C’est très CHIC: A compact password-authenticated key exchange from lattice-based KEM

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Abstract

Several Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocols have been recently proposed that leverage a Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) to create an efficient and easy-to-implement post-quantum secure PAKE. This line of work is driven by the intention of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to soon standardize a lattice-based post-quantum KEM called Kyber. In two recent works, Beguinet et al. (ACNS 2023) and Pan and Zeng (ASIACRYPT 2023) proposed generic compilers that transform KEM into PAKE, relying on an Ideal Cipher (IC) defined over a group. However, although IC on a group is often used in cryptographic protocols, special care must be taken to instantiate such objects in practice, especially when a low-entropy key is used. To address this concern, Dos Santos et al. (EUROCRYPT 2023) proposed a relaxation of the IC model under the Universal Composability (UC) framework called Half-Ideal Cipher (HIC). They demonstrate how to construct a UC-secure PAKE protocol, named EKE-KEM, from a KEM and a modified 2-round Feistel construction called m2F. Remarkably, m2F sidesteps the use of IC over a group, instead employing an IC defined over a fixed-length bitstring domain, which is easier to instantiate.

In this paper, we introduce a novel PAKE protocol called CHIC that improves the communication and computation efficiency of EKE-KEM. We do so by opening m2F construction in a white-box manner and avoiding the HIC abstraction in our analysis. We provide a detailed proof of the security of CHIC and establish precise security requirements for the underlying KEM, including one-wayness and anonymity of ciphertexts, and uniformity of public keys. Our analysis improves prior work by pinpointing the necessary and sufficient conditions for a tight security proof. Our findings extend to general KEM-based EKE-style protocols, under both game-based definitions (with Perfect Forward Secrecy) and UC PAKE definitions, and show that a passively secure KEM is not sufficient. In this respect, our results align with those of Pan and Zeng (ASIACRYPT 2023), but contradict the analyses of KEM-to-PAKE compilers by Beguinet et al. (ACNS 2023) and Dos Santos et al. (EUROCRYPT 2023).

Finally, we provide an implementation of CHIC, highlighting its minimal overhead compared to an underlying CCA-secure KEM - Kyber. An interesting aspect of the implementation is that we reuse existing Kyber reference code to solve an open problem concerning instantiating the half-ideal cipher construction. Specifically, we reuse the rejection sampling procedure, originally designed for public-key compression, to implement the hash onto the public key space, which is a component in the half-ideal cipher. As of now, to the best of our knowledge, CHIC stands as the most efficient PAKE protocol from black-box KEM that offers rigorously proven UC security.

Keywords: Password Authenticated Key Exchange, Key Encapsulation Mechanism, Universal Composability, Post-Quantum, Ideal Cipher.
1 Introduction

The problem of attaining secure communication online is commonly addressed by employing Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols that involve high-entropy long-term private keys, often relying on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). However, in scenarios where humans are involved in the authentication process, secure storage of long-term private keys by users is impractical, and most applications resort to a simpler and cost-effective solution—human-memorizable passwords. In most cases, applications carry out password-based authentication using (variants of) the bare-bones protocol where the user sends a password across the network to be checked wrt a previously stored record (usually a salted hashed value) of the same password. This protocol, which is chosen due to its usability and ease of deployment, has a number of disadvantages from the security point of view. An obvious shortcoming is that the password is explicitly transferred across the communications channel, and so it requires a previously established secure and one-side-authenticated channel to the server checking the password. This opens the way to a number of well-known attacks, such as impersonating the server via a phishing attack.

Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) [6, 5, 8] is a cryptographic primitive that can mitigate some of the limitations associated with low-entropy passwords, and bootstrap a shared password into a cryptographically strong session key. Intuitively, PAKE protocols guarantee that the only way to extract a password from a user over the network is to actively perform a password-guessing attack by trying to run the protocol with the user multiple times.

The most efficient PAKE constructions to date, namely the CPACE protocol that has been recently chosen for standardization by the IETF [2], are built as variants of the Diffie-Hellman protocol and they achieve security with essentially no bandwidth overhead and minimal computational overhead—in CPACE this overhead is reduced to hash operations. Indeed, one of the takeaways of the CPACE selection process was that performance is critical for adoption.\(^1\) This is because target applications include resource-constrained devices (e.g., IoT networks) and ad-hoc contexts (e.g., ePassports and file transfers). Therefore, a natural question to ask in the current context of migration to post-quantum secure cryptography is how to construct efficient PAKE protocols that are not Diffie-Hellman based and that, ideally, can leverage the recent results of the NIST post-quantum competition.

**KEM-based PAKE protocols.** In this direction, and very recently, several works [15, 19, 4, 18, 3] proposed black-box constructions of PAKE from a Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) and an Ideal Cipher (IC) or its variants (see below).\(^2\) Conceptually, this KEM-based design paradigm sheds new light on the thirty-year-old Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) approach to PAKE by Bellovin and Merritt [6]. From a practical point of view, this recent focus on the generic conversion of KEM into PAKE is largely driven by the efforts of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to standardize Post-Quantum (PQ) cryptographic schemes, including KEM and digital signatures. In particular, the final stage of KEM scheme standardization is currently underway [16] and the standardized scheme is based on Crystals-Kyber, a lattice-based post-quantum KEM. Kyber has undergone extensive scrutiny regarding its security and anonymity properties, as well as secure and efficient implementation, and this body of research can be leveraged when constructing PAKE protocols that use KEM in a black-box way.

A common characteristic of the above KEM-based PAKE proposals is their reliance on Random Oracle (RO) and Ideal Cipher (IC) models.\(^3\) Despite the similarities among these proposed protocols,

\(^1\)https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/usR4me-MKbW4QOQLprDKJu3TOHY

\(^2\)This list can be extended by the PAPKE protocol of [9], which was originally presented as a generic PAKE from PKE and IC, but it can be recast as construction from KEM and IC.

\(^3\)In [15] security is claimed based solely on RO, but that claim has not been formally established.
they still differ in subtle ways and can be categorized based on the model of analysis, design structure, and KEM security properties used to establish PAKE security. The protocols put forth by Bradley et al. [9], McQuoid et al. [15], Beguinet et al. [4] and Dos Santos et al. [19] are analysed under Universal Composability (UC) PAKE framework [10], while Pan and Zeng [18] and Alnahawi et al. [3] prove security under the game-based PAKE definition of Bellare-Pointcheval-Rogaway (BPR) [5]. We note that the UC PAKE security model of Canetti et al. [10] is significantly stronger than the BPR model. The superiority of the former springs fundamentally from the UC framework’s ability to capture security under arbitrary correlations of password inputs — which is beyond the scope of current game-based PAKE security notions. Indeed, another important takeaway from the CPACE selection process within the IETF, was the relevance of a (thoroughly scrutinized) proof of security in the UC framework.4

Two approaches to KEM-based PAKE. Prior KEM-based PAKE protocols follow two distinct design patterns. Firstly, sPAKE [15], CAKE [4], and PAKE-KEM [18], follow a procedure where the initiator Alice employs an IC to encrypt a KEM public key under her password, and the responder Bob decrypts this public key and uses it to encapsulate a secret value.5 This secret value is used by both parties as an input to a hash function—modelled as a Random Oracle (RO)—to derive a session key. However, Bob does not send the KEM ciphertext to Alice in the clear but instead utilizes a second IC to encrypt the KEM ciphertext before transmitting it to the initiator. This approach ensures that both parties are committed to a single password via IC encryption, based on the collision-freeness of IC outputs. A practical disadvantage of this two-sided usage of IC is that it requires two distinct IC instances, one over the domain of KEM public keys, and the other over the domain of KEM ciphertexts. In lattice-based KEMs, these domains are typically different, and both of them are large, which makes implementing IC for these domains non-trivial.

The second design pattern, used in PAPKE [9], OCAKE [4], EKE-KEM [19], and PAKEM [3], takes a slightly different approach. Here, the KEM ciphertext obtained by Bob is sent in the clear, accompanied by a key confirmation tag, whose purpose is to make Bob’s message a commitment to a single password guess.6 The second design uses only one instance of IC, which makes it more efficient, and it does not require special properties of KEM ciphertexts, e.g. that they are indistinguishable from random elements of the ciphertext domain. In this work, we focus on efficiency and therefore adopt this design pattern.

Opening up the IC blackbox. The sPAKE and EKE-KEM protocols of resp. [15] and [19] deviate from the above pattern by replacing the Ideal Cipher on the domain of public keys (and ciphertexts in [15]) with a weaker and easier-to-construct primitive. One motivation for reducing the requirement on the password-based encryption component is the difficulty of efficiently instantiating IC on a group domain—cf. the discussion of the costs of possible approaches in e.g. [19], which is necessary to instantiate the “KEM+IC” design for PAKE using KEM instantiated as an Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman. However, instantiating the same KEM+IC approach using a lattice-based KEM is also non-trivial because it would require a special-purpose IC on a domain of large bit strings (around one kilobyte in the case of Kyber). Even though there exist methods for extending an IC domain to bitstrings of arbitrary size, e.g., using Feistel networks, [11, 13] these generic IC domain extension techniques would add significant complexity to an implementation and incur a significant

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4https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/47pO6OSrVS8uozXnDuAM-alEk0-s
5In sPAKE [15] the IC is replaced by a weaker primitive, see more below.
6A seeming exception is the PAPKE protocol [9], which does not attach such a tag explicitly, but it requires a strong robustness property of the KEM, and the generic method for achieving this property includes expanding a CCA-secure KEM ciphertext with a key-committing tag [1]. Protocol PAKEM [3] also diverges from the pattern because it employs an additional message flow where Alice sends her own key confirmation tag to Bob. This last message achieves explicit mutual authentication in the Alice-to-Bob direction, but it adds an extra round to the protocol.
Motivated by the above, McQuoid et al. [15] proposed to replace IC in this KEM+IC approach to PAKE with a weaker primitive of a Programmable-Once Public Function (POPF), which they showed can be instantiated with a 2-round Feistel network ($2F$). In particular, in the case of Kyber KEM, the $2F$ encryption would involve just one RO hash onto the KEM public key domain, and one RO hash onto a domain of bitstrings of length $3\lambda$, where $\lambda$ is the security parameter. However, this way of implementing password encryption would add at least 384 (=3x128) bits to the KEM ciphertext. Moreover, as mentioned in footnote 3, the analysis of the resulting protocol as a UC-secure PAKE is currently incomplete. Dos Santos et al. [19] modify the 2-round Feistel network used by [15]—calling the result a modified 2-Feistel ($m2F$)—by reducing the bandwidth overhead to 256 (=2x128) bits: this is achieved at the cost of adding an IC on 256-bit strings into the encryption procedure. The security proof in [19] shows that $m2F$ realizes a UC abstraction of a (randomized) Half-Ideal Cipher (HIC), and then shows that the above KEM+IC approach to UC PAKE works also in the case of KEM+HIC. However, because it is a randomized encryption using a 256-bit random seed, it adds at least 256 bits to the encrypted public key.

