SoK: 5 Years of Neural Differential Cryptanalysis

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Abstract. At CRYPTO 2019, A. Gohr introduced Neural Differential Cryptanalysis by applying deep learning to modern block cipher cryptanalysis. Surprisingly, the resulting neural differential distinguishers enabled a new state-of-the-art key recovery complexity for 11 rounds of SPECK32. As of May 2024, according to Google Scholar, Gohr's article has been cited 178 times. The wide variety of targets, techniques, settings, and evaluation methodologies that appear in these follow-up works grants a careful systematization of knowledge, which we provide in this paper. More specifically, we propose a taxonomy of these 178 publications and focus on the 50 that deal with differential neural distinguishers to systematically review and compare them. We then discuss two challenges for the field, namely comparability of neural distinguishers and scaling.

Keywords: Neural Differential Cryptanalysis, Systematization of Knowledge

1 Introduction

Deep learning has experienced significant advancements in recent years, leading to remarkable achievements in various domains. Initially, Frank Rosenblatt introduced Multi-Layer Perceptrons (MLPs) in his book Perceptron in 1958 and laid the foundation for modern neural networks. The introduction of Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) in the 1980s [\[Fuk80\]](#page-24-0) led to a breakthrough in computer vision by the introduction of LeNet in 1998 [\[LBBH98\]](#page-27-0), achieving human-level performance in digit recognition. In the game of Go, advancements in Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) and reinforcement learning led to remarkable achievements, such as Google's AlphaGo surpassing human capabilities [\[SHM](#page-30-0)⁺16, [SHS](#page-30-1)⁺18, [SAH](#page-30-2)⁺20]. More recently, transformer-based Large Language Models (LLMs) [$VSP+17$], like GPT, have revolutionized natural language processing, demonstrating near-human capabilities in tasks like machine translation and language generation.

At CRYPTO'19, Gohr's seminal paper [\[Goh19a\]](#page-24-1) was "the first to show that neural networks can be used to produce attacks quite competitive to the published state of the art against a round-reduced version of a modern block cipher". A cryptanalytic distinguishing attack discerns encrypted data from random data by detecting distinctive features within the input data, enabling the differentiation of their respective distributions. In the context of differential cryptanalysis, the objective of the distinguisher is to discriminate between ciphertext pairs C_0 , C_1 derived from plaintext pairs P_0 , P_1 with a fixed input difference (δ) versus those originating from a random input difference (rand). Such a distinguisher can be used to mount a key recovery attack on a block cipher: When partially decrypting an $(r + 1)$ -round ciphertext pair using a guessed round key, the *r*-round distinguisher can differentiate between a valid key guess, which yields the characteristic distribution of the case δ , and an invalid key guess, which yields the uniform distribution of the case rand. A higher-accuracy distinguisher enhances the effectiveness of the key recovery attack. In Neural Differential Cryptanalysis, the distinguisher is a deep neural network $N\mathcal{D}$. Gohr's work challenged conventional belief by demonstrating the remarkable cryptographic distinguishing capabilities of machine learning techniques. Notably, neural networks applied to SPECK32 reduced to 8 rounds exhibit superior accuracy compared to pure differential distinguishers. Additionally, Gohr achieved significant improvements in the time complexity of the 11-round key recovery attack. Gohr's success has motivated extensive follow-up research in Neural Differential Cryptanalysis over the last five years.

[Figure 1](#page-1-0) a) shows the basic scheme for a neural differential distinguisher experiment as introduced in [\[Goh19a\]](#page-24-1).

Figure 1: a) Neural Differential Distinguisher: Basic Pipeline. Start with two plaintext P_0, P_1 , where $P_0 \oplus P_1 = \delta$ or $P_0 \oplus P_1 =$ rand. Encrypt them using a symmetric key *K* to obtain ciphertexts C_0, C_1 . Concatenate the ciphertexts $C_0|C_1$ and input them into a neural distinguisher $\mathcal{N}D$. The neural distinguisher's output is a neuron with a sigmoid activation function. The sigmoid curve indicates a binary decision output to answer if $P_0 \oplus P_1 \stackrel{?}{=} \delta$. **b) Neural Differential Cryptanalysis: Research Areas.**

[Figure 1](#page-1-0) b) gives a broad overview of the research directions in Neural Differential Cryptanalysis.

Researchers have explored every part of the basic pipeline. A majority of the works citing Gohr that focus on differential neural distinguishers have attempted to apply the scheme to **other symmetric primitives** or to use **other neural network architectures**. Variations of the initial experiment have been proposed, for which classification was proposed at FSE 2024 $[**BGH** + 23]$, based on the number of input ciphertexts *n*, the number of used input differences *m*, the applied feature engineering *E* and the distinguishing experiment type *T*. A general open question for deep neural networks is the one of **explainability**, i.e., cryptographic features the neural distinguisher is actually learning. Gohr's work was analyzed in detail by Benamira *et al.* at EUROCRYPT 2021 [\[BGPT21\]](#page-21-1), and more recently by Bao *et al.* at ASIACRYPT 2023 [\[BLYZ23\]](#page-22-0). Finally, we also observe some efforts into making the neural distinguisher process a more automated process $[BGH^+23]$ $[BGH^+23]$.

