Direct FSS Constructions for Branching Programs and More from PRGs with Encoded-Output Homomorphism

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Abstract. Function secret sharing (FSS) for a class $F$ allows to split a secret function $f \in F$ into (succinct) secret shares $f_0, f_1$, such that for all $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ it holds $f_0(x) - f_1(x) = f(x)$. FSS has numerous applications, including private database queries, nearest neighbour search, private heavy hitters and secure computation in the preprocessing model, where the supported class $F$ translates to richness in the application. Unfortunately, concretely efficient FSS constructions are only known for very limited function classes.

In this work we introduce the notion of pseudorandom generators with encoded-output homomorphism (EOH-PRGs), and give direct FSS constructions for bit-fixing predicates, branching programs and more based on this primitive. Further, we give constructions of FSS for deterministic finite automata (DFAs) from a KDM secure variant of EOH-PRGs.

\begin{itemize}
  \item New abstractions. Following the work of Alamati et al. (EUROCRYPT ’19), who classify minicrypt primitives with algebraic structure and their applications, we capture the essence of our FSS constructions in the notion of EOH-PRG, paving the road towards future efficiency improvements via new instantiations of this primitive. The abstraction of EOH-PRG and its instantiations may be of independent interest, as it is an approximate substitution of an ideal homomorphic PRG.
  \item Better efficiency. We show that EOH-PRGs can be instantiated from LWE and a small-exponent variant of the DCR assumption. A theoretical analysis of our instantiations suggest efficiency improvements over the state of the art both in terms of key size and evaluation time: We show that our FSS instantiations lead to smaller key sizes, improving over previous constructions by a factor of 3.5 and more. While for bit-fixing predicates our FSS constructions show comparable or mildly improved run time (depending on the instantiation), we achieve considerable improvements for branching programs by avoiding the expensive generic transformation via universal circuits, shaving off a factor of $w$ and more in the number of abstract operations, where $w$ corresponds to an upper bound on the width of the underlying class of branching programs.
\end{itemize}
– **New constructions.** We show that our instantiations of EOH-PRGs additionally support a form of KDM-security, without requiring an additional circular-security assumption. Based on this, we give the first FSS construction for DFAs which supports the evaluation of inputs of a-priori unbounded length without relying on FHE.

– **Applications.** We outline applications of our FSS constructions including pattern matching with wild cards, image matching, nearest neighbor search and regular expression matching.
1 Introduction

Boyle, Gilboa and Ishai [24] introduced the notion of function secret sharing in 2015. Function secret sharing for a class of functions $\mathcal{F}$ allows to split up a function $f : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{G}$ from $\mathcal{F}$ into secret shares $f_0, f_1$, such that for all $x \in \{0,1\}^n$ it holds $f_0(x) - f_1(x) = f(x)$. If $f : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{G}$ is an arbitrary function, its description size can in general scale with $2^n$, and thus there is no hope to get compact secret shares. On the other hand, if $f$ is from a class of functions with succinct description, one can hope to split the function up into succinct secret shares. As shown in [24], when relaxing the secrecy condition to computational (i.e., requiring that no computationally bounded adversary holding only a subset of the shares can derive information about the function within the function class), this can indeed be achieved.

Function secret sharing schemes have been used in numerous applications, such as multi-server private-information retrieval [44,24], oblivious RAM [39], anonymous broadcast messaging [34], private database queries [76], nearest neighbour search [70], private heavy hitters [15], private time-series database [36] and secure computation in the preprocessing model [21,27,22,20], showing significant speed-ups over previous approaches. In many of these settings, the class $\mathcal{F}$ supported by the FSS scheme corresponds to richer applications; for example, more sophisticated private database queries beyond private lookup.

Unfortunately, concretely efficient FSS constructions are only known for very limited function classes. For example, efficient function secret sharing schemes are known to exist for the class of point functions (i.e., functions that take a non-zero value only at a single input) and the class of comparison functions (i.e., functions that take the same non-zero value for all inputs less than a given point) [24,26,20]. While these are already sufficient for many powerful applications, they do not allow to support, for instance, complex database queries.

One way to obtain function secret sharing for richer classes of function is via homomorphic secret sharing (HSS) [25], the dual notion of function secret sharing, with the role of function and input reversed. HSS schemes for the class of polynomial-size branching programs (which in particular captures logarithmic-depth circuits) are known from a number of assumptions, such as the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption [25], the DCR assumption [41,60,67], and the Learning With Errors assumption [38,28].

As observed in [25], there exists a generic transformation from a homomorphic secret sharing scheme to a function sharing scheme by relying on universal circuits. A universal circuit for a function class $\mathcal{F}$, is a circuit $C_F$ such that $\forall f \in \mathcal{F}, \forall x \in \{0,1\}^n$ it holds $C_F(f, x) = f(x)$. Given such a universal circuit, one can transform the problem of constructing a function secret sharing scheme for $\mathcal{F}$ to the problem of constructing a homomorphic secret sharing scheme for the class of functions $C_F := \{C_F(\cdot, x) \mid x \in \{0,1\}^n\}$.

For the class of branching programs, there exists a universal circuit that is itself a branching program [25]. Any homomorphic secret sharing scheme for the class of branching programs thus implies a function secret scheme for the same class. Unfortunately, the transformation introduces a high concrete overhead,
especially when the structure of the branching program is wished to be hidden. More precisely, with the techniques given in [25], if $w$ is an upper bound on the width of a binary branching program, then the resulting universal branching program has a blow-up of $w^2$ in depth, which leads to large key size and running time. For branching programs over larger fields, this overhead gets even worse.

We also consider deterministic finite automata (DFAs) in this work [64,73]. A DFA is an automaton with finitely many states that rejects or accepts a given string following a sequence of states, where the next state is determined by the next symbol of the string. As observed, e.g., in [47], if $f$ is a function of input length $n$ that is computed by a DFA with $s$ states, it can be computed by a branching program of length $n$ and size $s \cdot n + 1$, an FSS for branching programs thus directly yields an FSS for DFAs with bounded input-length. Note though that FSS for branching programs does not allow to compute general classes of DFAs, since these can support inputs of a-priori unbounded length, while yet having a succinct representation.

1.1 Our Contributions

In this work, we present constructions of function secret sharing schemes for the class of bit-fixing predicates, branching programs and more from an abstract pseudorandom generator with encoded-output homomorphism (EOH-PRG). We further show that if the EOH-PRG additionally satisfies a form of KDM-security, we can construct FSS for deterministic finite automata supporting inputs of a-priori unbounded length.

We give instantiations of the EOH-PRG from the standard learning with errors (LWE) assumption or a binary-secret variant of ring-LWE, as well as from a small-exponent variant of the decisional composite residuosity (DCR) assumption. We give an overview of the efficiency comparison of our FSS to previous FSS constructions in Table 1.

In some sense, our work can be viewed as an extension of the line of work on exploring minicrypt primitives with algebraic structure and their applications, as started by Alamati et al. [5].

Our main results can be captured in a series of theorems. In the following, we will give a simplified definition of our EOH-PRG, which is yet too demanding for our instantiations, but allows to present the essence of our core theorems. For a full definition and more detailed explanation of our results, we refer to the technical overview section.

**EOH-PRG.** Roughly speaking, a EOH-PRG allows to encode messages $m$ and only requires the homomorphic property to hold relative to such encoded messages.

**Definition 1 (EOH-PRG (simplified)).** Let $S, H, \overline{H}$ be finite abelian groups. A function $\text{PRG}: S \to \overline{H}$ is a PRG with encoded output homomorphism (EOH-PRG) relative to $H$ if it is a pseudorandom generator and there exists a deterministic polynomial-time encoding function $\text{Encode}: H \to \overline{H}$ and conversion (or
"decoding") function $\text{Conv}: \overline{\mathbb{H}} \to \mathbb{H}$ such that for all $m \in \mathbb{H}$, for $s \in \mathbb{S}$, and for any secret shares $s_0 - s_1 = s$, $y_0 - y_1 = \text{PRG}(s) + \text{Encode}(m)$ it holds that

$$\text{Conv}(y_0 - \text{PRG}(s_0)) - \text{Conv}(y_1 - \text{PRG}(s_1)) = m.$$ 

Given a truly homomorphic PRG, one could obtain an EOH-PRG by setting $\mathbb{H} := \overline{\mathbb{H}}$ and choosing $\text{Encode}$ and $\text{Conv}$ as identity functions. Unfortunately, perfectly homomorphic PRGs with both the domain and image being additive groups in the typical sense are not known to exist; one barrier is that any homomorphic PRG with an output space that supports efficient linear algebra can be broken by Gaussian elimination.

The abstract EOH-PRG can be viewed as an almost homomorphic PRG, in which $\text{Conv}$ corrects errors introduced by an almost homomorphic PRG and transforms shares in $\overline{\mathbb{H}}$ to shares in $\mathbb{H}$ (similar to the rounding and lifting in [28]), or as a homomorphic PRG mapping additive shares to multiplicative shares, in which $\text{Conv}$ converts multiplicative shares back to additive shares (similar to the conversion procedure in [25, 60, 67]).

For our constructions, we further require the existence of an additive group $\mathbb{T}$ such that $\{0, 1\} \subseteq \mathbb{T}$ and such that $\mathbb{T}$ defines a non-trivial (left) group operation on $\overline{\mathbb{H}}$ via $\cdot: \mathbb{T} \times \overline{\mathbb{H}} \to \overline{\mathbb{H}}$. In the following, we refer to this by requiring that our EOH-PRGs have “tag space” $\mathbb{T}$.

**Tensor product theorem.** With this, we can state our main results. We start by giving our tensor product theorem, which can be viewed as lifting the tensor product theorem of [26] for point predicates (i.e., the family of predicates taking 1 exactly at one point) to arbitrary predicates. Below we present it for the family of bit-predicates, we note though that it readily extends to any predicates with logarithmic-size input space. For more detailed results we refer to the technical overview section and Section 5.

**Theorem 2 (Tensor product FSS (simplified)).** Let $\ell = \ell(\lambda)$ be a polynomial. Let $\mathcal{P}$ be a family of predicates $\{0, 1\} \to \{0, 1\}$. Let $\mathbb{S}, \overline{\mathbb{H}}, \mathbb{T}$ be finite abelian groups.

Then, if there exists an EOH-PRG $\text{PRG}: \mathbb{S} \to \overline{\mathbb{H}}$ relative to $\overline{\mathbb{H}} := (\mathbb{S} \times \mathbb{T})^2$ with tag space $\mathbb{T}$, there exists an FSS for the function class

$$\mathcal{P}^\otimes := \left\{ g_{P_1, \ldots, P_\ell}: \{0, 1\}^\ell \to \{0, 1\}, x \mapsto \bigwedge_{i=1}^\ell P_i(x_i) \ \forall i \in [\ell]: P_i \in \mathcal{P} \right\}$$

with key space $\mathbb{H}$ and “correction word” space $\overline{\mathbb{H}}^{\ell - 1}$ (note that the correction word space corresponds to the “public” part of the key which both parties share).

\[5\] Note though that this assumes an EOH-PRG with an accordingly larger output space and thus results in larger key sizes.
By instantiating the above with the family of bit-fixing predicates, i.e., the family of predicates
\[ P_{\alpha}(x) := \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } x = \alpha \lor \alpha = * \\
0 & \text{else}
\end{cases} \]
for \( \alpha \in \{0, 1, *\} \), we obtain a FSS construction for bit-fixing predicate (often also referred to as pattern matching with wildcards). We capture this result in the following corollary.

**Corollary 3 (FSS for bit-fixing predicates).** Assume all parameters are as in Theorem 2 and \( \text{PRG: } S \rightarrow H \) is a EOH-PRG relative to \( H := (S \times T)^2 \) with tag space \( T \). Then, there exists an FSS for \( \ell \)-bit bit-fixing predicates with key space \( H \) and correction word space \( e^H_{\ell-1} \).

Note that the FSS for bit-fixing predicates directly implies an FSS for the class of \( t \)-CNF formulas over \( n \) variables for constant \( t \), since a \( t \)-CNF formula can be naturally represented as a bit-fixing predicate of length \( O(2^t \cdot \binom{n}{t}) \). The underlying idea is that each of the \( O(2^t \cdot \binom{n}{t}) \) potential clauses can be viewed as a new variable, which can then be encoded as a series of 1’s (the clause appears) and *’s (the clause does not appear). To evaluate the function on a public input, the parties can first apply this variable transformation, and then evaluate the bit-fixing predicate on the resulting string.

**FSS for branching programs and others.** Next, we state our main theorem for branching programs. We remark that the FSS for branching programs only hides the transition function whereas the topology of the branching program, i.e., the number of nodes of each level, is revealed. It is easy to extend each level to \( w \) nodes via adding dummy nodes and then construct an FSS for the extended branching program (note that the same has to be done in order to apply the generic transformation from HSS to FSS, if the topology is wished to be hidden). For more details on the FSS for branching programs, we refer to the technical overview section.

**Theorem 4 (FSS for branching programs (simplified)).** Let \( P \) be an oblivious, layered branching program with \( \ell \) levels, width \( w \) and out-degree \( d \). Let \( S, H, T \) be finite abelian groups.

Then, if there exists an EOH-PRG \( \text{PRG: } S \rightarrow \tilde{H} \) relative to \( H := (S \times T^w)^d \) with tag space \( T \), there exists an FSS for \( P \) over key space \( H \) and correction word space \( e^H_{\ell-1} \).

With FSS for branching programs, we present an FSS for the class of approximate matching functions, which has many attractive application. The class of approximate matching functions computes the distance between an input and a given target string with wildcards, compares the distance with a threshold value, and outputs 0 or 1 accordingly. Formally, the family of approximate matching functions is defined as
\[ f(a, b)(x) := (\text{dist}(x, a) < b), \]
where $a \in \{0, 1, *\}$, $b \leq \ell$ and $\text{dist}(x, a) = \sum_{i \in [\ell]} (a[i] \neq * \land a[i] \neq x[i])$. The idea is to first convert an approximate matching function to a branching program with $\ell$ levels and width $\ell$ and out-degree 2 and then run the FSS for the resulting branching programs. For details, refer to Section E.1.

We further give an FSS for multivariate polynomials over polynomial size rings. Let $k, m, w \in \mathbb{N}$ and assume $R$ is a ring with $w$ elements. Let $P_{k,m,w}$ be the class of multivariate polynomials $P(X_1, \ldots, X_k) \in R[X_1, \ldots, X_k]$ which are of the form $\sum_{i=1}^m c_i \cdot X_1^{d_1} \cdots X_k^{d_k}$. Each monomial $c \cdot x^d$ can be transformed to a branching program with $k$ level, width $w$ and out-degree $w$. The idea is to run the FSS for each monomial and sum up the results. Note that our FSS also works polynomials over non-commutative rings. For details, refer to Section E.2.

**FSS for DFAs.** Finally, we give our construction of FSS for DFAs. Note that the construction of FSS for branching programs would directly imply an FSS for DFA, but requires the input size to be a-priori bounded as the FSS keys scale with the size of the input. Instead, we give a direct construction of a DFA, which can accept inputs of a-priori unbounded size (and for which the key sizes are independent of the size of the input). To that end, we introduce the notion of EOH-PRG with KDM-security. We stress that the kind of KDM-security we require for our FSS construction comes “for free” in our instantiations from LWE and DCR, without needing to assume a circular-security type assumption. For more details on DFAs and our construction, we refer to the technical overview section.

**Definition 5 (KDM-secure EOH-PRG (simplified)).** Let $\Psi$ be a family of embeddings $\psi: S \rightarrow H$. Let $\text{PRG}: S \rightarrow \mathbb{H}$ be an EOH-PRG relative to $H$. We say that $\text{PRG}$ satisfies KDM-security relative to $\Psi$, if for each $\psi \in \Psi$, $\text{PRG}^\psi(s) := \text{PRG}(s) + \text{Encode}(\psi(s))$ is a secure PRG.

For our DFA construction, we need to instantiate $\Psi$ with the family of embeddings $\psi_i$ which essentially maps $s \in S$ to a vector, where only parts of the entries are non-zero and each of the non-zero entries contains exactly $s$. With this we obtain the following theorem.

**Theorem 6 (FSS for DFAs (simplified)).** Let $M$ be a DFA with state set $Q$ and alphabet $\Sigma$. Let $\mu := |Q \cup \{A, R\}| = |Q| + 2$, where $A$ and $R$ stand for the merged accept state and rejection state, respectively. Let $S, \mathbb{H}, \mathbb{T}$ be finite abelian groups.

Then, if there exists a EOH-PRG $\text{PRG}: S \rightarrow \mathbb{H}$ relative to $H := (S \times \mathbb{T}^\mu)^{|\Sigma|+1}$ with tag space $\mathbb{T}$ which satisfies KDM-security relative to a suitable function family $\Psi$, there exists an FSS for $M$ over key space $H$ and correction word space $\mathbb{H}^{|Q|}$.

It is worth to mention that the FSS for DFA is the first that allows key size independent of the length of the input (except for the generic constructions from FHE).
Towards Instantiating the EOH-PRG. In order to instantiate our constructions, we have to allow for a slightly more permissive notion of EOH-PRG, which is not accounted for in the above overview (but for which it is rather straightforward to adapt the above theorems).

Namely, we have to allow the encoding function $\text{Encode}$ to support a smaller domain $H$, than the co-domain of the conversion function $\text{Conv}$. Further, we have to require $\text{PRG}$ to remain a PRG even if restricted to some subdomain $S$. (Note that this is a consequence of the above, since, e.g., for our recursive tensoring construction we will choose $H := (S \times \{1\})^2$, and thus require $\text{PRG}$ to remain a PRG on $S$ to achieve security in the next level.)

With this relaxation, we show that it is possible to instantiate the EOH-PRG from LWE and binary-secret ring-LWE building on the techniques of [28], and from a short exponent variant of the DCR assumption inspired by the techniques of [60,67]. More precisely, we obtain the following results.

**Theorem 7 (EOH-PRG from LWE (simplified)).** Let $n, p, q, r, \ell, w \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $r \mid p$, $p \mid q$, $1 \ll r \ll p$, and $n \log q < m \log p$, where $m := \ell(n + w)$. Further, let $q > 2pB$ and let $\chi$ be a $B$-bounded error distribution. Then, assuming learning with errors $\text{LWE}_{n,m,q,\chi}$ is hard, there exists an EOH-PRG $\text{PRG} : S \rightarrow eH$ relative to $(S, H, H)$, where $S = \{0,1\}^n$, $S = \mathbb{Z}_p^n$, $T = \mathbb{Z}_p$, $H = (S \times \{0,1\}^w)^\ell = \{0,1\}^m$ and $eH = H = (S \times T^w)^\ell = \mathbb{Z}_p^m$.

Note that for a suitable choice of parameters binary-secret LWE is implied by LWE, which allows us to instantiate the EOH-PRG from standard LWE. For the instantiations from ring-LWE, on the other hand, we have to rely on a stronger assumption which we refer to as ring-LWE with binary secrets (note that this was also done in the instantiation of [28]). As otherwise the instantiation from ring-LWE is similar, we omit it here and refer to Section 8 for details.

Recall that the DCR assumption states an $N$-th residue over $\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}$ is computationally indistinguishable from a random element over $\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}$, based on the DCR assumption, Brakerski and Goldwasser [29] showed that $(g_1 \ldots g_d, g_{s_1} \ldots g_{s_d})$ is pseudorandom, where $d \in \mathbb{N}$, each $g_i$ is a $N$-th residue over $\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}$, and $s$ is random element in $\mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)}$. (Note that this can also be viewed as the DDH assumption over $\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}$.)

We have to rely on a variant of this assumption, where the secret is chosen from a (sufficiently large) bounded subspace $[-B/2, B/2] \subset \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)}$. Note that similar flavors of small-exponent assumptions have been used in [51,4,23]. With this, we obtain the following theorem.

**Theorem 8 (EOH-PRG from DCR (simplified)).** Let $B$ be an integer such that $B \cdot 2^\lambda \leq N$ and $B > 2^\lambda$. Further, let $\ell, w \in \mathbb{N}$ be arbitrary.

Then, assuming a small exponent variant of DCR holds relative to $B$, there exists an EOH-PRG $\text{PRG} : S \rightarrow eH$ relative to $(S, H, H)$, where $S = [-B/2, B/2], S = \ldots$

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6 Here, by $\ll$ we denote a super-polynomial gap between parameters.

7 Note that this requirement on the error distribution is to ensure that LWE implies LWR [14].
Assumption & Key Size & No. of Mul./ Exp.

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<th>Bit-fixing</th>
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<td>$\ell (3w + 2)$</td>
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Table 1. Comparison of FSS constructed from EOH-PRG and from HSS. $\ell$ stands for the length of the bit-fixing predicate or branching program and $w$ stands for the width of the branching program. For branching programs we assume fixed out-degree $d = 2$. For the LWE assumption, $n$ stands for the secret length, $q$ the modulus of the LWE assumption, and $p$ the output modulus of the PRG. The number of multiplications is counted over $\mathbb{Z}_q$. Ring-LWE w/BS stands for ring-LWE with binary secret. For DCR assumption, $N$ stands for RSA modulus. For the comparison with [60], we use their most efficient instantiation, for which they have to assume a DCR variant with circular security ([60, Section 4.2]). The number of exponentiations is counted over $\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}$.

Note that in order for the DCR assumption to hold, the parties cannot know $\phi(N)^2$. In our construction, this will not be an issue. As we will explain in the technical overview, we are able to generate secret shares of elements $x \pmod{\phi(N^2)}$ whenever $|x|$ is sufficiently small (following the techniques of [60]), and can otherwise perform operations simply over $\mathbb{Z}$.

We give the concrete comparisons between our FSS for bit-fixing predicates and branching programs from EOH-PRGs and the FSS constructions via homomorphic secret sharing (HSS) in Table 1. Building on EOH-PRG yields more efficient constructions in terms of key size and runtime. Most notably, the new FSS schemes for branching programs provide significant improvements in run time over FSS from HSS for universal branching programs, by avoiding the overhead of the generic transformation. For details on the efficiency comparison we refer to Section H.

Applications. The central application of FSS schemes are forms of two-server private information retrieval [25]. Here, it is assumed that two (non-colluding) servers each hold a replication of a database $DB$ with $D$ items, and a client wants to launch a query to the database while keeping the query hidden from both servers individually. Given an FSS scheme supporting the query class, this can be achieved with succinct communication, by having the client split its query into succinct shares, which can then be evaluated by the server. By secrecy of
the FSS, the servers do not learn anything about the query, as long as they are non-colluding.

In Section G, we show a number of applications including private image matching, private nearest neighbour search and private partial text matching, and how our construction can be used towards boosting the applications in terms of expressiveness and/or efficiency. In particular, our improved FSS constructions for bit-fixing and branching programs yield direct applications to applications such as 2-server private counting queries and private payload computations, as considered, e.g., in [28], with better efficiency.

Note that for the most part in our application we solely focus on achieving client privacy. If the underlying database contains privacy-critical data e.g., medical, biological or financial data, one further needs to consider server privacy. We show how this can be achieved in the example of private nearest neighbor search (Section G.3).

1.2 Discussion and Related Work

Beyond the two-party case. Note that the FSS constructions from one-way functions [44,24,26] cannot be easily extended to more than two parties. Our FSS construction approach from EOH-PRGs, on the other hand, naturally extends beyond the two-party setting. However, it is not known how to instantiate the EOH-PRG from concrete assumptions for more than two parties. Our two-party instantiations from LWE and the DCR variant heavily rely on the distributed rounding [28] and distributed discrete logarithm [60], respectively, which were developed for two-party homomorphic secret sharing. To date, it is unclear how to generalize the distributed rounding or distributed discrete logarithm to more than two parties. In fact, [13] proved that there exists a barrier to directly generalize the share conversion from two-party to multi-party. Any such progress may lead to significant improvements for efficient multi-party FSS/HSS constructions.

On FSS from weaker assumptions. While construction FSS for function classes such as branching programs solely based on the assumption of one-way functions would be a major breakthrough [24], it seems a more tractable open question if such FSS can be constructed for subclasses of \( \text{AC}^0 \) such as bit-fixing predicates or \( t \)-CNF. In the technical overview, we give some intuition why it seems unlikely that the techniques of the line of work on FSS from one-way functions [44,24,26] allow for this without relying on additional structure (such as EOH-PRGs), due to an inherent exponential blow-up. An alternative route could be taken following [37], who give constructions of privately constrained PRFs for \( t \)-CNFs from one-way functions. Here, however, the problem is that de-randomizing the constrained points to fixed values would again introduce an exponential blow-up. We leave it as an interesting open questions to either give such candidates, or give barriers towards their construction.

Relation to secure branching program evaluation protocols. There is a line of work on secure branching program evaluation (BPE) [30,11,12,18,77,50,75]
relying on garbled circuits or homomorphic encryption. The setting considered in their work is somewhat orthogonal to ours: They consider a branching program (held by a sender) to be evaluated on a single input (held by a receiver), such that the result is learned by the receiver, and such that both the branching program provided by the sender and receiver input remain hidden. We, on the other hand, consider a branching program (held by a client) to be evaluated on a database (held by two servers), such that a linear combination of the outputs is learned by the client, and such that the branching program (i.e., database query) provided by the client remains hidden, as long as the two servers are not colluding. With our approach, the communication cost scales with \( \log N \) for a database of size \( N \), since the same branching program can be evaluated on all inputs. Except for the FHE-based approach [18], the communication cost of all other protocols in the BPE line of work instead scales with \( N \) to achieve the same functionality. This is even true for the protocols [77] relying on additively homomorphic encryption, since they still require communication between the receiver and sender per input to be evaluated. It is worth to point out that sublinear communication complexity in the line of work on BPE (as achieved in [75]) refers to sublinear in the size of the branching program, whereas we consider settings where the size of the database \( N \) is the dominating cost.