**Main contribution:** Compact m2F and bandwidth-minimal KEM-to-PAKE compiler. In this paper we revisit the construction of [19] and reduce the bandwidth overhead to a minimum. We observe that, for Kyber and other post-quantum KEMs, the public key can be split into two components, one of which is a 32-byte uniform seed $\rho$, and ask the following natural question:

*Can we reduce the bandwidth overhead of the m2F by using $\rho$ as the ephemeral randomness $r$ in the m2F construction?*

We answer this question in the affirmative by giving direct proof that the resulting construction is a UC secure PAKE in the joint Ideal Cipher and Random Oracle model. By direct proof we mean that we do not rely on the Half-Ideal-Cipher abstraction of [19], and instead perform the proof over the fully expanded construction. The reason for this is that the notion of a UC-secure Half-Ideal-Cipher crucially relies on the fact that the $m2F$ construction is randomized, i.e., that honest parties choose an ephemeral randomness that is independent of the input public key. By unifying this ephemeral randomness with a public-key component we lose this property and the ability to modularize the $m2F$ construction. Nevertheless, we call our construction CHIC for Compact Half-Ideal-Cipher, as a way to acknowledge the inspiration in the work of [19].

**Second contribution:** Fixing the Proof. We provide a detailed proof of the security of CHIC and establish precise security requirements for the underlying KEM, including passive one-way security (OW-CPA) and pseudo-uniformity of public-keys (UNI-PK), necessary to achieve UC PAKE security. Like prior works, our proof also shows that anonymity is also a necessary property for the security of the construction. However, we show that passive anonymity (i.e., indistinguishability of public keys and ciphertexts) is not sufficient to conclude the proof. More precisely, our result can be seen as a patch to the proofs by Beguinet et al. [4] and Dos Santos et al. [19], and shows that these protocols require a ANO-1PCA-secure KEM. Pan and Zeng [18] already suggested using KEMs with anonymous ciphertexts against plaintext-checkable attacks (ANO-PCA). However, it is not discussed in their work whether the constructions in [4, 19] could actually be proved under a weaker non-interactive assumption.

**Practical contribution:** Implementation and Experimental Evaluation. We give an implementation of the protocol, clarifying all aspects of real-world deployment of the protocol, and we confirm experimentally the efficiency properties of the protocol. Our implementation builds on the reference implementation of Kyber—the full construction offering CCA security [7, 20] and anonymity [12, 14, 21]. We clarify how to instantiate the $m2F$ components showing, in particular,
that hashing into the public-key space of Kyber can be done by reusing the code that the Kyber created for expanding the seed $\rho$ in the public key to a matrix over the algebraic ring that underlies the KEM construction. The implementation is available as supplementary material.

## 2 Preliminaries

In this section, we present the definition of Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) and introduce its security properties of interest for this work.

**Definition 1.** A Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) scheme is a tuple of polynomial-time algorithms $\text{KEM} = (\text{Keygen}, \text{Encap}, \text{Decap})$ that behaves as follows:

- **Keygen**($\lambda$) $\rightarrow$ (pk, sk): a key-generation algorithm that on input a security parameter $\lambda$, outputs a public/private key pair (pk, sk).
- **Encap**($pk$) $\rightarrow$ (c, K): an encapsulation algorithm that on input a public key pk, generates a ciphertext $c$ and a secret key $K$.
- **Decap**($sk, c$) $\rightarrow$ K: a decapsulation algorithm that on input a private key $sk$ and a ciphertext $c$, outputs a secret key $K$.

For correctness, we require that for any key pair $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{Keygen}(\lambda)$, and ciphertext and secret key $(c, K) \leftarrow \text{Encap}(pk)$, we have that $K = \text{Decap}(sk, c)$.

In this work, we assume that a KEM public key can be encoded as a bitstring and an element in a group with a Random Oracle indifferentiable hash. More formally:

**Definition 2.** (KEM with splittable public keys) A KEM scheme has splittable public keys if there exists polynomial $p$ s.t. each security parameter $\lambda$ defines domains $\mathcal{PK}_\lambda$, $G_\lambda$, and $N_\lambda = \{0, 1\}^{p(\lambda)}$, and an efficiently computable and invertible map $\text{Split} : \mathcal{PK}_\lambda \rightarrow N_\lambda \times G_\lambda$, which satisfy that (1) $G_\lambda$ is a group s.t. there exists an RO-indifferentiable hash onto $G_\lambda$, (2) any $(pk, sk)$ output by $\text{Keygen}(\lambda)$ satisfies that $pk \in \mathcal{PK}_\lambda$, and (3) distribution $\{r \mid (pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{Keygen}(\lambda), (r, M) \leftarrow \text{Split}(pk)\}$ is $\epsilon$-close to being uniform over $N_\lambda$, where $\epsilon = \epsilon(\lambda)$ is a negligible function of $\lambda$.

Crystals-Kyber [20] has splittable keys, where $\rho$ (referred to as $r$ here) is derived from expanding a purely random bitstring $d \in \mathbb{B}^{32}$ using a hash function $G(d)$ that produces two 32-byte outputs, with $\rho$ being one of them. In the security proofs of Kyber [20, 12, 14, 21], function $G$ is modeled as a random oracle, which ensures that the distribution of $\rho$ is uniform. In the current draft of FIPS 203 [16], function $G$ is specified to be instantiated as SHA3-512. For the sake of generality, in the security proof of CHIC 1, we allow $r$ to be statistically indistinguishable from uniform and account for a distance of $\epsilon$ between the distribution of $r$ and the uniform distribution.

**KEM security properties.** We also require three security properties from KEM, in addition to the splittable public keys property, namely OW-PCA, ANO-PCA, and UNI-PK, defined in Fig. 1.

First, we adopt the notion of one-wayness under plaintext checkable attacks from [17]. We consider an adversary whose goal is to decrypt a KEM ciphertext without the private decapsulation key but with access to a plaintext-checking oracle. This oracle allows the adversary to confirm if the decapsulation of a ciphertext under the challenge decryption key corresponds to a particular plaintext (i.e. the secret key $K$ in the context of KEM).

The *de facto* security notion for key encapsulation mechanisms and public-key encryption in general is indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA). It is trivial to see that

5
indistinguishable from public keys uniformly sampled from the same key space. This notion is also known as fuzziness \cite{4, 18}.

Finally, a less common security requirement but which proved to be essential for the constructions of PAKE protocol from KEM and IC \cite{19, 4, 18, 3} is public key indistinguishability from uniform. In other words, the public keys output by the KEM key generation algorithm must be computationally indistinguishable from public keys uniformly sampled from the same key space. This notion is also known as fuzziness \cite{4, 18}.

Definition 3. (KEM one-wayness under plaintext-checkable attacks) A Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) scheme is said to be OW-iPCA secure if for any PPT adversary, $A$ engaged in the OW-iPCA security game, where $A$ is restricted to making at most $i$ queries to the plaintext-checking oracle PCO, the advantage of $A$ defined as:

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{KEM}, A}^{\text{OW-iPCA}}(\lambda) \triangleq \Pr[\text{OW-iPCA}_{\text{KEM}}^A(\lambda) = 1]$$

is a negligible function of the security parameter $\lambda$. Experiment OW-iPCA is defined in Fig. 1.

Definition 4. (KEM anonymity under plaintext-checkable attacks) A Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) scheme is said to be ANO-iPCA secure if for any PPT adversary $A$ engaged in the ANO-iPCA security game, where $A$ is restricted to making at most $i$ queries to the plaintext-checking oracle PCO, the advantage of $A$ defined as:

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{KEM}, A}^{\text{ANO-iPCA}}(\lambda) \triangleq \Pr[\text{ANO-iPCA}_{\text{KEM}}(\lambda) = 0]$$

is a negligible function of the security parameter $\lambda$. Experiment ANO-iPCA is defined in Fig. 1.
oracle PCO, the advantage of $A$ defined as:

\[ \text{Adv}_{\text{KEM},A}^{\text{ANO-iPCA}}(\lambda) \overset{\text{def}}{=} 2 \cdot \Pr[\text{ANO-iPCA}_{\text{KEM}}^A(\lambda) = 1] - 1 \]  

is a negligible function of the security parameter $\lambda$. Experiment ANO-iPCA is defined in Fig. 1.

**Definition 5.** *(KEM public-key uniformity)* A Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) scheme is said to be UNI-PK secure if for any PPT adversary $A$ engaged in the UNI-PK security game, the advantage of $A$ defined as:

\[ \text{Adv}_{\text{KEM},A}^{\text{UNI-PK}}(\lambda) \overset{\text{def}}{=} 2 \cdot \Pr[\text{UNI-PK}_{\text{KEM}}^A(\lambda) = 1] - 1 \]  

is a negligible function of the security parameter $\lambda$. Experiment UNI-PK is defined in Fig. 1.

**CPA versus iPCA.** Some essential points should be noted concerning these security definitions. Firstly, when access to the PCO oracle is restricted to zero queries, it effectively results in the removal of the oracle from the experiment. This, in turn, gives rise to the weaker definitional variants known as ‘chosen-plaintext attacks,’ specifically OW-CPA and ANO-CPA. Furthermore, we made two adjustments to weaken our ANO-iPCA definition: (a) we refrained from providing the adversary with the challenge secret key $K^*$, and (b) we restricted the PCO oracle to queries on the left private decapsulation key $sk_0$. This contrasts with definitions in [12, 14, 21], which grant the adversary access to both keys via the oracle. These adaptations, which relax the requirements of the underlying KEM, are proven to be sufficient for establishing the security of the protocol CHIC presented in this paper.

It is also worth mentioning that for a very limited number of queries to the PCO oracle, OW-iPCA is equivalent to OW-CPA, as established by Lemma 1. However, it is essential to recognize that this equivalence cannot be readily extended to indistinguishability-based games. In such games, a flawed simulation resulting from an incorrect coin flip could nullify the advantage gained when the simulation was correct. Consequently, we cannot make a similar assertion regarding the relationship between ANO-iPCA and ANO-CPA.

**Lemma 1.** If $KEM$ is a OW-1PCA secure key encapsulation mechanism, then it is also OW-CPA secure.

**Proof.** Let $A$ be any adversary against game OW-1PCA. We construct an adversary $B$ against OW-CPA that simulates game OW-1PCA for $A$ as follows: i. Challenge $(pk, c^*)$ is forwarded to $A$. ii. The single oracle query to PCO is answered by $B$ with a coin flip. iii. Finally, $B$ forwards $A$’s answer to OW-1PCA as its own answer to OW-CPA.

