Two-Round Threshold Signature from Algebraic One-More Learning with Errors

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Abstract

Threshold signatures have recently seen a renewed interest due to applications in cryptocurrency while NIST has released a call for multi-party threshold schemes, with a deadline for submission expected for the first half of 2025. So far, all lattice-based threshold signatures requiring less than two-rounds are based on heavy tools such as (fully) homomorphic encryption (FHE) and homomorphic trapdoor commitments (HTDC). This is not unexpected considering that most efficient two-round signatures from classical assumptions either rely on idealized model such as algebraic group models or on one-more type assumptions, none of which we have a nice analogue in the lattice world.

In this work, we construct the first efficient two-round lattice-based threshold signature without relying on FHE or HTDC. It has an offline-online feature where the first round can be preprocessed without knowing message or the signer sets, effectively making the signing phase non-interactive. The signature size is small and shows great scalability. For example, even for a threshold as large as 1024 signers, we achieve a signature size roughly 11 KB. At the heart of our construction is a new lattice-based assumption called the \textit{algebraic one-more learning with errors} (AOM-MLWE) assumption. We believe this to be a strong inclusion to our lattice toolkits with an independent interest. We establish the selective security of AOM-MLWE based on the standard MLWE and MSIS assumptions, and provide an in depth analysis of its adaptive security, which our threshold signature is based on.
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1 Introduction

A $T$-out-of-$N$ threshold signature [Des90, DF90] allows to distribute a secret signing key to $N$ signers, where any set of the $T \leq N$ signers can collaborate to sign a message. Security guarantees that a set of signers less than $T$ cannot produce a valid signature. While threshold signatures have always been a topic of interest, in recent years, it has seen a renewed real-world interest largely due to applications in cryptocurrency, where secure and reliable storage of cryptographic keys are vital. Such interest has led US agency NIST to release a call for multi-party threshold schemes [PB23], with a deadline for submission expected for the first half of 2025.

Current State of Post-Quantum Threshold Signature. Classically secure threshold signature has approached a high state of maturity with the recent rapid developments. We now have a plethora of efficient solutions, covering many design choices, such as threshold BLS [Bol03, BL22], threshold ECDSA [GG18, LN18, DKLs19, DOK+20, CGG+20, CCL+20, DJN+20], and threshold Schnorr [KG20, Lin22, BCK+22, CGRS23, CKM23b].

While development on post-quantum threshold signature has been elusive for many years, we have started to see some interesting progress lately. The first round-optimal (i.e., one-round) lattice-based threshold signature was by Boneh et al. [BGG+18], later optimized by Agrawal, Stehlé, and Yadav [ASY22]. This remained mainly of theoretical interest as they required a threshold fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) to compute a standard (non-thresholdized) signature. Very recently, Gur, Katz, and Slide [GKS23] building on similar ideas, constructed a two-round threshold signature based on a threshold linear homomorphic encryption and homomorphic trapdoor commitment (HTDC) [GVW15b, DOTT21]. They provide a rough estimate claiming a signature size of around 12 KB with 1.5 MB communication per signer for the 3-out-of-5 setting. While this brings the original idea of [BGG+18] closer to practice, it does not scale well due to the heavy use of HTDC. In an independent and concurrent work, del Pino et al. [dPKM+24] constructed a three-round threshold signature without relying on any heavy tools such as FHE or HTDC for the first time. As such, [dPKM+24] has a small signature size of 13 KB with only 40 KB communication per user, achieving a great scalability supporting a threshold $T$ as large as 1024, a parameter range considered by NIST [PB23].

A Closer Look at Round Complexity. While [dPKM+24] brings lattice-based threshold signatures to the practical regime, the main drawback is that it requires three rounds. In environments where signers are using network-limited devices or unreliable networks for transmission, multiple rounds may become a performance bottleneck. This is why there is a strong interest in a round-optimal or a so-called offline-online efficient two-round protocol [BD22, Section 5.3.5]. The latter type allows to preprocess the first-round without knowing the set of $T$ signers and the message to be signed, effectively making the online signing phase non-interactive.

In the classical setting, we have efficient solutions for both of these types: threshold BLS [Bol03, BL22] offers a round-optimal protocol, whereas threshold Schnorr such as FROST and its variants [KG20, BCK+22, CGRS23] offer an offline-online efficient two-round protocol. This is in sharp contrast to the post-quantum setting where we currently need heavy tools like FHE or HTDC for threshold signatures offering less than two rounds.

Barriers to 2(≥)$-Round Lattice Schemes. When we look at how these classical protocols achieve low round complexity, the fundamental barriers in replicating them in the lattice setting becomes clear. First, the round-optimal threshold BLS is based on the BLS signature [BLS01]; a signature scheme using the rich algebraic properties of bilinear maps, something thought to be highly unlikely to be reproducible from lattices. On the other hand, the two-round threshold Schnorr like FROST only requires standard group operations for the construction. Unfortunately, the security proof relies on either the algebraic group model (AGM) [FKL18] or a variant of the one-more discrete logarithm (OM-DL) problem, both of which we do not have nice analogue in the lattice world. Indeed, as exemplified with FHE computation, since lattice operations can be non-algebraic, an idealized model like AGM does not seem to meaningfully capture lattice

\[\text{Note that while we have one-more-ISIS [AKSY22], an assumption having “one-more” in its name, it is qualitatively quite different from those considered in the classical setting. See Section 1.2 for more discussion.}\]
adversaries. To make matters worse, this does not seem to be just an artifact of the proof technique as a simple adaptation of the classical constructions are known to lead to insecure schemes.

In summary, to construct a lattice-based threshold signature with less than two rounds, we need to develop new techniques not yet in our lattice toolkits. This brings us to the main question of this work:

*Can we replicate the classically secure efficient 2(≥)-round threshold signatures from lattices?*

### 1.1 Our Contribution

In this work, we construct a new lattice-based offline-online efficient two-round threshold signature. Unlike prior works on lattice-based one or two-round threshold signatures [BGG+18, ASY22, GKS23], we do not rely on heavy tools such as FHE or HTDC. At a high level, our scheme is similar to the simple threshold Schnorr protocol FROST [KG20], one of the most popular classically secure two-round threshold signatures. In fact, it can be viewed as a thresholdized version of Raccoon [dPEK+23], a lattice-based signature scheme by del Pino et al., submitted to the additional NIST call for proposals [NIS22]. This interchangeability is a desirable property as it allows to seamlessly use our threshold signature in an ecosystem with Raccoon.

At the heart of our construction is a new lattice (falsifiable [Nao03, GW11]) assumption named the *algebraic one-more module Learning with Errors* (AOM-MLWE) assumption. AOM-MLWE is defined in spirit, similarly to the algebraic one-more discrete logarithm (AOM-DL) assumption, originally introduced by Nick, Ruffing, and Seurin [NRS21] to establish the security of the multi-signature scheme called MuSig2. AOM-DL is a strictly weaker assumption than the (non-falsifiable and non-algebraic) OM-DL. Informally, in OM-DL, an adversary has access to a very strong oracle that solves the discrete logarithm of any group element of its choice; in contrast, in AOM-DL, an adversary is limited to access this DL solving oracle on an *algebraic* combination of the provided challenge instances. While the distinction may seem insignificant on first sight, it has a large impact in the lattice setting. This extra algebraic restriction on the adversary is the key allowing us to provide a well-defined and non-trivial definition. See Section 4.1 for more detailed discussions on why a non-algebraic OM-MLWE would be difficult to define and use.

In more detail, half of our work is devoted to a theoretical and practical analysis of the newly introduced AOM-MLWE assumption. As typical with any lattice-based assumptions, the hardness of AOM-MLWE problem is dictated by many parameters. The most unique restriction to AOM-MLWE is the “allowed” algebraic combinations that an adversary can query to the MLWE solving oracle. Since MLWE secrets are small, there are several trivial queries an adversary can make to break the AOM-MLWE problem with a naive parameter selection. In our work, we pinpoint what these “weak” instances are and analyze the hardness of AOM-MLWE for specific “hard” instances, one of which underlies our threshold signature. Concretely, we first show that a *selective* variant of AOM-MLWE (sel-AOM-MLWE) of these hard instances is as secure as MLWE and MSIS — a variant where the adversary must commit to all the queries at the outset of the security game. We then provide an in-depth cryptanalysis analyzing the effect of an adaptive adversary and heuristically establish that an adaptive adversary is no stronger than a selective adversary.

It is worth noting that we have recently seen a boom in new lattice-based assumptions, used to construct exciting primitives: one-more-ISIS [AKSY22], K-R-ISIS [ACL+22], BASIS [WW23], evasive LWE [Wee22, Tsa22], only to name a few. While some (variants of the) assumptions can be based on standard lattice-assumptions, many of them are still new and have not undergone scrutiny, both from theory and practical cryptanalysis. Within this landscape, our assumption is in spirit closest to the *adaptive LWE* problem by Quach, Wee, and Wichs [QWW18], used to construct adaptively secure laconic function evaluation schemes and attribute-based encryption schemes [LLL22]. Similarly to AOM-MLWE, while adaptive LWE

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2In more detail, in OM-DL, the adversary is given \(g^a := (g^i)_{i \in \mathbb{Z}_q} \) as the challenge; can query any \(h \in \mathbb{G}\) to the oracle; and receives \(\text{dlog}_g(h)\). In contrast, in AOM-DL, the adversary can only query \(d \in \mathbb{Z}_q^2\) and receives \((a, d)\), making the oracle efficient.

3Note that this is fundamentally different from the AGM where the adversary is restricted to be algebraic. In AOM-MLWE, while the adversary can only make algebraic queries to the MLWE solving oracle, it has otherwise no algebraic restrictions.
is heuristically thought to be as hard as LWE, the selective variant is implied by the standard definition of LWE. We view this as one characteristic that differentiates AOM-MLWE from recent assumptions.

The second half of our work is devoted to the construction of our two-round threshold signature. The starting point of our construction is the recent efficient three-round threshold signature by del Pino et al. [dPKM+24], which is in a bird’s eyes view, an analog of the folklore construction of a three-round Schnorr signature using Shamir’s secret sharing protocol [Sha79a]. Our high level strategy to make it two-round is similar to FROST [KG20], however, there arise many lattice-related complications. As we explained above, the hardness of AOM-MLWE is dictated by the choice of the parameters, and consequently, our threshold signature must be constructed in a meticulous manner to comply with these restrictions. Along the way, as an independent interest, we resolve one of the open problems stated in [dPKM+24]. In their construction, they required each signer to maintain a long-term state and to authenticate their views with a standard (non-thresholdized) signature for unforgeability. Our two-round construction resolves both issues without any overhead.

Lastly, our two-round threshold signatures are practical with aggregated signature size roughly 11 KB. Our scheme naturally supports threshold up to 1024 participants, an upper limit of the “large” requirements of NIST preliminary call for threshold [PB23]. The main overhead is the offline phase where signers must exchange the preprocessing tokens with size a couple of hundreds kilobytes. See Section 8.3 for more details.

1.2 Related Works

Other Post-Quantum Threshold Signatures. Bendlin, Krembiel, and Peikert [BKP13] constructed a threshold signature based on the GPV signature [GPV08]. The protocol relies on generic multi-party computation (MPC) to perform Gaussian sampling. Khaburzaniya et al [KCLM22] recently proposed a threshold signatures from hash-based signatures using STARK. They report a signature of size 170 KB for a threshold of size 1024 signers, with an aggregation time of 4 to 20 seconds. While there are some isogeny-based threshold signatures [CS20, DM20], they only support sequential aggregation and thus requires numerous rounds to aggregate the signature.

Post-Quantum Multi-Signatures. Most closest to threshold signatures are multi-signatures. It can be viewed as an N-out-of-N threshold signature where each signers posses an individual signing key, rather than a secret share of one signing key. Unlike threshold signatures, constructing lattice-based multi-signatures has been more fruitful [FSZ22, DOT22, DOT22, BTT22, Che23]. The recent work by Boschini et al. [BTT22] and Chen [Che23] achieve a two-round protocol with signatures size roughly 100 KB and 30 KB, respectively. While Chen’s protocol has smaller signature size, it does not offer offline-online efficiency as Boschini et al’s protocol.

Related Lattice Assumptions. We review two lattice-based assumptions that seem most similar to our AOM-MLWE assumption. The one-more-ISIS assumption was introduced by Agrawal et al. [AKSY22] to construct a blind signature. While the assumption includes the term “one-more” and is formalized as a one-more style assumption, it is qualitatively quite different from those considered in the classical setting like OM-DL. In essence, the assumption claims that given a lattice trapdoor $T \in \mathbb{Z}^{m \times m}$ for a random matrix $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$, i.e., $T$ is short and $AT = 0 \mod q$, it is difficult to create a lattice trapdoor $T'$ with a better quality than $T$. Such notion of “quality” is lattice specific. The hint MLWE (Hint-MLWE) assumption was recently introduced by Kim et al. [KLSS23]. This assumption claims that the MLWE problem $(A, As + e)$ remains hard even given hints $(c_i \cdot s + z_i, c_i \cdot e + z_i')_{i \in [Q]}$, where $c_i$ is some random small element and $(z_i, z_i')$ are sampled from a discrete Gaussian distribution. When the samples $(z_i, z_i')$ are super-polynomially larger than $(c_i \cdot s, c_i \cdot e)$ it is clear that Hint-MLWE is as hard as MLWE. Kim et al. showed that even under milder conditions, Hint-MLWE are as hard as MLWE. While it shares similarity to AOM-MLWE since the adversary receives some information on the MLWE secret, the main difference is that in AOM-MLWE, the adversary obtains the exact value of the adversarially chosen inner product of the MLWE secrets.
2 Technical Overview

We provide an overview of our offline-online efficient two-round threshold signature and establish its security based on the AOM-MLWE assumption. We then discuss the hardness of the assumption.

2.1 Two-Round Threshold Signature from AOM-MLWE

We first explain how we arrive at our threshold signature assuming AOM-MLWE is hard.

Base Signature Scheme. We use Lyubashevsky’s lattice-based signature scheme [Lyu09, Lyu12] as our starting point. Let us briefly recall the protocol. Let $A \in \mathbb{R}_q^{k \times \ell}$ and $t = A \cdot s + e \in \mathbb{R}_q^k$ for “short” vectors $(s, e)$. The verification and signing keys are set as $(vk, sk) = ((A, t), (s, e))$. To sign a message $M$, the signer first constructs a commitment $w = A \cdot r + e'$, where $(r, e')$ are “short” vectors sampled from some specific distribution. A challenge $c \leftarrow H(vk, M, w)$, followed by a “short” response $(z, z') := (c \cdot s + r, c \cdot e + e')$ is then computed. Finally, $(c, z, z')$ is the signature. To verify, we check if $(z, z')$ are short and that $c = H(vk, M, A \cdot z + z' - c \cdot t)$.

While it is standard to perform rejection sampling [Lyu09, Lyu12] to make the distribution of the response non-singular, this is then translated into an offline-online efficient two-round protocol.

![Simplified three-round threshold signature of [dPKM’24]](image)

Figure 1: Simplified three-round threshold signature of [dPKM’24]. $sid \in \{0, 1\}^*$ is a session identifier and $SS \subseteq [N]$ is the set of active users. The second round is only initiated once signer $i$ obtains $T = |SS|$ first-round contributions. The final aggregated signature is $(c, z, z')$ where $z := \sum_{i \in SS} z_i$ and $z' := \sum_{i \in SS} z'_i$. By ignoring the highlights in blue, we arrive at an insecure adaptation of a naive threshold Schnorr.

A Naive Extension to a Threshold Signature. One naive way to thresholdize Lyubashevsky’s signature is to use Shamir’s secret sharing protocol to share the signing key. This is depicted in Fig. 1 (ignoring the blue highlights). The partial signing key $(s_i)_{i \in [N]}$ satisfy $s = \sum_{i \in [N]} L_{SS,i} \cdot s_i$ for any set $SS \subset [N]$ with $|SS| = T$,.
where $L_{SS,i}$ is the Lagrange coefficient. Correctness follows from observing that $\mathbf{z} = \sum_{i \in SS} \mathbf{z}_i = c \cdot \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{r}$, where $\mathbf{r} := \sum_{i \in SS} \mathbf{r}_i$. It is worth mentioning that the signers need to perform a hash-and-open with the commitment $\mathbf{w}_i$ to force a malicious signer $i^*$ to prepare its commitment $\mathbf{w}_{i^*}$ independently from the honest users' commitments. This is a procedure required for classical three-round schemes as well [BN06, CKM23a].

Unfortunately, it turns out this naive construction is insecure due to lattice-specific reasons. Since Lagrange coefficients can be arbitrarily large over modulo $q$, this forces the partial response $\mathbf{z}_i = c^* \cdot \mathbf{s}_i + \mathbf{r}_i$ to be large, where $c^* = c \cdot L_{SS,i}$. Similarly to why Lyubashevsky's signature becomes easily forgeable for large challenge spaces, the partial signing key $\mathbf{s}_i$ can be recovered from such a partial response using a large challenge $c^*$. While there are several workarounds to overcome large Lagrange coefficients, e.g. [ABV+12, BLMR13, BGG+18, LST18, BGG+18, DLN+21, AL21, ASY22, CSS+22], they are notorious for being highly impractical and/or non-scalable. For instance, one of the most simple and common approaches [ABV+12, BGG+18] require the modulus $q$ to grow with at least $O(N^2)$ — even for a general $N = 15$, we would require $q > 2^{80}$.

Three-Round Threshold Signature by del Pino et al. Very recently, del Pino et al. [dPKM+24] came up with a simple and elegant solution to sidestep this issue. Their idea is to additively mask the individual responses by a random vector and devise a way to publicly remove only the sum of the masks. This is depicted in Fig. 1. Each signers additionally share a pair-wise seed for a pseudorandom function (PRF). In the first round, signer $i$ now computes a so-called row mask $\mathbf{m}_i := \sum_{j \in SS} \text{PRF}(\text{seed}_{j,i}, \text{sid})$ and shares it along with the hash commitment $\mathbf{c}_{m_i}$, where $\text{sid}$ is a unique string defined per session. In the third round, it computes a column mask $\mathbf{m}_i^*: := \sum_{j \in SS} \text{PRF}(\text{seed}_{j,i}, \text{sid})$ and adds this to the response $\mathbf{z}_i$. Importantly, while the row masks $(\mathbf{m}_i)_{i \in SS}$ are public, the column masks $(\mathbf{m}_i^*)_{i \in SS}$ are kept private. Moreover, by construction, we have $\sum_{j \in SS} \mathbf{m}_j = \sum_{j \in SS} \mathbf{m}_j^*$. To offset the column masks, we subtract $\sum_{j \in SS} \mathbf{m}_j$ from $\sum_{j \in SS} \mathbf{z}_i$ to arrive at the desired aggregated response $\mathbf{z} = c \cdot \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{r}$.

The key observation to understand the security is that while the individual row masks $(\mathbf{m}_i)_{i \in SS}$ are known to the adversary, the only knowledge the adversary gains on the column masks $(\mathbf{m}_i^*)_{i \in HS}$ of honest signers HS $\subset$ SS are their sum $\sum_{j \in HS} \mathbf{m}_j^*$; put differently, $(\mathbf{m}_i^*)_{i \in HS}$ are distributed randomly, conditioned on their sum being $\sum_{j \in HS} \mathbf{m}_j^*$. This observation is leveraged to move around the terms $c \cdot L_{SS,i} \cdot \mathbf{s}_i$ included in the partial responses $\mathbf{z}_i$ of the honest signers, effectively allowing the reduction to reconstruct the signing key $\mathbf{s}$ under the hood of the adversary’s view. (See Appendix A for a pictorial example.)

We note that the security proof is easier said than done. The main source of difficulty is that an adversary can adaptively alter the views of the honest signers without being detected. In the context of the above intuition, this means moving the terms $c \cdot L_{SS,i} \cdot \mathbf{s}_i$ around consistently with the adversary’s view become very difficult. To this end, [dPKM+24] requires a standard signature scheme to authenticate the view of each honest signers. Moreover, so as not to sign on the same $\text{sid}$, the signers must remain stateful.

Making it Two-Round. To turn the protocol into a two-round protocol, we collapse the seemingly superfluous second round, consisting of only opening the hash commitment. Recall we required this hash-and-open to prevent a malicious signer $i^*$ from creating a commitment $\mathbf{w}_{i^*}$ affecting the aggregated commitment $\mathbf{w}$. We follow a similar high level approach taken by FROST [KG20] to prevent this while removing the second round. Our two-round threshold signature is depicted in Fig. 2. In the first round, each signer now generates a list of commitments in the clear. In the second round, they use a hash function $G$ modeled as a random oracle to compute a random weight $(\beta_b)_{b \in \text{rep}}$ and (locally) set the partial commitment $\mathbf{w}_j$ as $\mathbf{w}_j := \sum_{b \in \text{rep}} \beta_b \cdot \mathbf{w}_{j,b}$. Moreover, the row and column masks $(\mathbf{m}_i, \mathbf{m}_i^*)$ are now created in the second round at the same time from the PRF evaluated on input $\text{cnt} = SS || |M|| (\mathbf{w}_j)_{j \in SS}$. Importantly, we no longer require a session specific identifier $\text{sid}$ as in [dPKM+24]. Otherwise, it proceeds as before. Notice the first round pre-processing token $\mathbf{pp}_i$ can be generated without the knowledge of the message or set of signers, making the protocol offline-online efficient.

Before explaining the intuition of the security proof using AOM-MLWE, we note the effect of our modified mask evaluation. While it is a simple modification, including the commitments $(\mathbf{w}_j)_{j \in SS}$ in the PRF effectively “kills two birds with one stone”. First of all, the signer no longer needs to maintain a state since a commitment

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4While Albrecht and Lai [AL21, Section 3.1] defines the Lagrange interpolating polynomial on specific elements in $\mathcal{R}_q$ to handle the blowup more granularly, the concrete gain is unclear for a general $T$-out-of-$N$ threshold.
we can extract an (approximate) typical with any signatures based on identification protocols, by relying on the forking lemma [PS00, BN06].

The technically interesting part is what the reduction does once the adversary outputs a forgery. As for the attentive readers, since the reduction is playing an interactive game with AOM-MLWE, we must rely on a variant of the forking lemma with oracle access [EK18].
between standard proofs is that the reduction’s goal is to break AOM-MLWE, defined by the rep \cdot Qs \cdot N + 1 MLWE instances. Observe that in the course of simulating the adversary, the reduction may make up to 2 \cdot Qs \cdot N queries to the MLWE solving oracle, where the factor 2 comes from running the adversary twice.

We then require \text{rep} \geq 2 at the minimum to non-trivialize the game as the reduction cannot query more than the number of challenges it receives. It is relatively easy to show that when \text{rep} \geq 2, the reduction can (approximately) compute all of \((s, e)_i, (r_{i,b}, e_{i,b})\) for \((k, i, b) \in [Qs] \times [N] \times [\text{rep}]\) from the partial responses and adversary’s forgery, satisfying the winning condition of AOM-MLWE.

The only thing missing from our proof is establishing the hardness of the underlying AOM-MLWE assumption. The above does not yet tell us anything on how we should set \text{rep} \geq 2, what the noise distributions should be, or what should the allowable linear combinations to the MLWE solving oracles be.

### 2.2 Analyzing Hardness of AOM-MLWE

In the classical setting, the hardness of the algebraic one-more discrete logarithm (AOM-DL) problem [NRS21] is easy-to-state and well-established. It is a strictly harder problem than the (non-algebraic) OM-DL problem, already widely believed to be difficult. Indeed, AOM-DL can be shown to be hard in the generic group model (GGM) [Sho97, Mau05].

**Theoretical Hardness of AOM-MLWE.** The situation vastly changes when looking at the algebraic one-more MLWE (AOM-MLWE) problem. We do not have an already established (non-algebraic) OM-LWE problem to base hardness on or any idealized model such as the GGM to formally argue its hardness. In fact, the problem becomes trivially insecure if we naively define AOM-MLWE. However, this is not unsuspected as MLWE already exhibits a similar phenomenon; one can always set the parameters for MLWE so that it becomes trivially insecure. The added complexity of analyzing AOM-MLWE comes from the need to take into account the extra information an adversary learns by querying the MLWE solving oracle.

Let us give a very simple example. Assume the AOM-MLWE challenge is \(A_1 \cdot (t_i = A \cdot s_i + e_i)\) such that the secrets have infinity norm smaller than \(B\). Then, the adversary can query the linear combination \((1, B)\) to the MLWE solving oracle \(O_{\text{solve}}\) to obtain \(s_1 + B \cdot s_2\). If \(B < q\), then by taking modulo \(B\), the adversary easily recovers \(s_1\) and \(s_2\). Since it solves two MLWE instances with one query, it breaks AOM-MLWE. In Section 4, we present less obvious “weak” parameters for which AOM-MLWE admits a more sophisticated attack.

We then turn all our findings on the weak parameters of AOM-MLWE into a constructive argument to establish the hardness of AOM-MLWE. Specifically, we provide several sets of “hard” parameters and prove that the selective AOM-MLWE is as hard as the standard MLWE and MSIS problems. Here, selective security means that the adversary must commit to all the linear combinations it queries to oracle \(O_{\text{solve}}\) at the outset of the game. This establishes that to break AOM-MLWE, an adversary must cleverly use \(O_{\text{solve}}\) in an adaptive manner. While our result does not formally say anything about the adaptive security of AOM-MLWE, it illustrates that there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the hard parameters. We draw parallel between this situation to the numerous lattice-based primitives only proven selectively secure but are plausibly adaptively secure, e.g. [ABB10, GVW13, BGG14, GV15, GVW15a, GVW15b]. Considering that most natural selectively secure cryptographic primitives are plausibly adaptively secure, it would be highly interesting to see any attack exploiting the adaptive nature of AOM-MLWE. We leave it as an important theoretical question to bridge selective and adaptive security, often times very easy to establish in the classical setting using idealized models such as GGM.

**Practical Hardness of AOM-MLWE.** Lastly, we complement our theoretical analysis of AOM-MLWE with practical cryptanalysis. To provide a basic understanding of the techniques introduced, we present another simple attack, this one being purely statistical. Suppose we are allowed \(Q - 1\) queries on the challenge \(A_1 \cdot (t_i = A \cdot s_i + e_i)\), where all secrets and errors have a norm bounded by \(B\). We request all the \((s_1 + s_i, e_1 + e_i)\), such that summing them gives us the values of \((Q - 1)s_1 + \sum s_i\) and \((Q - 1)e_1 + \sum e_i\). These two equations effectively position \(s_1\) and \(e_1\) within balls of radius \(\frac{Q - 1}{Q} B\). This estimation is highly precise for large \(Q\), enabling the reconstruction of \(s_1\), \(e_1\) and derivation of all other values using elementary linear algebra. We demonstrate that this attack can be generalized to provide statistical information on all the secrets and errors of the AOM-MLWE instance. By meticulously analyzing the geometry of generic queries,
we can gather enough information to pinpoint the errors and secrets within a specific region of the space. Subsequently, we craft a final MLWE instance to decode these within the identified regions and solve the instance. In the context of our threshold signature schemes, we illustrate that the practical security of forgery, after collecting $Q$ transcripts, is equivalent to solving an MLWE instance with parameters that are $\frac{1}{\sqrt{WQ}}$ times smaller than for a direct forgery. Here, $W$ is the hamming weight of a challenge polynomial. Integrating this cryptanalysis with state-of-the-art lattice reduction estimation allows us to construct a set of parameters that align with the standard NIST levels I, III, and V.

3 Preliminary

3.1 Notations

We use lower (resp. upper) case bold fonts $v$ (resp. $M$) for vectors (resp. matrices). We always view vectors in the column form. We use $v_i$ (resp. $m_{ij}$) to indicate the $i$-th entry (resp. column) of $v$ (resp. $M$). For $(v,M) \in \mathcal{R}^\ell_q \times \mathcal{R}^{k \times \ell}_q$, $v^\top \odot M$ denotes the column-wise multiplication: $[v_1 \cdot M_1 | \cdots | v_\ell \cdot M_\ell]$. For $M = [m_1 | \cdots | m_k] \in \mathcal{R}^{k \times \ell}_q$, $\|M\|_2$ denotes $\max_{i \in [\ell]} \|m_i\|_2$.

3.2 Lattices and Gaussians

For integers $n, q \in \mathbb{N}$ we define the ring $\mathcal{R}$ as $\mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^n + 1)$ and $\mathcal{R}_q$ as $\mathcal{R}/q\mathcal{R}$. For a positive real $\sigma$, let $\rho_\sigma(z) = \exp\left(-\frac{\|z\|_2^2}{2\sigma^2}\right)$. The discrete Gaussian distribution over $\mathbb{Z}^n$ and standard deviation $\sigma$ is defined by its probability distribution function: $D_{\mathbb{Z}^n, \sigma}(z) = \sum_{x \in \mathbb{Z}^n} \rho_\sigma(z)$. We may simply note $D_\sigma$.

We denote $\mathcal{C} \subset \mathcal{R}_q$ as the set of polynomials with $\{-1, 0, 1\}$-coefficient and fixed hamming weight $W$, i.e., $\{c \in \mathcal{R}_q \mid \|c\|_\infty = 1 \land \|c\|_1 = W\}$. We denote $\mathcal{T} \subset \mathcal{R}_q$ as the set of all signed monomials, i.e., $\{(-1)^b \cdot X^i \mid (b, i) \in \{0, 1\} \times [n]\}$. We have the following guarantee on invertibility of differences of elements in $\mathcal{T}$ (see for example [BCK+14]).

Lemma 3.1. Let $n$ be a power of 2. For any distinct $a, b \in \mathcal{T}$, $(a−b)$ is invertible over $\mathcal{R}_q$ and $2 \cdot (a−b)^{-1} \in \mathcal{R}_q$ is a polynomial with coefficients in $\{-1, 0, 1\}$.

The following is a tail-cut bound on discrete Gaussian distributions from [dPKM\textsuperscript{+}24]. It immediately follows from combining standard tail-cut bounds [MR04, Lyu12] with the Minkowski’s inequality.

Lemma 3.2. For $s \xleftarrow{\$} D_\sigma^k$ and $v \in \mathcal{R}$, we have

$$\Pr \left[ \|v \cdot s\|_2 \geq e^{1/4}\|v\|_1 \sigma \cdot \sqrt{nk} \right] \leq 2^{-\frac{nk}{4}}.$$

The following follows from [MR04, GMPW20].

Lemma 3.3. Let $T$ be a positive integer and $\sigma > \sqrt{\log(2n) + \frac{\lambda}{\pi}}$. Then, the distribution of $x := \sum_{i \in T} x_i$ for $x \xleftarrow{\$} D_\sigma$ is within statistical distance $2^{-\lambda}$ of the distribution $x \xleftarrow{\$} D_{\sqrt{T}, \sigma}$.

3.3 Rényi Divergence

The Rényi divergence [Rén61] is a tool from information theory which has recently found many applications in lattice-based cryptography, see for instance [BLL\textsuperscript{+}15, Pre17]. We use the “exponential form” of the Rényi divergence, as it is common in lattice-based cryptography.

Definition 3.4 (Rényi divergence). Let $P, Q$ be two discrete distributions such that $\text{Supp}(P) \subseteq \text{Supp}(Q)$, and $\alpha \in (1; +\infty)$. The Rényi divergence of order $\alpha$ is:

$$R_\alpha(P; Q) = \left( \sum_{x \in X} \frac{P(x)^\alpha}{Q(x)^{\alpha-1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha-1}}.$$
Following Csiszár’s $f$-divergence framework [Csi63], $(R_{\alpha}^{-1} - 1)$ is an $f$-divergence for $f : x \mapsto x^\alpha - 1$. Lemma 3.5 presents some properties of the Rényi divergence; proofs can be found in van Erven and Harremoës [vEH14] or Bai et al. [BLR18].

**Lemma 3.5.** For distributions $\mathcal{P}$, $\mathcal{Q}$ and finite families of independent distributions $(\mathcal{P}_i)_{i \in [n]}, (\mathcal{Q}_i)_{i \in [n]}$, the Rényi divergence satisfies the following properties:

1. **Data processing inequality.** For a (randomized) function $f$,
   \[
   R_\alpha(f(\mathcal{P}); f(\mathcal{Q})) \leq R_\alpha(\mathcal{P}; \mathcal{Q}).
   \]

2. **Probability preservation.** For any event $E \subseteq \text{Supp}(\mathcal{Q})$:
   \[
   \mathcal{P}(E) \leq \frac{\mathcal{Q}(E)}{R_\alpha(\mathcal{P}; \mathcal{Q})}.
   \]

3. **Multiplicativity.**
   \[
   R_\alpha(\prod_i \mathcal{P}_i; \prod_i \mathcal{Q}_i) = \prod_i R_\alpha(\mathcal{P}_i; \mathcal{Q}_i).
   \]

   For discrete Gaussian distributions, we have the following [LSS14].