### 1.3 Organization

Only the main results and techniques are presented in the body part. Section 2 presents an overview of the central techniques, followed by preliminaries in Section 3. The EOH-PRG is formally defined in Section 4. We show the constructions for tensor product, branching programs and DFAs in Section 5, 6, 7, respectively. Finally, in Section 8 we present instantiations of the EOH-PRG.

### 2 Technical Overview

In the following we give an overview of the central techniques. We start by explaining the tensor product FSS for point functions of Boyle, Gilboa and Ishai [26] (in the following referred to as BGI16), and show how to extend their construction to a more general tensor product using an encoded-output PRG. Then, we show how this yields FSS for the classes of bit-fixing predicates. Next, we explain how the construction can be extended towards FSS for branching programs and for DFAs. Finally, we explain how to instantiate EOH-PRG from the learning with errors or DCR assumption. For an overview of our paper we refer to the table of contents H.2 in the Supplementary Material.

**Background** [24,26]. Before giving the construction, we recall some required preliminaries. Firstly, recall that a *point function* is simply a function that takes a non-zero value only at one dedicated point. More precisely, the point function
A function secret sharing scheme for a family of function $\mathcal{F}$ consists of tuple of PPT algorithms $(\text{Gen}, \text{Eval})$, such that $\text{Gen}$ takes as input the description $\hat{f}$ of $f$ and returns a tuple of keys $(k_0, k_1)$ and $\text{Eval}$ takes as input a party index $b$, a key $k_b$ and an input value $x$ and outputs an output value $y_b$, such that the following holds:

**Correctness:** For all $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$, it holds $\text{Eval}(0, k_0, x) - \text{Eval}(1, k_1, x) = f(x)$.

**Secrecy:** For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, $k_b$ computationally hides $\hat{f}$ within $\mathcal{F}$.

Note that an FSS for the class of point functions, is also referred to as distributed point function (DPF).

**Tensor product FSS for point functions [BGI16 [26]].** Given a function secret sharing scheme for the class $\mathcal{F}^0$ of point functions, and a function secret sharing scheme for a function class $\mathcal{F}$ of arbitrary functions, BGI16 gives a construction for the tensor product $\mathcal{F}^0 \otimes \mathcal{F}$, i.e., the class of functions

$$F_{\alpha, f}(x_1, x_2) := \begin{cases} f(x_2) & \text{if } x_1 = \alpha \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

for $\alpha \in \{0, 1\}^n, f \in \mathcal{F}$, where the key size scales polynomially in the key sizes of the underlying FSS schemes.\(^8\)

In the following, we describe the construction of BGI16 in a number of steps, adding layers of secrecy one-by-one. For the construction we assume that the FSS scheme $(\text{Gen}, \text{Eval})$ for $\mathcal{F}$ satisfies a symmetry property, i.e., $\text{Eval}(0, k, x) = \text{Eval}(1, k, x)$ for all inputs $x$ and keys $k$. Further, we assume that keys $(k_0, k_1) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(f)$ are individually pseudorandom over the same key space $\mathcal{K}$.

**First attempt: a construction with very limited secrecy:** To get a construction where $\alpha$ is hidden from $P_1$, one can proceed as follows: To share $F_{\alpha, f}$, one can generate keys $(k_0, k_1) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(\hat{f})$ and set $K_0 := (\alpha, k_0, k_1)$ and $K_1 := k_1$. To evaluate on point $(x_1, x_2)$, party $P_0$ outputs $y_0 := \text{Eval}(0, k_0, x_2)$ if $x_1 = \alpha$ and $y_0 := \text{Eval}(0, k_1, x_2)$ otherwise. Party $P_1$ simply outputs $y_1 := \text{Eval}(1, k_1, x_2)$.

**Correctness and very limited secrecy:** Here, for $x_1 = \alpha$ we have $y_0 - y_1 = \text{Eval}(0, k_0, x_2) - \text{Eval}(1, k_1, x_2) = f(x_2)$ by the correctness of $(\text{Gen}, \text{Eval})$. For $x_1 \neq \alpha$, on the other hand, it holds $y_0 - y_1 = \text{Eval}(0, k_1, x_2) - \text{Eval}(1, k_1, x_2) = 0$.

\(^8\) The resulting scheme actually satisfies a stronger notion of key compactness, namely the non-public part of the key does not grow, allowing to apply the tensor product operation recursively a polynomial number of times.
by symmetry, as required.\(^9\) This construction does obviously hide \(\alpha\) from \(P_1\), but otherwise does not provide any secrecy guarantees.

**Second attempt: a construction with secret \(\alpha\).** Towards hiding \(\alpha\) also from \(P_0\), the trick is to additionally use the FSS scheme \((\text{Gen}^\circ, \text{Eval}^\circ)\) for \(\mathcal{F}^\circ\), and flipping the order of \(k_0\) and \(k_1\) with probability 1/2, thereby hide from the parties when they use the same keys. More precisely, assume to be given an FSS for point functions with output space \(\{0, 1\}\) (i.e., the point function maps to 1 at the unique non-zero point \(\alpha\), and otherwise to 0). Now, the idea is to generate keys \((k_0^\circ, k_1^\circ) \leftarrow \text{Gen}^\circ(f_1^\circ)\), and compute “tag” values \(\tau_b \leftarrow \text{Eval}^\circ(b, k_b^\circ, \alpha)\) (i.e., \(\tau_0 \oplus \tau_1 = 1\) by construction) relative to these keys. The tag values are used to hide if the parties use the same key \(k_b\), by defining \(cw_{\tau_b} := k_b^\circ\) (where \((k_0^\circ, k_1^\circ) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(\hat{f})\) as before) and setting \(K_b := (k_b^\circ, cw_{\tau_b}, cw_{\tau_1})\). To evaluate at a point \((x_1, x_2)\), party \(P_b\) first computes \(t_b \leftarrow \text{Eval}^\circ(b, k_b^\circ, x_1)\) and then outputs \(y_b := \text{Eval}(b, cw_{\tau_b}, x_2)\).

**Correctness and secrecy of \(\alpha\):** Now, for \(x_1 = \alpha\), it holds \(cw_{\tau_0} = cw_{\tau_1} = k_b\). As before, the parties thus obtain \(y_0 - y_1 = \text{Eval}(0, k_0, x_2) - \text{Eval}(1, k_1, x_2) = f(x_2)\) as required. If \(x_1 \neq \alpha\), on the other hand, it holds \(t_0 = t_1\) and thus \(k_0 = k_1\), implying \(y_0 - y_1 = \text{Eval}(0, k_0, x_2) - \text{Eval}(1, k_0, x_2) = 0\), again by symmetry. The construction hides \(\alpha\) from both parties by the secrecy of \((\text{Gen}^\circ, \text{Eval}^\circ)\) and the pseudorandomness of keys for \((\text{Gen}, \text{Eval})\) (which prevents the parties from learning when they use the real key at position \(\alpha\) and when they use a “dummy key”), but still fully leaks \(f\).

The construction of BGI16. The idea of BGI16 to overcome this, is to additionally use a pseudorandom generator to blind the keys \(k_0, k_1\), such that party \(P_0\) is only able to recover \(k_0\) and party \(P_1\) is only able to recover \(k_1\) at the dedicated point \(x_1 = \alpha\) (without being able to distinguish this from the case where both parties recover the same “dummy” key, to ensure that \(\alpha\) remains hidden). To this end, assume that \(\text{FSS}^\circ\) is now an FSS for point functions with output space \(\{0, 1\}^{\lambda+1}\). The idea of BGI16 is as follows: To generate a key for \(F_{\alpha, f}\), the key generation algorithm starts by choosing \(s \leftarrow_R \{0, 1\}^\lambda\) at random and generating \((k_0^\circ, k_1^\circ) \leftarrow \text{Gen}^\circ(f_{\alpha, ||})\). Further, the key generation algorithm generates the corresponding “seed values” \(s_b \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda\) and, again, “tag values” \(\tau_b \in \{0, 1\}\) as \((s_b, \tau_b) \leftarrow \text{Eval}^\circ(b, k_b^\circ, \alpha)\) (i.e., \(s_0 \oplus s_1 = s\) and \(\tau_0 \oplus \tau_1 = 1\) by construction). Further, given a pseudorandom generator \(\text{PRG} : \{0, 1\}^\lambda \to \mathcal{K}\), the full “correction words” are generated as \(CW_{\tau_b} := k_b + \text{PRG}(s_b)\) (where \((k_0, k_1) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(\hat{f})\) as before) and the keys defined as \(K_b := (k_b^\circ, CW_0, CW_1)\). To evaluate on point \((x_1, x_2)\), the parties now compute \((s_b, t_b) \leftarrow \text{Eval}^\circ(b, k_b^\circ, x_1)\), “correct” their keys to \(k_b := CW_{t_b} - \text{PRG}(s_b)\) and evaluate to \(y_b := \text{Eval}(b, k_b, x_2)\).

**Correctness and secrecy of BGI16:** If \(x_1 = \alpha\), it holds \(k_b = CW_{t_b} - \text{PRG}(s_b) = CW_{\tau_b} - \text{PRG}(s_b) = k_b\) and thus \(y_0 - y_1 = \text{Eval}(0, k_0, x_2) - \text{Eval}(1, k_1, x_2) = f(x_2)\) as required. If \(x_1 \neq \alpha\), on the other hand, then \(t_0 = t_1\) and thus \(k_0 = k_1\) (i.e.,

\(^9\) This construction would not actually require symmetry of the underlying FSS since \(P_0\) knows when \(x_1 \neq \alpha\) and could evaluate \(\text{Eval}(1, k_1, x_2)\) in this case, but this will no longer be possible in the subsequent constructions.
both parties recover the same “dummy” key), and $y_0 - y_1 = \text{Eval}(0, \kappa_0, x_2) - \text{Eval}(1, \kappa_0, x_2) = 0$ by symmetry. Full secrecy holds by the above considerations and because $(\text{Gen}, \text{Eval})$ satisfies secrecy and pseudorandomness of keys, which prevents the parties from learning where the true FSS keys are embedded.

**Limitation of BGI16 to tensoring with point functions.** The issue with extending the above approach even slightly beyond point functions (e.g., to functions which take a non-zero value at two points) is that it would incur an exponential blow-up in the key size (and run time of the key generation), since the parties have to recover different key pairs $(K_0, K_1)$ and $(K'_0, K'_1)$ for different non-zero points $\alpha, \alpha'$ (as reusing a key would allow the parties to locally derive information about the position of non-zero points). Note that this includes the “correction word” part $CW_0, CW_1$ of the key, since keys with different first component require different correction words in construction of BGI16. The key generation time and key length thus (at least) double at each tensoring. Recursive tensoring is therefore limited to at most a logarithmic number of times, which is not sufficient for most applications.

This issue could be overcome, if the keys could be “randomized” in order to hide that the same key is reused. For additive secret sharing this is trivially the case: Namely, assume an output value is shared as $y = k_0 - k_1 \in \mathcal{K}$ (for some additive group $\mathcal{K}$). Then, for any $\Delta \in \mathcal{K}$, the secret can be re-shared as $(k_0 + \Delta, k_1 + \Delta)$, which looks like perfectly fresh keys from the view of the adversary. Unfortunately, the construction of BGI16 does not satisfy this property of “shift-invariance”, even if the underlying FSS schemes $\mathcal{F}$ were to satisfy these properties: Namely, even if $\sigma_0 - \sigma_1 = \sigma_0' - \sigma_1'$ (where $\sigma_b \leftrightarrow \text{Eval}(b, k_b, \alpha)$ and $\sigma'_b \leftrightarrow \text{Eval}(b, k_b, \alpha')$), the PRG outputs $\text{PRG}(\sigma_b)$ and $\text{PRG}(\sigma'_b)$ are in general uncorrelated.

This could be resolved by using an ideal *homomorphic* PRG, ensuring that the correlation is preserved to $\text{PRG}(\sigma_0) - \text{PRG}(\sigma_1) = \text{PRG}(\sigma_0') - \text{PRG}(\sigma_1')$. Unfortunately, perfectly homomorphic PRGs with both the domain and image being additive groups in the typical sense are not known to exist. For simplicity, we still start by outlining our tensor product construction assuming access to a perfectly homomorphic PRG $\text{PRG}: \{0, 1\}^\lambda \rightarrow \mathcal{K}$, before giving our full construction.

**Overcoming the limitations via an ideal homomorphic PRG.** We start by simplifying the construction of BGI16 assuming access to a perfectly homomorphic PRG $\text{PRG}: \{0, 1\}^\lambda \rightarrow \mathcal{K}$, and assuming a *shift-invariant* FSS $\mathcal{FSS} = (\text{Gen, Eval})$ for $\mathcal{F}$ with key space $\mathcal{K}$, i.e., for $(k_0, k_1) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(f)$, we assume that any shifted tuple $(k_0 + \Delta, k_1 + \Delta)$ for $\Delta \in \mathcal{K}$ constitutes a valid key pair for $f$. Then, the construction of BGI16 can be simplified to a construction requiring only one correction word $CW$:

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10 Note, that for correctness of the simplified construction outlined below, we would actually require $(\mathcal{K}, +):= ((\{0, 1\}^\lambda, \oplus), k \in \mathcal{K}$. To be aligned with the general construction, we will still use the notation $(\mathcal{K}, +)$ in the following.
Again, to generate a key for $F_{\alpha,f}$, the key generation algorithm samples $s \leftarrow_R \{0,1\}^\lambda$ and generates keys $(k_0^s, k_1^s) \leftarrow \text{Gen}^s(f^\alpha_1)$. Instead of pre-computing the tag and seed values at position $\alpha$, the key generation algorithm simply generates $(k_0, k_1) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(f)$, sets $CW := k_0 - k_1 + \text{PRG}(s)$ and outputs $(K_0, K_1)$, where $K_b := (k_b^s, CW)$. To evaluate, the parties now compute $(s_0, t_0) \leftarrow \text{Eval}^b(b, k_0^s, x_1)$ and then obtain the “corrected” keys as $\kappa_b := t_b \cdot CW - \text{PRG}(s_b)$. (Note that $t_b \in \{0,1\}$, and thus the multiplication simply corresponds to adding 0 or $CW$.)

Correctness holds, since at position $\alpha$ it holds $s_0 - s_1 = s$ and $t_0 - t_1 = 1$, and thus

$$\kappa_0 - \kappa_1 = (t_0 \cdot CW - \text{PRG}(s_0)) - (t_1 \cdot CW - \text{PRG}(s_1)) = CW - \text{PRG}(s) = k_0 - k_1 \text{.}$$

As FSS is shift-invariant, the above implies that $(\kappa_0, \kappa_1)$ and $(k_0, k_1)$ are functionally equivalent, and thus $y_0 - y_1 = \text{Eval}(0, \kappa_0, x_2) - \text{Eval}(1, \kappa_1, x_2) = f(x_2)$ as required. If $x_1 \neq \alpha$, on the other hand, we obtain $s_0 = s_1$ and $t_0 = t_1$ and thus $\kappa_0 = \kappa_1$ as before, and correctness follows from the symmetry of FSS. Secrecy holds by the secrecy of the underlying FSS schemes, together with the pseudorandomness of PRG.

Note that this simplified scheme readily extends beyond point functions.

**EOH-PRG.** In order to instantiate the above construction, we introduce the notion of PRG with encoded-output homomorphism (EOH-PRG) and show that the above construction can be extended to support instantiation from this weaker notion. Roughly, an EOH-PRG has “encoding” and “conversion” (or “decoding”) functions $\text{Encode}$ and $\text{Conv}$ such that it satisfies the following: given additive secret shares $(s_0, s_1)$ of a seed $s$, and additive secret shares $(y_0, y_1)$ of a blinded encoding $\text{PRG}(s) + \text{Encode}(m)$, we require $\text{Conv}(y_0 - \text{PRG}(s_0) - \text{Conv}(y_1 - \text{PRG}(s_1))) = m$ (except with negligible probability over the random choice of the secret shares). Intuitively, this is sufficient to instantiate (a variant of) the tensor product FSS above, by encoding the key difference $k_0 - k_1$ to $\text{Encode}(k_0 - k_1)$ before adding $\text{PRG}(s)$.

More formally, a EOH-PRG $\text{PRG}: \mathbb{S} \rightarrow \mathbb{H}$ as required for our tensor product construction is parametrized by $S, H, \mathbb{H}$, together with (efficiently computable) maps $\text{Encode}: H \rightarrow \mathbb{H}$ and $\text{Conv}: \mathbb{H} \rightarrow \mathbb{H}$ such that:

- $\text{PRG}: \mathbb{S} \rightarrow \mathbb{H}$ is a PRG.
- $S \subset \mathbb{S}$ is such that $\text{PRG}$ restricted to $S$ is still a PRG and $0 \in S$. Note that $S$ will serve as the seed space of our tensor product (recall that before $S = \{0,1\}^\lambda$). $0$ has to be included in $S$ to account for the case where both parties recover the same “dummy” seed value $s_0 = s_1$, i.e., $s_0 - s_1 = 0$.
- $\mathbb{H}$ is a finite abelian group containing the set $H \subset \mathbb{H}$. Note that $\mathbb{H}$ will correspond to the key space $K$ of the FSS FSS before encoding (i.e., recovery of the keys is relative to addition in $K$). $H \subset \mathbb{H}$ will correspond to the set

\footnote{Note that to obtain $t_0 \cdot CW - t_1 \cdot CW = CW$ we use $(K, +) = (\{0,1\}^\lambda, \oplus)$. We will later show how to generalize this.}
of actual key differences $k_0 - k_1$ for $(k_0, k_1) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(\hat{f})$ for $f \in \mathcal{F}$. Having separate $H \subset \mathbb{H}$ stems from the instantiations of EOH-PRG – given a truly homomorphic PRG, one could simply choose $H = \mathbb{H} = \tilde{\mathbb{H}}$.

- $\mathbb{H}$ is a finite abelian group containing the image of the PRG.

Finally, $\text{Enc}: H \rightarrow \mathbb{H}$ and $\text{Conv}: \mathbb{H} \rightarrow \mathbb{H}$ are such that for all $s \in S$, for all $m \in H$, for random secret shares $s_0, s_1 \leftarrow R S$ with $s_0 - s_1 = s$, and for random secret shares $y_0, y_1 \leftarrow R \tilde{\mathbb{H}}$ with $y_0 - y_1 = \text{PRG}(s) + \text{Encode}(m)$ it holds

$$\text{Conv}(y_0 - \text{PRG}(s_0)) - \text{Conv}(y_1 - \text{PRG}(s_1)) = m$$

in $\mathbb{H}$ except with negligible probability.

Further, we require a tag space which operates on $\tilde{\mathbb{H}}$. More formally, we require the following:

- $\mathbb{T}$ is a finite abelian group containing $\{0, 1\} \subset \mathbb{T}$. Note that $T = \{0, 1\}$ will serve as the tag space of our tensor product FSS, which is embedded in the group $\mathbb{T}$, i.e., recovery of the tag will now be additive over $\mathbb{T}$, rather than additive over $\{\{0, 1\}, \oplus\}$.

- $\cdot: \mathbb{T} \times \tilde{\mathbb{H}} \rightarrow \tilde{\mathbb{H}}$ is an efficiently computable non-trivial (left) group action of $\mathbb{T}$ on $\tilde{\mathbb{H}}$. Note that we need to define an operation of $\mathbb{T}$ on $\tilde{\mathbb{H}}$ in order to “correct” the keys based on the tag values. This allows to support more general key spaces than $\mathcal{K} = \{0, 1\}^k$.

In the following, we will assume this as part of the definition of an EOH-PRG and simply add $\mathbb{T}$ to the parametrization.

**Our tensor product FSS for arbitrary predicates from EOH-PRG.** Our tensor product construction from an EOH-PRG is essentially the same as the one from a perfectly homomorphic PRG (assuming the underlying FSS satisfy some additional properties), except that the correction word is computed as $CW := \text{PRG}(s) + \text{Enc}(k_0 - k_1)$, and the keys are recovered as $\kappa_b := \text{Conv}(t_b \cdot CW - \text{PRG}(s_b))$.$^{12}$

Note that for construction to satisfy correctness, it is now required that the FSS scheme $\text{FSS}$ for $\mathcal{F}$ satisfies $k_0 - k_1 \in H$ for all $f \in \mathcal{F}$ and $(k_0, k_1) \in \text{Gen}(\hat{f})$ (since the encoding function $\text{Encode}$ takes inputs in $H$), but satisfies shift invariance relative to the additive group $\mathbb{H}$ (since the decoding function $\text{Conv}$ returns elements in $\mathbb{H}$).

$^{12}$ A subtlety is that in the definition of EOH-PRG we only require correctness relative to random shifts, but here we rely on correctness relative to shifts of the form $t_b \cdot CW - \text{PRG}(s_b)$. This can be solved by having the parties re-randomize their shares with random offset $\text{PRF}(s, i)$ (where each time a fresh index $i$ is used and both parties hold the key $s$). This is necessary anyway for applying tensoring recursively, and allows for a simpler definition of EOH-PRG. Note though that this requires us to settle with a form of “non-adaptive” correctness as used e.g. in [28], where the inputs are assumed to be chosen independently of the keys.
An example for such an FSS can be obtained by additively secret-sharing the truth table with values in $H$ over $\mathbb{H}$ if the function class is sufficiently small, this can be done efficiently.

With this we obtain the following theorem.

**Theorem 9 (Theorem 20).** Assume $\text{PRG} : S \rightarrow \tilde{H}$ is an EOH-PRG parametrized by $(S, T, H, \mathbb{H})$. Further, let $\text{FSS}^P = (\text{Gen}^P, \text{Eval}^P)$ be an FSS for a function family $f^P : \{0, 1\}^{n_1} \rightarrow S \times T$, where

$$f^P_{\beta}(x_1) = \begin{cases} \beta & \text{if } P(x_1) = 1 \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases},$$

for $\beta \in S \times \{1\} \subseteq S \times T \subseteq S \times T$ (i.e., recovery is additive in $S \times T$) and $P \in \mathcal{P}$, and let $\text{FSS} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Eval})$ be a symmetric and shift-invariant FSS for some class of functions $\mathcal{F}$ of the form $f : \{0, 1\}^{n_2} \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ with key space $K = \mathbb{H}$, such that for any pair of keys $(k_0, k_1) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(f)$ it holds $k_0 - k_1 \in H$. Then, there exists an FSS $\text{FSS}^\otimes = (\text{Gen}^\otimes, \text{Eval}^\otimes)$ for the class $\mathcal{F}^P \otimes \mathcal{F}$ of functions

$$F_{P,f} : \{0, 1\}^{n_1+n_2} \rightarrow \mathcal{G}, (x_1, x_2) \mapsto \begin{cases} f(x_2) & \text{if } P(x_1) = 1 \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases},$$

for $P \in \mathcal{P}, f \in \mathcal{F}$, where the resulting keys consist of a “secret” part corresponding to the key space in $\text{FSS}^P$ and a “correction word” space $\tilde{H}$.

**FSS for bit-fixing predicates from EOH-PRG.** It is not hard to see that if $\text{FSS}^P$ in the above construction satisfies symmetry and shift-invariance, then so does the resulting FSS for $\mathcal{F}^P \otimes \mathcal{F}$. As further the secret part of the FSS does not grow, tensoring can be applied recursively an arbitrary (polynomial) number of times. While the construction of BGI16 is restricted to recursively tensoring point functions (and thus obtaining FSS for point functions), the new construction allows to, e.g., recursively tensor the truth-table function secret sharing scheme for one-bit functions

$$\varphi^\beta_\alpha(x) := \begin{cases} \beta & \text{if } x = \alpha \text{ or } \alpha = * \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases},$$

where $\alpha \in \{0, 1, *\}, \beta \in S \times \{1\} \subseteq S \times T$. Thus, given an EOH-PRG relative to $(S, T, H, \mathbb{H})$ with $H := (S \times T)^2$ and $\mathbb{H} := (S \times T)^2$ (as this is the domain of the keys for the truth-table function secret sharing of $\psi^0_\alpha$ over $S \times T$), one can obtain an FSS for the function class of bit-fixing predicates, i.e., the class

$$\varphi_\alpha(x) := \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \forall i \in [n] : x[i] = \alpha[i] \text{ or } \alpha[i] = * \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases},$$

The key for $\varphi^\beta_\alpha$ is a sharing of $(\beta, \beta), (\beta, 0), (0, \beta)$ for $\alpha = *, 0, 1$, respectively. The evaluation takes the first or second entry according to the input bit $x$.  

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13 The key for $\varphi^\beta_\alpha$ is a sharing of $(\beta, \beta), (\beta, 0), (0, \beta)$ for $\alpha = *, 0, 1$, respectively. The evaluation takes the first or second entry according to the input bit $x$. The
where $\alpha \in \{0,1,*\}^\ell$.