Notice that $B$ perfectly simulates OW-1PCA for $A$ half of the time, no matter what is $A$’s strategy for querying the plaintext-checking oracle. Therefore, at least half of the time (possibly more, in case $A$ wins regardless of the bad simulation of PCO), a win for $A$ translates into a win for $B$.

\[ \text{Adv}_{\text{KEM},B}^{\text{OW-CPA}}(\lambda) \geq \frac{1}{2} \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KEM},A}^{\text{OW-1PCA}}(\lambda) \]  

In broader terms, OW-iPCA is essentially equivalent to OW-CPA, but only when the number of queries made to the plaintext-checking oracle is limited to a few, as attempting to guess the PCO oracle’s responses multiple times leads to an exponential loss in the number of tosses.
Definition 6. (Modified 2-Feistel construction: $m2F$) The modified 2-round Feistel network, as introduced in [19], is constructed using three components: (1) block cipher denoted by the tuple of algorithms (IC.\texttt{Enc}, IC.\texttt{Dec}), with key space $K$ and input/output space $N$; (2) hash function $H$ whose output space is represented by group $G$; and (3) hash function $H'$ whose output space is $K$. The $m2F$ construction encompasses two efficiently computable functions, $m2F_{pw}: N \times G \rightarrow N \times G$ and its inverse $m2F_{pw}^{-1}$, both shown in Figure 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$m2F_{pw}(r, M)$</th>
<th>$m2F_{pw}^{-1}(s, T)$</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$R \leftarrow H(pw, r)$</td>
<td>$t \leftarrow H'(pw, T)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$T \leftarrow M \odot R$</td>
<td>$r \leftarrow \text{IC.\texttt{Dec}}(t, s)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$t \leftarrow H'(pw, T)$</td>
<td>$R \leftarrow H(pw, r)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$s \leftarrow \text{IC.\texttt{Enc}}(t, r)$</td>
<td>$M \leftarrow T \odot R^{-1}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\text{return} $(s, T)$</td>
<td>\text{return} $(r, M)$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Figure 2: The modified 2-Feistel [19], where $\odot$ is a group $G$ operation, and $(\cdot)^{-1}$ is an inverse in $G$.

Half-Ideal Cipher (HIC). In their work [19], the authors introduce a UC security notion they called (randomized) Half-Ideal Cipher (HIC), which is designed to relax the UC notion of an ideal cipher. This security notion is established through the introduction of an ideal functionality, denoted as $\mathcal{F}_\text{HIC}$, and is parameterized by the domain $N \times G$. Notably, $\mathcal{F}_\text{HIC}$ features ‘honest’ interfaces accessible for queries by the environment $Z$, with these queries being mediated through honest parties. However, the honest interfaces are restricted w.r.t. to half of the input: $Z$ has no control over the randomness parameter $r \in N$ in the encryption direction, and it cannot observe the value of $r$ during decryption. By contrast, $\mathcal{F}_\text{HIC}$ provides two adversarial interfaces that grant the adversary/simulator the capability to select $r$ and even program half of the output $T \in G$ during encryption. In the decryption direction, the adversary can also observe the value of $r$.

It is shown in [19] that the $m2F$ construction realizes $\mathcal{F}_\text{HIC}$ functionality in the Random Oracle and Ideal Cipher (IC) model. The HIC abstraction serves as an effective replacement for an ideal cipher in the construction of EKE-like protocols, eliminating the need for the direct use of an IC over groups, whose instantiations are non-trivial (e.g. see [19]). However, it’s worth noting that the randomized encryption of HIC introduces an overhead equal to the length of $r$. Due to the security proof of $m2F$ requiring no collisions on the domain of the IC, this overhead essentially amounts to $2\lambda$ bits, which is precisely what our construction CHIC optimizes.

HIC+ and why it fails. A natural question is whether the $\mathcal{F}_\text{HIC}$ could be extended to $\mathcal{F}_\text{HIC}^+$ which empowers honest parties and provides them with the ability to select and have visibility over $r$ in respectively encryption and decryption. Unfortunately, the $m2F$ construction would not be a provably secure realization of such extended functionality. To see why, let us exemplify with a concrete attack coordinated between an environment $Z$ and its adversary $A$:

1. $Z$ selects $r$ and $M$ at random from the respective domains, picks arbitrary $pw$, queries $\mathcal{F}_\text{HIC}^+$, via a honest party, on $\text{Enc}(pw, (r, M))$, and obtains some ciphertext $(s, T)$.

2. $Z$ queries $H'(pw, T)$ via its adversary $A$ and obtains $t$ (a key for IC).

3. $Z$ queries $\text{IC.\texttt{Enc}}(t, r)$ via its adversary $A$ and should get back $s$. 

8
Unfortunately, the simulator SIM cannot possibly know how to correctly answer the last query because it has no visibility over the first query $Z$ made to $F_{HIC}$, even though it controls IC, H and $H'$. This would not happen using $F_{HIC}$ interfaces because the environment $Z$ can only pass message $M$ to the honest party $Enc$ interface in step (1) above, and it would not know the randomness $r$ (which in the real-world would be internally chosen by that honest party).

Although we could not leverage the modular abstraction that $F_{HIC}$ introduces (or an extension of it), we still take full advantage of the m2F construction, as a white-box drop-in, in our protocol CHIC and rely directly on the RO and IC in the security proof. Therefore, no security definition is formally introduced here for $F_{HIC}$, and m2F is not explicitly parameterized by a security parameter $\lambda$, although its internal components are essential to the security analysis of CHIC.

3 Security Model

We begin this section with a brief review of the Universal Composability (UC) framework. Then we present the standard PAKE functionality as defined by Canetti et al. [10].

Let $P$ be a protocol of interest whose security properties are modelled within the UC framework. In the UC framework, the environment $Z$ embodies some higher-level protocol that uses $P$ as a sub-protocol, but also, at the same time, acts as an adversary that is attacking that higher-level protocol. Here, the adversary $A$ represents the adversary attacking protocol $P$. Between the environment $Z$ and the adversary there is a continuously open communication channel. Such setup allows $Z$ to launch an attack on the higher-level protocol with the help of $A$ (who is attacking protocol $P$). Note that $Z$ can only indirectly (through adversary $A$) make calls to idealized primitives such as an Ideal Cipher and/or a Random Oracle.

In the UC framework that models the security of PAKE protocols, parties are initialized by the environment $Z$ with arbitrary passwords of the environment’s choice. In the real world, protocols are executed according to protocol specifications, in the presence of an adversary $A$ capable of dropping, injecting, and modifying protocol messages at will, thus modelling an insecure network. In the ideal world, parties do not execute the protocol. Instead, they interact via an ideal functionality $F_{PAKE}$ described in Figure 3, in the presence of a simulator $SIM$ that acts as an adversary operating in the ideal world. The Simulator $SIM$ is also allowed to interact with $F_{PAKE}$, but only using the $F_{PAKE}$ adversarial interfaces as defined in Figure 3.

Finally, the goal of the environment $Z$ that interacts with the parties and the adversary (either real world $A$ or ideal world $SIM$) is to guess if it is in the real or in a simulation of the ideal world. Consequently, if for every efficient adversary $A$ no such efficient environment $Z$ exists that distinguishes the real world from the ideal world, we say that the protocol of interest $P$ securely emulates ideal functionality $F_{PAKE}$. The UC PAKE definition results in a stronger notion than game-based PAKE notions and successfully captures the scenario where clients register related passwords with different servers, as this is captured by the ability of $Z$ initializing parties with passwords of its choosing. Furthermore, the UC framework also ensures security under arbitrary protocol composition. Note that the environment $Z$ may reveal various information to the adversary $A$, thus allowing UC PAKE definitions to capture password leaks (static adversaries) and internal state leaks (adaptive adversaries) that may occur anytime during the protocol execution.

4 UC PAKE from Modified 2-Feistel and KEM

In this section, we present CHIC, a UC-secure Password Authenticated Key Exchange protocol. CHIC assumes a KEM scheme with splittable public keys (as defined in Def. 2), which is one-way secure
New Session. On (NewSession, sid, P_i, P_j, pw_C, role) from party P_i:
- Ignore this query if two or more records of the form (sid, ...) already exist.
- Else record (sid, P_i, P_j, fresh, pw_C, ⊥) and send (NewSession, sid, P_i, P_j, role) to A.

Test Password Guess. On (TestPw, sid, P_i, pw^*) from adversary A:
- Retrieve record (sid, P_i, P_j, fresh, pw_C, ⊥), abort if no such record exists.
- If pw^* = pw_C, then update the record to (sid, P_i, P_j, compromised, pw_C, ⊥) and send (TestPw, sid, correct) to A.
- Else update record to (sid, P_i, P_j, interrupted, pw_C, ⊥) and send (TestPw, sid, wrong) to A.

Session Key. On (NewKey, sid, P_i, k^*) from adversary A where |k^*| = λ:
- Retrieve record (sid, P_i, P_j, status, pw, ⊥) for status ∈ {fresh, interrupted, compromised}, abort if no such record exist.
- If status = compromised, set k ← k^*.
- If status = fresh and there exists a record (sid, P_j, P_i, completed, pw, k') whose status switched from fresh to completed when P_j received (NewKey, sid, k'), set k ← k'.
- Else set k ← \{0, 1\}^λ.
- Update the record to (sid, P_i, P_j, completed, pw, k), and output (NewKey, sid, k) to P_i.

Figure 3: The PAKE ideal functionality \( F_{PAKE} \) of Canetti et al. [10].
(OW-CPA), anonymous (ANO-1PCA), and has pseudorandom public keys (UNI-PK). The protocol, shown in Figure 4, is built upon the modified 2-Feistel (m2F) construction of Dos Santos et al. [19]. We take a moment to discuss several design choices in our protocol, which follows an EKE-style construction combining a KEM and the m2F.

First, a pivotal decision, in contrast to the strategy in [19], was to ‘de-randomize’ the m2F. We split the KEM public key and use the parts as inputs to the m2F. This approach helps us avoid employing an ideal cipher over a group, which can be both costly and challenging to instantiate and eliminates any communication overhead associated with the HIC abstraction.

Second, the inputs used for tag and session key generation realized through the $H_1$ and $H_2$ function calls in CHIC, are identical. This allows us to optimize our implementation by making a single call to a hash function with an extended output size of $2\lambda$. Subsequently, the output is cut in two halves, one forming the tag and the other the session key.

Third, the password is exclusively used in the m2F construction and is not provided as input to either $H_1$ or $H_2$. This design choice means that the initiator does not need to store the input password in memory while waiting for the responder’s answer. This choice has potential benefits in the event of a complete compromise of the initiator (including leakage of its internal state), as an attacker would be required to perform an offline dictionary attack to retrieve the initiator’s password under such circumstances. (However, we don’t analyse the security of our protocol under adaptive attacks in the UC sense, and this sort of offline-dictionary-attack-only scenario is not captured by the $F_{PAKE}$ functionality.)

