, t = 2\lambda/\log_2 3\), which is simply doubling the parameters in OWF setting to thwart the subset-sum attacks. In particular, both key and input will be \(2\lambda\)-bit strings. For the \((\mathbb{F}_3, \mathbb{F}_2)\)-wPRF we propose \(n = 2\lambda/\log_2 3, m = 7.06\lambda/\log_2 3, t = 2\lambda\).

Indeed, in the restricted single wPRF sample setting, it is not hard to show that the hardness of the OWF implies the hardness of a key recovery attack. Recall that the parameters of the OWF imply that it is approximately one-to-one. As such, for any given \(x\) we should expect there to be one value for \(x \odot k\) that is consistent with any given sample. Hence, we denote the parameters above as one-to-one. When generalized beyond the artificial constrain of a single sample, one can view each sample \((x_1, y_1), \ldots, (x_q, y_q)\) as defining a related OWF instance, where the OWF input \(k\) and parameter \(A\) are “subsetted” by \(x_i\).

**Many-to-One Parameters.** Unlike the OWF, recall that given a sample \((x, y)\), non-invertibility is not a requirement of a wPRF with respect to arbitrary key \(k'\). Building on this observation we propose to deviate from the OWF parameter regime and consider the setting where there are many consistent \(x \odot k\) for any given \((x, y)\). Specifically, we define \(n = 24\lambda, m = 2\lambda, t = \lambda/\log_2 3\) for the \((\mathbb{F}_2, \mathbb{F}_3)\)-wPRF and \(n = 4\lambda/\log_2 3, m = 2\lambda, t = \lambda\) for the \((\mathbb{F}_3, \mathbb{F}_2)\)-wPRF. Focusing on the \((\mathbb{F}_2, \mathbb{F}_3)\)-wPRF, observe that for any given sample \((y, x)\), there is a set \(Z_{y, x} := \{z \mid y = B \cdot (A \cdot z) \land z \odot x = z\}\) representing the valid \(k \odot x\) preimages. For the parameter regime above, it holds that \(|Z| = O(2^{\lambda})\). Indeed, consider the \(A', k'\) where \(A'\) consists of the columns of \(A\) indexed by \(i\) s.t. \(x_i = 1\) and \(k'\) consists of \(k_i\). For the average case of \(|x| = 2\lambda\), we have \(A' \in \mathbb{F}_2^{m \times m}\) and therefore

\(^{10}\) More aggressive parameter have been proposed, e.g., \((\lambda, 3.13\lambda, \lambda/\log_2 3)\) [DGH+21].
the size of $Z$ is precisely the size of $W = \{w \mid y = B \cdot 3 \cdot w \land w \in \mathbb{F}_2^m \}$. That is, $W$ is defined by the binary codewords of a random $t \times m$ linear codes (viewing $B$ as the parity check matrix) and therefore we would expect $|W| \approx (2/3)^m 3^{-t} > 2^{m-1.6t} > 2^\lambda$. Therefore the adversary has no advantage in recovering $k$ given a single sample.

Consider $q$ samples $(x^{(1)}, y^{(1)}), \ldots, (x^{(q)}, y^{(q)})$. Let $w^{(i)} := A \cdot (k \odot x^{(i)})$ and observe that given $A, B, x^{(i)}$, one can compute $A' \in \mathbb{F}_2^{m \times n}, B' \in \mathbb{F}_2^{m \times qm}$ such that $(w^{(1)}, \ldots, w^{(q)}) = A' \cdot k$ and $(y^{(1)}, \ldots, y^{(q)}) = B' \cdot (w^{(1)}, \ldots, w^{(q)})$.

Therefore, assuming $q$ is sufficiently large, one can define $P$ as the parity check matrix of $A'$ and solve the following subset sum problem $(\sum_{i \in I} P e_i, \sum_{i \in I} B' e_i) = (0, y)$ to recover $w = \sum_{i \in I} e_i$ and therefore $k$. However, the running time of for this problem with the best-known subset sum solver [BBSS20] is $O(2^{0.337qm})$.

Based on the discussion above, $q$ must be at least 2 and therefore the running time is at least $O(2^{0.337\cdot 2^\lambda}) = O(2^{1.35\lambda})$.

**Parameters for Optimizations.** In Section 5.3 we propose two alterations to the construction. The first proposes to restrict $x$ to be $s$ copies of $\hat{x} \in \mathbb{F}_2^\lambda$, i.e. $n = s \lambda$. The main attack that this alteration impacts is the potential improved efficiency for sparse polynomial. As with the prior works, our scheme can be framed as the problem of interpolating sparse polynomials, i.e. $F'(k, x) = \sum_{i=1}^n \prod_{j=1}^m \bar{x}_{ij}^{k_i}$. The efficiency of these solvers require evaluating the polynomial at specific values, e.g. roots of unity. Therefore, one must ensure that sufficiently few of such points coincide with the random weak PRF inputs, $x^{(1)}, \ldots, x^{(q)}$. Given that at most $q = 2^{40}$ queries are made, we conjecture that such techniques remain exponential time. Indeed, [BIP+18] shows that if such attacks are effective, then Learning with Rounding (LWR)[BPR12] for similar parameters is broken. Should a large bound on $q$ be desired, one can increase $n$ or decrease $s$ accordingly to maintain the security margin between $2^{1.45\lambda}$ and $q$.

We note that similar optimizations should not be applied to the protocol of [DGH+21] with a circulant key. In particular, when the wPRF is defined as $F(K, x) = B \cdot \langle K, 2 \cdot x \rangle$ and $K$ is circulant, the scheme suffers from a vulnerability when $x$ is symmetric, i.e. $x = (\hat{x}||\bar{x})$. Due to the symmetry of both $x$ and $K$, the intermediate value $w = K \cdot x$ will also be symmetric, i.e. $w = (\hat{w}||\bar{w})$. Given that $B$ is close to a rate 0.5 matrix, i.e. $m/2 \approx t$, the attacker can efficiently solve for $\hat{w}$ and thereby recover $w$, rendering the scheme insecure. To prevent this, [DGH+21] requires $x$ to be uniform over $n = 2\lambda$ which result in symmetric $x$ occurring with negligible probability, unlike the case of $n = \lambda$.

The second security relevant optimization we suggest is the restriction of the key $k \in \mathbb{F}_3^m$ for the $(\mathbb{F}_3, \mathbb{F}_2)$-wPRF to lie in the binary subset. As discussed, this halves the communication complexity of computing $x \odot k$ when implemented using Reusable Key OTs technique. We are not away of any attacks that can take advantage of this distribution change beyond relatively trivial attacks that partially rely on brute force. To mitigate the impact of these, we suggest increasing the key length by $\log_2(3)$, i.e. $n = 4\lambda$.

**Other Attacks.** Another avenue of attack would be utilizing Gröbner basis to solve a system of multilinear polynomial equations. However, in its plain format,
the algorithmic cost of such an attack is quite high and it does not seem to impact
the security of our wPRF constructions. On the flip side, we are not aware of any
other attack that particularly exploits the extra structure/information provided
by the wPRF and hence we suggest setting parameters based on subset sum.
Finally, we refer to the analysis in [BIP+18] for additional attacks that leverage
some common structure to both of our schemes.

6 MPC wPRF Protocols

We focus our weak PRF on the semi-honest two party setting where the input
x and key k are each known to the two parties, respectively. The structure of
our weak PRF lends itself to particularly efficient implementation in the set-
ting. However, we note other setting such as where x, k are secret shared can
easily be implemented using similar technique. Malicious security can of course
be achieved but we leave an efficient specification of this to future work. Our
protocols will assume that the output should be secret shared. In the case of an
OPRF, it is straightforward to reveal the result to the party with x.

6.1 Review of Silent OT/VOLE/OLE

To fully appreciate the design decision of our protocols it is important to under-
stand how Silent OT and VOLE protocols work[RRT23, BCG+19a, BCG+19b].
At the root of these protocols is the computational hard problem known as
syndrome decoding, aka learning parity with noise (LPN). For a secret ran-

dom sparse vector $e \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$, and a public error correcting code generator matrix
$G \in \mathbb{F}_{n \times \nu}^2$, the syndrome decoding assumption state that $(G, G \cdot e)$ is indistin-

guishable from $(G, r)$ for a uniform r. Note that $n < \nu$, e.g. $\nu = 2n$, and therefore
$G \cdot e$ compresses e.

The Silent OT/VOLE is a two party protocol with a sender and receiver. In its simplest formulation the goal is for the receiver to hold random vectors
$a \in \mathbb{F}_{2^\lambda}^n, B \in \mathbb{F}_{2^\lambda}^n$ and the sender to hold scaler $\Delta \in \mathbb{F}_{2^\lambda}$ and a vector
$C \in \mathbb{F}_{2^\lambda}^n$ such that

$$B + C = a \Delta$$

One can view $B, C$ as a secret sharing of $a$ times the scaler $\Delta$. The proceeds by
having the receiver samples a sparse vector $\hat{a} \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$ while the sender samples a
random $\Delta \in \mathbb{F}_{2^\lambda}$. The parties generate a secret sharing of $\hat{a} \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$ times $\Delta \in \mathbb{F}_{2^\lambda}$
using a technique known as a punctured PRF[BCG+19a]. Leveraging the sparsity
of $\hat{a}$, this only requires $O(\lambda \log(n/\lambda))$ communication, where typical parameters
have $\nu \approx 2^{20}$. Let $\hat{B}, \hat{C} \in \mathbb{F}_{2^\lambda}^n$ denote the shares of $\hat{a} \Delta$, i.e. $\hat{B} + \hat{C} = \hat{a} \Delta$. The idea
is to then compress these vectors to get $a = G \cdot \hat{a}, B = G \cdot \hat{B}, C = G \cdot \hat{C}$. Since
multiplication by G is linear, the correction $B + C = a \Delta$ still holds. However, by
the syndrome decoding assumption, a will now appear be uniformly distributed.

This protocol can more generally be referred to a $(\mathbb{S}, \mathbb{E})$-subfield VOLE where
we have a subfield $\mathbb{S}$ and an extension field $\mathbb{E} = \mathbb{S}^\sigma$ for some $\sigma$. The correlation
\(B = C + a\Delta\) holds for \(a \in \mathbb{S}^n\) and \(B, C \in \mathbb{E}^n, \Delta \in \mathbb{E}\). The description above is of course for \(\mathbb{S} = \mathbb{F}_2\) and \(\sigma = \lambda\).

As eluded to before, one can efficiently multiply many scalers \(x(1),...,x(q) \in \mathbb{S}\) by a vector \(k \in \mathbb{S}^m\) using subfield VOLE. The parties first generate a \((\mathbb{S}, \mathbb{S}^m)\)-subfield VOLE correlation of size \(q\) where \(\Delta = k\). The receiver can then send the difference \(x - a\) and have the sender update their correlation such that \(B + C = xk\).

One can obtain random one-out-of-two OT from \((\mathbb{F}_2, \mathbb{F}_{2^\lambda})\)-subfield VOLE. Random OT refers to the correlation where the sender holds random strings \(m_{i,0}, m_{i,1}\) while the receiver holds a bit \(a_i\) and the string \(m_{i,a_i}\). This can be achieved by defining sender messages \(m_{i,0} = H(C_i), m_{i,1} = H(C_i + \Delta)\) where the receiver knows random choice bit \(a_i\) and message \(m_{i,a_i} = H(B_i)\).

Finally, one can obtain a random binary OLE correlation from a random OT correlation, where the receiver holds \(x_0, y_0 \in \mathbb{F}_2\) and the sender holds \(x_1, y_1 \in \mathbb{F}_2\) such that \(x_0 + x_1 = y_0y_1\). From a single random OT \((m_0, m_1), (a, m_a)\), the parties can define \(y_0 = a, y_1 = \text{lsb}(m_0 + m_1), x_0 = \text{lsb}(m_a), x_1 = \text{lsb}(m_0)\).