**Lemma 3.6.** Let $\alpha \geq 2$ be an integer and $\mathbf{v} \in \mathcal{R}$. It holds that:

\[
R_\alpha(\mathcal{D}_{\sigma, \mathbf{v}}; \mathcal{D}_\sigma) = \exp \left( \frac{\alpha \|\mathbf{v}\|_2^2}{2\sigma^2} \right).
\]

Due to the symmetry of discrete Gaussian distribution, we also have the same bound on $R_\alpha(\mathcal{D}_\sigma; \mathcal{D}_{\sigma, \mathbf{v}})$.

### 3.4 Linear Secret Sharing

We recall the linear Shamir secret sharing scheme [Sha79b]. Let $N < q$ be an integer such that for distinct $i, j \in [N]$, $(i - j)$ is invertible over $\mathbb{Z}_q$. Let $S \subseteq [N]$ be a set of cardinality at least $T$. Then, given $i \in S$, we define the Lagrange coefficient $L_{S, i}$ as

\[
L_{S, i} := \prod_{j \in S \backslash \{i\}} \frac{-j}{i - j}.
\]

Let $s \in \mathcal{R}_q$ be a secret to be shared, $P \in \mathcal{R}_q[X]$ a degree $T - 1$ polynomial such that $P(0) = s$. Given any set of evaluation points $E = \{(i, y_i)\}_{i \in S}$ such that $y_i = P(i)$ for all $i \in S$, we note that

\[
s = \sum_{i \in S} L_{S, i} \cdot y_i.
\]

The notations naturally extend to secrets that are in vector form. With a slight abuse of notation, we say $\tilde{P} \in \mathcal{R}_q[X]$ is of degree $T - 1$ if each entry of $\tilde{P}$ is a degree $T - 1$ polynomial. Moreover, $\tilde{P}(x)$ denotes the evaluation of each entry of $\tilde{P}$ on the point $x$.

### 3.5 Pseudorandom Function

**Definition 3.7.** Let $\text{PRF} := \{\text{PRF}_\lambda : \{0, 1\}^\lambda \times \{0, 1\}^{\ell(\lambda)} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{n(\lambda)}\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ be a function family. We say $\text{PRF}$ is a pseudorandom function if for any efficient adversary $\mathcal{A}$, the advantage $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{PRF}}(1^\lambda)$ defined below is negligible:

\[
\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{PRF}}(1^\lambda) := \left| \Pr[\mathcal{A}(1^\lambda)^{\text{PRF}_\lambda(\text{seed}, \cdot)} : \text{seed} \xleftarrow{} \{0, 1\}^\lambda] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(1^\lambda)^{\text{Rand}(\cdot)} : \text{Rand} \xleftarrow{} \text{Func}([0, 1]^\ell, \{0, 1\}^n)] \right|,
\]

where $\text{Func}(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y})$ denotes the set of all functions from $\mathcal{X}$ to $\mathcal{Y}$.

For simplicity, we may omit the subscript $\lambda$ in the following.
3.6 Two Round Threshold Signature

A two-round threshold signature scheme consists of the following efficient algorithms. Let \( N \) be the number of total signers and \( T \) be a reconstruction threshold \( s.t. T \leq N \). Also, let \( SS \) be a signer set such that \( SS \subseteq [N] \) with size \( T \). Each signer \( i \in [N] \) maintains a state \( st_i \) to retain a short-lived session specific information (see Remark 3.11).

**TS\text{.Setup}(1^\lambda, N, T) \rightarrow t\text{spar}:** The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter \( 1^\lambda \), the number \( N \) of total signers, and a reconstruction threshold \( T \leq N \) and outputs a public parameter \( t\text{spar} \). We assume \( t\text{spar} \) includes \( N \) and \( T \).

**TS\text{.KeyGen}(t\text{spar}) \rightarrow (vk, (sk_i)_{i \in [N]}):** The key generation algorithm takes as input a public parameter \( t\text{spar} \) and outputs a verification key \( vk \), and secret key shares \( (sk_i)_{i \in [N]} \). It implicitly sets up an empty state \( \text{state}_i := \emptyset \) for all \( N \) signers. We assume \( vk \) includes \( t\text{spar} \).

**TS\text{.PP}(vk, i, sk_i, st_i) \rightarrow (pp_i, st_i):** The signing algorithm for a pre-processing round takes as input a verification key \( vk \), an index \( i \) of a signer, a secret key share \( sk_i \), and a state \( st_i \) of the signer \( i \) and outputs a pre-processing token \( pp_i \) and an updated state \( st_i \).

**TS\text{.Sign}(vk, SS, i, (pp_j)_{j \in SS}, sk_i, st_i) \rightarrow (\widehat{\text{sig}}_i, st_i):** The signing algorithm takes as input a verification key \( vk \), a signer set \( SS \), a message \( M \), an index \( i \in SS \) of a signer, a tuple of pre-processing tokens \( (pp_j)_{j \in SS} \), a secret key share \( sk_i \), and a state \( st_i \) of the signer \( i \) and outputs a partial signature \( \widehat{\text{sig}}_i \) and an updated state \( st_i \).

**TS\text{.Agg}(vk, SS, i, (\widehat{\text{sig}}_i)_{i \in SS}) \rightarrow \text{sig}:** The aggregation algorithm takes as input a verification key \( vk \), a signer set \( SS \), a message \( M \), and a tuple of partial signatures \( (\widehat{\text{sig}}_i)_{i \in SS} \) and outputs a signature \( \text{sig} \).

**TS\text{.Verify}(vk, M, \text{sig}) \rightarrow 1 \text{ or } 0:** The verification algorithm takes as input a verification key \( vk \), a message \( M \), and a signature \( \text{sig} \), and outputs 1 if \( \text{sig} \) is valid and 0 otherwise.

Below, we define the correctness of a two round threshold signature scheme.

**Definition 3.8 (Correctness).** We say that a two round threshold signature scheme \( TS \) satisfies correctness if, for all \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N}, N, T \in \text{poly}(\lambda) \ s.t. T \leq N, \text{ message } M, \text{ and } SS \subseteq [N] \ s.t. |SS| = T, \) the following holds:

\[
\Pr[\text{Game}_{TS}^{\text{cor}}(1^\lambda, N, T, M, SS) = 1] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda),
\]

where \( \text{Game}_{TS}^{\text{cor}} \) is shown in Fig. 3.

Now we define the unforgeability for a two round threshold signature scheme.

**Definition 3.9 (Unforgeability).** For a two round threshold signature scheme \( TS \), the advantage of an adversary \( A \) against the unforgeability of \( TS \) in the random oracle model is defined as

\[
\text{Adv}_{TS, A}^{\text{uf}}(1^\lambda, N, T) = \Pr[\text{Game}_{TS, A}^{\text{uf}}(1^\lambda, N, T) = 1],
\]

where \( \text{Game}_{TS, A}^{\text{uf}}(1^\lambda, N, T) \) is described in Fig. 4. We say that \( TS \) is unforgeable in the random oracle model if, for all \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N}, N, T \in \text{poly}(\lambda) \ s.t. T \leq N, \) and efficient adversary \( A, \) \( \text{Adv}_{TS, A}^{\text{uf}}(1^\lambda) = \text{negl}(\lambda) \) holds.

**Remark 3.10 (Other Definitions).** Our definition is equivalent to those of Bellare et al. [BCK+22], with the only difference that we exclude the leader. Bellare et al. assumes a communication model where a leader explicitly relays the communications between the signers. Unforgeability then captures the corruption of a leader. In contrast, we keep the communication model agnostic and exclude the leader for simplicity. This is without loss of generality as our unforgeability allows an adversary to control the communication channel between signers. Indeed, it is easy to check that the unforgeability of [BCK+22] is equivalent to ours.\(^6\)

\(^6\)In [BCK+22], there are several definitions, depending on the difference of the trivial forgery. Our unforgeability is equivalent to TS-UF-0, which regards a forgery on a message as trivial if the message is queried to the signing oracle.
Remark. While the signers maintain a state, our protocol only requires a short-lived state only specific to a particular session — this is a minimal requirement for any interactive protocol and is consistent with prior definitions. In contrast, a long-lived state is for example requires a short-lived state only specific to a particular session — this is a minimal requirement for any

Remark 3.11 (Session State). It is worth noting that while the signers maintain a state, our protocol only requires a short-lived state only specific to a particular session — this is a minimal requirement for any interactive protocol and is consistent with prior definitions. In contrast, a long-lived state is for example requires a short-lived state only specific to a particular session — this is a minimal requirement for any

Remark 3.12 (Qₜ-Bounded Scheme). While our construction of threshold signature supports an unbounded polynomially many signing queries, we would require a super-polynomial sized modulus q, making the scheme impractical. To this end, we consider a more fine grained bounded scheme where unforgeability holds against any adversary making at most $Qₜ = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ signing queries to $O_{\text{TS,Sign}}$. As per NIST’s 2022 call for additional (post-quantum) signatures [NIS22], we set $Qₜ = 2^{64}$ for our concrete instantiation. Indeed, this is common practice among practical signatures such as Falcon [PFH⁺22] and Raccoon [dPEK⁺23], including the three-round threshold Raccoon [dPKM⁺24].
3.7 Rounding and Norms Modulo $q$

This subsection is taken almost verbatim from [dPKM+24]. In all of the following we fix positive integers $q$ and $n$. We aim at giving a systematic treatment of the adaptation of the notions of norms and rounding maps to the ring of integers modulo $q$, $\mathbb{Z}_q$ and more generally in the free module $\mathbb{Z}^n_q$ of vectors mod $q$.

3.7.1 Length over Modular Integers

In this work we use the so-called canonical unsigned representation of integers modulo $q$. Given an integer $x \in \mathbb{Z}$, this representation is the unique non-negative element $0 \leq t \leq q - 1$ such that $x = t \mod q$. We will generically note this element $(x \mod q)$. Conversely, given a class $x + q\mathbb{Z} \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, we define the corresponding lift $\bar{x}$ to the unique integer in $x + q\mathbb{Z} \cap [0, \ldots, q - 1]$.

For any norm $\| \cdot \|$ over $\mathbb{Q}^n$, we define the length of a (vector) class $x + q\mathbb{Z}^n$ to be $\min_{\bar{x} \in x + q\mathbb{Z}^n} \| \bar{x} \|$, and overload the notation as $\| x + q\mathbb{Z}^n \|$, $\| x \mod q \|$ or even $\| x \|$ if the context is clear enough to avoid any ambiguity. As for the integers, we prefer to write simply $|x|$ when $n = 1$ to refer to the absolute value.

[dPKM+24] show that with the choices in this definition, $\| \cdot \|$ is indeed a $F$-norm over free modules over $\mathbb{Z}_q$. The only non trivial point to show is the triangular inequality.

**Lemma 3.13.** For any $q, n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{0\}$, and $x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, we have

$$\| x \| - \| y \| \leq \| x + y \| \leq \| x \| + \| y \|.$$

3.7.2 Modular Most-Significant Bit Decomposition

Let $\nu \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{0\}$. Any integer $x \in \mathbb{Z}$ can be uniquely decomposed as:

$$x = 2^\nu \cdot x_\tau + x_\perp, \quad (x_\tau, x_\perp) \in \mathbb{Z} \times [-2^{\nu-1}, 2^{\nu-1} - 1],$$

which consists essentially in separating the lower-order bits from the higher-order ones. We define the function

$$\lfloor \cdot \rfloor_\nu : \mathbb{Z} \to \mathbb{Z} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \lfloor x \rfloor_\nu = \lfloor x/2^\nu \rfloor = x_\tau,$$

where $\lfloor \cdot \rfloor : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{Z}$ denotes the rounding operator. More precisely the “rounding half-up” method $\lfloor x \rfloor = \lfloor x + \frac{1}{2} \rfloor$ where half-way values are rounded up: e.g. $\lfloor 2.5 \rfloor = 3$ and $\lfloor -2.5 \rfloor = -2$. With a slight overload of notation, when $q > 2^\nu$, we extend $\lfloor \cdot \rfloor_\nu$ to take inputs in $\mathbb{Z}_q$, in which case, we assume the output is an element in $\mathbb{Z}_{q,\nu}$ where $q_\nu = \lfloor q/2^\nu \rfloor$. Formally, we define:

$$\lfloor \cdot \rfloor_\nu : \mathbb{Z}_q \to \mathbb{Z}_{q,\nu} = \mathbb{Z}_{\lfloor q/2^\nu \rfloor} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \lfloor x \rfloor_\nu = \lfloor x/2^\nu \rfloor + q_\nu \mathbb{Z} = \lfloor \bar{x} \rfloor_\nu + q_\nu \mathbb{Z},$$

The function $\lfloor \cdot \rfloor_\nu$ naturally extends to vectors coefficient-wise. The following is a special case of [dPKM+24].

This bound on modular rounding operations are useful when arguing the small offset caused by performing modular rounding for efficiency.

**Lemma 3.14.** Let $\nu, q$ be positive integers such that $q > 2^\nu$, $\nu \geq 4$, and set $q_\nu = \lfloor q/2^\nu \rfloor$. Moreover, assume $q$ and $\nu$ satisfy $q_\nu = \lfloor q/2^\nu \rfloor$, that is, $q$ can be decomposed as $q = 2^\nu \cdot q_\nu + q_\perp$ for $q_\perp \in [0, 2^{\nu-1} - 1]$. Then, for any $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, we have

$$\lfloor x - 2^\nu \cdot \lfloor x \rfloor_\nu \rfloor \leq 2^\nu - 1. \quad (2)$$

Moreover, for any $x, \delta \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, we have

$$\| 2^\nu \cdot (\lfloor x + \delta \rfloor_\nu - \lfloor x \rfloor_\nu) \mod q \| \leq \| 2^\nu \cdot \lfloor \delta \rfloor_\nu \mod q \| + \| 1 \| \cdot 2^\nu. \quad (3)$$

In the remainder of the paper, we will not be as precise as above for better readability. For instance, we might informally use $x$ instead of the lift $\bar{x}$ or write $|2^\nu \cdot x|$ instead of $|2^\nu \cdot \bar{x} \mod q|$ when the context is clear and the distinction is unimportant.
3.8 Hardness Assumptions

We review some standard lattice-based hardness assumptions.

**Definition 3.15 (MLWE).** Let \( \ell, k, q \) be integers and \( \mathcal{D} \) be a probability distribution over \( \mathbb{R}_q \). The advantage of an adversary \( A \) against the Module Learning with Errors \( \text{MLWE}_{q, \ell, k, \mathcal{D}} \) problem is defined as:

\[
\text{Adv}^{\text{MLWE}}_A(1^\lambda) = \Pr[1 \leftarrow A(A, As + e)] - \Pr[1 \leftarrow A(A, b)]
\]

where \((A, b, s, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_q^{k \times \ell} \times \mathcal{R}_q^k \times \mathcal{D}^\ell \times \mathcal{D}^k \). The \( \text{MLWE}_{q, \ell, k, \mathcal{D}} \) assumption states that any efficient adversary \( A \) has negligible advantage. We may write \( \text{MLWE}_{q, \ell, k, \sigma} \) as a shorthand for \( \text{MLWE}_{q, \ell, k, \mathcal{D}} \) when \( \mathcal{D} \) is the Gaussian distribution of standard deviation \( \sigma \). Lastly, we also define a variant called uniform \( \text{MLWE} \) (UMLWE) where the secret key is sampled from the uniform distribution \( \mathcal{R}_q^k \).

**Definition 3.16 (MSIS).** Let \( \ell, k, q \) be integers and \( \beta > 0 \) a real number. The advantage of an adversary \( A \) against the Module Short Integer Solution \( \text{MSIS}_{q, \ell, k, \beta} \) problem is defined as:

\[
\text{Adv}^{\text{MSIS}}_A(1^\lambda) = \Pr \left[ A \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_q^k \times \mathcal{D}_\ell^k \times \mathcal{D}_k^k, s \leftarrow A(A) : (0 < \|s\|_2 \leq \beta) \land [A | 1] s \equiv 0 \mod q \right].
\]

The \( \text{MSIS}_{q, \ell, k, \beta} \) assumption states that any efficient adversary \( A \) has negligible advantage.

**Lemma 3.17 (Hardness of MLWE ([LS15])).** Let \( k(\lambda), \ell(\lambda), q(\lambda), n(\lambda), \sigma(\lambda) \) such that \( q \leq \text{poly}(n\ell) \), \( k \leq \text{poly}(\ell) \), and \( \sigma \geq \sqrt{\ell} \cdot \omega(\sqrt{n}) \). If \( \mathcal{D} \) is a discrete Gaussian distribution with standard deviation \( \sigma \), then the \( \text{MLWE}_{q, \ell, k, \mathcal{D}} \) problem is as hard as the worst-case lattice Generalized-Independent-Vector-Problem (GIVP) in dimension \( N = n\ell \) with approximation factor \( \sqrt{8 \cdot N^\ell \cdot \omega(\sqrt{n\ell}) \cdot q/\sigma} \).

**Lemma 3.18 (Hardness of MSIS ([LS15])).** For any \( k(\lambda), \ell(\lambda), q(\lambda), n(\lambda), \beta(\lambda) \) such that \( q > \beta \sqrt{n\ell} \cdot \omega(\log(n)) \) and \( \ell, \log q \leq \text{poly}(n) \). The \( \text{MSIS}_{q, \ell, k, \beta} \) problem is as hard as the worst-case lattice Generalized-Independent-Vector-Problem (GIVP) in dimension \( N = nk \) with approximation factor \( \beta \sqrt{N} \cdot \omega(\sqrt{n}) \).

The following will be a useful shorthand to be used in our security proof.

**Definition 3.19.** For any \( A \in \mathcal{R}_q^{k \times \ell} \), positive integers \( \text{rep} \) and \( \nu \), let \( \mathcal{D}^{\text{bd}-\text{MLWE}}_{q, \ell, k, \sigma, \text{rep}, \nu}(A) \) be the distribution defined as \( \left\{ [A \cdot s + e]_\nu | (s, e) = (\sum_{i \in \text{rep}} s_i, \sum_{i \in \text{rep}} e_i), \forall i \in \text{rep}, (s_i, e_i) \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_\ell \times \mathcal{D}_k \right\} \). That is, it samples \( \text{rep} \) \( \text{MLWE}_{q, \ell, k, \mathcal{D}} \) instances, aggregates them, and drops \( \nu \) trailing bits.

The following is an immediate application of the regularity lemma [LPR13]. While [dPKM+24] provides a formal case for \( \text{rep} = 1 \), it generalizes easily to any \( \text{rep} \) using Lemma 3.3.

**Lemma 3.20.** For any \( \sigma > \sqrt{\log(2n \cdot \max(2k)) + \lambda} \) and \( 2n \cdot q^{d^{-1}+\lambda} \) and \( \nu < \log(q) - 2 \), the following holds with all but probability \( 2^{-n} \):

\[
\Pr_{A \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_q^{k \times \ell}} \left[ H_{\infty} \left( \mathcal{D}^{\text{bd-MLWE}}_{q, \ell, k, \sigma, \text{rep}, \nu}(A) \right) \geq n - 1 \right] \geq 1 - 2^{-n+1}.
\]

3.9 Forking Lemma with Oracle Access

The forking lemma was originally introduced by Pointcheval and Stern [PS00] in the context of signature schemes. The lemma was later reformulated by Bellare and Neven [BN06] which extracts the purely probabilistic nature of the forking lemma. Below, we define a variant of their forking lemma defined by El Kaafarani and Katsuura [EK18], allowing the forking algorithm to have access to a deterministic oracle. This type of formalization is useful when we are trying to reduce the security of a scheme to an interactive assumption.
Lemma 3.21 (Forking Lemma with Oracle Access). Fix an integer \( q \geq 1 \) and a set \( H \) of size \( h \geq 2 \). Let \( A \) be a randomized algorithm that has oracle access to a deterministic algorithm \( O \), where on input \( \text{par}, \vec{h} := (h_1, \ldots, h_q) \), algorithm \( A \) returns \( J \in [0, \ldots, q] \) and an arbitrary string \( \sigma \). Let \( IG \) be a randomized algorithm called the input generator. The accepting probability of \( A \), denoted \( \text{acc} \), is defined below:

\[
\text{acc} = \Pr_{(\text{par}, \vec{h}) \leftarrow IG, \vec{h} \leftarrow H^q, (J, \sigma) \leftarrow A(\text{par}, \vec{h}) : J \geq 1}.
\]

The forking algorithm \( \text{Fork}_A^{O(\text{pr})} \) associated to \( A \) is a randomized oracle-calling algorithm that takes input \( \text{par} \) and proceeds as in Fig. 5. Let

\[
\text{frk} = \Pr_{(\text{par}, \vec{h}) \leftarrow IG, (b, (\sigma_1, \sigma_2)) \leftarrow \text{Fork}_A^{O(\text{pr})}((\text{par}, \vec{h})) : b = 1}.
\]

Then,

\[
\text{frk} \geq \text{acc} \cdot \left( \frac{\text{acc}}{q} - \frac{1}{h} \right).
\]

**Algorithm** \( \text{Fork}_A^{O(\text{pr})}(\text{par}) \)

\[
\begin{align*}
1 : \quad & \text{coin} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell_A} \quad / / \ell_A \text{-bit randomness used by } A \\
2 : \quad & \vec{h} := (h_1, \ldots, h_q) \leftarrow H^q \\
3 : \quad & (I, \sigma) := A^{O(\text{pr})}((\text{par}, \vec{h}; \rho)) \\
4 : \quad & \text{if } I = 0 \text{ then} \\
5 : \quad & \text{return } (0, (\bot, \bot)) \\
6 : \quad & (h_I', \ldots, h_q') \leftarrow H^{q-I+1} \\
7 : \quad & \vec{h'} := (h_1, \ldots, h_{I-1}, h_I', \ldots, h_q) \\
8 : \quad & (I', \sigma') := A^{O(\text{pr})}((\text{par}, \vec{h'}; \rho)) \\
9 : \quad & \text{if } I = I' \land h_I \neq h_I' \text{ then} \\
10 : \quad & \text{return } (1, (\sigma, \sigma')) \\
11 : \quad & \text{else} \\
12 : \quad & \text{return } (0, (\bot, \bot))
\end{align*}
\]

Figure 5: Description of the oracle-calling forking algorithm \( \text{Fork}_A^{O(\text{pr})} \).

4 Algebraic One-More Module Learning with Errors

We introduce the “Algebraic One-More Module Learning with Errors” (AOM-MLWE) problem, a term coined in reference to the algebraic one-more discrete logarithm (AOM-DL) problem recently introduced by Nick, Ruffing, and Seurin [NRS21]. This problem represents a notably milder variant when compared to the conventional “non-algebraic” one-more challenges encountered in classical contexts, such as the One-More Discrete Logarithm (OM-DL) problem [BNPS02, BNPS03, BMV08, BFP21]. After presenting AOM-MLWE and discussing the subtleties of the interplay of parameters, we delve into its relationship with the well-established MLWE and MSIS problems.
4.1 Motivation

Before explaining the algebraic variant, let us recall what a non-algebraic one-more type problem looks like. Informally, a non-algebraic one-more type assumption provides an adversary with Q challenge instances. It is further given access to an oracle that solves any instance given by the adversary, where these instances do not necessarily have to be the provided challenge instances. The problem then asks the adversary to output the Q solutions to the Q challenge instances while only given at most Q − 1 access to the oracle.

For instance, in the context of the OM-DL problem, the adversary is presented with \((g^{a_i})_{i \in [Q]}\) as the set of challenge instances. The oracle is designed to solve \(\text{dlog}_a(h)\) for any queried group element \(h\). It is noteworthy that while OM-DL qualifies as a strong “non-falsifiable” assumption [Nao03, GW11], primarily because the challenger is inefficient, OM-DL has proven successful and remains unsolved in practice. Indeed, we further gain confidence in the hardness of OM-DL as it was recently shown by Bauer, Fuchsbauer, and Plouviez [BFP21] to be hard in the generic group model [Sho97, Mau05].

Translating the OM-DL problem into the lattice-based framework presents a non-trivial challenge, primarily due to the fact that MLWE instances exhibit more inherent structure than their discrete logarithm (DL) counterparts. In the MLWE setting, let’s assume that the adversary is given a set of challenges \((t_i)_{i \in [Q]} = (As_i + e_i)_{i \in [Q]}\), and it queries the oracle for \(t_i + t_i^*\) for \(i \in [2 : Q]\). In response, the oracle provides the corresponding MLWE solutions, namely \((s_i + s_i^*, e_i + e_i^*)\).

While this exchange doesn’t immediately disclose the individual values of \(s_i\) and \(e_i\), with a sufficient number of samples, the adversary can statistically infer all these values — see Section 4.3 for more discussion. Such statistical attacks do not exist in the DL setting as each secret exponent \(a_i\) are distributed uniformly over \(\mathbb{Z}_p\); this is in sharp contrast with lattices where the secrets are small. This is only one trivial attack against OM-MLWE and it is unclear whether other, more sophisticated attacks exist. In fact, the adversary may learn non-trivial information via non-algebraic attacks; for instance, it can perform bit decomposition on the \(t_i\)’s and use it in a non-trivial manner to break OM-MLWE. This stands in contrast to the classical setting, where we have the generic group model (GGM) or the algebraic group model (AGM) [FKL18], both of which support the belief that such non-algebraic adversaries are not more useful.

In summary, OM-MLWE has two deficiencies. One is that, similarly to OM-DL, it is a non-falsifiable assumption since the challenger is inefficient. The other more significant one is that, while we can define OM-MLWE, it is unclear how to can gain confidence on its hardness as there is a plethora of plausible attacks against it. This is in sharp contrast to the classical setting where we have the GGM or AGM that lets us solely focus on the restricted and easy-to-analyze class of algebraic adversaries; since lattices naturally allow non-algebraic operations, it would be too restrictive to assume only an algebraic adversary.

4.2 Definition of AOM-MLWE

This brings us to the algebraic OM-MLWE problem, resolving both deficiencies of OM-MLWE. The term “algebraic” is employed because when the adversary queries the MLWE solving oracle with a vector \(b\), it must also provide a vector \(d\) that essentially “explains” the vector \(b\), as a proof that the query was made on a linear combination of the challenges. More formally, this requirement is expressed as \(b = Td\), where \(T = [As_1 + e_1 | \cdots | As_Q + e_Q]\), is a matrix representing the set of \(Q\) MLWE challenges generated by the challenger.

In particular, the AOM-MLWE problem restricts the adversary to only query the MLWE oracle on a linear combination of the MLWE challenges. Notice that since the challenger knows the corresponding MLWE secrets, it can answer the adversary’s queries efficiently, thus making the AOM-MLWE assumption falsifiable.

The algebraic restriction in the Algebraic One-More Module Learning with Errors (AOM-MLWE) problem offers additional advantages. Firstly, it simplifies the cryptanalysis process in comparison to the non-algebraic case, primarily because of the stringent limitations placed on the vector \(b\) that the adversary can query to the MLWE solving oracle. In our subsequent analysis, we demonstrate that the “selective” variant of the AOM-MLWE problem is as hard as solving the standard MLWE and MSIS problems. Importantly, we believe that no such analogous reduction exists in the non-algebraic setting, even when considering the selective
scenario. This reduction not only enhances the credibility of the AOM-MLWE problem’s hardness but also underscores that the only conceivable approach to weaken its security would be to exploit the adaptiveness.

**Definition of AOM-MLWE.** Formally, the AOM-MLWE problem is defined as follows, supposing we are working over the ring of integer \( R \) of a number field.

**Definition 4.1 (AOM-MLWE).** Let \( \ell, k, q, Q \) be integers and \( (\mathcal{D}_i)_{i \in [Q]} \) be a set of probability distributions over \( R_q \) with \( k \geq \ell \). Let \( \mathcal{L} \) denote an efficiently checkable subset of \( R_q^{\ell \times (Q-1)} \) and \( B_{\mathcal{L}}, B_s, B_e \) be integers. The advantage of an adversary \( A \) against the (search) Algebraic One-More Module Learning with Errors AOM-MLWE, \( q, \ell, k, Q, (\mathcal{D}_i)_{i \in [Q]} \), \( B_{\mathcal{L}}, B_s, B_e \) problem is defined as:

\[
\text{Adv}_{A}^{\text{AOM-MLWE}}(1^\lambda) = \Pr[\text{Game}_{A}^{\text{AOM-MLWE}}(1^\lambda, 1^Q) = 1],
\]

where Game_{A}^{\text{AOM-MLWE}} is shown in Fig. 6. The AOM-MLWE, \( q, \ell, k, Q, (\mathcal{D}_i)_{i \in [Q]} \), \( B_{\mathcal{L}}, B_s, B_e \) assumption states that any efficient adversary \( A \) has negligible advantage. We also define a selective variant of AOM-MLWE, denoted as sel-AOM-MLWE, whose game is shown in Fig. 6.

![Figure 6: The adaptive and selective algebraic one-more MLWE problem. In the selective setting, the adversary \( A \) commits to all the coefficients before observing the MLWE samples. Recall \( \odot \) denotes the column-wise multiplication.](image)

In above, we allow each MLWE samples to come from a different distribution. As we later see, for threshold signatures, we set the first MLWE sample to have smaller noise compared to the other MLWE samples. Moreover, we weaken the winning condition of the adversary so that it only needs to solve an approximate MLWE problem. We insist that the adversary wins even if it recovers a solution to the MLWE problem where each MLWE challenge \( t_i = A_s + e_i \) is modified to be \( v_i \cdot t_i \) for a small non-zero \( v_i \in R_q \). This relaxation captures a recurrent issue in lattice-based identification protocols, Fiat-Shamir based signatures, and zero-knowledge proof systems (see for instance [BCK+14, EK18, BLS19, ENS20] for some discussions).
Moreover, we define the assumption to be $Q$-bounded, that is, any adversary is limited to making at most $Q - 1$ queries to the MLWE solving oracle. If needed we can define a (polynomially) unbounded definition where the game is not quantified by $Q$.

**Hermite Normal Form vs Uniform Secrets.** Similarly to the standard definition of MLWE, we can define a variant of AOM-MLWE, denoted as AOM-ULMWE, where the secret $(s_i)_{i \in [Q]}$ are sampled uniformly from $\mathcal{R}_q^{|s| \times Q}$ instead of from the same distribution as the noise. In particular, the challenger no longer checks the bound on $\hat{S}$ output by the adversary. It is easy to see that AOM-MLWE implies AOM-ULMWE. Below, we show the opposite indication. The proof is a slight modification of the standard reduction by Applebaum et al. [ACPS09] from (the non-structured) ULWE to LWE. The non-triviality comes from the way the reduction simulates the oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{solve}}$ and how it transforms the solution. Looking ahead, handling uniform secrets will be more convenient when we later establish the hardness of the selective AOM-ULMWE based on the hardness of MLWE and MSIS.

**Lemma 4.2 (AOM-ULMWE implies AOM-MLWE).** Let $R_q = \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^n + 1)$ split into $s \in [n]$ fields. If there exists an adversary $A$ against the AOM-MLWE$_{\ell,k,Q,(\mathcal{D}_i)_{i \in [Q]},L,B_a,B_a}$ problem, then we can construct an adversary $B$ against the AOM-ULMWE$_{\ell,k,Q,(\mathcal{D}_i)_{i \in [Q]},L,B_a,max(B_a,B_a)}$ problem such that

$$
\left(1 - \frac{1}{q^n(k-\ell+1)/s}\right)^{st} \cdot \text{Adv}^{\text{AOM-MLWE}}_A(1^\lambda) \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{AOM-ULMWE}}_B(1^\lambda),
$$

where $\text{Time}(B) \approx \text{Time}(A)$.

**Proof.** Let $B$ be an adversary against AOM-ULMWE given $(A, T)$ as input, where $(A_0, A_1) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}_d(R_q) \times R_q^{k \times \ell}$, $A^T := [A_0^T | A_1^T]$, $S \leftarrow R_q^{|s| \times Q}$, $E \leftarrow D_{1}^k \times \cdots \times D_{Q}^{k+\ell}$, and $T = AS + E \in R_q^{(k+\ell) \times Q}$. Using [BJRW23, Appendix A], $A$ contains $\ell$ row vectors forming an invertible matrix with probability at least $(1 - \frac{1}{q^{\ell-1}})^{st}$. $B$ gives up the reduction and outputs 0 if such row vectors do not exist. Otherwise, let $A_0 \in R_q^{\ell \times \ell}$ and $A_1 \in R_q^{k \times \ell}$ denote the first $\ell$ and last $k$ rows of $A$ and assume without loss of generality that $A_0$ is invertible over $R_q$. Define $(E_0, T_0, E_1, T_1) \in (R_q^{|s| \times Q})^2 \times (R_q^{k \times Q})^2$ similarly.