Our Contributions. In our systematization of knowledge, we have achieved the following:

1. **Comprehensive Field Review:** We have conducted an exhaustive survey of the follow-up work [\(Section 3\)](#page-3-0). In this process, we have identified the **full body of research** in the field of Neural Differential Cryptanalysis. We analyzed the directions of the field, resulting in a detailed taxonomy of Differential Neural Cryptanalysis [\(Section 3\)](#page-3-0).

- 2. **Rigorous Classification and Comparison:** We systematically classified and compared the outcomes of peer-reviewed research on differential neural distinguishers [\(Section 6\)](#page-7-0). Our analysis reveals that, over the past five years, the research community has investigated differential neural distinguishers spanning diverse symmetric primitives and neural network architectures. We also identify severe methodological issues in some peer-reviewed papers and challenge their results.
- 3. **Best Practice Recommendations:** Evaluating research involving the training of neural networks presents significant challenges. We have developed a comprehensive set of best-practice guidelines specifically tailored for reviewers of Neural Differential Cryptanalysis research [\(Section 7\)](#page-16-0).
- 4. **Future Challenges:** We identify and discuss two major challenges set to shape the next five years of neural cryptanalysis [\(Section 8\)](#page-17-0).

Organization. We start with a short historical overview of works that connect Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Cryptography before Gohr's work [\[Goh19a\]](#page-24-1) in [Section 2.](#page-2-0) We identify the full body of research and taxonomy of research directions of Neural Differential Cryptanalysis in [Section 3.](#page-3-0) The comparative review of all differential neural distinguishers published to date is provided in [Section 6.](#page-7-0) Based on our observations in the comparative review, we give best practice recommendations for training (and reviewing) neural distinguishers in [Section 7.](#page-16-0) We formulate two future challenges for the field of Neural Differential Cryptanalysis in [Section 8.](#page-17-0)

2 AI and Cryptography in the Beginnings

The popularity and widespread adoption of neural differential distinguishers (more precisely, deep learning-based cryptanalysis) can be credited to the seminal work of A. Gohr [\[Goh19a\]](#page-24-1). However, even in that work, the author mentioned a number of related works at the intersection between cryptanalysis and AI. What distinguishes Gohr's work from previous ones is that it considers relevant (modern) ciphers and manages to obtain results that surpass state-of-the-art conventional cryptanalysis techniques. The following section is not meant to provide an exhaustive list of works connecting AI and cryptology but rather provide a brief historical overview of various approaches.

Already in 1947, researchers started considering connections between cryptography and artificial intelligence [\[Wea47\]](#page-32-1). While this attempt was devoid of any technical details, it still showcases the interest of the scientific community in combining these two domains. In 1984, L. Valiant discussed learnable Boolean functions and mentioned the evidence from cryptography that the whole class of functions computable by polynomial-size circuits is not learnable [\[Val84\]](#page-32-2). In 1994, R. Rivest wrote a paper on connections between cryptography and machine learning $[\text{Riv91}]$. Already there, he mentioned the possibility of using machine learning for cryptanalysis.

Klimov *et al.* analyzed the security of a key exchange protocol based on mutually learning neural networks [\[KMS02\]](#page-26-0). While the authors showcase it is unlikely that the attacker using a similar neural network is unlikely to converge to the same key, they showed it is possible to break the protocol in several ways. Castro *et al.* used evolutionary algorithms to construct a cryptanalytic tool that can distinguish between the two-round TEA algorithm and random permutations [\[CSIR02\]](#page-22-1). Laskari *et al.* considered the application of diverse computational intelligence techniques to the cryptanalysis of known cryptosystems, including public key cryptosystems and Feistel ciphers [\[LMSV07\]](#page-27-1). Tapiador *et al.* used heuristics to conduct nonlinear cryptanalysis and applied it to the MARS cipher S-box [\[TCHC07\]](#page-31-0). Chou *et al.* experimented with machine learning techniques to mount distinguishing attacks and concluded it is not possible to extract useful information from

ciphertexts produced by modern ciphers operating in secure modes, nor to distinguish them from random data [\[CLC12\]](#page-22-2).

On the other hand, Svenda *et al.* used evolutionary algorithms to construct empirical tests for randomness [\[SSUM14\]](#page-31-1). Awad and El-Alfy provided a survey of computational intelligence applications in cryptography, focusing on the automated design and cryptanalysis of ciphers [\[AEA17\]](#page-20-0).

3 Neural Differential Cryptanalysis: A Taxonomy of Research Directions

3.1 Selected Literature

As of May 13, 2024, a total of 178 works cite Gohr's work [\[Goh19a\]](#page-24-1) on Google Scholar. Out of these, 25 references are written in languages other than English and are not considered further. Additionally, 30 references are not peer-reviewed, being published only on platforms such as arXiv or ePrint [\[BBCD20,](#page-21-2) [BBDH21,](#page-21-3) [BBC](#page-21-4)+23, [BGL](#page-21-5)+21, [ElS21,](#page-23-0) [GJS20,](#page-24-2) [GLN22,](#page-24-3) [Goh22,](#page-24-4) [HRC21a,](#page-25-0) [HRC21b,](#page-25-1) [HRC21d,](#page-25-2) [JKM20,](#page-26-1) [JKM21,](#page-26-2) [Jun05,](#page-26-3) [KJL](#page-26-4)⁺22, [LTJ](#page-28-0)⁺20, [LSW](#page-28-1)⁺23, [LRC22,](#page-27-2) [PMC](#page-29-0)⁺22, [PMK20,](#page-29-1) [SM23a,](#page-30-4) [SWL](#page-31-2)⁺24, [Sug24,](#page-31-3) [WNB](#page-32-3)⁺23, [ZL20a,](#page-33-0) [ZL20b,](#page-33-1) [ZW22a,](#page-33-2) ZW⁺[22b,](#page-33-3) [ZZW24,](#page-34-0) [ZDW](#page-33-4)⁺23. After excluding these, we are left with 123 peer-reviewed references, which we systematically categorize as shown in [Figure 2.](#page-3-1)