### 6.2 OT based \((\mathbb{F}_3, \mathbb{F}_2)\)-wPRF Protocol

Given that we aim to have secret shared output and binary sharings are standard, we choose to begin with our \((\mathbb{F}_3, \mathbb{F}_2)\)-wPRF which outputs a vector over \(\mathbb{F}_2\). In addition, we will consider the optimized variant where the key is binary. Following the analysis in Section 5.4, we increase the input dimension to \(n = 4\lambda\). In particular, we will evaluate

\[f(k, x) = B \cdot_2 (A \cdot_3 [k \odot x])\]

where \(k \in \mathbb{F}_2^n, x \in \mathbb{F}_3^n, A \in \mathbb{F}_3^{m \times n}, B \in \mathbb{F}_2^{m \times t}\).

We consider two primitives for building these protocols, oblivious transfer and garbled circuits. Our first protocol will only make use of the former while the latter will use both. In all cases we choose to optimize the overall overhead of the protocols in terms of computational, communication and round complexity. Where it does not add additional overheads, we will make use of a prepossessing phase. This primarily takes the form of generating oblivious transfer correlations which can later be used in the main protocol.

**Reusable Key Correlations.** Our first technique use oblivious transfer to multiply \(k \odot x\). This can be achieved by having the party holding \(k\) act as the OT receiver with \(k_i\) as their choice bit\(^{11}\). This choice allows us to perform these OTs ahead of time, once \(k\) is fixed but before \(x\) is known, and later reuse them for each input \(x\). The OT sender will provide two messages, \((s_i, s_i + x_i)\), where \(s_i\) is sampled uniformly at random. Therefore the sender will learn \(f_i = s_i + x_i\). Let us interpret \(s, f\) as the individual shares of \([u]\) where \(u = k \odot x\). Given this \(\mathbb{F}_3^n\) sharing of \(k \odot x\), the parties can locally multiply with the public matrix \(A \in \mathbb{F}_3^{m \times n}\), i.e. \([u]\) := \(A \cdot_3 [u] = A \cdot_3 [k \odot x]\).\(^{11}\)

\(^{11}\)If one does not employ the binary key optimization, this can be generalized to a one-out-of-three OT as used later.
Nonreusable Input Correlations. As an alternative to

Modulus conversion. We now describe how to perform modulus conversion from \([v]^3 \in \mathbb{F}_3^m\) to \([v]^3 \in \mathbb{F}_2\), where \(v = w \mod 2\). For simplicity, let \(m = 1\) and the inputs of the two parties \(P_0, P_1\) are shares \((w_0, w_1)\) such that \(w = w_0 + 3w_1\). The truth table \(T\) of \(w\) mod 2 is described in Table 1. \(P_0\) with input \(w_0\) will use the \(w_0\)-th row of \(T\) as the sender input in a 1-out-of-3 OT and \(P_1\) will pick up \(T[w_0, w_1]\), using \(w_1\) as the receiver input. Looking ahead, we will actually want the parties to obtain shares of \(T[w_0, w_1]\). To achieve this, \(P_0\) can simply choose a random \(r \in \{0, 1\}\) and uses \(T[w_0, w_1] \oplus r\) as its input to the OT. By correctness, \(P_1\) will receive \(T[w_0, w_1] \oplus r\).

Derandomizing an OLE. We can build a 1-out-of-3 OT for bit messages from binary OLE, which itself is equivalent to a 1-out-of-2 OT. Each mod2 gate / 1-out-of-3 OT consumes 2 binary OLE’s. Recall that a binary OLE correlation is defined as a pair of tuples \((x_0, y_0)\) and \((x_1, y_1)\), held by \(P_0\) and \(P_1\) respectively, which satisfy \(x_0 \oplus x_1 = y_0 \cdot y_1\). We will partially derandomize these by allowing \(P_1\) to change their \(y_1\) to be a chosen value, \(c\). The parties will now hold correlation \((x'_0, y'_0, x'_1, c)\) where \(x_0, x_1, y_0\) are random and \(c\) is chosen by \(P_1\). A random binary OLE correlation can be converted into a chosen one if \(P_1\) sends \(d = (y_1 \oplus c)\), and \(P_0\) updates its share as \(x'_0 = x_0 \oplus y_0 \cdot d\).

For \(w_0\)-th row of \(T - T[w_0, :]\) - as the sender input in a 1-out-of-3 OT and \(P_1\) will pick up \(T[w_0, w_1]\), using \(w_1\) as the receiver input. Looking ahead, we will actually want the parties to obtain shares of \(T[w_0, w_1]\). To achieve this, \(P_0\) can simply choose a random \(r \in \{0, 1\}\) and uses \(T[w_0, w_1] \oplus r\) as its input to the OT. By correctness, \(P_1\) will receive \(T[w_0, w_1] \oplus r\).

Table 1. Truth table \(T\) of \(w \oplus w_1\) where \(w_0, w_1 \in \mathbb{F}_3\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(w_1)</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1-out-of-3 OT for mod 2. We will derandomize two OLEs using \(P_1\)’s \(u_1 \in \mathbb{F}_3\). This value is represented using two bits \((u_{1,0}, u_{1,1})\) such that \(u_1 = u_{1,0} + 3u_{1,1}\). We will derandomize two OLEs using \(u_{1,0}, u_{1,1}\). Let us define the resulting OLEs as

\((x_0, x_1, y_0, u_{1,0}), (x'_0, x'_1, y'_0, u_{1,1})\)

We will define the random 1-out-of-3 OT messages (in this case single bits) as

\[m_0 = x_0 \oplus x'_0\]
\[m_1 = x_0 \oplus y_0 \oplus x'_0\]
\[m_2 = x_0 \oplus x'_0 \oplus y'_0\]

Note that
when \( u_{1,0} = u_{1,1} = 0 \), then \( x_1 = x_0, x'_1 = x'_0 \) and therefore \( P_1 \) knows \( m_0 \). 
m_1, m_2 is uniform due to \( y_0, y'_0 \) being uniform, respectively.

- When \( u_{1,0} = 1, u_{1,1} = 0 \), then \( x_1 = x_0 + y_0 \) and \( x'_1 = x_0 \) and therefore \( P_1 \) knows \( m_1 = x_1 + x'_1 = (x_0 + y_0) + x'_0 \). \( m_0 \) is uniform because \( x_0 = x_1 + y_0 \) and \( y_0 \) is uniform given \( x_1 \). \( m_2 \) is uniform because \( y'_0 \) is uniform given \( x_1 \).

- Finally, when \( u_{1,0} = 0, u_{11} = 1 \), the same basic case as above applies.

These will be used to mask the truth table \( T \). That is, \( P_0 \) will sample mask \( r \) and send \( t_{F_3} \) where

\[
\begin{align*}
t_0 &= m_0 + T[u_0, 0] + r \\
t_1 &= m_1 + T[u_0, 1] + r \\
t_2 &= m_2 + T[u_0, 2] + r
\end{align*}
\]

\( P_1 \) can therefore compute

\[
z_1 = t_{u_1} + 3m_{u_1} = T[u_0, u_1] + 3r = (u \mod 2) + 3r
\]

and \( P_0 \) can compute

\[
z_0 = r
\]

and therefore we have \( z_0 \oplus z_1 = u \).

Reducing the communication. As an optimization, we don’t need to send \( t_0 \). The idea is that if the receiver want to learn \( T[u_0, 0] \), then they can set their share as \( m_0 \). That is,

\[
z_1 = \text{if } (u_1 = 0) \text{ then } m_0 \text{ else } t_{u_1} + 3m_{u_1}
\]

\[
= u_{1,0} \cdot 3t_{u_1} + m_{u_1}
\]

The sender now needs to define \( r \) appropriately. In particular,

\[
r := m_0 + T[u_0, 0]
\]

In the case of \( u_1 = 0 \), we have \( z_1 = m_0, z_0 = r + T[u_0, 0], \) and therefore we get the right result. The other cases are the same with the randomness of the mask \( r \) coming from \( m_0 \).

**Theorem 1.** The protocol of Figure 1 securely evaluates the \((F_3, F_2)\)-wPRF of Definition 8 with two-party semi-honest security in the random OLE/OT hybrid model where \( P_0 \) inputs the key \( k \) and \( P_1 \) inputs \( x \) and they receive \([F(k, x)]\) as output.

**Proof.** Consider a corrupt \( P_0 \). Their view consists of the random OT strings \( \sigma_{i,k} \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda, a, c \in \mathbb{F}_2^{2 \times m}, f \in \mathbb{F}_3^\lambda, \delta \in \mathbb{F}_2^m \). The simulation will send uniformly random strings for each of these.

Recall that \( P_0 \) knows either \( s_i \) or \( h_i \) while the other is uniformly distributed due to \( \sigma_{i,1 \oplus k} \) being uniformly distributed. Therefore, over the random choices of
OT based \((\mathbb{F}_3, \mathbb{F}_2)\)-wPRF protocol with shared output.

**Setup:**

1. \(P_0\) inputs their key \(k \in \mathbb{F}_{2^2}\).
2. The parties perform \(n\) random OTs where \(P_0\) is OT receiver with choice bit \(k_i\). \(P_1\) receives two random strings \(\sigma_{i,0}, \sigma_{i,1} \in \{0,1\}^\lambda\) and \(P_0\) receives \(\sigma_{i,k_i}\).
3. Let \(G_{i,0}, G_{i,1}\) denote stateful PRNGs with \(\mathbb{F}_3\) output held by \(P_1\) with seeds \(\sigma_{i,0}, \sigma_{i,1}\) respectively.
4. Let \(G'_i\) denote a stateful PRNG with \(\mathbb{F}_3\) output held by \(P_0\) with seed \(\sigma_{i,k_i}\).

**Eval:**

1. \(P_1\) inputs \(x \in \mathbb{F}_3^n\).
2. The parties preprocess/generate \(2 \times m\) random binary OLEs \(a, b, c, d \in \mathbb{F}_2^{2^m}\) where \(a \oplus b = c \oplus d\), \(P_0\) holds \(a, c\) and \(P_1\) holds \(b, d\).
3. \(P_1\) computes
   
   \[
   \begin{align*}
   &\text{(a)} \quad h_{0,i} \leftarrow G_{i,0} \\
   &\text{(b)} \quad h_{1,i} \leftarrow G_{i,1} \\
   &\text{(c)} \quad f := x - h_0 - h_1 \\
   &\text{(d)} \quad u := A \cdot h_0 \\
   &\text{(e)} \quad u' \in \mathbb{F}_2^{2^m}, \text{s.t.} \quad u = 2u'_2 + u'_1 \\
   &\text{(f)} \quad \delta := u' \oplus d.
   \end{align*}
   \]

   and sends \(f, \delta\) to \(P_0\).
4. \(P_0\) computes
   
   \[
   \begin{align*}
   &\text{(a)} \quad t_i \leftarrow G'_i \\
   &\text{(b)} \quad v := A \cdot (k \oplus f) + d \\\n   &\text{(c)} \quad v' \in \mathbb{F}_2^{2^m}, \text{s.t.} \quad v = 2v'_2 + v'_1 \\
   &\text{(d)} \quad a' := a \oplus (c \oplus \delta) \\
   &\text{(e)} \quad s_1 := a'_1 \oplus s_2 \\
   &\text{(f)} \quad s_2 := s_1 \oplus c_1 \\
   &\text{(g)} \quad s_3 := s_1 \oplus c_2 \\
   &\text{(h)} \quad t'_1 := s_1 \oplus v'_1 \\
   &\text{(i)} \quad t_2 := t_1 \oplus s_2 \oplus v'_1 \oplus v'_2 \oplus 1^m \\
   &\text{(j)} \quad t_3 := t_1 \oplus s_3 \oplus v'_2 \\
   &\text{(k)} \quad w := B \cdot t_0 \\
   \end{align*}
   \]

   and sends \(t_2, t_3\) to \(P_1\).
5. \(P_1\) computes \(q := B \cdot [(u'_1 \oplus t_2) \oplus (u'_2 \oplus t_3) \oplus b_1 \oplus b_2]\).
6. \(P_0\) outputs \(w\) and \(P_1\) outputs \(q\).