More generally, Theorem 9 yields the following corollary.

**Corollary 10.** Assume $\text{PRG} : S \rightarrow \tilde{H}$ is a EOH-PRG relative to $(S,T,H,\mathbb{H})$ with $H = (S \times T)^2, \mathbb{H} = (S \times T)^2$. Assume $P$ is a family of predicates $\{0,1\} \rightarrow \{0,1\}$. Then, there exists an FSS for the function class

$$F_{P_1,\ldots,P_\ell} : \{0,1\}^\ell \rightarrow \{0,1\}, \ x \mapsto \bigwedge_{i=1}^\ell P_i(x[i]),$$

where $P_1, \ldots, P_\ell \in P$.

**FSS for branching programs.** In general, a branching program can be described as a finite directed acyclic graph with one source node and two sink nodes, accept and reject. In this section, we focus on giving an FSS construction for oblivious $\ell$-layered branching programs with out-degree 2, i.e., each width-$w$ layer uses a fixed position of the input, each non-sink node has two outgoing edges labeled by 0 and 1, and edges only go from one level to the next level, as specified by a transition function $f : [\ell] \times [w] \times \{0,1\} \rightarrow [w]$.

Roughly, the idea to obtain an FSS for the class of such branching programs is to extend the tag value $t \in \{0,1\}$ to a tag vector $t \in \{0,1\}^w$, allowing to pick the “right” correction word in going from the $i$-th to the $(i+1)$-th level.

More precisely, for the $i$-th level, the key generation algorithm essentially chooses a seed $s_i \in S$, i.e., the $j$-th node on the $i$-th level is “labelled” by a seed value $s_{i,j} \in S$ together with a fixed tag vector $e_j \in \{0,1\}^w$, where $e_j$ corresponds to the $j$-th unit vector. Recall that each node has two outgoing edges, 0 and 1. In other words, for each node $(s_{i,j}, e_j)$ on level $i$, there exist two possible nodes $j_0 := f(i,j,0)$ and $j_1 := f(i,j,1)$ that can be reached in level $i+1$ with corresponding labels $(s_{i+1,j_0}, e_{j_0})$ and $(s_{i+1,j_1}, e_{j_1})$. To go from the $i$-th to the $(i+1)$-th level, the idea is now to encode the transitions into correction words. More precisely, we define

$$CW_i[j] := \text{PRG}(s_{i,j}) + \text{Encode}((s_{i+1,j_0}, e_{j_0}), (s_{i+1,j_1}, e_{j_1})).$$

Thus, the correction word for each node can be computed in this way. The FSS key consists of a sharing of the label of start node and correction words.

During evaluation, the tag vector allows to pick the right correction word to proceed to the next level. Namely, given secret shares $(s_b, t_b)$ such that

$$(s_0, t_0) + (s_1, t_1) = (s_{i,j}, e_j)$$

the parties can compute

$$y_b = \text{Conv} \left( \sum_{k=1}^w t_b[k] \cdot CW_i[k] - \text{PRG}(s_b) \right)$$
to obtain

\[ y_0 - y_1 = \text{Conv} \left( \sum_{k=1}^{w} t_0[k] \cdot CW_i[k] - \text{PRG}(s_0) \right) \]

\[ - \text{Conv} \left( \sum_{k \in [w_i]} t_1[k] \cdot CW_i[k] - \text{PRG}(s_1) \right) \]

\[ = \text{Conv}(t_0[j] \cdot CW_i[j] - \text{PRG}(s_0)) + \text{Conv}(t_1[j] \cdot CW_i[j] - \text{PRG}(s_1)) \]

\[ = (s_{i+1,j_0}, e_{j_0}, (s_{i+1,j_1}, e_{j_1})) \],

by the property of the EOH-PRG. The parties can now continue the evaluation with the left or right part of the output, depending on the \( i \)-th input bit.

Note that in the described inductive construction of FSS for branching programs, we assumed that each level has exactly \( w \) nodes. This can be achieved by virtually adding dummy nodes, for which the correction words for dummy nodes can be sampled uniformly at random, since these are never reached during evaluation.

**Comparison with FSS via universal branching programs.** Previous constructions of FSS for branching programs rely on homomorphic secret sharing (HSS) [25, Theorem 4.15] or FSS for all functions from fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [38, Section 6.3]. Given a branching program \( P \), the construction of [25] encodes \( P \) to \( \hat{P} \) and generates a universal branching program (UBP) for \( \hat{P} \) such that \( \text{UBP}(\hat{P}, x) = P(x) \) for arbitrary \( x \). Next, \( \hat{P} \) is secret-shared via the underlying HSS to hide the transition function of \( P \). Note that the transformation via UBPs incurs a considerate efficiency blow-up which is at least quadratic in the number of levels. Refer to Section H.2 for details.

In contrast, the evaluation of our FSS construction directly emulates the evaluation of the branching program. For each level of the program \( P \), the PRG needs to be evaluated once. Moreover, our FSS for branching programs naturally supports multi-edges. For the FSS via universal branching programs, on the other hand, the multi-edges need to be split into plain edges, incurring an additional blow-up. Finally, for branching programs with polynomial out-degree, say \( d \), our FSS construction only increases the correction word for each node from two elements to \( d \) elements.

**FSS for DFAs.** Given a DFA \( M := (Q, \Sigma, \delta, q_0, F) \), we first transform the set of accepting states \( F \) to a single accept state \( A \) via appending a special symbol \( \epsilon \) to the end of each input. Similarly, we can transfer the remaining states to a rejection state \( R \). The resulting DFA has alphabet \( \Sigma \cup \{\epsilon\} \) and states set \( Q \cup \{A, R\} \).

Similarly to the FSS for branching programs, the FSS for DFAs focuses on hiding the transition function. For each state \( s \in Q \), the label for \( s \) consists of a uniformly random seed and a tag vector assigned according to a designated order of the states. The correction word for \( s \) hides the labels of one-step reachable
states from \( s \). The key for the FSS is a random sharing of the label for \( q_0 \) and the correction word for every state in \( Q \). Since a state may be transferred to itself via some symbols, a KDM secure variant of EOH-PRG is necessary. With EOH-PRG, the key size of this FSS is independent of the length of string to be evaluated by the DFA.

In other words, FSS for DFAs can be viewed as one level of FSS for branching programs, where each input symbol evaluates to the same level again during evaluation.

**Instantiating the EOH-PRG.** In the following we explain our instantiations of EOH-PRG from LWE and a small-exponent DCR variant.

**EOH-PRG from LWE.** Recall that the LWE assumption naturally provides an almost-homomorphic PRG (AH-PRG). Let \( p, q \in \mathbb{N} \) with \( \gcd(p, q) = 1 \) and let \( \lfloor \cdot \rfloor_{q\to p} \) be defined as \( \lfloor \cdot \rfloor_{q\to p} : \mathbb{Z}_q \to \mathbb{Z}_p, x \mapsto \lfloor (p/q) \cdot x \rfloor \). Suppose \( A \leftarrow_R \mathbb{Z}^{n \times m}_q \). Then, \( \text{PRG}_A : \mathbb{Z}_q^n \to \mathbb{Z}_p^m, s \mapsto [sA]_{q\to p} \) is an AH-PRG. It is easy to verify that

\[
\text{PRG}_A(s_0 + s_1) = \text{PRG}_A(s_0) + \text{PRG}_A(s_1) + e
\]

with \( \|e\|_\infty \leq 1 \).

Note though that an AH-PRG is not sufficient to instantiate our construction, since the small error vector would lead to correctness errors with too high probability. To overcome this problem and obtain an EOH-PRG, we rely on the distributed rounding and lifting technique as introduced in [28].

Concretely, let \( r \in \mathbb{N} \) be an integer such that \( r|p \) and \( 1 \ll r \ll p \). Then, [28] observed that for \( \mu \in \mathbb{Z}_p \) the following holds. Given \( y = (p/r) \cdot \mu + e \mod p \) for small error \( e \), and random additive secret shares \( y_0 - y_1 = y \mod p \), it holds

\[
[y_0]_{p\to r} - [y_1]_{p\to r} = \mu \mod r,
\]

except with negligible probability. Further, if \( |\mu| \ll r \), then this secret sharing holds with overwhelming probability *over the integers* and thus also modulo \( p \):

\[
[y_0]_{p\to r} - [y_1]_{p\to r} = \mu \mod p.
\]

Towards obtaining a EOH-PRG, our idea is thus to encode a vector \( x \in \{0, 1\}^n \) as \( (p/r) \cdot x \), which then allows to remove errors potentially introduced via the AH-PRG using the conversion function \( y \mapsto \lfloor y \rfloor_{p\to r} \). More precisely, we instantiate the EOH-PRG as follows.

- **PRG:** \( \mathbb{Z}_p^n \to \mathbb{Z}_p^m, s \mapsto [sA]_{q\to p} \), where \( A \in \mathbb{Z}^{n \times m}_q \) and the vector-matrix multiplication \( sA \) is performed modulo \( q \);
- **Encode:** \( \{0, 1\}^m \to \mathbb{Z}_p^m, x \mapsto (p/r) \cdot x \);
- **Conv:** \( \mathbb{Z}_p^m \to \mathbb{Z}_p^m, y \mapsto \lfloor y \rfloor_{p\to r} \).

Setting \( m := \ell(n + w) \) (where \( \ell, w \) are determined by the underlying application), the above construction allows to obtain a EOH-PRG \( \text{PRG} : S \to \mathbb{H} \) relative to \( S, H, T, \mathbb{H} \) where \( S := \{0, 1\}^n, \ S := \mathbb{Z}_p^n, \ H = (S \times \{0, 1\}^w)\ell, \ T = \mathbb{Z}_p \) and \( \mathbb{H} = \mathbb{H} = (S \times T^w)\ell = \mathbb{Z}_p^m \).
**EOH-PRG from small-exponent DCR.** Next, we outline our EOH-PRG instantiation from a variant of the DCR assumption. Recall that the DCR assumption induces a homomorphic PRG mapping the additive group \((\mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)}, +)\) to the multiplicative group \((\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^\ast)^4\). Namely, assume \(g := (g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3) \in \mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^4\), where each \(g_i\) is uniformly sampled from the \(N\)-th residue group mod \(N^2\). Then, based on the DCR assumption, \(\text{PRG}_g: \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)} \rightarrow (\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^\ast)^4, r \mapsto (g_0^r, g_1^r, g_2^r, g_3^r)\) defines a homomorphic PRG \([29]\), for which it holds \(G_g(s_0 - s_1) = G_g(s_0)/G_g(s_1)\) for any \(s_0, s_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)}\). However, in order to use this recursively in our constructions, we need to be able to recover a homomorphism over \((\mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)}, +)\) (while not revealing \(\phi(N)\)).

To that end, we follow the techniques of \([60]\), who showed that given \(z_0 = z_1 \cdot (1 + N)^x \mod N^2\) for \(x \in \mathbb{Z}_N\), there exists an efficiently computable map \(\text{DDLog}: \mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^\ast \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_N\), which satisfies \(\text{DDLog}(z_0) - \text{DDLog}(z_1) = x \mod N\).

Further, if \(|x| \leq \frac{N}{2^\lambda}\), then \(\text{DDLog}(z_0) - \text{DDLog}(z_1) = x \mod \mathbb{Z}_N\), and thus in particular it holds \(\text{DDLog}(z_0) - \text{DDLog}(z_1) = x \mod \phi(N)\), allowing to recover the homomorphism over \((\mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)}, +)\). Note that this allows to generate secret shares of a value \(x \mod \phi(N)\) without knowing \(\phi(N)\), whenever \(|x|\) is sufficiently small.

Our idea is thus to build on a small-exponent variant of the DCR assumption which states that \(\text{PRG}_g(r)\) remains a PRG restricted to seeds \(r\) with \(|r| \leq \frac{N}{2^\lambda}\). It is pointed out in \([4]\) that this variant of the DCR assumption is reasonable as long as the domain of the small exponent is still exponentially large. This kind of low exponent assumption dates back to \([51]\).

With this we can state our EOH-PRG from small-exponent DCR as follows. Let \(B\) be an integer such that \(B \cdot 2^\lambda \leq N\) and \(B > 2^3\). Let \(m := \ell(1 + w)\) (where, again, \(\ell, w\) are determined by the underlying application). Assume the DCR variant assumption holds relative to exponents in \(B\). Then, we can instantiate the EOH-PRG as follows. (This instantiation is a little different from Section 8. Here we use \(\phi(N)\) instead of \(\phi(N^2)\) for the additive group.)

- \(\text{PRG}: \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)} \rightarrow (\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^\ast)^m, s \mapsto g^s\), where \(g \in (\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^\ast)^m\) and each entry of \(g\) is a \(N\)-th residue;
- \(\text{Encode}: (\lfloor -B/2, B/2 \rfloor \times \{0, 1\}^w)^\ell \rightarrow (\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^\ast)^m, x \mapsto (1 + N)^x \mod N^2\);
- \(\text{Conv}: (\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^\ast)^m \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)}^m, y \mapsto \text{DDLog}(y)\).

The above construction allows to obtain a EOH-PRG \(\text{PRG}: S \rightarrow \mathbb{H}\) relative to \((S, H, T, \mathbb{H})\) with \(S = \lfloor -B/2, B/2 \rfloor, T = \{0, 1\}, S = \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)}, T = \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)}, H = (S \times T^w)^\ell, \mathbb{H} = (S \times T^w)^\ell = \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)}^m\) and \(\mathbb{H} = (\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^\ast)^m\). We want to stress here that using the resulting EOH-PRG in our construction is possible without knowing \(\phi(N)\) via the techniques outlined above, the instantiation of our EOH-PRG is thus not in contradiction to the DCR assumption.
3 Preliminaries

In this section, we recall the preliminaries for function secret sharing from [43,24]. For the remaining preliminaries we refer to Section A in the Supplementary Material. Here, we only consider two-party function secret sharing as all of our constructions are in the two-party setting.

Definition 11 (Function Secret Sharing (FSS)). A function secret sharing scheme for function a function class $F$ consists of two PPT algorithms $(Gen, Eval)$:

- $Gen(1^\lambda, f)$ outputs a pair of keys $(k_0, k_1)$ and correction word $CW$ upon the security parameter and $f \in F$.
- $Eval(b, k_b, CW, x)$ outputs the corresponding share of $f(x)$ upon the party index $b$, $k_b$ and input $x$.

$(Gen, Eval)$ is a secure function secret sharing if it satisfies the correctness and security requirements:

- **Correctness** For all $f \in F$ and all $x \in D_f$,

$$Pr \left[ Eval(0, k_0, CW, x) - Eval(1, k_1, CW, x) = f(x) : (k_0, k_1) \leftarrow Gen^F(1^\lambda, f) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

where $D_f$ is the domain of $f$.

- **Security** Assume party $z$ is corrupted by an adversary $A$. Consider the following experiment.

  1. The adversary $A$ outputs $(f_0, f_1) \leftarrow A(1^\lambda, F)$.
  2. The challenger samples $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ and computes $(k_0, k_1, CW) \leftarrow Gen(1^\lambda, f_b)$.
  3. The adversary outputs $b' \leftarrow A(k_z, CW)$.

Let $Adv(1^\lambda, A)$ be the advantages of $A$ in guessing $b'$, i.e., $Adv(1^\lambda, A) := Pr[b = b'] - \frac{1}{2}$. Then $(Gen, Eval)$ is a secure FSS if $Adv(1^\lambda, A)$ is negligible for every $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and every PPT adversary $A$.

We remark that the FSS definition differs from the FSS in [43,24] in a formal sense, since here the correction word is viewed as an independent part whereas in literature the correction word is part of party key. This is necessary in order to define shift-invariance for FSS, which does not affect the correction-word part. Note that the correction word can also be viewed as the public part of the key for the two parties.

Further, note that we only require correctness, when the key $(k_0, k_1, CW)$ is generated independently from the input $x$. The reason for settling for this notion of correctness is that in our construction a PRF (with key known by the parties) is used by the parties to locally re-randomize their local share. By choosing the input adversarially (based on this key), the parties could hurt correctness, similar as is the case in [28]. Note that this is sufficient for all applications that do not require privacy for reconstruction, such as 2-server private information retrieval without database privacy.
4 FSS with Extra Properties and EOH-PRGs

In this section, we define shift-invariant FSS and symmetric FSS, which will serve as a basis for our recursive constructions. We further introduce the notion of a PRG with encoded-output homomorphism (EOH-PRG).

Shift-invariance essentially means that the keys remain functional when shifted by an arbitrary shift $s$. Note that the shift-invariance does not affect the correction word space $CW$, which is thus listed separately in Definition 12. Further, note that all of the FSS constructions in this work satisfy shift-invariance.

Definition 12 (Shift-invariant FSS). Let $(Gen, Eval)$ be an FSS for a function class $F$. Assume the key space $K$ of $(Gen, Eval)$ is a finite abelian group and the correction word space is $CW$. For any $f \in F$, let $D_f$ be the domain of $f$. We say $(Gen, Eval)$ is shift-invariant, if there exists a negligible function $\text{negl} : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ such that for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, $f \in F$, $x \in D_f$, $(k_0, k_1, CW) \leftarrow Gen(1^\lambda, f)$, and $s \leftarrow_R K$,

$$\Pr \left[ Eval(0, k_0 + s, CW, x) - Eval(1, k_1 + s, CW, x) = f(x) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

where the probability is taken over the randomness of $Gen$ and $s$.

Next, we introduce the notion of symmetric FSS. Note that the FSS schemes for point functions in [24,26] are also symmetric.

Definition 13 (Symmetric FSS). An FSS is symmetric if for all $k \in K$, for all $x \in D_f$,

$$Eval(0, k, CW, x) = Eval(1, k, CW, x).$$

4.1 PRG with Encoded-Output Homomorphism

We now define the notion PRG with encoded-output homomorphism (EOH-PRG), which is central to our work. EOH-PRG corresponds to an approximate substitution of ideal homomorphic PRG.

Note that in the following we consider all entities implicitly parametrized by $\lambda$ (e.g., by a set $S$ we denote an ensemble of sets $S = \{S_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$). In Section 8, we show how to obtain EOH-PRGs from the (ring)-LWE or DCR assumption.

Definition 14 (EOH-PRG). Let $\mathbb{S}, \mathbb{H}$ be finite abelian additive groups, and $\mathbb{H}$ a finite abelian group. Let $H \subset \mathbb{H}$ and $S \subset \mathbb{S}$ be subsets such that $0 \in S$. A function $\text{PRG} : \mathbb{S} \rightarrow \mathbb{H}$ is a PRG with encoded-output homomorphism (EOH-PRG) relative to $(S, H, \mathbb{H})$ if it is a secure PRG relative to $S$ and $\mathbb{S}$, and there exists a deterministic polynomial-time encoding function $\text{Encode} : H \rightarrow \mathbb{H}$ and a deterministic polynomial-time conversion function $\text{Conv} : \mathbb{H} \rightarrow \mathbb{H}$ such that for all $m \in H$, for $s \leftarrow_R S$ and $y := \text{PRG}(s) + \text{Encode}(m)$,
\[ s_0 \leftarrow_R S, \; y_0 \leftarrow_R \mathbb{H}, \; s_1 := s_0 - s, \; y_1 := y_0 - y \text{ it holds that} \]
\[ \text{Conv}(y_0 - \text{PRG}(s_0)) - \text{Conv}(y_1 - \text{PRG}(s_1)) = m \]
in \( \mathbb{H} \) except with negligible probability over the choice of \( s_0 \) and \( y_0 \).

Note that for \( y_0 = y_1, s_0 = s_1 \), we have \( \text{Conv}(y_0 - \text{PRG}(s_0)) = \text{Conv}(y_1 - \text{PRG}(s_1)) \) as \( \text{Conv} \) is deterministic.

Since for our instantiations we will typically have to work with a “tag space” \( T \) operating on \( \mathbb{H} \), we will slightly extend the definition of EOH-PRG, and typically refer to the below when we talk about an EOH-PRG.

**Definition 15 (EOH-PRG with “tag-space” \( T \)).** Let \( \text{PRG} : S \rightarrow \mathbb{H} \) be a EOH-PRG relative to \((S, H, \mathbb{H})\). We say that it is an EOH-PRG relative to \((S, T, H, \mathbb{H})\), if \( T \) is an additive group such that \( T := \{0, 1\} \subset \mathbb{T} \) and there exists a (non-trivial)\(^{14} \) efficiently computable (left) group operation \( \cdot : \mathbb{T} \times \mathbb{H} \rightarrow \mathbb{H} \) of \( T \) on \( \mathbb{H} \).

**Definition 16 (EOH-PRG with KDM security).** Let \( \text{PRG} : S \rightarrow \mathbb{H} \) be a EOH-PRG relative to \((S, T, H, \mathbb{H})\). Let \( \Psi \) a family of embeddings \( \psi : S \rightarrow H \). We say PRG is KDM secure relative to \( \Psi \), if for all \( \psi \in \Psi \), \( \text{PRG}^\psi : s \mapsto \text{PRG}(s) + \text{Encode}(\psi(s)) \) is a PRG relative to \( S \) and \( S \).

**Remark 17.** Note that the share obtained from \( \text{Conv} \) for \( m \) may be not pseudo-random. In order to ensure that the homomorphic property can be recursively applied, the two parties can use a PRF with shared key to re-randomize the share of \( m \).

**Remark 18.** For the tensor-product FSS, we need \( H = (S \times T)^2 \) and \( \mathbb{H} = (S \times \mathbb{T})^2 \), for out-degree 2 branching programs we need \( H = (S \times \{ e_i \}_{i=1}^{w})^2 \) and \( \mathbb{H} = (S \times \mathbb{T}^w)^2 \) where \( w \) is the width of the branching program and \( e_i \) is the \( i \)-th standard basis of \( \mathbb{T}^w \).

**Remark 19.** We further need that operations over \( S, \mathbb{H} \) and \( T \) are efficiently computable. While this is trivially the case for our instantiation from LWE, this can be sufficiently emulated for our instantiation with DCR (where \( S \) and \( T \) are additive modulo an unknown \( \phi(N) \)), by building on techniques of [60].

## 5 Tensor Product FSS for Arbitrary Predicates from EOH-PRGs

In this section, we present our tensor product FSS, which allows to tensor FSS schemes for arbitrary predicates, as long as the second FSS is symmetric and shift-invariant.

\(^{14}\) I.e., \( 1 \cdot h \neq 0 \) for \( h \neq 0 \).
Theorem 20 (Tensor Product FSS). Let \( n_1, n_2 \in \mathbb{N} \), and \( S, T \) be two finite abelian groups. Let \( \mathcal{P}_1 \) be a family of predicates mapping \( \{0,1\}^{n_1} \) to \( \{0,1\} \) and \( \mathcal{P}_2 \) be a family of predicates mapping \( \{0,1\}^{n_2} \) to \( \{0,1\} \). Let \( \mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{P}_1} : \{0,1\}^{n_1} \to S \times T, \mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{P}_2} : \{0,1\}^{n_2} \to S \times T \) be the function families induced by \( \mathcal{P}_1, \mathcal{P}_2 \) as

\[
\begin{align*}
    f_{\mathcal{P}_1, \beta} : \{0,1\}^{n_1} &\to S \times T, x \mapsto P_1(x) \cdot \beta = \begin{cases} 
\beta & \text{if } P_1(x) = 1, \\
0 & \text{else}
\end{cases}, \\
    f_{\mathcal{P}_2, \gamma} : \{0,1\}^{n_2} &\to S \times T, x \mapsto P_2(x) \cdot \gamma = \begin{cases} 
\gamma & \text{if } P_2(x) = 1, \\
0 & \text{else}
\end{cases},
\end{align*}
\]

respectively, with \( P_1 \in \mathcal{P}_1, P_2 \in \mathcal{P}_2 \) and \( \beta \in S \times \{1\}, \gamma \in S \times \{1\} \).

Assume

1. PRG: \( S \to \mathbb{H} \) is a EOH-PRG relative to \((S,T,H,\mathbb{H})\) (as in Definition 15), where \( \mathbb{H} := (S \times T)^2 \) and \( H := (S \times \{0,1\})^2 \).
2. \( \text{FSS}^{\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{P}_1}, \text{Eval}^{\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{P}_1}}} \) is an FSS for \( \mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{P}_1} \) over key space \( \mathcal{K}_1 \), correction word space \( CW_1 \) with pseudorandom correction words and pseudorandom output shares.
3. \( \text{FSS}^{\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{P}_2}, \text{Eval}^{\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{P}_2}}} \) is a symmetric and shift-invariant FSS for \( \mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{P}_2} \) over key space \( \mathcal{K}_2 := \mathbb{H} \), such that for all \((u_0, u_1) \in \text{Gen}^{\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{P}_2}} \) it holds \( u_0 - u_1 \in H \), with correction word space \( CW_2 \), and with pseudorandom correction words and output shares.
4. PRF: \( \{0,1\}^N \times \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{H} \) is a PRF (for \( N \) sufficiently large).