Figure 2: Taxonomy of the peer-reviewed publications in English that cite Gohr's work [\[Goh19a\]](#page-24-1) to date.

We consider the following references outside the field of research on Neural Differential Cryptanalysis as they are surveys, overviews, or book chapters that treat the use of "ML in cryptography" [\[BHR](#page-22-3)⁺22, [Bru21,](#page-22-4) [CDS22,](#page-22-5) [NR23,](#page-29-2) [PJ21,](#page-29-3) [PJ22,](#page-29-4) [Som23,](#page-31-4) [Tan23,](#page-31-5) [Tu22,](#page-32-4) [ZG24\]](#page-33-5), or their research focuses on other topics such as: classical cryptanalysis $[Bak21, BCdST+23,$ $[Bak21, BCdST+23,$ $[Bak21, BCdST+23,$ $[Bak21, BCdST+23,$ [ELR20,](#page-23-1) [FLW](#page-24-5)⁺23, [GPT21,](#page-24-6) [KS22,](#page-27-3) [KY21,](#page-27-4) [SLL24,](#page-30-5) [WW22,](#page-32-5) [YK21b,](#page-33-6) [YK22\]](#page-33-7), cryptanalysis of historic or toy ciphers [\[GZDAL22,](#page-24-7) [KSJS21,](#page-27-5) [KLK](#page-26-5)+23, [LMK](#page-27-6)+21, [PMDC22,](#page-29-5) [PKM23\]](#page-29-6), deep learning-supported design of cryptographic algorithms [\[CS21,](#page-22-6) [HLG](#page-25-3)+23, [ITYY21,](#page-25-4) [LTJ](#page-28-2)+21, [MJBHC22\]](#page-28-3), neural side-channel attacks [\[GJS21,](#page-24-8) [TDD22,](#page-31-6) [YBBP23,](#page-33-8) [ZZC](#page-34-1)+22], building distinguishers between different ciphers [\[BPS22,](#page-22-7) [DM23,](#page-23-2) [MPM](#page-28-4)+21, [XLC](#page-32-6)+22], neural preimage attacks [\[JMTD22,](#page-26-6) [LLL](#page-27-7)⁺21, [PTD22a\]](#page-29-7), the introduction of a new tool or library [\[BGG](#page-21-7)⁺²³, [Ess23,](#page-23-3) [Hal22\]](#page-24-9), the proposal of a new cipher [\[BSL21,](#page-22-8) [DCW23\]](#page-23-4), neural output prediction attacks [\[KEI](#page-26-7)+22, [KEI](#page-26-8)+23], neural integral distinguishers [\[HLLL,](#page-25-5) [ZL22\]](#page-33-9), neural attacks on protocols [\[TD21,](#page-31-7) [ZKL20\]](#page-33-10), post-quantum schemes [\[LWAZ](#page-28-5)+24, [WCCL22\]](#page-32-7), or pseudorandom number generators [\[Boa24,](#page-22-9) [EAZD23\]](#page-23-5), or other unrelated topics [\[KLJW23,](#page-26-9) [ZZS21,](#page-34-2) [PYW24,](#page-29-8) [AAEK22,](#page-20-2) [MGKMP21,](#page-28-6) [PTD22b,](#page-29-9) [HLZW20,](#page-25-6) [DZF](#page-23-6)⁺21, [AABAA22,](#page-20-3) [DDK](#page-23-7)⁺23, [RRSM22b,](#page-30-6) [So20,](#page-31-8) [TDF](#page-31-9)+22, [MKMP21,](#page-28-7) [MLYW22,](#page-28-8) [Kar23\]](#page-26-10).

This leaves us with a total of 49 peer-reviewed publications in the field of Neural Differential Cryptanalysis.

