Privacy Preserving Biometric Authentication for Fingerprints and Beyond

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ABSTRACT

Biometric authentication eliminates the need for users to remember secrets and serves as a convenient mechanism for user authentication. Traditional implementations of biometric-based authentication store sensitive user biometry on the server and the server becomes an attractive target of attack and a source of large-scale unintended disclosure of biometric data. To mitigate the problem, we can resort to privacy-preserving computation and store only protected biometrics on the server. While a variety of secure computation techniques is available, our analysis of privacy-preserving biometric computation and biometric authentication constructions revealed that available solutions fall short of addressing the challenges of privacy-preserving biometric authentication. Thus, in this work we put forward new constructions to address the challenges.

Our solutions employ a helper server and use threat models, where a client is always assumed to be malicious, while the helper server can be semi-honest or malicious. We also determined that standard secure multi-party computation security definitions are insufficient to properly demonstrate security in the two-phase (enrollment and authentication) entity authentication application. We thus extend the model and formally show security in the multi-phase setting, where information can flow from one phase to another and the set of participants can change between the phases. We implement our constructions and show that they exhibit practical performance for authentication in real time.

KEYWORDS
secure computation, biometric authentication, multi-phase secure execution, garbled circuit evaluation, oblivious transfer

1 INTRODUCTION

Biometric-based authentication provides a convenient user authentication mechanism which does not require users to remember passwords or maintain other secrets. Biometric-based authentication is also now more easily accessible than before to the average user for a variety of application due to proliferation of smartphones equipped with sufficient sensors. Biometric data, however, requires strong protection because, unlike password-based authentication, biometry cannot be replaced if the data becomes compromised. Enhancing protection of biometric data used in biometric-based authentication is the focus of this work.

We consider the problem of privacy-preserving biometric authentication in a system where users authenticate to a server using their biometric data, but the authentication server does not have access to the users’ biometric data in the clear. This is used to improve privacy protection of sensitive biometric data of users enrolled in the system. In particular, if the information stored on the server does not allow one to recover user’s biometric samples, user biometric data cannot be easily abused by insiders or through computer break-ins. Large-scale leakage of sensitive biometric data is of growing concern due to increasing availability of large-scale biometric data sets. Thus, this work targets designing a robust and practical solution to privacy-preserving biometric-based authentication which can be employed in place of traditional biometric-based authentication mechanisms and which makes abuse of sensitive biometric data more difficult.

In the context of privacy-preserving biometric-based authentication, we can consider two types of solutions: (i) those based on secure sketches and fuzzy extractors and (ii) solutions based on secure multi-party computation. The former has a disadvantage that it discloses partial information about each biometric sample, the implications of which are hard to quantify, and we focus on the latter that can guarantee that no biometric-related information of a user is disclosed to any party.

Now if we consider secure two-party computation between a user and an authentication server, we can distinguish between two types based on the amount of interaction between the user and the server: interactive two-party computation where the user carries the full burden of participating in secure evaluation of biometric matching and non-interactive computation on encrypted data. Note that in the context of user authentication, we must assume that a user can act maliciously in the attempt to circumvent the desired authentication mechanism and obtain access to the system at any possible cost. This means that when modeling secure multi-party computation we must provide security in the presence of malicious users which increases the cost of interactive protocols. This is often undesirable for clients who may operate from computationally-limited battery-powered devices and thus may present usability concerns. Non-interactive computation that employs fully homomorphic encryption permits conducting biometric matching of an encrypted biometric sample provided by the user at authentication time and the encrypted biometric data stored at the server at the enrollment time. A concern with this solution is that, in order for the user biometric data to stay private from the server, the decryption key must be available only to the client. This means that it is not possible for a client to enroll once and later able to authenticate from any computer or device because the device from which the user is authenticating has to have the user’s private decryption key. This nullifies the advantages of biometric-based authentication which permits authentication without the need to remember passwords or maintain secret keys and brings us back to requiring the user to use secrets together with their biometric information.

To mitigate these issues, our approach is to introduce an additional helper server. Introducing a helper server is not a new idea
by itself, but it makes a significant difference for this application. The helper server does not contribute inputs to the computation and does not learn any information about user biometric data or the result of user authentication, but contributes its computational power and might store protected biometric data. Multiple authentication servers can use the same helper server. The introduction of an additional server improves both usability and efficiency, as we demonstrate in this work. In particular, that expands the set of techniques we can use for privacy-preserving biometric matching and authentication and consequently aids efficiency. It also permits minimal involvement of users during authentication and removes the need for storing any keys or other secrets on user devices. This improves usability and enables a user to authenticate from different devices and a variety of platforms including weak battery-powered devices.

An interesting aspect of this work is that we found that employing traditional secure multi-party computation security definitions in the context of (privacy-preserving) authentication is insufficient and there is a need for new definitions. In particular, secure multi-party computation is concerned with a single evaluation of a function, during which the set of participants does not change. In the context of authentication, on the other hand, we deal with two phases: enrollment and authentication. Furthermore, the participants themselves can change because a malicious user might attempt to impersonate another user during authentication (but the enrollment phase was carried out by the authentic user). While we can use a traditional security definition to ensure that the participants do not learn unauthorized information during each phase by itself (and a malicious client is unable to circumvent the authentication process), there is still a need to link the two phases together and ensure that no biometric-based information is available to the participants due to the information flow from one phase to another. This is because the servers will obtain certain output after the enrollment phrase, but the output of function evaluation is never protected under the standard definition and is not treated as leakage. Thus, in this application we need to consider the overall view of the two-step process, conceptually treating the output of the first stage as an intermediate result (which must reveal no information) and not as the target output (which is allowed to reveal information). This will also permit us to demonstrate that a malicious user impersonating an authentic user is unable to learn sensitive biometric data of the original user entered at the registration phase. We determined that a few prior publications that treat the topic of biometric-based authentication [1, 3, 21] use a two-phase model; however, the definitions have custom interfaces and are not applicable to other functionalities. We provide a more detailed comparison in the related work section.

Our solution is based on garbled circuit evaluation [39] and we use two strong threat models, both of which treat the client as a malicious party. In the weaker model, the client is malicious (can behave arbitrarily), while the servers are semi-honest (follow the prescribed protocols) and do not collude with each other or the clients. In the stronger model, the helper server can act maliciously and can additionally collude with clients. When building our constructions, we introduce a variant of oblivious transfer (OT), termed oblivious transfer with bit operations (OTB), which may be of independent interest and consider over-the-threshold cosine similarity and Euclidean distance as the basis for biometric matching computation. We formally prove security of our solutions under standard security definitions, expanded as discussed above to accommodate multi-phase computation where the participants can change between the phases. We also implement and empirically evaluate performance of our solutions and show that they are well suited for authentication in real time.

Related Work. As mentioned earlier, there are two lines of work that employ cryptography to protect confidentiality of biometric data while performing biometric matching. The first uses secure sketches and fuzzy extractors, e.g., [11, 25, 29, 31, 38], some of which make use of an additional secret or user password to improve the properties of the solution.

The second line of research – closer to the focus of this work – uses secure multi-party computation or outsourcing. Constructions for biometric matching of different modalities have been developed. For instance, they include face [15, 20, 33, 36], iris [12, 13], fingerprints [8, 13, 14, 19], voice [4], and others. The computation itself widely differs in the complexity, ranging from simple Hamming distance and Euclidean distance computation over integers to hidden Markov model evaluation on floating-point values. A variety of techniques have been used including garbled circuit evaluation, secret sharing, encryption schemes with special properties (such as homomorphic encryption and predicate encryption), and a combination thereof. Earlier publications, including most publications listed above, focused on privacy-preserving biometric matching or identification in the semi-honest security setting. Performing authentication, however, demands a stronger security model in which clients must be assumed to be malicious.

Publications that treat privacy-preserving biometric authentication in the presence of a malicious client include [1, 2, 17, 23, 37]. The majority use homomorphic encryption to perform a simple distance computation and disclose it to one of the parties. For instance, in [17, 23] (as well as [16] that supports only semi-honest parties) the server computes \( \text{dist} \cdot r_0 + r_1 \), where \( \text{dist} \) is (Hamming or Euclidean) distance between the enrollment and current biometric samples and \( r_0, r_1 \) are large random values. The use of the randomizing values prevents a malicious client from making meaningful changes to the distance prior to sending it to the server. This structure has two disadvantages: (i) each client has to maintain a secret key on each device he/she wants to use for authentication (which our solution is set to mitigate) and (ii) the computed distance is revealed to one of the parties, commonly the server who can compile distributions of this information for each user over time or, worse, to the (malicious) client who can use the distance as the guide for improving its strategy for impersonating the authentic user. [37] employs homomorphic encryption only in their semi-honest protocol, where the decryption key is held by the server, but the client still needs to maintain another secret key. Their construction tolerating malicious clients is based on garbled circuit evaluation and relies on the fact that semi-honest garbled circuit evaluation provides security against malicious evaluators (which is the task

\[\text{Note that [30, 40] are said to provide privacy-preserving authentication as well, but in the solution of [40] an authority obtains cleartext access to user biometrics and thus does not achieve privacy, while in [30] the client is considered fully trusted and consequently the construction does not correspond to authentication.}\]
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assigned to a client). Nevertheless, each client has to maintain a secret key (or a share of enrollment biometric) in order to prevent the server from learning enrollment data. Besides these limitations of prior work, none consider linking security of enrollment and authentication phases like we do in this work to guarantee that no information is disclosed about user enrollment biometrics to a malicious participant impersonating the user at authentication time.

Homomorphic encryption with a similar masking scheme to the above works is also used in [2] while additionally employing digital signatures, garbled circuits, and ZKPKs, and is targeted for use with cosine similarity as a distance metric. While it does treat malicious adversaries, active tampering is limited to client devices only, and the remaining participants are semi-honest. Specifically, these participants are service providers and terminals, which loosely correlate to our $S_1$ and $S_2$ respectively, with the exception that the terminal is an external device outside client control which obtains the authentication phase biometric directly. This setting is equivalent to our weaker (non-colluding) security model. Moreover, both secret keys and encoded templates are stored on the devices, which can reveal non-revocable template information to adversaries which control the device. Their semi-honest-secure construction and the weaker of the two malicious-secure constructions also leak the computed distance; in the semi-honest case to the device, and in the weaker malicious construction, to the terminal. [1] uses the same set of primitives in a more general construction which is proven UC-secure, where multiple devices need to interact in order to authenticate the client. However, a result of this is that secret keys are distributed across devices such that an adversary controlling enough devices gains the secret key long with non-revocable enrollment templates. Moreover, the protocol they provide which is specific to cosine similarity is proved secure in the random oracle model. The work of Karmakar et al. [26] is a general purpose SMC compiler which can support a similar structure but cannot handle collusion between active adversaries, does not consider participants which may change between phases. The very recent (and concurrent to our result) work of [21] that proposes a functional encryption based protocol which is dynamic and multi-phase. This however still requires the client device to store secrets, and their implementation experiments yield slower overall times than ours, despite not taking network communication time into account as we do.

As far as definitional differences go, [3] provides custom interfaces, algorithms, and security properties and does not use standard secure multi-party computation definitions. [2] uses the real-ideal paradigm, but does not discuss the possibility of the enrollment and matching phases being carried out by different parties (to model impersonation). [1] considers the UC framework, but does not provide general MPC definitions.

There are also publications that modify conventional biometric matching for a certain biometric modality to be more amenable for use with privacy-preserving techniques. A notable example is SCiFI [33] that designed a new face identification mechanism and built a corresponding privacy-preserving protocol. Fingerprints are another example of a biometric modality where conventional minutiae-based matching is complex, and thus privacy-preserving solutions initially focused on simple but inaccurate FingerCode matching [8], and eventually grew to support conventional minutiae-based matching [9]. A more attractive approach is to develop a new feature representation and matching algorithm of high accuracy, as was done in DeepPrint [18]. That work showed that it is possible to represent fingerprints as (fixed-length) 192-element vectors and use simple Euclidean distance or cosine similarity for biometric matching, while achieving nearly identical accuracy to that of top performing variable-length minutiae-based matching implementations. We capitalize on biometric matching developed in [18] and use it as a basis for biometric matching in the secure biometric authentication protocols we develop. For potential deployment at scale, recent work such as [28], which provides an efficient virtual memory manager for secure computation may facilitate more efficient batching of many authentication attempts in parallel. To that end, it is worth noting that many OT extensions, including the one we use for our experiments [6], also benefit from improved performance for larger batches of transfers.