Fourth, it is worth noting that in our protocol the initiator, instead of aborting, outputs a random session key in the event that the received tag is invalid. We opt for this approach to ensure that our construction aligns with the security requirements specified in the standard UC PAKE functionality from [10] that foresees implicit authentication. However, in practice, when implementing the protocol, it is possible for the initiator to abort in that case, thus achieving explicit responder-to-initiator authentication. Furthermore, it is assumed that protocol participants erase any internal state as soon as it becomes unnecessary for the execution of the protocol. This means that the initiator instance after computing and sending $apk$ erases its entire internal state (including the password) except $fullsid$, $apk$, $pk$, and $sk$.

Note that if function $Split$ can be randomized, specifically if $Split(pk)$ returns $(r, pk)$ for $r \leftarrow \mathcal{N}$ and $Split^{-1}(r, pk)$ returns $pk$, then the $Split+m2F$ block in protocol CHIC would instantiate the randomized Half-Ideal Cipher construction of [19]. In that sense, the $Split+m2F$ procedure used in CHIC can be seen as a strict generalization of the HIC construction of [19].

5 Security Analysis

In this section, we prove that the protocol described in Figure 4 UC-realizes the standard PAKE functionality $F_{PAKE}$ shown in Figure 3.

**Theorem 1.** Let KEM be a OW-CPA, ANO-1PCA, and UNI-PK-secure key encapsulation mechanism with splittable public keys (Def. 2). Let IC be a block cipher modeled as an ideal cipher, and $H$, $H'$, $H_1$ and $H_2$ be hash functions modeled as random oracles. Then, the PAKE protocol CHIC described in Fig. 4 UC-realizes $F_{PAKE}$ in the static corruption model. If KEM is OW-CPA-secure then the proof is tight.

**Proof overview.** To prove Theorem 1 we show that the environment cannot distinguish between the “real world” experiment in which the environment $Z$ and adversary $A$ have parties $P_i$ and $P_j$
Figure 4: The CHIC protocol. KEM scheme has splittable public keys (Def. 2) with an efficiently computable and invertible map $\text{Split} : \mathbb{PK}_\lambda \to \mathbb{N}_\lambda \times \mathbb{G}_\lambda$. The protocol makes use of a block cipher denoted as $\text{IC}$ and hash functions $H$ and $H'$ in an m2F configuration (Def. 6), with domains that align with $\text{Split}$ and that are characterized by security parameter $\lambda$, i.e. $\{\text{IC.Enc, IC.Dec} : K_\lambda \times N_\lambda \to N_\lambda, H : \{0, 1\}^* \to G_\lambda, H' : \{0, 1\}^* \to K_\lambda \}$. Group operations within $G$ are represented by $\odot$, and the inverse operation by $(\cdot)^{-1}$. 
execute the protocol from Fig. 4, from an “ideal world” experiment in which a simulator SIM interacts with $F_{PAKE}$ and presents to environment $Z$ a view that is consistent with what $A$ produces in the real world. We assume wlog that $A$ is the dummy adversary, functioning as a communication intermediary between parties and the environment.

**The simulator.** We describe the UC simulator SIM for CHIC that will act as the ideal-world adversary, having access to the ideal functionality $F_{PAKE}$. SIM must simulate to $Z$ protocol messages between honest participants without knowing the passwords chosen by $Z$, while consistently answering random oracle and ideal cipher queries. In a limited number of cases, the simulator is unable to conclude the simulation and aborts. We argue in the proof that those bad events only happen with negligible probability and account for these events in the overall probability of $Z$ distinguishing between the “real world” from the “ideal world”.

- **First message:** After receiving (NewSession, sid, $P_i$, $P_j$, Alice) from $F_{PAKE}$, SIM picks a random $apk$ and sends message $apk$ from $P_i$ to $P_j$.

- **Second message:** After receiving (NewSession, sid, $P_i$, $P_j$, Bob) from $F_{PAKE}$, SIM waits for a message $apk$ sent to $P_j$ from $A$. Then SIM sets $fullsid \leftarrow (sid, P_i, P_j)$. In case the received $apk$ is an output of the m2F that commits the adversary to a password $pw$, SIM extracts the password $pw$ and tests it by sending (TestPwd, sid, $P_i$, $pw$) to $F_{PAKE}$. If $F_{PAKE}$ replies with “correct guess”, SIM computes the key according to the protocol specification and sends (NewKey, sid, $P_j$, key) to $F_{PAKE}$; in all other cases (including “wrong guess”, honest execution, etc.), SIM runs a KEM.Keygen algorithm, obtains a fresh key pair $(pk, sk)$, computes the ciphertext $c$ and the tag using the fresh $pk$, and sends (NewKey, sid, $P_j$, $\bot$) to $F_{PAKE}$. To conclude the second message flow, SIM sends the message $(c, tag)$ from $P_j$ to $P_i$ via $A$.

- **Final output:** After receiving message $(c, tag)$ sent to $P_i$ from $A$, in case of honest execution, SIM simply sends (NewKey, sid, $P_i$, $\bot$) to $F_{PAKE}$. If message $(c, tag)$ was tampered with by the adversary, SIM checks for a corresponding random oracle query to $H_1$ that returned $tag$. If such query has not been asked, SIM sends (TestPwd, sid, $P_i$, $\bot$) and (NewKey, sid, $P_i$, $\bot$) to $F_{PAKE}$, forcing a random session key. If $tag$ comes from $H_1$, $pk$ and $apk$ are extracted. If appropriate queries were made to the m2F, the password is also extractable. SIM extracts $A$’s password guess $pw$ and sends (TestPwd, sid, $P_i$, $pw$) to $F_{PAKE}$. In case of a “correct guess”, SIM computes the key by following the protocol and sends (NewKey, sid, $P_i$, key) to $F_{PAKE}$. If $tag$ is not valid (even if the password guess was correct) or $F_{PAKE}$ returned “wrong guess”, SIM sends (NewKey, sid, $P_i$, $\bot$) to $F_{PAKE}$. If the adversary did not commit to a password in its interaction with $m2F$, SIM sends (TestPwd, sid, $P_i$, $\bot$) and (NewKey, sid, $P_i$, $\bot$) to $F_{PAKE}$.

**Proof.** We prove Theorem 1 via a series of game hops. The first game corresponds to a simulator that is not constrained in any way and executes the real world for the environment perfectly. Concretely, this simulator controls all inputs/outputs to the parties, as well as their communications with the environment. In each hop, we modify this simulator gradually, so that in the final game one can clearly see that it can be divided into two parts, where the first part corresponds to the ideal functionality $F_{PAKE}$ and the second part to the simulator described earlier, which has only black-box access to $F_{PAKE}$ and does not know the honest parties secret passwords. Conceptually, we think of $F_{PAKE}$ as always existing alongside our simulator and receiving the inputs from $Z$: in the first game it is not used at all by the simulator, and gradually it will start using $F_{PAKE}$ to define the outputs.
of parties. Because the first game is identical to the real world and the last game is identical to the ideal world, we just need to show that the view of the environment is not affected by each of our modifications. Hence, in each hop, we analyze the probability of \( Z \) outputting 1 in the game \( G_i \) compared to that of \( Z \) outputting 1 in the game \( G_{i-1} \) and show that these change by a negligible amount.

Our analysis depends on the number of interactions between the environment and the execution model. To account for this, we consider and tally all queries made to the ideal cipher and random oracles, irrespective of whether they originate from honest parties or the adversary. We denote \( q_{IC} \) as the upper bound on queries to the ideal cipher, regardless of whether it is used for encryption (\( IC.\text{Enc} \)) or decryption (\( IC.\text{Dec} \)). Similarly, \( q_H, q_{H'}, \) and \( q_{H1} \) represent upper bounds on the number of queries made to the \( H, H', \) and \( H_1 \) oracles, respectively. Furthermore, we take into account the number of PAKE sessions and interactions occurring within each session. In this context, \( q_{\text{newSession}} \) serves as an upper bound on the number of sessions initiated by \( Z \), while \( q_{\text{send}} \) represents an upper bound on the number of messages delivered by \( A \) when interacting with the involved parties.

\[ \text{Game } G_0 \text{ (Real world): Simulation perfectly mimics the world with oracles } H, H', H_1, H_2, IC.\text{Enc} \text{ and IC.\text{Dec}}. \]

\[ \Pr[G_0] = \text{Real}_{Z,A,F_{PAKE}} \]  

\[ \text{Game } G_1 \text{ (Abort on random oracle collisions): On output collisions of } H_1, H \text{ or } H', \text{ the simulation aborts. This is a statistical hop with a birthday bound.} \]

\[ |\Pr[G_0] - \Pr[G_1]| \leq \frac{q_{H_1}^2}{2 \cdot |\text{Space}_{H_1}|} + \frac{q_H^2}{2 \cdot |\text{Space}_H|} + \frac{q_{H'}^2}{2 \cdot |\text{Space}_{H'}|} \]  

(6)

\[ \text{Game } G_2 \text{ (Full domain sampling of IC and abort on collisions): On new IC.\text{Enc} and IC.\text{Dec} queries, simulator samples } s \text{ and } r \text{ regardless of previous answers and instead aborts on output collisions (even collisions across different keys). } s \text{ and } r \text{ are high-entropy, therefore this is a statistical hop with a negligible difference. Note that queries must be answered consistently and thus decrypting a ciphertext returned by IC.\text{Enc} or encrypting a plaintext returned by IC.\text{Dec}, under the same key, is not considered a new query.} \]

\[ |\Pr[G_1] - \Pr[G_2]| \leq \frac{q_{IC}^2}{2 \cdot |\text{Space}_{IC}|} \]  

(7)

\[ \text{Game } G_3 \text{ (Abort if a new sample for } H' \text{ collides with a previous record of the IC): Upon sampling a new } t \text{ (key for ideal cipher) for the simulation of } H' \text{ oracle, if } t \text{ is not fresh (and therefore already included in List}_{IC}, \text{ the simulation aborts. This is a statistical hop.} \]

\[ |\Pr[G_2] - \Pr[G_3]| \leq \frac{q_{H'} \cdot q_{IC}}{|\text{Space}_{H'}|} \]  

(8)

\[ \text{Game } G_4 \text{ (Abort if a new sample for IC.\text{Dec} collides with a previous record of } H): \text{ Upon sampling a new } r \text{ for the simulation of IC.\text{Dec}, if } r \text{ is not fresh (and therefore already included in List}_{H}, \text{ the simulation aborts. This is a statistical hop.} \]

\[ |\Pr[G_3] - \Pr[G_4]| \leq \frac{q_{IC} \cdot q_{H}}{|\text{Space}_{IC}|} \]  