**Fig. 1.** Our \((\mathbb{F}_3, \mathbb{F}_2)\)-wPRF protocol based on OLE with plaintext inputs and secret sharing output.

\(\sigma_{i,1 \oplus k_i}, f\) is uniformly distributed and independent of \(x\). Finally, \(\delta\) is uniformly distributed give that \(d\) is uniformly distributed.

Now consider a corrupt \(P_1\). Their view consists of the OT strings \(\sigma, t_2, t_3\). Observe that

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{t}_2 &= \text{t}_1 \oplus \text{s}_2 \oplus v'_1 \oplus v'_2 \oplus 1^m \\
&= \text{s}_1 \oplus \text{s}_2 \oplus v'_1 \oplus 1^m \\
&= \text{c}_1 \oplus v'_1 \oplus 1^m
\end{align*}
\]
and 

\[ t_3 = t_1 \oplus s_3 \oplus v_2' \]
\[ = s_1 \oplus s_3 \oplus v_2' \]
\[ = c_2 \oplus v_1' \oplus v_2' \]

and recall that \( c \) is uniformly distributed. Therefore, \( t_2, t_3 \) are also uniformly distributed. Simulating the output distribution is straightforward given that the protocol is correct.

**Overheads.** The full protocol is described in Figure 1. Assuming the setup phase is reused, the protocol consumes \( 2m \) random OT/OLE correlations. When generated using a silent OT protocol [RRT23, BCG+19a, BCG+19b], the amortized cost of the OTs is \( O(\lambda) \) computation and less than one bit of communication. The main phase of the protocol derandomizes the OLEs using two bits of communication and while sending \( t_2, t_3 \) two bits, totaling to a combined \( 2m+(2m+n) \log_2(3) \) bits.

We also note the recent development of OT protocols with constant overhead by Boyle et al. [BCG+23]. This result implies that our share conversion protocol can be evaluated in constant amortized work, independent of the security parameter \( \lambda \). Moreover, if \( A, B \) are implemented using linear time encodable codes, the overall running amortized time of our protocol is \( O(\lambda) \) work per PRF evaluation.

**Concurrent work.** We would like to point out the concurrent work for constructing \( \mathbb{F}_3 \) to \( \mathbb{F}_2 \) conversion protocols [IKNZ23] in the OT hybrid model. Their optimized construction showed that they can generate a modulus conversion preprocessing pair (\( [r]^2, [r]^3 \)) using an amortized 1.33 OLEs/OTs and 3.08 bits of communication, or at the cost of 18 OLEs/OTs and 2.55 bits. This pair can then be used to derandomized to convert \( [v]^3 \) into \( [v]^2 \) using an additional 1.58 = \( \log_2(3) \) bits of communication, totaling 4.66 or 4.13 bits per modulus conversion. Our technique on the other hand requires 2 OLEs/OTs and only 4 bits of communication.

Although their construction can allow for fewer OLEs, e.g. 1.33 vs. 2, the surrounding protocol is more complicated and therefore it is not clear which would be more efficient in practice. We leave it to future work to investigate.

### 6.3 OT based \((\mathbb{F}_2, \mathbb{F}_3)\)-wPRF Protocol

We now present an OT-based protocol for our \((\mathbb{F}_2, \mathbb{F}_3)\)-wPRF where the inputs are known to the respective parties and the output is shared. Compared to the previous, this protocol achieves better computational efficiency at the expense of having a mod 3 output domain. However, for applications such as an OPRF this has little impact. Conceptually, the protocol works in a similar way. First shares of \( x \cdot k \) are computed using (preprocessed) OTs based on the key. The parties additionally generate \( m \) random OTs with strings in \( \mathbb{F}_3 \). These are used
to make the $F_2$ to $F_3$ modulus conversion. Since the inputs are already binary, each mod gate requires only one OT as opposed to two OLEs in the previous protocol.

In the amortized setting, this protocol requires $m$ OTs, two rounds of interaction and $2.6m + n$ bits of communication per evaluation. To convert the secret sharing output protocol to an OPRF, an additional $1.6t$ bits of communication and zero additional rounds are required.

### OT based $(F_2, F_3)$-wPRF protocol with shared output.

**Setup:**
1. $P_0$ inputs their key $k \in F_2^n$.
2. The parties perform $n$ random OTs where $P_0$ is OT receiver with choice bit $k_i$. $P_1$ receives two random strings $\sigma_{i,0}, \sigma_{i,1} \in \{0,1\}^\lambda$ and $P_0$ receives $\sigma_{i,k_i}$.
3. Let $G_{i,0}, G_{i,1}$ denote stateful PRNGs with $F_2$ output held by $P_1$ with seeds $\sigma_{i,0}, \sigma_{i,1}$ respectively.
4. Let $G'_i$ denote a stateful PRNG with $F_2$ output held by $P_0$ with seed $\sigma_{i,k_i}$.

**Eval:**
1. $P_1$ inputs $x \in F_2^n$.
2. The parties preprocess/generate $m$ random OTs where $P_0$ holds $s \in F_3^{2 \times m}$ and $P_1$ holds $d \in F_2^m$, $s' = (s_{d_1,1}, ..., s_{d_m,m})$.
3. $P_1$ computes
   (a) $h_{0,i} \leftarrow G_{i,0}$ for $i \in [n]$
   (b) $h_{1,i} \leftarrow G_{i,1}$ for $i \in [n]$
   (c) $f \leftarrow x \oplus h_0 \oplus h_1$
   (d) $u \leftarrow A \cdot 2^{h_0}$
   (e) $\delta \leftarrow u \oplus d$.
   and sends $f, \delta$ to $P_0$.
4. $P_0$ computes
   (a) $g_i \leftarrow G'_i$ for $i \in [n]$
   (b) $v \leftarrow A \cdot 2^{(k \odot f) \oplus g}$
   (c) $t \leftarrow v \cdot 3 \cdot s_0 - 3 \cdot s_1$
   (d) $w \leftarrow B \cdot 3^{(s_{d_1,1}, ..., s_{d_m,m})}$
   and sends $t$ to $P_1$.
5. $P_1$ computes $q \leftarrow B \cdot 3^{[s' + 3 \cdot (t \odot d)]}$.
6. $P_0$ outputs $w$ and $P_1$ outputs $q$.

Fig. 2. Our $(F_2, F_3)$-wPRF protocol based on OLE with plaintext inputs and secret sharing output.

**Theorem 2.** The protocol of Figure 2 securely evaluates the $(F_3, F_2)$-wPRF of Definition 8 with two-party semi-honest security in the random OLE/OT hybrid model where $P_0$ inputs the key $k$ and $P_1$ inputs $x$ and they receive $[F(k, x)]$ as output.

**Proof.** The simulation of the protocol is to send uniformly random messages.

Consider a corrupt $P_0$. Their view consists of $f, \delta$. The former is uniformly distributed given that either $h_{0,i}$ or $h_{1,i}$ is uniformly distributed. The latter is uniformly distributed due to $d$ being uniform.
Now consider a corrupt \( P_1 \). Their view consists of \( t \), which is uniformly distributed due to either \( s_{0,i} \) or \( s_{1,i} \) being uniformly distributed.

The simulations of the output distribution trivially follows from the correctness of the protocol.

### 6.4 Specialized Garbling

We now describe a specialized garbling scheme [Yao86] for evaluating our wPRF. We present this protocol only for the \((\mathbb{F}_2,\mathbb{F}_3)\)-wPRF but not that this can be generalized in a natural way. The core idea is that we can utilize free-xor with specialized unary gates for performing the modulus conversion step. As before, the parties will preprocess OTs using the key as the choice bit.

\( P_1 \) will act as the garbler with \( \Delta \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda \) being the global free-XOR key [KS08]. Instead of garbling labels for \( x \) and \( k \), \( P_1 \) will generate garbled labels \( L_i \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda \) where \( L_i \) is the zero label for \( x_i \cdot k_i \). In particular, the parties will use the preprocessed OTs for \( k \) with messages \((L_i, L_i \oplus x_i \Delta)\). \( P_0 \) will learn \( L_i' = L_i \oplus (x_i k_i) \Delta \). \( P_1, P_0 \) can multiply these labels with \( A \) to obtain \( U_i, U_i' \) respectively.

\( P_1 \) the garbles a unary gate that maps the zero label to a random \( r_i \in \mathbb{F}_3 \) value while one label is mapped to \( r_i + 1 \). Unlike in traditional garbling, we desire the output of the mod gate to be a single \( \mathbb{F}_3 \) element and as such the garbled table can be much smaller. In particular, with the use of the point-and-permute technique the garbled table can be a single \( \mathbb{F}_3 \) element.

In particular, we will restrict the free-XOR key \( \Delta \) to have a 1 in its least significant bit. As such, the least significant bits of \( U_i, U_i' \) for a secret sharing of the underlying value, i.e.

\[
\begin{align*}
  u_i &= \text{lsb}(U_i) \oplus \text{lsb}(U_i') \\
  &= \text{lsb}(U_i) \oplus \text{lsb}(U_i \oplus u_i \Delta) \\
  &= \text{lsb}(U_i) \oplus \text{lsb}(U_i) \oplus u_i \text{lsb}(\Delta) \\
  &= u_i
\end{align*}
\]

We wish to translate this secret sharing into an \( \mathbb{F}_3 \) sharing with the same underlying value. For now, let us assume that \( P_0 \) knows \( u_i = 0 \). \( P_1 \) can define \( r_i = -H(U_i) \). If \( P_0 \) has \( U_i' = U_i \), i.e. \( u_i = 0 \), then they can also derive \( r_i \) which forms a secret sharing of zero. However, if \( P_0 \) holds the one label \( U_i' = U_i \oplus \Delta \), then they will need assistance to compute \( r_i + 1 \). This is done by sending a garbled table containing the difference between \( r_i + 1 \) and \( H(U_i') \). Lastly, it is important that \( P_0 \) does not know the underlying value. However, in the explanation above we assume \( P_0 \) can conditionally add the difference based on the underlying value. This can be circumvented using the point-and-permute technique. The full protocol is given in Figure 3.

The overhead of this protocol is \( \lambda n + \log_2(3)m \) bits and requires no OTs after the initial set of OTs for the Key. Indeed, this makes conceptually sense due to the garbler not needing OTs for their input, i.e. \( x \).
We note that this protocol can easily be extended to the \((\mathbb{F}_3, \mathbb{F}_2)\)-wPRF. First the free-XOR can be generalized to work over the \(\mathbb{F}_{3^\lambda}\) extension field as opposed to \(\mathbb{F}_{2^\lambda}\), see [BMR16]. The unary gates can then consist of two 1-bit values.

**Garbling \((\mathbb{F}_2, \mathbb{F}_3)\)-wPRF protocol with shared output.**

**Setup:**
1. \(P_0\) inputs their key \(k \in \mathbb{F}_2^n\).
2. The parties perform \(n\) random OTs where \(P_0\) is OT receiver with choice bit \(k_i\). \(P_1\) receives two random strings \(\sigma_{i,0}, \sigma_{i,1} \in \{0,1\}^\lambda\) and \(P_0\) receives \(\sigma_{i,k_i}\).
3. Let \(G_{i,0}, G_{i,1}\) denote stateful PRNGs with \(\mathbb{F}_{2^\lambda}\) output held by \(P_1\) with seeds \(\sigma_{i,0}, \sigma_{i,1}\) respectively.
4. Let \(G_i'\) denote a stateful PRNG with \(\mathbb{F}_{2^\lambda}\) output held by \(P_0\) with seed \(\sigma_{i,k_i}\).