2 PRELIMINARIES

2.1 Problem Statement

We consider a setting where a client $C$ uses a service that employs biometric data for entity authentication. At the enrollment time, the client registers with the service, which involves $C$ capturing its biometric sample, extracting features to produce the desired representation $B$, and storing the result in a privacy-preserving way with the service. At the time of authentication, the client captures a new biometric sample and extracts the necessary representation $\hat{B}$, after which the client and the service engage in a protocol. As a result, the client is either authenticated and gains access to the service or is denied access. The computation involves performing biometric matching by first computing the distance between the enrollment and current biometric samples, $d = \text{dist}(B, \hat{B})$, and consequently comparing the distance to a predefined threshold $t$.

Because we utilize a helper server for usability and efficiency reasons, we denote the main authentication server as $S_1$ and a helper server as $S_2$ (recall that the same helper server can be employed by different services). Security requirements are such that $S_1$ has no access to sensitive biometric information about any user $C$ and only determines the outcome of each authentication (i.e., whether the supplied biometric was a close match and is considered authentic while achieving nearly identical accuracy to that of top performing variable-length minutiae-based matching implementations). $S_2$ learns no information about any biometrics and no information about authentication outcomes, i.e., its purpose is to improve efficiency and usability of the protocols for the client and the service.

Because we work with authentication, we must assume that the client is malicious, i.e., it will try all means at its disposal in the attempt to successfully authenticate without sufficient credentials. The servers, on the other hand, can be more trustworthy and can be expected to follow the prescribed computation. In particular, because $S_1$ is the authentication server, it must properly enforce access control and correctly perform the computation (as otherwise no meaningful guarantees can be maintained in the presence of a malicious client). However, someone with access to the server (e.g., a dishonest insider or in the case of a computer break-in) might be interested in extracting biometric information about the users from the information that the server handles. This includes information
stored at the server and the server’s view during all registration and authentication protocols. For that reason, we begin with a model of the servers being semi-honest and non-colluding.

In addition, because the helper server $S_2$ is not controlled by the service and may not be as trustworthy, we consider the possibility of $S_2$ behaving maliciously. For that reason, we consider a stronger security model, in which $S_1$ remains to be semi-honest and non-colluding with other parties, while $S_2$ can be malicious and possibly colluding with clients $C$ (who are always assumed to be malicious). This stronger model has implications on the cost of the protocols in order to maintain security.

### 2.2 Security Definitions

We use the standard formulation of security that relies on the real/ideal paradigm in the presence of malicious adversaries and guarantees correctness and no unintended information disclosure. The definition requires that the view of any adversary in real protocol execution is computationally indistinguishable from its view in an ideal world execution, where an ideal functionality produces the output and parties not controlled by the adversary are not participating in the computation.

In a general setup, let parties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ engage in a secure multi-party protocol $\Pi$ that computes function $f$. We specify $f$ as taking $n$ inputs $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ and producing $n$ outputs $y_1, \ldots, y_n$, i.e., $f(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = (y_1, \ldots, y_n)$. Each $x_i$ and $y_i$ is treated as a vector to permit entering and receiving multiple values, but some participants may not provide any inputs and/or receive no output (in which case the corresponding $x_i$ and/or $y_i$ is empty).

Adversary $A$ is permitted to corrupt one or more participants based on the threat model. The remaining parties are honest and denoted by $H$. We let $\text{VIEW}^{\Pi,A}$ denote the view of adversary $A$ after an execution of $\Pi$. The view is the union of the views of the parties controlled by $A$, which include their inputs, randomness used during the computation, and all messages received during the computation from other participants. We also let $\text{OUT}^{\Pi,H}$ denote the output of the honest parties after the execution, i.e., the produced $y_i$ that correspond to the honest parties. Let $\kappa$ denote a security parameter and define

$$\text{REAL}_{\Pi,A}(\kappa, \{x_i\}_{i=1}^n) \overset{\text{def}}{=} \text{VIEW}^{\Pi,A} \cup \text{OUT}^{\Pi,H}$$

In the ideal world, there is no protocol execution and instead a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) simulator $S$ interacts with $A$. The simulator is able to query an ideal functionality $F$ which computes function $f$ on behalf of the participants and the goal is to simulate $\Pi$’s execution without access to the data of non-corrupt participants. As before, the view of $A$ corresponds to the inputs, random choices, and the messages received by the parties controlled by $A$ during the simulation, which we denote by $\text{VIEW}_{f,A}$.

The ideal functionality evaluates the function $f$ on behalf of the participants. It uses inputs of honest participants and obtains inputs of corrupt participants from $S$. When $A$ is semi-honest, $S$ obtains access to inputs of the corrupt parties controlled by $A$ and supplies them to $F$. When $A$ is malicious, it can instruct the parties it controls to deviate from the prescribed computation and enter their inputs into the computation in a different form. Thus, it is $S$’s task to extract the corrupt parties’ inputs the way they were entered into the computation and communicate the inputs to $F$, who will evaluate the function using the supplied inputs. Note that $S$ or $F$ can abort if either of them obtain empty or malformed inputs or messages. If the evaluation is successful, the parties obtain the output according to the specification of $f$ and we denote the output of honest parties by $\text{OUT}_{f,H}$. Similar to the real execution, we define

$$\text{IDEAL}_{f,S(A)}(\kappa, \{x_i\}_{i=1}^n) \overset{\text{def}}{=} \text{VIEW}_{f,A} \cup \text{OUT}_{f,H}$$

Given the above, we formulate the security definition as:

**Definition 1.** An $n$-party protocol $\Pi$ between $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ securely evaluates function $f$ if for all PPT adversaries $A$ controlling a subset of the participants, all input vectors $x_i$, and $\kappa \in \mathbb{Z}$, there exists a PPT simulator $S$ such that

$$\text{REAL}_{\Pi,A}(\kappa, \{x_i\}_{i=1}^n) \approx \text{IDEAL}_{f,S(A)}(\kappa, \{x_i\}_{i=1}^n)$$

where $\approx$ denotes computational indistinguishability.

Because in our context information produced during one phase of the computation is used as input into another phase, we extend the standard definition to support multi-stage computation. For simplicity, we consider computation consisting of two phases, but the concept easily generalizes to any number of phases. To accomplish this task, we define the outputs of the first phase to be additional, auxiliary inputs $u_i$ (which may be empty) into the second phase. Conceptually this can be pictured as we pause after the first phase, save the output as the current state and resume the computation once the inputs into the second phase are received. Note that each phase receives inputs from the parties and the second phase additionally receives the outputs from the first phase in the form of auxiliary inputs.

It is important to take into account that the participating parties might change between the phases of the computation. This is the case for authentication applications, where a malicious user (imposter) might attempt to authenticate impersonating another user who previously enrolled in the system (authentic user). For that reason, we define two different, overlapping sets of participants $P_1^{(1)}, P_2^{(1)}, \ldots, P_n^{(1)}$ and $P_1^{(1)} P_2^{(1)} P_2^{(2)} \ldots P_n^{(2)}$. Here, superscript $(j)$ denote data associated with phase $j$ and $n_1$ (respectively, $n_2$) denote the number of participants in the first (resp., second) phase. If $p_i^{(j)} = p_j^{(j)}$ for some $i$ and $j$, i.e., the party is involved in both phases, then it will have an auxiliary input for the second phase. The remaining participants, i.e., those who are involved only in one of the phases, contribute their input and receive the output as in the conventional formulation of an execution.

The more complex participant structure requires that we also carefully specify adversarial corruptions. If a party is controlled by an adversary, the adversary controls it in both stages of the computation. If an adversary controls multiple conspiring participants, it will control them in all phases in which the parties are active protocol participants.

Let $f$ denote the multi-phase functionality and $f^{(1)}$ and $f^{(2)}$ denote the functions we evaluate in phases 1 and 2, respectively. The auxiliary input is set for each $p_i^{(j)}$ as $u_i^{(j)} = y_i^{(j)}$ if $p_i^{(j)} = p_j^{(j)}$ for some $j$ and $u_i^{(j)}$ is empty if $p_i^{(j)}$ was not a protocol participant in phase 1. Given this, we define real and ideal views...
in the second (or any subsequent) phase of the computation as
\[
\text{REAL}_{\Pi^{(2)}, \mathcal{A}}(1^k, \{x_i^{(2)}, u_i^{(2)}\}_{i=1}^{n_2}) \overset{\text{def}}{=} \text{VIEW}_{\Pi^{(2)}, \mathcal{A} \cup \text{OUT}}^{(2), \mathcal{H}} \text{ and }
\text{IDEAL}^{f^{(2)}, \mathcal{S}(\mathcal{A})}_{\Pi^{(2)}, \mathcal{A}}(1^k, \{x_i^{(2)}, u_i^{(2)}\}_{i=1}^{n_2}) \overset{\text{def}}{=} \text{VIEW}^{f^{(2)}, \mathcal{A} \cup \text{OUT}}^{(2), \mathcal{H}}.
\]

**Definition 2.** A sequence of two protocols \(\Pi^{(1)}\) and \(\Pi^{(2)}\), executed by parties \(P_1^{(1)}, \ldots, P_{n_1}^{(1)}\) and \(P_1^{(2)}, \ldots, P_{n_2}^{(2)}\), respectively, securely evaluates the sequence of functions \(f^{(1)}\) and \(f^{(2)}\) if for all PPT adversaries \(\mathcal{A}\) controlling a subset of the parties, all input vectors \(x_i^{(1)}, 1 \leq i \leq n_1\), and \(x_i^{(2)}, 1 \leq i \leq n_2\), all auxiliary input vectors \(u_i^{(1)} = y_i^{(1)}\) subject to \(P_i^{(2)} = p_i^{(1)}, \text{ and } \kappa \in \mathbb{Z}^+\), there exists PPT simulator \(\mathcal{S}\) such that
\[
\text{REAL}^{f^{(1)}, \mathcal{S}(\mathcal{A})}_{\Pi^{(1)}, \mathcal{A}}(1^k, \{x_i^{(1)}\}_{i=1}^{n_1}) \overset{\text{def}}{=} \text{IDEAL}^{f^{(1)}, \mathcal{S}(\mathcal{A})}_{\Pi^{(1)}, \mathcal{A}}(1^k, \{x_i^{(1)}\}_{i=1}^{n_1})
\]
and
\[
\text{REAL}^{f^{(2)}, \mathcal{S}(\mathcal{A})}_{\Pi^{(2)}, \mathcal{A}}(1^k, \{x_i^{(2)}, u_i^{(2)}\}_{i=1}^{n_2}) \overset{\text{def}}{=} \text{IDEAL}^{f^{(2)}, \mathcal{S}(\mathcal{A})}_{\Pi^{(2)}, \mathcal{A}}(1^k, \{x_i^{(2)}, u_i^{(2)}\}_{i=1}^{n_2}).
\]

For the purposes of this work, the computation participants are \(C, S_1\) and \(S_2\), i.e., we are dealing with three-party computation. As described earlier, we consider two threat models:

1. The minimal meaningful security model that treats \(C\) as malicious and \(S_1\) and \(S_2\) as semi-honest and non-colluding. For the purposes of showing security, this means that \(\mathcal{A}\) can corrupt one party at a time with the specified semi-honest/malicious abilities and our solutions need to be secure for each instantiation of \(\mathcal{A}\).

2. A stronger security model in which, in addition to malicious client \(C\), helper server \(S_2\) can behave maliciously and collude with some clients. Recall that it is not meaningful to assume that \(S_1\) is malicious in the context of this application, and \(S_1\) also does not collude with other parties. This means that \(\mathcal{A}\) has two instantiations: semi-honest \(S_1\) and malicious and colluding \(C\) and \(S_2\).

The user who participates in the registration is called authentic \(C_{\text{auth}}\). The same or a different user might attempt to authenticate later by engaging in the authentication protocol. If the user does not change, the parties \(S_1, S_2, C_{\text{auth}}\) participate in both phases of the protocol. Otherwise, the second phase is a three-party protocol executed by \(S_1, S_2\), and an imposter client, denoted as \(C_{\text{imp}}\).