Then there exists \( \text{FSS}^{\oplus, \text{Eval}^{\oplus}} \) for \( \mathcal{G} := \mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{P}_1} \otimes \mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{P}_2} \) is an FSS for \( \mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{P}_1} \otimes \mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{P}_2} \) over key space \( \mathcal{K}_1 \), correction word space \( CW_1 \times CW_2 \times \mathbb{H} \), with pseudorandom correction words and pseudorandom output shares, where

\[
g_{\mathcal{P}_1, \mathcal{P}_2, \gamma}(x_1, x_2) := P_1(x_1) \cdot P_2(x_2) \cdot \gamma = \begin{cases} 
\gamma & \text{if } P_1(x_1) = 1 \land P_2(x_2) = 1, \\
0 & \text{else}
\end{cases}.
\]

In particular, \( \text{FSS}^{\oplus} \) is symmetric and shift-invariant if \( \text{FSS}^{\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{P}_1}} \) is symmetric and shift-invariant.

The construction for \( (\text{Gen}^{\oplus}, \text{Eval}^{\oplus}) \) is shown in Figure 1. For the proof we refer to Section B in the Supplementary Material. A few remarks follow.

Remark 21. – The predicate family \( \mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{P}_2} \) can be changed to other function families rather than predicates, as long as the corresponding FSS remains symmetric and shift-invariant.

– The FSS for bit-fixing predicates from EOH-PRG in Section C can be viewed as the tensor product of FSS for length 1 predicates.

– The FSS schemes \( \text{FSS}^{\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{P}_1}} \) and \( \text{FSS}^{\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{P}_2}} \) are assumed to output pseudorandom shares. As shown in [26] this is the case for any expressive enough function family. If this is not the case, the output shares can be re-randomized by a PRF with global key and global state as used in our tensor product construction.

We further explain how to obtain FSS schemes for the for negation and disjunction of predicates in Section B.2.
6 FSS for Branching Programs

In this section, we generalize the FSS for tensor products to FSS for branching programs. Concretely, the one-bit tag is extended to a w-bit tag, which supports polynomially many possible choices (corresponding to the number of nodes in one level of the branching program). We also generalize the FSS for branching program to FSS for DFAs, approximate matching functions and multivariate polynomials. For details, we refer to Section 7 and E.

Recall that given a branching program $P$, the size is the number of nodes in $V$, the length is $\ell$, and the width is the maximal number of nodes of every level. Note that every branching program can be converted to a layered, input-oblivious branching program with polynomial blowup in size [63,25].

Now, we start to construct an FSS for branching programs. Let $P$ be a layered, oblivious branching program of width $w$, and let $P_i : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow [w]$ be the function which evaluates $P$ to level $i$ (i.e., to the state of the branching program at level $i$). We start by explaining how to obtain the FSS for the “first level” function

$$f_{P_1,\gamma} : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow (S \times T^w)^2, x \mapsto \gamma_x.$$
Note that there is one node in level 0 (the initial node) and two nodes in level 1 (one for the choice of 0 and 1 for the choice of 1), i.e., \( w_1 = 2 \) and \( P_1 \) considers only the first bit \( x_1 \) of the input \( x \in \{0,1\}^n \).

In order to be able to recurse, we set \( \gamma_b := (s_b, t_b) \), where \( s_b \in \mathcal{S} \) is some random seed and \( t_0 = (1,0) \) and \( t_1 = (0,1) \) are the unit vectors over \( \{0,1\}^2 \).

A function secret sharing scheme for \( f_{P_1, \gamma} \) which satisfies shift-invariance over \( (\mathcal{S} \times \mathbb{T})^2 \) for some abelian groups \( \mathcal{S}, \mathbb{T} \) with \( \mathcal{S} \subset \mathcal{S}, \mathbb{T} \subset \mathbb{T} \) can be obtained via a direct truth table sharing. We show the corresponding FSS in Figure 5 in the Supplementary Material D, and capture the statement in the following lemma.

**Lemma 22 (Base case).** Let \( \mathcal{S} \) and \( \mathbb{T} \) be finite abelian groups, and let \( \mathcal{S} \subset \mathcal{S}, \mathbb{T} \subset \mathbb{T} \) be arbitrary subsets.

Then, there exists a shift-invariant FSS for the family of functions \( f_{P_1, \gamma} \) over key space \( (\mathcal{S} \times \mathbb{T})^2 \).

Next, we show an inductive lemma to construct an FSS for \( P \) which extends an FSS for \( P_i \) to an FSS for \( P_{i+1} \).

**Lemma 23 (Inductive).** Assume

1. \( \text{FSS}^i = (\text{Gen}^i, \text{Eval}^i) \) is a shift-invariant FSS for \( P_i \) over key space \( (\mathcal{S} \times \mathbb{T})^2 \), correction word space \( CW_i \) with pseudorandom correction word and pseudorandom output share. \( \text{FSS}^i \) maps the input \( x \) with index set \( \{\tau(V_0), \tau(V_1), \ldots, \tau(V_{i-1})\} \) to the \( P_i(x) \)-th position of a given array \( \beta \).
2. \( \text{PRG}_i : \mathcal{S} \rightarrow \mathcal{H}_i \) is a EOH-PRG relative to \( (\mathcal{S}, \mathbb{T}, H_i, \mathcal{H}_i) \) as in Definition 15 where \( H_i = (\mathcal{S} \times T_{w_i+1})^2, \mathcal{H}_i = (\mathcal{S} \times T_{w_i+1})^2 \).

Then, there exists a shift-invariant FSS for \( P_{i+1} \) over key space \( (\mathcal{S} \times \mathbb{T})^2 \), correction word space \( CW_{i+1} \times \mathcal{H}_{i+1} \) with pseudorandom correction word and pseudorandom output share. Again, \( \text{FSS}^{i+1} \) maps the input \( x \) with index set \( \{\tau(V_0), \tau(V_1), \ldots, \tau(V_{i-1}), \tau(V_i)\} \) to the \( P_{i+1}(x) \)-th position of a given array \( \gamma \).

The FSS \( \text{FSS}^{i+1} = (\text{Gen}^{i+1}, \text{Eval}^{i+1}) \) for \( P_{i+1} \) is shown in Figure 2. For the proof of this lemma we refer to Section D.

With this, we can obtain an FSS for branching programs of arbitrarily polynomially-bounded width and length, as captured in the following theorem.

**Theorem 24 (FSS for BP from EOH-PRG).** Let \( P \) be a branching program with width \( (w_0, w_1, \ldots, w_\ell) \) for each level, where \( w_0 = 1, w_1 = 2, w_\ell = 2, w_i \leq w \) for \( i \in [0, \ell] \). Assume \( \text{PRG}_i : \mathcal{S} \rightarrow \mathcal{H}_i \) is a EOH-PRG relative to \( \mathcal{S}, \mathbb{T}, H_i = (\mathcal{S} \times T_{w_i+1})^2, \mathcal{H}_i = (\mathcal{S} \times T_{w_i+1})^2 \) for \( i \in [1, \ell] \).

Then, there exists an FSS for \( P \) over key space \( (\mathcal{S} \times \mathbb{T})^2 \) and correction word space \( \mathcal{H}_{i+1}^1 \times \mathcal{H}_{i+1}^2 \cdots \times \mathcal{H}_{i+1}^{w_i-1} \), i.e., with key size bounded by \( 2(\log |\mathcal{S}| + 2\log |\mathbb{T}|) + \sum_{i \in [1, \ell-1]} w_i \log |\mathcal{H}_i| \).

Note that the FSS construction for branching program in Theorem 24 only hides the transition function \( f \) whereas the topology of the branching program, i.e., the number of nodes of each level, is revealed. For a topology-hiding construction we refer to Section D.4 in the Supplementary Material.
Function secret sharing scheme $\mathrm{FSS}^{i+1} = (\mathrm{Gen}^{i+1}, \mathrm{Eval}^{i+1})$ from EOH-PRG for $P_{i+1}$:

**Parameters:** Let $\mathrm{PRG}_i : S \to \overline{H}_i$ be a EOH-PRG relative to $(S, T, (S \times T^{w_{i+1}})^2, (S \times T^{w_{i+1}})^2)$. Let $\mathrm{FSS}^i = (\mathrm{Gen}^i, \mathrm{Eval}^i)$ be a shift-invariant FSS for $P_i$ over key space $K$ and correction word space $CW$. Further let $N \in \mathbb{N}$ (sufficiently large) and $\mathrm{PRF} : \{0, 1\}^\lambda \times [N] \to \overline{H}$ is a PRF. We assume that both parties have access to a global key $K \leftarrow_R \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ and global state $st \in [N]$.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Gen}^{i+1}(1^\lambda, P_{i+1}, \gamma & \in (S \times T^{w_{i+1}})^{w_{i+1}}) : \\
1: & \text{ Parse } \gamma \text{ as } \gamma =: ((\sigma[1], e_1), (\sigma[2], e_2) \ldots (\sigma[w_{i+1}], e_{w_{i+1}})) \text{ with } \sigma \in S^{w_{i+1}} \text{ and } e_j \in T^{w_{i+1}} \text{ the } j\text{-th basis in } T^{w_{i+1}}. \quad \triangleright \sigma \text{ is the seed value for level } i + 1. \\
2: & \text{ Sample } s \leftarrow_R S^{w_i}. \quad \triangleright s \text{ is the seed value for level } i. \\
3: & \text{ Let } \beta =: ((s[1], e_1), (s[2], e_2) \ldots (s[w_i], e_{w_i})) \in (S \times T^{w_i})^{w_i} \text{ with } e_j \in T^{w_i} \text{ the } j\text{-th basis in } T^{w_i}. \\
4: & \text{ Let } (k_0, k_1, CW) \leftarrow \text{Gen}'(1^\lambda, P_{i+1}). \\
5: & \text{ Let } CW[1 : w_i] \in \overline{H}_i^{w_i} \text{ be the correction word for level } i \text{ as computed follows.} \\
6: & \text{ for } j \in [w_i] \text{ do} \\
7: & \quad \text{ Let } u_j \in (S \times T^{w_{i+1}})^2 \text{ be the key for level } i + 1 \text{ with 2 elements.} \\
8: & \quad \text{ Set } u_j[0] \leftarrow f(j(i, 0)) \text{ and } u_j[1] \leftarrow f(j(i, 1)). \quad \triangleright \text{Map } 0 \text{ and } 1 \text{ to the corresponding element of level } i + 1 \text{ in the array } \gamma. \\
9: & \quad \text{ Set } CW[j] \leftarrow \mathrm{PRG}^i(s[j]) + \mathrm{Encode}(u_j). \\
10: & \text{ end for} \\
11: & \text{ Let } CW_{i+1} := (CW_i, CW[1 : w_i]) \text{ be the new correction word.} \\
12: & \text{Return } (k_0, k_1, CW_{i+1}). \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Eval}^{i+1}(b, k_i, CW_{i+1}, x) : \\
1: & \text{ Parse } CW_{i+1} \text{ as } CW_{i+1} := (CW_i, CW[1 : w_i]). \\
2: & \text{ Let } (s_b, t_b) = \text{Eval}^i(b, k_i, CW_i, x). \quad \triangleright (s_b, t_b) \in S \times T^{w_i}. \\
3: & \text{ Compute } v_b \leftarrow \text{Conv}(\{j \in [w_i] \mid (s_b, t_b)[j] \cdot CW[j] - \mathrm{PRG}(s_b)) + \mathrm{PRF}(K, st)), \quad \triangleright v_b \in (S \times T^{w_{i+1}})^2. \\
4: & \text{ Update the state } st \leftarrow st + 1. \\
5: & \text{ Return } v_b[x[\tau(V_{i+1})]] \in S \times T^{w_{i+1}}. \quad \triangleright \text{Use the input } x[\tau(V_{i+1})] \text{ to choose the key for level } i + 1.
\end{align*}
\]

**Fig. 2.** $\mathrm{FSS}^i = (\mathrm{Gen}^i, \mathrm{Eval}^i)$ for $P_{i+1}$ from FSS $(\mathrm{Gen}^i, \mathrm{Eval}^i)$ and EOH-PRG $\mathrm{PRG}$.

### 7 FSS for DFAs

Similar to the FSS for branching programs, the FSS for DFAs mainly hides the transition function for each state. Given a DFA $M := (Q, \Sigma, \delta, F, q_0)$, the set of accepts states $F$ could be transferred to one accept state $A$ via appending an empty string $\epsilon$ to the input whereas the set of other states is transferred to one rejection state $R$. The transformation leads to a DFA with $|Q| + 2$ states and with alphabet $\Sigma \cup \{\epsilon\}$. The construction relies on a KDM secure EOH-PRG.

**Theorem 25 (FSS for DFAs).** Let $M := (Q, \Sigma, \delta, q_0, F)$ be a DFA. Let $\mu := |Q \cup \{A, R\}| = |Q| + 2$. Assume $\mathrm{PRG} : S \to \overline{H}$ be a KDM secure EOH-PRG relative to $(S, T, (S \times T^\mu)^{|Q|+1}, (S \times T^\mu)^{|Q|+1})$.
There exists a FSS for $M$ over key space $\mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{T}^\mu$ and correction word space $\overline{\mathbb{H}}^{|Q|}$. Futhermore, the key size is bounded by $\log |\mathcal{S}| + \mu \log |\mathcal{T}| + |Q| \log |\overline{\mathbb{H}}|$.

The FSS for $M$ is shown in Figure 3.

**Function secret sharing scheme for DFA from KDM secure EOH-PRG**

**Parameters:** Let $\text{PRG} : \mathcal{S} \rightarrow \overline{\mathbb{H}}$ be a KDM secure EOH-PRG relative to $(S, \mathcal{T}, (S \times T^\mu)^{|\Sigma|+1}, (S \times T^\mu)^{|\Sigma|+1})$ and $\mu := |Q \cup \{A, R\}| = |Q| + 2$. Further let $N \in \mathbb{N}$ (sufficiently large) and $\text{PRF}: \{0,1\}^\lambda \times [N] \rightarrow \overline{\mathbb{H}}$ is a PRF. We assume that both parties have access to a global key $K \leftarrow_R \{0,1\}^\lambda$ and global state $st \in [N]$.  

$\text{Gen}(\lambda, M)$:
1. Assign a fixed order to $Q \cup \{A, R\}$ and $\Sigma \cup \{\epsilon\}$.
2. Sample $\sigma \leftarrow_R S^\mu$.
3. Let $\beta \leftarrow ((\sigma[1], e_1), \ldots, (\sigma[|\mu|], e_{|\mu|})) \in (S \times T^\mu)^\mu$ with $e_j \in T^\mu$ the $j$-th basis in $T^\mu$.
4. Let $CW[1 : |Q|]$ be the correction words for meaningful states computed as follows.
5. For each state $s \in Q$ do
6. Let $u \in (S \times T^\mu)^{|\Sigma|+1}$ be the keys for one-step reachable states from $s$.
7. For symbol $\alpha \in \Sigma \cup \{\epsilon\}$ do
8. Let $t \leftarrow \delta(s, \alpha)$.
9. Set $u[\alpha] \leftarrow \beta[t]$. \hspace{1cm} \triangleright \beta[t]$ is the key for $t$.
10. end for
11. Set $CW[s] \leftarrow \text{PRG}(\sigma[s]) + \text{Encode}(u)$. \hspace{1cm} \triangleright No correction words for $\{A, R\}$.
12. end for
13. Sample $k_0, k_1 \leftarrow_R \mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{T}^\mu$ such that $k_0 - k_1 = \beta[q_0]$. \hspace{1cm} \triangleright Share the key for $q_0$.
14. Return $(k_0, k_1, CW)$.

$\text{Eval}(b, k_0, CW, x, i)$:
1. Return $k_i$ if $i > \text{len}(x)$.
2. Parse $k_i$ as $k_i = (s_i, t_i) \in S \times T^\mu$.
3. Compute $v_b \leftarrow \text{Conv}((\sum_{j \in [\mu]} t_b[j] \cdot CW[j] - \text{PRG}(s_b)) + \text{PRG}(K, st) \in (S \times T^\mu)^{|\Sigma|+1}$.
4. Update the state $st \leftarrow st + 1$.
5. Return $\text{Eval}(b, v_b[x[i]], CW, x, i + 1)$. \hspace{1cm} \triangleright Use the input $x[i]$ to choose the key for next state.

Fig. 3. FSS for a DFA from KDM secure EOH-PRG.

The correctness is easy to verify as the the tag vector is used in Lemma 23.

The security follows from the pseudorandomness of the KDM secure PRG. We explain why KDM secure EOH-PRG is required. For a state $s$, it is possible that $\delta(s, \alpha) = s$ for some input $\alpha \in \Sigma$, which leads to the correction word $CW[s] \leftarrow \text{PRG}(\sigma[s]) + \text{Encode}(u)$ and $\sigma[s]$ is also contained in the $\alpha$-th entry of $u$. The KDM secure EOH-PRG can be instantiated from LWE or DCR for free without assuming circular security (Remark 30). The running time of $\text{Eval}$ relies on the input length as DFAs.

Remark 26. The FSS for DFAs could be viewed as one level of the FSS for branching programs and there is no level change during the evaluation.
8 EOH-PRG Instantiated from LWE or DCR Assumption

In this section, we show EOH-PRG instantiated from LWE or a DCR variant assumption. As remarked following Definition 15, if a PRG is homomorphic then the PRG itself is a EOH-PRG. The LWE assumption implies an almost homomorphic PRG and the DCR assumption implies a homomorphic PRG mapping an additive group to a multiplicative group. We show how the AH-PRG from LWE or the H-PRG from DCR cooperate with other tools to implement the EOH-PRG.

Here we show the three instantiations from LWE, Ring-LWR and DCR. The preliminaries for the assumption, proof of the instantiations and remarks appear in Section F.

**Theorem 27 (EOH-PRG from LWE).** Let \( n = n(\lambda), p = p(\lambda), q = q(\lambda), r = r(\lambda), B = B(\lambda) \in \mathbb{N} \) such that \( r|p, p|q, 2\lambda^{(1)} \leq r, 2Br\lambda^{(1)} \leq p \) and \( n\log q \leq \ell(n+w)\log p \). Let \( w, \ell \) be parameters depending on concrete applications.

Assume LWE_{n,t(n+w),q} is hard. Let \( S = \{0,1\}^n, T = \{0,1\}, S = \mathbb{Z}_p, T = \mathbb{Z}_p, H = (S \times T^w) \ell = \{0,1\}^{\ell(n+w)}, H_0 = (S \times T^w) = \mathbb{Z}_p^{\ell(n+w)}, \mathbb{H}_0 = \mathbb{Z}_p^{\ell(n+w)} \) and the corresponding functions for the instantiation be

- The group action \( \cdot : \mathbb{Z}_p \times \mathbb{Z}_p^{\ell(n+w)} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^{\ell(n+w)}, (t,s) \mapsto t \cdot s \).
- \( \text{PRG:} \mathbb{Z}_p^n \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^{\ell(n+w)}, s \mapsto [sA]_q \rightarrow p \), where \( A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times \ell(n+w)} \) and the vector-matrix multiplication \( sA \) is performed modulo \( q \):
- \( \text{Encode:} \{0,1\}^{\ell(n+w)} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^{\ell(n+w)}, s \mapsto \frac{1}{\ell} \cdot s \);
- \( \text{Conv:} \mathbb{Z}_p^{\ell(n+w)} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^{\ell(n+w)}, t \mapsto [t]_{\mathbb{F}_p} \).

Then PRG is a EOH-PRG relative to \((S,T,H,\mathbb{H})\).

Similarly, we show the EOH-PRG instantiation from Ring-LWE. As pointed out in Lemma 36, to work with a binary secret Module-LWE instances, the rank of the Module-LWE should be at least \( \log q \) (basing on the Ring-LWE pseudo-randomness). However, small secret Module-LWR has been used in the NIST post-quantum cryptography submissions including Saber [35], Kyber [69] for constant rank. Based on this, we show the instantiation for good efficiency relying on Assumption 60.

Note if the number \( \ell(n+w) \) is not exactly a multiple of \( n \). Assume \( \ell(n+w) = n \cdot \mu + \gamma \) with \( 0 \leq \gamma < n \). The EOH-PRG from Ring-LWE output has \( \mu \) elements from \( \mathbb{F}_p \) and \( \gamma \) elements from \( \mathbb{Z}_p \).

**Theorem 28 (EOH-PRG from Ring-LWR).** Let \( n = n(\lambda), p = p(\lambda), q = q(\lambda), r = r(\lambda), B = B(\lambda) \in \mathbb{N} \) such that \( r|p, p|q, 2\lambda^{(1)} \leq r, 2Br\lambda^{(1)} \leq p \) and \( n\log q \leq \ell(n+w)\log p \). Let \( w, \ell \) be parameters depending on concrete applications. Denote \( R \) as the algebraic ring with degree \( n \).

Assume binary secret Ring-LWR \( R_{n,t,\ell} \left[ \frac{\ell(n+w)}{\mathbb{F}_p} \right] \) is hard. Let \( S = \{0,1\}^n, T = \{0,1\}, S = R, T = \mathbb{Z}_p, H = (S \times T^w) \ell = \{0,1\}^{\ell(n+w)}, H_0 = (S \times T^w) = R^{\ell(n+w)}, \mathbb{H}_0 = R^{\ell(n+w)} \) and the corresponding functions for the instantiation be...
Then PRG \( Z \) and \( N \) Let Theorem 29 (EOH-PRG from DCR).

- The group action \( \cdot : Z_p \times \left( R_p^\ell \times Z_p^{\ell w-n \left\lceil \frac{\lambda}{n} \right\rceil} \right) \to R_p^\ell \times Z_p^{\ell w-n \left\lceil \frac{\lambda}{n} \right\rceil}, (t, s) \mapsto t \cdot s \), where \( \cdot \) is the scalar multiplication mod \( p \).

- PRG: \( R_p \to R_p^\ell \times Z_p^{\ell w-n \left\lceil \frac{\lambda}{n} \right\rceil}, s \mapsto \psi\left( [s \cdot a]_q \right) \), where \( a \in R_q^{\ell + \left\lceil \frac{\lambda}{n} \right\rceil} \), the multiplication \( s \cdot a \) is performed modulo \( R_q \), and \( \psi(\cdot) \) takes the ring elements except the last one and the first \( \ell w - n \left\lceil \frac{\lambda}{n} \right\rceil \) coefficients of the last ring element;

- Encode: \( \{0, 1\}^{\ell(n+w)} \to R_p^\ell \times Z_p^{\ell w-n \left\lceil \frac{\lambda}{n} \right\rceil}, s \mapsto \frac{p}{r} \cdot s \);

- Conv: \( R_p^\ell \times Z_p^{\ell w-n \left\lceil \frac{\lambda}{n} \right\rceil} \to R_p^\ell \times Z_p^{\ell w-n \left\lceil \frac{\lambda}{n} \right\rceil}, t \mapsto [t]_{p \cdot r} \).

Then PRG is a EOH-PRG relative to \((S, T, H, \mathbb{H})\).

Next we show how the EOH-PRG is instantiated from the DCR variant assumption (Assumption 69). It is pointed out in [4, Section 4.1], the DCR variant assumption is sound if the domain of the small exponent is exponentially large. This kind of low exponent assumption dates back to [51] and was also used in [23]. To enable the group action, here we use \( Z_{\phi(N^2)} \) instead of \( Z_{\phi(N)} \) for the additive group.

**Theorem 29 (EOH-PRG from DCR).** Let \( B \) be an integer such that \( B \cdot 2^\lambda \leq N \) and \( B > 2^\lambda \).

Assume the DCR variant assumption holds. Let \( S = \left[ -\frac{B}{2}, \frac{B}{2} \right], T = \{0, 1\}, S = Z_{\phi(N^2)}, T = Z_{\phi(N^2)}, H = (S \times T^w)^\ell, \mathbb{H} = (S \times T^w)^\ell = Z_{\phi(N^2)}^{\ell(1+w)}, \mathbb{H} = (Z_{N^2}^*)^{\ell(1+w)} \) and the corresponding functions for the instantiation be

- The group action \( \cdot : Z_{\phi(N^2)} \times (Z_{N^2}^*)^{\ell(1+w)} \to (Z_{N^2}^*)^{\ell(1+w)}, (t, s) \mapsto g^t \mod N^2, \)

- PRG: \( Z_{\phi(N^2)} \to (Z_{N^2}^*)^{\ell(1+w)}, s \mapsto g^s \), where \( g \in (Z_{N^2}^*)^{\ell(1+w)} \) and each entry of \( g \) is a \( N \)-th residue;

- Encode: \( \{-B/2, B/2\} \times \{0, 1\}^\ell \to (Z_{N^2}^*)^{\ell(1+w)}, m \mapsto (1 + N)^m \mod N^2; \)

- Conv: \( (Z_{N^2}^*)^{\ell(1+w)} \to Z_{\phi(N^2)}, t \mapsto DDLog(t) \).

Then PRG is a EOH-PRG relative to \((S, T, H, \mathbb{H})\).

Note that the secret key \( \phi(N) \) for Paillier encryption is not explicitly used in the operations of instantiation of EOH-PRG from DCR.

**Remark 30 (KDM Security).** The FSS constructions for DFAs in Section 7 rely on the KDM security of EOH-PRG. It is straightforward to prove the pseudorandomness for LWE or DCR following the method to prove the KDM security in [6, Theorem 6] or [16, Section 3.2] as detailed in Remark 72.