**Eval:**
1. \(P_1\) inputs \(x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n\).
2. \(P_1\) computes
   (a) \(\Delta \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\lambda-1}||1\)
   (b) \(h_{0,i} \leftarrow G_{i,0}\) for \(i \in [n]\)
   (c) \(h_{1,i} \leftarrow G_{i,1}\) for \(i \in [n]\)
   (d) \(f := x\Delta \oplus h_0 \oplus h_1\)
   (e) \(r_i := -f \oplus \text{lsb}(U_i)\)
   (f) \(\sigma_i := -r_i + \text{lsb}(U_i) - \text{lsb}(U_i + \Delta)\) for \(i \in [n]\)
   (g) \(v_i := H(U_i + \Delta) + \text{lsb}(U_i)\)
   (h) \(q := B \cdot 3 v\)
3. \(P_0\) computes
   (a) \(g_i \leftarrow G_i'\) for \(i \in [n]\)
   (b) \(U' := A \cdot 2 h_0\)
   (c) \(v_i := H(U'_i) + \text{lsb}(U'_i)\)
   (d) \(w := B \cdot 3 v\)
4. \(P_0\) outputs \(w\) and \(P_1\) outputs \(q\).

**Fig. 3.** Our \((\mathbb{F}_2, \mathbb{F}_3)\)-wPRF protocol based on garbling with plaintext inputs and secret sharing output.

**Theorem 3.** The protocol of Figure 3 securely evaluates the \((\mathbb{F}_3, \mathbb{F}_2)\)-wPRF of Definition 8 with two-party semi-honest security in the random oracle \(H\) random OT hybrid model where \(P_0\) inputs the key \(k\) and \(P_1\) inputs \(x\) and they receive \([F(k, x)]\) as output. \(H : \{0,1\}^* \to \mathbb{F}_3\) is a random oracle.

**Proof.** The simulation of the protocol is to send uniformly random messages. The simulation follows the the standard free-XOR garbling argument. Essentially, a corrupt \(P_0\) can only distinguish if they query the random oracle at some input \(U'_i \oplus \Delta\), i.e. the not active wire labels. If no such query is made, the the simulator can replace all such queries with uniformly random values and then simulation follows immediately. Assuming the adversary makes such a query, then they have essentially guessed \(\Delta\). However, this can only happen with negligible probability.
7 Properties of the AM-OWF

We now turn our attention to constructing post-quantum secure signatures using the MPC-in-the-head paradigm and AM-OWF of [DGH+21]. Recall that the AM-OWF is defined as \( f(x) = B(Ax) \) where \( A \in \mathbb{F}_2^{m \times n} \) and \( B \in \mathbb{F}_3^{t \times m} \) are fixed public matrices chosen uniformly at random, and \( Ax \) is interpreted as a binary vector in \( \mathbb{F}_3^m \). Before diving into our signature constructions, we first prove some useful properties of the AM-OWF. Roughly speaking, our core lemma shows that when the input size is made slightly larger than the output, the statistical distance between the distribution of the output of the AM-OWF on a uniformly random input and the uniform distribution is negligible. At the same time, we show that a uniformly random value from \( \mathbb{F}_3^t \) lies in the image of the OWF with overwhelming probability. We will then use this lemma to prove the hardness of various problems closely related to the AM-OWF that will allow us to reduce the size of our post-quantum signature scheme. All proofs in this section can be found in Section 10.

**Lemma 2.** Let \( H = \{ h_{A,B} | A \in \mathbb{F}_2^{m \times n}, B \in \mathbb{F}_3^{t \times m}; \text{rank}(A) = n \} \) be a family of hash functions such that \( h_{A,B} : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^{t \log 3} \), then \( H \) is a universal hash family.

By appealing to the Leftover Hash Lemma, we have the following corollary. Intuitively, Corollary 1 shows that there is a if we swap the output of the AM-OWF with a uniformly random string of the same size, even a computationally unbounded adversary fails to distinguish them with some noticeable probability.

**Corollary 1.** Let \( h_{A,B} \leftarrow H \), as defined in Lemma 2 and \( n \geq t \log 3 + \omega(\log \lambda) \), then \( h_{A,B} \) is a strong \((n, \text{negl}(\lambda))\) extractor with output length \( t \log 3 \).

In addition to being close to the uniform distribution, we will now show that the AM-OWF covers an overwhelming fraction of the output domain \( \mathbb{F}_3^t \).

**Lemma 3.** For any \( h_{A,B} \leftarrow H \), let \( O_{h_{A,B}} = \{ h_{A,B}(x) | x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \} \) denote the covering of \( h_{A,B} \). Then, with overwhelming probability over the choice of \( h_{A,B} \), we have \( |O_{h_{A,B}}|/3^t \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) \).

7.1 Variants of the AM-OWF

We next investigate three variants of the AM-OWF and reduce their hardness to the hardness of inverting the AM-OWF. Recall that in the (OWF) game, a challenger samples \( A \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{m \times n}, B \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_3^{t \times m} \), and \( x \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n \) and computes an instance \( (A, B, y = B(Ax)) \). The adversary is tasked with finding any \( x \) such that \( B(Ax) = y \). The advantage of an adversary in this game is the probability with which it outputs such an \( x \).

**Systematic Form.** To improve the efficiency of our protocols using the AM-OWF, we wish to use the AM-OWF in systematic form i.e. the lowest \( m \times m \) entries of \( B \) form an identity matrix. Formally, the systOWF game is identical
to the OWF game except that B is enforced to have a systematic form. The adversary is given (A, B, x) where all entries are sampled uniformly at random except for the bottom-most entries of A and the right-most $m \times m$ entries of B. We now prove that this new game is just as hard the original OWF game.

**Lemma 4.** Given an adversary A that wins the systOWF game with noticeable advantage, there exists an adversary $A'$ that wins the OWF game with noticeable advantage.

**Anti-Solution.** Due to technical reasons in our protocols, we also need to argue that it is difficult to find an anti solution. We define another game (antiOWF) which is identical to the OWF game, except the adversary needs to output an x such that $B(1 \oplus (Ax)) = y$ and now argue that this as hard as the OWF game.

**Lemma 5.** Given an adversary A that wins the antiOWF game with noticeable advantage, there exists an adversary $A'$ that wins the OWF game with noticeable advantage.

**Approximate-Solution.** We define a final game approxOWF($n, m, t$), which is identical to the OWF game but with a relaxed requirement on the solution where the adversary is given (A, B, y), and must output $(x, v, v')$ such that $v = Ax$, $y = Bv'$, and $\Delta_H(v, v') \leq 1$. In fact, our result holds for any $\Delta_H(v, v') \leq O(1)$.

**Lemma 6.** Given an adversary A that wins the approxOWF($n, m + 1, t$) game with noticeable advantage, there exists an adversary $A'$ that wins the OWF game with noticeable advantage, for a slightly smaller OWF($n, m, t$) game.

### 7.2 Combinatorial Analysis

Similar to [CCJ23], we compute a bound on the success probability of a cheating prover who is free to choose the correlations used in the MPCitH. Although the high-level approach is the same, we use require very different techniques, relying on the properties of error correcting codes.

**Definition 10 (Combinatorial bound - informal).** A real $p \in (0, 1)$ is a combinatorial bound, if for every incorrect witness $x$, and every pair $(r, r') \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \times \mathbb{F}_3^n$, the probability over a random permutation $\pi$ that $x$ satisfies the following equations:

- $v' = z \odot (1 - \pi(r')) + (1 - z) \odot \pi(r')$ with $z = \pi(r) \oplus v$, and $v = Ax$
- $Bv' = y$

is upper-bounded by $p$.

We begin by making a few observations. As also noted in [CCJ23], for all possible combinations of $r, r'$, the effect of the share conversion step can be mapped to one of three different actions:

- Identity (copy): $v'_i = v_i$, whenever $r_i = r'_i$. 

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A malicious adversary who does not use a valid witness $x$ will arrive at a $v$ such that $Bv \neq y$. Therefore, the only way to satisfy $Bv' = y$ is to modify enough positions of $v$, to make it a codeword. Since we permute the randomness used, the actions chosen by the adversary are permuted before being used. Intuitively, the larger the number of flips, the lower the probability that a permutation aligns the flips with the positions that need to be modified.

We begin with the observation that $B$ can be viewed as the parity-check matrix of a random linear code where instead of checking whether the party is 0, we check that it is $y$. Therefore, $Bv' = y$ if and only if $v'$ a codeword. Because $B$ is a random linear code, it has good distance with high probability. Therefore, the possible values of $v'$ are sufficiently spread out. Suppose the minimum number of flip and $\text{const2}$ operations required to reach a particular word $v'$ from $v$ are $\delta_1$ and $\delta_2$ respectively. Then the number of permutations that map $v$ to $v'$ is given by $(m - \delta_1 - \delta_2)! \delta_1! \delta_2! \leq (m - \delta)! \delta!$, where $\delta = \delta_1 + \delta_2$. Over the choice of permutations, the probability that the adversary successfully lands on a particular word is upper bounded by $1/\binom{m}{\delta}$. Thus, if we can upper bound the number of codewords, at a distance $\delta$ from $v$, and take a union bound over all of them, we obtain the adversary’s probability of successfully cheating using a configuration with $\delta$ modifications.

**Few flips** ($0 < \delta < d/2$). If the minimum distance of $B$ is $d$, then within any hamming ball of radius $d/2$, there is at most one codeword. Thus, if the adversary modifies fewer than $d/2$ positions, there is at most one codeword that satisfies $Bv' = y$.

**Many flips** ($d/2 \leq \delta \leq m$). This case is more tricky because there are now (potentially) many codewords on the hamming ball of radius $\delta$. It is easy to see that the total number of words on the hamming ball is $\binom{m}{\delta}$. However, any codeword is at least a distance $d$ away from any other codeword. Therefore, for every codeword that we try to fit on the hamming ball, there are some number of words adjacent to this codeword that cannot also be a codeword. Formally, this set of adjacent words can be described as $B_\delta = \{ c | \Delta_H(v',c) \leq d \wedge \Delta_H(v,c) = \delta \}$. Without loss of generality, we choose $v$ to be the origin $\{0\}^m$ and $v' = \{0\}^{m-\delta} \{1\}^{\delta_1} \{2\}^{\delta_2}$, where $\delta_1 + \delta_2 = \delta$. The description of $B_\delta$ can be simplified as $B_\delta = \{ c | \text{Wt}(c) = \delta \wedge \text{Wt}(c-v') \leq d \}$. We can now compute a lowerbound on $|B_\delta|$ and hence an upperbound on $C_\delta$, the number of codewords at a distance $\delta$. Observe that we enumerate over words in $B_\delta$ by first choosing an $\alpha \leq \min(d/2, \delta, m - \delta)$ subset of the 0 positions that will be flipped to either 1 or 2 and then restoring the weight to $\delta$ by zero-ing out an $\alpha$ sized subset of the 1/2 positions. In addition, one can flip the 1/2 positions to 2/1, in each of the above configurations.

$$
|B_\delta| \geq \sum_{\alpha=0}^{\min(d/2, \delta, m-\delta)} \left( \frac{m-\delta}{\alpha} \right) \left( \frac{\delta}{\alpha} \right) \left( \frac{2^\alpha}{\sum_{\beta=1}^{\min(2\alpha, \delta-\alpha)} \left( \frac{\delta-\alpha}{\beta} \right)} \right),
$$

(1)

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Therefore, $C_{\delta} = \lceil \binom{m}{\delta} / |B_{\delta}| \rceil$ is an upper bound on the number of codewords on the hamming ball of radius $\delta$. To finish the argument, we simply take a union bound over all the codewords on the hamming ball to obtain an upper bound on the probability of successfully landing on some codeword, $p_2 \leq C_{\delta} / \binom{m}{\delta}$. By explicitly plotting the combinatorial bound for the parameters of the AM-OWF, we can see that $|B_{\delta}| > \binom{m}{\delta}$, in the regime where $\delta < d/2$ and $\delta > m - d/2$.\(^{12}\)

In otherwords, a single code word and it’s adjacent words are sufficient to cover the entire hamming ball. This is illustrated in Figure 4.

\[\text{Fig. 4.}\] The blue line denotes Combinatorial bound for different values of $\delta$ for the parameters $(m, d) = (452, 35)$. The dotted orange line is $1/\binom{m}{\delta}$, the probability with which an adversary succeeds lands on a particular codeword $\delta$ hamming distance away. The gap between the two curves highlights the impact of a growing number of codewords on the adversary’s chance of success. Importantly, the best strategy is for the adversary to make as few flips as possible (or flip almost all but a few) to avoid detection.