### 2.3 Building Blocks

In this work, we use the following cryptographic primitives:

- **Oblivious Transfer (OT)** is a protocol between two parties, sender \(S\) and receiver \(R\). In 1-out-of-2 OT, denoted by OT\(_{2}^{2}\), the sender holds two strings, \(m_0\) and \(m_1\), while the receiver holds bit \(b\) and learns \(m_b\). The security requirements are that the sender learn nothing about \(b\), and the receiver learns nothing about the remaining string \(m_{1-b}\).

- **Garbled circuit (GC) evaluation** is a secure two-party protocol parameterized by computational security parameter \(k\) that evaluates some function \(f\), represented as a boolean circuit, on private inputs. One party, garbler \(G\), chooses two random labels \(t_i^0, t_i^1\) to represent each (boolean) wire \(i\) in the circuit. For each binary gate of the circuit, \(G\) derives an encryption key from each of the four possible input wire label pairs and uses these to encrypt the label of the corresponding output wire. This collection of per-gate tables constitutes the garbled circuit \(G_f\). The other party, evaluator \(E\), receives from \(G\) both \(G_f\) and the set of input wire labels corresponding to \(G\)'s input values (which are required to not reveal anything about the input they represent). \(E\) then engages in an OT\(_{2}^{2}\) protocol with \(G\) to obtain the wire labels corresponding to \(E\)'s input values. Finally, \(E\) evaluates the circuit gates beginning with the input labels and obtains the final output label(s). At the end of the protocol, \(E\) sends the corresponding output label(s) to \(G\) (which necessarily reveals the actual output to \(G\)). For the construction to comply with the security definition, it must be the case that
  - \(G\) and \(E\) learn nothing about each others' input and
  - \(G\) learns the function output.

The literature contains a number of well known optimizations to the original Yao construction [39]. This includes the use of the “free XOR” gates introduced in [27] which imposes a certain relationship between the two labels corresponding to a wire, namely, that \(t_i^0 \oplus t_i^1 = \Delta\) for each wire \(i\). The labels are also commonly generated as pseudorandom strings. In our implementation discussed in Section 4, we use garbling as in the JustGarble work [10].

The conventional variant of garbled circuit implementation for semi-honest adversaries provides resilience against malicious evaluators, as long as the appropriate variant of OT is used. We do not require a strengthened variant secure against malicious adversaries, since within our protocols it is possible to arrange for the circuit garbler to be semi-honest.

- **A commitment scheme** is parameterized by a security parameter \(k\) and characterized by two algorithms, commit and open. The commit algorithm is randomized and denoted by \(c = \text{com}(x, r)\), where \(x\) is the value being committed and \(r\) is randomness specified explicitly. We call \(c\) to be a commitment to \(x\). Commitment \(c\) can later be opened (typically by revealing \(x\) and \(r\)), which exposes the value of \(x\). The security requirements are hiding and binding properties of the commitment scheme. Namely, hiding requires that
the release of \( c \) does not disclose information about \( x \) and binding requires that it is infeasible to open a commitment \( c \) to any value other than the value \( x \) used to produce the commitment. The security guarantees can be information-theoretic or computational.

### 2.3.1 Oblivious Transfer with Bit Operations

This generalization of OT works with any already proven secure OT scheme. Here, the parties agree upon a binary boolean function, denoted as \( \odot : \mathbb{F}_2 \times \mathbb{F}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2 \). In addition to the sender holding messages \( m_0 \) and \( m_1 \) and the receiver holding bit \( b \), the sender now also holds an input bit \( c \). Then the receiver obtains \( m_{b \odot c} \) without learning anything else, while the sender learns nothing about receiver’s input \( b \).

This operation is realized using regular OT, where instead of entering \((m_0, m_1)\), the sender enters \((\tilde{m}_0, \tilde{m}_1)\) specified as follows for the three most common binary boolean operations:

- **AND:** the sender sets \( \tilde{m}_0 = m_0 \) and \( \tilde{m}_1 = m_1 \)
- **OR:** the sender sets \( \tilde{m}_0 = m_1 \) and \( \tilde{m}_1 = m_1 \)
- **XOR:** the sender sets \( \tilde{m}_0 = m_1 \) and \( \tilde{m}_1 = m_2 \)

In terms of correctness, notice that in the case of AND, if the sender holds \( c = 0 \), then the receiver obtains \( m_0 \) regardless of their input \((b \land 0) = 0\), and \( m_b \) otherwise \((b \land 1 = b)\). Similarly, in the case of OR, if the sender holds \( c = 1 \), then the receiver obtains \( m_1 \) regardless of their input and \( m_b \) otherwise. And in the case of XOR, \( b \oplus c = c \) if and only if \( b = 0 \), while \( b \oplus c = \neg c = c \oplus 1 \) if and only if \( b = 1 \).

In terms of security, note that nothing in this modification would allow the sender to learn \( b \) if the OT being used already prevents this (although the sender may know exactly which string the receiver gets; this is a function of the sender’s input). Similarly, the receiver always receives exactly one string \( m_{b \oplus c} \) without learning \( m_{\odot c} \) and does not learn anything about \( c \) (but the receiver may know they are getting \( m_0 \) based on their input and the function \( \odot \) being computed).

We will be using this OT variant while transferring GC labels that correspond to an XOR-share of the clients’ private biometric data and denote it as OTB.

### 2.4 DeepPrint Fingerprint Matching

We are interested in supporting authentication based on popular biometric modalities with good distinguishing properties such as fingerprints and iris codes. Iris codes are represented as binary strings and their matching is based on the Hamming distance. As a result, iris matching does not introduce significant complexity. On the other hand, conventional minutiae-based comparison of fingerprints is complex and not well suited for use in secure computation. For that reason, DeepPrint [18] that uses deep neural network for fingerprint feature selection with excellent discriminating properties is of interest to us. The resulting fingerprint representations are fixed length and can be compared using simple conventional distance metrics, making it easier to use the representation with cryptographic tools.

DeepPrint encodes a fingerprint biometric as a vector of 192 single-precision floating-point values, which is normalized to be unit length. A unit-length vector is defined as having its \( L^2 \) norm, denoted by \( \|B\| \) for a biometric vector \( B \), be equal to 1. Concretely, for vector \( B = (B[i])_{i=1}^m \), it is required that \( \|B\| = \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^m B[i]^2} = 1 \).

Then the distance between two unit-length DeepPrint representations \( B \) and \( \tilde{B} \) can be determined using the cosine similarity between the two vectors, defined as the dot product of the vectors divided by the product of their \( L^2 \) norms \((\sum_{i=1}^m B[i] \tilde{B}[i])/(\|B\| \|\tilde{B}\|)\). Of course, when normalizing to unit length, this division is unnecessary and the computation simply corresponds to \( m \) multiplications and \( m-1 \) additions.

The range of values the cosine similarity distance metric may take on normalized inputs is \([-1, 1]\), with 1 representing an exact match. Thus, to determine if two representations are within a close distance, treated as a “match,” it suffices to determine if their dot product is within the range \((1-t, 1]\) for a desired threshold value \( t \).

The authors of [18] also used Euclidean distance as a distance function. For two unit-length vectors \( B \) and \( \tilde{B} \), Euclidean distance defined as \( \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^m (B[i] - \tilde{B}[i])^2} \) yields values in the range \([0, 2]\), with 0 representing an exact match. Thus, a match is determined by checking if the distance is within \([0, t]\) for some threshold \( t \). For performance reasons, we work with squared Euclidean distance, in which case the threshold \( t \) needs to be adjusted accordingly. We use notation \( d \sim t \) to denote the result of comparing the distance \( d \) to threshold \( t \), where the exact operation depends on the distance metric (i.e., checking \( 1-t < d \leq 1 \) for cosine similarity and \( d < t \) for Euclidean distance); \( \text{dist}(B, \tilde{B}) \) denotes the distance computation.

DeepPrint representation requires 768 bytes of storage for 192 32-bit (single precision) floating-point values, but can be compressed to 200 bytes. This is accomplished in [18] by compressing a floating-point vector element to an 8-bit integer using min-max normalization as follows: Given DeepPrint floating-point vector \( B = (B[1], \ldots, B[192]) \), define \( h_B = \max_i(B[i]) \), \( t_B = \min_i(B[i]) \) and compute

\[
\tilde{B}[i] = \left[ \frac{255 (B[i] - t_B)}{h_B - t_B} \right]
\]

for \( i \in [1, 192] \). The compressed representation stores 192 8-bit integers \( \tilde{B}[i] \) and two 32-bit floating point values \( h_B \) and \( t_B \). Matching of two compressed representations is performed by decompressing the representations and computing the distance on floats. The compression has a minimal impact on the matching accuracy [18].

### 2.5 Vector Normalization in Adversarial Settings

Normalization of DeepPrint biometric representations is assumed to be performed as part of feature extraction after biometric sampling. Its presence has a direct impact on how the threshold \( t \) that determines a match of two biometric representations is chosen: scaling normalization will result in scaling the threshold \( t \) as well.

This is of interest for us because in the context of this work a biometric sample comes from a user who can act maliciously and construct a biometric representation that deviates from the expectations including normalization. Thus, it becomes important to enforce proper normalization of a biometric representation a user submits. If normalization is not enforced, a malicious user can succeed with authentication without a matching biometric by manipulating vector normalization. As a specific example, consider

\footnote{For performance reasons, we can instead check the square of the norm against 1.}
that squared Euclidean distance is used for distance computation and biometric vectors $B$ are assumed to be unit-length normalized (i.e., $\|B\| = \|\tilde{B}\| = 1$). For two vectors $B$ and $\tilde{B}$, the squared Euclidean distance is $\|B - \tilde{B}\|^2$. By the triangle inequality, we have

$$\|B - \tilde{B}\|^2 \leq (\|B\| + \|\tilde{B}\|)^2 = \|B\|^2 + 2\|\tilde{B}\| + \|\tilde{B}\|^2$$

Now if the distance between vectors $B$ and $\tilde{B}$ is compared to a predetermined threshold $t$, the client will perform normalization and authentication of the actual vectors (i.e., in such cases, $\|B - \tilde{B}\|^2 < t$ is always true). Even when an adversary tampers with (normalization of) the actual vectors (i.e., in such cases, $\|B - \tilde{B}\|^2 < t$ is always true), the servers will result in successful authentication independent of the actual vectors.

3 SOLUTIONS BASED ON GARBLED CIRCUIT EVALUATION

Recall that we consider two threat models: (i) semi-honest servers $S_1$ and $S_2$ and malicious client, and (ii) semi-honest $S_1$ and malicious client and $C$. We label the first model as SH1 and the second as MAR. We start our solution secure in the first model and consequently strengthen it to maintain security in the second, stronger model.

In our solution, the client’s involvement is minimal and its task primarily consists of splitting its biometric into two XOR shares and communicating the respective shares to the servers $S_1$ and $S_2$. This will take place both at registration and authentication. At registration time, the servers perform the normalization check on the user’s private biometric using OTB and garbled circuit evaluation. In this computation, $S_1$ acts as the garbler and $S_2$ as the evaluator. If the normalization check succeeds, the servers accept and store the biometric. The authentication phase proceeds similarly; where in addition to checking whether the submitted biometric meets the normalization criteria, the servers also compute the distance between the registered and newly received biometrics and determine if the distance is within the desired threshold.

When $S_2$ can be malicious (the second, stronger model), additional information is stored at registration time. In addition to storing shares of user biometric $B$, the servers obtain and check a one-way function of $B$ that allows the servers to verify correct share reconstruction within the garbled circuit without obtaining any information about $B$. That additional information is used during the authentication phase to ensure that $S_2$ did not tamper with its values, and we additionally employ stronger tools such as OT resilient to malicious behavior.

In the rest of the paper, we assume a fixed-length biometric representation of $m$ bits. Notation $x \sim \mathcal{U}(X)$ means that variable $x$ is sampled uniformly at random from the set $X$. When working with garbled circuits, we let $n$ denote the total number of wires, where the wires with the lowest indices correspond to the inputs and the wires with the highest indices correspond to the output. The parties hold security parameter $\kappa$ and agree on the algorithms corresponding to the building blocks. All protocols assume the existence of secure channels between each pair of parties for sending sensitive information such as shares and keys.

3.1 Malicious $C$, semi-honest $S_1$ and $S_2$

We start the description of our first solution with the expected functionalities for registration and authentication, which are listed in Figures 1 and 2, respectively.