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Supplementary Material

A Supplementary Materials for Preliminaries

Notations. We use $\lambda$ to denote the security parameter. For integers $p < q$, the rounding function $\lceil \cdot \rceil_{q \rightarrow p}$ is defined as $\lceil \cdot \rceil_{q \rightarrow p} : \mathbb{Z}_q \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$, $x \mapsto \lceil (p/q) \cdot x \rceil$.

A.1 LWE and LWR

Definition 31 (LWE). [66] Let $n, m, q \in \mathbb{N}$ and $\chi$ be a noise distribution over $\mathbb{Z}$. Assume $s \leftarrow \mathcal{R} \mathbb{Z}_n^q$. Let $m = \text{poly}(n)$, $A \leftarrow \mathcal{R} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ and $e \leftarrow \chi^m$. Given $(A, sA + e)$,

the $\text{LWE}_{n,m,q,\chi}$ problem is to output the vector $s$.

Recall that $\text{LWE}_{n,m,q,\chi}$ problem is exactly the search LWE problem. Denote $\eta$-LWE as the LWE instance with secret sampled from $\{-\eta \ldots 0 \ldots \eta\}^n$.

Definition 32 (LWR). [10] Let $n, m, q, p \in \mathbb{N}$. The $\text{LWR}_{n,m,q,p}$ problem is to distinguish between the following two distributions:

$$(A, \lceil sA \rceil_{q \rightarrow p}) \text{ and } (A, \lceil u \rceil_{q \rightarrow p})$$

where $s \leftarrow \mathcal{R} \mathbb{Z}_n^q$, $m = \text{poly}(n)$, $A \leftarrow \mathcal{R} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ and $u \leftarrow \mathcal{R} \mathbb{Z}_q^m$.

For super-polynomial ratio $q/p$, [10] proved that LWR is as hard as LWE. Bogdanov et al. [14] established the hardness of binary secret LWR for polynomial ratio $q/p$. A similar result can be directly achieved via applying the reduction of [10] to binary secret LWE.

Lemma 33. [14, Theorem 3] Assume $s$ is sampled from $\{0, 1\}^n$. For polynomial ratio $q/p$, the $\text{LWR}_{n,m,q,\chi}$ distribution is pseudorandom under the assumption that the corresponding $\text{LWE}_{n,m,q,\chi}$ is hard.

If each entry of the matrix and the vector is sampled from $\mathcal{R}_q := \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^n + 1)$ rather than $\mathbb{Z}_q$, then the problem is Module-LWE.

Definition 34 (Module-LWE). [54] Let $n, m, q, d \in \mathbb{N}$. Let $\mathcal{R}_q := \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^n + 1)$ and $\chi$ be a noise distribution over $\mathcal{R}$. Assume $s \leftarrow \mathcal{R}^d_q$. Let $m = \text{poly}(n, d)$, $A \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_{q}^{d \times m}$ and $e \leftarrow \chi^d$. Given

$$(A, sA + e),$$

the $\text{Module-LWE}_{d,m,q,\chi}$ problem is to output the vector $s$.

Here $d$ is the rank of Module-LWE problem. If $d = 1$, then it is Ring-LWE problem [57].
Definition 35 (Module-LWR). Let $d, n, m, q, p \in \mathbb{N}$. Let $R_q := \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^n + 1)$. The Module-LWR$_{n,m,q,p}$ problem is to distinguish between the following two distributions:

$$(A, [sA]_{q \rightarrow p}) \text{ and } (A, [u]_{q \rightarrow p}),$$

where $s \leftarrow_R R_q^d$, $m = \poly(n)$, $A \leftarrow_R R_q^{d \times m}$ and $u \leftarrow_R R_q^m$.

Boudgoust et al. [19] proved the small secret Module-LWE with larger rank is at least as hard as random secret Module-LWE with smaller rank.

Lemma 36. [19, Theorem 3.2] For any cyclotomic field of degree $n$, there exists a PPT reduction from the decisional Module-LWE$_{k,m,q,D}$ assumption to decisional $\eta$-Module-LWE$_{d,m,q,D}$ assumption, where $d \cdot \log_2 (2 \eta + 1) \geq (k + 1) \cdot \log_2 q + \omega(\log_2 n)$, $d \leq m \leq \poly(n)$, $\alpha \geq \sqrt{n/q} \cdot \sqrt{\ln(2nm(1 + \epsilon^{-1}))}/\pi$, $\beta \geq \alpha \cdot n \eta \sqrt{2d \sqrt{4n^2 \eta^2 + 1}}$ and $D$ is a Gaussian distribution with s.d. $\alpha$.

A.2 Almost Homomorphic PRGs (AH-PRG)

Definition 37 (Homomorphic PRGs). Let $G_0, G_1$ be two finite abelian additive groups. A function $G : G_0 \rightarrow G_1$ is a homomorphic PRG if it is a secure PRG and for all $x_0, x_1 \in G_0$,

$$G(x_0 + x_1) = G(x_0) + G(x_1).$$

There are no known PRGs such that both $G_0$ and $G_1$ are additive groups in the typical sense. Thus, the definition is relaxed to almost homomorphic.

Definition 38 (Almost Homomorphic PRGs (B-AH-PRG)). Let $G_0, G_1$ be two finite abelian additive groups where $G_2$ is equipped with norm $\| \cdot \|$. Let $B \in \mathbb{N}$. A function $G : G_0 \rightarrow G_1$ is B-AH-PRG if for all $x_0, x_1 \in G_0$,

$$G(x_0 + x_1) = G(x_0) + G(x_1) + e,$$

where $e \in G_2$ and $\| e \| \leq B$.

Next we show an instantiation of 1-AH-PRG from LWR problem [17].

Example 39 (AH-PRG from LWR). Assume $A \leftarrow_R \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$. Then

$$G_A(s) := [sA]_{q \rightarrow p}$$

is an 1-AH-PRG under the assumption that LWE$_{n,m,q}$ is hard relative to $\| \cdot \|_\infty$.

The security of $G_A$ follows from the pseudorandomness of LWR distributions and the almost homomorphic property naturally follows from the rounding operation. Note that here almost-homomorphic property does not require the super-polynomial ratio $q/p$. 
A.3 DCR Assumption

Definition 40 (DCR Assumption [61]). Let $N = PQ$ be an RSA modulus [49]. The DCR assumption is that for any PPT adversary there is no advantage to distinguish between an $N$-th residue over $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$ and an arbitrary element of $\mathbb{Z}_N^2$.

A.4 Bit-fixing Predicates and CNF/DNF Formulae

Definition 41 (Bit-fixing Predicates). Given a vector $v \in \{0, 1, *\}^\ell$, the bit-fixing predicates $P^\text{BF}_v : \{0, 1\}^\ell \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ specified by the vector $v$ is defined as

$$P^\text{BF}_v(x) := \bigwedge_{i \in [\ell]} (v[i] = x[i] \lor v[i] = *) .$$

The family of bit-fixing predicates specified by length $\ell$ predicates is defined as

$$P^\text{BF}_\ell := \{ P^\text{BF}_v : v \in \{0, 1, *\}^\ell \} .$$

Definition 42 (CNF/DNF formulae). Given a set of $n$ variables $\{u_1, \ldots, u_n\}$, a conjunctive normal form (CNF) formula is an AND of ORs of literals, e.g., a CNF formula $\varphi$ is defined as

$$\varphi := \bigwedge_i \bigvee_j v_{ij} ,$$

where each $v_{ij}$ is either a variable $u_k$ or its negation $\neg u_k$. Each $\bigvee_j v_{ij}$ is called a clause of $\varphi$. A CNF formula $\varphi$ is called $k$-CNF if every clause of $\varphi$ has at most $k$ literals.

A disjunctive normal form (DNF) formula is an OR of ANDs of literals, i.e., a DNF formula $\phi$ is defined as

$$\phi := \bigvee_i \bigwedge_j w_{ij} .$$

Similarly, a DNF formula is called $k$-DNF if every clause of $\phi$ has at most $k$ literals.

A.5 DFA

Definition 43 (Deterministic Finite Automata (DFA)). [73, Definition 1.15] A DFA $M$ is defined by $(Q, \Sigma, \delta, q_0, F)$ where

- $Q$ is the state set,
- $\Sigma$ is the alphabet,
- $\delta : Q \times \Sigma \rightarrow Q$ a transition function,
- $q_0 \in Q$ is the start state,
- $F \subset Q$ is the set of accept states.
A DFA $M$ accepts a string $x = (x_1 \ldots x_\ell) \in \Sigma^\ell$ if there exists a sequence of states $(s_0 \ldots s_\ell)$ such that

1. $s_0 = q_0$,
2. $\delta(s_i, x_{i+1}) = s_{i+1}$ for $i \in \{0, 1 \ldots \ell - 1\}$,
3. $s_\ell \in F$.

DFAs recognize the set of regular languages [73, Definition 1.16].

B Tensor Product and FSS for Negation and Disjunction of Predicates

In this section, we present the missing proofs of Section 5 and the FSS for negation and disjunction of predicates.

B.1 Proof of Theorem 20

Proof. We directly prove $\text{FSS}^\otimes$ is symmetric and shift-invariant if $\text{FSS}^{\mathcal{P}_1}$ is symmetric and shift-invariant. We first prove correctness and shift-invariance. Let $\sigma \in K_1$ be an arbitrary random shift for the key of the two-party. Thus, the target is to prove that for all $P_1 \in \mathcal{P}_1, P_2 \in \mathcal{P}_2, x$,

$$\Pr[\text{Eval}^\otimes(0, k_0 + \sigma, CW^\otimes, x) - \text{Eval}^\otimes(1, k_1 + \sigma, CW^\otimes, x) = g_{P_1, P_2}(x) \cdot \gamma : (k_0, k_1, CW^\otimes) \leftarrow \text{Gen}^\otimes(1^\lambda, g_{P_1, P_2})] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Recall that in $\text{Gen}^{\mathcal{P}_1}$, it is set to output $\beta := (s, 1)$ if $P_1(x) = 1$ whereas to output $(0, 0)$ if $P_1(x) = 0$. We continue the proof by distinguish two cases depending on $x_1$.

Case $P_1(x_1) = 1$: Recall that in $\text{Eval}^\otimes$, we use $(s_0, t_0)$ to denote intermediate evaluation result according to the input $x_1$. Because $\text{FSS}^{\mathcal{P}_1}$ is shift-invariant, thus $(s_0, t_0) - (s_1, t_1) = (s, 1)$ over $(S, T)$ with overwhelming probability. That the share $(s_0, t_0)$ is pseudorandom follows from the definition of $\text{FSS}^{\mathcal{P}_1}$. Recall that $CW \leftarrow \text{PRG}(s) + \text{Encode}(u_0 - u_1)$. From the definition of EOH-PRG, as $(s_0, s_1)$ is a random sharing of $s$, the key $(w_0, w_1)$ for $\text{FSS}^{\mathcal{P}_2}$ satisfies

$$w_0 - w_1 = (\text{Conv}(t_0 \cdot CW - \text{PRG}(s_0)) + \text{PRG}(K, st)) - (\text{Conv}(t_1 \cdot CW - \text{PRG}(s_1)) + \text{PRF}(K, st)) = u_0 - u_1$$

except with negligible probability. Recall that $(u_0, u_1)$ is the key for the shift-invariant FSS $(\text{Gen}^{\mathcal{P}_2}, \text{Eval}^{\mathcal{P}_2})$. Thus, for $P_1(x_1) = 1$,

$$\Pr[\text{Eval}^{\mathcal{P}_2}(b, u_0, CW_2, x_2) - \text{Eval}^{\mathcal{P}_2}(b, u_1, CW_2, x_2) = P_2(x_2) \cdot \gamma] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Hence, for $P_1(x_1) = 1$, the FSS satisfies shift-invariance and correctness holds with probability $1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$.
Case $P_1(x_1) = 0$: Then $(s_0, t_0) = (s_1, t_1)$ with overwhelming probability. Thus, the key $(w_0, w_1)$ for $FSS_{P_2}$ satisfies
\[ w_0 - w_1 = \text{Conv}(t_0 \cdot CW - \text{PRG}(s_0)) - \text{Conv}(t_1 \cdot CW - \text{PRG}(s_1)) = 0. \]
as $\text{Conv}$ is deterministic. Therefore for $P_1(x_1) = 0$,
\[
\Pr[\text{Eval}_{F_{P_2}}(0, w_0, CW_2, x_2) - \text{Eval}_{F_{P_2}}(b, w_1, CW_2, x_2) = 0] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)
\]
as $FSS_{P_2}$ is symmetric.

Hence, with overwhelming probability, the resulting FSS satisfies correctness and shift-invariance.

Next we show that the FSS also satisfies symmetry. If $FSS_{P_1}$ is symmetric, for identical keys the two-party obtains identical $(s_b, t_b)$ on arbitrary input $x_1$ and identical $(v_b, w_b)$ as $\text{PRG}$ and $\text{Conv}$ are both deterministic. Hence, the two-party finally obtains same value as also $FSS_{P_2}$ is symmetric.

Next we prove that the final output share is pseudorandom. From the assumption that $FSS_{P_2}$ has pseudorandom output share, once the evaluation for $FSS_{P_1}$ is correct, the $FSS_{P_2}$ leads to pseudorandom final output share.

The security of $FSS^\otimes$ follows the security of $FSS_{P_1}$, the security of $FSS_{P_2}$ and the pseudorandomness of PRG via a series of games. It is formally proved in Lemma 44.

**Lemma 44 (Security).** If PRG is a PRG with encoded-output homomorphism, $(\text{Gen}_{F_{P_1}}, \text{Eval}_{F_{P_1}})$ is a secure FSS for $F_{P_1}$, and $(\text{Gen}_{F_{P_2}}, \text{Eval}_{F_{P_2}})$ is a secure FSS for $F_{P_2}$ then $(\text{Gen}^\otimes, \text{Eval}^\otimes)$ is a secure FSS for $F_{P_1} \times F_{P_2}$.

Furthermore, the correction word $CW^\otimes$ is pseudorandom.

**Proof (Proof of Lemma 44).** We prove the security via a series of hybrid games. Concretely, for any two functions $g_{P_1, P_2, \gamma}$ and $g_{Q_1, Q_2, \gamma'}$ with $P_1, Q_1 \in P_1$ and $P_2, Q_2 \in P_2$, we transfer the key distribution of $g_{P_1, P_2}$ to the key distribution of $g_{Q_1, Q_2}$ step-by-step. For each party index $b$, the party key consists of $k_b$ and $CW$. Now we define the hybrid distributions. The changed part of each distribution is explicitly represented with boxes.

$H_0$ : The key distribution for $g_{P_1, P_2, \gamma}$.

\[
H_0(b, g_{P_1, P_2, \gamma}) := \begin{cases} 
\begin{array}{c}
\{ (k_b, CW^\otimes) : \\
(k_0, k_1, CW_1) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{F_{P_1}}(1^\lambda, f_{P_1}(s, 1)) \\
(u_0, u_1, CW_2) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{F_{P_2}}(1^\lambda, f_{P_2, \gamma}) \\
CW \leftarrow \text{PRG}(s) + \text{Encode}(u_0 - u_1) \in \mathbb{H} \\
CW^\otimes := (CW_1, CW_2, CW)
\end{array}
\end{cases}
\]
$H_1$: (Security of $\text{FSS}^{P_1}$) Change the key for $P_1$ to $Q_1$. Note that the correction word $CW$ is still computed with respect to the seed $s$ for $g_{P_1,p_2,\gamma}$.

$$H_1(b, g_{P_1,p_2,\gamma}, g_{Q_1,q_2,\gamma'}) := \begin{cases} (s, s') \leftarrow R S \\ (k_0, k_1, CW_1) \leftarrow \text{Gen}^{P_1}(1^\lambda, f_{Q_1,(s',1)}) \\ (u_0, u_1, CW_2) \leftarrow \text{Gen}^{P_2}(1^\lambda, f_{P_2,\gamma}) \\ CW \leftarrow \text{PRG}(s) + \text{Encode}(u_0 - u_1) \in \mathbb{H} \\ CW^\oplus := (CW_1, CW_2, CW) \end{cases}$$

From the security of $\text{FSS}^{P_1}$, the key distributions for $P_1$ and $Q_1$ are identical. Thus the two distributions $H_0(b, g_{P_1,p_2,\gamma})$ and $H_1(b, g_{P_1,p_2,\gamma}, g_{Q_1,q_2,\gamma'})$ are identical.

$H_2$: (PRG security) Change $\text{PRG}(s)$ to random $S$. Note that $s$ is not used in the remaining part.

$$H_2(b, g_{P_1,p_2,\gamma}, g_{Q_1,q_2,\gamma'}) := \begin{cases} S \leftarrow R \mathbb{H} \\ s' \leftarrow R S \\ (k_0, k_1, CW_1) \leftarrow \text{Gen}^{P_1}(1^\lambda, f_{Q_1,(s',1)}) \\ (u_0, u_1, CW_2) \leftarrow \text{Gen}^{P_2}(1^\lambda, f_{P_2,\gamma}) \\ CW \leftarrow S + \text{Encode}(u_0 - u_1) \in \mathbb{H} \\ CW^\oplus := (CW_1, CW_2, CW) \end{cases}$$

By the pseudorandomness of the output of $\text{PRG}$, the two distributions $H_1(b, g_{P_1,p_2,\gamma}, g_{Q_1,q_2,\gamma'})$ and $H_2(b, g_{P_1,p_2,\gamma}, g_{Q_1,q_2,\gamma'})$ are computational indistinguishable.

$H_3$: (Security of $\text{FSS}^{P_2}$) Change $CW_2$ for $P_2$ to $Q_2$.

$$H_3(b, g_{P_1,p_2,\gamma}, g_{Q_1,q_2,\gamma'}) := \begin{cases} S' \leftarrow R \mathbb{H} \\ s' \leftarrow R S \\ (k_0, k_1, CW_1) \leftarrow \text{Gen}^{P_1}(1^\lambda, f_{Q_1,(s',1)}) \\ (u_0, u_1, CW_2) \leftarrow \text{Gen}^{P_2}(1^\lambda, f_{P_2,\gamma}) \\ CW \leftarrow S' \in \mathbb{H} \\ CW^\oplus := (CW_1, CW_2, CW) \end{cases}$$

The two distributions $H_2(b, g_{P_1,p_2,\gamma}, g_{Q_1,q_2,\gamma'})$ and $H_3(b, g_{P_1,p_2,\gamma}, g_{Q_1,q_2,\gamma'})$ are computational indistinguishable from the security of $\text{FSS}^{P_2}$. Actually, the distribution $H_3$ is completely independent of $g_{P_1,p_2}$. Moreover, $CW_2$ is pseudorandom as $\text{FSS}^{P_2}$ outputs pseudorandom correction words. Next we can apply the first two steps via an reversed order to obtain the key distribution for $g_{Q_1,q_2,\gamma'}$. 
As $CW$ is random, we can change it to a value relying on the key $(u_0, u_1)$ without changing the distribution.

$$H_3(b, g_{Q_1, Q_2, \gamma'}) := \begin{cases} 
S' \leftarrow R \mathbb{H} \\
S' \leftarrow R S \\
(k_0, k_1, CW_1) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{P_1}(1^\lambda, f_{Q_1, (s', 1)}) \\
(u_0, u_1, CW_2) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{P_2}(1^\lambda, f_{Q_2, \gamma'}) \\
CW \leftarrow S' + \text{Encode}(u_0 - u_1) \in \mathbb{H} \\
CW^\otimes := (CW_1, CW_2, CW) 
\end{cases}$$

$$H_4 : (\text{PRG security}) \ Change S' \ to \ PRG(s').$$

$$H_4(b, g_{Q_1, Q_2, \gamma'}) := \begin{cases} 
s' \leftarrow R S \\
(k_0, k_1, CW_1) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{P_1}(1^\lambda, f_{Q_1, (s', 1)}) \\
(u_0, u_1, CW_2) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{P_2}(1^\lambda, f_{Q_2, \gamma'}) \\
CW \leftarrow \text{PRG}(s') + \text{Encode}(u_0 - u_1) \in \mathbb{H} \\
CW^\otimes := (CW_1, CW_2, CW) 
\end{cases}$$

Now the distribution $H_4(b, g_{Q_1, Q_2, \gamma'})$ is exactly the key distribution for $g_{Q_1, Q_2, \gamma'}$, namely, $H_4(b, g_{Q_1, Q_2, \gamma'}) = H_0(b, g_{Q_1, Q_2, \gamma'})$.

By combining the distributions from $H_0$ to $H_4$, for each party index $b$, the key distribution for $g_{P_1, P_2, \gamma}$ and $g_{Q_1, Q_2, \gamma'}$ are computational indistinguishable.

### B.2 FSS for Negation and Disjunction of Predicates

In this section, we show some basic FSS constructions for negation and disjunction of predicates. The tensor product construction can be viewed as the conjunction of predicates. Before the FSS construction for negation and disjunction, we first define the notion anti-symmetric FSS.

**Definition 45 (Anti-symmetric FSS).** An FSS is anti-symmetric if for $k_0 = k_1$, for all $x \in D_f$,

$$\text{Eval}(0, k_0, CW, x) - \text{Eval}(1, k_1, CW, x) \neq 0.$$ 

If the anti-symmetric FSS is for a predicate, then $\text{Eval}(0, k_0, CW, x) - \text{Eval}(1, k_1, CW, x) = 1$ for $k_0 = k_1$ and $\text{Eval}(0, k_0, CW, x) - \text{Eval}(1, k_1, CW, x) = 0$ for $k_0 \neq k_1$.

Note that the tensor operation does not work for anti-symmetric FSS.

**Lemma 46 (FSS for Negation of Predicates).** Let $P$ be a family of predicates mapping $\{0, 1\}^n$ to $\{0, 1\}$. Let $F_P : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow S \times T$ be the function family induced by $P$ as

$$f_{P, \beta} : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow S \times T, \ x \mapsto \beta \cdot P(x) = \begin{cases} 
\beta & \text{if } P(x) = 1 \\
0 & \text{else}
\end{cases}$$
with \( P \in \mathcal{P} \) and \( \beta \in S \times \{1\} \subseteq S \times T \). Similarly, let \( \mathcal{F}_{\neg P} : \{0,1\}^n \to S \times T \) be the function family induced by \( \neg P \) as

\[
f_{\neg P,\beta} : \{0,1\}^n \to S \times T, \ x \mapsto \beta \cdot (1 - P(x)) = \begin{cases} 
\beta & \text{if } P(x) = 0 \\
0 & \text{else} 
\end{cases}.
\]

Assume there exists a shift-invariant FSS for \( \mathcal{F}_P \) over key space \( \mathcal{K} \) and correction word space \( \mathcal{CW} \).

Then there exists a shift-invariant FSS for \( \mathcal{F}_{\neg P} \) over key space \( \mathcal{K} \times (S \times T) \) and correction word space \( \mathcal{CW} \). In particular, if the FSS for \( \mathcal{F}_P \) is symmetric, then the FSS for \( \mathcal{F}_{\neg P} \) is anti-symmetric.

The FSS for \( \mathcal{F}_{\neg P} \) can be obtained by adding an extra step to \( \mathcal{F}_P \) to switch the between value \( \beta \) and 0. Concretely, assume \((\beta_0, \beta_1)\) is a random sharing of \( \beta \), namely \( \beta_0 - \beta_1 = \beta \). Let \((k_0, k_1, CW)\) be the key output by \( \text{FSS}^{\neg P} \) for \( P \). Then the key output by \( \text{FSS}^{\neg P} \) for \( \neg P \) is \(((k_0, \beta_0), (k_1, \beta_1), CW)\). The evaluation for \( \text{FSS}^{\neg P} \) becomes \( \beta_0 - \text{Eval}(0, k_0, CW, x) \). It is easy to verify that

\[
(\beta_0 - \text{Eval}(0, k_0, CW, x)) - (\beta_1 - \text{Eval}(1, k_1, CW, x)) = (\beta_0 - \beta_1) - (\text{Eval}(0, k_0, CW, x) - \text{Eval}(1, k_1, CW, x)) = \beta - \beta \cdot P(x) = \beta \cdot (1 - P(x)).
\]

Hence, the correctness holds. Because \((\beta_0, \beta_1)\) is a random sharing of \( \beta \), the security holds as well.

**Lemma 47 (FSS for Disjunction of Predicates).** Given an anti-symmetric and shift-invariant FSS for \( \mathcal{P}_1 \), an anti-symmetric and shift-invariant FSS for \( \mathcal{P}_2 \) and a EOH-PRG, there exists anti-symmetric and shift-invariant FSS construction for \( \mathcal{P}_1 \lor \mathcal{P}_2 \).

**Proof.** Given \( \mathcal{P}_1 \lor \mathcal{P}_2 \), the FSS first takes negation to \( \mathcal{P}_1 \lor \mathcal{P}_2 \) to obtain \( \neg \mathcal{P}_1 \land \neg \mathcal{P}_2 \), then run the FSS for tensor products of \( \neg \mathcal{P}_1 \) and \( \neg \mathcal{P}_2 \) and finally take negation to the FSS to obtain an FSS for \( \mathcal{P}_1 \lor \mathcal{P}_2 \).

**C FSS for Bit-fixing Predicates from EOH-PRG**

In this section, we show function secret sharing (FSS) schemes for bit-fixing predicates from EOH-PRG.