(9)
Game $G_5$ (On calls to IC.Dec where the password is extractable from the ideal cipher key, force a record to $H$): On a new query IC.Dec$(t, s)$—i.e., a query where a fresh ideal cipher preimage $r$ is sampled—check if $t$ came out of $H'$ oracle and, if so, introduce the following change to the oracle. First, extract the password $pw$ associated with $t$ (there is at most 1 since we have already discarded the possibility of collisions in $H'$), then call $H(pw, r)$, forcing $r$ to be added into the records of oracle $H$. Note that due to the abort triggers introduced in the previous games, this modification is equivalent to sampling a random pair $(r, R)$ and trying to program $H$ directly by adding the tuple $(pw, r, R)$ to $List_4$. This action will abort if either $(*, r, *) \in List_H$ (see Game $G_4$) or if $(*, *, R) \in List_H$ (see Game $G_1$). Nothing really changes unless IC.Dec triggers an abort that did not occur in the previous game. This is a statistical hop.

$$|\Pr[G_4] - \Pr[G_5]| \leq \frac{q_{IC} \cdot q_H}{|Space_{IC}|} + \frac{q_{IC} \cdot q_H}{|Space_H|}$$  \hspace{1cm} (10)

Game $G_6$ (On calls to IC.Dec where the password is extractable from the ideal cipher key, use KEM.Keygen and store secrets): On a new query IC.Dec$(t, s)$, if $t$ came out of $H'$ oracle, instead of directly sampling a random pair $(r, R)$, the simulator relies on KEM.Keygen and KEM.Split, and stores the secrets for future use. This hop is down to the uniformity of KEM public keys.

$$|\Pr[G_5] - \Pr[G_6]| \leq q_{IC} \cdot Adv_{KEM}^{pk-uniformity}$$  \hspace{1cm} (11)

Game $G_7$ (Set random key via $F_{PAKE}$ if $tag$ was not output by $H_1$): Modify Alice’s response when $tag$ was not output by $H_1$ wrt fullsid, apk and $c$: use $F_{PAKE}$ to generate the session key totally at random by compromising the session with an invalid password and then completing the session with NewKey. The protocol specification determines Alice’s session key to be random if $tag$ is incorrect. A tag not coming out of $H_1$ will only be valid with negligible probability. Therefore, this is a statistical hop.

$$|\Pr[G_6] - \Pr[G_7]| \leq \frac{q_{send}}{|Space_{H_1}|}$$  \hspace{1cm} (12)

Game $G_8$ (For passive attacks, use a private oracle $H_1^*$ without inputs $pk$ and $K$ to compute $tag$, and set session key directly via $F_{PAKE}$ instead of using the key coming from $H_2$): For passive attacks, i.e. messages are correctly computed and forwarded to the intended party (apk from Alice to Bob, and possibly $(c, tag)$ from Bob to Alice), compute the $tag$ with private oracle $H_1^*$ and use the functionality to generate the session key, without testing the password.

The intuition of this hop is that the KEM ciphertext must conceal $K$, therefore the adversary will not call $H_1(*, *, *, *, K)$ or $H_2(*, *, *, *, K)$. If it does, the simulator breaks the one-wayness of the KEM. The technical difficulty in the reduction is that the simulator does not know ahead of time if the session will be actively attacked. Therefore, it must embed the challenge $pk^*$ in each session, one at a time (hybrid argument), and complete the simulation without detectable changes to the protocol. If the adversary relays correctly apk from Alice to Bob but then decides to actively interfere with the communication and forward its own $(c, tag)$ back to Alice, the simulator faces the dilemma of whether to force Alice to use a random session key (if $tag$ is invalid) or the session key resulting from $H_2(fullsid, pk, apk, c, K)$ (if $tag$ is valid). This boils down to whether $c$ encrypts $K$ included in $tag$ or not. However, because we embedded the challenge $pk^*$ to compute the first flow of messages, we no longer can decrypt $c$. For this reason, we reduce this hop down to OW-1PCA and take advantage of the PCO oracle to check if the key $K$ included in the $tag$ is effectively the key encrypted under $c$.

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7Our protocol is implicitly rejecting to follow the standard $F_{PAKE}$ functionality.
The reduction goes as follows (hybrid argument, one public key at a time): i. Embed challenge \( pk^* \) into Alice’s initialization procedure. ii. If the adversary is passive and delivers \( apk \) to Bob, reduction uses challenge \( c^* \) and private oracles \( H_1^* \) and \( H_2^* \) to proceed. These private oracles receive the same inputs as their public counterparts \( H_1 \) and \( H_2 \), except for the arguments \( pk \) and \( K \). (Note that \( K^* \) encrypted under \( c^* \) is unknown to the reduction.) Since the ciphertext \( c^* \) is an input to both \( H_1 \) and \( H_2 \), this fixes a single key anyway and the games are identical unless \( K^* \) is queried to either oracle. If such a query is never placed, the usage of these private oracles is independent of \( Z \)’s view. iii. On Alice’s side, if the adversary is still passive, decryption is not needed: \( tag \) is valid and session \( key \) is derived from private oracle \( H_2^* \). Due to the uniqueness of inputs, private oracle \( H_2^* \) will produce the same key on both sides, as would the public oracle \( H_2 \) in \( G_7 \) and NewKey query to \( \mathcal{F}_\text{PAKE} \) in \( G_8 \).

If the adversary is active (and the reduction embedded the challenge \( pk^* \) in this session) the reduction algorithm will use the PCO oracle to verify the tag: it verifies that the unique \( H_1 \) entry corresponding to the \( tag \) includes \( key \) encrypted under \( c^* \). In this reduction, there is at most one PCO call per embedded challenge public key \( pk^* \) since KEM decryption occurs only in one place in our protocol. If this check fails, the reduction returns a fresh random key to the attacker, which is consistent with both games: trivially so in \( G_7 \), and in \( G_8 \) because this forces the functionality to produce a fresh random session key by issuing a TestPwd with \( \perp \).

When the adversary concludes its run, the reduction algorithm confirms the inclusion of the correct \( K^* \) in queries to \( H_1 \) and \( H_2 \) via calls to the PCO oracle before submitting its answer against the one-wayness property of KEM ciphertexts. If no such query with the correct \( K^* \) exists, \( G_7 \) and \( G_8 \) are identical. As an alternative approach, randomly selecting an entry from the \( H_1 \) and \( H_2 \) tables can lead to a less tight reduction. However, this approach does not require confirmation of the inclusion of \( K^* \) in \( H_1 \) and \( H_2 \) oracle queries, and therefore at most one query to the PCO oracle is required for the correct simulation of active attacks to Alice, after embedding the challenge public key in the first flow from Alice to Bob. Importantly, Lemma 1 establishes the equivalence between \( \text{OW-1PCA} \) and \( \text{OW-CPA} \).

\[
| \Pr[G_7] - \Pr[G_8] | \leq q_{send} \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KEM}}^{\text{OW-1PCA}} \quad (13)
\]

\[
| \Pr[G_7] - \Pr[G_8] | \leq (q_{H_1} + q_{H_2}) \cdot q_{send} \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KEM}}^{\text{OW-CPA}} \quad (14)
\]

**Game \( G_9 \) (Simulate Bob’s response with a fresh public key for passive attacks):** For honestly transmitted \( apk \), the simulator creates ciphertext \( c \) with a fresh public key, then computes \( tag \) with the private oracle \( H_1^* \) (as in the previous game), and finally sends \((c, tag)\) on Bob’s behalf. We bridge this hop using ANO-1PCA, with a hybrid argument, replacing one public key at a time. Note that Alice does not decrypt honestly transmitted ciphertexts since \( G_8 \). However, if there’s an active attack on the second round of the session where the reduction programmed the challenge \( pk_0 \) from ANO-1PCA game, the decryption key is not available. As before, the reduction takes advantage of a single call to the PCO oracle and the (single) relevant record of \( H_1 \) to determine whether the \( tag \) is valid.

More in detail, the reduction goes as follows (hybrid argument, one public key at the time): i. Embed challenge \( pk_0 \) into Alice’s initialization procedure. ii. If the adversary is passive and delivers \( apk \) to Bob, reduction uses challenge \( c^* \). iii. On Alice’s side, if the attack is passive, no need to decrypt \( c^* \). If there is an active attack, extract \( K \) from \( tag \) by inspecting \( H_1 \) records, and check \( K \) against \( c \) submitted by the adversary and \( sk_0 \) to determine the validity of \( tag \) without actually decrypting the ciphertext. Note that the PCO oracle of the standard ANO-1PCA game allows checks against both \( sk_0 \) and \( sk_1 \), and the reduction embedded \( pk_0 \) on Alice’s side. Therefore, checks must be carried out against \( sk_0 \).
There are a few noteworthy observations regarding the definitional requirements for this reduction. For starters, we only need a weaker version of ANO-1PCA where the PCO oracle only allows plaintext checks against one of the secret keys. Another observation is that we don’t require the challenger of the ANO-1PCA game to provide $K^*$ as part of the challenge. This is a direct result of the modification introduced in $G_8$ that lifts the need to use the encapsulated key for passive attacks (via the usage of private oracle $H^*$ to compute the tag, and NewKey to $F_{PAKE}$ to set the session key).\(^8\)

This reduction algorithm perfectly interpolates between games $G_8$ and $G_9$. If challenge $c^*$ is a result of $KEM.Encap$ with $pk_0$, this corresponds to $G_8$. On the other hand, if $c^*$ is a result of $KEM.Encap$ with $pk_1$, the simulation adheres to the specifications of $G_9$.

\[
|\Pr[G_8] - \Pr[G_9]| \leq q_{send} \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{ano-1pca}}^\text{KEM} \tag{15}
\]

**Game $G_{10}$** (Active attacks on Alice: The tag is invalid if the password cannot be extracted from an adversarially crafted message from Bob to Alice): On adversarially crafted $(c, tag)$ sent to Alice, the $tag$ forces a commitment to a single $pk$ and, consequently, to a unique password due to the joint operation of $IC.Dec$ and $H'$. The only case in which password extraction fails is if the adversary did not reconstruct the $pk$ to which it committed using calls to $IC.Dec$ and $H'$. However, in this case, the correct $pk$ that Alice will be using is information-theoretically hidden from the adversary’s view. More in detail, in $G_{10}$ we check if the $pk$ was not obtained from $apk$ via the appropriate calls to $H'$ and then $IC.Dec$. (Note that since $G_6$ the appropriate decryption calls create a record in $List_{secrets}$.) If this is not the case, then $tag$ is declared as invalid. In such cases, we force a random session key via $F_{PAKE}$.