We now describe how $B$ internally uses an adversary $A$ against AOM-MLWE. $B$ first computes $A^* = -A_1A_0^{-1}$ and $T^* = T_1 - A_1A_0^{-1}T_0$ and invokes $A$ on input $(A^*, T^*) \in R_q^{k \times \ell} \times R_q^{k \times Q}$. When $A$ queries its oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{solve}}$ for the $i$-th time ($i \leq Q - 1$) on input $d_i \in L$, $B$ queries its own solve oracle on the same input and receives back $(u_i, w_i) = (Sd_i, Ed_i) \in R_q^{\ell} \times R_q^{k+\ell}$. $B$ then discards $u_i$, parses $w_i$ into $(u_i^*, w_i^*) \in R_q^{\ell} \times R_q^{k}$ such that $u_i^*$ and $w_i^*$ are the first $\ell$ and last $k$ entries of $w_i$. It then returns $(u_i^*, w_i^*)$ to $A$. Finally, when $A$ outputs a solution $(\hat{v}, \hat{S}, \hat{E}) \in R_q^{|s| \times Q} \times R_q^{|s| \times Q} \times R_q^{k \times Q}$, $B$ outputs the following as its solution:

$$(v, \hat{S}, \hat{E}) = \left(v^*, -A_0^{-1}\hat{S}^* + v^*T \odot A_0^{-1}T_0, \left[\frac{\hat{S}^*}{\hat{E}^*}\right]\right) \in R_q^{|s| \times Q} \times R_q^{|s| \times Q} \times R_q^{(k+\ell) \times Q}.$$

It remains to analyze the winning probability of $B$. It is clear that $\text{Time}(B) \approx \text{Time}(A)$. Given $A_0S + E_0 = T_0$ and the fact that $A_0$ is invertible, we have $S = -A_0^{-1}(E_0 - T_0)$. Plugging this into $A_1S + E_1 = T_1$, we have $(-A_1A_0^{-1})E_0 + E_1 = T_1 - A_1A_0^{-1}T_0$, which is $A^*E_0 + E_1 = T^*$. Since $A_1$ and $T_1$ are distributed randomly, $B$ perfectly simulates the AOM-MLWE problem instance to $A$. Moreover, $B$ perfectly simulates the solve oracle queries since $Ed_i \in R_q^{k+\ell}$ allows to compute $(Ed_i, E_i, d_i) \in R_q^{\ell} \times R_q^{k}$. Finally, if $A$ outputs a valid solution $(v^*, \hat{S}^*, \hat{E}^*)$, then we have $v^*T \odot T^* = A^*\hat{S}^* + \hat{E}^*$. Substituting $T$ and $v$, we can rewrite the left hand side as

$$v^*T \odot T = v^*T \odot T_1 - v^*T \odot A_1A_0^{-1}T_0.$$

Moreover, substituting $A$, $\hat{S}$, and $v$, we can rewrite the right hand side as

$$A^*\hat{S}^* + \hat{E}^* = (-A_1A_0^{-1})\hat{S}^* + \hat{E}^* = A_1(\hat{S} - v^*T \odot A_0^{-1}T_0) + \hat{E}^*.$$
Since both sides are identical, we have
\[ A_i \hat{S} + \hat{E}^* = v^T \odot T_1 - v^T \odot A_i A_0^{-1} T_0 + A_i (v^T \odot A_0^{-1} T_0) = v^T \odot T_1, \]
where for the second equality, we used the fact that for any \( u \in \mathbb{R}^c \) and \( (B, C) \in \mathbb{R}^{a \times b} \times \mathbb{R}^{b \times c} \), we have \( u^T \odot (BC) = B(u^T \odot C) \). Finally, from \( \hat{S} = -A_0 \hat{S} + v^T \odot A_0^{-1} T_0 \), we have \( A_0 \hat{S} + \hat{S}^* = A_0 (v^T \odot A_0^{-1} T_0) \), where the right hand side is equal to \( v^T \odot T_0 \) again due to commutativity. Combining all the arguments together, we have \( A \hat{S} + \hat{E} = v^T \odot T \) as desired. Lastly, noting the size of \((\hat{S}^*, \hat{E}^*)\) translates to \( E \), the output of \( B \) is a valid solution when \( A \) outputs a valid solution. This completes the proof. \[ \square \]

4.3 Preliminary Discussion on the Hardness of AOM-MLWE

Here, we provide an informal discussion on the hardness of (adaptive) under standard assumptions, this section provides insight into why we believe it is hard. We later use these insights to establish the hardness of the selective AOM-MLWE problem for well-chosen parameters based on MSIS and MLWE. This informal discussion will also form the basis for the cryptanalysis of the AOM-MLWE problem in Section 7.

4.3.1 When AOM-MLWE is Trivially Broken

The AOM-MLWE problem is parameterized by many parameters, of which the space of accepted linear combinations \( L \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{Q \times (Q - 1)} \) and the distributions \((D_i)_{i \in [Q]}\) play one of the most fundamental roles. All other parameters such as the size of the MLWE solutions (i.e., \( B_\alpha, B_\beta \)) and the accepted “slack” \( B_L \) are more standard and can be handled similarly following prior works on lattice-based cryptography. Throughout this section, for simplicity of explanation, assume \( L = \prod_{i \in [Q - 1]} \hat{L} \) which naturally embeds into \( \oplus_{i \in [Q]} \mathbb{R}^q = \mathbb{R}^Q \) and allows to consider each column of \( L \) as being included in \( \hat{L} \). Specifically, the vector \( d \) the adversary \( A \) queries to the MLWE solving oracle \( O_{\text{solve}} \) satisfies \( d \in \hat{L} \).

First Insecure Example: Overstretched Queries and Separation of Secrets. In the scenario where \( D_i = D \) for all \( i \in [Q] \) and \( D \) represents a distribution that generates polynomials with coefficients having an \( \ell_\infty \)-norm smaller than \( 0 < B < \sqrt{q/2} \) and with the additional assumptions that \( d = [1 \mid B \mid 0] \in \mathbb{R}^Q \) is within \( \hat{L} \), a non-trivial vulnerability emerges.

The combination of the secrets by \( d \) gives the equation \( Sd = s_1 + B \cdot s_2 \pmod{q} \). However, by the assumption on the size of \( s_i \) and \( B \), the magnitude of \( Sd \) is much smaller than \( q \), meaning that this equation actually holds without modulo. Then the adversary can easily recover \((s_1, s_2)\): we simply have \( s_1 = Sd \pmod{B} \) precisely corresponding to the original \( s_1 \), as the entries of \( s_1 \) are all smaller than \( B \). The adjacent figure proposes a two dimensional representation of the attack, where the reduction mod \( B \) are depicted by their decoding cells on the bottom. Significantly, in this situation, the adversary can extract two MLWE secrets using just one oracle query to the MLWE solver. This outcome effectively breaches the security of AOM-MLWE and underscores the critical requirement that the size of the MLWE secret and noise must be quite larger than the elements present in \( \hat{L} \).

Second Insecure Example: Anomalously Large Number of Queries and Statistical Recovery. Now assume \( \hat{L} = B_{\infty, 1}(0) \) the \( \ell_\infty \) ball of radius 1 and assert that the secrets are independently and uniformly distributed with coefficients bounded by \( 0 < B < q/2 \).

While the above attack no longer works as the query vectors \( d \) are too small compared to the size of the secrets and noises, consider an adversary that queries the oracle on input \( d_i \in \mathbb{R}^Q \) for \( i \in [2 : Q] \), where \( d_i = (1, 0, \ldots, 0, 1, 0, \ldots, 0)^T \) is the vector with zero entries except for the 1-st and \( i \)-th entries which are set to 1. Hence, the adversary receives tuples of the form \((s_i^* = s_1 + s_i), i \in [2 : Q] \pmod{q}\) and this result is also valid without modulo by assumption on \( B \). The attacker can then construct the empirical estimator
\[
\hat{s}_1 = \frac{1}{Q - 1} \sum_{i = 2}^{Q} s_i^*.
\]
which converges towards its mean value $s_1$. Quantitatively, this sum will be a random variable centered at $s_1$ and of standard deviation of order $B/\sqrt{3Q}$. The attacker can then round $s_1$ to the nearest integer and claim it as the secret $s_1$. By Tchebyshev inequality and amplification, this process is correct with probability at least $(1 - 2B^2/3Q)^n$ for $n$ being the number of coefficients of the secrets. Hence when $Q \geq nB^2$, i.e., the size of the secrets is much smaller than the root number of oracle queries, a total recovery is possible in linear time. The adjacent figure represents the situation when $n = 1$, i.e. with only one coefficient to recover. The probability density of the candidate estimator is superposed with the acceptance zone which is the segment of length 1 centered at the secret. This example indicates that the size of the MLWE secret and noise crucially depend on the accepted number of queries $Q$.

4.3.2 When AOM-MLWE is Plausibly Hard.

It’s important to highlight that the attacks discussed in the previous examples are, in a sense, statistical in nature. These attacks rely solely on the linear combination of the secrets or the vectors but do not utilize any information about the specific MLWE sample $T = AS + E$. Indeed, when we delve into the assessment of the hardness of the “selective” AOM-MLWE problem, we observe that these statistical attacks represent the sole advantage an adversary possesses compared to MLWE and MSIS. To put it differently, once we configure the parameters in such a way that the aforementioned statistical attacks are no longer viable, the only viable approach to compromise sel-AOM-MLWE is to break MLWE or MSIS. This insight serves as a cornerstone when evaluating the concrete hardness of AOM-MLWE using state-of-the-art cryptanalysis techniques.

In this work, we provide two reductions from MLWE or MSIS to sel-AOM-MLWE. Conceptually, the two reductions embed, in a different way, a single MLWE instance $t^* \in \mathcal{R}_q^k$ into the $Q$ MLWE instances $T \in \mathcal{R}_q^{k \times Q}$ provided by the sel-AOM-MLWE game. It is worth noting that in the non-algebraic setting, it is unclear whether even the selective variant is implied by any standard assumptions. We thus believe that there is a fundamental gap between the hardness of the AOM-MLWE problem and its non-algebraic variant and view this indication as an evidence for the hardness of AOM-MLWE.

In the following, we present only one of the reductions, capturing the parameter setting of the threshold signature we construct in Section 5. This will be our main focus of cryptanalysis. The second reduction, which we call the “alternative” reduction, captures a parameter setting not used in this work and is presented in Appendix B.

4.4 MSIS and MLWE Imply Selective AOM-MLWE

In this section, we embed $t^* = As^* + e^*$ in one of the columns of $T = AS + E$ and define the accepted linear combinations $\mathcal{L}$ so that $t^*$ remains a hard MLWE instance even after the adversary obtains the hints (SD, ED). Without loss of generality, we set the first column $(S, E)$ to be $(s^*, e^*)$. Moreover, for simplicity, we focus on the uniform secret sel-AOM-UMLWE, establishing the hardness of sel-AOM-MLWE (cf. Lemma 4.2).

**Remark 4.3 (Invertible Submatrix of $A$).** In this section, we restrict the challenge matrix $A$ to contain $\ell$ rows that form an invertible matrix over $\mathcal{R}_q$ — we say that $A$ contains an invertible submatrix in the remaining of this work. This condition is easily enforced by resampling $A \overset{\ell}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{R}_q^{k \times \ell}$ until an invertible matrix is found, an efficiently computable check using standard linear algebra. For certain choices of $(k, \ell, \mathcal{R}_q)$, this is without loss of generality as $A \overset{k}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{R}_q^{k \times \ell}$ satisfies this condition with overwhelming probability. In other cases like $k = \ell$ and $\mathcal{R}_q$ a fully-splitting ring, $A$ is non-invertible with a non-negligible probability (see [BJRW23, Appendix A] for details).

This restriction is explicitly used when reducing MSIS to sel-AOM-UMLWE (see Footnote 11). While this seems like an artifact of our proof technique, we choose to simply enforce this restriction on the sel-AOM-UMLWE problem as this restriction on $A$ makes the original sel-AOM-UMLWE problem no easier. For consistency, this restriction on $A$ is enforced in our threshold signature as well. We leave it as an interesting problem to complete the reduction without the invertible submatrix restriction.
4.4.1 Constraints and Parameter Selection.

As discussed in the previous section, the parameters for which (selective) AOM-UMLWE is hard needs to be chosen in a meticulous manner. We provide the set of parameters for which we establish hardness of sel-AOM-UMLWE\textsubscript{q,ℓ,k,Q,ℓ} for every ℓ∈[Q], L,B\textsubscript{L},B\textsubscript{e}. Below, on first glance, the condition on the accepted linear combinations L⊆R\textsuperscript{Q×(Q−1)} may seem contrived and it is not immediately clear how one sets L in practice. A concrete example of L satisfying such constraints is provide in Section 4.5. Looking ahead, this is exactly the same L appearing in the proof of our threshold signature scheme.

Constraints on Parameters. We first define the following intermediate variables that will be used in the proof:

- \( D_1 \) is defined as \( 2 \cdot D_{\sigma_1} := \{ x \mid x \sim \mathcal{D}_{\sigma_1} \} \), where \( \mathcal{D}_{\sigma_1} \) is a discrete Gaussian distribution with width \( \sigma_1 > 0 \).
- \( D_i \) for \( i \in [2 : Q] \) is a discrete Gaussian distribution \( \mathcal{D}_{\sigma_i} \) with width \( \sigma_i > 0 \), where denote \( \sigma^* = \min_{i \in [2 : Q]} \sigma_i \).
- Accepted linear combinations \( L \subseteq R_{q}^{Q \times Q^{-1}} \) satisfy that for any matrix \( D = [d^\top] \in L \), where \( d^\top \) is the first row of \( D \), \( D \) is invertible over \( R_{q} \).\(^7\)
- \( \gamma_L > 0 \) is a bound w.r.t. \( L \) such that for any element \( D \in L \) as above, we have \( \gamma_L \geq \|u_i\|_2 \) for all \( i \in [Q − 1] \), where \( u = 2 \cdot d^\top D^{-1} \in R_{q}^{1 \times (Q−1)} \), and \( u_i \) is the \( i \)-th entry of \( u \).\(^8\)
- \( \epsilon_{\text{lattice}} = \text{Adv}_{\text{UMLWE}}^L(1^\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\text{MSIS}}^B(1^\lambda) + 2^{-\frac{\alpha}{\kappa}} \) for Lemma 4.7, where \( n \) is the dimension of \( R_{q} \) and \( B \) and \( B' \) are constructed from the adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) against the AOM-UMLWE problem.
- The order of the Rényi divergence \( \alpha = \frac{\sigma^*}{\gamma_L \sigma_1 \cdot n \cdot \sqrt{Q \cdot k}} \geq 2 \) and \( \sigma^* \geq \gamma_L \cdot \sigma_1 \cdot n \cdot \sqrt{Q \cdot k} \) chosen to minimize the overall advantage in Lemma 4.7, over all possible choices of Rényi’s orders.

We now list the constraints for the proof to hold:

- UMLWE\textsubscript{q,ℓ,k,D\textsubscript{σ}} is hard, implying \( \text{Adv}_{\text{UMLWE}}^L(1^\lambda) = \text{negl}(\lambda) \). i.e., \( \sigma_1 \geq \sqrt{\ell} \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log n}) \) using Lemma 3.17.
- MSIS\textsubscript{q,ℓ+1,k−ℓ,B\textsubscript{L}+B\textsubscript{e}} is hard, implying \( \text{Adv}_{\text{MSIS}}^B(1^\lambda) = \text{negl}(\lambda) \). i.e., \( q > (B \cdot B_e) \cdot \sqrt{n(k−\ell)} \cdot \omega(\log(n(k−\ell))) \) using Lemma 3.18.
- \( 2^{-\frac{\alpha}{\kappa}} = \text{negl}(\lambda) \) to bound the norm of samples from discrete Gaussians using Lemma 3.2.

4.4.2 Candidate Asymmetric Parameters.

Finally, we give a set of asymptotic parameters which fit the above constraints. Below it is helpful to keep in mind that the number \( Q \) of UMLWE samples and the “quality” \( \gamma_L \) of the accepted linear combinations \( L \) dictate the parameters.

Definition 4.4 (Parameters Establishing Hardness of sel-AOM-UMLWE). We denote the set of following asymptotic parameters and conditions along with the restricted accepted linear combinations \( L \) explained above as hard-param.

- \( n, \ell, k = \text{poly}(\lambda) \) such that \( n \geq \lambda \).

\(^7\)This and the following requirements come from the discussion regarding the last insecure example provided in Section 4.3.

\(^8\)In general, we can allow \( u = v \cdot d^\top D^{-1} \) for some fixed small polynomial \( v \) and replace the factor 2 in \( D_1 \) by \( v \). For simplicity, we use 2 as it is the only case relevant for our later instantiation of threshold signatures.
• \( A \) is resampled from \( \mathcal{R}_{q}^{k \times \ell} \) until it contains an invertible submatrix.

• \( D_1 = 2 \cdot D_{\sigma_1} \) with \( \sigma_1 = \sqrt{\ell} \cdot \log n \).

• \( D_i = D_{\sigma_i} \) for \( i \in [2 : Q] \) such that \( \sigma^* = \min_{i \in [2 : Q]} \sigma_i \).

• \( \sigma^* = \gamma_{\mathcal{L}} \cdot \sigma_1 \cdot n \cdot \sqrt{Q} \cdot k \).

• \( q \) is the smallest prime larger than \((B_{\mathcal{L}} + B_{e}) \cdot \sqrt{n(k-\ell)} \cdot \log^2(n(k-\ell))\).

• Plugging in \( \sigma^* \), \( \alpha = \sqrt{-\log(\epsilon_{\text{lattice}})} \) which is larger than 2 assuming hardness of UMLWE and MSIS.

### 4.4.3 Reduction

Hardness of the “selective” sel-AOM-UMLWE problem is established for the selected parameters through a reduction from standard lattice problems, namely the MSIS and UMLWE problems.

The following is a proof outline of our main Theorem 4.5.

1. Instead of independently and uniformly sampling the \( Q - 1 \) other secrets \( s_2, \ldots, s_Q \), our initial transformation involves the challenger first uniformly sampling the answer \( W \) corresponding to SD and then reverse-engineering the corresponding other \( Q - 1 \) secrets so that \( W = SD \). Importantly, the first secret \( s_1 \) is still uniformly sampled from \( \mathcal{R}_{q,1} \), independent of \( W \).

2. Similarly, we next wish to retain the first error \( e_1 \) as a valid error for UMLWE, answer ED by some \( Y \) sampled independently of \( e_1 \), and then reverse-engineer the \( Q - 1 \) other noises \( e_2, \ldots, e_Q \) to keep the view of the adversary consistent. However, unlike the secrets which are uniformly random, the noises must follow a specific discrete Gaussian distribution. To this end, we use Rényi divergence to carefully argue that this modification cannot be detected with overwhelming probability. This is the key step where we use above restriction on the accepted linear combinations \( \mathcal{L} \).

3. Finally, the challenger replaces the construction of the first challenge \( As_1 + e_1 \) with a truly uniform element, which is an indistinguishable transformation according to the UMLWE assumption. We conclude the reduction by constructing a MSIS adversary based on an adversary in our modified game. This final step is where we use the condition that \( A \) contains an invertible submatrix (cf. Remark 4.3).

**Theorem 4.5 (UMLWE and MSIS imply sel-AOM-UMLWE).** If there exists an adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) against the sel-AOM-UMLWE\(_{q,\ell,k,Q,\langle D \rangle \in [Q],L_{\mathcal{L}},B_{\mathcal{L}},B_{e}}\) problem, defined with respect to the hard-param parameters in Definition 4.4, then we can construct an adversary \( \mathcal{B} \) and \( \mathcal{B}' \) against the UMLWE\(_{q,\ell,k,D_{\sigma_1}}\) and MSIS\(_{q,\ell+1,k-\ell,B_{\mathcal{L}}+B_{e}}\) problems such that

\[
\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{sel-AOM-UMLWE}}(1^\lambda) \leq \epsilon_{\text{lattice}} \cdot \exp \left( \sqrt{Q \cdot k \cdot \log(\epsilon_{\text{lattice}})} \cdot \frac{\gamma_{\mathcal{L}} \cdot \sigma_1 \cdot n}{\sigma^*} \right) + 2^{-\frac{n}{10}}.
\]

where \( \epsilon_{\text{lattice}} = \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}}^{\text{UMLWE}}(1^\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}'}^{\text{MSIS}}(1^\lambda) + 2^{-\frac{n}{10}} \) and \( \text{Time}(\mathcal{B}), \text{Time}(\mathcal{B}') \approx \text{Time}(\mathcal{A}) \).

Concretely, plugging in hard-param and assuming the hardness of UMLWE and MSIS, we have

\[
\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{sel-AOM-UMLWE}}(1^\lambda) = \text{negl}(\lambda).
\]

**Proof.** Let \( \mathcal{A} \) be an adversary against the sel-AOM-UMLWE problem. Below, we consider a sequence of games where the first game is the original game and the last is a game that can be reduced from the MSIS problem. The detail of each game is provided in Fig. 7. We denote \( \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{Game}}(1^\lambda) \) as the advantage of \( \mathcal{A} \) in Game\(_i\).

---

\(^9\)We can alternatively use the Hint-MLWE assumption by Kim et al. [KLSS23] instead of relying on the Rényi divergence. While we did not opt to do so since the efficiency gain seemed limited, it could be worthwhile to investigate this in more detail in future work.
Figure 7: Hybrid games for the proof of Theorem 4.5. Recall the game restricts the adversary to output \( D \) such that \( D \) is invertible. \textbf{Game}_4 is the same as \textbf{Game}_3 except that it adds an \texttt{abort} condition (i.e., outputs 0 if the condition holds). \textbf{Game}_6 is the same as \textbf{Game}_5 except that it removes the \texttt{abort} condition. \textbf{Game}_7 is the same as \textbf{Game}_6 except that it samples \( t_1 \) randomly.
Game 1: This is the real sel-AOM-UMLWE game.

Game 2: In this game, the challenger modifies how the UMLWE secrets except for the first $s_1$ is set. By the restriction on $L$, $D \in R_q^{(Q−1) \times (Q−1)}$ is invertible over $R_q$. Therefore, since $W$ is uniform random, the secrets are $[s_2 | \cdots | s_Q]$ independently and uniformly distributed. Moreover, $SD = W$ by construction. Thus, we have

$$Adv_A^{\text{Game}_1}(1^\lambda) = Adv_A^{\text{Game}_2}(1^\lambda).$$

Game 3: In this game, the challenger computes $T$ using $(t_1, e_1)$ without explicitly using $s_1$. In particular, this is identical to the previous game by noting the following equality:

$$A[s_2 | \cdots | s_Q] = A(W - s_1 d^T)D^{-1} = AW D^{-1} - (As_1) d^T D^{-1} = AW D^{-1} - (t_1 - e_1) d^T D^{-1}$$

Finally, we use the equality $TD = AW + ED$ to compute the error term $Y$ provided to the adversary, where recall $W$ was identical to $SD$. Thus, we have

$$Adv_A^{\text{Game}_3}(1^\lambda) = Adv_A^{\text{Game}_1}(1^\lambda).$$

Game 4: In this game, the challenger adds a check on the size of the noise term $e_1$. Let us define the function $\text{BadNorm}(e_1, D)$ that outputs 1 if and only if $||u \cdot \sigma||_2 \geq e^{1/4}||u||_1 \cdot \sigma \cdot \sqrt{n}k$ for any $i \in [Q−1]$, where $\bar{u}^T = d^T D^{-1} \in R_q^{1 \times (Q−1)}$, $u_i$ is the $i$-th elements of $2 \cdot \bar{u}$, and $e_1 := 2 \cdot \bar{e}_1$. The challenger then aborts the game if $\text{BadNorm}(e_1, D) = 1$. Due to Lemma 3.2 and $\bar{e}_1 \sim D^k_{\sigma_1}$, we have

$$|Adv_A^{\text{Game}_4}(1^\lambda) - Adv_A^{\text{Game}_1}(1^\lambda)| \leq 2^{-\frac{n}{2^k}}.$$ 

Game 5: In this game, the challenger removes the noise term $e_1$ when preparing the UMLWE challenge $T$. We use the Rényi divergence to relate the advantage of this game to the previous game. While the advantages differ non-negligibly, the difference is polynomially related, which suffices for our purpose.\footnote{From a theoretical perspective, we can rely on the statistical distance by simply assuming $D_2$ is a discrete Gaussian with width super-polynomially larger than the size of $e_1 u$. For concrete efficiency, we rely on a more fine-grained analysis by using the upper bound $Q$ and the Rényi divergence.}

Let us set $\bar{u}^T = d^T D^{-1} \in R_q^{1 \times (Q−1)}$, $u = 2 \cdot \bar{u}$, and define two distributions $D_{\sigma_1 \bar{u}} = \{2 \cdot \bar{e}_1 \bar{u}^T + E_r | \bar{e}_1 \sim D^k_{\sigma_1}, E_r \sim \prod_{i \in [2:Q]} D^k_i\}$ and $D_\sigma = \{E_r | E_r \sim \prod_{i \in [2:Q]} D^k_i\}$. Here note that $e_1 := 2 \cdot \bar{e}_1$ for $\bar{e}_1 \sim D^k_{\sigma_1}$ is the same distribution as $e_1 \sim D^k$. Since the only difference between Game 4 and Game 5 is whether $2 \cdot \bar{e}_1 \cdot \bar{u}$ is used or not, we have the following:

$$Adv_A^{\text{Game}_4}(1^\lambda) \leq Adv_A^{\text{Game}_5}(1^\lambda) \frac{\alpha - 1}{\alpha} \cdot R_a(D_{\sigma_1 u}; D_\sigma)$$

$$\leq Adv_A^{\text{Game}_5}(1^\lambda) \frac{\alpha - 1}{\alpha} \cdot \prod_{i \in [2:Q]} \exp \left( \frac{\alpha \cdot \|u_i - 1 \cdot \bar{e}_1\|_2^2}{2\sigma_i^2} \right)$$

$$\leq Adv_A^{\text{Game}_5}(1^\lambda) \frac{\alpha - 1}{\alpha} \cdot \prod_{i \in [2:Q]} \exp \left( \frac{\alpha \cdot (e^{1/4} ||u_i - 1||_1 \cdot \sigma \cdot \sqrt{n}k)^2}{2\sigma_i^2} \right)$$

$$\leq Adv_A^{\text{Game}_5}(1^\lambda) \frac{\alpha - 1}{\alpha} \cdot \exp \left( \frac{Q \cdot \alpha \cdot k \cdot (\gamma_c \cdot \sigma \cdot \alpha \cdot n)^2}{\sigma^2} \right).$$

(4)

The first inequality follows from Lemma 3.5, Items 1 and 2, the second follows from Lemma 3.5, Item 3 and Lemma 3.6, the third follows from Lemma 3.2 and the abort condition we added in Game 4, and the last follows from the definitions of $\sigma^*$ and $\gamma_c$ and the facts $||a||_1 \leq \sqrt{n} \cdot ||a||_2$ for $a \in R_q$ and $\sqrt{c}/2 < 1$. Here, note that we can properly invoke Lemma 3.5, Item 3 since each entry of $D_{\sigma_1 u}$ are distributed independently once $2 \cdot \bar{e}_1 \cdot \bar{u}$ is fixed. We proceed with the hybrid games to prove that $Adv_A^{\text{Game}_4}(1^\lambda)$ and $Adv_A^{\text{Game}_5}(1^\lambda)$ are polynomially related for our selection of $\alpha$.\footnote{From a theoretical perspective, we can rely on the statistical distance by simply assuming $D_2$ is a discrete Gaussian with width super-polynomially larger than the size of $e_1 u$. For concrete efficiency, we rely on a more fine-grained analysis by using the upper bound $Q$ and the Rényi divergence.}
Game$_6$: In this game, the challenger undo the abort check added in Game$_4$. Following the same argument, we have
\[
\left| \text{Adv}^{\text{Game}_{6}}_A(1^\lambda) - \text{Adv}^{\text{Game}_{7}}_A(1^\lambda) \right| \leq 2^{-\frac{\alpha k}{\sigma^2}}.
\]

Game$_7$: Lastly, in this game, the challenger samples $t_1$ uniformly random over $\mathcal{R}_q^k$ instead of setting it as a valid UMLWE sample. Note that the challenger no longer requires knowledge of the secret and noise $(s_1, e_1)$, and in particular, run the game only using $t_1$. Moreover, due to the modification we made in Game$_6$, $e_1$ is distributed exactly as in a valid UMLWE sample, multiplied by 2. Since $q$ is odd, it is easy to check that we can construct an UMLWE adversary $B$ that internally runs $A$ solving the (decisional) UMLWE$_{q, t, k, D_s}$ problem such that
\[
\left| \text{Adv}^{\text{Game}_{6}}_A(1^\lambda) - \text{Adv}^{\text{Game}_{7}}_A(1^\lambda) \right| \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{UMLWE}}_B(1^\lambda).
\]

In the above, an attentive reader may have noticed that we assumed the hardness of UMLWE where $A^\top \sim \mathcal{L}$ (GL$_q(R_q) \times \mathcal{R}_q^{\ell \times (k-\ell)}$, rather than the standard UMLWE where $A \sim \mathcal{R}_q^{k \times \ell}$. However, this is without loss of generality since the hardness of the latter implies the hardness of the former assuming the probability of a random matrix sampled from $\mathcal{R}_q^{k \times k}$ is invertible with non-negligible probability.

We show in Lemma 4.6 that there we can construct an MSIS adversary $B'$ that internally runs $A$ solving the MSIS$_{q, t, k-\ell, B_c + B_s}$ problem such that
\[
\text{Adv}^{\text{Game}_{6}}_A(1^\lambda) \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{MSIS}}_{B'}(1^\lambda).
\]

Before providing the proof of Lemma 4.6, we finish the proof of Theorem 4.5.

Collecting the bounds, we obtain
\[
\text{Adv}^{\text{Game}_{1}}_A(1^\lambda) \leq \left( \text{Adv}^{\text{UMLWE}}_B(1^\lambda) + \text{Adv}^{\text{MSIS}}_{B'}(1^\lambda) + 2^{-\frac{\alpha k}{\sigma^2}} \right)^{\frac{n-1}{1}} \
\times \exp \left( \frac{Q \cdot k \cdot (\gamma \sigma \cdot \sigma_1 \cdot n)^2}{\sigma^2} \right) + 2^{-\frac{\alpha k}{\sigma^2}},
\]

Plugging our choices of parameters hard-param (remark here that the choice of $\alpha$ was made to minimize the latter expression), we obtain
\[
\text{Adv}^{\text{Game}_{1}}_A(1^\lambda) \leq \epsilon_{\text{lattice}} \cdot \exp \left( \sqrt{-Q \cdot k \cdot \log(\epsilon_{\text{lattice}})} \cdot \frac{\gamma \sigma \cdot \sigma_1 \cdot n}{\sigma^2} \right) + 2^{-\frac{\alpha k}{\sigma^2}},
\]
where $\epsilon_{\text{lattice}} = \text{Adv}^{\text{UMLWE}}_B(1^\lambda) + \text{Adv}^{\text{MSIS}}_{B'}(1^\lambda) + 2^{-\frac{\alpha k}{\sigma^2}}$. We finally show in Lemma 4.7 that the right hand side is negligible, assuming the hardness of the UMLWE and MSIS problem. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.5.

It remains to prove the following two Lemmata 4.6 and 4.7.

**Lemma 4.6.** There exists an adversary $B'$ that internally runs $A$ solving the MSIS$_{q, t, k-\ell, B_c + B_s}$ problem such that
\[
\text{Adv}^{\text{Game}_{7}}_A(1^\lambda) \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{MSIS}}_{B'}(1^\lambda).
\]

Moreover, we have $\text{Time}(B') \approx \text{Time}(A)$.