The Body of Peer-Reviewed Research in Neural Differential Cryptanalysis

The full body of peer-reviewed publications that focus specifically on advancing research of Neural Differential Cryptanalysis is $[BB22, BBD+23, BGL+22,$ $[BB22, BBD+23, BGL+22,$ [BLYZ23,](#page-22-0) [BR21,](#page-22-10) [BGH](#page-21-0)⁺23, [BGPT21,](#page-21-1) [BBP22,](#page-21-10) [CSY23,](#page-22-11) [CSYY23,](#page-23-8) [DCC23,](#page-23-9) [ERP22,](#page-23-10) [EGP23,](#page-23-11) [HGH](#page-25-7)⁺23, [HRC21c,](#page-25-8) [HRC23,](#page-25-9) [KJL](#page-26-11)⁺23, [KKJ](#page-26-12)⁺24, [LCLH22,](#page-27-8) [LLHC23,](#page-27-9) [LRC23,](#page-27-10) [LRCL23,](#page-27-11) [LLS](#page-27-12)⁺24, [LTZ22a,](#page-28-9) [LTZ22b,](#page-28-10) [MLR](#page-28-11)⁺23, [MPKM](#page-28-12)⁺22, [Pal,](#page-29-10) [PPWR23,](#page-29-11) [PSM23,](#page-29-12) [RLS23,](#page-30-7) [RRSM22a,](#page-30-8) [SM23b,](#page-31-10) [SCL24,](#page-30-9) [SSL](#page-31-11)⁺24, [SZM21,](#page-31-12) [SSL](#page-31-13)⁺22, [TTJ23,](#page-32-8) [TH21,](#page-32-9) [WW21,](#page-32-10) [WWH21,](#page-32-11) [WTZ](#page-32-12)⁺22, [WQW](#page-32-13)⁺24, [YK21a,](#page-33-11) [YW23,](#page-33-12) [ZZY](#page-34-3)⁺21, [ZZ21,](#page-34-4) [ZLWL23,](#page-33-13) [ZWC23\]](#page-33-14).

3.2 Taxonomy of Research Directions

We found contributions to the explainability (or interpretability) of neural distinguishers in the following nine works [\[Goh19a,](#page-24-1) [BGPT21,](#page-21-1) [CSY23,](#page-22-11) [BBP22,](#page-21-10) [DCC23,](#page-23-9) [HGH](#page-25-7)⁺23, [LRC23,](#page-27-10) [YW23,](#page-33-12) [BLYZ23\]](#page-22-0), and will discuss their respective contributions in [Section 4.](#page-5-0) We found contributions to neural-aided key recovery attacks in the following 16 works [\[Goh19a,](#page-24-1) [BGL](#page-21-5)⁺21, [HRC21a,](#page-25-0) [TH21,](#page-32-9) [ERP22,](#page-23-10) [LTZ22a,](#page-28-9) [BGL](#page-21-9)⁺22, [CSY23,](#page-22-11) [CSYY23,](#page-23-8) [BLYZ23,](#page-22-0) [KLK](#page-26-5)⁺23, [LCLH22,](#page-27-8) [LLHC23,](#page-27-9) [TTJ23,](#page-32-8) [YW23,](#page-33-12) [ZLWL23\]](#page-33-13), and will give an overview of these works in [Section 5.](#page-6-0)

The majority (44/49) of peer-reviewed research on Neural Differential Cryptanalysis involves the training of differential neural distinguishers. More precisely, differential neural distinguishers are trained in [\[BGPT21,](#page-21-1) [BB22,](#page-20-4) [YK21a,](#page-33-11) [CSY23,](#page-22-11) [CSYY23,](#page-23-8) [BR21,](#page-22-10) [BGL](#page-21-9)⁺22, [SZM21,](#page-31-12) [HRC21c,](#page-25-8) [BBP22,](#page-21-10) [TH21,](#page-32-9) [BGH](#page-21-0)⁺23, [LLS](#page-27-12)⁺24, [WW21,](#page-32-10) [RRSM22a,](#page-30-8) [ERP22,](#page-23-10) [WWH21,](#page-32-11) [ZLWL23,](#page-33-13) [BBD](#page-21-8)⁺23, [LTZ22a,](#page-28-9) [TTJ23,](#page-32-8) [KJL](#page-26-11)⁺23, [LCLH22,](#page-27-8) [HRC23,](#page-25-9) [LTZ22b,](#page-28-10) [BLYZ23,](#page-22-0) [HGH](#page-25-7)⁺23, [LRC23,](#page-27-10) [EGP23,](#page-23-11) [LRCL23,](#page-27-11) [YW23,](#page-33-12) [DCC23,](#page-23-9) [LLHC23,](#page-27-9) [WTZ](#page-32-12)+22, [SSL](#page-31-13)+22, [RLS23,](#page-30-7) [ZWC23,](#page-33-14) $ZZY+21$ $ZZY+21$, [PSM23,](#page-29-12) [MPKM](#page-28-12)⁺22, [SSL](#page-31-11)⁺24, [WQW](#page-32-13)⁺24, [KKJ](#page-26-12)⁺24, [SM23b\]](#page-31-10). We will provide a comparative review of all peer-reviewed differential neural distinguishers to date in [Subsec](#page-11-0)[tion 6.3.](#page-11-0)

Research Directions in Neural Differential Cryptanalysis

In the following sections, we will give a survey-like overview of the work-to-date on explainability [\(Section 4\)](#page-5-0) and neural-aided key recovery [\(Section 5\)](#page-6-0). The main part of our remaining work will focus on a critical, comparative review of trained differential neural distinguishers [\(Section 6\)](#page-7-0). Based on this discussion, we will provide best practice recommendations for neural distinguisher training [\(Section 7\)](#page-16-0) and formulate the future challenges [\(Section 8\)](#page-17-0) for the field of Neural Differential Cryptanalysis.