The two games $G_9$ and $G_{10}$ are identical unless the adversary guessed Alice’s public key (and created the $tag$ sent to Alice with it) without having obtained it from $apk$ via the appropriate calls to $H'$ and then $IC.Dec$. This is a statistical hop. We account for a lucky guess of the $r$ part of $pk$ only, which we know to be uniform and hidden from the adversary’s view.

\[
|\Pr[G_9] - \Pr[G_{10}]| \leq \frac{q_{send}}{|\text{Space}_IC|} \tag{16}
\]

**Game $G_{11}$** (Active attacks on Alice: If the password is extractable, test it and proceed accordingly): On Alice’s side, if the password can be extracted, test the password via TestPwd. If the guess is correct, run the protocol honestly and program the session key. If the guess is wrong, tell functionality to complete the session with a random key. Note that different passwords are guaranteed to lead to different public keys for a fixed $apk$, as oracles discard collisions. In turn, because $pk$ is also included as an argument of $H_1$, the tag-verification procedure is bound to fail. Therefore, Game $G_{10}$ and Game $G_{11}$ are identical from $Z$’s perspective. This is a bridge hop.

\[
\Pr[G_{10}] = \Pr[G_{11}] \tag{17}
\]

**Game $G_{12}$** (Simulate Alice’s initial message without using the password): Notice that the simulator deals with Alice’s response without using $sk$, except for the case where Alice is actively attacked with the correct password. Therefore, the simulator can simulate a NewSession for Alice.

\(^8\)We note that this is the point in the proof where we could not find a way to avoid a decryption-like oracle and that forces us to use an actively secure KEM. This stands in contention with the results in [19, 4], where we believe the authors have missed this point. We also note that ANO-PCA was already used in the security proof from Pan and Zeng [18]. The authors claim that OCAKE protocol in [4] lacks perfect forward secrecy (PFS), but it is unclear whether the claim is attributed to the fact that the original proof for the protocol requires the underlying KEM to satisfy merely ANO-CPA.
by directly sampling \( apk \), leaving the generation of the public key for later. As such, the password \( pw \) is not required at this stage.

Nevertheless, the simulator of \( G_{12} \) creates an IC record for \( apk := (s, T) \), with placeholders that can later be replaced by Alice’s \( pk \). More precisely, it adds \((⊥, ⊥, s, mode = E)\) to \( List_{IC} \). If \( s \) is unfresh, the simulation aborts. The record only gets updated when Alice’s password \( pw \) is confirmed to be correct as a result of a TestPwd query to \( F_{PAKE} \), and \( m_{2F}^{-1}(apk) \) is computed by querying its oracles. Recall that queries to \( IC.Dec \) with \( t \) that permits password extraction leads to \( sk \) being embedded in \( List_{secrets} \). So, the decryption key is always available in the only case still needed (active attack with the correct password).

Following the rules of the previous game \( G_{11} \), Alice generates a key-pair with \( KEM.Keygen \) and then computes \( apk \) by feeding \( pk \) to the oracles of the \( m_2F \), which leads to early abortion if the newly sampled \( R \) is in \( List_H \) (rule added in \( G_1 \)), or the newly sampled \( t \) is in \( List_{IC} \) (rule added in \( G_3 \)), and if the newly sampled \( s \) is in \( List_{IC} \) (rule added in \( G_2 \)). In \( G_{12} \), we abort only if the newly sampled \( s \) is in \( List_{IC} \). This means that the other abortion events have to be accounted for in the analysis of this game hop. Furthermore, if the adversary places a new query to \( IC.Enc \) and happens to land on \( s \)—it’s important to emphasize new query, meaning this only applies to queries \( IC.Enc(t, r) \) where \( r \) is not the result of a previous query \( IC.Dec(t, s) \)—the game aborts since there’s already a record (albeit incomplete). Notice that in \( G_{11} \) there is one particular \( r \) for which the oracle would respond without aborting, this is the \( r \) of Alice’s \( pk \). We assumed that \( KEM \) has splittable keys, and by definition \( r \) is \( ε \)-close to being uniform where \( ε \) is negligible in \( λ \). Therefore, this hop is statistical.

\[
| Pr[G_{11}] - Pr[G_{12}] | \leq \frac{q_{newSession} \cdot |H|^2}{|Space_H|} + \frac{q_{newSession} \cdot |H'|}{|Space_{H'}|} + \frac{q_{newSession} \cdot |T|}{|Space_{IC}|} + \varepsilon \tag{18}
\]

**Game \( G_{13} \)** (Active attacks on Bob: if there’s no record consistent with \( apk \) having been computed in the forward direction, use private oracle \( H_1^* \) to compute \( tag \) an set random session key via \( F_{PAKE} \)): The attacker sends its own \( apk \) to Bob and there is no record consistent with \( apk \) having been computed in the forward direction. In such cases, the simulator uses the private oracle \( H_1^* \) to compute the \( tag \) and sets a random session key via \( F_{PAKE} \). Recall that the private oracle \( H_1^* \) does not take as input \( pk \) and \( K \). We reduce this hop down to OW-PCA. We use a hybrid argument, changing the behavior of one Bob session at a time. The intuition is that if \( apk \) was not computed in the forward direction with an appropriate call to \( IC.Enc \), the attacker has no control over the KEM public key (and corresponding secret key) associated with \( apk \) sent to Bob. Therefore, the attacker cannot decrypt Bob’s ciphertext, and is unlikely to query \( H_1 \) with \( K \) encrypted in Bob’s response. If it does, we break the OW-PCA game of \( KEM \).

The reduction algorithm knows Bob’s password. The inverse of the attacker’s \( apk \) sent to Bob, under Bob’s password, must be the challenge \( pk^* \) of the OW-PCA game. The difficulty in arguing this hop arises from the adversary’s potential actions with \( apk \): they might attempt to decrypt it using Bob’s password before or after sending it, or they may not decrypt \( apk \) with Bob’s password at all (willingly or because the Bob’s password was never correctly guessed by the adversary).

Remember, in this particular game hop, we are exclusively handling adversary-generated \( apk \) values, which are not computed following the forward direction of the \( m_2F \). Therefore, we apply a hybrid argument over all \( q_{send} \) queries from Alice to Bob, and all \( IC.Dec \) queries, carefully associating the challenge \( pk^* \) with one of these queries. The reduction algorithm loses the ability to decrypt ciphertexts encrypted under \( pk^* \), but in the protocol only Alice needs to decrypt ciphertexts and she will do so under her secret key (regardless of whether \( apk \) sent out is crafted by the adversary and possibly associated with \( pk^* \)).

The reduction algorithm also embeds \( c^* \) in the computation of \( tag \) with private oracle \( H_1^* \) and in Bob’s response. It also monitors queries to public oracles \( H_1 \) and \( H_2 \), extracting \( K \) and testing with
the PCO oracle against challenge $c^*$. If the PCO oracle returns true, the reduction would submit $K$ and would win the OW-PCA game. Otherwise, the usage of private oracle $H_0^*$ and setting Bob’s session key to be random via $F_{PAKE}$ is identical from $Z$’s view.

Alternatively, as also described in the proof strategy of the hop to $G_6$, if we are willing the bear the cost of a loss in tightness, we could use a guessing argument instead by simply outputting a $K$ queried to one of the public oracles $H_1$ and $H_2$, and avoid relying on any PCO oracle for this reduction (as mentioned earlier, Alice is always able to decrypt).

$$|\Pr[G_{12}] - \Pr[G_{13}]| \leq (q_{\text{send}} + q_{\text{IC}}) \cdot Adv_{\text{KEM}}^{\text{OW-PCA}}$$  \hspace{1cm} (19)$$

$$|\Pr[G_{12}] - \Pr[G_{13}]| \leq (q_{H_1} + q_{H_2}) \cdot (q_{\text{send}} + q_{\text{IC}}) \cdot Adv_{\text{KEM}}^{\text{OW-CPA}}$$  \hspace{1cm} (20)

**Game $G_{14}$ (Active attacks on Bob: if there’s no record consistent with apk having been computed in the forward direction, encrypt the ciphertext under a freshly generated public key):** As in the case of the previous game hop, the attacker sends its own apk to Bob and there’s no record consistent with apk having been computed in the forward direction. Now, the simulator encrypts the ciphertext that Bob sends out under a freshly generated public key. This is a reduction to ANO-CPA.

The reduction is similar to the previous game hop in that we embed $pk_0$ in one send query to Bob at the time, and then embed the challenge $c^*$ in Bob’s response. As in the analysis of the previous game hop, we have to account for the possibility that the attacker tried to decrypt apk under Bob’s password before sending it. In that case, $pk_0$ needs to be embedded upon the IC.Dec call. In the worst case, the lost in tightness w.r.t. to ANO-CPA is limited by $q_{\text{send}} + q_{\text{IC}}$. If $c^*$ was encrypted under $pk_0$, we adhere to the specifications of $G_{13}$. If it was encrypted under $pk_1$, we adhere to the rules of $G_{14}$. We have already established in the previous game that tag is computed via private oracle $H_1$ (that does not take pk as input). As in the reduction strategy of the previous game hop, the challenge $pk^*$ of ANO-CPA is never associated with the apk sent by Alice. Thus, Alice’s decryption key $sk$ is always available when needed, and a PCO oracle is also not needed for this reduction.

$$|\Pr[G_{13}] - \Pr[G_{14}]| \leq (q_{\text{send}} + q_{\text{IC}}) \cdot Adv_{\text{KEM}}^{\text{ANO-CPA}}$$  \hspace{1cm} (21)

**Game $G_{15}$ (Active attacks on Bob: if there is a record consistent with apk having been computed in the forward direction, extract the password, test it, and use private oracle $H_1^*$ and set a random session key if “wrong guess”):** The simulator now deals with the case where there is a record consistent with apk having been computed in the forward direction. The simulator extracts the password and tests it. If “correct guess”, the simulator keeps following the protocol and sets the correctly-computed session key via $F_{PAKE}$ (this doesn’t change anything from $Z$’s view). If “wrong guess”, the simulator makes use of private oracle $H_1^*$ to compute the tag and sets a random session key via $F_{PAKE}$. The reduction is similar to that of $G_{13}$.

$$|\Pr[G_{14}] - \Pr[G_{15}]| \leq (q_{\text{send}} + q_{\text{IC}}) \cdot Adv_{\text{KEM}}^{\text{OW-CPA}}$$  \hspace{1cm} (22)$$

$$|\Pr[G_{14}] - \Pr[G_{15}]| \leq (q_{H_1} + q_{H_2}) \cdot (q_{\text{send}} + q_{\text{IC}}) \cdot Adv_{\text{KEM}}^{\text{OW-CPA}}$$  \hspace{1cm} (23)

**Game $G_{16}$ (Active attacks on Bob: if there is a record consistent with apk having been computed in the forward direction, extract the password, test it, and encrypt the ciphertext under a freshly generated public key if “wrong guess”):** This change and reduction is similar to that argued in $G_{14}$.

$$|\Pr[G_{15}] - \Pr[G_{16}]| \leq (q_{\text{send}} + q_{\text{IC}}) \cdot Adv_{\text{KEM}}^{\text{ANO-CPA}}$$  \hspace{1cm} (24)
Game $G_{17}$ (Ideal world): At this point, we are in the ideal world, where the simulator is using the ideal functionality $F_{PAKE}$ to generate all keys except for those where there is a correct password guess.

$$\Pr[G_{16}] = \Pr[G_{17}] = \text{Ideal}_{Z,\text{SIM},F_{PAKE}}$$

(25)

Bringing all these elements together and leveraging Lemma 1 to bound the advantage against OW-1PCA as no more than twice the advantage against OW-CPA, we can simplify the expression to obtain the following result with minimal requirements on the KEM as shown in Equation 26. Alternatively, assuming KEM is a OW-PCA-secure key encapsulation mechanism, we obtain the tight result shown in Equation 27.