At registration time, the client (which may be corrupt) supplies its biometric $B$, from which it generates two XOR shares $B_1$ and $B_2$. The ideal functionality performs the normalization check for $B$, the output of which is bit $b$, which is communicated to $S_1$. If the check succeeds, the ideal functionality outputs accept to all parties and shares $B_1$ and $B_2$ to $S_1$ and $S_2$, respectively. Otherwise, the parties receive reject and $S_1$ and $S_2$ receive empty string $\perp$ in place of shares.

During authentication, servers $S_1$ and $S_2$ contribute the shares $B_1$ and $B_2$ they received during registration, while the client contributes biometric $\tilde{B}$. The functionality performs two checks:

1. normalization check for $\tilde{B}$: $b_1 = (\sum_{i=1}^{m}(\tilde{B}[i])^2 \leq 1$.
2. comparison of the distance between enrollment and authentication biometrics $B$ and $\tilde{B}$ to threshold $t$: $b_2 = (\text{dist}(B_1 \oplus B_2, \tilde{B}) \leq t)$.
Protocol 1 Registration Reg-SH

**Input:** C holds biometric B.

**Output:** S1 receives bit b and biometric share B1; S2 receives accept or reject and biometric share B2; C receives accept or reject.

**Common Input:** Computational security parameter κ.

**Protocol steps:**

1. C generates m-bit random value r \( \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^m \), sets \( \tilde{B}_1 = r \), computes \( B_2 = B_1 \oplus \tilde{B}_1 \), and securely communicates \( B_1 \) to \( S_1 \) and \( B_2 \) to \( S_2 \). If the receiving server determines that \( B_1 \) or \( B_2 \) is not an m-bit string, it signals abort.

2. \( S_1 \) generates labels \( \ell_i \) for \( i \in [1, n] \) and \( j \in \{0, 1\} \), computes garbled gates \( \mathcal{G}_f \) for the normalization check computation, and sends \( \mathcal{G}_f \) to \( S_2 \).

3. \( S_1 \) and \( S_2 \) engage in \( m \) instances of OTB \( \mathcal{T}_i \) to communicate to \( S_2 \) labels \( \ell_i \) for \( i \in [1, m] \); \( S_1 \) enters labels \( \ell_i \) and \( \ell_i \oplus 1 \) into OT, \( S_2 \) enters bit \( B_2[i] \) and learns label \( \ell_i \oplus B_2[i] = \ell_i \).

4. \( S_2 \) evaluates the circuit and sends the computed label of the output wire \( \ell_i \) to \( S_1 \).

5. If \( \ell_i = 0 \), \( S_1 \) signals rejection to \( C \) and \( S_2 \); \( S_1 \) and \( S_2 \) output \( B_1 \) and \( S_2 \) outputs \( B_2 \).

6. Otherwise, \( S_1 \) signals acceptance to \( C \) and \( S_2 \); \( S_1 \) outputs \( B_1 \) and \( S_2 \) outputs \( B_2 \).

The resulting bits \( b_1, b_2 \) are communicated to \( S_1 \) who then notifies the client of the accept (if both checks pass) or reject decision. Note that we could output a single bit \( b_1 \wedge b_2 \) to \( S_1 \) to indicate success, but it may be beneficial to differentiate between rejection based on the distance and rejection based on the normalization failure. The former may be the result of authentic user authentication failure, while the latter indicates malfeasance by the client.

The registration and authentication protocols in this model are given as Protocol 1, Reg-SH, and Protocol 2, Auth-SH, respectively. In Protocol 1, client \( C \) samples a fresh biometric vector \( B \) for enrollment, splits it into XOR shares \( B_1 \) and \( B_2 \), and sends the shares \( B_1 \) and \( B_2 \) to \( S_1 \) and \( S_2 \), respectively. The two servers engage in GC evaluation to determine whether or not the received biometric vector \( B \) is unit-length normalized, with \( S_1 \) serving the role of the garbler and \( S_2 \) the role of the evaluator.

Instead of entering \( B_1 \) and \( B_2 \) as inputs into GC evaluation, the servers utilize \( m \) instances of OTB \( \mathcal{T}_i \) to enter \( B_1 \oplus B_2 \) directly using the first \( m \) wires. The boolean operation of OTB allows for the computation of \( B_1[i] \oplus B_2[i] \) outside the GC and is realized as follows. With regular OT, \( S_1 \) would supply labels \( \ell_i \) and \( \ell_i \oplus 1 \), while \( S_2 \) supply \( B_2[i] \) and receive \( \ell_i \). In our protocol, \( S_1 \) instead supplies labels \( \ell_i \) and \( \ell_i \oplus B_2[i] \). As a result, when \( S_1 \)’s share \( B_1[i] = 0 \), the labels are supplied as usual. However, when \( B_1[i] = 1 \), the supplied labels are swapped relative to usual OT operation. The outcome is that the receiver obtains labels representing the XOR of share bits \( B_1[i] \) and \( B_2[i] \), or \( B[i] \). We can use an OT extension in the implementation.

After circuit evaluation, \( S_2 \) obtains the output label \( \ell_i \) that represents the outcome of the normalization check and indicates whether registration was successful. \( S_1 \) interprets the result and communicates the decision to the other parties.

Protocol 2 proceeds similar to Protocol 1. This time, the parties use \( 2m \) instances of OTB to communicate garbled circuit labels corresponding to inputs \( B = B_1 \oplus B_2 \) and \( \tilde{B} = B_1 \oplus \tilde{B}_1 \) to \( S_2 \). The output wires with indices \( n - 1 \) are used to the decision bits \( b_1 \) and \( b_2 \), respectively. If both checks succeed, the client obtain the accept decision and otherwise, it learns that the protocol did not succeed.

Our first security result is as follows:

**Theorem 1.** The sequence of Protocols 1 and 2 executed by participants \( S_1, S_2, C_{auth} \) is secure in the presence of semi-honest \( S_1 \) and \( S_2 \) and malicious \( C_{auth} \), according to Definition 2, given supplemental functionalities with security guarantees as discussed in Section 2.3.

**Theorem 2.** The sequence of Protocols 1 and 2, where Protocol 1 is executed by participants \( S_1, S_2, C_{auth} \) and Protocol 2 is executed by participants \( S_1, S_2, C_{mp} \), is secure in the presence of semi-honest \( S_1 \) and \( S_2 \) and malicious \( C_{auth} \) or \( C_{mp} \) according to Definition 2, given supplemental functionalities with security guarantees as discussed in Section 2.3.

The proofs can be found in Appendix A.

### 3.2 Malicious and colluding \( C \) and \( S_2 \), semi-honest \( S_1 \)

We now consider a stronger threat model in which the helper server \( S_2 \) can act maliciously and collude with clients \( C \).
Functionality $F_{\text{reg-mal}}$

1. $F_{\text{reg-mal}}$ receives inputs $B \in \{0,1\}^m$, $c$, and $v$ from $C$.
2. $F_{\text{reg-mal}}$ samples $r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^m$ and defines $B_1 = r$ and $B_2 = r \oplus B$.
3. $F_{\text{reg-mal}}$ computes $b_1, b_2 = (\sum_{i=1}^m B[i])^2 \oplus 1, \text{com}(B, v) \oplus c$.
4. $F_{\text{auth-mal}}$ outputs $(b_1, b_2)$ and $(B_1, c)$ to $S_1$ and $(B_2, v)$ to $S_2$.
5. In addition, if $(b_1, b_2) = (1, 1)$, $F_{\text{reg-mal}}$ outputs accept to $C$ and $S_2$; otherwise, it outputs reject to $C$ and $S_2$.

Figure 3: Ideal registration functionality with malicious and colluding $S_2$ and $C$.

When $S_2$ is not guaranteed to follow the prescribed behavior, it can deviate from the prescribed computation during a protocol execution, but also modify the biometric share $B_2$ that it receives as part of registration when entering it in the authentication protocol. For that reason, we need to be able to detect this kind of misbehavior in addition to detecting client’s misbehavior when it does not use a normalized biometric. Deviations from the prescribed behavior during the protocol execution can be addressed by employing techniques resilient to malicious behavior, while changes to $B_2$ between protocol executions require a new solution.

Our solution to this problem is to modify the registration phase to enable $S_1$ to learn a function of $S_2$’s share $B_2$, which is later used during the authentication to verify that the share that $S_2$ inputs matches $S_1$’s verification token. We use a commitment scheme for this purpose: the client is instructed to compute a commitment $c$ to its enrollment biometric $B$ and the commitment $c$ is given to $S_1$. The binding property of the commitment ensures that it is not feasible for $S_2$ (or $S_2$ in collusion with $C$) to later enter a different biometric $B' \neq B$ that matches commitment $c$. The random choices $v$ used in producing commitment $c = \text{com}(B, v)$ cannot be disclosed to $S_1$ because they permit the opening of the commitment (and thus disclosure of $B$) and for that reason, $v$ is known only to $S_2$. Note that commitments are used in an unconventional way in a three-party setting, but their properties allow us to achieve security in a multi-phase execution.

The ideal functionality for registration in this stronger security model is given in Figure 3. In addition to producing shares $B_1$ and $B_2$ of enrollment biometric $B$, the computation includes two checks:

1. (1) normalization check for $B$: $b_1 = (\sum_{i=1}^m (B[i])^2 \oplus 1)$
2. (2) check that commitment $c$ matches biometric $B$: $b_2 = \text{com}(B, v) = c$.

If registration is successful, $S_1$ obtains and stores $B_1$ and $c$, while $S_2$ obtains and stores $B_2$ and $v$.

At authentication time, the servers contribute their shares of $B$ and $B$ as before, but also the remaining values ($c$ and $v$) that they received at registration time. This time the authentication functionality computes three checks:

1. (1) comparison of the distance between enrollment and authentication biometrics $B$ and $\tilde{B}$ to threshold $t$: $b_2 = (\text{dist}(B_1 \oplus B_2, \tilde{B}) \geq t)$

Figure 4: Ideal authentication functionality with malicious and colluding $S_2$ and $C$.

2. (2) normalization check for $\tilde{B}$: $b_1 = (\sum_{i=1}^m (\tilde{B}[i])^2 \oplus 1)$
3. (3) check that commitment $c$ matches submitted biometric $B$: $b_3 = \text{com}(B_1 \oplus B_2, v) = c$.

$S_1$ receives these three bits, which allows it to determine the reason for failure (and address it outside the protocol). If at least one of these three bits is 0, authentication fails. Figure 4 specifies the ideal functionality.

As can be seen from the figure, the ideal functionality is written to differentiate between two authentication failure modes: communicating a reject decision to the client and sending an abort signal. The reason is that when the last check fails ($b_3 = 0$), we know that the failure is due to $S_2$’s misbehavior and the client receives a message that the operation did not go through (as opposed to successfully finished with a negative result). It is also possible for other checks to fail due to $S_2$’s misbehavior, but they can also be a result of the client submitting a biometric which is not normalized or not within the desired distance from the enrollment biometric.

The registration protocol for this setting is called Auth-MAL and is given as Protocol 4. It proceeds by the client generating shares and a commitment, and the servers verifying that they received consistent values and properly normalized input. Similar to the normalization check, the commitment check takes place within the garbled circuit. For concreteness, let $|v| = k_1$, $|c| = k_2$, and the inputs being entered into the GC evaluation as $B$, $v$, and $c$. Secret-shared $B$ is entered into GC evaluation via OTB as before, while $v$ is entered using conventional OT. We have to resort to a maliciously secure variant of OT to guarantee correct execution. Recall that GC evaluation itself is resilient to malicious behavior. At the end of GC evaluation, $S_2$ obtains the output labels $\ell^{b_2}_{\text{ot}}$ and $\ell^{b_1}_{\text{ot}}$ that it communicates to $S_1$. Note that $S_2$ can tamper with them prior to sending. If the received labels correspond to bits 1, $S_1$ announces successful completion. If at least one of the labels is invalid, $S_1$ aborts. Otherwise, it sends a reject signal.

Authentication is termed Auth-MAL and is given as Protocol 4. The changes to the previous authentication protocol include: (i) the addition of commitment inputs $(c, v)$, (ii) the use of OT for entering $v$, (iii) changes to the circuit to perform commitment verification, (iv) the use of maliciously secure OT, and (v) different handling of the results of function evaluation by $S_1$. We assume that the circuit wires are allocated to the inputs in the following order: $B$ (m bits),
Protocol 3 Registration Reg-MAL

Input: C holds biometric B.
Output: S1 receives bits b1 and b2, biometric share B1, and verification token c; S2 receives accept or reject, biometric share B2, and verification supplement v; C receives accept or reject.
Common Input: Computational security parameter κ and statistical security parameter ρ.