4 Overview: Explainability of Differential Neural Distinguishers

Neural distinguishers enabling new attacks, potentially better than manual cryptanalysis, motivated researchers to try to understand what made these attacks so powerful and to learn new properties from these. The lack of explainability is the "machine's inability to explain its decisions and actions to human users" [\[GVWT21\]](#page-24-10). One of the major efforts in research on explainability was the 4-year program (2017-2021) "XAI" by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) of the United States Department of Defense *"DARPA's Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) Program"* [\[GA19\]](#page-24-11). A more recent review of the research in XAI is given in *"Interpreting Black-Box Models: A Review on Explainable Artificial Intelligence"* [\[HCM](#page-24-12)⁺24]. To this day, explainability is an active research field in AI and has resulted in various ways to add some explainability to a neural network, e.g. by pruning, ablation studies, or visualization techniques.

A. Gohr investigated the capabilities of provided neural networks by introducing a differential cryptanalytic task called the real differences experiment [\[Goh19a\]](#page-24-1). Then, the author looks at the feature importance and gives some evidence that the neural distinguishers exploit features outside the difference distribution table.

In [\[BGPT21\]](#page-21-1), Benamira *et al.* studied the properties of pairs that were correctly classified and proposed that Gohr's neural distinguishers learn differential-linear features. In particular, the authors observed that the pairs for which the score of the neural distinguisher at round 5 is high often follow a specific truncated differential pattern at round 3; a similar observation is made for rounds 6 and 4, leading to the authors proposing that the features learned by the neural distinguisher are differential-linear in nature. The authors further modified the neural network to use a Heaviside activation function, which forces its output to be 0 or 1, to study the Boolean functions learned on SPECK. From these, they derived advanced features that could be used to replace the initial 1D convolutions of Gohr's network. Later, the truncated differential observations from [\[BGPT21\]](#page-21-1) were used by [\[BGH](#page-21-0)⁺23] to automatically identify good input differences for neural distinguishers.

In [\[BBP22\]](#page-21-10), Bacuieti *et al.* further investigated the structure of the neural network itself. In particular, they used the *lottery ticket hypothesis* to prune Gohr's neural network to a minimal working version, on which they used feature visualization techniques to obtain a visual representation of the neural network's behavior. They additionally show that, for the case of SPECK32, there is no significant accuracy difference between the depth 1 neural network and the depth 10 version for Speck reduced to 7 and 8 rounds.

Ablation studies are routinely performed for neural networks to understand their sensitivity and fidelity under small perturbations on either the network itself or its input data. Ablation studies can give insights into the explainability of neural network models, as detailed, for example, in *"BASED-XAI: Breaking Ablation Studies Down for Explainable Artificial Intelligence"* [\[HSB](#page-25-10)⁺22], or *"Logic Rule Guided Attribution with Dynamic Ablation"* [\[ALH22\]](#page-20-5). In [\[YW23\]](#page-33-12), Yue *et al.* performed a data ablation study to observe trade-offs between improved accuracy and overfitting when using multiple ciphertext pairs per sample for differential neural distinguishers.

Chen *et al.* proposed a new concept named Informative Bit and a test called a Bit Sensitivity Test to identify those [\[CSY23\]](#page-22-11). The authors defined an informative bit as the ciphertext bit that is helpful in distinguishing between the cipher and a pseudo-random permutation. As such, this can be seen as an interpretability approach.

Deng *et al.* introduced the attention mechanism into the differential cryptanalysis on SPECK [\[DCC23\]](#page-23-9). The authors used a visualization algorithm to demonstrate the effectiveness of the attention mechanism and further analyze the features extracted from the ciphertext by deep learning. With this visualization technique, the authors evaluate on which bits the attention mechanism focuses most, which in turn provides interpretability results.

Hambitzer *et al.* introduced deep learning ensemble (NNBits) as a tool for bit-profiling and evaluation of cryptographic (pseudo) random bit sequences $[HGH⁺23]$ $[HGH⁺23]$. From the bit-level information provided by NNBits, the authors managed to partially explain the accuracy obtained by Gohr's depth-1 neural distinguisher in round 6 for SPECK32/64.

Liu *et al.* performed an interpretability analysis of two new neural distinguishers whose results are mainly reflected in the relationship between the neural distinguishers, truncated differential, and advantage bits [\[LRC23\]](#page-27-10). The authors considered the interpretability of the algorithm named the advantage bits search and investigated the types of bit positions preferred by the distinguisher.

Bao *et al.* developed explicit rules to be used alongside DDTs to enhance the effectiveness of distinguishers [\[BLYZ23\]](#page-22-0). The rules are based on strong correlations between bit values in the right pairs of XOR-differential propagation through addition modulo 2 *ⁿ*. The authors also show that those rules can be closely linked to the previous studies of the multi-bit constraints and the fixed-key differential probability. Finally, the authors concluded that by leveraging the value-dependent differential probability, it is possible to add additional knowledge to DDT-based distinguishers.

5 Overview: Neural Aided Key Recovery Attacks

As already stated, the turning point in the development of AI-based distinguishers was the work by A. Gohr that managed to obtain results rivaling (and surpassing) state-of-the-art results with manual cryptanalysis [\[Goh19a\]](#page-24-1). More precisely, Gohr obtained high accuracy for 6-round and 7-round neural distinguishers of Speck32/64 and achieved 11-round and 12-round key recovery attacks based on the neural distinguishers.

Bao *et al.* introduced the generalized neutral bits techniques and the framework of conditional differential neural cryptanalysis $[BGL^+21]$ $[BGL^+21]$. The authors improved the success rate of deep learning-assisted key recovery attacks, considering accuracies and the number of rounds of neural distinguishers, as well as the classical differential paths spliced in front of neural distinguishers. Moreover, they explored data complexity for deep learning-assisted key recovery attacks. Finally, they managed successful key recovery attacks on 13-round Speck32/64 and 16-round Simon32/64.