We first construct a symmetric and shift-invariant FSS for one-bit predicate

\[
P_{\alpha}^{BF} : \{0,1\} \to \{0,1\}, \ x \mapsto \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } x = \alpha \text{ or } \alpha = \ast \\
0 & \text{else} 
\end{cases}.
\]

For this, we use a naive secret sharing of the truth table. The construction is shown in Figure 4.
Function secret sharing scheme $\text{FSS}^1 = (\text{Gen}^1, \text{Eval}^1)$

**Parameters:** Let $S, T$ be two finite abelian groups such that $S \subseteq \mathbb{S}$.

$\text{Gen}^1(1^\lambda, \alpha)$:
1. Sample $s \leftarrow_R S$.
2. Sample $s_0^b, s_1^b, s_x^b, s_0^t, s_1^t, s_x^t \leftarrow_R S$ and $t_0^b, t_0^t, t_1^t \leftarrow_R T$ according to the following three cases:
3. **Case** $\alpha = e$: $s_0^0 - s_1^0 = s_0^1 - s_1^1 = s$ and $t_0^0 - t_0^1 = -t_1^0 - t_1^1 = 1$.
4. **Case** $\alpha = 0$: $s_0^0 - s_1^0 = s, s_0^1 - s_1^1 = 0$, and $t_0^0 - t_0^1 = 1, t_1^0 - t_1^1 = 0$.
5. **Case** $\alpha = 1$: $s_0^0 - s_1^0 = 0, s_0^1 - s_1^1 = s$, and $t_0^0 - t_0^1 = 0, t_1^0 - t_1^1 = 1$.
6. **Return** $k_b := (s_0^b, s_1^b, t_0^b, t_1^b) \in \mathbb{S}^2 \times T^2$ for $b \in \{0, 1\}$.

$\text{Eval}^1(b, k_b, x)$:
1. Parse $k_b$ as $k_b = (s_0^b, s_1^b, t_0^b, t_1^b)$.
2. **Return** $(s_x^b, t_x^b)$.

**Fig. 4.** One-bit FSS $\text{FSS}^1$. Superscripts $b$ for $s$ and $t$ represent the party id.

**Lemma 48 (One-bit FSS).** Let $S, T$ be two finite abelian groups. Then $(\text{Gen}^1, \text{Eval}^1)$ is a symmetric and shift-invariant FSS over key space $K := \mathbb{S}^2 \times T^2$.

**Proof.** Security is straightforward as the key $k_b$ for Party $P_b$ is fully uniform. Correctness and the shift-invariant property directly follow from the nature of additive sharing of seed and tag. Symmetry follows from the evaluation.

**Remark 49.** From the construction, it is obvious that the tag part indicates the output of the one-bit FSS. To keep consistent with the tensor operation, we keep the seed part and the tag part for each bit. Furthermore, it is natural to map the matched output $s$ to a prior value $\beta$ via an extra operation as in [26].

**Theorem 50 (FSS from EOH-PRG).** Assume $\text{PRG} : \mathbb{S} \rightarrow \mathbb{H}$ is a EOH-PRG relative to $(S, T, (S \times T)^2, (S \times T)^2)$.

There exists a symmetric and shift-invariant FSS for the family of bit-fixing predicates of length $\ell$ with key space $\mathbb{S}^{2^\ell} \times T^2$ and correction word space $\mathbb{H}^{2\ell - 1}$.

Moreover, the key size is $2(\log |S| + \log |T|) + (\ell - 1) \log |\mathbb{H}|$.

**Proof.** Iteratively applying Theorem 20 to Lemma 48, i.e., tensoring the one-bit FSS to itself, $\ell - 2$ times, yields FSS for bit-fixing predicates. The correctness and security follow from Theorem 20 and Lemma 48. The correction word consists of $\ell - 1$ elements from $\mathbb{H}$ and the key $k_b$ is an element of $\mathbb{S}^{2^\ell} \times T^{2\ell}$. Thus the key size is exactly $2(\log |S| + \log |T|) + (\ell - 1) \log |\mathbb{H}|$.

**Remark 51.** Note that the key size is a polynomial of the security parameter and the input length $\ell$ whereas the naive sharing of the truth table of bit-fixing predicates is of exponential size.

As presented in Section 8, the EOH-PRG could be instantiated from the LWE assumption or the DCR variant assumption. The comparisons of the resulting
FSS schemes from EOH-PRG and FSS for bit-fixing predicates from HSS are shown in Table 2. It is clear that whatever for instantiations from LWE or from DCR, our FSS from EOH-PRG has better key size and running time.

D Supplementary Materials for FSS for Branching Programs

In this section, we show the missing preliminaries, constructions, proofs and remarks of Section 6.

D.1 Branching Programs

We start by recalling the definition of branching programs.

**Definition 52 (Oblivious, layered branching program).** A layered branching program $P$ for a function $g : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ is a directed acyclic graph $(V, E)$, where $V$ is divided into $\ell + 1$ disjoint levels $V_0, V_1, \ldots, V_\ell$ such that every node $u \in V_i, i < \ell$ has out-degree 2, and such that edges only points from nodes in level $V_i$ to nodes in level $V_{i+1}$. Further, we assume that level $i$ consists of $w_i$ nodes, upper bounded by the width $w$ of the branching program. Further, there are two adjoint functions $\tau, f$ such that

- $V_0 = \{v_0\}$ contains the only initial node.
- $V_\ell = \{v_a, v_r\}$ contains the accept node $v_a$ and the rejection node $v_r$.
- $\tau : V \setminus V_\ell \rightarrow [n]$ is the index-to-input map which maps all the non-sink nodes to the input of $P$.
- $f : [\ell] \times [w] \times \{0,1\} \rightarrow [w], f_i(j, x[\tau(i)]) \mapsto k$ is the transition function, which maps the $j$-node in level $i$ to the $k$-th node in level $i + 1$ upon the input $x[\tau(i)]$. (Note that here we actually consider maps $f_i : [w_i] \times \{0,1\} \rightarrow [w_{i+1}]$, since different levels might have a different amount of nodes, but for simplicity we use $f$ as above, where we assume $w$ to be an upper bound on the number of nodes.)

The branching program is called input-oblivious if every level $i$ node $v \in V_i$ is mapped to the same input index via the index-to-input map $\tau$.

Each branching program can be converted to a layered, input-oblivious branching program with polynomial blowup in size [63,25].

D.2 Supplementary Constructions for FSS for Branching Programs

The FSS for $P_1$ is show in Figure 5. It is a naive sharing of the labels of the nodes in level 1. Each label for the two nodes in level 1 consists of a seed $s$ and a standard basis of $\mathbb{T}^2$ as the tag vector $t$. The two labels for the two nodes are rearranged according to the transition function for the root node. In the $\text{FSS}^1, \text{Gen}^1$ directly shares the rearranged labels and $\text{Eval}^1$ chooses the shared
We first address the correctness of \((\text{Gen}^2, \text{Eval}^2)\).}

**Proof.** Let \(S, T\) be two finite abelian groups. \(\text{Gen}^2(1^\lambda, P_1, \gamma) \in (S \times T^2)^2:\)

1. Parse \(\gamma\) as \(\gamma = ((\sigma[1], e_1), (\sigma[2], e_2))\) with \(\sigma \in S^2\) and \((e_1, e_2) \in T^2\) the standard basis of \(T^2\). \(\triangleright \sigma\) is the seed value for level 1.
2. Set \(u \leftarrow (\gamma[f(0, 1, 0)], \gamma[f(0, 1, 1)]) \in (S \times T^2)^2\). \(\triangleright \text{Map } 0\text{ and } 1\text{ to the corresponding element of level } 1\text{ in the array } \gamma.\)
3. Sample \(u_0, u_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{R} (S \times T^2)^2\) such that \(u_0 - u_1 = u\).
4. **Return** \(k_0 \leftarrow u_0\) for \(b \in \{0, 1\}\).

**Eval}^1(b, k_0, x)\):

1. **Return** \(k_0[x[\tau(V_0)]] \in S \times T^2. \triangleright \text{Use input } x[\tau(V_0)] \text{ to choose the label for level } 1.\)

![Fig. 5. FSS \((\text{Gen}^1, \text{Eval}^1)\) for \(P_1\). Superscripts for \(k, s, t, v\) represent the party id.](image)

We omit the proof of Lemma 22 as it is straightforward.

### D.3 Proof of Lemma 23

**Proof.** We first address the correctness of \((\text{Gen}^{i+1}, \text{Eval}^{i+1})\). For correctness, the target is to show that for all \(x \in \{0, 1\}^n\),

\[
\Pr[\text{Eval}^{i+1}(0, k_0, CW_{i+1}, x) - \text{Eval}^{i+1}(1, k_1, CW_{i+1}, x) = \gamma[P_{i+1}(x)]] = 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda).
\]

From the definition of \(P_i\) and \(P_{i+1}\), \(P_{i+1}(x) = f(i, P_i(x), x[\tau(V_i)])\). From the correctness of \((\text{Gen}^i, \text{Eval}^i)\), we have that

\[
\Pr[\text{Eval}^i(0, k_0, CW_i, x) - \text{Eval}^i(1, k_1, CW_i, x) = \beta[P_i(x)]] = 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda).
\]

It is exactly that

\[
s_0 - s_1 = s[P_i(x)] \text{ and } t_0 - t_1 = e_{P_i(x)} \in T^{w_i}.
\]

In particular, \(t_0[P_i(x)] - t_1[P_i(x)] = 1\) and \(t_0[j] - t_1[j] = 0\) for \(j \neq P_i(x)\). It is easy to verify that

\[
\sum_{j \in [w_i]} t_0[j] \cdot CW[j] - \sum_{j \in [w_i]} t_1[j] \cdot CW[j] = CW[P_i(x)].
\]

Recall that \(CW[j] \leftarrow \text{PRG}(s[j]) + \text{Encode}(u[j])\). From the definition of EOHPRG, as \((s_0, s_1)\) is a random sharing of \(s[P_i(x)]\), the key \((v_0, v_1)\) for level \(i + 1\).
satisfies
\[ v_0 - v_1 = \text{Conv} \left( \sum_{j \in [w_i]} t_0[j] \cdot CW[j] - \text{PRG}(s_0) \right) - \text{Conv} \left( \sum_{j \in [w_i]} t_1[j] \cdot CW[j] - \text{PRG}(s_1) \right) = u_{P_i(x)} \]

with overwhelming probability. Thus, \((v_0, v_1)\) is a pseudorandom sharing of
\[ u_{P_i(x)} \]

as each \(v_b\) is re-randomized by the PRF. From the \(\text{Gen}^{i+1}\),
\[ v_0 - v_1 = \gamma[P_{i+1}(x)] = \gamma[f(i, P_i(x), 0)], \gamma[f(i, P_i(x), 1)] \]
Thus, \((v_0[x|\tau(V_{i+1})], v_1[x|\tau(V_{i+1})])\) is exactly a share of \(\gamma[P_{i+1}(x)]\).
Hence, \(\text{FSS}^{i+1}\) is also shift-invariant.

The security follows from the security of \(\text{FSS}^i\) and the pseudorandomness of \(\text{PRG}\). The security can be formally proved as in the security proof of Lemma 44 via hybrid games. We omit the details here.

D.4 Topology-Hiding FSS for Branching Programs

It is easy to extend each level to \(w\) nodes via adding dummy nodes and then construct an FSS for the extended branching program. Concretely, level 1 and level \(\ell\) inherently have 2 nodes for every out-degree 2 branching program. We only add dummy nodes from level 2 to level \(\ell - 1\). (In fact, note that for any out-degree 2 branching programs, the \(i\)-th level has at most 2\(^i\) nodes, and thus we could only add small number of dummy nodes for the first \(|\log w|\) levels. For simplicity, here we consider a simpler padding though, where we add dummy nodes to level \(i\) for \(i \in [2, \ell - 1]\) such that level \(i\) has exactly \(w\) nodes.)

Formally, we obtain the following theorem.

**Theorem 53 (Topology Hiding FSS for BP from EOH-PRG).** Let \(P\) be a branching program with length \(\ell\) and width \(w\). Assume \(\text{PRG} : S \rightarrow \mathbb{H}\) and \(\text{PRG}_{\ell-1} : S \rightarrow \mathbb{H}_{\ell-1}\) are EOH-PRGs.

Then, there exists a topology-hiding FSS for \(P\) over key space \((S \times \mathbb{T}^2)^2\) and correction word space \(\mathbb{H}_{w(\ell - 2)} \times \mathbb{H}_{\ell-1}\). Moreover, the key size is bounded by
\[ 2(|S| + 2|\mathbb{T}|) + w(\ell - 2) \log |\mathbb{H}| + w \log |\mathbb{H}_{\ell-1}|. \]

Note that here dummy nodes are used to hide the level width spectrum of the branching program. Correction words for dummy nodes can be uniformly sampled, since these nodes will never be reached during evaluation. This allows to achieve topology hiding at little extra cost.

E FSS for Approximate Matching Functions and Polynomials

In this section, we present the the FSS for approximate matching functions and polynomials.
E.1 FSS for Approximate Matching Functions

In this section, we show an FSS for approximate matching function using the tag vector technique introduced for branching programs. Concretely the approximate matching function is defined as

\[ f_{a,b}(x) := (\text{dist}(x, a) < b) \]

where \( a \in \{0, 1, *\}^\ell \), \( x \in \{0, 1\}^\ell \), \( b \leq \ell \) and \( \text{dist}(x, a) = \sum_{i \in [\ell]} (a[i] \neq * \land a[i] \neq x[i]) \).

The approximate matching function first counts the number of unmatched bits and then compare with a threshold value \( b \). It is a distance comparing generalization of the bit-fixing predicate. Consequently, the bit-fixing predicate is the special case \( \text{dist}(x, a) < 1 \).

We construct a branching program for \( f_{a,b} \) first and then run the FSS for branching program to build an FSS for \( f_{a,b} \). Now we sketch the branching program for \( f_{a,b} \). The branching program consists of \( \ell + 1 \) levels i.e., \( \{V_0, V_1, \ldots, V_{\ell}\} \), and for \( i < \ell \), level \( i \) has \( i + 1 \) nodes, which correspond to the possible \( i + 1 \) distance values. For level \( i < \ell - 1 \), assume the distance for the current node is \( j \). If \( a[i] = * \), the distance is still \( j \) for level \( i + 1 \), which implies the both edge 0 and edge 1 point to the distance \( j \) node in level \( i + 1 \). If \( a[i] = 0 \), edge 0 points to the distance \( j \) node in level \( i + 1 \) and edge 1 points to the distance \( j + 1 \) node in level \( i + 1 \) whereas if \( a[i] = 1 \) the two edges for 0 and 1 are exchanged. In the last level, from level \( \ell - 1 \) to level \( \ell \), the matching for \( a[\ell] \) and the comparison operation are merged. Therefore level \( \ell \) has only two nodes. If the node in level \( \ell - 1 \) stands for the distance \( \geq b \), whatever \( a[\ell] \) is, the node points to the 0 node in level \( \ell \). If the node in level \( \ell - 1 \) stands for the distance \( \leq b - 1 \), whatever \( a[\ell] \) is, the node points to the 1 node in level \( \ell \). Only if the node in level \( \ell - 1 \) exactly stands for the distance \( b - 1 \), the unmatched \( a[\ell] \) will change the distance from \( b - 1 \) to \( b \), which points to the 0 node in level \( \ell \). In summary, the branching program has \( \ell + 1 \) levels. For \( i \in [0, \ell - 1] \), level \( i \) has \( i + 1 \) nodes and level \( \ell \) has only two nodes.

With the branching program for \( f_{a,b} \), we construct an FSS for it.

**Theorem 54.** Given \( a \in \{0, 1, *\}^\ell \) and \( b < \ell \), let \( f_{a,b} \) be an approximate matching function. Let \( P_{f_{a,b}} \) be the corresponding branching program of \( f_{a,b} \) and \( \{1, 2, \ldots, \ell - 1, \ell, 2\} \) the level width spectrum of \( P_{f_{a,b}} \). Assume that for \( i \in [1, \ell - 2] \), \( \text{PRG}_i : S \rightarrow \overline{\mathbb{H}}_i \) relative to \( (S, T, (S \times T_1 + 2)^2, (S \times T_2)^2) \) and \( \text{PRG}_{i-1} : S \rightarrow \overline{\mathbb{H}} \) relative to \( (S, T, (S \times T_1)^2, (S \times T_2)^2) \) are EOH-PRGs.

There exists an FSS for \( f_{a,b} \) over key space \( (S \times T_2)^2 \) and correction word space \( \prod_{i \in [1, \ell - 2]} \overline{\mathbb{H}}_i^{\ell+1} \times \overline{\mathbb{H}}^{\ell} \). Moreover, the key size is bounded by \( 2\log |S| + 4\log |T| + \sum_{i \in [1, \ell - 2]} (i + 1)\log |\overline{\mathbb{H}}_i| + \ell\log |\overline{\mathbb{H}}| \).

**Remark 55.** Note that although the construction reveals the topology structure of the branching program \( P_{f_{a,b}} \), the bit-fixing predicate \( a \) and the threshold value \( b \) are still hidden. In fact, for length \( \ell \) predicates, the approximate matching functions share the same topology structure.
Note that the approximate matching function is a little different from the distributed comparison function (DCF) in [24]. In DCF, the operand to compare is explicitly given as input and the DCF only hides the threshold value \( b \). In our approximate matching function, the value to be compared is a shared result of another FSS, which also explains the reason that DCF enables super-polynomial possible threshold values whereas our approximate matching function only supports polynomially possible threshold values because we need to use a branching program to record the distance of each step and map the distance to the comparison result in the final step.

The FSS for branching program is readily to extend to out-degree \( q \) to support \( q \)-ary string.

Remark 56. – The distance comparison condition can also be changed to an equality condition, which only changes the operation of the branching program of last level.

– For \( q \)-ary strings, the distance for each position can be defined for approximate equality, for instance, the two numbers are viewed as equal if the difference is less than some bound \( B \).

E.2 FSS for Polynomials over a Ring

In this section, FSS schemes for polynomials over a ring are presented and the working ring has polynomial size. Before the FSS constructions for polynomials, we recall some definitions for polynomials over a ring.

Definition 57 (Total Degree). Let \( k, w \in \mathbb{N} \). Let \( R \) be a ring with \( w \) elements. For a monomial \( x^d = x_1^{d_1} \cdot x_2^{d_2} \cdots x_k^{d_k} \), the total degree of \( x^d \) is defined as \( d_1 + d_2 + \cdots + d_k \). The total degree of a polynomial \( P(x) = \sum_i c_i x_i^d \) with \( c_i \in R \) is the maximal total degree of monomials with \( c_i \neq 0 \).

Given a polynomial \( P(x) = \sum_{i \in [m]} c_i x_i^d \), the FSS securely shares each monomial \( c_i x_i^d \) and sums up all the local shares of the monomials after evaluation. The FSS for a monomial is built upon the branching program induced by the monomial. Given \( c x_i^d \), the first level of the FSS corresponds to \( c x_1^{d_1} \), the second level \( x_2^{d_2} \), and the \( i \)-th level \( x_i^{d_i} \), etc. Given an input \( y \in R^k \), the shared value of the FSS for \( P(y) \) corresponds to the seed and tag for \( P(y) \) in level \( k \). Assume the ring \( R \) has a set of element \( \{0, 1, \ldots, w-1\} \). Then \( \langle t_{P(y)}, (0, 1, \ldots, w-1) \rangle \) is exactly the value \( P(y) \). After the evaluation of each monomial, the two-party locally sums up the shares for the monomials.

We briefly sketch the branching program from a monomial. The monomial \( c x_i^d \) can be viewed as an out-degree \( w \) branching program with \( k \) levels and \( w \) nodes in each level. The level 1 nodes are rearranged according to \( c \cdot x_1^{d_1} \), i.e., the order of the elements \( (c \cdot 0^{d_1}, c \cdot 1^{d_1}, \ldots, c \cdot (w-1)^{d_1}) \). Inductively, for a node \( j \) in level \( i \), assuming \( v_j \) being the corresponding value of node \( j \) in ring \( R \), the edges to next level from node \( j \) is rearranged according to \( v_j \cdot x_i^{d_i+1} \), i.e., \( (v_j \cdot 0^{d_i+1}, v_j \cdot 1^{d_i+1}, \ldots, v_j \cdot (w-1)^{d_i+1}) \).

Thus, we have an FSS for a monomial.
Lemma 58 (FSS for a Monomial). Let $k, w \in \mathbb{N}$. Assume $R$ is a ring with $w$ elements. Let $PRG : S \rightarrow \mathbb{H}$ be a EOH-PRG relative to $(S, T, (S \times T^w)^w, (S \times T^w)^w)$. Let $c \cdot x^d$ be a monomial defined over ring $R$ and $k$ variables.

There exists an FSS for $c \cdot x^d$ over key space $(S \times T^w)^w$ and correction word space $\mathbb{H}^{(k-1)w}$ with key size $w(\log |S| + w \log |T|) + (k-1)w \log |\mathbb{H}|$.

Remark 59. Note that the coefficient $c$ is embedded into level 1 of the induced branching program and thus is hidden by the FSS. Similarly, the degree $d_i$ is embedded into level $i$ of the branching program and thus is hidden by the FSS. For $d_i = 0$, $x_i$ does not appear in $c \cdot x^d$, the branching program directly multiplies the previous value by 1 to hide this $d_i$ as $x_i^{d_i}$ is exactly 1.

Remark 60. Note that there is no real multiplication happened during the FSS evaluation. Each multiplication is essentially a move from one node to another node in the induced branching program. For the same reason, the multiplication over the ring $R$ can be non-commutative.

Remark 61. Different from the $t$-CNF/$t$-DNF cases, the FSS for polynomials of constant total degree can be achieved via directly sharing the coefficient of each possible monomial. It is an information-theoretic FSS.

Theorem 62 (FSS for Polynomials). Let $k, w \in \mathbb{N}$. Assume $R$ is a ring with $w$ elements. Let $PRG : S \rightarrow \mathbb{H}$ be a EOH-PRG relative to $(S, T, (S \times T^w)^w, (S \times T^w)^w)$. Let $P(x)$ be a polynomial with $m$ monomials defined over $R$ and $k$ variables.

There exists a shift-invariant FSS for $P(x)$ over key space $(S \times T^w)^{mw}$ and correction word space $\mathbb{H}^{mw(k-1)}$ with key size $mw(k-1) \log |\mathbb{H}| + mw(\log |S| + w \log |T|)$.

The FSS construction is obtained via sharing each monomial according to Lemma 58 and the Eval sums up all the tag values.

Remark 63. The FSS for polynomials $(c_1 x_1^{d_1} + c_2 x_2^{d_2} + \cdots + c_k x_k^{d_k})^d$ of this form is not captured by Theorem 62. By following the same idea as in Lemma 58, the FSS for $(c_1 x_1^{d_1} + c_2 x_2^{d_2} + \cdots + c_k x_k^{d_k})^d$ is straightforward to obtain, which computes the power $d$ in the last level. The FSS for this type of polynomials can be combined with the FSS in Theorem 62.

F Supplementary Materials for EOH-PRG Instantiated from LWE or DCR

We show the missing preliminaries, proofs and remarks of Section 8.
F.1 EOH-PRG from LWE

Before presenting the proof of EOH-PRG instantiated from LWE, we recall some basic results from [28].

**Lemma 64 (Distributed Rounding).** [28, Lemma 1] Let $p, q, B \in \mathbb{N}$ with $p|q$ and $2Bp\chi^{(1)} \leq q$. Assume

$$s = \frac{2}{p}m + e \mod q$$

for some $m \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ with $|e|_\infty \leq B$. Assume $s = s_0 - s_1$ for random $s_0,s_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_q$. Then

$$\Pr \left[ m = \lfloor s \rfloor_{q^{-}p} = \lfloor s_0 \rfloor_{q^{-}p} - \lfloor s_1 \rfloor_{q^{-}p} \mod p \right] \geq 1 - \frac{2Bp}{q} \geq 1 - \frac{1}{\chi^{(1)}}.$$  

The probability is over the randomness of $s_0$ and $s_1$.

**Lemma 65 (Lifting).** [28, Lemma 2] Let $B, p \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $B\chi^{(1)} \leq p$. Given $z \in \mathbb{Z}$ with $|z|_\infty \leq B$ and $z$ being additively shared as $z = z_0 - z_1 \mod p$, then

$$\Pr \left[ z = z_0 - z_1 \text{ over } \mathbb{Z} \right] \geq 1 - \frac{B}{p} \geq 1 - \frac{1}{\chi^{(1)}},$$

where the probability is taken over the randomness of $z_0, z_1$.

Moreover, for any $q \in \mathbb{N}$, $\Pr \left[ z = z_0 - z_1 \pmod q \right] \geq 1 - \frac{1}{\chi^{(1)}}$. Note that here $q$ is completely independent of $B, p$.

With the two lemmas, we show the proof of the instantiation from LWE.