**Proof.** Let $A$ be an adversary against the sel-AOM-UMLWE problem in Game$_7$. We construct an adversary $B'$ solving the MSIS problem having the same advantage as $A$. Assume $B'$ is given $M = [h | M] \in \mathcal{R}_q^{(k-\ell) \times (t+1)}$ as the MSIS problem where $h \in \mathcal{R}_q^{k-\ell}$. It then samples a random $(A', t') \sim \mathcal{L}$ (GL$_q(R_q) \times \mathcal{R}_q^{k-\ell}$ and sets
\[
A = \begin{bmatrix} A' \\ -M A' \end{bmatrix} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{k \times \ell} \quad \text{and} \quad t_1 = \begin{bmatrix} t' \\ h - M t' \end{bmatrix} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{k}.
\]
It then simulates Game and, where the only difference is that it uses the above computed \((A, t_1)\) rather than sampling them. At the end of the game, \(A\) outputs an approximate UMLWE solution \((v, \hat{S}, \hat{E})\). \(B'\) then sets \((v_1, \hat{S}, \hat{E}) \in R_q \times R_q^* \times R_q^k\) as the first entry and columns of \(v\) and \((\hat{S}, \hat{E})\), respectively, and outputs \[ s^* = \begin{bmatrix} v_1 \\ -E \end{bmatrix} \in R_q^{k+1} \text{ as the MSIS solution.} \]

Let us analyze the success probability of \(B'\). Clearly, we have \(\text{Time}(B') \approx \text{Time}(A)\). Moreover, since \(A'\) is invertible, the instance given to \(A\) is identical to those provided in the sel-AOM-UMLWE game in Game.\(^\text{11}\)

Now, if \(A\) breaks sel-AOM-UMLWE in Game, we have \(v_1 \cdot t_1 = A\hat{S} + \hat{E}\). Due to Eq. (5), if we left multiply \([M | I]\) to the equation, we have

\[ v_1 \cdot h - [M | I]E = [h | M | I]s^* = 0. \]

Due to \(A\)'s winning condition, we have \(v_1 \neq 0\). This implies that \(s^* \neq 0\) as desired. Moreover, we can bound the size of \(s^*\) as \(\|s^*\|_2 \leq B_E + B_M\). This completes the proof.

**Lemma 4.7.** Under the assumption that UMLWE\(_{q, \ell, k, D_1}\) and MSIS\(_{q, \ell+1, k-\ell, B_L+B_u}\) are hard, we have the following plugging in our parameter selection hard-param:

\[ \epsilon_{\text{lattice}} \cdot \exp \left( \sqrt{Q \cdot k \cdot \log(\epsilon_{\text{lattice}})} \cdot \frac{\gamma_L \cdot \sigma_1 \cdot \eta}{\sigma^*} \right) = \text{negl}(\lambda). \]

**Proof.** Plugging in our choice of \(\sigma^*\) to the right hand side, we have \(\epsilon_{\text{lattice}} \cdot \exp \left( \sqrt{-\log(\epsilon_{\text{lattice}})} \right). \) It can be checked that for any negligible function \(f\), \(f \cdot \exp(\sqrt{-\log(f)}) = \text{negl}(\lambda)\). Hence, assuming the hardness of the UMLWE and MSIS problem, we conclude that the term is indeed negligible as desired. \(\square\)

**4.5 Example of Accepted Linear Combination** \(L = L_T\)

Lastly, we provide a concrete example of an accepted linear combinations \(L\) satisfying the constraints in Section 4.4. The \(L\) we consider in this section appears in the threshold signature scheme presented in Section 5. We define \(L_{TS} := L\). More specifically, when we reduce the unforgeability of our threshold signature scheme to the AOM-MLWE problem, the set of vectors the reduction queries to the MLWE solving oracle \(O_{\text{solve}}\) is guaranteed to be in \(L_{TS}\). Below, \(L_{TS}\) is defined by two sets \(C\) and \(T\), where \(C\) is the so-called challenge set of the threshold signature scheme consisting of \([-1, 0, 1]\)-coefficient polynomials with fixed hamming weight \(W > 0\) and \(T\) is the set of signed monomials. Recall Section 3.2 for their definitions. Formally, \(L_{TS}\) is defined as follows.

**Definition 4.8 (Accepted Linear Combinations \(L_{TS}\) for Threshold Signature).** Let \(C\) and \(T\) be the sets defined in Section 3.2. Let \(\tau\) and \(Q'\) be integers such that \(\tau \geq 2\) and set \(Q = \tau \cdot Q' + 1\). Let \(P_k\) be the set of permutation matrices of size \(k > 0\). Define two sets \(C_{TS}\) and \(B_{TS}\) as follows:

- \(C_{TS} = \{ [c, c', 0, \ldots, 0] \mid c, c' \in C \cup \{0\} \}\). I.e., a set of row vectors where the first two entries are in \(C \cup \{0\}\) and the remaining \(\tau - 2\) entries are zero.

- \(B_{TS} = \left\{ \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ b_1 & b'_1 \\ b_2 & b'_2 \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ b_{\tau-1} & b'_{\tau-1} \end{bmatrix} \in R_q^{\tau \times \tau} \mid \forall i \in [\tau - 1], (b_i, b'_i) \in T^2 \land b_1 \neq b'_1 \right\}. \) I.e., a set of invertible matrices where the first two columns consist of entries in \(T\), the first two rows are full-rank, and the remaining entries consist of an identity matrix of dimension \(\tau - 2\).

\(^{11}\)This is the critical step where we rely on the restriction that \(A\) contains an invertible submatrix of size \((\ell \times \ell)\). If \(A\) did not contain such a submatrix, we will no longer be able to argue above that \(\overline{MA}\) is uniform random over \(R_q^{(k-\ell)\times \ell}\).
Then, define the set of accepted linear combinations $L_{TS}$ as follows:

$$L_{TS} = \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \left[ \begin{array}{c} 1 \\ P_{\text{row}} \end{array} \right] \left[ \begin{array}{c} e_1 \\ B_1 \\ e_2 \\ B_2 \\ \vdots \\ e_{Q'} \\ B_{Q'} \end{array} \right] \cdot P_{\text{column}} \subseteq R_q^{Q \times (Q-1)} \\ \forall i \in [Q'], (e_i, B_i) \in \mathcal{C}_TS \times \mathcal{B}_{TS}, \\ (P_{\text{row}}, P_{\text{column}}) \in P_{Q',1} \end{array} \right\}.$$ 

The following shows that $L_{TS}$ satisfies the condition required to establish the hardness of sel-AOM-MLWE problem via Theorem 4.5.

**Lemma 4.9.** The set of accepted linear combinations $L_{TS}$ defined in Definition 4.8 satisfies the condition imposed by hard-param defined in Definition 4.4, where $\gamma_{L_{TS}} = 2 \cdot W \sqrt{n}$.

Concretely, for any matrix $D = \left[ \begin{array}{c} d^T \\ D \end{array} \right] \in L_{TS}$, where $d^T$ is the first row of $D$, $D$ is invertible over $R_q$. Moreover, we have $\gamma_{L_{TS}} \geq \|u_i\|_2$ for all $i \in [Q - 1]$, where $u = 2 \cdot d^T D^{-1} \in R_q^{1 \times (Q - 1)}$ and $u_i$ is the $i$-th entry of $u$.

**Proof.** By Lemma 3.1, any matrix $B \in \mathcal{B}_{TS}$ is invertible. Specifically, we have

$$B = \left[ \begin{array}{cccc} 1 & 1 & & \\ b_1 & b_1' & & \\ b_2 & b_2' & 1 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \\ b_{r-1} & b_{r-1}' & & 1 \end{array} \right] \quad \text{and} \quad B^{-1} = \left[ \begin{array}{ccc} b_1' & -1 & \\ -b_1 & 1 \\ * & * & 1 \\ * & * & \ddots \\ * & * & 1 \end{array} \right], \quad (6)$$

where note that $2(b_1' - b_1)$ is invertible by Lemma 3.1 and $*$ denotes an arbitrary element in $R_q$. Since $D$ is a matrix that can be obtained by applying a row and column permutations to a block diagonal matrix with entries in $\mathcal{B}_{TS}$, $D$ is invertible as desired.

It remains to check the $L_2$-norm of $u = 2 \cdot d^T D$ is small. First notice that permutations do not alter the size of the vector, hence we can ignore them without loss of generality. Moreover, since $D$ is block diagonal, we can focus on the case $Q' = 1$. That is, it remains to establish that $\gamma_{L_{TS}} \geq \|u_i\|_2$ for all $i \in [\tau]$, where $u' = 2 \cdot c^T B^{-1}$ for any $(c, B) \in \mathcal{C}_TS \times \mathcal{B}_{TS}$ and $u_i$ is the $i$-th entry. Let $c = [c, c', 0, \cdots, 0]$ for $c, c' \in \mathcal{C} \cup \{0\}$. Then, plugging in Eq. (6),

$$2 \cdot c^T B^{-1} = [2(b_1' - b_1)^{-1} \cdot (c b_1' - c' b_1), 2(b_1' - b_1)^{-1} \cdot (-c + c'), 0, \cdots, 0] \in R_q^\tau, \quad (7)$$

Using Lemma 3.1 and the fact that $b_1, b_1'$ are monomials, we can bound the first entry using $\|2(b_1' - b_1)^{-1} \cdot (c b_1' - c' b_1)\|_2 \leq \|2(b_1' - b_1)^{-1}\|_2 \cdot \|c b_1'\|_1 \leq W \sqrt{n} = 2^{-1} \cdot \gamma_{L_{TS}}$, where we use the Minkowski inequality. The same bound holds for the second entry. This completes the proof.

**Remark 4.10.** By considering our specific $L_{TS}$ in the proof of Theorem 4.5, we can obtain better asymptotic parameters than those in Definition 4.4. Specifically, we can takes $\sigma^*$ to $\gamma_{C} \cdot \sigma_1 \cdot n \cdot \sqrt{2Q' \cdot k}$ instead of $\gamma_{C} \cdot \sigma_1 \cdot n \cdot \sqrt{\tau Q' \cdot k}$. This is because we can bound the Rényi divergence in Eq. (4) independently of $\tau$. Recall that $u_i$ in Eq. (4) is $i$-th entry of $u = 2d^T D^{-1} \in R_q^{\tau Q'}$. There are at most $2Q'$ non-zero entries in $u$ since there are at most $2$ non-zero entries in $2 \cdot c^T B^{-1}$ for any $(c, B) \in \mathcal{C}_TS \times \mathcal{B}_{TS}$, as shown in Eq. (7). Thus, we can obtain the tighter upper bound.

### 5 Construction of Our 2-Round Threshold Signature

In this section, we present our 2-round threshold signature scheme $\mathcal{T}_{5,2\text{-round}}$.

**Parameters.** For reference, we provide in Table 1 the parameters used in the scheme. Parameters related to the security proof will be provide in Section 6.

29
AOM

2

Lt
key
security based on our point of view, this has almost no impact on the signing and verification algorithms, it is vital when establishing sel.

we believe this to be an artifact of our current proof, this restriction is used to establish hardness of the

appears in Fiat-Shamir based signatures. While we define $H$ in the pre-processing phase and $G$ (see Section 3.7.2 for more detail).

$X$ each elements live and be explicit about our use of the the lift notation, i.e., $\bar{X}$

algorithm always hold. We thus focus on the check on the

Proof. It is clear that when the signatures are generated honestly the check $\|c = c′\|$ inside the verification

algorithm always hold. We thus focus on the check on the $L_2$-norm. Below, we will be precise on where
each elements live and be explicit about our use of the the lift notation, i.e., $\bar{x} \in \{0, 1, \cdots, q - 1\}$ for $x \in \mathcal{R}_q$
(see Section 3.7.2 for more detail).

Fix any $(N, T, SS \subset [N])$ such that $|SS| = T$. Then, it can be checked that

$$z = \sum_{j \in SS} (z_j - m_j)$$

$$= \sum_{j \in SS} (c \cdot L_{SS,j} \cdot s_j + \sum_{b \in [rep]} \beta_b \cdot r_{j,b} + m_j^* - m_j)$$

$$= 2 \cdot c \cdot s + \sum_{j \in SS} \sum_{b \in [rep]} \beta_b \cdot r_{j,b} \in \mathcal{R}_q^\ell.$$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\mathcal{R}_q$</td>
<td>Polynomial ring $\mathcal{R}_q = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(q, X^n + 1)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(k, \ell)$</td>
<td>Dimension of public matrix $\Lambda \in \mathcal{R}_q^{k \times \ell}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(D_t, \sigma_t)$</td>
<td>Gaussian distribution with width $\sigma_t$ used for the verification key $t$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(D_w, \sigma_w)$</td>
<td>Gaussian distribution with width $\sigma_w$ used for the commitment $w$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\nu_t$</td>
<td>Amount of bit dropping performed on verification key $t$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\nu_w$</td>
<td>Amount of bit dropping performed on (aggregated) commitment $w$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(q_{\nu_t}, q_{\nu_w})$</td>
<td>Rounded moduli satisfying $(q_{\nu_t}, q_{\nu_w}) := ([q/2^{\nu_t}], [q/2^{\nu_w}]) = ([q/2^{\nu_t}], [q/2^{\nu_w}])$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$T \subset \mathcal{R}_q$</td>
<td>Set of signed monomials (see Section 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{rep}$</td>
<td>An integer s.t. $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(\mathcal{C} \subset \mathcal{R}_q, \mathcal{W})$</td>
<td>Challenge set ${c \in \mathcal{R}<em>q \mid |c|</em>\infty = 1 \wedge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$B$</td>
<td>Two-norm bound on the signature $|c|_2$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Overview of parameters used in our 2-round threshold signature.

Construction. The construction of our 2-round threshold signature $\text{TS}_{2\text{-round}}$ is provide in Fig. 8. Our scheme uses two hash functions modeled as a random oracle in the security proof. $G : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{1\} \times \text{rep}^{-1}$ is used to aggregate the individual commitments into one commitment; that is, each user outputs $\text{rep}$ commitments in the pre-processing phase and $G$ is used to aggregate them. $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathcal{C}$ is used to generate the random challenge polynomial for which the users reply with a response. Note that $H$ is the typical hash function that appears in Fiat-Shamir based signatures. While we define $G$ and $H$ to take an arbitrary bit string as input, it is understood that in practice, we check the format of these inputs. Moreover, as standard practice, the two hash functions can be derived from a single hash function using appropriate domain separation.

In the setup, we resample $\Lambda \in R_q^{k \times \ell}$ until $\ell$ of its rows consist of an invertible matrix in $\mathcal{R}_q^{k \times \ell}$. While we believe this to be an artifact of our current proof, this restriction is used to establish hardness of the sel-AOM-UMLWE (see Sections 4.4 and 6). Another peculiarity of our construction is that the verification key $t$ is generated using $2 \cdot (\Lambda \cdot s + e)$ rather than the more conventional $\Lambda \cdot s + e$. While from an algorithmic point of view, this has almost no impact on the signing and verification algorithms, it is vital when establishing security based on our AOM-MLWE assumption. Specifically, this is used to invoke Lemma 4.9, establishing that the adversary’s queries fall into the accepted linear combinations $\mathcal{L}_T$ required to argue hardness of AOM-MLWE. It is not clear whether this is an artifact of our proof and we leave it as an interesting problem to remove the factor 2 from our construction.

The following establishes the correctness of our scheme.

Theorem 5.1 (Correctness). The 2-round threshold signature $\text{TS}_{2\text{-round}}$ in Fig. 8 is correct if $(W \cdot 2^n + 2^{\nu_w}) \cdot \sqrt{n}k + e + 1/\ell, (2W \cdot \sigma_t + \sigma_w \cdot \sqrt{\text{rep} \cdot N}) \cdot \sqrt{\ell} \cdot (\sqrt{\ell} + \sqrt{\ell}) \leq B, \sigma_w > \sqrt{\log(2nk) + 1},$ and assuming $(q, \nu_t, \nu_w)$ satisfies the condition in Table 1.

Proof. It is clear that when the signatures are generated honestly the check $\|c = c′\|$ inside the verification algorithm always hold. We thus focus on the check on the $L_2$-norm. Below, we will be precise on where each elements live and be explicit about our use of the the lift notation, i.e., $\bar{x} \in \{0, 1, \cdots, q - 1\}$ for $x \in \mathcal{R}_q$ (see Section 3.7.2 for more detail).

Fix any $(N, T, SS \subset [N])$ such that $|SS| = T$. Then, it can be checked that
Figure 8: Our two round threshold signature $\text{TS}_2$-round. In the above, $L_{SS,i}$ denotes the Lagrange coefficient of user $i$ in the set $SS \subseteq [N]$ (see Section 3.4 for the definition). $\text{pick } X \text{ from } Y$ denotes the process of picking an element $X$ from the set $Y$. 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TS.Setup$(1^\lambda, N, T)$</th>
<th>TS.PP$(vk, i, sk_i, st_i)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: $A \xleftarrow{$} R_q^{k \times t}$</td>
<td>1: parse $(tspar, t) \leftarrow vk$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: $\text{tspar} := (A, N, T)$</td>
<td>2: parse $(A, N, T) \leftarrow tspar$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: return $\text{tspar}$</td>
<td>3: for $b \in \text{[rep]}$ do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4: $(r_{i,b}, e_{i,b}) \xleftarrow{$} D_w^k \times D_w^k$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5: $w_{i,b} := Ar_{i,b} + e_{i,b} \in R_q^k$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6: $\bar{w}<em>i := [w</em>{i,1}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7: $pp_i := \bar{w}_i$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8: $st_i := st_i \cup { (\bar{w}<em>i, (r</em>{i,b})_{b \in \text{[rep]}}) }$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9: return $(pp_i, st_i)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TS.KeyGen</strong>$(\text{tspar})$</td>
<td><strong>TS.Sign</strong>$(vk, SS, M, i, (pp_i)_{j \in SS}, sk_i, st_i)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: parse $(A, N, T) \leftarrow \text{tspar}$</td>
<td>1: parse $(s_i, (\text{seed}<em>{i,j}, \text{seed}</em>{j,i})_{j \in [N]}) \leftarrow sk_i$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: $(s, e) \xleftarrow{$} D_t^s \times D_t^s$</td>
<td>2: req $[SS \subseteq [N]] \land [i \in SS] \land [(pp_i, \cdot) \in st_i] \land$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: $t := [2 \cdot (As + e)]_v \in R_q^{k \times t}$</td>
<td>3: parse $(\vec{w}<em>j)</em>{j \in SS \cdot (i)} \leftarrow (pp_j)_{j \in SS}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: for $(i, j) \in [N] \times [N]$ do</td>
<td>4: pick $(\vec{w}<em>i, (r</em>{i,b})_{b \in \text{[rep]}})$ from $st_i$ with $pp_i = \vec{w}_i$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5: $\text{seed}_{i,j} \xleftarrow{$} (0, 1)^\lambda$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6: $\tilde{P} \xleftarrow{$} R_q^{t \times [X]}$ with $\deg(\tilde{P}) = T - 1, \tilde{P}(0) = 2 \cdot s$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7: $(s_i)<em>{i \in [N]} := (\tilde{P}(i))</em>{i \in [N]}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8: $vk := (\text{tspar}, t)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9: $(sk_i)<em>{i \in [N]} := { (s_i, (\text{seed}</em>{i,j}, \text{seed}<em>{j,i})</em>{j \in [N]}) }_{i \in [N]}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10: return $(vk, (sk_i)_{i \in [N]})$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TS.Aggr</strong>(vk, SS, M, $(\widehat{\text{sig}}<em>j)</em>{j \in SS}$)</td>
<td>11: $c := H(vk, M, w) ~ / \ c \in \mathcal{C}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: parse $(\text{tspar}, t) \leftarrow vk$</td>
<td>12: $m_i := \sum_{j \in SS} \text{PRF}(\text{seed}_{i,j}, \text{cntt}) \in R_q^\ell$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: parse $(A, N, T) \leftarrow \text{tspar}$</td>
<td>13: $m_i^* := \sum_{j \in SS} \text{PRF}(\text{seed}_{j,i}, \text{cntt}) \in R_q^\ell$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: parse $(w_j, m_j, z_j)_{j \in SS} \leftarrow (\widehat{\text{sig}}<em>j)</em>{j \in SS}$</td>
<td>14: $z_i := c \cdot L_{SS,i} \cdot s_i + \sum_{b \in \text{[rep]}} \beta_b \cdot r_{i,b} + m_i^* \in R_q^\ell$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: $w := \left[ \sum_{j \in SS} w_j \right]<em>{w} \in R_q^{k</em>{w}}$</td>
<td>15: $st_i := st_i \setminus { (\vec{w}<em>i, (r</em>{i,b})_{b \in \text{[rep]}}) }$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: return $(w, m_i, z_i)$</td>
<td>16: $\widehat{\text{sig}}_i := (w_i, m_i, z_i)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6: $c := H(vk, M, w)$</td>
<td>17: return $(\widehat{\text{sig}}_i, st_i)$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
where the last equality follows from the correctness of the linear Shamir secret sharing scheme and the fact that $\sum_{j \in SS} m_j^* = \sum_{j \in SS} m_j$. We then have
\[
y = \begin{bmatrix} Az - 2^{\nu_\mathsf{w}} \cdot c \cdot \bar{t} \end{bmatrix}_{\nu_\mathsf{w}} \\
= 2 \cdot c \cdot As + \sum_{j \in SS} \sum_{b \in \text{rep}} \beta_b \cdot A_{j,b} - 2^{\nu_\mathsf{w}} \cdot c \cdot t \\
= 2 \cdot c \cdot (\bar{t} - e) + \sum_{j \in SS} (w_j - \sum_{b \in \text{rep}} \beta_b \cdot e'_{j,b}) - 2^{\nu_\mathsf{w}} \cdot c \cdot t \\
= w + c \cdot (2 \cdot t - 2^{\nu_\mathsf{w}} \cdot \lfloor 2 \cdot \bar{t} \rfloor_{\nu_\mathsf{w}}) - \left(2 \cdot c \cdot e + \sum_{j \in SS} \sum_{b \in \text{rep}} \beta_b \cdot e'_{j,b}\right)
\]
where $\bar{t} = As + e \in R_q^k$, $w = \sum_{j \in SS} w_j \in R_q^k$, and note that $t = \lfloor 2 \cdot \bar{t} \rfloor_{\nu_\mathsf{w}} \in R_{q^\nu_\mathsf{w}}^k$ and $w = \lfloor w \rfloor_{\nu_\mathsf{w}} \in R_{q^\nu_\mathsf{w}}^k$.
Plugging the above $y$ and using Lemma 3.14 Eq. (3), we have
\[
\|2^{\nu_\mathsf{w}} \cdot \bar{h} \text{ mod } q\|_2 = ||2^{\nu_\mathsf{w}} \cdot w - \bar{y} \text{ mod } q\|_2 \\
= ||2^{\nu_\mathsf{w}} \cdot \lfloor w \rfloor_{\nu_\mathsf{w}} - [w + c \cdot \alpha_t] \text{ mod } q\|_2 \\
\leq ||c \cdot \alpha_t + \alpha \text{ mod } q\|_2 + \sqrt{n_k} \cdot 2^{\nu_\mathsf{w}}.
\]
Using Lemma 3.13, we further have $||c \cdot \alpha_t + \alpha \text{ mod } q\|_2 \leq ||c \cdot \alpha_t \text{ mod } q\|_2 + ||\alpha \text{ mod } q\|_2$. Using the Minkowski inequality and Lemma 3.14, Eq. (2), we have $||c \cdot \alpha_t \text{ mod } q\|_2 \leq W \cdot \sqrt{n_k} \cdot (2^{\nu_\mathsf{w}} - 1)$, where recall $W = ||c||_1$. Moreover, we have $||\alpha \text{ mod } q\|_2 \leq e^{1/4} \cdot (2W \cdot \sigma_t + \sigma_w \cdot \sqrt{\text{rep} \cdot |SS|}) \cdot \sqrt{n_k}$ with overwhelming probability from Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.3, where note that we use the fact $\beta_b \in T$ for the latter. Lastly, with the same argument, we have $||x \text{ mod } q\|_2 \leq e^{1/4} \cdot (2W \cdot \sigma_t + \sigma_w \cdot \sqrt{\text{rep} \cdot |SS|}) \cdot \sqrt{n_k}$. Combining all the bounds result in the desired bound.

6 Security of Our 2-Round Threshold Signature

In this section, we prove the unforgeability of our 2-round threshold signature scheme $T\mathsf{S}_{2\text{-round}}$. We will rely on the hardness of the AOM-MLWE problem with parameters based on those proposed in Sections 4.4 and 4.5. Before providing the proof of unforgeability, we first give asymptotic parameters for which our scheme is provably secure. A concrete parameter selection along with an efficiency analysis is provided in Section 7.

6.1 Asymptotic Parameters

We will first be explicit on how we establish the parameters for the hardness of the AOM-MLWE problem. We begin by choosing the parameters for which the selective AOM-UMLWE problem is hard as in Theorem 4.5. We then use the equivalence between sel-AOM-UMLWE and sel-AOM-MLWE in Lemma 4.2. Lastly, as discussed in Section 4, we assume that AOM-MLWE is as hard as its selective variant. The final step is the only step for which we do not have a supporting security reduction. Concretely, we rely on the following:

1. Let us define $\text{sel-AOM-UMLWE}_{q,t,k+l,Q,(D_i)_{i \in \{Q\},E_{T\mathsf{S}},B_{E_{T\mathsf{S}}},\max\{B_x,B_k\}}$; where
   \[Q = \text{rep} \cdot Q_5 + 1,\]
Theorem 6.1. The 2-round threshold signature $TS_{2\text{-round}}$ in Fig. 8 is unforgeable under the AOM-MLWE assumption and the pseudorandomness of PRF.

Formally, for any $N$ and $T$ with $T \leq N$ and an adversary $A$ against the unforgeability game making at most $Q_H$, $Q_G$, and $Q_S$ queries to the random oracles $H$ and $G$, and the signing oracle, respectively, there exists...
adversaries $B$ and $B'$ against the AOM-MLWE$_{q,\ell,k,Q,(D_i)_{i\in[Q_G]},L_{TS},H_{CS},H_A,B_B}$ problem and pseudorandomness of PRF such that

$$Adv_{T_{SA},A}^{ts-uf}(\lambda, N, T) \leq \sqrt{Q_{RO} \cdot Adv_{T_{B}}^{AOM-MLWE}(\lambda)} + N^2 \cdot Adv_{T_{B}}^{PRF}(\lambda) + \frac{Q_{S}^2}{2^{n-1}} + \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

where $Q_{RO} = Q_H + 2Q_G + 2Q_S + 1$ and $\text{Time}(B) \approx 2 \cdot \text{Time}(A)$.

**Overview.** Before providing the full proof, we provide a brief overview. The proof consists of two parts. The first half consists of carefully constructing a sequence of games so that the reduction can simulate the game using only knowledge of the signing key $sk = s$, implicitly defined by the partial signing keys $s_i$ included in the secret key shares $sk_i$. At a birds eye’s view, this is similar to what was done in [dPKM+24] and an intuition of the idea is given in Appendix A. At a lower level, as explained in Section 2, the difference lies in how we generate the masks $m_i$ and $m_i^*$. We no longer rely on session unique identifiers $sid \in \{0,1\}^*$ and standard signatures to explicitly authenticate the signers’ views. Instead, we replace $sid$ with $ctnt := SS[M\|(\vec{w}_j)_{j \in SS}$ and the signature by viewing the masks as an implicit MAC on the “message” $ctnt$. The reduction then consists of a careful book keeping of the signers that have signed with respect to $ctnt$.

The second half consists of constructing an AOM-MLWE adversary $B$ using the adversary $A$ against the unforgeability game. $B$ is given $T = AS + E$ as the problem instance, where $A \leftarrow R_{q}^{k \times \ell}, (s, e) \leftarrow D_{t}^{k} \times D_{t}^{k}$, $(\vec{r}, \vec{e}_{b}) \leftarrow D_{w}^{\nu} \times D_{w}^{\nu}$ for $(i, b) \in [Q] \times [\text{rep}]$, and $(S, E) = ([2 \cdot s | \vec{r}_{1,1} | \vec{r}_{1,2} | \cdots | \vec{r}_{q,\text{rep}}], [2 \cdot e | \vec{e}_{1,1} | \vec{e}_{1,2} | \cdots | \vec{e}_{q,\text{rep}}]) \in R_{q}^{\nu \times \text{rep} \cdot Q_{s} + 1} \times R_{\ell}^{\nu \times \text{rep} \cdot Q_{s} + 1}$. It embeds the first column $t_1$ of $T$ into the verification key $t$, and the rest is used to simulate the pre-processing token $pp_i$ of the honest signers. Due to the above modification, whenever the reduction needs to simulate a partial response $z_i$, they will be of the form $z_i = c \cdot s + \sum_{b \in [\text{rep}]} \beta_b \cdot r_{i,b}$ (public vector) or $z_i = \sum_{b \in [\text{rep}]} \beta_b \cdot r_{i,b}$ (public vector). Thus, it can simulate by querying the MLWE solving oracle on the respective coefficients (i.e., linear combination). The bulk of the proof consists of proving that the all the queries fall into the accepted linear combinations $L_{TS}$, required by the winning condition of the AOM-MLWE problem. This check is non-trivialized by the fact that the adversary is reworded in order to extract from the forgery an MLWE solution with respect to the verification key $t$.

**Proof.** Let $A$ be an adversary against the unforgeability game. We consider a sequence of games where the first hybrid is the original game and the last is a game that can be reduced from the AOM-MLWE problem. We relate the advantage of $A$ for each adjacent games, where $\epsilon_i$ denotes the advantage of $A$ in Game$_i$.

**Game$_1$:** This is the real unforgeability game. Formally, this is depicted in Fig. 9. By definition, we have

$$\epsilon_1 := Adv_{T_{SA},A}^{ts-uf}(\lambda, N, T).$$

**Game$_2$:** In this game, the challenger modifies how it maintains the random oracles $G$ and $H$. This is depicted in Fig. 10. Specifically, when $G$ is queried on a pair $(vk, ctnt)$ such that $ctnt$ correctly parses as $SS[M\|(\vec{w}_j)_{j \in SS}$, it computes the aggregated commitment $w$ and sets $H(vk, M, w) \leftarrow c$ for a random $c \leftarrow C$ if it hasn’t been set yet. Since the time on which $H$ is set cannot be detected by $A$, the two games are identical. Thus, we have

$$\epsilon_2 = \epsilon_1.$$

Looking ahead, this modification is useful when invoking the forking lemma to extract an MLWE solution from the forgery (see Lemma 6.2 for the detail).

**Game$_3$:** This game, depicted in Fig. 11, is merely a syntactical modification to aid readability. In particular, we divide the signer set $SS$ into the set of honest users $sHS := SS \cap HS$ and corrupt users $sCS := SS \cap CS$, and define intermediate masking terms $(m_{i,sHS}, m_{i,sCS}, m_{i,sCS,i})$. The advantage remains the same and we have

$$\epsilon_3 = \epsilon_2.$$
Figure 9: The first game, identical to the real unforgeability game.

Game₆: In this game, the challenger samples a random mask \( \mathbf{m}_{i,j} \) instead of computing \( \mathbf{m}_{i,j} = \text{PRF}(\text{seed}_{i,j}, \text{cnt}) \) when \( i, j \in \text{HS} \). This is depicted in Fig. 11. In particular, the challenger prepares an empty list \( \text{Rand}[-] \) at the beginning of the game and assigns \( \text{Rand}[\text{cnt}, i, j] \) random masks. Since \( \text{seed}_{i,j} \) is never revealed to the adversary \( A \) when \( i, j \in \text{HS} \), we can go over at most \((N - 1)^2\) hybrids using the pseudorandomness of the PRF to establish indistinguishability of the two games. That is,
Game\textsubscript{2}:

\begin{align*}
G(\text{vk, ctnt}) \\
1 & : \text{ if } [Q_{\text{ctnt}}[\text{vk, ctnt}] = \perp] \text{ then} \\
2 & : (\beta_b)_{b \in [2, \text{rep}]} \leftarrow T_{\text{rep}}^{-1} \\
3 & : Q_{\text{ctnt}}[\text{vk, ctnt}] := (1, (\beta_b)_{b \in [2, \text{rep}]} ) \\
4 & : \text{ if } [SS || M || (\tilde{w}_j)_{j \in SS} \leftarrow \text{ctnt correctly parses}] \text{ then} \\
5 & : \text{ for } j \in SS \text{ do} \\
6 & : \text{ parse } [w_{j, 1} | \cdots | w_{j, \text{rep}}] \leftarrow \tilde{w}_j \\
7 & : w_j := \sum_{b \in [\text{rep}]} \beta_b \cdot w_{j, b} \in \mathcal{R}_q^t \\
8 & : w := \sum_{j \in SS} w_j \mid_{w_j} \in \mathcal{R}_{q, w}^k \\
9 & : \text{ if } [Q_{\text{ctnt}}[\text{vk, M, w}] \neq \perp] \text{ then} \\
10 & : c \leftarrow \mathcal{C}_i, Q_{\text{ctnt}}[\text{vk, M, w}] \leftarrow c \\
11 & : \text{return } Q_{\text{ctnt}}[\text{vk, ctnt}] 
\end{align*}

Figure 10: The second game. The only difference between Game\textsubscript{1} is how the random oracle \(G\) is simulated. This is highlighted in blue. In above, we assume \(\text{ctnt}\) can be checked to have a correct encoding: a signer set \(SS \in [N]\), a message, and \(|SS| (= T)\) commitments.

there exists an adversary \(\mathcal{B}'\) against the pseudorandomness of PRF such that

\[|\epsilon_4 - \epsilon_3| \leq N^2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}}^\text{PRF}(1^\lambda).\]

Game\textsubscript{5}: In this game, the challenger adds an abort condition when queried the signing oracle \(O_{\text{tsg, sign}}\). This is depicted in Fig. 12. The challenger first prepares an empty list \(\text{Signed}[-]\) at the beginning of the game. When the adversary \(A\) queries the signing oracle \(O_{\text{tsg, sign}}\) on user \(i \in SS\), it sets \(\text{ctnt} := SS || M || (\tilde{w}_j)_{j \in SS}\) and checks if \(\text{Signed}[-]\) and \(\text{ctnt} \leftarrow i\), that is, the challenger checks whether user \(i\) has already signed with \(\text{ctnt}\). If so, it aborts the game and otherwise, it proceeds identically to Game\textsubscript{4} and the challenger updates \(\text{Signed}[-] \leftarrow \top\).