For the sake of completeness, a description in pseudo-code of the simulator $\text{SIM}$ of the ideal world is provided in Appendix A. Each step of the process, starting from the code execution of uncorrupted parties in the real world and leading to the simulation of the ideal world, is meticulously detailed. Every modification is framed and cross-referenced with the specific game hop where it was initially introduced to ensure a traceable progression of the proof.

$$|\text{Real}_{Z,A,F_{PAKE}} - \text{Ideal}_{Z,\text{SIM},F_{PAKE}}| \leq$$

$$q_c \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KEM}}^{\text{pk-uniformity}} + 4 \cdot (q_{H_1} + q_{H_2}) \cdot (q_{\text{send}} + q_c) \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KEM}}^{\text{ow-PCA}} +$$

$$+ (3 \cdot q_{\text{send}} + 2 \cdot q_c) \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KEM}}^{\text{no-PCA}}$$

$$+ \frac{q_c^2 + 2 \cdot q_c \cdot q_{H} + q_{\text{send}} + q_{\text{newSession}} \cdot q_{H}}{|\text{Space}_{\text{C}}|} \quad (26)$$

$$+ \frac{q_{H_1}^2 + q_c \cdot q_{H} + q_{\text{newSession}} \cdot q_{H}}{|\text{Space}_{H_1}|}$$

$$+ \frac{q_{H_1}^2 + q_c \cdot q_{H} + q_{\text{newSession}} \cdot q_{H}}{|\text{Space}_{H_1}|} +$$

$$+ q_{\text{send}} \in \text{Space}_{H_1}$$

$$|\text{Real}_{Z,A,F_{PAKE}} - \text{Ideal}_{Z,\text{SIM},F_{PAKE}}| \leq$$

$$q_c \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KEM}}^{\text{pk-uniformity}} + (3 \cdot q_{\text{send}} + 2 \cdot q_c) \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KEM}}^{\text{ow-PCA}} +$$

$$+ (3 \cdot q_{\text{send}} + 2 \cdot q_c) \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{KEM}}^{\text{no-PCA}}$$

$$+ \frac{q_c^2 + 2 \cdot q_c \cdot q_{H} + q_{\text{send}} + q_{\text{newSession}} \cdot q_{H}}{|\text{Space}_{\text{C}}|} \quad (27)$$

$$+ \frac{q_{H_1}^2 + q_c \cdot q_{H} + q_{\text{newSession}} \cdot q_{H}}{|\text{Space}_{H_1}|}$$

$$+ \frac{q_{H_1}^2 + q_c \cdot q_{H} + q_{\text{newSession}} \cdot q_{H}}{|\text{Space}_{H_1}|} +$$

$$+ q_{\text{send}} \in \text{Space}_{H_1}$$

\[ \square \]

On tightness. The bounds we give here are aligned with those obtained in prior works on EKE-like constructions from KEMs. The main difference wrt Diffie-Hellman based constructions is that we cannot use self reducibility properties to remove the multiplicative factors associated with dealing with multiple-instance KEM security properties. Intuitively, the $q_c$ multiplicative factor is the most problematic, but it seems intrinsic to the use of the ideal cipher; it corresponds to the reduction’s uncertainty as to which of the adversary’s reverse ideal cipher queries will the adversary choose to fix the KEM public key on which it will be challenged. A KEM with a tight proof of multi-instance security would solve this problem.

6 Implementation and Performance Analysis

We make two preliminary notes on our instantiation of CHIC, which distinguish this work from previous proposals for building PAKE from a lattice-based KEM in the Ideal Cipher model.

Firstly, contrary to what has been suggested in previous papers [4, 19, 3], our security proof shows that the construction requires a KEM that offers more than just passive security (namely
Intuitively, some of the conditions hold trivially: 1) We have can run a ring element values in rejection sampling procedure, and let pseudorandom under the MLWE assumption.

Secondly, we recall that the bandwidth requirements of the IND-CCA version of Kyber are the same as that of the underlying IND-CPA PKE construction: this is one of the properties of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation used by Kyber. For this reason, when it comes to bandwidth usage, our construction still outperforms previous proposals that (unjustifiably) propose to use the IND-CPA version. Indeed, there is no overhead in public-key transmission in the first flow of our protocol due to the compact half-ideal cipher, whereas in the second flow we have only the overhead of transmitting the (short) MAC tag.

We now show that Kyber also satisfies the remaining requirements for instantiating CHIC.

**Theorem 2.** Kyber has splitable and pseudorandom public keys.

**Proof.** Kyber works over ring \( R_q = \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^n + 1) \), where \( q = 3329 \) is a small prime and \( n = 256 \). A public key consists of two parts: 1) a byte encoding of a vector \( t \in R_q^k \), where \( k = 2, 3 \) or 4, and 2) a seed \( \rho \in \{0,1\}^{256} \) that is sampled uniformly at random. The first component is computed (in the NTT domain) as \( t = A^T s + e \), where \( s \) (the secret key) and \( e \) the ephemeral noise are sampled from a suitable (low norm) distribution. Matrix \( A \) is obtained using a rejection sampling procedure seeded by \( \rho \) that guarantees a uniform distribution over \( R_q^{k \times k} \). Note that this makes the public key pseudorandom under the MLWE assumption.

To see that this procedure satisfies the conditions specified in Definition 2, we observe that two of the conditions hold trivially: 1) We have \( G_\lambda = R_q^k \) is an (additive) group, where \( k \) is fixed by the security parameter; 3) The distribution of the second component is uniform over \( N_\lambda = \{0,1\}^{256} \) for all the considered security parameters. Condition 2) requires that one can hash to \( R_q^k \) indifferentially from a random oracle. Arguably, the procedure that is used to sample matrix \( A \) in the Kyber standard (one \( R_q \) element at the time) has exactly this property, assuming SHAKE-128 is an ideal XOF, i.e., that SHAKE-128 generates an arbitrarily large sequence of uniform random bytes when called on a given input. \(^9\)

To construct a uniform polynomial in \( R_q \), the procedure takes as input the seed \( \rho \) and some public domain separation inputs that ensure all \( R_q \) values are sampled independently, and it first uses its input to seed the SHAKE-128 XOF. The procedure then rejection-samples one coefficient at a time, by taking the next 12 bits from the output of SHAKE-128 and checking if they encode an integer in the range \([q]\). Values that are out of range are discarded, so the polynomial is intuitively just first set of 12-bit sequences produced by SHAKE-128 that fall within the correct range.

We sketch the indifferentiability argument next.\(^10\) Let \( O \) denote SHAKE-128 and \( R \) denote the rejection sampling procedure, and let \( I \) denote the ideal random function that produces uniform values in \( R_q \) when given the same input as \( R \). Indifferentiability requires that a simulator \( S \) can explain the outputs of \( R \) to an adversary with access to \( O \) in the following sense.

\[
A^{R^{O(\cdot)},O(\cdot)} \sim A^{I^{(\cdot)},S^{(\cdot)}}.
\]

Intuitively, \( S \) can perfectly simulate \( O \) as follows. When \( A \) queries \( O \) on fresh input \( X \), \( S \) can obtain a ring element \( Y \) by querying \( I(X) \) (recall that \( R \) just passes its own input to the XOF). In parallel, \( S \) can run \( R^{O(X)} \) lazily sampling \( O \) as needed, to obtain a discardable ring element \( Y' \). Now \( S \) can just reprogram the \( O \) value that gave rise to \( Y' \), replacing the positions that encode \( Y' \) coefficients with values that explain the coefficients of \( Y \). This simulation is perfect. \( \square \)

\(^9\) The procedure can be truncated, which introduces a non-zero but arbitrarily small failure probability.

\(^10\) This argument was communicated to us by (anonimized) in private communication and is being published as independent work.
Our Implementation. We have implemented CHIC in C by extending the reference implementation of Kyber available from github.com/pqcrystals/kyber. The implementation is provided as supplementary material to this submission.

Before discussing parameter choices and giving some performance figures, we briefly describe how we implemented the three components of the compact half-ideal cipher construction, as well as the computation of the MAC tag and key derivation hashes, which are all that’s needed beyond Kyber KEM:

- **Ideal cipher over 256-bits:** We take the Rijndael variant that uses 256-bit blocks and 256-bit keys. The code was taken from the open-source tool ccrypt, which in turn adapts on the original Rijndael reference implementation. We recall that this block cipher is used to hide the seed component $\rho$ that results from public-key splitting.

- **Hashing to the Kyber polynomial ring $R_q$:** We reuse the implementation of the rejection sampling procedure that is used internally by Kyber to expand the public-key seed to a $k \times k$ matrix over $R_q$. The only difference to the Kyber implementation is that, rather than sampling a $k \times k$ matrix starting from a seed $\rho$, our implementation samples a vector of size $k$, seeded by the input to random oracle $H$ in our compact half ideal cipher construction. We recall that the output of this procedure is used to mask the vector over $R_k^q$ that results from public-key splitting using a group operation.

- **Masking vectors in $R_k^q$:** We reuse the functions already available in the Kyber code that permit adding and subtracting vectors over $R_k^q$.

- **Hashing to the key space of Rijndael** We use SHA3-256 to produce the required 32-bytes.

- **Key Derivation Function and Tag Computation** Since these two hash functions take the same input, we implement them as a single SHA3-512 computation that produces 64 bytes, which we then split to obtain the session key (which is kept secret) and the tag (which is transmitted).

Parameter selection. We do not carry out a security analysis against quantum attackers\(^{11}\) so our parameter selection considers only classical adversaries. Nevertheless, we note that the ideal cipher layer in the protocol is irrelevant against passive adversaries, and so our protocol offers the same security as Kyber KEM against adversaries that just store protocol traces and try to break confidentiality in the future using a quantum computer. From this perspective, we consider it plausible to consider instantiations for all the variants of Kyber, where a higher-level of security protection against quantum passive attackers is needed, whilst offering only 128-bit security against classical active attackers. The latter security level follows from the birthday-bound terms in our main theorem and the fact that we use Rijndael with 256-bit block and key sizes and must exclude collisions on both, as well as over the tag space.