**Proof (Proof of Theorem 27).** It is straightforward to verify that $: \mathbb{Z}_p \times \mathbb{Z}_p^{(n+w)} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^{(n+w)}$ is indeed a group action. That PRG is a secure PRG relative to $S = \{0,1\}^n$ follows from the assumption of $\text{LWE}_{n,\ell(n+w),q}$ from Lemma 33. Next, we prove PRG is a EOH-PRG relative to $(S, T, H, H)$. For all $m \in H$, for $s \leftarrow_R S$, let $y := \text{PRG}(s) + \text{Encode}(m)$. Assume $y$ is uniformly randomly shared as $(y_0, y_1)$ and $s$ is uniformly randomly shared as $(s_0, s_1)$, i.e., $y_0 \leftarrow_R \mathbb{H}, s_0 \leftarrow_R S, y_1 := y_0 - y$ over $\mathbb{H}, s_1 := s_0 - s$ over $S$. The target is to prove that $\text{Conv}(y_0 - \text{PRG}(s_0)) - \text{Conv}(y_1 - \text{PRG}(s_1)) = m \mod p$ with overwhelming probability. Thus,

$$\text{Conv}(y_0 - \text{PRG}(s_0)) - \text{Conv}(y_1 - \text{PRG}(s_1))$$

$$= \lfloor y_0 - \text{PRG}(s_0) \rfloor_{p^{-}r} - \lfloor y_1 - \text{PRG}(s_1) \rfloor_{p^{-}r}$$

$$= \lfloor y + y_0 - \text{PRG}(s_0) \rfloor_{p^{-}r} - \lfloor y_1 - \text{PRG}(s_1) \rfloor_{p^{-}r}$$

$$= \lfloor \text{PRG}(s) + \text{Encode}(m) + y_1 - \text{PRG}(s_0) \rfloor_{p^{-}r} - \lfloor y_1 - \text{PRG}(s_1) \rfloor_{p^{-}r}$$

$$= \lfloor \text{Encode}(m) + e + y_1 - \text{PRG}(s_1) \rfloor_{p^{-}r} - \lfloor y_1 - \text{PRG}(s_1) \rfloor_{p^{-}r}$$

$$= m \mod r$$
where $|e|_{\infty} \leq 1$. The last two steps follow the AH-PRG property of PRG and the distributed rounding lemma, respectively. Let $m_0 := \text{Conv}(y_0 - \text{PRG}(s_0)), m_1 := \text{Conv}(y_0 - \text{PRG}(s_0))$. Then $m_0 - m_1 = m$ over $\mathbb{Z}$ with overwhelming probability from the lifting lemma and thus $m_0 - m_1 = m \mod p$.

For the EOH-PRG instantiation from Ring-LWR, we show the following Ring-LWR assumption.

\textbf{Definition 66 (Assumption).} Let $n = n(\lambda), p = p(\lambda), q = q(\lambda), r = r(\lambda), B = B(\lambda), m = \ell + \lceil \frac{\ell w}{\ell} \rceil \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $r | p, p | q, 2^\omega(1) \leq r, 2B^\omega(1) \leq p$ and $n \log q \leq \ell(\lambda \omega(1))$. Assume the binary secret $\text{Ring-LWR}_{R, m, q, p}$ is pseudorandom, i.e., $(a, \lfloor s \cdot a \rfloor_q \rightarrow p)$ is pseudorandom, where $s \leftarrow_R \{0, 1\}^n, a \leftarrow_R \mathbb{R}_q$.

Note the function $\psi(\cdot)$ is additively homomorphic as it only operates on coefficients. Therefore the PRG is still an AH-PRG as only the rounding operation leads to errors and the other operations are homomorphic. The proof of Theorem 28 is very similar to the proof of Theorem 27. We omit the details here.

A few remarks follow.

\textbf{Remark 67.} – It is possible to sample each entry of $S$ from a larger domain rather than $\{0, 1\}$. The only consequence is to adjust the parameter $(p, r)$ such that the distributed rounding lemma and lifting lemma hold.

– The EOH-PRG can be reused for concrete applications like FSS for bit-fixing predicates, for branching programs and for DFAs.

– For instantiation from Ring-LWE, the computation may become more efficient because of the NTT optimization.

– In the parameter setting, we require $n \log q \leq \ell(\lambda \omega(1))$ rather than $p^\omega(1) \leq q$ as the HSS instantiated from LWE [28].

– Although the PRG is performed over $\mathbb{Z}_q$ and the LWE assumption is over $\mathbb{Z}_p$, the FSS key is still shared over $\mathbb{Z}_p$.

### F.2 EOH-PRG from DCR

Before showing the proof for EOH-PRG from DCR assumption, we first recall some basic results for the DCR assumption.

\textbf{Lemma 68 (Distributed DLog).} [60, Lemma 3.3] Let $N = PQ$ be an RSA modulus. Assume $z_0, z_1$ are sampled from $\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}$ such that $\frac{z_0}{z_1} = (1 + N)^x \mod N^2$ for some $x \in \mathbb{Z}_N$. Then there exists a PPT $\text{DDLog} : \mathbb{Z}_{N^2} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_N$ such that

$$\text{DDLog}(z_0) - \text{DDLog}(z_1) = x \mod N.$$  

Moreover, if $|x| \leq \frac{N}{2^\omega}$, then

$$\text{DDLog}(z_0) - \text{DDLog}(z_1) = x \mod \mathbb{Z}$$

with probability at least $1 - \frac{1}{2^\omega}$, where the probability is over the randomness of $z_0, z_1$. 


Definition 69 (DCR Variant Assumption). [29, Lemma B.1] Let $\mu \in \mathbb{N}$. Assume $g := (g_0, \ldots, g_\mu) \in \mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^\mu$ and every entry of $g$ is uniformly sampled from the $N$-th residue group $\mod N^2$. For a random $r \in [N]$, $(g_0^r \cdots g_\mu^r) \in \mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^\mu$ is pseudorandom if the DCR assumption over $\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}$ holds.

In particular, we use the assumption that for $r \in [\frac{N}{2}]$, $g^r$ is still pseudorandom for any PPT adversary.

It is pointed out in [4, Section 4.1], the DCR variant assumption is sound if the domain of the small exponent is exponentially large. This kind of low exponent assumption dates back to [51] and was also used in [23].

Remark 70. From the DCR variant assumption, the PRG maps additive group to multiplicative group. With the DDLog operation, the multiplicative group is converted back to the additive group again.

The proof of Theorem 29 is very similar to the proof of Theorem 27. As the group $\mathbb{H}$ is multiplicative group, we briefly show the techniques.

Proof. It is easy to verify that $\cdot : \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N^2)} \times (\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^\phi)^{\ell(1+w)} \to (\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^\phi)^{\ell(1+w)}$ is indeed a group action. PRG being a secure PRG relative to $S = [-B/2, B/2]$ follows from the DCR variant assumption. Next, we prove PRG is a EOH-PRG relative to $(S, T, H, \mathbb{H})$. For all $m \in H^\ell$, for $s \leftarrow_R S$, let $y := \text{PRG}(s) \times \text{Encode}(m)$. Assume $y_0 \leftarrow_R \mathbb{H}, s_0 \leftarrow_R S, y_1 := y_0 \div y, s_1 = s_0 - s$. The target is to prove that $\text{Conv}(y_0 \div \text{PRG}(s_0)) - \text{Conv}(y_1 \div \text{PRG}(s_1)) = m \mod \phi(N^2)$ with overwhelming probability. Thus,

$$\begin{align*}
\text{Conv}(y_0 \div \text{PRG}(s_0)) - \text{Conv}(y_1 \div \text{PRG}(s_1)) &= \text{DDLog}(y_0 \div \text{PRG}(s_0)) - \text{DDLog}(y_1 \div \text{PRG}(s_1)) \\
&= \text{DDLog}(y_1 \times y \div \text{PRG}(s + s_1)) - \text{DDLog}(y_1 \div \text{PRG}(s_1)) \\
&= \text{DDLog}(y_1 \times \text{Encode}(m) \div \text{PRG}(s_1)) - \text{DDLog}(y_1 \div \text{PRG}(s_1)) \\
&= m.
\end{align*}$$

The last two steps follow from the lifting operation and the distributed DLog lemma, respectively. Let $m_0 := \text{Conv}(y_0 \div \text{PRG}(s_0)), m_1 := \text{Conv}(y_0 \div \text{PRG}(s_0))$. Then $m_0 - m_1 = m$ over $\mathbb{Z}$ with overwhelming probability from the lifting operation and thus $m_0 - m_1 = m \mod \phi(N^2)$.

A few remarks follow.

Remark 71. Note that for LWE or DCR instantiations, $(m_0, m_1)$ output by Conv is not a pseudorandom sharing of $m$ over $\mathbb{Z}_p$. In our FSS construction for tensor products, for branching programs, and for DFAs, the Conv output is randomized by a PRF.

Remark 72 (KDM Security). The FSS constructions for DFAs in Section 7 rely on the KDM security of EOH-PRG. It is straightforward to prove the pseudorandomness for LWE or DCR following the method to prove the KDM security in [6, Theorem 6] or [16, Section 3.2]. We briefly shows the steps to prove the KDM security of PRG for LWE and DCR, respectively.
**LWE**: Suppose $s_i$ is used in the encoding part. The goal is to prove if there exists an adversary $A$ breaking the pseudorandomness of $(A, [sA]_{q-p} + \frac{x}{y} (0 \ldots s_i \ldots 0))$, then there exists an adversary $B$ breaking the pseudorandomness of $PRG$. Given an instance $(A, [sA]_{q-p})$ of $PRG$, $B$ transforms it to $(A - \frac{q}{r} B, [sA]_{q-p})$, where $B$ is a public matrix mapping $s$ to the vector $(0 \ldots s_i \ldots 0)$, and then feeds it to $A$. It is easy to verify $(A - \frac{q}{r} B, [sA]_{q-p})$ is indeed an instance of the KDM security game. $B$ uses the advantage of $A$ to distinguish $PRG$ from uniform distribution.

**DCR**: According to the DCR assumption, the distribution $(g, g^*)$ is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution $(h, h^*)$, where $g := (g_1 \ldots g_\mu), h := (h_1 \ldots h_\mu/(1 + N) \ldots, h_\mu)$, and each entry of $\{g_i, h_i\}_{i \in [\mu]}$ is sampled from the $N$-th residue group. Given an instance of EOH-PRG instantiated from DCR, one is able to convert it to an instance of the KDM instance. If there exists an adversary breaking the KDM security game, then one is able to use that adversary distinguishing the EOH-PRG instantiated from DCR and the uniform distribution.

### G FSS Applications

In this section, we present some applications of the FSS for tensor operation, bit-fixing predicates, branching programs, DFAs and more. The general framework follows the model of the 2-server PIR applications of FSS [25]. There are two roles in the applications, clients and 2-server. Each server holds a replication of a database $DB$ with $N$ items. A client starts a query to the database while keeping the query hidden from the 2-server. The protocol with FSS works as follows. First, a client splits a private query into shares via FSS and sends each share to the corresponding server. Next, the servers use the FSS share to run the FSS evaluation and sends the result to the client. Finally, the client combines the responses from the two servers to get the final result of the query. Servers learn nothing on the query as long as the two servers do not collude. Note that only in the private nearest neighbour search (Section G.3), the server privacy is required. As our main intention was to show the direct applicability of our FSS constructions in various application scenarios, we do not focus on server privacy for the most part.

Lots of online sites provide query services to customers, for instance online shopping sites and travel sites. However, the query may reveal the privacy information of customers. The service provider is able to collect the user information and acts immorally or maliciously via making use of the collected information. For example, travel sites count the frequencies of searched flights and increase the prices for frequently searched flights. Splinter [76] is a system designed to protect the query privacy and provides a subset of $SQL$ queries capturing most useful applications with good performance. Splinter employs FSS to split each query into shares and sends the shares to the servers, respectively. Non-colluding servers are unable to obtain useful information of the query. Splinter provides \{sum, count, min, max, top-k\} queries for various conditions.
As pointed out in Section II and in Table 1, for bit-fixing predicates and
Ring-LWE instantiation, the direct FSS constructions have key size reduced
by a factor around 4 and comparable running time comparing with the previous
FSS constructions from HSS. For bit-fixing preidates and DCR instantiation, the
direct FSS constructions have key size reduced by a factor of 3.5 and running
time reduced by a factor of 1.75 comparing with the previous FSS constructions
from HSS.

The direct FSS constructions for branching programs avoid the heavy uni-
versal branching program transformation. Concretely, assuming $n$ is the secret
length of LWE instance and $w$ the width of the branching program. For branch-
ing programs and Ring-LWE instantiation, the direct FSS constructions have key
size reduced from a factor $2w \times n$ to $w + n$ and running time reduced from a factor
$8w^2$ to $2 + \lceil \frac{2w}{n} \rceil$ comparing with the existing FSS for branching programs from
HSS. For branching programs and DCR instantiation, the direct FSS construc-
tions have key size around 0.28 of the key size of the FSS from HSS and running
time reduced from a factor $14w^2$ to $3w + 2$. Hence, the resulting applications
have smaller key size and better running time.

It is worth to mention that the FSS for DFA is the first that allows key size
independent of the length of the input (except for the generic constructions from
FHE).

G.1 Private Image Matching on Public Data

It is mentioned that image matching is not covered by Splinter. Privacy-preserving
image matching protocol has many critical applications, including face detection
[9], logo patent search, patient CT image retrieval [71] as these types of query
images contain sensitive information and thus leakage of the query images leads
to severe impact. We use our FSS from EOH-PRG to design a protocol for image
matching supporting \{\text{sum, count, min, top-k}\} queries.

There are many image matching algorithms such as SIFT, SURF, BRIEF,
ORB, etc [58]. Each of the image matching algorithms consists of three steps,
key point detection, feature descriptor construction, and feature matching. The
BRIEF [32] and ORB [68] use Hamming distance to perform feature matching
over binary strings. Actually, there are algorithms to convert the float point
SIFT or SURF descriptors to binary string with Hamming distance to speed up
the matching algorithm [32]. The FSS for approximate matching function for
Hamming distance from Section E.1 can be exactly used here to do the image
matching.

The private image matching algorithm works as follows. Before the proto-
col, the two servers preprocess the image database to obtain the binary feature
descriptors for each image according to the corresponding matching algorithm.
Given a query image, a client extracts the binary feature descriptor for the query
image. Next, the client generates the FSS keys for the query image according to
the FSS for approximate matching function and sends the FSS keys to the two
servers, respectively. Next, the two servers run the FSS evaluation algorithm to
obtain the share of the response and send the share to the client. Finally, the
client receives the responses from the two servers to obtain the matching results. Next, the client and the two servers run the FSS for approximate matching function following the aforementioned framework to perform the query.

That the binary descriptor of the query image is hidden follows the security of the FSS scheme. Thus, the secrecy of the query image follows. Let $\ell$ be the length of binary feature descriptor. The computational complexity of the FSS evaluation is $O(\ell N)$ PRG evaluations and the communication cost for the FSS share scales with $O(\ell^2)$ and the cost for the FSS response is $\log N$ as it only contains the ID of the fetched image.

Most existing secure privacy-preserving image matching protocols [48] rely on the searchable encryption [74] or homomorphic encryption [61] to perform computation on encrypted images, which incur huge computation cost. Recently a private approximate membership computation protocol with perceptual hash matching was proposed in [53], which can also be used to perform image matching. However, the approximate membership computation protocol heavily relies on fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). It is worth to mention that PIR is used in [72] to protect the privacy of the query image. However, the similarity computation is not supported in the protocol with PIR.

The protocol naturally integrates with the Splinter system to enable \{sum, count, min, top-k\} query for images. The \{count, sum\} query only takes one round whereas the \{min, top-k\} query takes $\log \ell$ rounds of communication.

### G.2 Private Partial Text Matching

In private partial text matching protocol, the two servers hold a database of strings and a client would like to run the fuzzy pattern matching without leaking the query pattern. It was also pointed out that Splinter [76] does not support partial text matching. The like operator in SQL is a typical case of the partial text matching. Although there are many optimizations for the like operator in real SQL engines for instance MySQL [2], DFA is still used in partial text matching for not indexed fields. DFA is also used in the pattern matching in Tcl programming language library [3](Henry Spencer’s implementation) and in the filename glob syntax [1]. Private DFA evaluation has many interesting applications, for example private searching on DNA sequences, pharmaceutical databases and malware detection. With the FSS for DFA in Section 7, it is natural to support the like operator or DFA evaluations. Furthermore, the FSS for DFA can be used to support regular expressions as DFAs recognize regular languages.

The private partial text matching protocol works as follows. Given a pattern string, a client first creates a DFA for the pattern string. Next, the client and the two servers run the FSS for DFAs following the above-mentioned framework to execute the matching.

**Remark 73.** Following the security of the FSS scheme, the pattern string is hidden. However, the FSS construction reveals the number of states of the DFA which presumably reveals some information on the regular expression. This could be fixed by adding some dummy states at the expense of inflated key size and running time as in the FSS for branching programs.
Previous protocols employ oblivious automation evaluation both hiding the DFA and the input text. For our FSS, we only care the DFA secrecy. However, the communication complexity of existing oblivious automation evaluation suffers an extra factor of the input text length whatever the constructions relying on garbled circuits and oblivious transfer [59], homomorphic encryption [42] with several rounds of interactions, or conditional disclosure of secrets [62]. The keysize of the FSS for is independent of the input length.

The protocol can also be integrated with the system Splinter [76] to enable \{\text{sum}, \text{count}\} query for fuzzy pattern.

\section{G.3 Nearest Neighbour Search}

In private nearest neighbour search protocol, the two servers hold a database of feature vectors and a client wants to find the nearest neighbour to the query feature based on some metrics, e.g., Euclidean, Hamming, $\ell_1$, without revealing information on the query feature vector. For nearest neighbour search, database privacy is also required, which says the client learns nothing on the database beyond the query answer after the interactions.

The private nearest neighbour search (NNS) protocol has many applications such as online music recommendation [31], image search [52], face recognition [40], biometric identification [45], image recognition especially for handwriting recognition [55], clustering in NLP [65], patient genomic or data search [8] and so on.

There are many secure privacy-preserving protocols for nearest neighbour search, which behaves with high running time and large bandwidth. Most of the existing protocols rely on two-party secure computation or fully homomorphic encryptions. For instance, the protocol SANNS [33] uses oblivious RAM, garbled circuits and homomorphic encryptions. In the recent more efficient protocol [70], locality sensitive hashing (LSH) is heavily involved, which incurs some accuracy loss. To achieve a good accuracy, say $> 95\%$, $O(\sqrt{N})$ number of queries to the database is necessary, which leads to an extra $O(\sqrt{N})$ factor to the communication cost.

For ease of exposition, assume there exists only one nearest neighbour for the query vector. Assume the query vector has dimension $d$, namely from $\{0, 1\}^d$ and the protocol only returns the identifier (ID) of the nearest neighbour. Our privacy-preserving protocol for NNS only supports Hamming distance and the $\ell_1$ distance as the $\ell_1$ distance can be embedded into Hamming space with a small distortion [56,46]. The Hamming distance based NSS is used in image search, biometric identification, clustering in NLP, patient genomic data search and so on. It is easy to observe that Euclidean distance computation is captured by NC$^1$. To naturally and efficiently support Euclidean distance, it requires further future work.

Our protocol follows from the framework of the protocol in [70] without relying on LSH and behaves with improved communication cost. In fact, both LSH and DPF are replaced by the approximate matching function in our protocol. For a query vector $q$, a client sends out $d$ queries for the distance $\{1, 2 \ldots d\}$,
respectively via the FSS for approximate matching function from Section E.1. The two servers run the FSS evaluation algorithm to obtain the result for each distance. Assume the nearest neighbour vector has distance $z$ with identifier $id$. Note that the two servers obtain a sharing of the vector $v := [0, \ldots, 0, id, \ldots]$, where $id$ appears exactly in the $z$-th position of $v$. To suppress the information leakage from the answer vector $v$, oblivious masking is employed [70, Section 5.1], which maps each $v[i]$ for $i < z$ to 0, to a uniformly random element for $i > z$, and keeps the $v[z]$. The full protocol is shown in Figure 6. The correctness

![Private Nearest Neighbour Search Protocol](image-url)

Fig. 6. Private nearest neighbour search protocol involving FSS for approximate matching function and oblivious masking.

of the protocol is easy to verify. The client privacy follows from the security of the FSS scheme and the server privacy follows from the in-depth analysis of [70, Section 7.2], which achieves asymptotically optimal leakage. The communication cost from the client has a $d$ factor for FSS key as there are $d$ FSS keys and the communication cost from the servers is $O(d \log N)$ as each masked id is of size $O(\log N)$. The computational cost for the server has a $d \cdot N$ factor of a single FSS evaluation and the computation cost for oblivious masking is $O(d)$. Note that the computation cost almost matches the computational cost of the protocol in
with LSH and the communication cost is significantly improved over the \(\sqrt{N}\) factor especially for \(d \in \text{polylog}(N)\) as in [70, Table 6].

### G.4 FSS for t-CN\(N/\)t-DNF and CN\(N/DN\(F\)

For the ease of exposition, we mainly show the FSS constructions for exact \(t\)-CN\(N\) formulae. Recall that in exact \(t\)-CN\(N\) formula, each clause contains exactly \(t\) literals. An FSS for \(t\)-CN\(N\) can be conjuncted from FSS for exact \(j\)-CN\(N\) for \(j \in [t]\).

Assume the \(t\)-CN\(N\)/t-DNF formula through this section has \(k\) variables and \(m\) clauses.

**Theorem 74 (FSS for exact \(t\)-CN\(N\)).** Assume PRG \(: \mathbb{S} \to \mathbb{H}\) is a EOH-PRG relative to \((\mathbb{S}, \mathbb{T}, (\mathbb{S} \times \mathbb{T})^2, (\mathbb{S} \times \mathbb{T})^2)\).

There exists a symmetric and shift-invariant FSS for the family of exact \(t\)-CN\(N\) formulae with key space \(\mathbb{S}^2 \times \mathbb{T}^2\) and correction word space \(\mathbb{H}^{2^t \cdot \binom{k}{t}}\).

To derive the FSS scheme, the given exact \(t\)-CN\(N\) formula \(\varphi\) is first transformed to an equivalent bit-fixing predicate \(a\) of length \(2^t \cdot \binom{k}{t}\) and then the FSS scheme for the bit-fixing predicate \(a\) leads to an FSS scheme for \(\varphi\). The construction is presented in Figure 7. Let \(f\) be a public canonical function that maps the clause of exactly \(t\) literals out of \(k\) variables to a number in range \(\{1 \ldots 2^t \cdot \binom{k}{t}\}\).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function secret sharing scheme FSS(_{t})-CN(N) for exact (t)-CN(N):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parameters:</strong> Let PRG (: \mathbb{S} \to \mathbb{H}) be a EOH-PRG relative to ((\mathbb{S}, \mathbb{T}, (\mathbb{S} \times \mathbb{T})^2, (\mathbb{S} \times \mathbb{T})^2)). Let (K = 2^t \cdot \binom{k}{t}).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gen(_{t})-CN(N) (1(\lambda), (\varphi))</strong> :</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Construct a bit-fixing predicate (a) of length (K) s.t. (P^\text{BF}_a) is equivalent to (\varphi) as follows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: for clause (\varphi_i) of (\varphi) do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: Set (a[f(\varphi_i)] = 1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: end for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: Set other entries of (a) to *.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6: <strong>Return</strong> Gen(_K) (1(\lambda), (a)).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eval(_{t})-CN(N) ((b), (k_b), (x))</strong> :</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Map (x) to a length (K) binary string (y) according to (f).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: for all clause (\rho) with (t) literals do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: Evaluate (\rho(x)) and set (y[f(\rho)] = \rho(x)).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: end for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: <strong>Return</strong> Eval(_K) ((b), (k_b), (y)).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Fig. 7. FSS (Gen\(_{t}\)-CN\(N\), Eval\(_{t}\)-DN\(F\)) for exact \(t\)-CN\(N\) formula.](image)

**Proof.** For the correctness part, we show that the exact \(t\)-CN\(N\) formula \(\varphi\) is equivalent to the bit-fixing predicate \(P^\text{BF}_a\) induced by \(a\). From Gen\(_{t}\)-CN\(N\), we have...
\(a[f(\varphi_i)] = 1\) and other entries of \(a\) are set to \(*\). Recall that \(P_{BF}^a(y) = 1\) if
\[
\bigwedge_{j \in [K]} (y[j] = a[j] \text{ or } a[j] = *)
\]
Thus, for the entry \(a[j]\) of \(a\) not corresponding to any clause of \(\varphi\), \(a[j]\) is matched.
For the clauses contained by \(\varphi\), all matched \(y[j]\) lead to the matched state. It suffices to only consider the evaluations of the clauses contained by \(\varphi\).

Let \(x\) be a satisfying assignment of \(\varphi\). Thus, each clause \(\varphi_i\) of \(\varphi\) evaluated under \(x\) is satisfied, i.e., \(\varphi_i(x) = 1\), then the corresponding \(y[f(\varphi_i)] = \varphi_i(x) = 1\) and thus \(y[f(\varphi_i)] = a[f(\varphi_i)] = 1\). Hence, \(y\) matches the predicate \(a\).