Let us bound the probability that an honest user \(i\) signs the same \(\text{ctnt}\) more than once. Notice that \(\text{ctnt}\) includes \(\tilde{w}_i\); the vector of commitments that user \(i\) generated in the pre-processing phase. By construction, \(\tilde{w}_i\) is stored in \(st_i\), which is discarded once user \(i\) signs with \(\text{ctnt}\). In particular, for an honest user \(i\) to have signed on the same \(\text{ctnt}\) more than twice, then it must have generated the same vector of commitments \(\tilde{w}_i\) in the pre-processing phase. Since these commitments are generated honestly, the probability of such an event occurring can be bounded by \(2^{-(n+1)}\) with overwhelming probability using Lemma 3.20. Thus, we have

\[|\epsilon_5 - \epsilon_4| \leq \frac{Q_S^2}{2^{n-1}} + \text{negl}(\lambda).\]

Game\textsubscript{6}: In this game, the challenger changes how it generates the intermediate masking terms of the honest users \((m_{\text{tsg}}, m^*_\text{tsg}, i)\). This is depicted in Fig. 12. Throughout the proof, we will call \(m_{\text{tsg}}\) and
Game₃:

\[ \mathcal{O}_{TS_{\text{Sign}}}(SS, M, i, (pp_j)_{j \in SS}) \]

\[
\begin{align*}
11: & \quad m_i,_{\text{CS}} := \sum_{j \in \text{CS}} \text{PRF}(seed_{i,j}, \text{cntn}) \\
12: & \quad m_{i,\text{CS},i} := \sum_{j \in \text{CS}} \text{PRF}(seed_{j,i}, \text{cntn}) \\
13: & \quad m_{i,\text{HS}} := \sum_{j \in \text{HS}} \text{PRF}(seed_{j,i}, \text{cntn}) \\
14: & \quad m_{i,\text{HS},i} := \sum_{j \in \text{HS}} \text{PRF}(seed_{j,i}, \text{cntn}) \\
15: & \quad m_i := m_{i,\text{HS}} + m_{i,\text{CS},i} \in \mathcal{R}_q^f \\
16: & \quad m_i^* := m_{i,\text{HS},i} + m_{i,\text{CS},i} \in \mathcal{R}_q^f \\
17: & \quad z_i := c \cdot L_{SS,i} \cdot s_i + \sum_{b \in \text{rep}} \beta_b \cdot r_{i,b} + m_i^* \in \mathcal{R}_q^f \\
18: & \quad st_i := st_i \setminus \{ (\tilde{w}_i, (r_{i,b})_{b \in \text{rep}}) \} \\
19: & \quad Q_M := Q_M \cup \{ M \} \\
20: & \quad \text{return } \tilde{\sigma}_i := (w_i, m_i, z_i)
\end{align*}
\]

Game₄:

\[ \mathcal{O}_{TS_{\text{Sign}}}(SS, M, i, (pp_j)_{j \in SS}) \]

\[
\begin{align*}
11: & \quad m_i,_{\text{CS}} := \sum_{j \in \text{CS}} \text{PRF}(seed_{i,j}, \text{cntn}) \\
12: & \quad m_{i,\text{CS},i} := \sum_{j \in \text{CS}} \text{PRF}(seed_{j,i}, \text{cntn}) \\
13: & \quad \text{for } j \in \text{SHS} \text{ do} \\
14: & \quad \text{if } [\text{Rand}[\text{cntn}, j] = \bot] \text{ then} \\
15: & \quad \quad m_{i,j} \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_q^f, \text{Rand}[\text{cntn}, i, j] \leftarrow m_{i,j} \\
16: & \quad \text{if } [\text{Rand}[\text{cntn}, j, i] = \bot] \text{ then} \\
17: & \quad \quad m_{i,j} \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_q^f, \text{Rand}[\text{cntn}, j, i] \leftarrow m_{i,j} \\
18: & \quad m_{i,\text{HS}} := \sum_{j \in \text{HS}} \text{Rand}[\text{cntn}, i, j] \\
19: & \quad m_{i,\text{HS},i} := \sum_{j \in \text{HS}} \text{Rand}[\text{cntn}, j, i] \\
20: & \quad m_i := m_{i,\text{HS}} + m_{i,\text{CS},i} \in \mathcal{R}_q^f \\
21: & \quad m_i^* := m_{i,\text{HS},i} + m_{i,\text{CS},i} \in \mathcal{R}_q^f \\
22: & \quad z_i := c \cdot L_{SS,i} \cdot s_i + \sum_{b \in \text{rep}} \beta_b \cdot r_{i,b} + m_i^* \in \mathcal{R}_q^f \\
23: & \quad st_i := st_i \setminus \{ (\tilde{w}_i, (r_{i,b})_{b \in \text{rep}}) \} \\
24: & \quad Q_M := Q_M \cup \{ M \} \\
25: & \quad \text{return } \tilde{\sigma}_i := (w_i, m_i, z_i)
\end{align*}
\]

Figure 11: The third and fourth games. The changes between the previous game are highlighted in blue. For readability, we omit the lines that are identical to those of \( \mathcal{O}_{TS_{\text{Sign}}} \) in Game₁. We assume Game₄ initializes an empty list \( \text{Rand}[] := \bot \) at the beginning of the game. Lastly, \( \text{SHS} := SS \cap \text{HS} \) and \( \text{SCS} := SS \cap \text{CS} \).
\textbf{Game}_5:\ 

\begin{align*}
O_{TS, \text{Sign}}&(SS, M, i, (pp_j)_{j \in SS}) \\
// & ~ \text{Identical to Lines 1 to 10 of } O_{TS, \text{Sign}} \text{ in Game}_1 \\
11: & ~ m_{i, \text{CS}} := \sum_{j \in \text{CS}} \text{PRF}(\text{seed}_{i, j}, \text{ctnt}) \\
12: & ~ m_{i, \text{CS}, i} := \sum_{j \in \text{CS}} \text{PRF}(\text{seed}_{j, i}, \text{ctnt}) \\
13: & ~ \text{abort if } [\text{Signed}][\text{ctnt}, i] = \top \\
14: & ~ \text{for } j \in \text{HS} \text{ do} \\
15: & ~ \text{if } [\text{Rand}][\text{ctnt}, i, j] = \bot \text{ then} \\
16: & ~ m_{i, j} \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_q^j, \text{Rand}[\text{ctnt}, i, j] \leftarrow m_{i, j} \\
17: & ~ \text{if } [\text{Rand}][\text{ctnt}, j, i] = \bot \text{ then} \\
18: & ~ m_{j, i} \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_q^i, \text{Rand}[\text{ctnt}, j, i] \leftarrow m_{j, i} \\
19: & ~ m_{i, \text{HS}} := \sum_{j \in \text{HS}} \text{Rand}[\text{ctnt}, i, j] \\
20: & ~ m_{i, \text{HS}, i} := \sum_{j \in \text{HS}} \text{Rand}[\text{ctnt}, j, i] \\
21: & ~ \text{Signed}[\text{ctnt}, i] \leftarrow \top \\
22: & ~ m_i := m_{i, \text{HS}} + m_{i, \text{CS}} \in \mathcal{R}_q^j \\
23: & ~ m_i^* := m_{i, \text{HS}, i} + m_{i, \text{CS}, i} \in \mathcal{R}_q^j \\
24: & ~ z_i := c \cdot L_{SS, i} \cdot s_i + \sum_{b \in \text{[rep]}} \beta_b \cdot r_{i, b} + m_i^* \in \mathcal{R}_q^j \\
25: & ~ s_{i} := s_{i} \setminus \{ (w_i, (r_{i, b})_{b \in \text{[rep]}}) \} \\
26: & ~ Q_M := Q_M \cup \{ M \} \\
27: & ~ \text{return } \text{sig}_i := (w_i, m_i, z_i) \\
\end{align*}

\textbf{Game}_6:\ 

\begin{align*}
O_{TS, \text{Sign}}&(SS, M, i, (pp_j)_{j \in SS \setminus \{ i \}}) \\
// & ~ \text{Identical to Lines 1 to 10 of } O_{TS, \text{Sign}} \text{ in Game}_1 \\
11: & ~ m_{i, \text{CS}} := \sum_{j \in \text{CS}} \text{PRF}(\text{seed}_{i, j}, \text{ctnt}) \\
12: & ~ m_{i, \text{CS}, i} := \sum_{j \in \text{CS}} \text{PRF}(\text{seed}_{j, i}, \text{ctnt}) \\
13: & ~ \text{abort if } [\text{Signed}][\text{ctnt}, i] = \top \\
14: & ~ m_{i, \text{HS}} \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_q^i, \text{Mask}[\text{ctnt}, i].m \leftarrow m_{i, \text{HS}} \\
15: & ~ \text{if } [\text{Rand}][\text{ctnt}, j, i] = \bot \text{ then} \\
16: & ~ m_{i, \text{HS}, i} := \sum_{j \in \text{HS}} \text{Mask}[\text{ctnt}, j].m \\
17: & ~ \text{else} \\
18: & ~ m_{i, \text{HS}, i} \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_q^i \\
19: & ~ \text{Mask}[\text{ctnt}, i].m^* \leftarrow m_{i, \text{HS}, i}^* \\
20: & ~ \text{Signed}[\text{ctnt}, i] \leftarrow \top \\
21: & ~ m_i := m_{i, \text{HS}} + m_{i, \text{CS}} \in \mathcal{R}_q^j \\
22: & ~ m_i^* := m_{i, \text{HS}, i}^* + m_{i, \text{CS}, i} \in \mathcal{R}_q^j \\
23: & ~ z_i := c \cdot L_{SS, i} \cdot s_i + \sum_{b \in \text{[rep]}} \beta_b \cdot r_{i, b} + m_i^* \in \mathcal{R}_q^j \\
24: & ~ s_{i} := s_{i} \setminus \{ (w_i, (r_{i, b})_{b \in \text{[rep]}}) \} \\
25: & ~ Q_M := Q_M \cup \{ M \} \\
26: & ~ \text{return } \text{sig}_i := (w_i, m_i, z_i) \\
\end{align*}

Figure 12: The fifth and sixth games. The changes between the previous game are highlighted in blue. We assume both games initialize an empty list \text{Signed}[] := \bot and an empty object \text{Mask}[] := \bot at the beginning of the game. \text{Mask}[] contains two fields: \text{Mask[]}\cdot.m to store row masks and \text{Mask[]}\cdot.m^* to store column masks.

$m_{\text{HS}, i}$ the row and column masks, respectively. Viewing $(m_{i, j})_{i, j \in \text{HS}}$ from \text{Game}_5 as a matrix, $m_{i, \text{HS}}$ and $m_{i, \text{HS}, i}$ are indeed sum of the row and column entries, respectively. Concretely, in this game, the challenger prepares a new object \text{Mask}[] containing two fields: \text{Mask[]}\cdot.m to store row masks and \text{Mask[]}\cdot.m^*. The challenger directly generates the row and column masks $m_{i, \text{HS}}$ and $m_{i, \text{HS}, i}$, rather than generating the individual masks $(m_{i, j})_{i, j \in \text{HS}}$, and stores them in \text{Mask[]}\cdot.m and \text{Mask[]}\cdot.m^*.

We prove the view of the two games are identically distributed to the adversary $A$. Assume $A$ queries the signing oracle on user $i \in \text{HS}$ with signer set $SS$. We first focus on the row masks. Since user $i$ has never signed with $\text{ctnt} = SS||M||(w_j)_{j \in SS}$ (i.e., $\text{Signed}[\text{ctnt}, i] = \bot$), we have $\text{Rand}[\text{ctnt}, i, i] = \bot$ in \text{Game}_5. This implies $m_{i, i} \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_q^j$, and in particular, $m_{i, \text{HS}} := \sum_{j \in \text{HS}} \text{Rand}[\text{ctnt}, i, j]$ is distributed uniformly random over $\mathcal{R}_q^j$ in \text{Game}_5. On the other hand, $m_{i, \text{HS}} := \text{Mask}[\text{ctnt}, i].m$ in \text{Game}_6 is also
distributed uniformly random over $\mathcal{R}^*_\ell$ since $\text{Mask}[\text{ctnt}, i], m = \bot$ if $\text{Signed}[\text{ctnt}, i] = \bot$. Therefore, the view of $\mathcal{A}$ remains identical in both games.

Next, we look at the column masks. We first assume user $i \in \text{shS}$ is the last user to sign with $\text{ctnt}$. In this case, there exists at least one $j \in \text{shS}$ distinct from $i$ for which $\text{Rand}[\text{ctnt}, j, i]$ is not set yet. This implies $m_{j,i} \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{R}^\ell_q$, and in particular, $m^*_{\text{shS}, i} := \sum_{j \in \text{shS}} \text{Rand}[\text{ctnt}, j, i]$ is distributed uniformly random over $\mathcal{R}^\ell_q$ in Game$_5$. Similarly to the previous argument, $m^*_{\text{shS}, i} := \text{Mask}[\text{ctnt}, i], m^*$ in Game$_6$ is also distributed uniformly random over $\mathcal{R}^\ell_q$, and thus, the view of $\mathcal{A}$ remains identical in both games.

Lastly, let us assume user $i \in \text{shS}$ is the last user to sign with $\text{ctnt}$. That is, $\text{Signed}[\text{ctnt}, j] = \top$ for all $j \in \text{shS}\{i\}$. In Game$_5$, this implies that everything except $\text{Rand}[\text{ctnt}, i, i]$ is already set. Namely, after $m_{i,i}$ is sampled, the set $(m_{i,j})_{i,j \in \text{shS}}$ is fully determined. Moreover, by construction, we have

$$
\sum_{j \in \text{shS}} m_{j,i} = \sum_{j \in \text{shS}} m^*_{\text{shS}, j}.
$$

Combining the arguments, the column mask $m^*_{\text{shS}, i}$ of the final user is uniquely defined as

$$
m^*_{\text{shS}, i} = \sum_{j \in \text{shS}} m_{j,i} - \sum_{j \in \text{shS}\{i\}} m^*_{\text{shS}, j}.
$$

This is identical to how $m^*_{\text{shS}, i}$ is set in Game$_6$. Therefore, the view of $\mathcal{A}$ remains identical in both games. We conclude that,

$$
\epsilon_6 = \epsilon_5.
$$

**Game$_7$:** In this game, the challenger modifies how it computes the responses $z_i$. This is depicted in Fig. 13. When the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ queries the signing oracle on user $i \in \text{shS}$, the challenger constructs $\text{ctnt} := \text{SS}[\text{M}[(\vec{w}_j)_{j \in \text{shS}}]]$ and checks whether user $i$ is the last user in $\text{shS}$ to sign with $\text{ctnt}$. If not, the challenger removes the partial secret key $s_k = s_i$ from the response $z_i$. Otherwise, if user $i$ is the last user, then it uses $2 \cdot s = \sum_{j \in \text{CS}} L_{sS,j} \cdot s_j$ in place of the partial secret key $s_i$ to generate the response $z_i$.

We show the view of $\mathcal{A}$ remains identical to the previous game. The key observation is that up until the last user in $\text{shS}$, denoted as $i^*$, signs with $\text{ctnt}$, the row and column masks $(m_{j,i}, m^*_{\text{shS}, j})_{j \in \text{shS}\{i^*\}}$ are independently and uniformly distributed over $\mathcal{R}_q^\ell$. Moreover, until $i^*$ signs with $\text{ctnt}$, all the column masks $(m^*_{\text{shS}, j})_{j \in \text{shS}\{i^*\}}$ remain information theoretically hidden from $\mathcal{A}$.

With this observation, we can equally define the challenger of Game$_7$ to first sample $\vec{m}^*_{\text{shS}, j} \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{R}_q^\ell$ and set the row mask as $m^*_{\text{shS}, j} := c \cdot L_{sS,j} \cdot s_j + \vec{m}^*_{\text{shS}, j}$ for all users $j \in \text{shS}\{i^*\}$. This induces the same distribution as simply sampling $m^*_{\text{shS}, j} \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{R}_q^\ell$. Then, we can rewrite the response $z_j$ as

$$
z_j := c \cdot L_{sS,j} \cdot s_j + \sum_{b \in \text{rep}} \beta_b \cdot r_{j,b} + m^*_{\text{shS}, j} + m^*_{\text{CS}, j}.
$$

Since $\vec{m}^*_{\text{shS}, j}$ is distributed identically to the column mask of user $j$ sampled in Game$_6$, the response $z_j$ for $j \in \text{shS}\{i^*\}$ is identically distributed to Game$_6$.

It remains to analyze the response $z_{i^*}$ for the last user $i^*$. First, notice that the column mask $m^*_{\text{shS}, i}$ of user $i^*$ can be rewritten as

$$
m^*_{\text{shS}, i} = \sum_{j \in \text{shS}} \text{Mask}[\text{ctnt}, j], m - \sum_{j \in \text{shS}\{i^*\}} \text{Mask}[\text{ctnt}, j], m^*.
$$

\[\text{Note that the adversary } \mathcal{A} \text{ may never invoke the last user. For instance, } \mathcal{A} \text{ can query user } i \in \text{shS} \text{ with } \text{ctnt}' := \text{SS}[\text{M}'[(\vec{w}_j)_{j \in \text{SS}}]], \text{ in which case } \text{Signed}[\text{ctnt}, i] \text{ will never be set } \top \text{ due to the argument we made in Game}_4: \text{ user } i \text{ never samples the same } \vec{w}_i.\]
Plugging this into $z_{i^*}$, we have

$$z_{i^*} = 2 \cdot c \cdot s - c \sum_{j \in \text{sHS} \setminus \{i^*\}} L_{SS,j} \cdot s_j + \sum_{b \in \text{rep}} \beta_b \cdot r_{i^*,b} + m^*_{\text{ShS},i^*} + m^*_{\text{CS},i^*},$$

$$= c \cdot \left( 2 \cdot c \cdot s - \sum_{j \in \text{sCS} \setminus \{i^*\}} L_{SS,j} \cdot s_j \right) + \sum_{b \in \text{rep}} \beta_b \cdot r_{i^*,b} + \sum_{j \in \text{sHS}} m_{\text{ShS},j} - \sum_{j \in \text{sHS} \setminus \{i^*\}} \tilde{m}_{j,\text{ShS}}^* + m^*_{\text{CS},i^*},$$

$$= c \cdot L_{SS,i^*} \cdot s_{i^*} + \sum_{b \in \text{rep}} \beta_b \cdot r_{i^*,b} + \sum_{j \in \text{sHS}} m_{\text{ShS},j} - \sum_{j \in \text{sHS} \setminus \{i^*\}} \tilde{m}_{j,\text{ShS}}^* + m^*_{\text{CS},i^*},$$

where the second equality comes from the correctness of the linear Shamir secret sharing scheme. It is easy to check that this is exactly how $z_{i^*}$ is generated in $\text{Game}_6$, where recall we define $\tilde{m}_{j,\text{ShS}}^*$ for $j \in \text{sHS} \setminus \{i^*\}$ as the column masks of user $j$ sampled in $\text{Game}_6$. 

Figure 13: The seventh game. The changes between the previous game are highlighted in blue.
Combining all the arguments, the response $z_j$ for all users $j \in s\text{HS}$ are distributed identically in both games. Thus, we have

$$\epsilon_7 = \epsilon_6.$$  

**Games: In this final game, the challenger modifies how it generates the commitment $\vec{w}_i$ in the pre-processing oracle $O_{TS,PP}$ and how it generates the partial secret keys $(s_i)_{i \in [N]}$. This is depicted in Fig. 14. The challenger first prepares an empty list $\text{Com}[]$ and a counter $\text{ctr}_\vec{w} := 1$ at the beginning of the game. It then only generates secret shares for the corrupted signers $(s_i)_{i \in CS}$ by uniformly sampling $s_i \xleftarrow{} \mathcal{R}_{q_i}^t$. Since $s_i$ of the linear Shamir secret sharing scheme is uniformly distributed over $\mathcal{R}_{q_i}^t$, the view of $A$

![Game_8](image_url)
remains identical to the previous game. Furthermore, it generates \( \vec{w}_i \) and \((\vec{r}_{i,b})_{b \in \text{rep}}\) for all \( i \in [Q_S] \) and stores them in \( \text{Com}[] \) at the beginning of the game. When \( A \) queries the pre-processing oracle \( \Omega_{T_{S,PP}} \) for the \( \text{ctr}_\vec{w} \)-th time, it uses \((\vec{w}_i, (\vec{r}_{i,b})_{b \in \text{rep}}) := \text{Com}[\text{ctr}_\vec{w}] \) and increments \( \text{ctr}_\vec{w} \). Since the timing on which \( \vec{w}_i \) is generated by the challenger is unnoticeable from \( A \), the view of \( A \) remains identical to the previous game. We thus have

\[
\epsilon_8 = \epsilon_7.
\]

Using Lemma 6.2, which we will prove in Section 6.3, there exists an adversary \( B \) against the \( \text{AOM-MLWE}_{q,\ell,k,Q,(D_i)_{i \in [Q]}} \) problem that internally runs \( A \) against the security game in \( \text{Games}_8 \) such that

\[
\epsilon_8 \leq \sqrt{Q_{\text{RO}} \cdot \text{Adv}_B^{\text{AOM-MLWE}}(1^\lambda)} + \text{negl}(\lambda),
\]

where \( Q_{\text{RO}} = Q_H + 2Q_G + 2Q_S + 1 \) and \( Q = \text{rep} \cdot Q_S + 1 \). Moreover, we have \( \text{Time}(B) \approx 2 \cdot \text{Time}(A) \). Collecting the bounds, we obtain

\[
\text{Adv}_{T_{S,A}}^{\text{uf}}(1^\lambda, N, T) \leq \sqrt{Q_{\text{RO}} \cdot \text{Adv}_B^{\text{AOM-MLWE}}(1^\lambda)} + \frac{Q_S^2}{2n-1} + \text{negl}(\lambda).
\]

This completes the proof. \( \square \)

### 6.3 Proof of Lemma 6.2

This section provides the proof of Lemma 6.2, formally stated below.

**Lemma 6.2.** If there exist an adversary \( A \) against the security game in \( \text{Games}_8 \) with advantage \( \epsilon_8 \), then we can construct an adversary \( B \) against the \( \text{AOM-MLWE}_{q,\ell,k,Q,(D_i)_{i \in [Q]}} \) problem such that

\[
\epsilon_8 \leq \sqrt{Q_{\text{RO}} \cdot \text{Adv}_B^{\text{AOM-MLWE}}(1^\lambda)} + \text{negl}(\lambda),
\]

where \( Q_{\text{RO}} = Q_H + 2Q_G + 2Q_S + 1 \) and the parameters from Section 6.1. Moreover, we have \( \text{Time}(B) \approx 2 \cdot \text{Time}(A) \).

**Proof.** To show this lemma, we construct an adversary \( B \) solving the \( \text{AOM-MLWE} \) problem which internally runs the adversary \( A \) against the security game in \( \text{Games}_8 \). \( B \) is given \((A, T) \in R_q^{k \times \ell} \times R_q^{k \times (\text{rep} \cdot Q_S + 1)} \) as the problem instance, where \( Q = \text{rep} \cdot Q_S + 1 \). At a high level, \( B \) invokes the forking lemma and simulates the view of \( A \) using at most \( Q - 1 = \text{rep} \cdot Q_S \) queries to its MLWE solving oracle \( \Omega_{\text{solve}} \). It then extracts the \( Q \)-th solution from the two forgeries it obtains from \( A \) to prepare the \( Q \) MLWE solutions. The proof consists of five parts: (1) we first explain the necessary algorithms to invoke the forking lemma; (2) we then explain how \( B \) invokes the forking lemma; (3) we explain the necessary conditions for \( B \) to be able to extract the \( Q \) MLWE solutions; (4) we explain how \( B \) extracts the \( Q \) MLWE solutions; and lastly, (5) explain the solutions are indeed valid.

1. **Algorithms \((C_T, \Omega)\) required to invoke the Forking Lemma.** We first define the algorithm \( C_T \) and \( \Omega \) to be used in the forking algorithm \( \text{Fork}^{\text{O(\text{par},\cdot)}}(\text{par}) \) of the (oracle-aided) forking lemma in Lemma 3.21. Looking ahead, \( C_T \) is almost identical to the challenger in \( \text{Games}_8 \) and \( \text{O(\text{par},\cdot)} \) will be set to the MLWE solving oracle \( \Omega_{\text{solve}} \) with some additional book keeping.

Let us first define the input generator \( \text{IG} \), the set \( \mathcal{H} \), and the integer \( q_{\text{Fork}} \) in Lemma 3.21. \( \text{IG} \) first samples \( A \leftarrow R_{q}^{k \times \ell} \), \((s,e) \leftarrow D_{\ell}^C \times D_{\ell}^T \), and \((\vec{r}_{i,b}, \vec{c}_{i,b}) \leftarrow D_{\ell}^C \times D_{\ell}^W \) for \((i, b) \in [Q_S] \times \text{rep} \). It then sets \((S,E) = ([2 \cdot s | \vec{r}_{1,1} | \vec{r}_{1,2} | \cdots | \vec{r}_{Q_S,\text{rep}}], [2 \cdot e | \vec{c}_{1,1} | \vec{c}_{1,2} | \cdots | \vec{c}_{Q_S,\text{rep}}]) \in R_{q}^{\ell \times (\text{rep} \cdot Q_S + 1)} \times R_{q}^{\ell \times (\text{rep} \cdot Q_S + 1)} \) and \( T = AS + E \). Finally, it outputs \( \text{par}(\text{par}) := ((A, T), (S, E)) \). We define \( \mathcal{H} := C \times \{1\} \times \text{rep}^{-1} \). For \( h \in \mathcal{H} \), we write \( h = (c, (\beta_i)_{i \in \text{rep}}) \), where \( \beta_1 = 1 \). Lastly, we set \( q_{\text{Fork}} := Q_{\text{RO}} := Q_H + 2Q_G + 2Q_S + 1 \).
The description of $O(\texttt{par}, \cdot)$ is simple. When $O$ is queried on $d = [d_0, \ldots, d_{\text{rep} \cdot Q_S}]$, it outputs $\bot$ if $d \notin L_{TS}$. Here, note that membership of $L_{TS}$ is efficiently checkable. Otherwise, it simply outputs $(\texttt{SD}, \texttt{ED})$. Notice that $O(\texttt{par}, \cdot)$ is deterministic as required.

We next define $C_{TS}$, given as input $\texttt{par}$ and $\vec{h} \in H^{Q_{RO}}$. $C_{TS}$ first simulates the $\texttt{Games}_S$ challenger, except for three modifications. The first modification is that it uses $A$ provided in $\texttt{par}$ and generates $t$ and $(\vec{w}_i)_{i \in [Q_S]}$ from $T$ in $\texttt{par}$. That is, it parses $[t_0^*; \ldots; t_{\text{rep} \cdot Q_S}^*] \leftarrow T$ and sets $t := [t_0^*; t_{\text{rep} \cdot (i-1)+1}^*; \ldots; t_{\text{rep} \cdot i}^*]$ for $i \in [Q_S]$. Since $D_1 = 2 \cdot D_t$, and $D_i = D_w$ for $i \in [2; \text{rep} \cdot Q_S + 1]$, these are identically distributed to those of $\texttt{Games}_S$.

The second modification is that it answers the random oracle queries using $\vec{h}$ with $|\vec{h}| = Q_{RO}$, instead of sampling them on its own. More concretely, it initializes a counter $\texttt{ctr}$ to 1 and increments it at any time a new entry in $Q_H[\cdot]$ or $Q_G[\cdot]$ needs to be defined. Moreover, when a new entry of $Q_H[\cdot]$ (resp. $Q_G[\cdot]$) needs to be defined, it parses $(c_{\text{ctr}}, (\beta_{\text{ctr}, b} \cdot h_{\text{ctr}})) \leftarrow h_{\text{ctr}} \in H$ and uses $c_{\text{ctr}}$ (resp. $\beta_{\text{ctr}, b}$) where the unused $(\beta_{\text{ctr}, b})_{b \in [\text{rep}]}$ (resp. $c_{\text{ctr}}$) is discarded. This change is only conceptual since every $h_{\text{ctr}}$ is uniformly chosen from $H$. Here, recall an adversary $A$ against the unforgeability of the threshold signature scheme makes at most $Q_H$, $Q_G$, and $Q_S$ queries to the random oracles $H$, $G$, and signing oracle $TS$.Sign, respectively. Therefore, $\vec{h}$ with $|\vec{h}| = Q_{RO} = Q_1 + 2Q_G + 2Q_S + 1$ suffices.

The third modification is that when $C_{TS}$ needs to generate a response $z_i$ during answering queries to $O_{TS}.\text{Sign}$, it does so by accessing $O(\texttt{par}, \cdot)$. Recall $\texttt{par}$ includes all the secret of the challenger in $\texttt{Games}_S$. More concretely, there are two types of responses $z_i$ to consider. One is the response made by the last user in $\texttt{sHS}$ (i.e., Line 19 of Fig. 13) and the other is the response made by the other users (i.e., Line 21 of Fig. 13). We show how to generate $z_i$ for both types of responses. Assume $O_{TS}.\text{Sign}$ is queried on user $i$, signer set $SS$, and $\vec{w}_i$ is user $i$'s commitment stored in $\texttt{st}$. Further, assume $\vec{w}_i = \vec{w}_s$ for some $s \in [Q_S]$, where the existence of such $s$ is guaranteed by the construction and the uniqueness is (implicitly) guaranteed from the argument in $\texttt{Games}_S$.

Now, for the first type of response, it executes the same procedure until Line 18 of Fig. 13 and then prepares $d_i := [d_{s,0}; \ldots; d_{s,\text{rep} \cdot Q_S}]$, where $d_{s,0} = c_s \cdot (\beta_{\text{rep} \cdot (s-1)+1, \text{rep} \cdot s}) = (\beta_{s, b})_{b \in [\text{rep}]}$, and $d_{s,j} = 0$ for all other $j \in [0; \text{rep} \cdot Q_S]$. It then queries $d_i$ to $O(\texttt{par}, \cdot)$, receives $(s_i, e_i)$, and computes

$$z_i := s_i - c \sum_{j \in CS} L_{SS, j} \cdot s_j + m_{\text{HS}, i} + m_{\text{CS}, i}^*.$$  

This is identical to the partial response generated in $\texttt{Games}_S$ since we have $s_i = 2 \cdot c \cdot s + \sum_{b \in [\text{rep}]} \beta_{s, b} \cdot \vec{r}_{s, b}$, where recall $\vec{w}_s$ is $\vec{w}_i$. For the second type of response, it executes the same procedure until Line 20 of Fig. 13 and then prepares $d_i := [d_{s,0}; \ldots; d_{s,\text{rep} \cdot Q_S}]$, where $d_{s,j} \in [\text{rep} \cdot (s-1)+1, \text{rep} \cdot s] = (\beta_{s, b})_{b \in [\text{rep}]}$, and $d_{s,j} = 0$ for all other $j \in [0; \text{rep} \cdot Q_S]$. It then queries $d_i$ to $O(\texttt{par}, \cdot)$, receives $(s_i, e_i)$, and computes

$$z_i := s_i + m_{\text{HS}, i} + m_{\text{CS}, i}^*.$$  

Similarly to the above argument, this is identical to the partial response in $\texttt{Games}_S$.