Hou *et al.* trained 9-round and 8-round differential distinguisher of SIMON32 based on deep residual neural networks. The authors managed to construct a last subkey recovery attack on 11-Round SIMON32 with practical data and time complexities [\[HRC21a\]](#page-25-0).

Tian and Hu trained a residual neural network to get the 7-, 8-, and 9-round neural distinguishers for SIMON32/64 [\[TH21\]](#page-32-9). Moreover, they performed a distinguishing attack and key-recovery attack against 15-round SIMON32/64.

Yadav and Kumar used an *r*-round classical differential distinguisher to build an $(r + s)$ -round ML-based differential distinguisher, where *s* denotes the rounds covered by the ML-based distinguisher [\[YK21a\]](#page-33-11). The authors demonstrated a reduction in data complexities of distinguishers for 9-round SPECK32, 12-round SIMON32, and 8-round GIFT64.

Ebrahimi *et al.* presented a Partial Differential (PD) ML-distinguisher and demonstrated its effectiveness on lightweight cipher SPECK32/64 [\[ERP22\]](#page-23-10). With this approach, the authors managed to train a partial ML distinguisher over 8-bits, which is almost as accurate as an equivalent ML distinguisher over the entire 32 bits for six rounds of SPECK32/64.

Lyu *et al.* improved upon Gohr's framework and applied it to Simeck32/64 [\[LTZ22a\]](#page-28-9). The authors obtained 8/9/10-round neural differential distinguishers for Simeck32/64 and recovered the penultimate round and last round subkeys for 13/14/15-round Simeck32/64 with low data complexity and time complexity.

Bao *et al.* developed ML-based key-recovery attacks on more extended round-reduced Speck32/64 [$BGL+22$]. With their approach, the authors achieved an improved 12-round and the first practical 13-round attacks. Moreover, the authors provided the first practical 16-round-based key-recovery attack on Simon32/64.

Chen *et al.* proposed a Neural-Aided Statistical Attack (NASA) running experiments on round reduced Speck32/64, DES, and Speck96/96 [\[CSY23\]](#page-22-11). With this approach, the authors break 10-round DES while Gohr's attack breaks 8-round DES.

Chen *et al.* proposed a neural distinguisher that considers multiple ciphertext pairs simultaneously and builds multiple ciphertext pairs from different keys [\[CSYY23\]](#page-23-8). The authors consider five round-reduced ciphers: Speck32/64, Chaskey, PRESENT, DES, and SHA3-256, and show reduced data complexity of the attack.

Bao *et al.* provided explicit rules to be used alongside DDTs to enhance the effectiveness of distinguishers compared to pure DDT-based distinguishers [\[BLYZ23\]](#page-22-0). The authors successfully conducted a 14-round key recovery attack on Speck32/64.

Kim *et al.* considered lightweight block ciphers (S-DES, S-AES, and S-SPECK) and showed a reduction in the number of parameters required for training and an increase in the average of bit accuracy probability compared with previous state-of-the-art work [\[KLK](#page-26-5)⁺23].

Lin *et al.* presented practical key recovery attacks on KATAN ciphers [\[LCLH22\]](#page-27-8). More precisely, the authors provided practical key recovery attacks on the 125-round KATAN32, 106-round KATAN48, and 95-round KATAN64.

Lin *et al.* proposed a conditional differential analysis framework that is based on deep learning with the multi-differential neural distinguishers [\[LLHC23\]](#page-27-9). The authors presented practical key recovery attacks on the 97-round KATAN32, 82-round KATAN48, and 70-round KATAN64.

Teng *et al.* constructed neural distinguishers for the LBC-IoT and SLIM block ciphers [\[TTJ23\]](#page-32-8). The authors showed a practical-time key recovery attack on LBC-IoT for up to 8 rounds.

Yue and Wu showed a better accuracy of the 7-round differential neural distinguisher for Speck32/64 compared to the one from A. Gohr [\[YW23\]](#page-33-12). The authors demonstrated a key recovery attack on 8 rounds of Speck32/64.

Zhang *et al.* provided practical key recovery attacks on SIMECK32/64, improved the 15-round attack, and launched the first practical 16-, 17-round key recovery attacks for SIMECK32/64 [\[ZLWL23\]](#page-33-13).

6 Comparative Review: Differential Neural Distinguishers

In the following, we provide a comparative review of all trained differential neural distinguishers to date. First, all investigated neural network architectures to date are reviewed [\(Subsection 6.1\)](#page-8-0), then we detail the classification scheme [\(Subsection 6.2\)](#page-9-0) and finalize with a comparative review of the best differential neural distinguishers for each symmetric primitive [\(Subsection 6.3\)](#page-11-0).

6.1 Architectures

In deep learning, various specialized layers and mechanisms^{[1](#page-8-1)} optimize neural networks. To date, a number of different neural network architectures have been employed in Neural Differential Cryptanalysis.