Protocol steps:
1. C generates m-bit random value \( R \sim \{0, 1\}^m \), sets \( B_1 = R \) and \( B_2 = B \odot B \), and computes \( c = \text{com}(B, v) \) using freshly generated randomness \( v \).
2. C securely communicates \((B_1, v)\) to S1 and \((B_2, v)\) to S2. If any communicated value is malformed, the corresponding server signals abort.
3. S1 generates labels \( t_1^i \) and garbled gates \( G_f \) for the normalization and commitment checks and sends \( G_f \) to S2.
4. S1 and S2 engage in \( m \) instances of maliciously secure OTB to communicate to S2 labels \( \ell_{B_1[i]} \oplus \ell_{B_2[i]} \) for \( i \in [1, m] \) as in prior protocols and κ1 instances of conventionally maliciously secure OT to communicate to S2 labels \( \ell_{B_1[i]} \) for \( i \in [1, \kappa_1] \). S1 also sends labels \( \ell_{m+k_1}^i \) for \( i \in [1, k_2] \) to S2.
5. S2 evaluates the circuit and communicates the output labels \( \ell_{b_2}^{n-1} \) and \( \ell_{b_2}^n \) to S1.
6. S1 performs the following:
   a. If \( \ell_{b_2}^{n-1} = \ell_{b_2}^{n-1} \) and \( \ell_{b_2}^n = \ell_{b_2}^n \), S1 broadcasts accept. S1 stores \( B_1, c \) and S2 stores \( B_2, v \).
   b. Otherwise, S1 sends reject to all parties.

\( \overline{B} \) (m bits), \( v \) (κ1 bits), and \( c \) (κ2 bits). As before, the circuit size is denoted by \( n \), while the output wires this time are \( n - 2, n - 1, n \).

Authentication is successful if and only if all output bits are 1 (i.e., all three checks pass). Any malformed output labels and the failure of the commitment check point to S2’s misbehavior and result in abort, while failures of the normalization check and a large difference between \( B \) and \( \overline{B} \) can be due to C or S2 and result in reject.

Theorem 3. The sequence of Protocols 3 and 4 executed by participants \( S_1, S_2, C_{auth} \) is secure in the presence of semi-honest \( S_1 \) and malicious and colluding \( S_2 \) and \( C_{auth} \) according to Definition 2, given supplemental functionalities with security guarantees as discussed in Section 2.3.

Theorem 4. The sequence of Protocols 3 and 4, where Protocol 3 is executed by participants \( S_1, S_2, C_{auth} \), and Protocol 4 is executed by participants \( S_1, S_2, C_{imp} \), is secure in the presence of semi-honest \( S_1 \) and malicious and colluding \( S_2 \) and \( C_{auth} \) or \( C_{imp} \), according to Definition 2, given supplemental functionalities with security guarantees as discussed in Section 2.3.

The proofs can be found in Appendix A.

Protocol 4 Authentication Auth-MAL

Input: C holds biometric \( \overline{B} \), \( S_1 \) holds biometric share \( B_1 \) and verification token \( c \); \( S_2 \) holds biometric share \( B_2 \) and verification supplement \( v \).
Output: \( S_1 \) receives bits \( b_1, b_2 \), and \( b_1, b_2; C \) receives accept or reject.
Common Input: Computational security parameter κ, statistical security parameter ρ, and threshold \( t \).

Protocol steps:
1. C generates \( m \)-bit random value \( \overline{B}_2 \sim \{0, 1\}^m \), sets \( \overline{B}_1 = \overline{B}_2 \odot \overline{B} \), and sends \( \overline{B}_1, B_1, B_2 \) to \( S_1 \) and \( \overline{B}_2 \) to \( S_2 \). If any received value is malformed, then the corresponding server signals abort.
2. \( S_1 \) generates labels \( \ell_{t_1}^i \), computes garbled gates \( G_f \) for the over-the-threshold distance computation, normalization check, and commitment verification, and sends \( G_f \) to \( S_2 \).
3. \( S_1 \) and \( S_2 \) engage in \( 2m \) instances of maliciously secure OTB to communicate to \( S_2 \) labels \( \ell_{B_1[i]} \oplus \ell_{B_2[i]} \) for \( i \in [1, m] \) and \( k_1 \) instances of conventional maliciously secure OT to communicate to \( S_2 \) labels \( \ell_{B_1[i]} \) for \( i \in [1, k_1] \). \( S_1 \) also sends labels \( \ell_{m+k_1}^i \) for \( i \in [1, k_2] \) to \( S_2 \).
4. \( S_2 \) evaluates the circuit and sends the computed output labels \( \ell_{b_1}^{n-2}, \ell_{b_1}^{n-1}, \ell_{b_1}^n \) to \( S_1 \).
5. \( S_1 \) performs the following:
   a. If \( \ell_{b_1}^{n-2} = \ell_{b_1}^{n-1} = \ell_{b_1}^n \), \( S_1 \) sends accept to \( C \) and terminate to \( S_2 \).
   b. If \( \ell_{b_1}^{n-2} \) or \( \ell_{b_1}^n \), \( S_1 \) sends reject to \( C \) and terminate to \( S_2 \).
   c. Otherwise, \( S_1 \) sends reject to all parties.

4 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION

4.1 Working with Compressed DeepPrint Representation

The use of garbled circuits permits implementing any desired functionality and we realize DeepPrint’s matching using compressed representation to lower the cost of the computation. Recall that the main benefit of compressed DeepPrint representation is to lower its storage cost, as the value is uncompressed to its original size during the matching. However, in the context of this work, shorter bitlength representation and the use of integer instead of floating-point values can aid efficiency of the computation itself. Thus, we would ideally like to compute as much as possible using the compressed form in a manner which is not lossy with respect to this compression heuristic.

To this end, suppose that we are comparing two DeepPrint representations \( X \) and \( Y \) consisting of \( m \) (\( \approx 192 \)) elements. Recall that the compressed representation of \( X \) uses \( h_X, \ell_X \) together with 8-bit integers \( \tilde{X}[i] \) defined in equation 1. We also define \( \Delta_X = (h_X - \ell_X) / 255 \geq 0 \), represent a compressed biometric as \( \tilde{X} \equiv (\Delta_X, \ell_X, \tilde{X}[i]) \), and define its decompressed 32-bit floating point biometric as \( \tilde{X} = \{\tilde{X}[i]\} \) where \( \tilde{X}[i] \equiv \tilde{X}[i] + \ell_X \). When using cosine similarity for authentication on pre-normalized vectors which have been compressed and subsequently decompressed,
as is done in [18], it suffices to compare the dot product $\vec{X} \cdot \vec{Y}$ against a threshold value. With this in mind, we have

$$\vec{X} \cdot \vec{Y} = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \vec{X}[i] \vec{Y}[i] = \sum_{i=1}^{m} (\vec{X}[i] \Delta_X + \ell_X)(\vec{Y}[i] \Delta_Y + \ell_Y)$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^{m} (\vec{X}[i] \vec{Y}[i] \Delta_X \Delta_Y + \ell_X \vec{Y}[i] \Delta_Y + \ell_Y \vec{X}[i] \Delta_Y + \ell_X \ell_Y)$$

$$= \left( \Delta_X \Delta_Y \sum_{i=1}^{m} \vec{X}[i] \vec{Y}[i] \right) + \left( \ell_X \Delta_Y \sum_{i=1}^{m} \vec{Y}[i] \right) + \left( \ell_Y \Delta_X \sum_{i=1}^{m} \vec{X}[i] \right) + m \ell_X \ell_Y$$

In the final line of this equation, there are $m$ 8-bit multiplications outputting 16-bit values, which are much cheaper than full size floating-point or even 32-bit integer operations. The summations then require $8 + \log_2(m)$ bits to represent the $\sum_{i=1}^{m} \vec{X}[i]$ and $\sum_{i=1}^{m} \vec{Y}[i]$ terms, and $16 + \log_2(m)$ bits for the $\sum_{i=1}^{m} \vec{X}[i] \vec{Y}[i]$ term. Once the computation is performed on short values, we convert the sums to floating-point representation and compute the remaining operations using regular floating-point arithmetic. Thus, there are 3 conversions, 8 32-bit floating-point multiplications and 3 32-bit floating-point additions.

Conversion to a floating-point value involves locating the index of the most significant set bit, shifting the mantissa by this value, and adjusting the exponent by that value as well. Other operations such as floating-point addition involve shifting by an oblivious value as well.

Euclidean distance can be computed over compressed values as well, but this suffers from a bit of a performance penalty. The corresponding system of equations is

$$\sum_{i=1}^{m} (x_i - y_i)^2 = \sum_{i=1}^{m} (\vec{X}[i] \Delta_X - \vec{Y}[i] \Delta_Y + \ell_X - \ell_Y)^2$$

$$= \left( \Delta_X^2 \sum_{i=1}^{m} \vec{X}[i] \right) + \left( \Delta_Y^2 \sum_{i=1}^{m} \vec{Y}[i] \right) - 2\Delta_X \Delta_Y \sum_{i=1}^{m} \vec{X}[i] \vec{Y}[i] + \left( 2(\ell_X - \ell_Y) \Delta_X \sum_{i=1}^{m} \vec{X}[i] \right) - \left( 2(\ell_X - \ell_Y) \Delta_Y \sum_{i=1}^{m} \vec{Y}[i] \right) + m (\ell_X - \ell_Y)^2$$

which shows an increase in the number of shorter integer operations, floating-point operations, and integer to floating-point conversions.

All of these operations need to be implemented within garbled circuits. Our garbled circuit implementation was built to maximize efficiency starting from the low level such as introduction and propagation of constant publicly known values, using identical logic to OTB in processing AND, OR, and XOR gates (where at least one input is of a constant value), by flagging each constant wire as special and systematically eliminating the need to evaluate gates whenever possible. Such optimization can, for example, cut in half the number of gates needed to evaluate multiplication when compared to the built in multiplication in JustGarble [10] (specifically, by not processing gates when adding known oblivious zeros).

The above combined with other garbled circuit optimizations, such as efficient shifting by an oblivious value, allowed us to generate very efficient floating point circuits. We are aware of only one other work by Pullonen and Siim [35] that built garbled circuits for floating-point operations, and our circuits compare very favorably against theirs. In particular, our single-precision floating-point addition uses 2030 gates vs. 7052 gates in that work; our multiplication has 3690 gates vs. 7701 gates in that work, and comparison is efficient at 300 gates, though not tested in [35]. There can be differences in the treatment of special floating-point values (i.e., we treat infinity as non-a-number NaN which improves performance), but we expect that even with full IEEE 754 standard treatment, our circuits will compare favorably.

### 4.2 Experimental Evaluation

Our implementation uses the garbled circuit instantiation due to [10] with the free-XOR and row reduction optimizations. The OT extension sub-protocols used were that of Asharov et. al. [5] for the protocol with semi-honest $S_2$, and that of Asharov et al. [7] for the protocol with malicious $S_2$. Note that both of these protocols use optimizations of the semi-honest protocol of Ishai et. al. [24] to generate the base-OTs. SHA2-256 was used to form commitments (i.e., we have $k_2 = 256$), with $|\sigma| = 128$ random bits included as entropy supplement (i.e. we have $k_1 = 128$). Reported performance is averaged over 100 runs.

The the following machines were used to run the experiments:

- An AMD Ryzen5-3600 6-core processor operating at 3.6 GHz, running openSUSE Leap 15.3 on the GNU/Linux kernel 5.3.18-150300.59.101-default.
- Identical computers with Intel Xeon E5-2620v4 8-core processors operating at 2.1GHz, running Ubuntu 20.04.3 LTS on the GNU/Linux kernel 5.4.0-131-generic x86_64.

All communication used TCP sockets in the following configurations:

- Each party on a different Xeon machine on a LAN.
- The two servers on Xeon machines on a LAN, with the client on the Ryzen machine connecting via VPN from the internet.