Performance Analysis. As stated in the start of this section, the bandwidth overhead of our protocol over Kyber KEM is minimal: it comprises only 32-bytes for the tag in the second flow.

Concerning execution time, Table 1 shows values in microseconds for the two stages of the initiator and the single stage of the responder for three cases: 1) using just the IND-CPA version of Kyber (this is a passively secure key exchange); 2) using just the IND-CCA version of Kyber (still

\[^{11}\text{We are not aware of any results that consider quantum attackers in the Ideal Cipher model against practical protocols.}\]
Table 1: Experimental results in microseconds. Comparison of execution times of CHIC participants (two initiator stages and responder single stage) with respect to key exchange using only a CPA or CCA Kyber KEM.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CPA KEM</th>
<th>CCA KEM</th>
<th>CHIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KeyGen</td>
<td>Enc</td>
<td>Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyber512</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyber768</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyber1024</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

only a passively secure key exchange) and 3) using CHIC. The measurements were taken in a modest laptop with a 2.3 GHz Intel “Core i5” processor with four cores, 128 MB of embedded eDRAM, a 6 MB shared level 3 cache, and 16 GB of RAM. We did not explore aggressive optimizations using parallelism (or even SIMD implementations), so these results can definitely be improved. The overhead in computation time for initiators is around 25% for Kyber 768 wrt the bare CCA KEM key exchange. For responders, it is around 50%. Overall, these overheads decrease as the security level of Kyber increases, but the execution times are still in the order of tens of microseconds.

References


A The simulator

We detail the ideal world simulator $\text{SIM}$ for proof of Theorem 1, using labeled frames to indicate the game hops where modifications occur.

On query $(\text{NewSession}, sid, P_i, P_j, role)$ from $F_{\text{PAKE}}$:

- if $role = \text{Bob}$
  - add $(sid, P_i, P_j, Bob, \perp, \perp)$ to $\mathsf{List}_{\text{transcripts}}$
- if $role = \text{Alice}$
  - $apk \leftarrow \text{Space}_{apk}$
  - $(s, T) \leftarrow apk$
  - if $\exists (*, *, T, *) \in \mathsf{List}_H$ abort
  - if $\exists (*, *, *, *) \in \mathsf{List}_C$ abort
  - add $(\perp, \perp, s, \text{mode} = E)$ to $\mathsf{List}_C$
  - add $(sid, P_i, P_j, \text{Alice}, msg_1, \perp)$ to $\mathsf{List}_{\text{transcripts}}$
  - send $apk$ from $P_i$ to $P_j$
  - return

On query $(\text{Send}, msg)$ from $A$ to $(sid, P_i)$:

- find $(sid, P_i, P_j, role, msg_1, msg_2) \in \mathsf{List}_{\text{transcripts}}$
  - if not found return $\perp$ // ignore query

  // $msg$ is either for Alice or Bob;
  // check consistency of state in the recorded transcript
  - if $role = \text{Bob}$ $\&\&$ $(msg_1 \neq \perp \&\& \ perp 2 \neq \perp)$ return $\perp$ // ignore query
  - if $role = \text{Alice}$ $\&\&$ $(msg_1 = \perp \&\& \ perp 2 \neq \perp)$ return $\perp$ // ignore query

- if $role = \text{Bob}$
  - update record $(sid, P_i, P_j, Bob, msg, \perp) \in \mathsf{List}_{\text{transcripts}}$

  $\backslash \backslash$ case (a) $msg$ is $apk$ transmitted by Alice (legitimate partner of Bob)

  - if $\exists (sid, P_j, P_i, Alice, msg, *) \in \mathsf{List}_{\text{transcripts}}$
    - $(sk, pk) \leftarrow \text{KEM.Keygen}($\lambda$)$
    - $(c, \_ ) \leftarrow \text{KEM.Encap}(pk)$
    - $tag \leftarrow H_1^*(\text{fullsid}, apk, c)$
    - send $(c, tag)$ to $P_i$
    - send $(\text{NewKey}, sid, P_i, \perp)$
    - update Bob’s record in $\mathsf{List}_{\text{transcripts}}$
    - return

  $\backslash \backslash$ $apk$ comes from $A$

  - $apk \leftarrow msg_1$
  - $(s, T) \leftarrow apk$

    for $(\text{fullsid}, pw, T, t) \in \mathsf{List}_H$
    - find $(t, r, s, \text{mode} = E) \in \mathsf{List}_C$

G12
G12
G9
G9
G8
// case (b) apk computed in the forward direction
if record found
    // pw is extractable; at most 1 record in the forward direction
send (TestPwd, sid, P_i, pw) to F_PAKE // test password
if "correct guess"
    // execute the protocol honestly
R ← H(fullsid, pw, r)
M ← T ⊙ R^{-1}
pk ← KEM.Split^{-1}(r, M)
(c, K) ← KEM.Encap(pk)
tag ← H_2(fullsid, pk, apk, c, K)
key ← H_2(fullsid, pk, apk, c, K)
send (c, tag) to P_j
update Bob's record in List_transcripts
return
if "wrong guess"
    // complete session with fresh key
(sk, pk) ← KEM.Keygen(λ)
(c, K) ← KEM.Encap(pk)
tag ← H_2(fullsid, apk, c)
send (c, tag) to P_j
send (NewKey, sid, P_i, ⊥)
update Bob's record in List_transcripts
return
// case (c) all other cases
// (e.g. no record of apk in the forward direction)
if no record found
    (sk, pk) ← KEM.Keygen(λ)
    (c, K) ← KEM.Encap(pk)
tag ← H_2(fullsid, apk, c)
send (c, tag) to P_j
send (NewKey, sid, P_i, ⊥)
update Bob's record in List_transcripts
return
if role = Alice
    update record (sid, P_i, P_j, Alice, msg_1, msg) ∈ List_transcripts
fullsid ← (sid, P_i, P_j)
(c, tag) ← msg
apk ← msg_1
if ∃(sid, P_j, P_i, Bob, apk, msg) ∈ List_transcripts
send (NewKey, sid, P_i, ⊥)
return
if ∃ (fullsid, *, apk, c, *, tag) ∈ List_H_1
send (TestPwd, sid, P_j, ⊥)
send (NewKey, sid, P_i, ⊥)
return
// extract pk from tag, record must exist
find (fullsid, pk, apk, c, K, tag) to List_H_1
find (pw, sk, pk, apk) to List_secrets
if record found
    send (TestPwd, sid, P_i, pw) to \texttt{FPAKE}
if “correct guess”
    // run protocol honestly and program the session key
    // replace placeholders if needed
    (s, T) \leftarrow \text{apk}
    if \exists (⊥, ⊥, s, mode = E) \in \text{List}_{\text{IC}}
        (r, M) \leftarrow \text{KEM.Split}(pk)
        t \leftarrow H(pw, M \odot H(\text{fullsid}, pw, r))
        update record \((t, r, s, mode = E)\) in \text{List}_{\text{IC}}
    K \leftarrow \text{KEM.Decap}(sk, c)
    if tag \neq H_1(\text{fullsid}, pk, apk, c, K)
        // send random key via functionality
        send (NewKey, sid, P_i, ⊥)
    return
    else
        // tell \texttt{FPAKE} to complete session with key
        key \leftarrow H_2(\text{fullsid}, apk, c, tag, K)
        send (NewKey, sid, P_i, key)
    return
if “wrong guess”
    // tell \texttt{FPAKE} to complete the session with a random key
    send (NewKey, sid, P_i, ⊥)
    return

On query \(H_1(\text{fullsid}, pk, apk, c, K)\):
find (\text{fullsid}, pk, apk, c, K, tag) \in \text{List}_{H_1}
if found return tag
tag \leftarrow \text{Space}_{H_1}
if \exists (*, *, *, *, tag) \in \text{List}_{H_1}
    abort
add (\text{fullsid}, pk, apk, c, K, tag) \in \text{List}_{H_1}
return tag

On query \(H_2(\text{fullsid}, apk, c, tag, K)\):
find (\text{fullsid}, apk, c, tag, K, key) \in \text{List}_{H_2}
if found return key
key \leftarrow \text{Space}_{H_2}
add (\text{fullsid}, apk, c, tag, K, key) \in \text{List}_{H_2}
return key

On query \(H(\text{fullsid}, pw, r)\):
find (\text{fullsid}, pw, r, R) \in \text{List}_{H}
if found return R
R \leftarrow \text{Space}_{H}
if \exists (*, *, *, R) \in \text{List}_{H}
    abort
add (\text{fullsid}, pw, r, R) \in \text{List}_{H}
return R

On query \(H'(\text{fullsid}, pw, T)\):
find (\text{fullsid}, pw, T, t) \in \text{List}_{H'}
if found return t
t \leftarrow \text{Space}_{H'}
if \exists (*, *, *, t) \in \text{List}_{H'}
    abort
if \exists (t, *, *, *) \in \text{List}_{\text{IC}}
    abort
add (pw, T, t) \in \text{List}_{H'}
return t
On query \texttt{IC.Enc}(t, r):
\begin{align*}
\text{find } (t, r, s, \text{mode}) & \in \text{List}_{IC} & \\
\text{if found return } s & \\
\end{align*}
\begin{align*}
s & \leftarrow \text{Space}_{IC} & \\
\text{if } \exists (s, *, s, *) & \in \text{List}_{IC} \text{ abort} & \\
\text{add } (t, r, s, \text{mode } = E) & \text{ to List}_{IC} & \\
\text{return } s & \\
\end{align*}

On query \texttt{IC.Dec}(t, s):
\begin{align*}
\text{find } (t, r, s, \text{mode}) & \in \text{List}_{IC} & \\
\text{if found return } r & \\
\text{find } (\text{fullsid}, \text{pw}, T, t) & \in \text{List}_{H'} & \\
\text{if found} & \\
\text{if found} & \\
\text{find } (\text{fullsid}, \text{pw}, r, R) & \in \text{List}_{H} & \\
\text{if } (s, *, r, *), R & \in \text{List}_{H} \text{ abort} & \\
\text{add } (\text{fullsid}, \text{pw}, r, R) & \text{ to List}_{H} & \\
\text{apk } & \leftarrow (s, T) & \\
\text{add } (\text{pw}, \text{sk}, \text{pk}, \text{apk}) & \text{ to List}_{secrets} & \\
\text{if not found} & \\
\text{r } & \leftarrow \text{Space}_{IC} & \\
\text{if } \exists (t, r, s, *) & \in \text{List}_{IC} \text{ abort} & \\
\text{add } (t, r, s, \text{mode } = D) & \text{ to List}_{IC} & \\
\text{return } r & \\
\end{align*}