\textit{Anti-Solution.} Observe that if the adversary found an $x$ such that $B(1 \oplus A x) = y$, then they could chose all operations to be flip.\(^{13}\) and succeed every single time. However, from Lemma 5, we know that this is as hard as the OWF game itself. Looking ahead, when we build a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of

\(^{12}\) In fact, there is only one codeword on a hamming ball at distance $\delta > m - d^*$ for some $d^* > d/2$, as seen in Figure 4.

\(^{13}\) The adversary could also choose all operations to be $\text{const}2$, but with overwhelming probability $\{2\}^m$ is not in the code.
a pre-image of the AM-OWF, we actually only achieve a weakened notion of knowledge soundness that extracts either a pre-image or an anti-solution. Since we have shown that both these problems are hard, it suffices to compile our MPCitH protocol to a signature scheme. Similar to [CCJ23], if we further relax the soundness notion to an appropriately defined approximate notion, where the extractor is able to find an $x$ such that $B(Ax) = v$, and there exists a $v'$ such that $Bv' = y$ and $\Delta_H(v, v') \leq f$ for an appropriately chosen $f$. By appealing to Lemma 6, we know that for $f = O(1)$, this problem is also hard, thus in each parallel repetition of the MPCitH protocol, the chance of the adversary cheating is smaller, thereby requiring fewer repetitions.

8 Post-Quantum Signature

We use the MPC-in-the-head framework [IKOS07] and instantiate it with the alternating-moduli OWF proposed in [DGH+21], which is in turn based on [BIP+18]. Instead of using a generic compiler such as [KKW18], we aim to compute the same circuit but use a bespoke MPC protocol, tailored to the AM-OWF, allowing us to shrink the size by 2-3×, when compared to [DGH+21].

Overview. Our MPC protocol is quite simple and proceeds as follows. The $N$ parties start with an additive sharing of $x$ and can locally compute $Ax$. They then engage in a share conversion procedure to convert shares of $v = Ax$ to shares of $v' \in \mathbb{F}_3^m$. To convert the shares, parties mask shares of $x$ with shares of $r \in \mathbb{F}_2^m$, reconstruct $x + r$, and then compute $[v']_3 = v \oplus [1-r]^3 + (1-v) \oplus [r]^3$. The parties finish the protocol by computing $Bv'$ and reconstructing the output.

However, the main difficulty is in efficiently compiling this MPC protocol to a publicly verifiable proof of knowledge of a pre-image of the AM-OWF. One can of course use generic techniques such as the KKW [KKW18] or ZKB++ [CDG+17] proof systems as done in [DGH+21], and although they produce competitive signature sizes, they are still larger than more recent post-quantum signatures based on symmetric-key assumptions [FJR22,CCJ23,AGH+23,KZ22,BBdSG+22]. We use a technique similar to [CCJ23], to handle the pre-processing for free and design a bespoke MPCitH protocol for proving knowledge of the pre-image of an AM-OWF.

The high-level idea is as follows. We allow the prover to freely choose (potentially malicious) correlations $(\|r\|_2, \|r\|_3)$, but demand that the correlations are permuted using a uniformly random permutation $\pi$ that is chosen by the verifier. This allows use to completely avoid any checks on the preprocessed correlations, as we are able to bound the probability with which a prover can cheat for the very specific circuit we are interested in. The rest of the protocol proceeds as described above. The proof of security can be found in Section 11.

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14 This technique of using shuffled correlations was first observed in [CCJ23].
The full zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocol is specified in Figure 5. A signature scheme can then be constructed by applying the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, where the random coins provided by the verifier is replaced by a random oracle hash of the protocol transcript and the message being signed.

Our security proof proceeds in a manner very similar to that of [CCJ23]. We first note that Kales and Zaverucha [KZ20] showed that there was an attack on signature schemes using Fiat-Shamir heuristic on 5-round MPC-in-the-Head protocol. The core observation is that a malicious prover can cleverly resample verifier challenges in the second and fourth round such that the cost of finding a forgery is reduced to

$$\text{cost}_{\text{forge}} := \min_{\tau_1, \tau_2; \tau_1 + \tau_2 = \tau} \frac{1}{\sum_{i=\tau_1}^{\tau} \binom{\tau}{i} p^i (1 - p)^{\tau - i} + N_2}$$

where $p$ is the combinatorial bound. We handle this by making the combinatorial bound very small, allowing us to use (approximately) the same number of repetitions as if this attack did not exist. We now define an analogous $f$-strongly invalid witness and combinatorial bound.

**Definition 11 ($f$-strongly invalid witness).** We say that $x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$ is an $f$-weakly valid witness if there exists $v' \in \mathbb{F}_3^n$ such that $Ax = v$, $Bv' = y$, and either $\Delta_H(v, v') \leq f$ or $\Delta_H(1 \oplus v, v') \leq f$. If $x$ is not an $f$-weakly valid witness, then it is an $f$-strongly invalid witness.

**Definition 12 (Combinatorial Bound).** A combinatorial bound for the zero-knowledge proof Figure 5 with parameters $(n, t, m)$ is a real $p = p(t, m, f) \in (0, 1)$ such that for any $f$-strongly invalid witness $x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$, and for any pair of vectors $(r, r') \in \mathbb{F}_2^m \times \mathbb{F}_3^m$,

$$\Pr_{\pi \leftarrow \text{Perm}_m}[Bv' = y | v = Ax, v' = \pi(r') + (x \oplus \pi(r)) \odot (1 - 2\pi(r'))] \leq p(t, m, f),$$

where $\text{Perm}_m$ denotes the set of all permutations of $\{1, \ldots, m\}$.

We are now ready to state the main theorem of soundness for Figure 5, which we prove in Section 11

**Theorem 4.** Let Commit be a non-interactive commitment scheme and $H$ be a collision resistant hash function. Let $p$ be a combinatorial bound for the protocol in Figure 5. Then the protocol in Figure 5 is a gap honest-verifier zero-knowledge argument of knowledge for the relation $R$ such that $((A, B, y), x) \in R$ iff $B(Ax) = y$. The gap relation $R'$ is such that $((A, B, y), x) \in R'$ iff $B(Ax) = y$ and $x$ is an $f$-weakly valid witness. The soundness error of the proof is at most $\varepsilon = p + 1/N - p/N$.

**Proof Size.** The prover sends the following to the verifier in the proof of knowledge of the pre-image of the AM-OWF.

- Commitments $h$ and $h'$ of size $2\lambda$ bits each.
Verifiable Proof-of-Knowledge of a Pre-Image of the AM-OWF

**Inputs:** The prover and the verifier have matrices $A \in \mathbb{F}_2^{m \times k}$ and $B \in \mathbb{F}_3^{K \times m}$ and a vector $y \in \mathbb{F}_3^k$. $B = [B_i]_i$ is in systematic form and the prover knows a vector $x$ such that $B(Ax) = y$.

**Round 1.** The prover emulates the pre-processing phase and commits to the inputs:
1. Sample a random seed $\text{seed}^*$
2. Using $\text{seed}^*$ as the root of a depth-$\log N$ GGM-PRF [GGM84], produce leaves $\{(\text{seed}_i, \sigma_i)\}_{i \in [N]}$.
3. For $i \in [N - 1]$, expand $\text{seed}_i$ to obtain the $i$-th pseudorandom share of $x \in \mathbb{F}_2^k$, $s \in \mathbb{F}_2^m$ and $t \in \mathbb{F}_m^m$. Set $\text{state}_i = \text{seed}_i$.
4. For the $N$-th party set:
   - $[s]_N$ to be a pseudorandom share.
   - $[x]_N = x \oplus_{1 \leq i \leq N - 1} [x]_i$.
   - $[t]_N = s - \sum_{i=1}^{N-1} [t]_i \mod 3$.
   - $\text{state}_N = \text{seed}_N[[x]_N][[t]_N]$.
5. Compute and send $h = H(\text{com}_1, \ldots, \text{com}_N)$, where $\text{com}_i = \text{Commit}(\text{seed}_i; \sigma_i)$.

**Round 2.** The verifier samples a permutation $\pi$ of $m$ elements and sends it to the verifier.

**Round 3.** The prover now emulates the execution of the MPC protocol and commits to intermediate wire values.
1. Compute intermediate wire values:
   - $[z] = [v] \oplus \lceil \pi(s) \rceil$.
   - $z = \oplus_{i=1}^{3} z_i$.
   - $[v'] = z + (1 - 2z) \odot \lceil \pi(t) \rceil \mod 3$.
   - $[y] = B[v'] \mod 3$.
   - Set $\text{msg}_i = ([z], [y])$.
2. Compute $h' = H(\text{msg}_1, \ldots, \text{msg}_N)$.
3. Send $h'$ and $z^{(1)} - 1$ - the first $(m - K)$ entries of $z - 1$ to the verifier.

**Round 4.** The verifier chooses a position $i^* \in [N]$ to not open and sends it to the prover.

**Round 5.** The prover sends $(\text{state}_i, \sigma_i)_{i \neq i^*}$ and $\text{com}_i^*$.

**Verification.** Verifier accepts if all of the below checks pass.
1. For $i \in [N] \setminus i^*$, compute $\text{com}_i = \text{Commit}(\text{state}_i, \sigma_i)$ and recover the $i$-th party’s shares of $x$, $s$ and $t$, using $\text{state}_i$.
2. For all but the $i^*$-th share, compute:
   - $[z] = [v] \oplus \lceil \pi(s) \rceil$.
   - $[v^{(1)}] = z^{(1)} + (1 - 2z^{(1)}) \odot \lceil \pi(t^{(1)}) \rceil \mod 3$.
   - $[v^{(2)}] = y - B[v^{(1)}] \mod 3$.
   - $z^{(2)} = [v^{(2)}] - \lceil \pi(t^{(2)}) \rceil$.
   - $[y] = B[v'] \mod 3$.
3. Recompute $\text{msg}_i^* = (z \oplus_{i \neq i^*} [z]_i), y - \sum_{i \neq i^*} [y]_i \mod 3$.

Check if $h = H(\text{com}_1, \ldots, \text{com}_N)$ and $h' = H(\text{msg}_1, \ldots, \text{msg}_N)$.

**Fig. 5.** A 5 round zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of a pre-image of the AM-OWF.
– The co-path of $i^*$ of size $\lambda \log N$ bits.
– $\text{com}_{i^*}$ of size $2\lambda$ bits.
– The $N$-th shares of $x$ and $t$ of size $(n + m \log 3)$ bits.
– $z$ of size $m - t$ bits.

where the $h, h'$ commitments across all $\tau$ parallel executions can be combined into one commitment of size $2\lambda$ each.

$$
\text{SIZE} = 4\lambda + \tau \left( \lambda (\log N) + \frac{2\lambda}{x_N} + \frac{n}{\text{com}_{i^*}} + \frac{m - t}{\text{Compressed } z} + \frac{m \log 3}{t_N} \right)
$$

In Figure 6, we report sizes of our signature scheme for the parameter sets listed below. We expect performance similar to [CCJ23] during signing/verification. We also note that because our MPC-in-the-Head is based on additive secret sharing, the hypercube technique from [AGH+23] can be used to scale up to a larger number of parties while remaining computationally efficient.

**Parameters.** In [DGH+21], the authors propose $(n, m, t) = (\lambda, 3.53\lambda, \lambda / \log 3)$. However, for the relaxed notion of soundness that our zero-knowledge proof achieves, we actually require that it must be hard to find an $f$-weakly valid witness for the AM-OWF (Definition 11). The parameter $f$ is set such that the combinatorial bound is made as low as possible in order to minimize the impact of the attack from [KZ20] on the signature size. As well will show later, this in turn determines the value of $n, m,$ and $t$. During our search for parameters, we also identified an important metric that must be paid attention to when introducing any form of additional structure in $\mathbf{B}$.