Network latency and throughput were measured by transmitting buffers of size $4^d$ bytes for $i \in [0, 12]$ bidirectionally. Round trip time is taken to be the average of the transmissions of size $\leq 256$, as these generally represent one packet. Throughput is taken to be $((2 \cdot 8 \cdot \text{bufsize}) - \text{latency})/\text{time(\text{sec})}$ as a buffer of size bufsize is sent twice in this round trip test. The results are: (i) Xeon LAN: RTT of 0.345 ms and throughput of 946 Mbit/sec and (ii) Ryzen to Xeon over internet (VPN): RTT of 45.9 ms and throughput of 20.4 Mbit/sec. We note that we use encrypted channels only for information which could leak data. In particular, all biometric shares, garbled circuit labels, and registration and authentication decisions are encrypted. Meanwhile, the garbled table and OTB communications are not.

Performance of authentication protocols is given in Tables 1 and 2. Time to garble and transmit the garbled table and/or labels from $S_1$ to $S_2$ is omitted from these runtime results because they
can be precomputed, however garbling time is comparable to that of garbled circuit evaluation time. The category "Other" includes communication time, other local computation time, and down time. The communication time is relatively insignificant for the local tests but dominates the mixed internet test times. The client computation time is not directly shown in the tables, but it is minimal, showing that the solution is well suited for constrained devices. In particular, the client’s computation took on average 0.17 ms computation with additional 0.05 ms for data transmission to the socket, after which the client awaits a response.

We test squared Euclidean distance against cosine similarity, and find the latter to be slightly more efficient. Cosine similarity needs only a dot product to compute while squared Euclidean distance requires an additional subtraction. And although we further optimize Euclidean distance by employing a recursive squaring circuit which asymptotically approaches a constant factor of 2 improvement, this is not enough to offset the required less efficient decompression from integers to float. Note that Euclidean distance can reuse many of the summations necessary for decompression to do the normalization check.

For comparison, Morampudi et al. [30] achieve iris matching using FHE in approximately 10ms on similarly sized feature vectors. Conversely, some HE schemes can even surpass these numbers due to an optimization of Bodetti et al. [15] of the FHE scheme of Fan and Vercauteren [22], which leverages vector packing to achieve parallel multiplications. Bodetti et al. can compare two 512 dimensional face representations in 2.5 ms. Also, the DeepPrint representation was tested using the same HE scheme and achieved efficiency of 1.26 ms. However, we again note that this necessitates storage of a dedicated private key on the client device, which as mentioned significantly reduces portability by locking the client to a device and requiring storage of system-specific sensitive data. Also, these results do not consider network overhead, so are only comparable with our local machine results. Arguably even more importantly, such numbers assume no protection against (e.g., a server) learning the outcome of the distance measurement directly. In our work, only the accept/reject decision is learned by any server. Finally, the work of [21], which uses functional encryption, performs somewhat more poorly than our protocols despite suffering the same limitations. Specifically, their authentication takes 28-53 ms at the client and 123-224 ms at the server (depending on the biometric template size; 64 or 128 bytes respectively). Note that this also requires clients to store secrets, and their experiments do not take network time into account. Also, while the work of [21] can be instantiated such that servers do not learn the measured distance, their numbers do not reflect tests on such instantiations.

## 5 CONCLUSIONS

In this work, we treat the topic of privacy-preserving biometric-based authentication that permits users to authenticate with biometric data in a such a way that users do not have to maintain any additional secrets and the authentication server does not learn information about user biometrics. We build solutions using a number of cryptographic techniques such as garbled circuit evaluation, a new variant of oblivious transfer, and a commitment scheme that rely on a helper server. An interesting aspect of our work is that the standard security definitions adopted in secure multi-party computation literature were not sufficient to demonstrate security in our application and we extend them to accommodate computation consisting of multiple phases where the set of participants might change from one phase to another. We consider two different security models, both of which model users as malicious and differ in the assumptions on the servers. We formally prove all of our constructions to be secure in the respective models and implement them to demonstrate that they have practical performance.

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## REFERENCES

A SECURITY PROOFS

Proof of Theorem 1. We need to consider each type of the adversary, namely, malicious $C_{auth}$, semi-honest $S_1$, and semi-honest $S_2$. We first note that $C_{auth}$ is the only party contributing input to the computation and thus it is not possible for $A_{auth}$ to violate security and discover information about other parties’ inputs. Thus, we proceed with first showing security in the presence of semi-honest $S_3$, controlling $S_1$ and $S_2$, and building a simulator $S_{adv}$. Afterwards, we treat the case of semi-honest $S_3$, controlling $S_2$ and building its simulator $S_{adv}$.

Adversary $A_{adv}$. Simulation of Protocol 1, Reg-SH, proceeds as follows:

1. $S_3$ invokes $F_{reg-sb}$ and receives bit $b$ and either $B_1$ or $\bot$.
2. If $F_{reg-sb}$ output $B_1$ then $S_3$ chooses random $B_2$ subject to $|B_1 \oplus B_2| = 1$ and stores both values for use in the authentication phase.
3. Otherwise, $S_3$ samples random $B_1 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^m$ and chooses random $B_2$ subject to $|B_1 \oplus B_2| \neq 1$.
4. $S_3$ sends $B_1$ to $A_{adv}$.
5. $S_3$ receives from $A_{adv}$ the garbled gates $G_f$.
6. $S_3$ and $A_{adv}$ engage in $m$ instances of OTB, with $S_3$ entering $B_2$ to simulate $S_2$’s participation. As a result, $S_3$ receives labels corresponding to $B_1 \oplus B_2$.
7. $S_3$ evaluates the garbled circuit and obtains the output label corresponding to $B$ and sends it to $A_{adv}$.

We now argue indistinguishability between real and ideal execution. First note that $S_1$’s view in Protocol 1 is formed by $S_1$’s local randomness and the following components:

1. Receiving $B_1$ from $C$ in Protocol 1 Step 1.
2. Engaging in OTB with $S_2$ in Protocol 1 Step 3, with $S_2$ receiving $m$ labels.
3. Receiving $O_f^b$ from $S_2$ in Protocol 1 Step 4.
4. Using $O_f^b$ to determine the computation outcome.

Because $A_{adv}$ is semi-honest, it will not deviate from what is prescribed in Protocol 1. We now examine all components above.

For part (1), $S_{adv}$ always sends a random $B_1$ to $A_{adv}$, which has identical distribution to the value used in the protocol. For part (2), the security guarantees of OTB are such $A_{adv}$ does not learn any information acting as a sender and there is only a negligible in $k$ chance that it learns the bits input by $S_3$, satisfying the indistinguishability requirement.

For parts (3) and (4), $S_{adv}$ uses the output of $F_{reg-sb}$, in the simulation steps leading up to this point to ensure $A_{adv}$ derives the correct output as part of its view, as follows: If $F_{reg-sb}$ reports (accept, $B_1$),

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then $S_1$ uses this value $B_1$ in OTB and chooses $B_2$, which given this $B_1$, is guaranteed to pass the normalization check. If instead $F_{reg-sh}$ reports reject, then $S_1$ selects a random $B_1$ which matches the expected share distribution in real execution and chooses $B_2$ which is guaranteed to fail the normalization check (and will thus trigger rejection of the enrollment biometric).

We obtain that all components of real and ideal executions are indistinguishable to $A_{S_1}$ except for vanishing probability in $\kappa$.

If $S_1$ receives in the registration phase, we proceed to simulation of Protocol 2, Auth-SH. Recall that $S_1$ retains and reuses the values $B_1$ and $B_2$ from the registration phase when it was successful. The simulator works as follows:

1. $S_1$ invokes $F_{auth-sh}$ and receives output bits $(b_1, b_2)$.
2. $S_1$ samples random $\tilde{B}_1$ and sends $\tilde{B}_1$ to $A_{S_2}$.
3. Using $B_1$ and $B_2$ from the registration phase simulation, $S_1$ chooses $\tilde{B}_2$, subject to the following two constraints:
   a. If $b_1 = 0$, then $\tilde{B}_2$ is chosen such that $\text{dist}(B_1 \oplus B_2, \tilde{B}_1 \oplus \tilde{B}_2) \geq t$, and otherwise subject to $\text{dist}(B_1 \oplus B_2, \tilde{B}_1 \oplus \tilde{B}_2) < t$.
   b. If $b_2 = 0$, then $\tilde{B}_2$ is chosen subject to $||B_1 \oplus \tilde{B}_2|| \neq 1$, and otherwise subject to $||B_1 \oplus B_2|| = 1$.
4. $S_1$ receives from $A_{S_2}$ the garbled gates $\mathcal{G}_f$.
5. $A_{S_1}$ and $S_2$ engage in 2m instances of OTB, with $S_1$ entering the bits of $(B_2, \tilde{B}_2)$. As a result, $S_1$ receives labels corresponding to $(B_1 \oplus B_2)$.
6. $S_1$ evaluates the garbled circuit, obtains the output label corresponding to $(b_1, b_2)$, and sends them to $A_{S_2}$.

$S_1$’s view in Protocol 2 is formed by its local randomness and the following components:

1. $S_1$’s share $B_1$ received in Protocol 1, which is used as an auxiliary input to this protocol.
2. Receiving $B_1$ from $C$ in Protocol 2 Step 1.
3. Engaging in OTB with $S_2$ in Protocol 2 Step 3, with $S_2$ receiving 2m labels.
4. Receiving $r_{b_1}^{B_1}$ and $r_{b_2}^{B_2}$ from $S_2$ in Protocol 2 Step 3.
5. Using $r_{b_1}^{B_1}$ and $r_{b_2}^{B_2}$ to determine the computation outcome.

The value in part (1) is output from registration and was discussed above. For part (2), $S_1$ sends a random $\tilde{B}_1$ to $A_{S_2}$, which has identical distribution to the value used in the protocol. And for part (3), the security guarantees of OTB are again such that $A_{S_1}$ does not learn any information acting as a sender and there is only a negligible in $\kappa$ chance that it learns the bits input by $S_1$.

For parts (4) and (5), $S_1$ again uses the output of $F_{reg-sh}$ to ensure $A_{S_2}$ derives the correct output as part of its view. In particular, the bit $b_1$ received from $F_{reg-sh}$ represents the outcome of the biometric distance check, and $b_2$ represents the outcome of the normalization check. $S_1$ then uses the $\tilde{B}_1$ it generated to choose $\tilde{B}_2$ such that the distance check passes if and only if $b_1 = 1$ and the normalization check passes if and only if $b_2 = 1$ (where failure of either will trigger rejection of the authentication attempt). Thus, again the probability that the simulated view diverges from real execution is negligible in $\kappa$.

**Adversary $A_{S_2}$**: Next we have adversary $A_{S_2}$ controlling semi-honest $S_2$ and construct a corresponding simulator $S_{S_2}$. Simulation of the registration phase proceeds as follows:

1. $S_{S_2}$ invokes $F_{reg-sh}$ and receives either $(B_2, \text{accept})$ or $(\bot, \text{reject})$.
2. If $F_{reg-sh}$ outputs $(B_2, \text{accept})$, then $S_{S_2}$ chooses random $B_1$ subject to $||B_1 \oplus B_2|| = 1$ and stores both values for use in the authentication phase.
3. Otherwise, $S_{S_2}$ samples random $B_2 \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^m$, chooses $B_1$ subject to $||B_1 \oplus B_2|| \neq 1$, and stores both values for use in the authentication phase.
4. $S_{S_2}$ sends $B_2$ to $A_{S_2}$.
5. $S_{S_2}$ constructs a garbled circuit as per Protocol 1 sends the garbled gates $\mathcal{G}_f$ to $A_{S_2}$.
6. $S_{S_2}$ and $A_{S_2}$ engage in $n$ instances of OTB, with $S_{S_2}$ entering the bits of $B_1$. As a result, $A_{S_2}$ receives labels corresponding to $B_1 \oplus B_2$.
7. $S_{S_2}$ receives from $A_{S_2}$ the output label corresponding to $B_2$.
8. If $F_{reg-sh}$ output is $\bot$, then $S_{S_2}$ sends reject to $A_{S_2}$, otherwise $S_{S_2}$ sends accept to $A_{S_2}$.

$S_2$’s view in Protocol 1 is formed by $S_2$’s local randomness and the following components:

1. Receiving $B_2$ from $C$ in Protocol 1 Step 1.
2. Engaging in OTB with $S_1$ in Protocol 1 Step 3, with $S_2$ receiving $m$ labels.
3. Obtaining $r_{B_2}^{b_2}$ from garbled circuit evaluation in Protocol 1 Step 4.
4. Receiving the registration decision from $S_1$.