Let \(x\) be an unsatisfying assignment of \(\varphi\). There exists at least one clause of \(\varphi\) evaluated under \(x\) being unsatisfied. WLOG, let the \(\varphi_i\) be one of the unsatisfied clauses, i.e., \(\varphi_i(x) = 0\) and thus \(y[f(\varphi_i)] = \varphi_i(x) = 0\). From \(\text{gen}^{t-CNF}\), \(a[f(\varphi_i)]\) is set to 1. Thus, \(y[f(\varphi_i)] \neq a[f(\varphi_i)]\). Therefore, \(y\) does not match the predicate \(a\).

We have proved that the exact \(t\)-CNF formula \(\varphi\) is equivalent to the bit-fixing predicate \(P_{BF}^a\).

Correctness of FSS for \(t\)-CNF follows from the transformation and the correctness of FSS for bit-fixing predicates. Security follows from the security of FSS for bit-fixing predicates.

**Corollary 75.** Assume \(\text{PRG} : S \rightarrow \tilde{H}\) is a EOH-PRG relative to \((S, T, (S \times T)^2, (S \times T)^2)\). There exists a symmetric and shift-invariant FSS for the family of \(t\)-CNF formulae.

Given the FSS constructions for exact \(t\)-CNF, one can take the tensor product operation to the FSS for exact \(j\)-CNF for \(j \in [t]\) to obtain an FSS for \(t\)-CNF via Theorem 20.

**Theorem 76 (FSS for \(t\)-DNF).** Assume \(\text{PRG} : S \rightarrow \tilde{H}\) is a EOH-PRG relative to \((S, T, (S \times T)^2, (S \times T)^2)\).

There exists an anti-symmetric and shift-invariant FSS for the family of exact \(t\)-DNF formulae.

Given a \(t\)-DNF formula \(\phi\), we first take an negation to \(\phi\) to obtain a \(t\)-CNF formula \(\neg \phi\). Next we call the FSS for \(t\)-CNF to obtain an FSS for \(\neg \phi\) and then take the negation to the FSS to obtain an FSS for \(\phi\) according to Lemma 46.

**Remark 77.** Note that in the FSS construction for \(t\)-CNF and \(t\)-DNF formulae, the key size is completely independent of the clause number \(m\). The key size only relies on \((k, t)\) and the EOH-PRG.

**Remark 78.** As shown in Table 2, our direct FSS constructions for \(t\)-CNF/\(t\)-DNF from bit-fixing predicates instantiated from Ring-LWR have key size around a quarter of the previous FSS from HSS instantiated from Ring-LWE and comparable running time. For DCR assumptions, the direct FSS constructions for \(t\)-CNF/\(t\)-DNF have key size reduced by a factor of 3.5 and running time improved by a factor of 1.75 comparing with the previous FSS for bit-fixing predicates from HSS.
FSS for CNF/DNF It is obvious that we can not directly construct FSS for CNF as for t-CNF because each clause of a CNF formula has wide-ranging literals. However, there exists a polynomial time algorithm to transform a CNF formula to an equivalent t-CNF [7, Lemma 2.14] via adding variables and splitting long clauses to smaller clauses. Concretely, assume the given formula has $k$ variables and $m$ clauses. In the transformed t-CNF formula, there are at most $\frac{km}{2(t-1)} + k$ variables. It is still $\text{poly}(k,m)$ and thus the FSS is of key size $\text{poly}(k,m) \cdot \log ||H||$. Although the resulting FSS construction does not reveal the clauses of the induced t-CNF, the FSS still reveals the number of new variables, which perhaps leaks the shapes of the clauses of the original CNF formula.

It is straightforward to transform a CNF/DNF formula to a branching program such that each level of the branching program has width 3 and the length $km$, where $k$ is the variable number and $m$ the clause number. The FSS for resulting branching programs does not reveals the shapes of each clause.

Remark 79. As shown in Table 3, the FSS constructions for width 3 branching programs directly from EOH-PRG instantiated from Ring-LWR have key size around one-sixth and running time improved by a factor of 24 comparing with the FSS for branching programs from HSS instantiated from Ring-LWE. For DCR assumptions, the direct FSS constructions for width 3 branching programs have key size reduced by a factor of 2.625 and running time reduced by a factor around 11.45 comparing with the FSS for width 3 branching programs from HSS.

G.5 Other Applications

Multi-server PIR The counting query or retrieval matches or payload computing are the typical applications of FSS for 2-server PIR as in [24,26,28]. With the new FSS constructions for bit-fixing predicates, pattern matching with wildcards becomes more efficient comparing with existing schemes from HSS as indicated in Table 1. The direct FSS constructions for branching programs avoid the overheads in the previous FSS for branching programs from HSS [25]. Thus, any queries expressed by branching programs can also be efficiently implemented by the new FSS for branching programs.

Polynomial number of conjunctions of intervals [24] proposed an FSS scheme for the interval function, which is improved from one dimension interval to constant dimension intervals in [26]. The FSS for constant dimension intervals has many practical applications such as Splinter [76], which provides private searching queries on Yelp clone of restaurant reviews, ticket search, etc. However, the key size for constant dimension intervals scales with $n^d$, where $n$ is the length of the PRG seed and $d$ the number of dimensions. Hence for super-constant dimension intervals the key size increases to super-polynomial. The tensor product from EOH-PRG works for arbitrary polynomial number of intervals via replacing the PRG by EOH-PRG and tensoring by EOH-PRG. The key size of tensor product FSS only scales linearly with the number of intervals. [20] pointed out that the conjunctions of FSS from one-way function as a barrier to 1-round
secure evaluation of multiply-then-truncate. We leave this as future research to use EOH-PRG to efficiently achieve 1-round secure evaluation of multiply-then-truncate.

**SQL query** Splinter [76] proposed using FSS to efficiently implement private SQL queries, especially focusing on hiding the where conditions as pointed out in Section G.1 and G.2. The FSS for bit-fixing predicates, for approximate matching functions and for DFAs from EOH-PRG greatly enriches the expressiveness of where conditions. Actually any where condition captured by NC$^1$ can be efficiently hidden by our FSS for branching programs. Moreover, the polynomial number of conjunctions of intervals can also be used to support polynomial number of range conditions.

**Decision Tree** Theorem 53 gives an FSS for branching program without revealing the topology of the branching program via adding dummy nodes. Boyle et al. [26, Section 3.3] presented a FSS for decision tree from one-way function, which reveals the topology of the decision tree. The same method could also be used to implement an FSS for decision tree without leaking the topology of the decision tree at the cost of increased key size via adding dummy nodes.

## H Comparisons

In this section, we present comparisons for FSS instantiated from concrete assumptions and the FSS constructed from HSS. We focus on the FSS for bit-fixing predicates and FSS for branching programs, respectively.

There are also FSS constructions from homomorphic secret sharing (HSS) [28,60]. HSS can be viewed as the dual of FSS. In particular, for HSS the input is hidden and the circuit is public, whereas for FSS, the circuit is private and the input is shared by all parties. [28,60] constructed HSS for RMS programs with super-polynomial plaintext space and negligible correctness error based on LWE or DCR assumptions. [25] proposed a general framework to construct an FSS for arbitrary branching program from HSS for branching programs. However, this makes the resulting FSS cumbersome. We compare our direct FSS constructions for branching programs with the FSS for branching programs from HSS. The FSS constructions in Section G.4 for $t$-CNF/$t$-DNF are based on the FSS for bit-fixing predicates from EOH-PRG.

The comparison results in this section indicate our FSS for bit-fixing predicates, branching programs and DFAs from EOH-PRG are very efficient.

### H.1 FSS for Bit-fixing Predicates from HSS vs. EOH-PRG

There is a novel idea to implement an FSS for bit-fixing predicates from HSS. In this section, we compare the FSS for bit-fixing predicates built directly from EOH-PRG with FSS from HSS.

We first present the idea to construct FSS for bit-fixing predicates from HSS, and then compare the two FSS schemes constructed from the two methods.
Lemma 80. Let $\text{HSS} = (\text{Setup, Input, Eval})$ be a secure HSS scheme. Let $a \in \{0, 1, *\}^\ell$ be a bit-fixing predicate. Then there exists an FSS scheme for $a$ and the FSS key consists of at least $2\ell$ ciphertexts.

Proof. We first create a matrix $B \in \{0, 1\}^{2 \times \ell}$ corresponding to $a$. The converting rule works as follows.

Case $a[i] = *$: $B[0, i] = B[1, i] = 1$.
Case $a[i] = 0$: $B[0, i] = 1$, $B[1, i] = 0$.
Case $a[i] = 1$: $B[0, i] = 0$, $B[1, i] = 1$.

Next, we use $\text{Input}$ to encrypt each entry of $B$ times $sk$ to obtain a matrix $C$ of ciphertexts, i.e., $C[j, i] = \text{HSS.Input}(B[j, i] \cdot sk)$ for $i \in [\ell], j \in \{0, 1\}$. Assume $(ek_0, ek_1) := \text{HSS.Setup}(1^\lambda)$. Then $(ek_0, ek_1, C)$ is the key of the FSS for $P^\text{BF}_a$.

Given an input $x$, the FSS evaluation is performed by the multiplication specified by the input $x$. After first multiplication, $x[1] \cdot sk$ is shared by the two-party as $sk$ is additively shared in $\text{HSS.Setup}$. Each party runs the multiplication

$$\text{Mul}(C[x[i+1], i+1], M_i \cdot sk)$$

for $i \in [\ell-1]$ to do the evaluation, where $M_i$ is the memory multiplication value, i.e., $M_i = \prod_{j=1}^i B[x[j], j]$.

In this construction, the memory value becomes 0 once the input $x[i]$ is not matched. It is straightforward to prove that the resulting FSS exactly implements the bit-fixing predicate $P^\text{BF}_a$. The security follows from the security of $\text{HSS}$ and the CPA security of the encryption scheme. Note that the FSS key for $P_b$ consists of $ek_b$ and $C$ with $2\ell$ ciphertexts.

As [28,60] instantiated HSS from LWE and DCR assumption, we compare the FSS for bit-fixing predicates from HSS and from EOH-PRG instantiated from LWE and DCR assumptions.

We only consider the HSS instantiated from Ring-LWE [28, Figure 8] rather than from LWE because the HSS instantiated from LWE incurs larger ciphertext size. Recall the HSS instantiated from Ring-LWE, each ciphertext contains four $R_q$ elements and the key is a sharing of one ring element. The most costing operation is the $\text{Mul}$ operation. Each $\text{Mul}$ costs exactly four multiplications over the ring $R_q$ and each multiplication takes $n \log n$ multiplications over $\mathbb{Z}_q$ assume the parameters are chosen permitting the NTT optimizations. There are total $\ell \text{ Mul}$ operations during FSS evaluation. Hence, the key size for bit-fixing predicates FSS from HSS instantiated from Ring-LWE is about $8\ell n \log q$ as each HSS ciphertext contains exactly four $R_q$ elements. The key size of $ek_b$ is omitted here. The evaluation cost is $4\ell n \log n$ multiplications over $\mathbb{Z}_q$. The PRF key used to re-randomize the intermediate memory values is not taken into account here.

As for the FSS for bit-fixing predicates from EOH-PRG instantiated from (Ring-)LWE, we consider instantiations from both of the LWE assumption and the Ring-LWE assumption. Recall that in Section 8, for EOH-PRG instantiated from LWE, each correction word has size $2(n + 1) \log p$ and the key size for
the first bit is still $2(n+1)\log p$. There are $\ell - 1$ correction words. Thus the total key size is $2\ell(n+1)\log p$. The size for the PRG matrix is not taken into account because it can be instantiated from a PRG or a random oracle. During evaluation, the most expensive operation is the PRG evaluation. Each PRG evaluation takes $2n(n+1)$ multiplications over $\mathbb{Z}_q$. Hence, the total computation cost is $2(\ell - 1)n(n+1)$ multiplications over $\mathbb{Z}_q$.

For EOH-PRG instantiated from Ring-LWR, the PRG becomes $\text{PRG} : \mathbb{R}_q \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_p^2 \times \mathbb{Z}_p^2$. Thus each correction word consists of 2 elements of $\mathbb{R}_p$ and 2 elements of $\mathbb{Z}_p$. Hence the total key size is $2\ell(n+1)\log p$. During evaluation, the most costing operation is still the PRG evaluation. Each PRG evaluation takes 4 multiplications over $\mathbb{R}_q$ as the PRG evaluation takes multiplications over $\mathbb{R}_q$ before applies the $\psi(\cdot)$ function. Thus total number of multiplications of FSS evaluation over $\mathbb{Z}_q$ is bounded by $4\ell n \log n$. The comparison is shown in Table 2.

For EOH-PRG instantiated from Ring-LWR, the PRG becomes $\text{PRG} : \mathbb{R}_q \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_p^2 \times \mathbb{Z}_p^2$. Thus each correction word consists of 2 elements of $\mathbb{R}_p$ and 2 elements of $\mathbb{Z}_p$. Hence the total key size is $2\ell(n+1)\log p$. During evaluation, the most costing operation is still the PRG evaluation. Each PRG evaluation takes 4 multiplications over $\mathbb{R}_q$ as the PRG evaluation takes multiplications over $\mathbb{R}_q$ before applies the $\psi(\cdot)$ function. Thus total number of multiplications of FSS evaluation over $\mathbb{Z}_q$ is bounded by $4\ell n \log n$. The comparison is shown in Table 2.

Next, we consider the instantiations from DCR assumption. Recall the HSS instantiated from DCR assumption [60, Section 4.2], each ciphertext contains seven $\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}$ elements(six elements suffice for the KDM security and each HSS ciphertext contains exactly seven elements). Thus, the key size for bit-fixing FSS from HSS is around $14\ell \log N^2$. For the DCR assumption, the most costing is the exponentiation operation. Each Mul takes seven exponentiation operations. Thus, the FSS evaluation takes in total $7\ell$ exponentiation operations. For the EOH-PRG instantiated from DCR variant assumption, recall that the PRG is $\text{PRG} : \mathbb{Z}_N \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^4$ and each correction word contains 4 $\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}$ elements and thus the key size is bounded by $4\ell \log N^2$. During evaluation, each PRG evaluation takes 4 exponentiation operations and thus the FSS evaluation totally takes at most $4\ell$ exponentiation operations. The comparison is shown in Table 2.

![Table 2](image)

**Table 2.** The comparison of FSS for bit-fixing predicates constructed from EOH-PRG and from HSS. $\ell$ stands for bit-fixing predicate length. For LWE assumption, $n$ stands for the secret length, $q$ the modulus of the LWE assumption, and $p$ the output modulus of the PRG. The number of multiplications is counted over $\mathbb{Z}_q$. For DCR assumption, $N$ stands for RSA modulus. Here we assume six ciphertexts suffice to achieve KDM security for the HSS from DCR assumption as in [60, Section 4.2]. The number of exponentiations is counted over $\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}$.

In summary,
– the direct FSS from EOH-PRG instantiated from LWE provides a quarter of the key size of the FSS from HSS instantiated from Ring-LWE whereas the running time is amplified by a factor of $\frac{n}{\log n}$.
– the Ring-LWR instantiation of EOH-PRG provides a quarter of the key size of the HSS from Ring-LWE and comparable running time.
– the direct FSS from EOH-PRG instantiated from DCR variant assumption provides significant improvements over the HSS from DCR assumption in key size and the number of exponentiations. Concretely, the key size is reduced by a factor of 3.5 and the running time reduced by a factor a 1.75.

Remark 81. There is no encryption operation involved in the FSS construction from EOH-PRG. If the HSS is instantiated from the LWE assumption, there exists an HSS from symmetric encryption scheme. The decryption is just an explicit linear operation. However, if HSS is instantiated from the DCR assumption, there is definitely no decryption operation and even there is no secret key derived in the Gen procedure.

H.2 FSS for Branching Programs from HSS vs. EOH-PRG

In this section, we only consider the branching programs with out-degree 2 as in Section D.1. Given a layered oblivious branching program $P$, [25, Theorem A.5] provided a general method to construct an FSS for $P$ from HSS. The construction encodes $P$ into $\hat{P}$ and a universal branching program $\text{UBP}$ such that for any $x$, $\text{UBP}(\hat{P}, x) = P(x)$, and runs the HSS for $\text{UBP}(\hat{P}, x)$ to hide $\hat{P}$ to obtain an FSS for $P$.

We roughly recall the structure of $\text{UBP}$ and $\hat{P}$ to show the key size and the efficiency of the FSS. The encoding $\hat{P}$ contains every pair of nodes in adjacent levels of $P$. If the pair of nodes corresponds to an edge in $P$, then it is 1 in $\hat{P}$. Otherwise, it is 0. Thus, the size of $\hat{P}$ is $\sum_{i\in[1,\ell-1]} w_i \cdot w_{i+1} \leq \ell \cdot w^2$. The $\text{UBP}$ contains $\ell+1$ blocks of levels $W_0, W_1, \ldots, W_\ell$. The number of levels of $W_\ell$ is $2w_i \cdot w_{i+1}$ for $i < \ell$. In $\text{UBP}$ evaluation, the input to level $U_m$ for $1 \leq m < w_i \cdot w_{i+1}$, where $m = jw_{i+1} + k, 1 \leq j \leq w_i, 1 \leq k \leq w_{i+1}$, is $y_{\alpha_0} \in \hat{P}$ for $\alpha_0 = (j, k)$ and the input to level $U_m$ for $w_i \cdot w_{i+1} \leq m < 2w_i \cdot w_{i+1}$, where $m = w_i \cdot w_{i+1} + jw_{i+1} + k, 1 \leq j \leq w_i, 1 \leq k \leq w_{i+1}$ is $y_{\alpha_1} \in \hat{P}$ for $\alpha_1 = (j, k)$. In summary, the input for each $U_m$ for $1 \leq m < 2w_i \cdot w_{i+1}$ is a value in $P$ only depending on $m$. The input to level $U_{2w_i \cdot w_{i+1}}$ is $x_i$.

The FSS for $P$ from HSS encrypts every element of $\hat{P}$. There are roughly $\ell \cdot w^2$ HSS ciphertexts. During the evaluation, for each block except for the last level, the input is in encryption form and thus for each block $U_i$ there are $2w_i \cdot w_{i+1} - 1$ Mul operations of HSS. There are totally at most $2\ell w^2$ number of Mul operations for the FSS evaluation.

For HSS from Ring-LWE, the key contains $4\ell \cdot w^2 |R_q|$ elements as each ciphertext consists of four $R_q$ elements. Thus the key size is $4\ell w^2 n \log q$. There are $8\ell w^2$ multiplications over $R_q$ and thus totally $8\ell w^2 n \log n$ multiplications over $\mathbb{Z}_q$. 


For HSS from DCR assumption, the key contains around $7\ell \cdot w^2 Z_{N^2}$ elements as each ciphertext contains seven $Z_{N^2}$ elements. Thus the key size is $7\ell w^2 \log N^2$. There are total $14\ell w^2$ exponentiations operations during evaluation as each Mul takes 6 exponentiations.

Now we show the key size and runtime of the FSS from EOH-PRG. For EOH-PRG instantiated from LWE, the PRG is $\text{PRG} : Z_q^n \rightarrow Z_p^{2(n+w)}$. The size of each level correction word is $2w(n+w) \log p$ and as each level has at most $w$ correction words. Thus the total key size is bounded by $2\ell w(n+w) \log p$. During PRG evaluation, there are $2n(n+w)$ multiplications over $Z_q$ in each level. Thus, there are totally $2\ell n(n+w)$ multiplications.

For EOH-PRG instantiated from Ring-LWE, the PRG becomes $\text{PRG} : R_q \rightarrow R_p^{2 + \lceil \frac{2w}{n} \rceil} \times Z_p^{2w-n \lceil \frac{2w}{n} \rceil}$ as multiple tag bits are compressed to ring elements. The size of each level correction word is $2w(n+w) \log p$ and thus the total key size is bounded by $2\ell w(n+w) \log p$. During PRG evaluation, there are $2 + \lceil \frac{2w}{n} \rceil$ multiplications over $R_q$ each level. Hence, there are totally $\ell(2 + \lceil \frac{2w}{n} \rceil)n \log n$ multiplications over $Z_q$.

For EOH-PRG instantiated from DCR variant assumption, the PRG is $\text{PRG} : Z_N \rightarrow Z_{N^2}^{2w}$. The size of each level correction word is $2w(w+1) \log N^2$ and thus the total key size is $2\ell w(w+1) \log N^2$. During PRG evaluation, there are $3w + 2$ exponentiations in each level as each tag bit is used to compute the exponentiation of corresponding correction word. Thus, there are totally $\ell(3w+2)$ exponentiation operations.

The key size and efficiency is summarized in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Assumption</th>
<th>Key Size</th>
<th>No. of Mul. or Exp.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LWE</td>
<td>HSS</td>
<td>$4w^2n \log q$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EOH-PRG</td>
<td>$2w(n+w) \log p$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EOH-PRG</td>
<td>$2w(n+w) \log p$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCR</td>
<td>HSS</td>
<td>$7w^2 \log N^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EOH-PRG</td>
<td>$2\ell w(w+1) \log N^2$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. The comparison of FSS for branching programs constructed from EOH-PRG and from HSS. $w$ stands for the branching program width and $\ell$ for the branching program length. For branching programs we assume fixed out-degree $d = 2$. For LWE assumption, $n$ stands for the secret length, $q$ the modulus of the LWE assumption, and $p$ the output modulus of the PRG. The number of multiplications is counted over $Z_q$. For DCR assumption, $N$ stands for RSA modulus. Here we assume six ciphertexts suffice to achieve KDM security for the HSS from DCR assumption as in [60, Section 4.2]. The number of exponentiations is counted over $Z_{N^2}$.

In summary,

- for LWE related assumption, the key size of the FSS from EOH-PRG instantiated from LWE and Ring-LWR are equal. The key size is improved from a factor of $4wn$ to $2(n+w)$ comparing to the FSS for branching programs...
from HSS Ring-LWE. As for the running time, the FSS from EOH-PRG from LWE is very inefficient. The running time of the FSS from EOH-PRG from Ring-LWR is improved from a factor $8w$ to $2 + \lceil \frac{2w}{3} \rceil$.

– for DCR related assumption, the key size of FSS from EOH-PRG is improved by a factor around $3$ of the key size of the FSS from HSS and the number of exponentiation operations of FSS from EOH-PRG is a $w$ of magnitude less than the FSS from HSS.

Remark 82. It is worth to mention that our FSS for branching programs from EOH-PRG naturally generalize to branching programs with multi-edge as in Section E.1 and with polynomial out-degree as in Section E.2. However, for the FSS from HSS, the universal branching program needs to split the multi-edge at the cost of increasing edges because in the encoding $\hat{P}$ of $P$ each two nodes and the edge value form a point in $\hat{P}$ and the polynomial out-degree of $P$ causes worse blow-up for the universal branching programs for the number of levels of each block, which leads to worse running time.
# Table of Contents

1 Introduction ................................................................. 3  
  1.1 Our Contributions .................................................... 4  
  1.2 Discussion and Related Work .................................... 10  
  1.3 Organization ......................................................... 11  
2 Technical Overview ..................................................... 11  
3 Preliminaries ............................................................... 22  
4 FSS with Extra Properties and EOH-PRGs .......................... 23  
  4.1 PRG with Encoded-Output Homomorphism ....................... 23  
5 Tensor Product FSS for Arbitrary Predicates from EOH-PRGs ... 24  
6 FSS for Branching Programs .......................................... 26  
7 FSS for DFAs ............................................................... 28  
8 EOH-PRG Instantiated from LWE or DCR Assumption .......... 30  
A Supplementary Materials for Preliminaries ....................... 37  
  A.1 LWE and LWR ........................................................ 37  
  A.2 Almost Homomorphic PRGs(AH-PRG) ............................ 38  
  A.3 DCR Assumption .................................................... 39  
  A.4 Bit-fixing Predicates and CNF/DNF Formulae .................. 39  
  A.5 DFA ................................................................. 39  
B Tensor Product and FSS for Negation and Disjunction of Predicates 40  
  B.1 Proof of Theorem 20 ................................................. 40  
  B.2 FSS for Negation and Disjunction of Predicates ............ 43  
C FSS for Bit-fixing Predicates from EOH-PRG ...................... 44  
D Supplementary Materials for FSS for Branching Programs ...... 46  
  D.1 Branching Programs ................................................ 46  
  D.2 Supplementary Constructions for FSS for Branching Programs 46  
  D.3 Proof of Lemma 23 ................................................ 47  
  D.4 Topology-Hiding FSS for Branching Programs ................. 48  
E FSS for Approximate Matching Functions and Polynomials .......... 48  
  E.1 FSS for Approximate Matching Functions .................... 49  
  E.2 FSS for Polynomials over a Ring .............................. 50  
F Supplementary Materials for EOH-PRG Instantiated from LWE or  
  DCR ................................................................. 51  
  F.1 EOH-PRG from LWE ................................................. 52  
  F.2 EOH-PRG from DCR .............................................. 53  
G FSS Applications .......................................................... 55  
  G.1 Private Image Matching on Public Data ....................... 56  
  G.2 Private Partial Text Matching ................................. 57  
  G.3 Nearest Neighbour Search ..................................... 58  
  G.4 FSS for t-CNF/t-DNF and CNF/DNF ............................ 60  
  G.5 Other Applications .............................................. 62  
H Comparisons ............................................................... 63
H.1  FSS for Bit-fixing Predicates from HSS vs. EOH-PRG ............ 63
H.2  FSS for Branching Programs from HSS vs. EOH-PRG ............ 66