It remains to explain what $C_{TS}$ does after it simulates the modified $\texttt{Games}_S$ challenger. At the end of the simulation, $C_{TS}$ is given the forgery $(s^* = (c^*, z^*, h^*), M^*)$ from $A$. It first checks the validity of the forgery as in $\texttt{Games}_S$ and returns $(0, \bot)$ if the forgery is invalid. Otherwise, because the forgery is valid, there must exist an index $i^* \in [Q_{RO}]$ for which $c_{i^*} = H(\nu k, M^*, [A \cdot z^* - 2^{s^*} \cdot c^* \cdot t]_{\nu w} + h^*)$, where $c_{i^*} \in \vec{h}_{i^*}$ and $c^* = c_{i^*}$. In this case, $C_{TS}$ outputs $(i^*, s^*)$. Since $C_{TS}$ simulates $\texttt{Games}_S$ perfectly, we have

$$\text{acc} = \Pr \left[ (i^*, s^*) \leftarrow C_{TS}(\texttt{par}, \vec{h}) : i^* \geq 1 \right] = \epsilon_S.$$  

(2) $B$ invoking the Forging algorithm $\text{Forg}_{C_{TS}}(\texttt{par})$. We now explain how $B$ invokes the forking algorithm $\text{Forg}_{C_{TS}}(\texttt{par})$ and prepares its state to extract the $Q$ MLWE solutions. Recall $B$ is given $(A, T) \in \mathcal{R}_{k^x}^{x \ell} \times \mathcal{R}_q^{k^x \cdot (\text{rep} \cdot Q_S + 1)}$ as the AOM-MLWE problem and has access to an MLWE solving oracle $O_{\text{solve}}$.  

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Instead of running IG, $B$ sets $\text{par} = (\text{A}, \text{T})$ and (perfectly) simulates $\text{O}(\text{par}, \cdot)$ using $\text{O}_{\text{solve}}(\cdot)$. It then executes $\text{Fork}^{\text{Next}(\cdot)}(\text{par})$ which behaves identically to $\text{Fork}^{\text{Next}(\cdot)}(\text{par})$. From the forking lemma (cf. Lemma 3.21), $B$ obtains two valid forgeries $\text{sig}_1^*$ and $\text{sig}_2^*$, which are involved in the same input of $H$, with probability

$$\text{frk} \geq \text{acc} \cdot \left( \frac{\text{acc}}{Q_{\text{RO}}} - \frac{1}{h} \right) = \frac{\epsilon_5^2}{Q_{\text{RO}}} - \text{neg}(\lambda),$$

where the inequality follows from $h = |\mathcal{H}| = |\mathcal{C}| \cdot |\mathcal{T}|^{\text{rep} - 1}$ and $|\mathcal{C}| \geq 2^\lambda$. Moreover, throughout the execution, $B$ maintains a list $\text{Ans}[-]$, initially empty. Whenever $\text{O}(\text{par}, \cdot)$ is queried on $d \in \mathcal{L}_{\text{TS}}$, it first parses $[d_0 \mid \cdots \mid d_{\text{rep} \cdot \text{Qs}}] \leftarrow d$, where by the definition of $\mathcal{C}_{\text{TS}}$, we have $d_0 \in \mathcal{C} \cup \{0\}$ and for some $\kappa \in \mathcal{Q}_S$, $(d_j)_{j \in \text{rep}(\kappa) + 1 + \text{rep} \cdot \text{Qs}} \in \{1\} \times \mathcal{T}_{\text{rep} - 1}$, and $d_j = 0$ for all other $j \in \text{rep} \cdot \text{Qs}$. It then stores the reply from $\text{O}(\text{par}, \cdot)$ as $\text{Ans}[\kappa] \leftarrow \text{Ans}[\kappa] \cup \{(d, \text{Sd}, \text{Ed})\}$. Here, note that $\text{Ans}[\kappa]$ can store up to 2 tuples. This is because by definition of $\mathcal{C}_{\text{TS}}$, every $d$ has a corresponding user commitment $\tilde{w}_i$ and the $\kappa$ defined via $d$ satisfies $\tilde{w}_i = \tilde{w}_\kappa$. Therefore, since the same user commitment $\tilde{w}_i$ cannot be reused during a single invocation of $\mathcal{C}_{\text{TS}}$, the same $\kappa$ can appear at most twice.

(3) Conditions on which the extraction by $B$ succeeds. Before explaining how $B$ extracts the $Q$ MLWE solutions, we explain two bad conditions that must not occur for $B$ to be able to extract, and prove that these two bad conditions can happen with only negligible probability. The first condition is standard in Fiat-Shamir type proofs: we denote $\text{Collc}$ as the event when the two challenges $(c_1^*, c_2^*)$ included in $\text{sig}_1^* = (c_1^*, z_1^*, h_1^*)$ and $\text{sig}_2^* = (c_2^*, z_2^*, h_2^*)$ are identical. That is, $c_1^* = c_2^*$. Since both challenges are uniformly random over $\mathcal{C}$, it is immediate that $\Pr[\text{Collc}] = 1/|\mathcal{C}| = \text{neg}(\lambda)$.

The second condition is unique to threshold signatures. For every $\kappa \in \mathcal{Q}_S$ such that $|\text{Ans}[\kappa]| = 2$, let $\{(d_\kappa, s_\kappa, e_\kappa), (d_\kappa', s_\kappa', e_\kappa')\} \leftarrow \text{Ans}[\kappa]$. By definition, we can parse $[d_{\kappa,0} \mid \cdots \mid d_{\kappa,\text{rep} \cdot \text{Qs}}] \leftarrow d_\kappa$, where $d_{\kappa,0} \in \mathcal{C} \cup \{0\}$, $(d_{\kappa,j})_{j \in \text{rep}(\kappa) + 1 + \text{rep} \cdot \text{Qs}} \in \{1\} \times \mathcal{T}_{\text{rep} - 1}$, and $d_{\kappa,j} = 0$ for all other $j \in \text{rep} \cdot \text{Qs}$. We parse $d_\kappa'$ similarly. Then we denote $\text{BadQuery}$ as the event that there exists $\kappa \in \mathcal{Q}_S$ such that $d_{\kappa,0} \neq d_{\kappa,0}'$ but $(d_{\kappa,j})_{j \in \text{rep}(\kappa) + 1 + \text{rep} \cdot \text{Qs}} = (d_{\kappa,j}')_{j \in \text{rep}(\kappa) + 1 + \text{rep} \cdot \text{Qs}}$. To bound $\Pr[\text{BadQuery}]$, recall that $d_\kappa$ (resp. $d_\kappa'$) is defined in the first (resp. second) invocation of $\mathcal{C}_{\text{TS}}$. Moreover, by how $d_\kappa$ is defined, there exists corresponding $c$ and $(\beta_b)_{b \in [\kappa]}$ with $c = d_{\kappa,0}$ and $(\beta_b)_{b \in [\kappa]} = (d_{\kappa,j})_{j \in \text{rep}(\kappa) + 1 + \text{rep} \cdot \text{Qs}}$ such that $(c, (\beta_b)_{b \in [\kappa]}) \in (h_\kappa, h_{\kappa}')$ for some $h_\kappa, h_{\kappa}' \in \tilde{h}$ and distinct $I_\kappa, I_{\kappa}' \in [Q_{\text{RO}}]$. In other words, $d_{\kappa,0}$ and $(d_{\kappa,j})_{j \in \text{rep}(\kappa) + 1 + \text{rep} \cdot \text{Qs}}$ are the outputs of the random oracles $H$ and $G$, respectively. Similarly, we define the indices $I_\kappa', I_{\kappa}' \in [Q_{\text{RO}}]$ induced by $d_\kappa'$.

First, assume $I^* < I_\beta$ or $I^* < I_{\beta}'$. Then, since either $h_{\beta}$ or $h_{\beta}'$ are sampled uniformly and independently after the forking point $I^*$, the probability that $(d_{\kappa,j})_{j \in \text{rep}(\kappa) + 1 + \text{rep} \cdot \text{Qs}} = (d_{\kappa,j}')_{j \in \text{rep}(\kappa) + 1 + \text{rep} \cdot \text{Qs}}$ (i.e., $(\beta_b)_{b \in [\kappa]} = (\beta_b)_{b \in [\kappa]}$) is bounded by $\frac{1}{2 |\mathcal{T}_{\text{rep} - 1}|} = \text{neg}(\lambda)$. Following a similar argument, we cannot have $I_\beta \neq I_{\beta}'$ when $I_\beta, I_{\beta}' < I^*$ with all but a negligible probability. Moreover, we have $I_\beta \neq I^*$ since $c_1^* \in h_{I^*}$ is used; that is, the $\beta$-terms in $h_{I^*}$ are discarded. Therefore, we can assume $I_\beta = I_{\beta}' < I^*$ if $\text{BadQuery}$ occurs.

We next have $I_c, I_{\beta}' \neq I^*$ since due to the winning condition of the unforgeability game, the adversary cannot query the signing oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{TS}, \text{Sign}}$ on $M^*$. Lastly, due to the modification we made in Game2, we have either $I_c < I_\beta$ or $I_c = I_\beta + 1$ and either $I_c' < I_{\beta}'$ or $I_c' = I_{\beta}' + 1$. Combining $I_c, I_c' \neq I^*$ and $I_\beta = I_{\beta}' < I^*$, and the fact that the behavior of $\mathcal{C}_{\text{TS}}$ is identical in the two runs before the rewinding point, we must have $I_c = I_{\beta}'$. However, this implies that $\text{BadQuery}$ does not occur. To summarize, we can bound $\Pr[\text{BadQuery}] \leq 2^{\frac{Q_{\text{RO}}}{|\mathcal{T}_{\text{rep} - 1}|}} = \text{neg}(\lambda)$ by taking the union bound over all $\kappa \in [\mathcal{Q}_S]$.

As we show in Items (4) and (5) below, when $\text{Collc}$ and $\text{BadQuery}$ do not occur, $B$ will be able to extract $Q$ MLWE solutions to break the AOM-MLWE problem. Therefore, we conclude

$$\text{Adv}_{B}^{\text{AOM-MLWE}} (1^\lambda) = \Pr \left[ (b, \text{sig}_1^*, \text{sig}_2^*) \leftarrow \text{Fork}^{\text{Next}(\cdot)}(\text{par}) : b = 1 \wedge \neg \text{Collc} \wedge \neg \text{BadQuery} \right]$$

$$\geq \text{frk} - \Pr[\text{Collc}] - \Pr[\text{BadQuery}]$$

$$\geq \frac{\epsilon_5^2}{Q_{\text{RO}}} - \text{neg}(\lambda),$$
where the final inequality follows from Eq. (8) and the bounds we established for \( \Pr[\text{Collec}] \) and \( \Pr[\text{BadQuery}] \).

We can rewrite the bound to arrive at the following statement in the lemma:

\[
\epsilon_s \leq \sqrt{Q_{\text{RO}} \cdot \text{Adv}^{\text{AOM-MLWE}}_{\mathcal{B}}(\lambda)} + \text{negl}(\lambda).
\]

(4) \( \mathcal{B} \) extracting the Q MLWE solutions. To prove Lemma 6.2, it remains to show how \( \mathcal{B} \) extracts the solution of the AOM-MLWE problem from \( \text{sig}_1^*, \text{sig}_2^* \), and the list \( \text{Ans}[\cdot] \), conditioned on \( \text{Collec} \) and \( \text{BadQuery} \) not occurring. Here, we first focus on how \( \mathcal{B} \) extracts a solution and postpone verifying that the solution is valid to Item (5). Below, we will be precise on where each elements live and be explicit about our use of the lift notation, i.e., \( x \in \mathbb{R}_q \) (see Section 3.7.2 for more detail).

First, \( \mathcal{B} \) extracts \((v_0, \hat{s}_0, \hat{e}_0)\) satisfying \( v_0 \cdot t_0^* = A \cdot \hat{s}_0 + \hat{e}_0 \in R_q^k \), i.e., an approximate secret key associated to the verification key \( t = \lfloor t_0^* \rfloor_{v_0} \in R_q^k \). Due to the forking lemma, the challenges \( c_1^* \) and \( c_2^* \) are generated on the same input to the random oracle \( H \). Therefore, \( \text{sig}_1^* = (c_1^*, z_1^*, h_1^*) \) and \( \text{sig}_2^* = (c_2^*, z_2^*, h_2^*) \) satisfy

\[
[Az_1^* - 2^{\nu_1} \cdot c_1^* \cdot \mathbf{1}]_{v_0} + h_1^* = [Az_2^* - 2^{\nu_2} \cdot c_2^* \cdot \mathbf{1}]_{v_0} + h_2^* \mod q_{v_0}.
\]

Let us consider taking the lift of both sides:

\[
[Az_1^* - 2^{\nu_1} \cdot c_1^* \cdot \mathbf{1}]_{v_0} + h_1^* = [Az_2^* - 2^{\nu_2} \cdot c_2^* \cdot \mathbf{1}]_{v_0} + h_2^*.
\]

Then, since the output of \( \lfloor \cdot \rfloor_{v_0} \) is over \( \mathcal{R}_{q_{v_0}} \) and \( h_1^*, h_2^* \) are also over \( \mathcal{R}_{q_{v_0}} \), there exists a unique vector \( \delta_1 \in \mathcal{R}^k \) with \( \|\delta_1\|_\infty \leq 2 \) such that

\[
[Az_1^* - 2^{\nu_1} \cdot c_1^* \cdot \mathbf{1}]_{v_0} + h_1^* = [Az_2^* - 2^{\nu_2} \cdot c_2^* \cdot \mathbf{1}]_{v_0} + h_2^* + q_{v_0} \cdot \delta_1.
\]

Clearly, the equality also holds over modulo \( q \). Let us now multiply both sides by \( 2^{\nu_1} \) and apply Lemma 3.14, Eq. (2) as follows:

\[
Az_1^* - c_1^* \cdot t_0^* + 2^{\nu_1} \cdot \mathbf{1} = Az_2^* - c_2^* \cdot t_0^* + 2^{\nu_1} \cdot \mathbf{1} + 2^{\nu_1} \cdot q_{v_0} \cdot \delta_1 + (\delta_2 + c_1^* \cdot \delta_3 + c_2^* \cdot \delta_4) \mod q,
\]

where \( \delta_2, \delta_3, \delta_4 \in \mathcal{R}_q^k \) satisfy \( \|\delta_2\|_\infty \leq 2 \cdot (2^{\nu_1} - 1) \) and \( \|\delta_3\|_\infty, \|\delta_4\|_\infty \leq 2^{\nu_1} - 1 \). In particular, \( \delta_2, \delta_3, \delta_4 \) are the noise incurred by invoking Lemma 3.14, Eq. (2). Rearranging the terms, we obtain the following:

\[
(c_1^* - c_2^*) \cdot t_0^* = A \cdot (z_1^* - z_2^*) + (2^{\nu_1} \cdot \mathbf{1}) + 2^{\nu_1} \cdot \mathbf{1} - (q_{v_0} \cdot \delta_1 + c_1^* \cdot \delta_3 + c_2^* \cdot \delta_4) \mod q.
\]

Here, we use the fact that we can be uniquely expressed as \( q = 2^{\nu_1} q_{v_0} + q_{\text{bot}} \) with \( q_{\text{bot}} \in [0, 2^{\nu_1} - 1] \) to swap \( 2^{\nu_1} q_{v_0} \) with \( q_{\text{bot}} \) (see also Lemma 3.14). Finally, \( \mathcal{B} \) sets \((v_0, \hat{s}_0, \hat{e}_0)\) as shown in Eq. (11). Since \( c_1^* \neq c_2^* \) holds when \( \text{Collec} \) does not occur, \( v_0 \neq 0 \) holds. As mentioned above, we postpone verifying the size bound of the solution to Item (5).

Next, for each \( k \in \{Q_3\} \), \( \mathcal{B} \) extracts \((v_i, \hat{s}_i, \hat{e}_i)\) satisfying \( v_i \cdot t_i^* = A \cdot \hat{s}_i + \hat{e}_i \) from \( \text{Ans}[\cdot] \) and \((v_0, \hat{s}_0, \hat{e}_0)\). Below, for readability, we denote the MLWE solution \((S, E) \in \mathcal{R}_q^{k \times (\text{rep}Q_3 + 1)} \times \mathcal{R}_q^{k \times (\text{rep}Q_3 + 1)} \) used by the AOM-MLWE challenger as \((s_0^*, s_1^*, \cdots, s_{\text{rep}Q_3}^*), (e_0^*, e_1^*, \cdots, e_{\text{rep}Q_3}^*)\)

Next, to this end, \( \mathcal{B} \) first performs a preparation step to “complete” the list \( \text{Ans}[\cdot] \). Recall \( |\text{Ans}[\cdot]| \leq 2 \). If \( |\text{Ans}[\cdot]| = 0 \), then it defines \( d_k \in \mathcal{L}_{T_S} \) to be any vector such that \( d_{k,0} = 0, d_{k,\text{rep}(k-1)+1} = 1, d_{k,\text{rep}(k-1)+b} \in T \) for \( b \in \{2, \text{rep}\} \), and \( d_{k,j} = 0 \) for all other \( j \in \text{rep} \). It also defines \( d_k^* \) to be identical to \( d_k \), except that \( d_{k,\text{rep}(k-1)+2} \in T \) is distinct from \( d_{k,\text{rep}(k-1)+1} \). Then queries \( \text{O}_{\text{solve}} \) on input \( d_k \) and \( d_k^* \), and receives \( (s_k, e_k) \) and \( (s_k^*, e_k^*) \), respectively. Lastly, it updates \( \text{Ans}[\cdot] \leftarrow \text{Ans}[\cdot] \cup \{(d_k, s_k, e_k), (d_k^*, s_k^*, e_k^*)\} \). Next, if \( |\text{Ans}[\cdot]| = 1 \), define \( (d_k, s_k, e_k) \leftarrow \text{Ans}[\cdot] \). By definition, we can parse \( d_{k,0} \cdots d_{k,j} \) to be \( d_k \), where \( d_{k,0} \in C \cup \{0\}, (d_{k,j})_j \in \text{rep}(k-1)+1, \text{rep}(k) \) \( = \mathbb{T}^{\text{rep}-1} \), and \( d_{k,j} = 0 \) for all other \( j \in \text{rep} \). It also defines
Let \( \mathbf{d}'_k \) to be identical to \( \mathbf{d}_k \), except that \( d'_{k, \text{rep}, (k-1)+2} \in \mathbb{T} \) that is distinct from \( d_{k, \text{rep}, (k-1)+2} \). \( \mathcal{B} \) then queries \( \mathcal{O}_{\text{solve}} \) on input \( \mathbf{d}'_k \), receives \( (s'_k, e'_k) \), and finally updates \( \text{Ans}[k] \leftarrow \text{Ans}[k] \cup \{(s'_k, e'_k)\} \).

At the end of the preparation of \( \text{Ans}[\cdot] \), for all \( k \in [Q_\mathcal{S}] \), we have \( |\text{Ans}[k]| = 2 \). Since the number of elements in the list \( \text{Ans}[\cdot] \) is the number of times \( \mathcal{B} \) queried \( \mathcal{O}_{\text{solve}} \), we know that \( \mathcal{B} \) queried \( \mathcal{O}_{\text{solve}} \cdot 2 \cdot Q_\mathcal{S} \) times so far. Moreover, for any \( \{(\mathbf{d}_k, s_k, e_k), (\mathbf{d}'_k, s'_k, e'_k)\} \in \text{Ans}[k] \), we can parse \( [d_{k, 0} \ | \ \cdots | \ d_{k, \text{rep}, Q_\mathcal{S}}] \leftarrow \mathbf{d}_k \), where \( d_{k, 0} \in \mathcal{C} \cup \{0\} \), \((d_{k, j})_{j \in [\text{rep}(k-1)+1, \text{rep}(k)]} \in \{1\} \times \mathbb{T}^{\text{rep}(k-1)} \), and \( d_{j, j} = 0 \) for all other \( j \in [Q_\mathcal{S} \cdot \text{rep}] \). Similarly for \( \mathbf{d}'_k \). From how \( \mathbf{d}_k \) and \( \mathbf{d}'_k \) are defined via \( \mathcal{C}_\mathcal{T}_\mathcal{S} \) and \( \mathcal{B} \), we have the following

\[
\begin{align*}
\mathbf{A}s_k + e_k &= d_{k, 0} \cdot t_0^* + t_{\text{rep}(k-1)+1}^* + \sum_{b \in [2, \text{rep}]} d_{k, \text{rep}(k-1)+b} \cdot t_{\text{rep}(k-1)+b}^* \\
\mathbf{A}s'_k + e'_k &= d'_{k, 0} \cdot t_0^* + t_{\text{rep}(k-1)+1}^* + \sum_{b \in [2, \text{rep}]} d'_{k, \text{rep}(k-1)+b} \cdot t_{\text{rep}(k-1)+b}^*,
\end{align*}
\]

and

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
\mathbf{s}_k \\
\mathbf{e}_k \\
\mathbf{s}'_k \\
\mathbf{e}'_k
\end{bmatrix}
= \begin{bmatrix}
d_{k, 0} \cdot \mathbf{s}_0 \\
d_{k, 0} \cdot \mathbf{s}'_0 \\
d'_{k, 0} \cdot \mathbf{s}_0 \\
d'_{k, 0} \cdot \mathbf{s}'_0
\end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix}
s_{\text{rep}(k-1)+1}^* \\
e_{\text{rep}(k-1)+1}^* \\
s'_{\text{rep}(k-1)+1}^* \\
e'_{\text{rep}(k-1)+1}^*
\end{bmatrix} + \sum_{b \in [2, \text{rep}]} \begin{bmatrix}
d_{k, \text{rep}(k-1)+b} \cdot s_{\text{rep}(k-1)+b}^* \\
d_{k, \text{rep}(k-1)+b} \cdot e_{\text{rep}(k-1)+b}^* \\
d'_{k, \text{rep}(k-1)+b} \cdot s_{\text{rep}(k-1)+b}^* \\
d'_{k, \text{rep}(k-1)+b} \cdot e_{\text{rep}(k-1)+b}^*
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

\( \mathcal{B} \) next queries \( \mathcal{O}_{\text{solve}} \) additionally \((\text{rep} - 2) \cdot Q_\mathcal{S}\) times. Recall that conditioning on \( \text{BadQuery} \) not occurring, there exists at least one index \( \alpha_k \in [\text{rep} \cdot (k-1) + 2, \text{rep} \cdot k] \) s.t. \( d_{k, \alpha_k} \neq d'_{k, \alpha_k} \). For each \( i \in [\text{rep} \cdot (k-1) + 2, \text{rep} \cdot k] \setminus \{\alpha_k\} \), \( \mathcal{B} \) prepares \( \mathbf{d}_i^{(i)} = \left[ d_{k, 0}^{(i)} \ | \ \cdots | \ d_{k, \text{rep}, Q_\mathcal{S}}^{(i)} \right] \) such that \( d_{k, 0}^{(i)} = 1 \) and \( d_{k, j}^{(i)} = 0 \) otherwise, and queries \( \mathbf{d}_i^{(i)} \) to \( \mathcal{O}_{\text{solve}} \). By definition, \( \mathcal{B} \) receives \( (s_i^*, e_i^*) \), i.e., the exact MLWE solution associated to \( t_i^* \), and sets \((v_i, \mathbf{s}_i, \mathbf{e}_i) := (1, s_i^*, e_i^*)\). At this point, combining with the \( 2 \cdot Q_\mathcal{S} \) queries it used to complete the list \( \text{Ans}[k] \), the total number of \( \mathcal{O}_{\text{solve}} \) query performed by \( \mathcal{B} \) is \( \text{rep} \cdot Q_\mathcal{S} \).

It remains for \( \mathcal{B} \) to extract \((v_{\text{rep}(k-1)+1}, \mathbf{s}_{\text{rep}(k-1)+1}, \mathbf{e}_{\text{rep}(k-1)+1}) \) and \((v_{\alpha_k}, \mathbf{s}_{\alpha_k}, \mathbf{e}_{\alpha_k}) \) for \( k \in [Q_\mathcal{S}] \) without making any more \( \mathcal{O}_{\text{solve}} \) query. Let us first define

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
\mathbf{s}_k \\
\mathbf{e}_k \\
\mathbf{s}'_k \\
\mathbf{e}'_k
\end{bmatrix}
= \begin{bmatrix}
\mathbf{s}_k \\
\mathbf{e}_k \\
\mathbf{s}'_k \\
\mathbf{e}'_k
\end{bmatrix} - \sum_{i \in [\text{rep} \cdot (k-1) + 2, \text{rep} \cdot k] \setminus \{\alpha_k\}} d_{k, i} \cdot \begin{bmatrix}
\mathbf{s}_i \\
\mathbf{e}_i
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

Plugging in Eq. (14) and using fact that \((v_i, \mathbf{s}_i, \mathbf{e}_i) := (1, s_i^*, e_i^*)\) for all \( i \in [\text{rep} \cdot (k-1) + 2, \text{rep} \cdot k] \setminus \{\alpha_k\} \), we can compute

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
\mathbf{s}_k \\
\mathbf{e}_k \\
\mathbf{s}'_k \\
\mathbf{e}'_k
\end{bmatrix}
= \begin{bmatrix}
d_{k, 0} \cdot \mathbf{s}_0 \\
d_{k, 0} \cdot \mathbf{s}'_0 \\
d'_{k, 0} \cdot \mathbf{s}_0 \\
d'_{k, 0} \cdot \mathbf{s}'_0
\end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix}
s_{\text{rep}(k-1)+1}^* \\
e_{\text{rep}(k-1)+1}^* \\
s'_{\text{rep}(k-1)+1}^* \\
e'_{\text{rep}(k-1)+1}^*
\end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix}
d_{k, \alpha_k} \cdot s_{\alpha_k}^* \\
d_{k, \alpha_k} \cdot e_{\alpha_k}^* \\
d'_{k, \alpha_k} \cdot s_{\alpha_k}^* \\
d'_{k, \alpha_k} \cdot e_{\alpha_k}^*
\end{bmatrix},
\]

which in particular implies

\[
\begin{align*}
\mathbf{A}s_k + e_k &= d_{k, 0} \cdot \mathbf{t}_0^* + t_{\text{rep}(k-1)+1}^* + d_{k, \alpha_k} \cdot \mathbf{t}_{\alpha_k}^* \\
\mathbf{A}s_k' + e_k' &= d'_{k, 0} \cdot \mathbf{t}_0^* + t_{\text{rep}(k-1)+1}^* + d'_{k, \alpha_k} \cdot \mathbf{t}_{\alpha_k}^*.
\end{align*}
\]

By multiplying the above two equations by \( v_0 \) and plugging in \( \mathbf{t}_0^* \) from Eq. (11), we have

\[
\begin{align*}
v_0 \cdot \left( t_{\text{rep}(k-1)+1}^* + d_{k, \alpha_k} \cdot \mathbf{t}_{\alpha_k}^* \right) &= \mathbf{A} \left( v_0 \cdot \mathbf{s}_k - d_{k, 0} \cdot \mathbf{s}_0 \right) + \left( v_0 \cdot \mathbf{e}_k - d_{k, 0} \cdot \mathbf{e}_0 \right) = \mathbf{g}^*.
\end{align*}
\]
Finally, it remains to show that
\[ B \quad \text{have} \quad \kappa \quad d \quad \parallel \quad \text{Moreover,} \quad since \quad d \quad \parallel \quad D \quad \text{is maximized when} \quad \kappa,\alpha \quad v \quad s \quad \text{such that} \quad 2 \quad \leq \quad 1 \quad + \quad \parallel \quad \text{TS} \quad \text{satisfying} \quad \kappa,\alpha \quad \cdot \quad 2 \quad \parallel \quad \text{TS} \quad \text{as the solution to the AOM-MLWE game.}

(5) Checking the validity of B’s solution. Finally, it remains to show that B satisfies the winning condition of the AOM-MLWE game. We first check that all the queries (d(κ)|i ∈ [rep · QS]) made by B is in \( L_{TS} \) defined in Definition 4.8. For \( \kappa \in [QS] \), there are two queries \( d_{\kappa} \) and \( d'_{\kappa} \) satisfying \( d_{\kappa,0} \in \mathcal{C} \cup \{0\}, d'_{\kappa,0} = d'_{\kappa,\kappa - 1} \in \mathbb{T} \) or \( b \in \{2, \text{rep}\} \), \( d_{\kappa,\kappa} \neq d'_{\kappa,\kappa} \), and \( d_{\kappa,j} = d'_{\kappa,j} = 0 \) otherwise. Denote \( (κ_1, \ldots, κ_{rep - 2}) = \{\text{rep} \cdot (κ - 1) + 2, \text{rep} \cdot κ\} \). Then, there are rep – 2 queries \( (d_{\kappa,κ_j})_j \in [rep - 2] \) such that \( d_{\kappa,κ_j} = 1 \) and \( d_{κ_j} = 0 \) for \( j \in [0, \text{rep} \cdot QS] \). Let us define a matrix \( D_κ := [d_κ | d'_κ | \ldots | d'_{κ,κ_{rep-2}}] \in \mathbb{R}_{q}^{rep \times rep} \). Let \( c_κ \) be the first row of \( D_κ \) and \( D_κ \) be a matrix in \( \mathbb{R}_{q}^{rep \times rep} \) such that \( D_κ = \begin{bmatrix} c_κ \\ \\ D_κ \end{bmatrix} \). From the above described conditions of \( d_{\kappa}, d'_{\kappa} \), and \( (d_{\kappa,κ_j})_j \in [rep - 2] \), we have \( c_κ \in \mathcal{C}_{TS} \) and \( P^{(κ)}_{\text{row}} D_κ \in B_{TS} \) where \( P^{(κ)}_{\text{row}} \) is a permutation matrix in \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{rep}} \) (see Definition 4.8 for the definition of \( \mathcal{C}_{TS} \) and \( B_{TS} \)). Thus, we obtain

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
1 \\
\vdots \\
(\text{P}_{\text{row}}^{(κ)})
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
c_1 \\
c_2 \\
\vdots \\
c_{QS}
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
D_1 \\
D_2 \\
\vdots \\
D_{QS}
\end{bmatrix}
\in L_{TS}.
\]

Therefore, the set of \( \text{rep} \cdot QS \) queries is included in \( L_{TS} \) as desired.

To complete the proof, it remains to prove that \( (v, \hat{S}, \hat{E}) \) satisfies \( 0 < \|v_i\|_2 \leq B_{L_{TS}} \) for all \( i \in [0, \text{rep} \cdot QS] \), \( \|S\|_2 \leq B_s \), and \( \|E\|_2 \leq B_e \). First, we show \( 0 < \|v_i\|_2 \leq B_{L_{TS}} \) for all \( i \in [0, \text{rep} \cdot QS] \). Since \( c^*_i \neq c^*_2 \), we have \( v_0 \neq 0 \). For \( i \in [\text{rep} \cdot QS], \) \( v_i \) is 1 or \( v_0(d - d') \) where \( d, d' \in \mathbb{T} \) and \( d \neq d' \). If \( v_i = 1 \), it is clear that \( v_i \neq 0 \). We now suppose that \( v_i = v_0(d - d') = 0 \). Then, since \( (d - d') \) is invertible due to Lemma 3.1, we have \( v_0 \neq 0 \). This is contradiction. Thus, we have \( v_0(d - d') \neq 0 \). Therefore, \( v_i \neq 0 \) for \( i \in [0, \text{rep} \cdot QS] \). Moreover, \( \|v_i\|_2 \) is maximized when \( v_i \) is set as in Eqs. (18) and (19). Then, from \( d_{\kappa,\kappa_0}, d'_{\kappa,\kappa_0} \in \mathbb{T} \), we have \( \|v_i\|_2 \leq \|(d_{\kappa,\kappa_0} - d'_{\kappa,\kappa_0}) \cdot (c^*_i - c^*_2)\|_2 \leq 2\|c^*_i\|_2 + 2\|c^*_2\|_2 \). Since \( \|c\|_2 = \sqrt{\mathbb{W}} \) for any \( c \in \mathbb{C} \), we have \( \|v_i\|_2 \leq 4\sqrt{\mathbb{W}} = B_{L_{TS}} \). Therefore, we have \( 0 < \|v_i\|_2 \leq B_{L} \) for all \( i \in [0, \text{rep} \cdot QS] \).