For part (1), $S_{S_2}$ always sends a random $B_2$ to $A_{S_2}$, which has identical distribution to the value used in the protocol. For part (2), the security guarantees of OTB are such that there is only a negligible in $\kappa$ chance that $A_{S_2}$ learns information about the protected messages input by $S_2$.

For part (3), the guarantees of garbled circuits (in particular, the fact that the labels cannot be distinguished from random strings) ensure that the probability of $A_{S_2}$ decoding the output label is negligible in $\kappa$. And for part (4), note that as with the simulation against $A_{S_1}$, the inputs are crafted to ensure that the output will match the decision output by $F_{reg-sh}$. Thus, the real and ideal execution views are again indistinguishable to $A_{S_2}$ except with probability negligible in $\kappa$.

If $S_{S_2}$ receives accept in the registration phase, we proceed to simulation of the authentication phase, as follows:

1. $S_{S_2}$ samples random $\tilde{B}_2$ and sends it to $A_{S_2}$.
2. $S_{S_2}$ constructs a garbled circuit as per Protocol 2 and sends to $A_{S_2}$ the garbled gates $\mathcal{G}_f$.
3. $A_{S_2}$ and $S_{S_2}$ engage $2m$ in OTB, with $S_{S_2}$ entering bits $(0^m, 0^m)$. As a result, $A_{S_2}$ receives labels corresponding to $(B_2, \tilde{B}_2)$.
4. $S_{S_2}$ receives the output labels corresponding to $(b_1, b_2)$ from $A_{S_2}$.
5. $S_{S_2}$ sends to $A_{S_2}$ the terminate signal.

Note that $S_2$’s view in Protocol 2 is formed by its local randomness and the following components:
(1) $S_2$’s share $B_2$ received in Protocol 1, which is used as an auxiliary input to this protocol.
(2) Receiving $B_2$ from $C$ in Protocol 2 Step 1.
(3) Engaging in OTB with $S_1$ in Protocol 2 Step 3, with $S_2$ receiving $2m$ labels.
(4) Obtaining $\ell_{n-1}$ and $\ell_n$ from garbled circuit evaluation in Protocol 2 Step 3.
(5) Receiving the termination signal at the conclusion of Protocol 2.

The value in part (1) is output from registration and was discussed above. For part (2), $S_{32}$ sends a random $\tilde{B}_2$ to $A_{S_2}$, identically distributed to the value used in the protocol. For part (3), the security guarantees of OTB are such that there is a negligible in $\kappa$ chance that $A_{S_2}$ learns information about the protected messages input by $S_{32}$ and thus cannot determine that $S_{32}$ did not enter values according to the protocol specification (recall that $A_{S_2}$ receives no authentication decision). And for part (4), the guarantees of garbled circuits again ensure that the probability of $A_{S_2}$ decoding the output label is negligible in $\kappa$. Thus, the probability that the simulated view diverges from real execution is negligible in $\kappa$.

We also note that in all of the above cases, repeated authentication on the same biometric is still secure. That is, no substantial advantage can be gained by running a polynomial number of authentications, as the probability of leakage is negligibly small in the security parameter. This implies the inability of any server to succeed in reconstructing a biometric.

Proof of Theorem 2. In the context of this theorem, security with respect to the servers is identical to that in the context of Theorem 1. Thus, we do not repeat security analysis in the presence of a malicious $C$. Where $C$ initiates the authentication phase.

**Adversary $A_{C_{imp}}$** Recall that $C_{imp}$ does not participate in the registration process for the given user and thus $A_{C_{imp}}$ has no knowledge of the biometric $B$ and the corresponding shares $B_1$ and $B_2$ entered by $C_{auth}$ into the computation at registration time.

We build simulator $S_{C_{imp}}$ for Protocol 2 that operates as follows:

1. $S_{C_{imp}}$ receives $\tilde{B}_1$ from $A_{C_{imp}}$. If $\tilde{B}_1$ is not an $m$-bit string, $S_{C_{imp}}$ aborts.
2. $S_{C_{imp}}$ receives $\tilde{B}_2$ from $A_{C_{imp}}$. If $\tilde{B}_2$ is not an $m$-bit string, $S_{C_{imp}}$ aborts.
3. $S_{C_{imp}}$ invokes $\mathcal{F}_{auth-sh}$ on input $\tilde{B}_1 \oplus \tilde{B}_2$ and receives accept or reject.
4. $S_{C_{imp}}$ sends the decision to $A_{C_{imp}}$.

Note that client-server interaction in real and simulated executions is simple, with the client sending shares of its input and receiving authentication outcome. We next compare the adversarial views in real and simulated executions.

If the client does not form the shares $\tilde{B}_1$ and $\tilde{B}_2$ properly and instead sends values which are not $m$-bit strings, both real and simulated executions terminate with 100% probability. Otherwise, the shares are well-formed and will undergo identical verification to determine the outcome (either by querying the ideal functionality or performing the checks via garbled circuit evaluation). In both cases, the outcome will be reject if the input $\tilde{B}_1 \oplus \tilde{B}_2$ has not been properly normalized and/or is not within the required distance from the enrolment biometric $B$. Because the cryptographic tools used in the real execution are computationally secure, we obtain that there is only a negligible in $\kappa$ probability that $A_{C_{imp}}$ can distinguish the two views.

Proof of Theorem 3. In the context of this theorem, we need to prove security in the presence of adversaries $A_{S_1}$ and the combined $A_{C_{auth} \cup S_2}$. Note that similarly to the proof of Theorem 1, $A_{C_{auth}}$ does not gain any information by behaving maliciously in either the registration or authentication phases. And since a malicious $A_{C_{auth}}$ has the ability to dictate the outcome of both phases, collusion with a malicious $S_2$ is trivial, as there is nothing they can do or learn that cannot be already achieved or provided by $C_{auth}$ For this reason, we only provide a simulation in the presence of $A_{S_1}$. This will change for Theorem 4, where showing security in the presence of $A_{C_{auth} \cup S_2}$ is needed.

**Adversary $A_{S_1}$** Our simulator $S_{32}$ for Protocol 3, Reg-MAL, proceeds as follows:

1. $S_{32}$ invokes $\mathcal{F}_{reg-mal}$ and receives bits $(b_1, b_2)$ and $(B_1, c).
2. If $b_1 = 1$, $S_{32}$ chooses $B_2$ subject to $||B_1 \oplus B_2|| = 1$; otherwise, it chooses $B_2$ subject to $||B_1 \oplus B_2|| \neq 1$.
3. $S_{32}$ samples a $k_1$-bit $\tilde{v}$ at random from the witness space of the commitment scheme.
4. If $b_2 = 1$, $S_{32}$ computes $\tilde{c} = \text{com}(B_1 \oplus B_2, \tilde{v})$; otherwise, $S_{32}$ sets $\tilde{c} = c$.
5. If $(b_1, b_2) = (1, 1)$, $S_{32}$ stores $(B_1, B_2)$ and $(\tilde{c}, \tilde{v})$ for use with authentication.
6. $S_{32}$ sends $(B_1, \tilde{c})$ to $A_{S_1}$.
7. $S_{32}$ receives from $A_{S_1}$, the garbled gates $G_{bf}$.
8. $S_{32}$ and $A_{S_1}$ engage in $m$ instances of maliciously secure OT and $k_1$ instances of conventional maliciously secure OT, where $S_{32}$ enters $(B_2, \tilde{v})$ for its input. As a result, $S_{32}$ receives labels corresponding to $(B_1 \oplus B_2, \tilde{v})$.
9. $S_{32}$ also receives from $A_{S_1}$, $k_1$ labels corresponding to $A_{S_1}$’s input $\tilde{c}$.
10. $S_{32}$ evaluates the garbled circuit and sends the two output labels to $A_{S_1}$.
11. $S_{32}$ receives the decision from $A_{S_1}$ on behalf of $C$ and $S_2$.

In order to compare the real and simulated views, we recall that $S_1$’s view in Protocol 3 is formed by its local randomness and the following interactive components:

1. Receiving $B_1$ and $c$ from $C$ in Protocol 3 Step 2.
2. Engaging in OT with $S_2$ in Protocol 3 Step 4, with $S_2$ receiving $m$ labels.
3. Engaging in OT with $S_2$ in Protocol 3 Step 4, with $S_2$ receiving $k_1$ labels.
4. Receiving $\ell_{n-1}$ and $\ell_n$ from $S_2$ in Protocol 3 Step 5.
5. Using the labels to determine the computation outcome.

We next argue indistinguishability between real and simulated execution. For part (1) above, we have that $S_1$ receives $B_1$ and $c$ from $C$ in the protocol, while our simulator might supply $S_1$ with a modified $\tilde{c}$, which differs from $c$ supplied as input to the ideal functionality. Nevertheless, we argue that the adversary is unable to distinguish the values. In particular, when $b_2 = 0$ (i.e., the commitment $c$ is not
well formed or was not specified in a consistent way), the simulated view in this step is identical to the protocol view. In particular, client specified commitment $c$ follows the same distribution as during protocol execution. However, when $b_2 = 1$ (i.e., the commitment is well formed and verifies), the simulator forms a different commitment $\tilde{c}$ and communicates $(B_1, \tilde{c})$ to $S_1$. In that case, the commitment is drawn from the same distribution as during the protocol execution and the views cannot be distinguished.

For parts (2) and (3), the simulator relies on security of oblivious transfer and a computationally limited adversary is unable to distinguish the simulation from the real protocol interaction.

Once $S_1$ receives the output labels of garbled circuit evaluation, it is able to interpret them and extract the output $(b_1, b_2)$; this is parts (4) and (5) above. We argue that the inputs to garbled circuit evaluation were constructed by simulator $S_{\text{reg}}$ in such a way that the output bits will correspond to $(b_1, b_2)$ provided to $S_{\text{reg}}$ by ideal functionality $F_{\text{reg-mal}}$, which correspond to true output. In particular, if $S_{\text{reg}}$ receives $b_1 = 1$ (i.e., the input biometric is properly normalized), it uses $(B_1, B_2)$ subject to $\|B_1 @ B_2\| = 1$; otherwise $B_2$ is chosen to have $\|B_1 @ B_2\| \neq 1$. This means that $S_1$ will recover the correct bit. Similarly, if $S_{\text{reg}}$ receives $b_2 = 1$ (the commitment verifies), it constructs another valid commitment $\tilde{c}$ for which it knows the opening $(B_1 @ B_2, \tilde{c})$. If $S_{\text{reg}}$ receives $b_2 = 0$ (invalid commitment), it uses the original commitment $c$ with a random opening $(B_1 @ B_2, \tilde{c})$, which will fail the verification with overwhelming probability, as desired. This means that during the simulated view, $S_1$ will recover the same $(b_1, b_2)$ as during the protocol execution with all but negligible probability in the security parameter. This means the real and simulated views are indistinguishable.

If $S_{\text{reg}}$ receives $(b_1, b_2) = (1, 1)$ during registration, we proceed with simulation of Protocol 4, Auth-MAL, as follows:

(1) $S_{\text{reg}}$ invokes $F_{\text{auth-mal}}$ and receives output bits $(b_1, b_2, b_3)$.
(2) $S_{\text{reg}}$ samples random $B_1$ and sends $B_1$ to $A_S$.
(3) Using $B_1$ and $b_2$ from registration simulation, $S_{\text{reg}}$ chooses $B_2$ as follows:
   (a) If $b_1 = 1$, $B_2$ is chosen subject to $\text{dist}(B_1 @ B_2, B_1 @ \tilde{B}_2) < t$; otherwise, it is chosen subject to $\text{dist}(B_1 @ B_2, B_1 @ \tilde{B}_2) \geq t$.
   (b) If $b_2 = 1$, $B_2$ is chosen subject to $\|\tilde{B}_1 @ B_2\| = 1$; otherwise, it is chosen subject to $\|\tilde{B}_1 @ B_2\| \neq 1$.
(4) In addition, $S_{\text{reg}}$ uses stored $\tilde{c}$ to set $\tilde{v}'$ as follows: if $b_3 = 1$, $\tilde{v}' = \tilde{v}$; otherwise, $\tilde{v}' \neq \tilde{v}$.
(5) $S_{\text{reg}}$ receives from $A_S$, the garbled gates $G_f$ and $k_2$ labels corresponding to $A_S$’s input $c$.
(6) $A_S$ and $S_{\text{reg}}$ engage in $2m$ instances of maliciously secure OTB and $k_1$ instances of conventional maliciously secure OT, with $S_{\text{reg}}$ entering $B_2, \tilde{B}_2, v'$. As a result, $S_{\text{reg}}$ receives labels corresponding to $(B_1 @ B_2, \tilde{B}_1 @ \tilde{B}_2, v')$.
(7) $S_{\text{reg}}$ evaluates the garbled circuit, obtains the output labels corresponding to $(b_1, b_2, b_3)$, and sends them to $A_S$.
(8) $S_{\text{reg}}$ receives the final decision from $A_S$, on behalf of $C$ and $S_2$.