We target 128 bit security with the following parameters a) **Fast:** (18, 193), b) **Balanced:** (13, 1723), and c) **Short:** (9, 65536) reported as $(\tau, N)$, where $N$ is the number of parties and $\tau$ is the number of parallel repetitions. Using Equation 2, we set $f = 11$, and now determine $n, m, t$ such that it is still hard to find an $f$-weakly valid witness. To ensure that the covering lemma (Lemma 3) still holds true we fix $n = t \log 3 + 10$.

**Choosing $t$ and $m$.** We choose $t, m$ such that if we sample a uniformly random value, it is not an $f$-weakly valid witness, with overwhelming probability. The reason we use this strategy is because there does not seem to be a good way to choose inputs such that the output of $\mathbf{A}x$ lies close to the codewords of $\mathbf{B}$. Indeed if there existed a strategy that did better than simply trying at random, then we can extend the approxOWF reduction (Lemma 6) to the setting where $\Delta_H(v, v') \leq f$ and break the AM-OWF for the parameters proposed in [DGH+21]. Thus, when introducing any additional structure in $\mathbf{B}$, it must be the case that the codewords must be sufficiently spread out, at least on average.

Coming back to the choice of $t$ and $m$, a random linear code approaches the GV bound. Therefore, the number of codewords of $\mathbf{B}$ is approximately $3^m / q^{H_q(d/m)m}$, where $d$ is the minimum distance of $\mathbf{B}$. The fraction of volume occupied by all words within hamming distance $f$ of codewords of $\mathbf{B}$ is therefore given by $q^{-H_q(f/m)m - H_q(d/m)m}$, which we set to be smaller than $2^{-128}$ as this is
<table>
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<th>Scheme</th>
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<td>Hash</td>
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<td>[HBD⁺²²] (short)</td>
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<td>[CCJ⁺²³] (fast)</td>
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<td>RSD/f-almost-RSD over ( \mathbb{F}_2 )</td>
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<td>[CCJ⁺²³] (medium-1)</td>
<td>9.7/8.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>[CCJ⁺²³] (medium-2)</td>
<td>9.1/8.3</td>
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<td>8.6/7.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>[AGH⁺²³] (Fast)</td>
<td>14.4/9.7</td>
<td>SD over ( \mathbb{F}<em>2/\mathbb{F}</em>{256} )</td>
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<td>Rain₄</td>
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Fig. 6. Comparison of signature sizes against state-of-the-art schemes based on symmetric-key assumptions. For \([\text{ARZV}⁺²³]\), we report the largest maximum signature sizes of the hypercube variant. EM-AES refers to AES in Even-Mansour mode.
also the probability with which a random word is within hamming distance $f$ of a codeword. This gives us $t = 135$, $m = 450$ and $n = 224$.

9 Post-Quantum Ring Signatures

An efficient proof of knowledge of the pre image of the AM-OWF also serves as a building block for Ring Signatures [RST01] and Ring CT [Noe15]. Prior work introduced generic compilers to lift MPCitH proof for a single NP statement to a disjunction of multiple NP statements [GGHAK22], where the additional cost on top of a single MPCitH proof only grows logarithmically in the number of statements. Although the compiler is asymptotically very good, we observe that there is an initial startup cost resulting in a larger than necessary overhead when there are a small number of statements. In this section, we provide concretely more efficient protocols in the few statements regime.

Overview. The goal of a ring signature is to convince a verifier that a message was signed by one party out of a set of $\ell$ parties. Recall that in the case of the AM-OWF based signature scheme, the public keys lie in $\mathbb{F}_{3^t}$. A signer needs to produce a proof that they know $x_i$ such that $y_i = B(Ax_i)$ lies in some set of public keys $(y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_\ell)$. Our strategy is to extend the MPC protocol from Section 8 as follows. Recall that at the end of the MPC protocol computing the AM-OWF on input $x_i$, all parties hold shares of $y_i$. All that is left to do is prove that parties hold a secret sharing of some $y_i \in (y_1, \ldots, y_\ell)$.

First interpret the public keys $(y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_\ell)$ as elements in the field $\mathbb{GF}(3^t)$ and interpolate a degree-$(\ell - 1)$ polynomial $Y(x)$ such that $Y(i) = y_i$. $Y(X)$ satisfies the following property for all $i \in [\ell]$,

$$Y(X) = (X - i)Q(X) + y_i,$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

where $Q(X)$ is a polynomial of degree at most $(\ell - 2)$ and $i$ is interpreted as an element of $\mathbb{GF}(3^t)$ in a natural sense of ternary decomposition. Observe that $Y(X)$ can be computed by the verifier, $Q(X)$ can be computed by the prover and secret shared with the parties in the first round, and the parties hold shares of $Y(i) = y_i$ by the end of round 3.\footnote{Because we no longer have the public key in the clear, we cannot exploit the systematic form for compression.} In round 4 of the MPC protocol Figure 5, we have the verifier send a random point $r \leftarrow \mathbb{GF}(3^t)$ and have the parties evaluate Equation 3 at this point. Note that the verifier can actually compute all powers of $r$, and thus the $Y(r)$ can be computed by the verifier. The parties can compute shares of $Q(r)$ and $(r - i)$ through local operations on their shares in verifiable manner. Finally, given access to one Beaver triple, the parties can multiply $Q(r)$ and $(r - i)$ to obtain shares of the R.H.S. of Equation 3, which can be revealed to ensure that the reconstructed value matches $Y(r)$. We note that the probability with which the verifier samples a bad $r$ such that $Y(X) - y_i \neq Q(X)(X - i)$ but $Y(r) - y_i = Q(r)(r - i)$, is $\leq \ell/|\mathbb{F}_{3^t}|$ as a polynomial of degree $\ell - 1$ has at most $\ell - 1$ roots.\footnote{Because we no longer have the public key in the clear, we cannot exploit the systematic form for compression.}
An astute reader might have observed that we are not done yet, because the prover could have used any \( i \in \text{GF}(3^t) \) not restricted to \( i \in [\ell] \). In fact, a prover could use an public key \( y^* \) by choosing \( i^* \) to be a root of the polynomial \( Y(X) - y^* \). An naive solution is to demand a range proof on \( i \) via the ternary analogue of bit-decomposition where the prover shows that \( i \) can be represented using \( \log_3 \ell \cdot 3^t \) elements \((b_0, b_1, \ldots, b_{\log_3 \ell})\). The parties would be provided with secret shares of \( b_j \) in \( \text{GF}(3^t) \) and they check that a) \( i = \sum_{j=1}^{\log_3 \ell} b_j \cdot 3^j \) and b) \( b_j \in \{0, 1, 2\} \), which requires two additional multiplications to verify that \( b_j(b_j - 1)(b_j - 2) = 0 \). Instead, we propose a way to carry out this range check for free, as long as \( \ell \) is a power of 3.\(^{16}\)

Our main observation is that a verifier already knows that \( i \in [\ell] \), therefore instead of secret sharing \( i \in \text{GF}(3^t) \), we can share it in \( \text{GF}(\ell) \) without any loss of privacy. Later, when evaluating Equation 3, the parties then locally embed these shares in \( \text{GF}(3^t) \) by simply appending \( (t - \log_3 \ell) \)-zeros. Thereby, adding just \( \tau \log \ell \) bits to the final signature size.

Although the above construction is simple, it performs surprisingly well (See Figure 7) and highlights the advantage of using a flexible framework such as MPCitH. Note that we were forced to use powers of 3 due to the structure of the public keys in the AM-OWF. Instead one could use a OWF with binary output such as \([KZ22]\), which has slightly larger signature sizes, but will still have competitive signature sizes in addition to being able to support powers of 2.

### 9.1 Ring-Signature size

The above technique indeed works generically for disjunctions of the same relation in any MPCitH based proof system, by first interpreting the statement being proved as a field element \( \text{GF}(p') \) for some prime \( p \). Below, we quantify the overhead introduced on top of a single proof.

In the MPCitH proof, the prover now additionally needs to generate Beaver triples as part of the pre-processing material. This can be done using the sacrifice-based technique from \([DPSZ12, DKL^{+}13, LN17]\). The communication can further be optimized by using PRG seeds to generate the shares of Beaver triples. Let \(([a], [b], [c])\) be the Beaver triple such that \( a.b = c \), then \([a], [b]\) of all \( N \) parties can be set to be the output of the PRG as the correlation should indeed be uniformly random. Similarly, \([c]\) can also be set to the output of the PRG, but with the share of \( N \)-th party \([c]_N = c - \sum_{i=1}^{N-1} [c]_i \), implying that the additional communication in the MPCitH per beaver triple is just one field element.

In our protocol, we only need one Beaver triple per iteration of the MPC proof. Using a sacrifice check for each iteration of the MPCitH requires \( 2\tau \) Beaver triples in total and therefore, the communication per iteration in the preprocessing phase is two field elements during the check and two additional field elements as the view of parties in the MPC. During the online phase, parties hold shares

---

\(^{16}\) The ring size can always (albeit wastefully) be padded to the next largest power of 2 by inserting random keys sampled as the output of a random oracle.
of the coefficients of the $\ell - 1$ coefficients of $Q(X)$ from Equation 3, each of which adds one field element to the communication per iteration of the MPCitH proof. Finally, when parties multiply $Q(r)$ and $(r - i)$, they broadcast two field elements. Thus, the communication overhead of the online phase of MPCitH is $(\ell + 1)$ field elements per iteration. The total proof size grows linearly in $\ell$ and the incremental cost of adding a statement to the disjunction is $\approx \tau t \log 3$ bits.

$$\text{Size} = |I_{\text{MPCitH}}| + \tau \log 3(t(\ell - 1 + 6) + \log_3 \ell)$$

**Compiling with [GGHAK22].** As expected, at small to medium sizes of the ring, our protocol outperforms state-of-the-art ring signatures but the sizes can get very big at larger ring sizes (See Figure 7). However, [GGHAK22] devised a concretely efficient compiler to prove set-membership in various MPCitH proofs which uses Merkle trees in a black-box manner to reduce computational and communication overhead. Their sizes are roughly $42 + 1.5 \times \log \ell$ KB for a ring of size $\ell$, but the 42 KB is is the size of a single signature using LowMC, with the KKW proof system. Since then, there has been tremendous progress in building signatures using MPCitH, bringing sizes down to $\approx 5$ KB for a single signature. We expect that using their compiler with any of the KKW-style proof systems from Figure 6 would yield ring signatures that only grow logarithmically in the ring size and are competitive with state-of-the-art lattice based ring signatures.
10 Missing proofs from Section 7

Lemma 2. Let \( \mathcal{H} = \{ h_{A, B} \mid A \in \mathbb{F}_2^{m \times n}, B \in \mathbb{F}_3^{t \times m}; \text{rank}(A) = n \} \) be a family of hash functions such that \( h_{A, B} : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{t \log 3} \), then \( \mathcal{H} \) is a universal hash family.

Proof. Observe that \( \text{rank}(A) = n \) and hence \( A \) is an injective mapping. Define the group \( G = (\mathbb{F}_3^t,+) \) and observe that \( h_{A, B}(x) \) is basically a subset sum over \( m \) group elements \( g_1, \ldots, g_m \) where \( g_i \) denotes the \( i \)th column of \( B \).

Let \( w = Ax \) and \( w' = Ay \). Since \( w \neq w' \) (because \( x \neq y \) and \( A \) is an injective mapping), there is at least one entry where one of them (say \( w_i \)) is non-zero and \( w'_i \) is zero. Without loss of generality, let \( i = 1 \). Observe that

\[
\Pr[h_{A, B}(x) = h_{A, B}(y)] = \Pr \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{t} w_i \cdot g_i = \sum_{i=1}^{t} w'_i \cdot g_i \right]
\]

\[
= \Pr \left[ g_1 = \sum_{i=2}^{t} w_i \cdot g_i - \sum_{i=2}^{t} w'_i \cdot g_i \right]
\]

\[
= |G|^{-1} = 3^{-t},
\]

where the last line follows from the fact that \( g_1 \) is distributed uniformly and independently from others, and the proof is complete. \( \square \)

Lemma 3. For any \( h_{A, B} \leftarrow \mathcal{H} \), let \( \mathcal{O}_{h_{A, B}} = \{ h_{A, B}(x) \mid x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \} \) denote the covering of \( h_{A, B} \). Then, with overwhelming probability over the choice of \( h_{A, B} \), we have \( |\mathcal{O}_{h_{A, B}}|/3^t \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) \).