Next, we show \( \|S\|_2 \leq B_s \). Similarly to above, \( \|S\|_2 \) is maximized when \( \hat{s} \) is set as in Egs. (18) and (19). Since \( d_{\kappa,rep(κ - 1) + b}, d'_{\kappa,rep(κ - 1) + b} \in \mathbb{T} \) for \( b \in [2, \text{rep}] \), it suffices to focus on Eq. (18). Then, for any \( \kappa \in [QS] \), we have

\[
\|S_{\kappa}\|_2 = \|\hat{s}^* - \hat{s}^*\|_2
\]

\[
= \|v_0 \cdot (\hat{s}_\kappa - \hat{s}_\kappa) - (d_{\kappa,0} - d'_{\kappa,0}) \cdot \hat{s}_0\|_2
\]

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First, we derive an upper bound on \( \|v_0 \cdot \mathbf{\hat{s}}_k\|_2 \). From Eq. (15), we have

\[
\|v_0 \cdot \mathbf{\hat{s}}_k\|_2 = \|v_0 \cdot d_{\kappa,0} \cdot s^* + v_0 \cdot s^*_\text{rep} + v_0 \cdot d_{\kappa,\alpha} \cdot s^*_\alpha\|_2 \\
\leq \|v_0 \cdot d_{\kappa,0} \cdot s^*_0\|_2 + \|v_0 \cdot s^*_\text{rep} + v_0 \cdot d_{\kappa,\alpha} \cdot s^*_\alpha\|_2
\]

From Lemma 3.2 and \( s^*_0 \overset{\delta}{\sim} D^\prime_w := 2 \cdot D^\prime_w \), we have \( \|v_0 \cdot d_{\kappa,0} \cdot s^*_0\|_2 \leq 2 \cdot (e^{1/4}, \|v_0\|_1, \sigma_t, \sqrt{n\ell}) \) with overwhelming probability. Here, recall \( d_{\kappa,0} \in C \). Then, because \( \|c \cdot c'\|_1 \leq \|c\|_1 \cdot \|c'\|_1 = W^2 \) for any \( c, c' \in C \), we have \( \|v_0 \cdot d_{\kappa,0}\|_1 \leq 2W^2 \). Namely, we have

\[
\|v_0 \cdot d_{\kappa,0} \cdot s^*_0\|_2 \leq 4e^{1/4} \cdot W^2 \cdot \sigma_t \cdot \sqrt{n\ell}.
\]

Next, since \( d_{\kappa,\alpha} \in T \), the distribution of \( d_{\kappa,\alpha} \cdot s^*_\alpha \) is identical to \( s^*_\alpha \). Then, from Lemma 3.2, \( s_i \overset{\delta}{\sim} D^\prime_w \) for \( i \in [\text{rep} \cdot QS] \), and \( \|v_0\|_1 \leq 2W \), we have that \( \|v_0 \cdot s^*_\text{rep} + v_0 \cdot d_{\kappa,\alpha} \cdot s^*_\alpha\|_2 \) are bounded by \( 2e^{1/4} \cdot W \cdot \sigma_w \cdot \sqrt{n\ell} \). Combining the two bounds, we arrive at

\[
\|v_0 \cdot \mathbf{\hat{s}}_k\|_2 \leq 4e^{1/4} \cdot (W^2 \cdot \sigma_t + W \cdot \sigma_w) \cdot \sqrt{n\ell}.
\]

Similarly, \( \|v_0 \cdot s^*_i\|_2 \) has the same upper bound as \( \|v_0 \cdot \mathbf{\hat{s}}_k\|_2 \). We also have \( \|s_{\alpha\kappa}\|_2 = \|z^*_1 - z^*_2\|_2 \leq 2B \) since \( \|z^*_1, 2w \cdot H^*_1 \mod q\|_2 \leq B \) and \( \|z^*_2, 2w \cdot H^*_2 \mod q\|_2 \leq B \) hold. Collecting all the bounds, we obtain our desired bound:

\[
\|\mathbf{\hat{s}}_{\alpha\kappa}\|_2 \leq 8e^{1/4} \cdot (W^2 \cdot \sigma_t + W \cdot \sigma_w) \cdot \sqrt{n\ell} + 4B = B_{\alpha}.
\]

Finally, we show \( \|\mathbf{\hat{E}}\|_2 \leq B_{\text{e}} \). Similarly to above, we only focus on \( \|\mathbf{\hat{e}}_{\alpha\kappa}\|_2 \) in Eq. (18). Then, for any \( \kappa \in [QS] \), we have

\[
\|\mathbf{\hat{e}}_{\alpha\kappa}\|_2 = \|\mathbf{\hat{e}}^* - \mathbf{\hat{e}}^*_\alpha\|_2 \\
= \|v_0 \cdot (\mathbf{\hat{e}}_\kappa - \mathbf{\hat{e}}^*_\kappa) - (d_{\kappa,0} - d^*_\kappa,0) \cdot \mathbf{\hat{e}}_0\|_2 \\
\leq \|v_0 \cdot \mathbf{e}_\kappa\|_2 + \|v_0 \cdot \mathbf{e}'_\kappa\|_2 + 2\|\mathbf{\hat{e}}_0\|_2.
\]

By an almost identical argument to \( \|\mathbf{\hat{s}}_{\alpha\kappa}\|_2 \), we have

\[
\|\mathbf{\hat{e}}_{\alpha\kappa}\|_2 \leq 8e^{1/4} \cdot (W^2 \cdot \sigma_t + W \cdot \sigma_w) \cdot \sqrt{n\ell} + 2\|\mathbf{\hat{e}}_0\|_2.
\]

It remains to derive an upper bound on \( \|\mathbf{\hat{e}}_0\|_2 \). By the definition of \( \mathbf{\hat{e}}_0 \) in Eq. (11),

\[
\|\mathbf{\hat{e}}_0\|_2 = \|2^{w_1} \cdot \mathbf{H}^*_1 - 2^{w_2} \cdot \mathbf{H}^*_2 \cdot (q_{\text{bot}} \cdot \delta + \hat{\delta}_2 + c^*_1 \cdot \hat{\delta}_3 + c^*_2 \cdot \hat{\delta}_4) \mod q\|_2 \\
= \|2^{w_1} \cdot \mathbf{H}^*_1 \mod q\|_2 + \|2^{w_2} \cdot \mathbf{H}^*_2 \mod q\|_2 + \|q_{\text{bot}} \cdot \delta\|_2 + \|\hat{\delta}_2\|_2 + \|c^*_1 \cdot \hat{\delta}_3\|_2 + \|c^*_2 \cdot \hat{\delta}_4\|_2,
\]

where we have already established that \( \|\delta_1\|_\infty \leq 2 \), \( \|\delta_2\|_\infty \leq 2 \cdot (2^{w_1} - 1) \), and \( \|\delta_3\|_\infty, \|\delta_4\|_\infty \leq 2^{w_1} - 1 \). By the verification bound, we have \( \|2^{w_1} \cdot \mathbf{H}^*_1 \mod q\|_2, \|2^{w_2} \cdot \mathbf{H}^*_2 \mod q\|_2 \leq B \). Due to our choice of \( q \), we have \( q_{\text{bot}} \in [0, 2^{w_1} - 1] \). Combining the bounds, we have

\[
\|\mathbf{\hat{e}}_0\|_2 \leq (2^{w_1+2} + W \cdot 2^{w_1+1}) \cdot \sqrt{n\ell} + 2B.
\]

Collecting all the bounds, we obtain our desired bound:

\[
\|\mathbf{\hat{e}}_{\alpha\kappa}\|_2 \leq \left(2^{w_1+3} + W \cdot 2^{w_1+2} + 8e^{1/4} \cdot (W^2 \cdot \sigma_t + W \cdot \sigma_w)\right) \cdot \sqrt{n\ell} + 4B = B_{\alpha}.
\]

In summary, \( B \)'s output \((v, \mathbf{\hat{S}}, \mathbf{\hat{E}})\) is valid a solution to the AOM-MLWE problem. Since \( B \) runs \( A \) twice, we have \( \text{Time}(B) \approx 2 \cdot \text{Time}(A) \). This completes the proof. \(\square\)
7 Cryptanalysis of AOM-MLWE

We now turn to the concrete security analysis of the AOM-MLWE problem and go beyond the reductions proposed in Section 4. To do so, we aim at giving the sharpest concrete reduction to AOM-MLWE from approx-SVP, which in turns can be solved using lattice reduction algorithms and converted in a bitsec estimate.

7.1 A First Naive Attempt

Let \( T = AS + E \) be an AOM-MLWE challenge with \( Q - 1 \) queries available. The first intuition we might have is that from a linear algebra perspective each of the \( Q - 1 \) query removes one degree of freedom in the module rank. Hence since our problem consists in \( Q \) independent MLWE instances (or equivalently one big instance in rank \( Q! \)) we can assume that after the query, the dimension of the resulting linear algebra problem is reduced to \( Q - (Q - 1) = 1 \), that is a single MLWE. We can very easily formalize this intuition by querying first \( e_1,s_1 \), then \( e_2,s_2 \) and so on until \( e_{Q-1},s_{Q-1} \). We then solve the remaining instance \( As_Q + e_Q \) to retrieve \( s_Q \) and \( e_Q \), completing the resolution. One might argue that because of the shape of the queries matrices, we can’t query directly the values of \( e_i \) and \( s_i \). However, we can always do so as the challenge space has sufficiently many inversibles and use basic Gauss pivot to exactly retrieve \( Q - 1 \) of them. However, this attack is far from being optimal. We now show that we can diffuse a bit of the final vector in each of the queries so that we can get a statical leak in addition of the sole values, which will make the final instance of MLWE much easier.

7.2 Solving AOM-MLWE with Selective Queries Better than Naively

As we saw in the preliminary discussion of Section 4, the query power gives a statistical advantage in breaking the final MLWE instance. The attack we proposed in Section 7.1 is fully relying on lattice reduction and completely ignores the subtlety of the choices of the queries. Whereas the attack proposed in Section 4.3.1, we fully break the scheme with only a statistical recovery. For harder set of parameters, we can not do so. We however show that we can combine this statistical information with standard lattice reduction arguments to do better.

7.3 A Simple Example

Let us reuse the attack we already described in Section 4.3.1 and roughly analyze it, as it will give the main intuitions on how the leakage exploitation works.

We use the (selective) queries: \( d_i = (1, \ldots, 0, 1, 0, \ldots, 0)^T \) where the second 1 is in position \( i \), for \( i \) ranging from 2 to \( Q \). As in Section 4.3.1, we then get the the sets of \( Q - 1 \) secrets \( s_i + s_1 \) and noises \( e_1 + e_i \). Computing the sum of them yields \( \tilde{s}_1 = (Q - 1)s_1 + \eta \) and \( \tilde{e}_1 = (Q - 1)e_1 + \epsilon \) where \( (\eta, \epsilon) = \sum_{i=2}^{Q}(s_i, e_i) \). As we are working above the smoothing parameter of \( R \)—the functional conditions on the standard deviation of the error and secret in our scheme are orders of magnitude above even the crudest estimate of the smoothing of this cyclotomic ring—, these two variables are distributed as discrete gaussians of width multiple by a factor \( Q - 1 \). For the sake of simplicity, let us assume for a moment that both variables \( \tilde{s}_1, \tilde{e}_1 \) are both multiple of \( Q - 1 \). We will see in a minute that we can treat the general case in a similar manner: but for now write \( s'_1 = \frac{s_1}{Q-1} = s_1 + \eta' \) and \( e'_1 = \frac{e_1}{Q-1} = e_1 + \epsilon' \). Now we can write a new MLWE instance derived from the sample \( t_1 = As_1 + e_1 \). To do so let expand \( s_1, e_1 \) using our approximations:

\[
\begin{align*}
t_1 &= As_1 + e_1 = A(s'_1 - \eta') + (e'_1 - \epsilon') = (As'_1 + e'_1) - (A\eta' + \epsilon')
\end{align*}
\]

Since \( As'_1 + e'_1 \) is known by the attacker, we can write

\[
\tau := t_1 + (As'_1 + e'_1) = A\eta' + \epsilon'.
\]

This new instance is now easier than the original one, as the absolute norms of the secret and noise are smaller by a factor \( \frac{1}{\sqrt{Q-1}} \).
Remark 7.1. We can directly handle the general case where the divisibility condition \( Q - 1 \mid s_1, e_1 \) is not fulfilled. For that it suffices to scale the instance \( t = As_1 + e_1 \) by the factor \( Q - 1 \). As such, we will end with a final instance of the shape \((Q - 1) \cdot (A\eta' + \epsilon') \mod q(Q - 1)\), where the information/noise ratio are exactly the same as in the specific case presented.

Once \( s_1, e_1 \) are recovered from \( \eta', \epsilon' \), simply remark that each query result \( s_i + e_i = s_i \) by subtracting \( s_1, e_1 \). We then recovered all the secrets and errors, completing the attack.

7.4 The General Case.

The generic situation is quite similar but a bit more subtle than this attack. Indeed, we need to accommodate to the specific shape that is imposed on the query matrix. For an AOM-MLWE challenge \( T = AS + E \) with \( Q - 1 \) queries collected in a matrix \( D \). The blueprint of the attack goes as follows:

1. Get the matrices of query answers: \( \text{Ans}_s = SD \) and \( \text{Ans}_e = ED \).
2. Decompose the Queries and Extraction of \( e_1 \): separate the first line of \( D \) and perform linear algebra in order to rewrite \( e_1 \) as a known target \( e_1' \) plus some controlled noise \( \epsilon' \). This localizes \( e_1 \) in an ellipsoid centered at \( e_1' \) and of known parameters with overwhelming probability. Same goes for \( s_1 \) decomposed as \( s_1' \) plus some noise \( \eta' \).
3. Decode \( e_1 \) by yet another MLWE instance: craft the following challenge \( \tau := -t_1 + (As_1' + e_1') = A\eta' + \epsilon' \).

The trick here is that both \( \eta' \) and \( \epsilon' \) are elliptically distributed, which implies to isotropize the problem to solve it classically. This step induces a distortion of the space which we can quantify finely.
4. Recover \( \eta', \epsilon' \) from lattice reduction and use linear algebra to recover \( s_1, e_1 \) and subsequently \( s_i, e_i \).

We now turn to these steps in more details.

Setup. Let \( T = AS + E \) the AOM-MLWE challenge, with the secret matrix \( S \in \mathbb{R}_q^{k \times q} \) and the error matrix \( E \in \mathbb{R}_q^{k \times Q - 1} \). Suppose that the query is encoded in a matrix \( D \in \mathbb{R}_q^{Q \times Q - 1} \), so that the challenger returns the matrices of answers \( \text{Ans}_s = SD \) and \( \text{Ans}_e = ED \).

Decomposing the Query and Extraction of \( e_1 \). Up to permutation of the rows, let us assume that we can decompose \( D \) as

\[
D = \left( \begin{array}{c} d^1 \hline \overline{D} \end{array} \right)
\]

for a vector \( d \in \mathbb{R}_q^{Q - 1} \) and \( \overline{D} \in \text{GL}_{Q - 1}(\mathbb{R}_q) \).

Similarly, we decompose the errors and secrets by their first columns as: \( E = (e_1 | \overline{E}) \) and \( S = (s_1 | \overline{S}) \) Using these decompositions, we have by linear algebra:

\[
\text{Ans}_s = s_1 d^1 + SD \quad \text{and} \quad \text{Ans}_e = e_1 d^1 + ED.
\]

We now have explicit dependency on \( s_1 \) and \( e_1 \), but only through the multiplication by \( d^1 \). To make this latter term disappear we use the pseudo-inversion trick: multiplying on the right by \( d^\top \), then dividing by the totally positive element \( d^\top d \) gives:

\[
s_1 = \frac{\text{Ans}_s d}{d^\top d} \quad \text{and} \quad e_1 = \frac{\text{Ans}_e d}{d^\top d}.
\] (20)
Exploiting the MLWE Structure with the Leakage. We now assume—exactly as we did first in the example before—that the vectors $s'_i, e'_i$ are of integral coefficients. We now have derived a non-trivial statistical information: $e_1$ and $s_1$ are random variables centered respectively at $e'_1$ and $s'_1$ and with covariances $\sigma^2_1 \Sigma_1$ and $\sigma^2_2 \Sigma_1$ where $\Sigma = \left( \frac{\Sigma_1}{\Delta} \right)$.

This translates directly into a geometric information as we can construct a new corresponding MLWE instance corresponding to the decoding of $\epsilon$ and $\eta$:

$$\tau := t_1 - (As'_1 + e'_1) = A\eta + \epsilon.$$ 

Solving Approximate Elliptic Secret/Noise MLWE. The situation is then syntactically very similar to the previous attack, but this time, the distribution of the resulting secret/error is elliptic instead of spherical. As it is now the case in all lattice-based schemes based on structured lattices, we will do a leap of faith and assume that the security of MLWE is the same as the security of the lattice problem obtained when descending over $\mathbb{Z}$.

To solve this new instance, we will use a reduction to unique-SVP through so-called distorted-BDD, as done for instance in [DDGR20]. The core trick is to first embed the MLWE instance into a module lattice of rank $\ell \cdot n + 1$. Let $\Lambda = \{ (x, y, w) \mid x + A \cdot y - \tau w = 0 \pmod{q} \}$ where $A$ is overloaded to also denote the antirculant matrix corresponding to the multiplication endomorphism in $\mathcal{R}_q^{\ell}$ by the matrix $A$. A basis of this lattice is given by

$$\begin{pmatrix} qI_{kn} & 0 & 0 \\ A & -I_{kn} & 0 \\ \tau & 0 & I_n \end{pmatrix}.$$ 

Now remark that the vector (e, s, 1) belong to the lattice $\Lambda$, but that any short vector of the shape $(e', s', v)$ for small enough $v$ will also be a solution of the approximate problem, with the relaxation by $v$. We can be even more precise and remark that with overwhelming probability this vector belongs to the intersection of the ellipsoid defined by the symmetric block-diagonal semi-definite positive matrix:

$$S = \begin{pmatrix} \sigma_e \Sigma & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & \sigma_s \Sigma & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & I_n \end{pmatrix},$$ 

that is to say the set $E = \{ x \in \mathbb{R}^{(k+\ell+1)n} \mid \langle x, S^{-1}S^{-1}x \rangle \leq \sqrt{d\ell} \}$.

It then suffices to apply the matrix $S^{-1}$ on $\Lambda$ to re-isotropize the problem and reduce it to a usual spherical DBDD instance.

Solving the Final approx-SVP Instance. From this point, we can apply lattice reduction on this lattice $\Lambda^* = S^{-1}\Lambda$ to retrieve short vectors. To do so, we rely on the DBKZ algorithm, which achieve the best time/quality trade-offs in the literature. Let us do a very brief recall on the output guarantees of this algorithm.

Modelization of the Output of Reduced Bases. For the sake of clarity in the following explanations, we adopt the "Geometric series assumption" (GSA). This assumption states that the norm of the Gram-Schmidt vectors of a reduced basis decreases with a geometric decay. Specifically, in the context of the self-dual Block Korkine-Zolotarev (DBKZ) reduction algorithm proposed by Micciancio and Walter [MW16], the GSA can be instantiated as follows. Suppose we have an output basis $(b_i)_{i \in [n]}$ obtained from the DBKZ algorithm with a block size denoted as $\beta$, applied to a lattice $\Lambda$ of rank $n$. Then, the following equation holds for the $i$-th Gram-Schmidt vector $b_i^*$ of the basis:

$$\|b_i^*\| = \gamma_n^{i-1} \sqrt{\text{vol}(\Lambda)}, \quad \text{where} \quad \gamma_\beta = \left( \frac{\pi \beta}{2 \pi e} \right)^{\frac{1}{2\pi \beta}}.$$ 

\footnote{For the sake of notational simplicity, we denote the vectors of the modules $\mathcal{R}_q^\ell, \mathcal{R}_1^\ell$ and their descent over $\mathbb{Z}$ by the same symbol.}
for $b_i^*$ being the $i$-th Gram Schmidt vector of the basis. In particular this implies that the first vector of the output basis is satisfying the relation:

$$\|b_1\| \leq \gamma^n \text{vol}(\Lambda)\frac{1}{2n}.$$  

In order to get a finer estimate, when computing the actual figures this analysis can be refined by using the probabilistic simulation of [DDGR20] rather than this coarser GSA-based model to determine the BKZ blocksize $\beta$ for a successful attack. This helps to take into account the well-known quadratic tail phenomenon of reduced bases [YD17].

**Solving uSVP.** To retrieve vectors of size comparable to $\|(e^*, s^*)\|$, we therefore need to select a blocksize $\beta$ such that:

$$\sqrt{\frac{\beta}{(k + \ell + 1)n}}\|(e_1, s_1)\| \leq \gamma_\beta^{(k+\ell+1)n} \text{vol}(\Lambda^*)^{\frac{1}{(k+\ell+1)n}}.$$

Conveniently, during the isotropization step, we re-scale the target secret vector to be normally distributed, so that with overwhelming probability we have $\|(e^*, s^*)\| \leq \sqrt{\ell d}$. Further, we also know the volume of $\Lambda^*$ since by multilinearity of the determinant we get $\text{vol}(\Lambda^*) = \text{vol}(\Lambda) \det(S) = q^{\ell d} \det(S)$. All in all we then seek for the minimal $\beta$ such that:

$$\sqrt{\beta} \leq \gamma_\beta^{(k+\ell+1)n} \text{det}(S)^{\frac{1}{(k+\ell+1)n}}.$$  

### 7.5 Concrete Model of Lattice Reduction, GSA and Beyond

Before delving in the concrete parameter selection, we need to devise a sound method to convert the complexity of the resulting MLWE instance, constructed through the previous reduction to actual figures representing the bit-security of the problem.

**The Core-SVP Hardness.** Indeed, to accurately assess the hardness of the underlying problems and ensure a specified level of bit-security, it is necessary to establish a model that simulates the behavior of a practical oracle for approximate Shortest Vector Problem (SVP). This modeling is crucial since our hard problems involve the identification of relatively short vectors in various lattices. To achieve this, we will employ the celebrated (self-dual) Block Korkine-Zolotarev (BKZ) algorithm. Specifically, the BKZ algorithm with a block size denoted by $\beta$ necessitates a polynomial number of calls to an SVP oracle in dimension $\beta$, with a heuristically expected number of calls that is approximately linear—with some implementation tricks.

To account for potential future advancements in this reduction method, we will only consider the cost of a single call to the SVP oracle. This approach, known as *core-SVP hardness*, entails a highly conservative estimation. This cautionary measure is warranted by the possibility of cost amortization for SVP calls within BKZ, particularly when sieving is employed as the SVP oracle. Notably, sieving has become the prevailing standard for larger block sizes, as exemplified in [ADH+19].

**From Lattice Reduction Block-Size to Concrete Bitsec.** This analysis translates into concrete bit-security estimates following the methodology of NEWHOPE [ADPS16] (so-called “core-SVP methodology”). In this model, the bit complexity of lattice sieving (which is asymptotically the best SVP oracle) is taken as $[0.292\beta]$ in the classical setting [BDGL16] and $[0.257\beta]$ in the quantum setting [CL21] in blocksize $\beta$.

### 8 Parameters Selection

We now turn to parameters selection. Classically for parameter selection of lattice scheme, we rely on the so-called Core-SVP methodology to convert lattice reduction blocksize into concrete bitsecurity. We provide a complete overview of this in Section 7.5. The security of our two-round threshold scheme is evaluated against forgery and key recovery/pseudo-randomness of the verification key. We point out that the practical bounds are not directly based on the advantage bounds given in the asymptotic security proof (e.g., we
ignore the loss from the forking lemma, we devise a more direct reduction for AOM-MLWE). However we still do enforce that all the functional constraints between parameters are satisfied. This is common practice when dealing with practical security, as epitomized in the parameter selection process of the NIST standards ML-DSA (Dilithium)[LDK+22], FN-DSA (Falcon)[PFH+22], or the recent signatures [EFG+22, dPEK+23].

8.1 Direct Forgery Resilience

A direct forgery can be done by reverse-engineering a signature from the verification process. More precisely this amounts to solve the following problem usually referred as the SelfTargetMSIS assumption. Following the methodology of Dilithium [LDK+22, §C.3], combined with the nearest colattice algorithm for solving CVP gives the condition: $B \leq \min_{n \leq m \leq (k+\ell)q} \left( \sqrt[m]{q^k} \right)$. Together with the challenge space condition $(\frac{n}{W}) \cdot 2^W \geq 2^\lambda$. We let the reader refer to appendix more details.

8.2 Breaking Unforgeability

For the second attack, we will follow the security reduction done in Section 6, which quantifies the reduction to the AOM-MLWE problem and amounts to perform a key recovery using the maximal number of signature queries to collect as much information as we can. Recall from the security proof that the advantage in breaking the unforgeability game is expressed as:

$$\text{Adv}_{TS,A}^{ts-uf}(1^\lambda, N, T) \leq \sqrt{Q_{RO} \cdot \text{Adv}_{TS}^{AOM-MLWE}(1^\lambda)} + N^2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{PRF}^{B}(1^\lambda) + \frac{Q_S}{2^{2\lambda/3}} + \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

the negl($\lambda$) term being indeed negligible when the set of relations between coefficients given in Section 6 are satisfied. We normalize the cost by the global number of queries, that is to say $Q_{RO}$ when computing the bit-security:

$$\lambda_{\text{real}} = \log_2(\text{Time}(A)/\text{Adv}_{TS,A}^{ts-uf}(1^\lambda, N, T)),$$

where the running time of the adversary satisfies $\text{Time}(A) \geq Q_{RO}$. Our goal is then to ensure $\lambda_{\text{real}} \leq \lambda + O(1)$. The term in $N^2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{PRF}^{B}(1^\lambda)$ is itself exponentially small in $\lambda$ when normalized by $\text{Time}(A)$ and the term $Q_S 2^{-2\lambda}$ is itself smaller than $2^{-\lambda}$, so that we only care about the first term. As typical with practice oriented schemes (e.g., [Sch90, FKP16, BKV19]), we treat the advantage by ignoring the square root induced by the forking lemma. To do so we rely on the worst case analysis of Section 7 to reduce the problem to a single MLWE instance in dimension $df$. In order to evaluate the cost of this remaining MLWE, we need to analyse the shape of the admissible queries in fine-grained way. As this analysis is purely geometrical and quite convoluted, we defer it to Appendix C.2. The analysis reveals that, practically speaking, the secret/vectors of the resulting MLWE instance are $\sqrt{WQ_S}$ times smaller than for the original parameters of the AOM-MLWE challenge itself, meaning that an attacker would need to solve an MLWE instance ($n,q,k,\ell,\frac{\gamma}{\sqrt{WQ_S}}$) type instance. Hence we seek for a set of parameters which are secure even reduced by this large factor. To do so, we can rely on the extensive literature on the cryptanalysis of MLWE. To our knowledge, the state-of-the-art for estimating the concrete hardness of MLWE is the so-called lattice estimator (https://github.com/malb/lattice-estimator). According to this estimator on our tentative parameters, the best known attacks are the primal uSVP attack by Alkim et al. [ADPS16] and the dual/hybrid attack by Espitau et al. [EJK20] all in all combined with the so-called dimension for free trick of [Duc18].

8.3 Parameter Sets.

Despite the apparently large variables, parameters can be set in a systematic way and we can devise an optimization tool to explore the parameter space and find the signatures with the smallest size/communication complexity while still achieving the desired security guarantees. The result of our exploration are collected in Section 8.3, targeting NIST level I, III and V of security, with supporting roughly $2^{80}$ queries of signatures before being endanger. Moreover all of them support a threshold up to 1024 participants, which is the
upper limit of the “large” requirements of NIST preliminary call for threshold. It is remarkable that our 2
round signatures are practical with aggregated signature size lower than 11KiB. The main overhead in its
use being in the offline phase where signers must exchange the tokens, which are of size a couple of hundreds
kilobytes. It is worth highlighting that if we consider a model where the aggregator stores the preprocessing
tokens, the individual signers do not need to include w_i in the partial signature sig_i. In this case, the online
communication per user becomes much smaller: 28KB, 37.5KB, and 44KB for NIST level I, III, and V, respectively.

Table 2: All sizes are given in KB for a maximum T of 1024 and Q being upper bounded by 2^60. on, off
refers to the communication cost per user in the online/offline phase. The online cost is written XX(YY)
for XX being the size of the optimized version where the tokens are already processed by the aggregator and
YY being the naive scheme where the tokens are transmitted at an online phase. The corresponding
security is given in bits: Sec F for the forgery and Sec K for the key recovery respectively.

| Sec (F/K) | log q | log σ_t | log σ_w | n | ℓ | k | W | |vk| | | | on/us | off/us |
|----------|-------|---------|---------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 128 / 146 | 50 | 5 | 34.5 | 38 | 38 | 256 | 9 | 11 | 23 | 5.5 | 10.8 | 28(225) | 261 |
| 192 / 192 | 50 | 10 | 35 | 34 | 38 | 512 | 6 | 7 | 31 | 7 | 14.5 | 37.5(300) | 441 |
| 256 / 282 | 51 | 15 | 37 | 35 | 40 | 512 | 7 | 10 | 44 | 9.5 | 18 | 44(350) | 830 |

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A Visual Aid for Row and Column Masks

Figure 15: Figure taken from [dPKM+24]. Relationships between the individual masks $m_{i,j}$, the row masks $m_i$, and column masks $m^*_j$.

- The row masks $m_i$ (blue, dotted pattern) are all public.
- An adversary corrupting the user set $\{1, 2, 3\}$ learns the set $(m_{i,j})_{\min(i,j) \leq 3}$ and can infer the column masks $(m^*_j)_{j \leq 3}$ (red).
Here, we provide slightly more intuition behind the idea of [dPKM+24]. Fig. 15 is taken from [dPKM+24] for the sake of aiding our explanation. For \(i, j \in SS\), let \(m_{i,j} = \text{PRF}(\text{seed}_{i,j}, \text{sid})\) and let \(HS\) (resp. \(CS\)) be the set of honest (resp. corrupt) signers in the signer set \(SS\). In Fig. 15, \(SS = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}\), \(HS = \{4, 5\}\), and \(CS = \{1, 2, 3\}\).

Let us focus on the column masks \((m_j^*)_{j \in HS}\) used to construct the responses \((z_j = c \cdot L_{SS,j} \cdot s_j + r_j + m_j^*)_{j \in HS}\) to form an intuition of the security proof. The proof hinges on the key observation that while the individual row masks \((m_j)_{j \in HS}\) are known to the adversary, the only knowledge the adversary gains on the column masks \((m_j^*)_{j \in HS}\) are their sum \(\sum_{j \in HS} m_j^*\); put differently, \((m_j^*)_{j \in HS}\) are distributed randomly, conditioned on their sum being \(\sum_{j \in HS} m_j^*\). This can be checked from the fact that \(m_j^*\) can be written as \(\sum_{j \in HS} m_{i,j} + \sum_{j \in CS} m_{i,j}\), where each \(m_{i,j}\) for \(i, j \in HS\) remains random to the adversary since \(\text{seed}_{i,j}\) is only known to the honest signers \(i\) and \(j\). (See Fig. 15 for a pictorial example.) Using this fact, for any \(h \in HS\), the set of honest responses

\[
z_h = c \cdot L_{SS,h} \cdot s_h + r_h + m_h^* \quad \land \quad (z_j = c \cdot L_{SS,j} \cdot s_j + r_j + m_j^*)_{j \in HS \setminus \{h\}}
\]

is distributed identically to

\[
z_h = c \cdot \sum_{j \in HS} (L_{SS,j} \cdot s_j + r_j) + m_h^* \quad \land \quad (z_j = m_j^*)_{j \in HS \setminus \{h\}}
\]

for randomly chosen \((m_j^*)_{j \in HS \setminus \{h\}}\) and \(m_h^* := \sum_{j \in HS} m_j^* - \sum_{j \in HS \setminus \{h\}} m_j^*\). Using the correctness of the Shamir secret sharing protocol, this can be further rewritten as

\[
z_h = c \cdot s - \sum_{j \in CS} L_{SS,j} \cdot s_j + \sum_{j \in HS} r_j + m_h^* \quad \land \quad (z_j = m_j^*)_{j \in HS \setminus \{h\}}
\]

Therefore, the set of honest responses can be simulated only with the signing key \(s\), and importantly, all the large Lagrange coefficients multiplied to the partial signing keys \(s_i\) can be moved around to cancel them out. At this point, we can use similar arguments to the standard Lyubashevsky signature to complete the proof. While the concrete method we generate the masks and how the reduction retains consistency within the security proof is different, the way we use the mask to move around the large Lagrange coefficients is identical to [dPKM+24].

**B Alternative Reduction to sel-AOM-MLWE**

We provide an alternative reduction from the MLWE and MSIS problem to sel-AOM-MLWE. While the parameter sets to establish the hardness of this variant of sel-AOM-MLWE is not used in our work, we nonetheless included it as we believe to be informative to understand the hardness of AOM-MLWE.

In this reduction, we embed a single MLWE instance \(t^* = As^* + e^*\) in *all* of the columns of \(T = AS + E\) and define the (alternative) accepted linear combinations \(\mathcal{L}_{alt}\) so that this embedding can be done in an unnoticeable manner. At a high level, since the adversary only obtains \((SD, ED)\) as the MLWE hints, where \(D \in L_{alt} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{Q \times (Q-1)}\), we can embed an MLWE instance in the orthogonal subspace spanned by the columns of \(D\).

**B.0.1 Constraints and Parameter Selection**

We provide the set of parameters for which we establish hardness of sel-AOM-MLWE_{q,t,k,Q,(D),e \in [Q],L_{alt},B_{alt},B_s,B_a}. One concrete example of \(L_{alt}\) satisfying the below constraints is provide in Section 4.5.