This time, $S_1$’s view in Protocol 4 is formed by its local randomness and the following components:

(1) $S_1$’s share $B_1$ and commitment value $c$ received in Protocol 3, which is used as an auxiliary input to this protocol.
(2) Receiving $\tilde{B}_1$ from $C$ in Protocol 4 Step 1.
(3) Engaging in OTB and OT with $S_2$ in Protocol 4 Step 3, with $S_2$ receiving $2m + k_1$ labels.
(4) Receiving labels $\tilde{b}_1, \tilde{b}_2, \tilde{b}_3$ from $S_2$ in Protocol 4 Step 4.
(5) Using the labels to determine the computation outcome.

Parts (1)–(5) are similar to our prior analysis, where either there is no difference in the views or the views could be distinguished only with a negligible probability. To demonstrate indistinguishability for parts (4)–(5), we need to show that $S_1$ recovers the same output bits $(b_1, b_2, b_3)$ as what the ideal functionality $F_{\text{auth-mal}}$ (and real execution) supply.

The bits $b_1$ and $b_2$ correspond to the distance and normalization checks, respectively. The biometric shares $(B_1, B_2)$ are set to produce the correct bits during garbled circuit evaluation. However, bit $b_3$ is new and corresponds to the result of the commitment check. To this extent, the simulator $S_{\text{reg}}$ uses consistent commitment opening information when $b_3 = 1$ and modifies $\tilde{c}$ otherwise to cause the check to fail (which will happen with overwhelming probability). We obtain that $S_1$ will recover the correct output and is unable to distinguish the real and simulated views with more than a negligible probability.

\[\square\]

**Proof of Theorem 4.** In the context of this proof, showing security in the presence of semi-honest $A_S$ follows the same procedures as in the proof of Theorem 3. Although $F_{\text{auth-mal}}$ obtains inputs from $C_{\text{imp}}$ instead of $C_{\text{auth}}$, the difference does not impact simulator construction and therefore the conclusions of Theorem 3 apply here as well.

We thus proceed to show security in the presence of malicious $A_{C_{\text{imp}, S_2}}$. There are two adversarial structures to consider: $S_2$ colluding with $C_{\text{auth}}$ and $S_2$ colluding with $C_{\text{imp}}$. The latter is the most important to consider and show that a malicious user working in coordination with $S_2$ is unable to attack the original user’s biometric $B$. The situation when the adversary is $A_{C_{\text{imp}, S_2}}$, however, is different. During registration, this constitutes the identical scenario of that of Theorem 3, where the adversary is unable to learn any additional information. Then during authentication, $A_{C_{\text{imp}, S_2}}$’s capabilities are that of $S_2$ alone who does not learn any output from the protocol. Therefore, we concentrate on showing security in the presence of adversary $A_{C_{\text{imp}, S_2}}$.

**Adversary $A_{C_{\text{imp}, S_2}}$**. We begin by constructing simulator $S_{C_{\text{imp}, S_2}}$ for Protocol 3, the registration. Because $C_{\text{imp}}$ is not an active participant of the protocol, $A_{C_{\text{imp}, S_2}}$’s capabilities during registration are equivalent to that of $A_{S_2}$.

(1) $S_{C_{\text{imp}, S_2}}$ invokes $F_{\text{reg-mal}}$ and receives $(B_2, v)$ and accept or reject decision.
(2) $S_{C_{\text{imp}, S_2}}$ chooses $\tilde{B}_1 \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^m$ subject to $\|\tilde{B}_1 @ B_2\| = 1$ and computes $\tilde{c} = \text{com}(\tilde{B}_1 @ B_2, v)$.
(3) $S_{C_{\text{imp}, S_2}}$ sends $(B_2, v)$ to $A_{C_{\text{imp}, S_2}}$.
(4) $S_{C_{\text{imp}, S_2}}$ produces garbled circuit $G_f$ as in Protocol 3 and sends it to $A_{C_{\text{imp}, S_2}}$.
(5) $S_{C_{\text{imp}, S_2}}$ and $A_{C_{\text{imp}, S_2}}$ engage in $m$ instances of maliciously secure OTB and $k_1$ instances of conventional maliciously secure OTB.


secure OT, with $S_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$ entering $\tilde{B_1}$ into OTB. As a result, $S_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$ receives labels corresponding to $\tilde{B_1} \oplus B_2 \oplus \sigma$. $S_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$ also sends labels $\{\ell_{m+k+1}'\}_{i \in \{1, k\}}$ (that corresponds to $\overline{c}'$) to $A_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$.

(6) $S_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$ receives labels $\ell_{n-1}'$ and $\ell_{n}'$ from $A_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$.

(7) If $\ell_{n-1}' = \ell_{n-1}'$, $\ell_{n}' = \ell_{n}'$, $S_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$ stores $(B_2, \sigma)$ for use in authentication and sends the accept or reject decision received from to $A_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$. Otherwise, it sends reject to $A_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$.

$S_2$’s view in Protocol 3 is formed by $S_2$’s local randomness and the following components:

1. Receiving $(B_2, c)$ from $C$ in Protocol 3 Step 2.
2. Receiving garbled gates $G_f$ from $S_1$ in Protocol 3 Step 3.
3. Engaging in OT with $S_1$ in Protocol 3 Step 4, with $S_2$ receiving $m$ labels.
4. Engaging in OT with $S_1$ in Protocol 3 Step 4, with $S_2$ receiving $k_1$ labels.
5. Receiving $k_2$ labels $\ell_{m+k+1}''\ell_{m+k+1}'\ell_{m+k+1}$ from $S_1$ in Protocol 3 Step 4.
6. Obtaining $\ell_{n}''$ and $\ell_{n-1}''$ from garbled circuit evaluation in Protocol 3 Step 5.
7. Receiving the registration decision from $S_1$.

Communication in part (1) has identical distribution in real and simulated executions. That is, the value $\sigma$ is passed unmodified from $F_{\text{reg-imp}}$ as it was obtained from $C$. The value $B_2$ is also generated according to the specification, as it would in the case of non-adversarial $C$.

Parts (2)–(5) in the simulation are executed as in real computation. Due to the security properties of garbled circuit evaluation and OT, $A_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$ is unable to obtain any information about $\tilde{B_1}$ and $\overline{c}'$ that the simulator enters into the circuit. Similarly, the labels in part (6) have identical distributions in real and simulated views and do not reveal any information to $A_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$.

Part (7) is the most interesting case. There are three situations to consider:

1. If $A_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$ evaluates the circuit correctly, it will arrive at labels $f_i''$ and $f_i''$, because the inputs into the circuit were set to pass both checks. In that case, the simulator outputs the accept/reject decision (which is dictated by the client’s inputs) and is identical to that in real execution.
2. If $A_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$ instead modifies the values it enters into the garbled circuit (i.e., $B_2$, $\sigma$, or both), the verification will not pass with overwhelming probability and the simulator outputs reject. This is identical to the behavior in the real execution.
3. Lastly, if $A_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$ does not evaluate the circuit and returns malformed labels which do not correspond to the labels for circuit wires $n$ and $n - 1$, the simulator will output reject, which is the same as in the protocol execution.

We obtain that the real and simulated view differ with at most negligible probability and are therefore indistinguishable.

Provided registration was successful, we continue on to the authentication phase. To that end, we will need to extract input from this adversary. Note that for garbled circuits secure against (only) semi-honest adversaries, there is no provision for the evaluator to guarantee that each garbled gate computes the function prescribed to it. We can leverage this fact to allow $A_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$ to extract input from $S_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$ as follows: for each input bit, there exists at least one path through $G_f$ to one of the output bits. Hence for each bit $i \in \{1, 2m + k\}$ of $A_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$’s input, we have $S_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$ construct a circuit $G_f'$ where each gate along the guaranteed path is set to be an identity gate. From this $S_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$ can learn a single bit of $S_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$’s input, and then rewind and repeat. Since $A_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$ learns not the bit, but a pseudorandom label for which recovery is intractable, it cannot distinguish this execution from one which actually computes the prescribed function $f$.

We note that in what follows the notation $\sigma'$ represents the value the adversary inputs into the garbled circuit in the authentication phase, whereas $\overline{\sigma}$ is the value output from registration, and these need not be the same given an active adversary. The simulation of Protocol 4 proceeds as follows:

1. $S_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$ receives $\tilde{B_1}$ from $A_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$.
2. $S_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$ uses the input extraction technique described above to obtain $(B_2, \tilde{B_2}, \sigma')$.
3. $S_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$ constructs garbled circuit $G_f$ as per Protocol 4 and sends it to $A_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$.
4. $S_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$ engages in malicious-secure OTB and OT with $A_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$, entering $B_1 = \tilde{B_1} = 0$. As a result, $A_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$ receives labels corresponding to $(\tilde{B_2}, \tilde{B_2}, \sigma')$.
5. $S_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$ sends labels $\{\ell_0''\}_{m+k+1}''\ell_{m+k+1}''\ell_{m+k+1}$ corresponding to $c = 0$ to $A_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$.
6. $S_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$ sends $S_2$’s inputs $(B_2, \sigma')$ and $C$’s input $\tilde{B_1} \oplus \tilde{B_2}$ to $F_{\text{auth-imp}}$ and receives (accept, terminate), (reject, terminate), or (abort, abort) outputs for $C$ and $S_2$, respectively.
7. $S_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$ receives $(\ell_{n-2}''', \ell_{n-1}''', \ell_{n}''')$ from $A_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$.
8. If each of the received labels corresponds to a valid label for the associated wire, $S_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$ sends to $A_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$ the decision it received from $F_{\text{auth-imp}}$. Otherwise, it sends (abort, abort) to $A_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$.

$S_2$ and $C$’s view in Protocol 4 is formed by $S_2$’s and $C$’s local randomness and the following interaction with $S_1$:

1. Receiving garbled gates $G_f$ from $S_1$ in Protocol 4 Step 2.
2. Engaging in OT with $S_1$ in Protocol 4 Step 3, with $S_2$ receiving $m$ labels.
3. Engaging in OT with $S_1$ in Protocol 4 Step 3, with $S_2$ receiving $k_1$ labels.
4. Receiving $k_2$ labels $\ell_{m+k+1}''\ell_{m+k+1}''\ell_{m+k+1}$ from $S_1$ in Protocol 4 Step 3.
5. Obtaining labels $\ell_{n-2}''', \ell_{n-1}''', \ell_{n}'''$ from garbled circuit evaluation in Protocol 4 Step 4.
6. Receiving the authentication decision from $S_1$.

This time, parts (1)–(5) correspond to garbled circuit and OT execution and, as before, do not disclose any information about inputs on which the circuit is evaluated. This means that $A_{\text{imp}\cup S_2}$ is unable to determine the fact that the simulator enters zero values into the circuit.

For part (6), we note that the simulator submits to the ideal functionality $F_{\text{auth-imp}}$ inputs extracted from the adversary as well as
information consistent with the information produced by $\mathcal{F}_{\text{reg-mal}}$ at registration time. This means that, if the circuit is evaluated correctly, its output will correspond to the result of evaluation of same function as in real protocol execution. We see that in that case the simulator simply passes the output from the ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{auth-mal}}$ to the adversary.

Otherwise, $\mathcal{A}_{\text{Comp}\cup\mathcal{S}_2}$ might deviate from circuit evaluation and return one of more labels which do not correspond to the output wires. In that case, the simulator sends to the corrupt parties abort, which is the identical behavior to that in the protocol execution.

We obtain that the adversary is unable to tell the real and simulated views apart with more than a negligible probability. \qed