Proof. Suppose this was not true, then we would have \( \Delta(h_{A, B}(U_k), U_{1 \log 3}) \geq 1/\text{poly}(\lambda) \), hence contradicting Lemma 2. Thus, the output of the AM-OWF must cover an overwhelming fraction of the output domain. \( \square \)

10.1 Variants of the AM-OWF

Lemma 4. Given an adversary \( A \) that wins the systOWF game with noticeable advantage, there exists an adversary \( A' \) that wins the OWF game with noticeable advantage.

Proof. Given an instance from the OWF game \( (A, B, y) \), let \( M_1, M_2 \) be defined as the matrices such that \( AM_1 = \begin{bmatrix} I_k & A \end{bmatrix} \) and \( M_2B = [B | I_k] \). \( A' \) then provides the adversary \( A \) with \( (AM_1, M_2B, \tilde{y} = M_2y) \). \( M_1 \) and \( M_2 \) are infact the inverses of the bottom-most square and right-most square of \( A \) and \( B \) respectively, which exist with overwhelming probability as these matrices are full rank with overwhelming probability and is easy to compute using standard Gaussian elimination. Thus, when \( A \) responds with \( \tilde{x} \) such that \( M_2B(AM_1\tilde{x}) = \tilde{y} \), which happens with non-negligible probability, \( A' \) outputs \( x = M_1\tilde{x} \). \( \square \)
Lemma 5. Given an adversary $A$ that wins the antIOWF game with noticeable advantage, there exists an adversary $A'$ that wins the OWF game with noticeable advantage.

Proof. Given an instance from the OWF game $(A, B, y)$, provide the adversary $A'$ with $(A, B, \tilde{y} = B(1)^m - y)$. With noticeable probability, the new instance is indistinguishable from an honestly sampled instance with due to Corollary 1 and Lemma 3, as the distribution of the image is close to uniformly random and the AM-OWF covers a noticeable fraction of $\mathbb{F}_3^d$. Hence, $A$ outputs $x$ such that $B(1 \oplus A x) = \tilde{y}$ with probability at least $\varepsilon \varepsilon'$. $A'$ then outputs $x$ as the solution to OWF challenge $(A, B, y)$. It is easy to see that if $B(1 \oplus A x) = \tilde{y}$, then $B(A x) = y$ because the flip operation can be emulated in $\mathbb{F}_3$ as $B(1 - (A x))$ where $A x$ is first embedded in $\mathbb{F}_3$.

Lemma 6. Given an adversary $A$ that wins the approxOWF$(n, m + 1, t)$ game with noticeable advantage, there exists an adversary $A'$ that wins the OWF game with noticeable advantage, for a slightly smaller OWF$(n, m, t)$ game.

Proof. Given a OWF challenge $(A, B, y)$, $A'$ first guesses a random position $j \in [1, m + 1]$, hoping this is the position that $A$ will cause an edit. $A'$ then computes an approxOWF$(n, m + 1, t)$ instance by:

1. inserting a random row $a \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_3^n$ at the $j$-th position of $A$ to get $\tilde{A}$
2. inserting a random column $b \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_3^n$ at the $j$-th position of $B$ to get $\tilde{B}$
3. $\tilde{y} \leftarrow y + b, v'[j]$, where $v'[j]$ is the $j$-th entry of $v'$ and sampled uniformly at random from $\mathbb{F}_3$ as a guess for the modified entry.

Observe that this new instance always has a solution in the approxOWF$(n, m + 1, t)$ game, and that the statistical distance from the uniform distribution over $\mathbb{F}_3^n$ is upperbounded by $1/\text{poly}(\lambda)$ for some polynomial $\text{poly}(\lambda)$ (Corollary 1). Thus $A$ will continue to output a solution with non-negligible probability on this new instance. Suppose $A'$’s guess was correct for the modified entry and let $A$’s output be $(x, v, v')$ and $\tilde{v}$ be identical to $v$, except with the $j$-th entry deleted. Then it is easy to see that $(x, \tilde{v})$ is a solution to the OWF challenge given to $A'$.

11 Proof of Security

Theorem 4. Let Commit be a non-interactive commitment scheme and $H$ be a collision resistant hash function. Let $p$ be a combinatorial bound for the protocol in Figure 5. Then the protocol in Figure 5 is a gap honest-verifier zero-knowledge argument of knowledge for the relation $\mathcal{R}$ such that $((A, B, y), x) \in \mathcal{R}$ iff $B(A x) = y$. The gap relation $\mathcal{R}'$ is such that $((A, B, y), x) \in \mathcal{R}'$ if $B(A x) = y$ and $x$ is an $f$-weakly valid witness. The soundness error of the proof is at most $\varepsilon = p + 1/N - p/N$.

Proof. We need to show that the interactive zero-knowledge proof is complete, honest-verifier zero-knowledge, and that the soundness error is at most $\varepsilon$. Completeness is easy to see from the description of the protocol.
Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge. To prove that the protocol is honest-verifier zero-knowledge we show that the MPC protocol described in Figure 5 is secure against a semi-honest adversary corrupting up to \( n - 1 \) parties. The simulator works as follows:

- Sample a uniformly random position \( i^* \leftarrow [n] \) and a uniformly random permutation \( \pi \leftarrow \text{Perm}_m \).
- Carry out Round 1 of Figure 5 honestly, using a uniformly random value for \( x \).
- In Round 3, compute shares of \( z \) and \( y \) for all \( i \neq i^* \) as described. To compute the message sent by the \( i^* \)-th party, first sample \( z \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_m^{2^m} \), and compute \( [z]_i = z \oplus_{i \neq i^*} [z]_i \), and \( [y]_i = y - \sum_{i \neq i^*} [y]_i \).

To see that this is a good simulator, note that the distribution of the \( r, r' \) and their shares is identical to that of a real execution. Given any \( N - 1 \) shares of \( v \) and \( r \), the distribution of \( z \) is uniformly random and hence the distribution of \( z \) is also identical to a real execution. Next, the shares of \( y \) are fully determined given \( z \) and the shares of \( r, r', \) and \( x \). Indeed, the \( i^* \)-th party’s share of \( y \) is not consistent with this but the commitment to the \( i^* \)-th party’s state is never opened. Also note that \( \text{msg}_{i^*} \) is indeed consistent with the views that are opened. Finally, due to the hiding property of the commitment scheme, the simulation is computationally indistinguishable from a real execution.

Soundness. Let \( \tilde{P} \) be a malicious prover which manages to generate an accepting proof with probability \( \tilde{\varepsilon} > \varepsilon \). Then there exists an extractor \( \text{Ext} \), which when given blackbox access to \( A \) with rewinding capabilities, can extract a witness \( x \) such that it is a weakly valid witness (Definition 11). Let \( R \) denote the randomness used by \( \tilde{P} \) to generate the first round commitment \( h \) and let \( r \) be a possible realization of \( R \). Let \( \text{Succ} \) denote the even that \( \tilde{P} \) succeeds in convincing \( V \). By the hypothesis, we have

\[
\Pr[\text{Succ}_{\tilde{P}}] = \tilde{\varepsilon} > \varepsilon = p + \frac{1}{N} - p.
\]

Fix an arbitrary value \( \alpha \in \{0, 1\} \) such that \((1 - \alpha)\tilde{\varepsilon} > \varepsilon\), which exists since \( \tilde{\varepsilon} > \varepsilon \). We say that a realization \( r \) of the prover randomness is good if

\[
\Pr[\text{Succ}_{\tilde{P}} | R = r] \geq (1 - \alpha)\tilde{\varepsilon}.
\]

Furthermore, by the splitting lemma [PS00], we have \( \Pr[R \text{ is good } | \text{Succ}_{\tilde{P}}] \geq \alpha \). Let \( T_0 \) be the transcript of a successful execution of the zero-knowledge proof with \( \tilde{P} \), \( r \) denote the random coin used by \( \tilde{P} \) in the first round and \( d_0 \) denote the fourth-round message of the verifier. If \( r \) is good, then

\[
\Pr[\text{Succ}_{\tilde{P}} | R = r] \geq (1 - \alpha)\tilde{\varepsilon} > \varepsilon > \frac{1}{N},
\]

which implies that there necessarily exists a second successful transcript \( T_1 \), with a different fourth round message \( d_1 \neq d_0 \). As we will demonstrate afterwards,
given \((T_0, T_1)\), it is possible to extract a triplet \((x, r, r')\) consistent with both transcripts, where \(x\) is a weakly valid witness, and \((r, r')\) is the preprocessing material used by the prover.

Let \((\pi_0, d_0)\) and \((\pi_1, d_1)\), with \(d_0 \neq d_1\) denote the verifier challenges used in successful transcripts \(T_0\) and \(T_1\), respectively. Denote the fifth round messages in these transcripts by \((\text{state}_i, \sigma_i)\) and \((\text{state}'_i, \sigma'_i)\). Suppose \(\exists i \in [N] \setminus \{d_0, d_1\}\) such that \((\text{state}_i, \sigma_i) \neq (\text{state}'_i, \sigma'_i)\). Then one of the following must be true:

- The committed values are different:
  \[
  \text{com}_i = \text{Commit}(\text{state}_i, \sigma_i) \neq \text{Commit}(\text{state}'_i, \sigma'_i) = \text{com}'_i,
  \]
  but since both of these transcripts verify, this implies that the prover has found a collision for \(H\) i.e. \(H(\text{com}_1, \ldots, \text{com}_N) = H(\text{com}'_1, \ldots, \text{com}'_N)\).

- The commitments are identical:
  \[
  \text{com}_i = \text{Commit}(\text{state}_i, \sigma_i) = \text{Commit}(\text{state}'_i, \sigma'_i) = \text{com}'_i,
  \]
  but this violates the binding property of the commitment scheme.

Therefore, it must be the case that \(\{\text{state}_i, \sigma_i\}_{i \neq d_0, d_1} = \{\text{state}'_i, \sigma'_i\}_{i \neq d_0, d_1}\). Furthermore, since \(d_0 \neq d_1\), they jointly define a unique tuple \((\text{state}_i, \sigma_i)_{i \in [N]}\), from which we can extract the witness \(x\) and the preprocessing material \((r, r')\) used by the prover.

Finally, we show that if \(x\) is a strongly invalid witness, then \(\Pr[\text{Succ}_P | R = r] \leq \varepsilon\), contradicting our assumption that \(r\) is good. Let us denote \(\text{BadPerm}\) the event (defined over a random choice of permutation \(\pi\), and for the fixed value of \((x, r, r')\)) that \(Ax = v\) and \(By' = y\), where \(y' = \pi(r') + (x \oplus \pi(r)) \odot (1 - 2\pi(r'))\). By definition of the combinatorial bound (Definition 12), we have \(\Pr[\text{BadPerm}] \leq p\).

We can rewrite our desired inequality as

\[
\Pr[\text{Succ}_P | R = r] = \Pr[\text{Succ}_P \land \text{BadPerm} | R = r] + \Pr[\text{Succ}_P \land \neg \text{BadPerm} | R = r] \\
\leq p + (1 - p) \cdot \Pr[\text{Succ}_P | R = r \land \neg \text{BadPerm}].
\]

If we can show that \(\Pr[\text{Succ}_P | R = r \land \neg \text{BadPerm}] \leq 1/N\), then we are done. For the sake of contradiction, assume that \(\Pr[\text{Succ}_P | R = r \land \neg \text{BadPerm}] > 1/N\). Since \(\Pr[\text{Succ}_P | R = r] \geq \varepsilon\), using the same argument as earlier, given a successful transcript \(\hat{T}_0\) with fourth round message \(d_0\), there must exist a second successful transcript \(T_1\) with identical first three rounds but fourth round message \(d_1 \neq d_0\). Moreover, \(\hat{T}_0\) and \(T_1\) must be consistent and uniquely define a tuple \((\text{state}_i, \tilde{\sigma}_i)_{i \in [N]}\). Since we condition on the same randomness \(R = r\), the \(\hat{h}\) in the second round corresponding to transcripts, \((\hat{T}_0, \hat{T}_1)\) and \((T_0, T_1)\) must be identical and therefore, by the collision resistance of \(H\), \((\text{state}_i, \tilde{\sigma}_i)_{i \in [N]} = (\text{state}_i, \sigma_i)_{i \in [N]}\).