 $N \mathcal{D}_{\text{Gohr}}$ N $\mathcal{D}_{\text{Gohr}}$ is the original neural network architecture as introduced by Gohr in [\[Goh19a\]](#page-24-1). It consists of an initial reshaping that "mirrors the word-oriented structure of the cipher", a single bit-sliced convolution, a residual convolutional tower of two different possible depths (depth-1, depth-10), and, finally, a fully connected prediction head. A staged training approach in combination with an elaborate additional training procedure is required to obtain the 8-round distinguisher for [SPECK.](#page-43-0) $N\mathcal{D}_{\rm Gohr}$ has subsequently been used on ten primitives [\(CHASKEY,](#page-35-0) [DES,](#page-35-1) [KATAN,](#page-37-0) [LBCIoT,](#page-38-0) [PRESENT,](#page-39-0) [SIMECK,](#page-40-0) [SIMON,](#page-41-0) [SLIM,](#page-42-0) [SPECK,](#page-43-0) [SHA3\)](#page-39-1) by [\[BGPT21,](#page-21-1) [HRC21c,](#page-25-8) [SZM21,](#page-31-12) [TH21,](#page-32-9) [WW21,](#page-32-10) [BB22,](#page-20-4) [LCLH22,](#page-27-8) [LTZ22b,](#page-28-10) [WTZ](#page-32-12)⁺22, [CSY23,](#page-22-11) [CSYY23,](#page-23-8) [EGP23,](#page-23-11) [HGH](#page-25-7)⁺23, [LLHC23,](#page-27-9) [LRCL23,](#page-27-11) [RLS23,](#page-30-7) [TTJ23,](#page-32-8) [ZWC23,](#page-33-14) [ZLWL23,](#page-33-13) [WQW](#page-32-13)+24]. A non-peer-reviewed work by Gohr, Leander, and Neumann [\[GLN22\]](#page-24-3) provides a thorough investigation of relevant hyperparameters when adapting $N\mathcal{D}_{\text{Gohr}}$ to a new primitive. Variants of Gohr's original network have been created: $N\mathcal{D}_{\text{Gohr}}^{\text{pruned}}$ is a pruned version of $N\mathcal{D}_{\text{Gohr}}$ for [SPECK](#page-43-0) introduced in [\[BBP22\]](#page-21-10). $\mathcal{ND}^{\rm{attntn.}}_{\rm{Gohr}}$ was introduced in [\[DCC23\]](#page-23-9) and adds an attention mechanism to $\mathcal{ND}_{\rm{Gohr}}$ and applies it to [SPECK.](#page-43-0) [\[HGH](#page-25-7)⁺23] uses an ensemble of $\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\text{Gohr}}\left(\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\text{Gohr}}^{\text{ensmbl.}}\right)$ to explain the accuracy of Gohr's network on [SPECK.](#page-43-0) A variant of Gohr's network that uses a separable convolution instead of the traditional one $(ND_{\text{Gohr}}^{\text{sep,conv.}})$ was introduced in [\[LRC23\]](#page-27-10) and applied to [SPECK](#page-43-0) with the motivation to save training cost.

Convolutional Neural Networks without residual connections [\(CNNs](#page-8-2)) have been investigated in [\[BB22\]](#page-20-4), and it was concluded that "CNNs are not suitable for the purpose of finding a distinguisher". This is contradicted in [\[BR21\]](#page-22-10). Moreover, [\[WWH21\]](#page-32-11) builds CNN-based neural differential distinguishers for [PRESENT](#page-39-0) and [SPECK.](#page-43-0) [\[MPKM](#page-28-12)⁺22] compares CNNs and MLPs on GIFT and PRIDE, where MLPs give better accuracies. [DenseNet](#page-8-2) is a variant of CNNs in which every convolutional layer is directly connected to *all following* downstream layers. It has been used by [\[SM23b\]](#page-31-10) on SPECK-32.

[DBitNet](#page-8-3) DBitNet was introduced in [\[BGH](#page-21-0)+23] as a "cipher-agnostic" neural network that aims to avoid SPECK-dedicated features of N_{Cohr} . It is based on *dilated convolutional* layers. In a dilated convolution, the convolution kernel is not learning dependencies between neighboring neurons but between neurons that are farther apart. In this way, [DBitNet](#page-8-3) aims to avoid the input reshaping and bit-slicing convolution of $N\mathcal{D}_{G\text{ohr}}$. No-tably, using a simple staged^{[2](#page-8-4)} training pipeline, and a simple additional polishing step, the same accuracy as Gohr is obtained for [SPECK.](#page-43-0) It has been employed in [\[BGH](#page-21-0)⁺23]

¹We give a short introduction to the needed vocabulary to understand the various architectures used for Neural Differential Cryptanalysis: MLPs employ *densely* connected layers in which every neuron in layer *i* is connected to all neurons in layer *i* − 1. This leads to a large number of parameters. A *convolutional layer*, the basis for CNNs (Convolutional Neural Networks), uses filters to scan the input, requiring more computations (FLOPs or MACs) than densely connected layers but excelling in capturing spatial hierarchies. The *inception module* enhances feature capture by using multiple parallel convolutional operations with different kernel sizes, concatenating the outputs for richer feature extraction. *Residual connections* allow information to bypass layers in RESNets (Residual Neural Networks), preventing blockages and enhancing information flow during training. *LSTM* is a type of RNN (recurrent neural network) that captures long-term dependencies in sequential data with memory cells and gating mechanisms and is effective in tasks like time-series prediction. *Attention mechanisms* are the basis for modern transformer neural networks, dynamically focusing on important input parts and improving tasks like translation or generative AI.