**Constraints on Parameters.** We first give the intermediate variables that will be used during the proof:

- \(D_i\) for \(i \in [Q]\) is a discrete Gaussian distribution \(D_{\sigma_i}\) with width \(\sigma_i > 0\), where denote \(\sigma_{\text{max}} = \max_{i \in [Q]} \sigma_i\) and \(\sigma_{\text{min}} = \min_{i \in [Q]} \sigma_i\). In particular, we denote \(\sigma^* = \sigma_{\text{min}}\).
We now list the constraints for the proof to hold:

- \( \mathcal{D} \) is a discrete Gaussian distribution \( \mathcal{D}_\sigma \) with width \( \sigma > 0 \).
- A bound \( \gamma_{\mathcal{L}_{\mathit{alt}}} > 0 \) and an efficient algorithm \( \text{AppSolveSVP} : \mathcal{R}_Q^{Q \times (Q-1)} \to \mathcal{R}_Q^Q \) such that for any input \( D \) in the set of accepted linear combinations \( \mathcal{L}_{\mathit{alt}} \subseteq \mathcal{R}_Q^{Q \times (Q-1)} \). \( \text{AppSolveSVP} \) outputs \( w \in \{w' \in \mathcal{R}_Q^Q \setminus \{0\} \mid w'^T D = 0 \} \) such that \( \|w_i\|_2 \leq \gamma_{\mathcal{L}_{\mathit{alt}}} \) for \( i \in [Q] \). That is, we assume we can efficiently solve the (approximate) shortest vector problem of a lattice spanned by the orthogonal subspace of any matrix in \( \mathcal{L}_{\mathit{alt}} \).
- \( \alpha \) is the order of the Rényi divergence.
- The accepted “slack” for the AOM-MLWE solution is \( B_{\mathcal{L}_{\mathit{alt}}} = 1 \). While we can accommodate for a larger slack, we do not investigate this as this section is mainly to show feasibility.
- \( \epsilon_{\mathit{lattice}} = \text{Adv}_{B_{\mathcal{L}}}^{\text{MLWE}} (1^\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{B'}^{\text{MSIS}} (1^\lambda) + 2 \cdot \frac{\Delta}{\sqrt{2}} \) for Lemma B.3, where \( n \) is the dimension of \( \mathcal{R}_q \), \( B \) and \( B' \) are constructed from the adversary \( A \) against the sel-AOM-MLWE problem.

We now list the constraints for the proof to hold:

- MLWE_{\ell,k,D} is hard, implying \( \text{Adv}_{B_{\mathcal{L}}}^{\text{MLWE}} (1^\lambda) = \text{negl}(\lambda) \). I.e., \( \sigma \geq \sqrt{\ell} \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log n}) \) using Lemma 3.17.
- MSIS_{\ell+1,k,B_{\mathcal{L}}} is hard, where \( B_{\mathcal{L}} = B_a + B_n + \sqrt{n} \cdot (\gamma_{\mathcal{L}_{\mathit{alt}}} + e^{1/4} \cdot \sigma_{\max} \cdot \sqrt{n} \cdot (\sqrt{\ell} + \sqrt{k})) \), implying \( \text{Adv}_{B_{\mathcal{L}}}^{\text{MSIS}} (1^\lambda) = \text{negl}(\lambda) \). I.e., \( q > B_{\mathcal{L}} \cdot \sqrt{nk} \cdot \omega(\log(nk)) \) using Lemma 3.18.
- \( 2 \cdot \frac{\Delta}{\sqrt{2}} = \text{negl}(\lambda) \) to bound the norm of samples from discrete Gaussians using Lemma 3.2.
- \( \alpha = \frac{\sigma^*}{\gamma_{\mathcal{L}_{\mathit{alt}}} \cdot \sigma \cdot n \cdot \sqrt{Q} \cdot (\ell + k)} \geq 2 \) and \( \sigma^* \geq \gamma_{\mathcal{L}_{\mathit{alt}}} \cdot \sigma \cdot n \cdot \sqrt{Q} \cdot (\ell + k) \).

### B.0.2 Candidate Asymptotic Parameters

Finally, we give a set of asymptotic parameters which fit the above constraints. Below it is helpful to keep in mind that the number \( Q \) of MLWE samples and the “quality” \( \gamma_{\mathcal{L}_{\mathit{alt}}} \) of the accepted linear combinations \( \mathcal{L}_{\mathit{alt}} \) dictate the parameters.

**Definition B.1** (Alternative Parameters Establishing Hardness of sel-AOM-MLWE). We denote the set of following asymptotic parameters along with the restricted accepted linear combinations \( \mathcal{L}_{\mathit{alt}} \) and associated algorithm \( \text{AppSolveSVP} \) explained above as \( \text{alt-hard-param} \).

- \( n, \ell, k \) such that \( n \geq \lambda \).
- \( D = \mathcal{D}_\sigma \) with \( \sigma = \sqrt{\ell} \cdot \log n \).
- \( D_i = \mathcal{D}_{\sigma_i} \) for \( i \in [Q] \) such that \( \sigma^* = \min_{i \in [Q]} \sigma_i \).
- \( \sigma^* = \gamma_{\mathcal{L}_{\mathit{alt}}} \cdot \sigma \cdot n \cdot \sqrt{Q} \cdot (\ell + k) \).
- \( q \) is the smallest prime larger than \( B_{\mathcal{L}} \cdot \sqrt{nk} \cdot \log^2(nk) \), where \( B_{\mathcal{L}} = B_a + B_n + \sqrt{n} \cdot (\gamma_{\mathcal{L}_{\mathit{alt}}} + e^{1/4} \cdot \sigma_{\max} \cdot \sqrt{n} \cdot (\sqrt{\ell} + \sqrt{k})) \).
- Plugging in \( \sigma^* \), \( \alpha = \sqrt{-\log(\epsilon_{\mathit{lattice}})} \) which is larger than 2 assuming hardness of MLWE and MSIS.
B.0.3 Reduction

The following establishes the hardness of \text{sel-AOM-MLWE} for the above parameter selection.

**Theorem B.2 (MLWE and MSIS imply \text{sel-AOM-MLWE}).** If there exists an adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) against the \text{sel-AOM-MLWE}\(_{q,\ell,k,Q,(D_i)_{i\in\mathcal{Q}};\mathcal{L}_{\text{alt}},\mathcal{B}_\text{alt},\mathcal{B}_s,B_k)} \) problem, defined with respect to the parameter selection \text{alt-hard-param} in Definition B.1, then we can construct an adversary \( \mathcal{B} \) and \( \mathcal{B}' \) against the \text{MLWE}\(_{q,\ell,k,Q,\mathcal{D}} \) and \text{MSIS}\(_{q,\ell,l,k,B_\text{MSIS}} \) problems such that

\[
\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{sel-AOM-MLWE}}(1^\lambda) \leq \epsilon_{\text{lattice}} \cdot \exp \left( \sqrt{Q} \cdot (\ell + k) \cdot \log(\epsilon_{\text{lattice}}) \cdot \frac{\gamma L_{\text{alt}} \cdot (\sigma^{+})^n}{(\sigma^{+})^n} \right) + 2^{-\frac{nk}{2}},
\]

where \( \epsilon_{\text{lattice}} = \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}}^{\text{MLWE}}(1^\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}}^{\text{MSIS}}(1^\lambda) + 2^{-\frac{nk}{2}} \) and \( \text{Time}(\mathcal{A}) + \text{Time}(\text{AppSolveSVP}) \).

Concretely, plugging in \text{alt-hard-param} and assuming the hardness of MLWE and MSIS, we have

\[
\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{sel-AOM-MLWE}}(1^\lambda) = \text{negl}(\lambda).
\]

**Proof.** Let \( \mathcal{A} \) be an adversary against the \text{sel-AOM-MLWE} problem. Below, we consider a sequence of games where the first game is the original game and the last is a game that can be reduced from the MSIS problem. The detail of each game is provided in Fig. 16. We denote \( \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{Game}_i}(1^\lambda) \) as the advantage of \( \mathcal{A} \) in \text{Game}_i.

\text{Game}_1: This is the real \text{sel-AOM-MLWE} game.

\text{Game}_2: In this game, the challenger samples short vectors \( (\tilde{\mathbf{s}}, \tilde{\mathbf{e}}) \sim \mathcal{D}_{\mathbf{e}} \times \mathcal{D}_{\mathbf{e}} \) used nowhere in the game and aborts if it exceed some norm bound. Specifically, given \( D \in \mathcal{L}_{\text{alt}} \) from the adversary \( \mathcal{A} \), the challenger first computes \( w \leftarrow \text{AppSolveSVP}(D) \). Due to the assumption on the accepted linear combinations \( C_{\text{alt}} \), \text{AppSolveSVP} is efficient and \( w \in \mathcal{R}^Q \) is a vector satisfying \( w^\top D = 0 \) and \( \|w_i\|_2 \leq \gamma_{\text{alt}} \) for \( i \in \mathcal{Q} \). It then checks the function \( \text{BadNorm}(\tilde{\mathbf{s}}, \tilde{\mathbf{e}}, w) \) which equals 1 if and only if \( \|w_i \cdot \tilde{\mathbf{s}}\|_2 \geq e^{1/4} \cdot \|w_i\|_1 \cdot \sigma \cdot \sqrt{nL} \) or \( \|w_i \cdot \tilde{\mathbf{e}}\|_2 \geq e^{1/4} \cdot \|w_i\|_1 \cdot \sigma \cdot \sqrt{nL} \). Due to Lemma 3.2 and our parameter selection, we have

\[
\left| \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{Game}_1}(1^\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{Game}_2}(1^\lambda) \right| \leq 2^{-\frac{nk}{2}}.
\]

\text{Game}_3: In this game, the challenger modifies how the MLWE secret and noise are set. Specifically, it shifts the MLWE secret and noise by \( (\tilde{\mathbf{s}} \bar{\top}, \tilde{\mathbf{e}} \bar{\top}) \in \mathcal{R}_{\mathbf{e}}^{Q \times l} \times \mathcal{R}_{\mathbf{e}}^{k \times Q} \).

The only difference between the previous game is the distribution of the MLWE samples. We use the Rényi divergence to relate the advantage of this game to the previous game. While the advantages differ non-negligibly, the difference is polynomial related, which suffices for our purpose.\(^{14}\) For a fixed pair of \( (\tilde{\mathbf{w}} \bar{\top}, \tilde{\mathbf{w}} \bar{\top}) \), define two distributions \( \mathcal{D}_{\tilde{\mathbf{w}},(\tilde{\mathbf{s}} \bar{\top}, \tilde{\mathbf{w}} \bar{\top})} = \{(S + \tilde{\mathbf{w}} \bar{\top}, \mathbf{E}_+, \tilde{\mathbf{w}} \bar{\top}) \mid (S, E) \sim \prod_{i \in [Q]} \mathcal{D}_{\tilde{\mathbf{w}}} \times \prod_{i \in [Q]} \mathcal{D}_{\tilde{\mathbf{w}}} \} \) and \( \mathcal{D}_{\tilde{\mathbf{w}}} = \{(S, E) \sim \prod_{i \in [Q]} \mathcal{D}_{\tilde{\mathbf{w}}} \times \prod_{i \in [Q]} \mathcal{D}_{\tilde{\mathbf{w}}} \} \). We then have the following:

\[
\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{Game}_3}(1^\lambda) \leq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{Game}_1}(1^\lambda) \exp \left( \frac{\alpha \|w_i \cdot \tilde{\mathbf{s}}\|_2^2}{2\sigma_i^2} \right) \cdot \prod_{i \in [Q]} \exp \left( \frac{\alpha \|w_i \cdot \tilde{\mathbf{e}}\|_2^2}{2\sigma_i^2} \right)
\]

\[
\leq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{Game}_1}(1^\lambda) \cdot \prod_{i \in [Q]} \exp \left( \frac{\alpha \|w_i \cdot \tilde{\mathbf{s}}\|_2^2}{2\sigma_i^2} \right)
\]

\[
\cdot \prod_{i \in [Q]} \exp \left( \frac{\alpha \|w_i \cdot \tilde{\mathbf{e}}\|_2^2}{2\sigma_i^2} \right)
\]

\[^{14}\text{From a theoretical perspective, we can rely on the statistical distance by simply assuming } D_i \text{ is a discrete Gaussian with width that is super-polynomially larger than the size of } \tilde{\mathbf{w}} \bar{\top} \text{ and } \tilde{\mathbf{w}} \bar{\top}. \text{ For concrete efficiency, we rely on a more fine-grained analysis by using the upper bound } Q \text{ and the Rényi divergence.} \]


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Game 1: Real Game$^{{\text{ALT}}}$-AOM-MLWE $(1^λ, 1^Q)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: $A \leftarrow R_{q}^{k×ℓ}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: $D \leftarrow A(A)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: if $[D \notin \mathcal{L}<em>{alt} \subseteq R</em>{q}^{Q×(Q-1)}]$ return $0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: for $i \in [Q]$ do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: $(s_i, e_i) \leftarrow D_i^f \times D_i^k$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6: $(S, E) := ([s_1 \cdots s_Q], [e_1 \cdots e_Q])$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7: $T := AS + E \in R_{q}^{k×Q}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8: $(v, \widehat{S}, \widehat{E}) \leftarrow A(A, T, (SD, ED))$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9: if $[v \boldsymbol{\parallel} T = \mathbb{A}\mathbb{S} + \widehat{E}]$ return $1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10: // Remaining check is identical to Game 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Game 2:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: $A \leftarrow R_{q}^{k×ℓ}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: $D \leftarrow A(A)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: if $[D \notin \mathcal{L}<em>{alt} \subseteq R</em>{q}^{Q×(Q-1)}]$ return $0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: $w \leftarrow \text{AppSolveSVP}(D)$ // Note $w^T D = 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: for $i \in [Q]$ do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6: $(s_i, e_i) \leftarrow D_i^f \times D_i^k$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7: $(S, E) := ([s_1 \cdots s_Q], [e_1 \cdots e_Q])$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8: $(\widehat{s}, \widehat{e}) \leftarrow D^f \times D^k$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9: abort if $[\text{BadNorm}(\widehat{s}, \widehat{e}, w)]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10: $T := AS + E \in R_{q}^{k×Q}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11: $(v, \widehat{S}, \widehat{E}) \leftarrow A(A, T, (SD, ED))$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12: // Remaining check is identical to Game 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Game 3, Game 4:</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: $A \leftarrow R_{q}^{k×ℓ}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: $D \leftarrow A(A)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: if $[D \notin \mathcal{L}<em>{alt} \subseteq R</em>{q}^{Q×(Q-1)}]$ return $0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: $w \leftarrow \text{AppSolveSVP}(D)$ // Note $w^T D = 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: for $i \in [Q]$ do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6: $(s_i, e_i) \leftarrow D_i^f \times D_i^k$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7: $(S, E) := ([s_1 \cdots s_Q], [e_1 \cdots e_Q])$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8: $(\widehat{s}, \widehat{e}) \leftarrow D^f \times D^k$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9: abort if $[\text{BadNorm}(\widehat{s}, \widehat{e}, w)]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10: $(\widehat{S}, \widehat{E}) := (S + \widehat{s}w^T, E + \widehat{e}w^T)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11: $T := AS + E + w^T \in R_{q}^{k×Q}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12: $(v, \widehat{S}, \widehat{E}) \leftarrow A(A, T, (SD, ED))$ // For Game 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13: $(v, \widehat{S}, \widehat{E}) \leftarrow A(A, T, (SD, ED))$ // For Game 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14: // Remaining check is identical to Game 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<tr>
<th>Game 5, Game 6:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: $A \leftarrow R_{q}^{k×ℓ}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: $D \leftarrow A(A)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: if $[D \notin \mathcal{L}<em>{alt} \subseteq R</em>{q}^{Q×(Q-1)}]$ return $0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: $w \leftarrow \text{AppSolveSVP}(D)$ // Note $w^T D = 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: for $i \in [Q]$ do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6: $(s_i, e_i) \leftarrow D_i^f \times D_i^k$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7: $(S, E) := ([s_1 \cdots s_Q], [e_1 \cdots e_Q])$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8: $(\widehat{s}, \widehat{e}) \leftarrow D^f \times D^k$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9: $t := AS + \widehat{s}w + \widehat{e}w^T \in R_{q}^{k×Q}$ // For Game 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10: $t \leftarrow R_{q}^{k×Q}$ // For Game 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11: $T := AS + E + tw^T \in R_{q}^{k×Q}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12: $(v, \widehat{S}, \widehat{E}) \leftarrow A(A, T, (SD, ED))$ // For Game 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13: $(v, \widehat{S}, \widehat{E}) \leftarrow A(A, T, (SD, ED))$ // For Game 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14: // Remaining check is identical to Game 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 16: Hybrid games for the proof of Theorem B.2. Recall the game restricts the adversary to output $D$ that is full-rank and $\text{AppSolveSVP}$ solves the shortest vector $w$ in the orthogonal subspace of $D$. Game 4 is the same as Game 3 except the output it provides to the adversary $A$. Game 6 is the same as Game 5 except that it samples $t$ randomly.
The first inequality follows from Lemma 3.5, Items 1 and 2, the second follows from Lemma 3.5, Item 3 and Lemma 3.6, the third follows from Lemma 3.2 and the abort condition we added in Game$_2$, and the last follows from the definitions of $\sigma^*$ and $\gamma_{L_{ab}}$ and the facts $\|a\|_1 \leq \sqrt{n} \cdot \|a\|_2$ for $a \in \mathbb{R}_q$ and $\sqrt{\sigma}/2 < 1$. We proceed with the hybrid games to prove that $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^\text{Game}_2(1^\lambda)$ and $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^\text{Game}_3(1^\lambda)$ are polynomially related for our selection of $\alpha$.

Game$_4$: In this game, the challenger returns $(\text{SD}, \text{ED})$ to the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ instead of $(\text{SD}, \text{ED})$. By definition of $w$, we have $w^T D = 0$. Hence, $\tilde{S} D = (S + \tilde{s} w^T) D = \text{SD}$. The same holds for the MLWE errors. Therefore, the view of $\mathcal{A}$ in both games are identical, and in particular, we have

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^\text{Game}_3(1^\lambda) = \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^\text{Game}_2(1^\lambda).$$

Game$_5$: In this game, the challenger removes the bound check on $(\tilde{s}, \tilde{e})$ and computes the MLWE instances $T$ without explicitly computing $(S, E)$. It can be easily checked that the two ways of computing $T$ are identical as long as abort is not triggered. Similarly to Game$_2$, we have

$$\left| \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^\text{Game}_3(1^\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^\text{Game}_2(1^\lambda) \right| \leq 2^{-\frac{\alpha \cdot \log(n)}{\sigma^*}}.$$

Game$_6$: Lastly, in this game, the challenger modifies the MLWE instance $t$ to a random $t \leftarrow \mathbb{R}_q^k$. Notice that in Game$_5$, the challenger no longer requires the MLWE secret associated to $t$ to run the game. Thus, it is easy to check that we can construct an MLWE adversary $\mathcal{B}$ that internally runs $\mathcal{A}$ solving the MLWE$_{q, \ell, k, D}$ problem such that

$$\left| \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^\text{Game}_3(1^\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^\text{Game}_6(1^\lambda) \right| \leq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}}^\text{MLWE}(1^\lambda).$$

It is worth noting that this is where we require AppSolveSVP to be efficient as we have $\text{Time}(\mathcal{B}) = \text{Time}(\mathcal{A}) + \text{Time}(\text{AppSolveSVP})$.

We show in Lemma B.3 that we can construct an MSIS adversary $\mathcal{B}'$ that internally runs $\mathcal{A}$ solving the MSIS$_{q, \ell+1, k, B_{\text{MSIS}}}$ problem such that

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}}^\text{Game}_4(1^\lambda) \leq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}'}^\text{MSIS}(1^\lambda).$$

Before providing the proof of Lemma B.3, we finish the proof of Theorem B.2.

Collecting the bounds, we obtain

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^\text{Game}_2(1^\lambda) \leq \left( \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}}^\text{MLWE}(1^\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}'}^\text{MSIS}(1^\lambda) + 2^{-\frac{\alpha \cdot \log(n)}{\sigma^*}} \right) \cdot \exp \left( \frac{Q \cdot \alpha \cdot \gamma_{L_{ab}} \cdot \sigma \cdot n^2 \cdot (\ell + k)}{\sigma^*} \right) + 2^{-\frac{\alpha \cdot \log(n)}{\sigma^*}}.$$

Plugging our choices of parameters alt-hard-param, we obtain

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^\text{Game}_2(1^\lambda) \leq \epsilon_{\text{lattice}} \cdot \exp \left( \sqrt{-Q \cdot (\ell + k) \cdot \log(\epsilon_{\text{lattice}})} + \frac{\gamma_{L_{ab}} \cdot \sigma \cdot n}{\sigma^*} \right) + 2^{-\frac{\alpha \cdot \log(n)}{\sigma^*}},$$

where $\epsilon_{\text{lattice}} = \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}}^\text{MLWE}(1^\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}'}^\text{MSIS}(1^\lambda) + 2^{-\frac{\alpha \cdot \log(n)}{\sigma^*}}$. Following an identical argument made in Lemma 4.7, we conclude that the right hand side is negligible, assuming the hardness of the MLWE and MSIS problem. This completes the proof of Theorem B.2.

It remains to prove the following Lemma B.3.
Lemma B.3. There exists an adversary $B'$ that internally runs $A$ solving the $\text{MSIS}_{q,\ell+1,k,B_{\text{MSIS}}}$ problem such that

$$\text{Adv}^{\text{Game}_6}_A(1^\lambda) \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{MSIS}}_{B'}(1^\lambda).$$

Moreover, we have $\text{Time}(B') \approx \text{Time}(A) + \text{Time}(\text{AppSolveSVP}).$

Proof. Let $A$ be an adversary against the sel-AOM-MLWE problem in $\text{Game}_6$. We construct an adversary $B'$ solving the MSIS problem having the same advantage as $A$. Assume $B'$ is given $M = [A \mid t] \in R_q^{k \times (\ell+1)}$ as the MSIS problem, where $t \in R_q^k$. It then simulates $\text{Game}_6$ to $A$, where the only difference is that it uses the above computed $(A, t)$ rather than sampling them. At the end of the game, $A$ outputs an approximate MLWE solution $(v, \hat{S}, \hat{E})$. $B'$ then computes

$$S = \begin{bmatrix} \hat{S} - v^T \odot S \\
- v^T \odot w^T \\
- v^T \odot E \end{bmatrix} \in R_q^{(k+\ell+1) \times Q}$$

and outputs the first non-zero column in $S^*$ as the MSIS solution if it exists. If not, it aborts the game.

Let us analyze the success probability of $B'$. Clearly, we have $\text{Time}(B') \approx \text{Time}(A) + \text{Time}(\text{AppSolveSVP}).$

Moreover, if $A$ breaks sel-AOM-MLWE in $\text{Game}_6$, we have $v^T \odot T = \hat{A} \hat{S} + \hat{E}$. Combining this with $T = \hat{A} \hat{S} + E + tw^T$, we have

$$\left( (A \hat{S} + \hat{E}) - v^T \odot (A \hat{S} + E + tw^T) \right) = \begin{bmatrix} A & t \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \hat{S} - v^T \odot S \\
- v^T \odot w^T \\
- v^T \odot E \end{bmatrix} = 0,$$

where we used the fact that for any $u \in R_q^n$ and $(B, C) \in R_q^{n \times b} \times R_q^{n \times c}$, we have $u^T \odot (BC) = B(u^T \odot C)$.

We can then bound each column $i \in [Q]$ of $S^*$ by $||S^*_i||_2 \leq ||\hat{S}_i||_2 + ||\hat{E}_i||_2 + ||v_i \cdot w_i||_2 + ||v_i \cdot S_i||_2 + ||v_i \cdot E_i||_2 \leq B_s + B_e + \sqrt{n} \cdot B \cdot \gamma L_{\text{alt}} \cdot (\gamma L_{\text{alt}} + e^{1/4} \cdot \sigma_{\max} \cdot \sqrt{n} \cdot (\sqrt{\ell} + \sqrt{k})) = B_{\text{MSIS}}$. It remains to check that there is a non-trivial (i.e., non-zero) column in $S^*$. By the winning condition of $A$, each entry $v_i$ of $v$ satisfies $||v_i||_2$. In particular, this implies $v_i \in T$. Moreover, since $w \neq 0$, there exists some entry $i \in [Q]$ such that $w_i \neq 0$. Then, we must have $v_i w_i \neq 0$, implying that the $i$-th column of $S^*$ is non-zero. Therefore, if $A$ wins the sel-AOM-UMLWE game, then there always exist a non-zero column in $S^*$, allowing $B$ to win the MSIS game as desired. This completes the proof.

\hfill $\Box$

\hfill $\Box$

B.0.4 A Concrete Example for $L_{\text{alt}}$.

Since our result does not use the parameters provided by the alternative reduction, we only briefly discuss a very simple instance of $L_{\text{alt}}$ for the sake of completeness.

Let us define $L_{\text{alt}} \in R_q^{Q \times (Q-1)}$ as a subset of $\{ I \otimes H \mid H \in Z_q^{Q \times (Q-1)} \}$, where $I$ is the identity matrix of dimension $n$. Namely, any matrix $D \in L_{\text{alt}}$ only contains $Z_q$ entries. In this particular case, $\text{AppSolveSVP}$ can be constructed efficiently. Namely, for any $D \in L_{\text{alt}}$, there is an efficiently computable corresponding $H \in Z_q^{Q \times (Q-1)}$. For this matrix $H$, we can first compute some vector $u \in Z_q^Q$ such that $u^T H = 0$. Then, assuming the modulus $q = \text{poly}(\lambda)$, we can efficiently brute force search the smallest $a \in Z_q$ such that $a \cdot u$ is minimized. Denoting such a vector as $u^*$, it is clear that $u^*$ is the shortest vector in the orthogonal space spanned by the columns of $H$. Then, $\text{AppSolveSVP}(D)$ outputs $w = u^* \otimes 1$, where 1 is an all one vector of length $n$. It is clear that $w^T D = 0$ and such $w$ is short if $u^*$ is short.
C Omitted Details For The Cryptanalysis of AOM-MLWE

C.1 Concrete Model of Lattice Reduction, GSA and Beyond

We now turn to the practical conversion of the BKZ blocksize used by lattice reduction into concrete bitsec. Before delving in the concrete parameter selection, we need to devise a sound method to convert the complexity of the resulting MLWE instance, constructed through the previous reduction to actual figures representing the bit-security of the problem.

The Core-SVP Hardness. Indeed, to accurately assess the hardness of the underlying problems and ensure a specified level of bit-security, it is necessary to establish a model that simulates the behavior of a practical oracle for approximate Shortest Vector Problem (SVP). This modeling is crucial since our hard problems involve the identification of relatively short vectors in various lattices. To achieve this, we will employ the celebrated (self-dual) Block Korkine-Zolotarev (BKZ) algorithm. Specifically, the BKZ algorithm with a block size denoted by $\beta$ necessitates a polynomial number of calls to an SVP oracle in dimension $\beta$, with a heuristically expected number of calls that is approximately linear—with some implementation tricks.

To account for potential future advancements in this reduction method, we will only consider the cost of a single call to the SVP oracle. This approach, known as core-SVP hardness, entails a highly conservative estimation. This cautionary measure is warranted by the possibility of cost amortization for SVP calls within BKZ, particularly when sieving is employed as the SVP oracle. Notably, sieving has become the prevailing standard for larger block sizes, as exemplified in [ADH+19].

From Lattice Reduction Block-Size to Concrete Bitsec. This analysis translates into concrete bit-security estimates following the methodology of NewHope [ADPS16] (so-called “core-SVP methodology”). In this model, the bit complexity of lattice sieving (which is asymptotically the best SVP oracle) is taken as $\lfloor 0.292^\beta \rfloor$ in the classical setting [BDGL16] and $\lfloor 0.257^\beta \rfloor$ in the quantum setting [CL21] in blocksize $\beta$.

C.2 Shape Of The Queries

We described the attack for any query matrix $D$. Let us now restrict to the matrices of the form prescribed by the definition of the scheme (see Section 4.5 for the detailed definition) and study the best cases scenarii (for the attacker). As the permutation matrices doesn’t affect the geometry of the attack, we can, without loss of generality only study the queries stemming from the set:

$$L'_\text{TS} = \left\{ \begin{bmatrix} c^T_1 & c^T_2 & \cdots & c^T_{Q_5} \\ B_1 & B_2 & \cdots & B_{Q_5} \end{bmatrix} \in \mathcal{R}^{Q \times (Q-1)}_q \mid \forall i \in [Q_5], (c_i, B_i) \in C_{\text{TS}} \times \mathcal{B}_{\text{TS}}, \right\}$$

with

$$B_{\text{TS}} = \left\{ \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ b_1 & b'_1 \\ b_2 & b'_2 \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ b_{\tau-1} & b'_{\tau-1} \\ 1 \end{bmatrix} \in \mathcal{R}^{\tau \times 7}_q \mid \forall i \in [\tau - 1], (b_i, b'_i) \in \mathbb{T}^2 \land b_1 \neq b'_1 \right\},$$

and $C_{\text{TS}} = \{ [c, c', 0, \cdots, 0]^T \in \mathcal{R}^7_q \mid c, c' \in C \cup \{0\} \}.$

Size of $d^T d$. This latter set will be mainly driving the efficiency of the attack as the vector $d$ is now a vector of length $Q$, consisting of $Q - 2Q_5$ 0 and $2Q_5$ coefficients taken in $C$. This means in particular that $d^T d$ is a sum of $2Q_5$ arbitrary terms in the set $C^2 = \{ c' c \mid c \in C \}$. Remark that $Q_5$ is exceedingly large compared
to the rest of the parameters (essentially exponential in the security parameter while other quantities are chosen to be polynomial in it in practice), so that the coefficients of $d^\dagger d$ will be extremely concentrated. More precisely, its constant coefficient will be exactly $WQ$ by construction and the other coefficients will behave as discrete Gaussian elements of standard deviation in $O(\sqrt{Q})$ by central limit theorem. As such, this element is *almost* a relative integer, in the sense that its complex embeddings will be concentrated around the constant coefficient $WQ$. In particular, its inverse will show the same concentration at the value $1/(WQ)$ (it is in this sense *almost* a rational number).

**On the shape of the $\overline{D}$ block.** Now for the term corresponding to $\overline{D}$, remark that identity matrices do not belong to the set $B_{TS}$. Moreover from the shape of the matrix $\Sigma$, we can see that the best case (from the attacker perspective) is realized when the matrix $\overline{D}$ is as close as possible form the identity. Hence, in a conservative line, we will assume without loss of security that $\overline{D}$ is exactly an identity.

### C.3 Omitted Parameter Selection.

#### C.3.1 On SelfTargetMSIS.

A direct forgery can be done by reverse-engineering a signature from the verification process. More precisely this amount to solve the following problem usually referred as the **SelfTargetMSIS** assumption. Find a vector $z_{sol}$ such that:

$$z_{sol} = \begin{bmatrix} c \\ z' \end{bmatrix} \wedge (\|z_{sol}\|_2 \leq B) \wedge H \left( \begin{bmatrix} -\widehat{vk} & \mid & I \end{bmatrix} \cdot z_{sol}, M \right) = c,$$

(22)

$B$ beeing set from the correctness condition of Section 6.1. Following [LDK +22, §C.3], we assume that the best way to solve (22) is either by (i) breaking the second preimage resistance of $H$ or by (ii) generating $w$ at random, computing $c = H(w, M)$, and finally solving the inhomogenous SIS instance:

$$\left( \begin{bmatrix} A & I \end{bmatrix} \cdot z' = w - c \cdot vk \right) \wedge (\|z'\| \leq B - W).$$

(23)

**Solving The Inhomogeneous MSIS instance Eq. (23).** We can cast it as finding $\bar{z}$ at a bounded distance from the point $v = w - c \cdot vk$. This BDD problem can be solved using the so-called *Nearest-Cospace* framework of Espitau and Kirchner [EK20], which state that under the GSA, the decoding can be done in time $\text{poly}(n)$ calls to a CVP oracle in dimension $\beta$, as long as:

$$\|\bar{z} - v\| \leq \min_{x \leq \ell n} \left( \gamma^{(k+\ell)n-\epsilon} q^{\frac{k n}{\ell \epsilon}} \right).$$

As such, we need to enforce the condition:

$$B \leq \min_{\ell \leq m \leq (k+\ell)n} \left( \gamma^m q^{\frac{k n}{\ell \epsilon}} \right).$$

**Challenge Space.** We need the hash function $H$ to be second preimage resistant. To guarantee this we ensure that $|C| > 2^\lambda$. Considering how $C$ is defined in Section 3.2 it is enough to set $W$ such that:

$$\binom{n}{W} \cdot 2^W \geq 2^\lambda.$$