Now, using \(\hat{T}_0\), we can reconstruct the messages sent by all parties using a strategy similar to verifying the transcript to obtain \((\text{msg}_i^0)_{i \in [N]}\). Similarly, using
Thread in thread, we obtain \( \{ \tilde{msg}_1 \}_{i \in [N]} \). Because \( \tilde{T}_0 \) and \( \tilde{T}_1 \), share the same first three rounds, using a similar argument as above \( \{ \tilde{msg}_0^0 \}_{i \in [N]} \neq \{ \tilde{msg}_0^1 \}_{i \in [N]} \).

Note that when we recovered \( \tilde{msg}_0^0 \) we set \( J_y K \tilde{d}_0 = J_y K \tilde{d}_0 \). Because we started with the assumption that \( x \) is a strongly invalid witness and conditioned on not using a bad permutation, it must be true that \( \tilde{msg}_0^0 \neq \tilde{msg}_1^0 \) as otherwise we have actually found a valid witness. But this also means that we have found two different inputs \( \{ \tilde{msg}_0^0 \}_{i \in [N]} \) and \( \{ \tilde{msg}_1^0 \}_{i \in [N]} \) that hash to the same value, contradicting the collision resistance of \( H \). Thus \( Pr[Succ_\tilde{P} | R = r \land \neg \text{BadPerm}] \leq 1/N \) and hence,

\[
Pr[Succ_\tilde{P}] \leq p + (1 - p) \frac{1}{N},
\]

when \( x \) is a strongly invalid witness. The remaining proof and description of the extractor is identical to that of \([FJR22,CCJ23]\) and we omit it here. \( \square \)

## 12 PRF Protocol Evaluation

We present our MPC protocols in Section 6 and summarize them in Section 2. We intend to open source the implementation. The protocols generate all correlated randomness via Silent OT techniques, see Section 6.1. We implement our wPRF protocols for the OPRF setting as well as plaintext inputs and secret shared output. We compare their performance to the alternating moduli protocol of \([DGH+21]\) and our GMW-based implementation of LowMC \([ARS+15]\). Our LowMC implementation employs various optimizations such as transposed representation, vectorization, and precomputed key schedule. LowMC offers a variety of parameters that give tradeoffs between computational overhead, round complexity, and number of OTs/OLEs that are required. We parameterize it as \((n, m, k, d, r) \in \{(256, 63, 128, 128, 14), (128, 3, 128, 128, 88)\}\).

Running times were obtained on a core i7 consumer-grade laptop with 8GB RAM. Each party is executed on a separate thread with network communication being simulated, i.e., minimal communication overhead. Given that our protocol is 2 rounds, one can easily estimate the cost of network communication by dividing the communication by the bandwidth plus network latency.

Protocols with the Key OT optimization perform a setup phase where OTs for each bit of the key are performed. This reusable correlated randomness allows the parties to compute shares of \((k \odot x)\). Alternatively, our Input-OTS protocol for multiplying \((k \odot x)\) requires more OTs but less communication. The OT-Mod modulus conversion protocols for the \((F_2, F_3)\)-wPRF and \((F_3, F_2)\)-wPRF use \(m\) and \(2m\) OT/OLE correlations, respectively. The final protocol uses garbling techniques to implement modulus conversion and does not require any additional OTs beyond the reusable OTs for the key.

**OPRF.** In Figure 8 we report the metrics for our protocol when used as an OPRF in comparison related works. We consider the setting where a succinct setup phase is performed. During this phase, the key is known but the evaluation points, i.e., \( x \), are not. For \([DGH+21]\) and our protocols in Figure 8, we
separate the preprocessing $p$ and online $o$ metrics as $p + o$. We note that less or more preprocessing communication can be achieved depending on the Silent OT parameters used.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>Assumption</th>
<th>$r$</th>
<th>Comm. (bits)</th>
<th>time ($\mu s$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[ADDS21] R(LWE) &amp; SIS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$2^{24}$</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[SBH21] Legendre PRF</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>$+2^{24}$</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[BKW20] CSIDH</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>$2^{21}$</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Bas23] SIDH</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$2^{25}$</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[HHM’23] CSIDH</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>$+2^{17.4}$</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ADDG23] AM-[BIP’18]</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.821</td>
<td>151.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[DGH’21] AM-[DGH’21]</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>65 + 1,252</td>
<td>25.4+6.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This OT - $(\mathbb{F}_2,\mathbb{F}_3)$-wPRF</td>
<td>AM</td>
<td>38 + 916</td>
<td>7.8+0.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This OT - $(\mathbb{F}_2,\mathbb{F}_3)$-wPRF</td>
<td>AM</td>
<td>38 + 1,173</td>
<td>14.6+1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This work – Garble</td>
<td>AM</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>$2^{17}$</td>
<td>0+4.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>[Mea86] DDH</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>121</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 8. Comparison of our distributed wPRF protocols against other OPRF protocols. We consider the setting where multiple (adaptive) evaluations for a fixed key are performed. $r$ denotes the round complexity and + denotes that additional rounds are required to set up the protocols. Comm. reports the end-to-end amortized communication (including any preprocessing) per evaluation in bits.

The most efficient protocol is our OT base $(\mathbb{F}_2,\mathbb{F}_3)$-wPRF protocol (Figure 2) with the Input-OTs optimization. It requires 8.7 microseconds per amortized evaluation and a total of two rounds, including the preprocessing. Excluding the succinct setup phase (7.8$\mu$s & 38 bits), the amortized communication cost is $916 = \lambda + m + (m + t) \log_2(3)$ bits and $0.9\mu$s for $(n, m, t) = (4\lambda, 2\lambda, \lambda/\log_2(3))$ and $\lambda = 128$, see Section 5.4. This protocol requires $\lambda + m$ OLE/OTs per evaluation which form the dominant computational cost, 7.8$\mu$s compared to 0.9$\mu$s of online time. The prior protocol [DGH’21] based on alternating moduli requires an amortized total of 32.9$\mu$s and 1,317 bits of communication, a 3.7× and 1.4× improvement. Due to a lack of implementation, for their online time we use their reported plaintext running time of 6.1$\mu$s [DGH’21], however, our implementation technique would likely lower this closer to our 1$\mu$s. Regardless, the bulk of the running time improvement comes from our protocol requiring fewer OTs. Moreover, our 128 input OTs are of 4 bit strings while [DGH’21] uses 256 OTs of 256 bit strings. When properly implemented, this results in an almost 256/4 = 64× faster OT generation due multiplying smaller vectors with the syndrome decoding matrix.

The lowest communication OPRF protocol is based on DDH [Mea86]. It is extremely communication-efficient, requiring just two curve elements to be sent. However, DDH is insecure in the post-quantum setting and, unlike ours, does not lend itself to secret shared output. Moreover, it requires an order of magnitude
more time which makes it less attractive when performing many evaluations. However, for a single evaluation DDH [Mea86] remains the best option.

We also consider our $\langle \mathbb{F}_3, \mathbb{F}_2 \rangle$-wPRF but observe that the performance metrics are worse than our $\langle \mathbb{F}_2, \mathbb{F}_3 \rangle$-wPRF. This is due in part to requiring disproportionately larger parameters and the mod operation being less efficient. Finally, we consider the garbling based protocol of Figure 3. This protocol has the interesting advantage that it only requires OT correlations in the setup phase where the key is set. In particular, one OT per bit of the key is performed. All subsequent evaluations of the protocol can be implemented with only calls to the random oracle. The advantage of this is highlighted when only a small number of evaluations are performed. In this regime the sublinear OT protocols have relatively high computational/communication overhead due to the hidden constants. The communication overhead of this protocol is $2^{15} = \lambda n + (m + t) \log_2(3)$.

**Detailed Comparison.** We now turn our attention to a more detailed analysis of our wPRFs and related work. For this analysis we will continue to assume $x$ is known to one party while $k$ is known to the other. The parties will receive a secret sharing of $F(k, x)$. We report our findings in Figure 9. As above, we divide the running time of the protocol into the time to generate the OT correlations and the online phase. As can be seen in Figure 9, the main cost is OT generation, requiring between 8 and 14 times more time than the online phase.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>Optimization</th>
<th>$r$</th>
<th>Comm. (bits)</th>
<th>Online (µs)</th>
<th>#OTs</th>
<th>OT time (µs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LowMC [ARS+15]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14+</td>
<td>10,584</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>5,292</td>
<td>151.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[DGH+21] $\langle \mathbb{F}_2, \mathbb{F}_3 \rangle$-wPRF</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>88+</td>
<td>3,168</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>1,584</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>($\mathbb{F}_2, \mathbb{F}_3$)-wPRF</td>
<td>Input-OTs, OT-Mod</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>384*</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Key-OTs, OT-Mod</td>
<td>2+</td>
<td>1,174</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>($\mathbb{F}_3, \mathbb{F}_2$)-wPRF</td>
<td>Key-OTs, OT-Mod</td>
<td>2+</td>
<td>1,151</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Key-OTs, Garble-Mod†</td>
<td>1+</td>
<td>32,768</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 9. Comparison of our distributed wPRF protocols with secret shared output against LowMC [ARS+15] when performing $q = 2^{20}$ concurrent evaluations. $r$ denotes the round complexity and + denotes that one extra round is required for a reusable setup. Times reported are amortized per evaluation. † denotes estimated running time.

We present several variants of our protocols. As with the OPRF performance numbers, we observe that our $\langle \mathbb{F}_2, \mathbb{F}_3 \rangle$-wPRF with the Input-OTs optimization performs the best, requiring a total of 8.9µs and just 38 + 790 bits of online communication, where the 38 bits of communication is for the OT generation. The next most efficient protocol is also our $\langle \mathbb{F}_2, \mathbb{F}_3 \rangle$-wPRF but with the Key-OT optimization which reduces the number of OTs required at the expense of more communication. However, despite requiring 50% fewer OTs, we observe a minimal decrease in running time. This is because the Input-OT optimization
makes use of a VOLE correlation for short strings, i.e., 4 bits, while OT/OLE requires generation of a VOLE correlation for 128 bit strings. When properly implemented, this essentially translates to a 128/4 = 32× improvement in running time for the matrix multiply step in the VOLE protocol, which is the main overhead. As a result, we generally suggest only using the Input-OT optimization for the \((\mathbb{F}_2, \mathbb{F}_3)\)-wPRF.

However, a major drawback of the \((\mathbb{F}_2, \mathbb{F}_3)\)-wPRF with secret shared output is that the output shares and values are mod 3. This is highly non-standard and if shared output is desired, more post processing would be required. A more natural (and efficient) option is for the wPRF to naively output the desired share format, e.g., \((\mathbb{F}_2, \mathbb{F}_3)\)-wPRF. We only implement this protocol with the Key-OT optimization. The protocol requires 1\(\mu\)s and 14.6\(\mu\)s of online and OT generation time, respectively. The protocol requires 1,151 bits of online communication and 52 bits for OT generation. One could consider using the Input-OT optimization to lower the communication overhead but this would require implementing \(\mathbb{F}_3\) Silent OT/VOLE which has higher computational cost, approximately 5× by our estimates.

Compared to [DGH+21], our protocols perform better in communication, running time, and the number of OTs used. When compared to LowMC [ARS+15], our online phase is between 7 and 13 times faster. When profiling both implementations, we observe that almost all of the time is spent in the matrix-vector multiplication routine. Given that [ARS+15] requires many more such multiplications, it follows that their running time should be worse. Additionally, their protocol requires substantially more OTs/OLEs, a factor between 20 and 3 times depending on the parameters used.

References


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