²*Staged training* refers to the method to continue training the best *r* − 1 round neural differential distinguisher in round *r*.

to automatically generate distinguishers for seven primitives [\(SPECK,](#page-43-0) [SIMON,](#page-41-0) [HIGHT,](#page-37-1) [PRESENT,](#page-39-0) [KATAN,](#page-37-0) [TEA and XTEA,](#page-44-0) [LEA\)](#page-38-1).

MLP The [MLP](#page-9-1) (Multi-Layer Perceptron) is a neural network architecture in which subsequent layers are densely connected. MLPs are often outperformed by residual networks and CNNs. However, they are generally computationally more lightweight, which motivates many works $[BR21, YK21a, ZZY+21, BB22, ERP22, RRSM22a, SSL+22,$ $BBD+23$ $BBD+23$, [PSM23,](#page-29-12) [KKJ](#page-26-12)+24, [SSL](#page-31-11)+24] on diverse primitives [\(ASCON,](#page-34-5) [FF1 and FF3,](#page-35-2) [GIFT,](#page-36-0) [GIMLI,](#page-36-1) [KNOT,](#page-38-2) [PRESENT,](#page-39-0) [SIMECK,](#page-40-0) [SIMON,](#page-41-0) [SPECK,](#page-43-0) [TEA and XTEA,](#page-44-0) [TinyJAMBU\)](#page-44-1) to investigate their potential as a differential neural distinguisher.

Long-short term memory cells $(ISTMs)$ were used in [\[BB22,](#page-20-4) [SSL](#page-31-13)⁺22] on [GIMLI,](#page-36-1) [TinyJAMBU,](#page-44-1) and [GIFT.](#page-36-0) [\[BB22\]](#page-20-4) investigated CNNs in comparison to *Long Short-Term Memory Networks* (LSTMs) and MLPs on the GIMLI-PERMUTATION and found that MLPs perform best. In contrast, [\[SSL](#page-31-13)+22] compared LSTMs and MLPs on TinyJAMBU and GIFT and obtained better neural distinguishers using LSTMs.

Inception In the Inception architecture *[\(INC\)](#page-9-2)*, a layer inspired by GoogLeNet's Inception module replaces at least one of the (convolutional) layers of the original $N\mathcal{D}_{\text{Gohr}}$ architecture. The Inception module consists of multiple parallel convolutional layers that process the module input using a variety of kernel sizes. This might allow for extracting features that could not be extracted with one specific kernel size.

[\[ZWC23,](#page-33-14) [ZLWL23\]](#page-33-13) construct the [INC](#page-9-2) architecture by replacing the initial convolutional block of $N \mathcal{D}_{\text{Gohr}}$ and obtain neural distinguishes for [SIMECK,](#page-40-0) [PRESENT,](#page-39-0) [CHASKEY,](#page-35-0) and [DES.](#page-35-1) [\[YW23\]](#page-33-12) construct [INC](#page-9-2) by replacing the convolutional layers in the residual blocks of $N \mathcal{D}_{Gohr}$ and apply this architecture to [SPECK.](#page-43-0)

[\[BLYZ23\]](#page-22-0) introduces the idea of staged training together with a partially frozen network [\(INC](#page-9-2)freeze). The underlying idea for the freezing of particular layers is that "convolutional layers are viewed as feature extractors" (which can be reused in subsequent rounds and can therefore be frozen), while "fully connected layers are viewed as a classifier" (which have to be updated when training a new round).

Others. In [\[KJL](#page-26-11)⁺23], the first quantum neural network based distinguisher [\(Quantum\)](#page-9-3) is built for [SPECK.](#page-43-0) [SENet](#page-9-3) stands for Squeeze-and-Excitation network and was used for the first time as a neural differential distinguisher in $[BGL+22]$ $[BGL+22]$. [SENet](#page-9-3) introduces a new building block for CNN that improves the finding of channel interdependencies at almost no computational cost. [\[BGL](#page-21-9)⁺22] applied [SENet](#page-9-3) to [SPECK](#page-43-0) and [SIMON.](#page-41-0) [SE-ResNet](#page-9-3) was first used as differential neural distinguisher by $[LLS+24]$ $[LLS+24]$, motivated by "the success of $\mathcal{N}D_{\text{Gohr}}$ on SPECK [\[Goh19a\]](#page-24-1) and [SENet](#page-9-3) on SIMON [\[BGL](#page-21-9)+22]". [\[LLS](#page-27-12)+24] apply [SE-ResNet](#page-9-3) to [SIMON](#page-41-0) and [SIMECK.](#page-40-0)

Note that $[BGL+22]$ $[BGL+22]$ also investigates **DenseNet**; it is, however, surpassed by [SENet](#page-9-3) and, therefore, does not appear in the following compilation of best neural distinguishers. Gohr's analysis was performed within the secret key chosen-plaintext attack (SK / CPA) model. We do not consider the following neural distinguisher that was trained under a different attack model: [\[PPWR23\]](#page-29-11) uses generative AI trained in an adaptively chosen ciphertext or known key scenario to distinguish 10-round SPECK32/64. We report [Classical ML](#page-9-3) results, such as SVM in $[BBD+23]$ $[BBD+23]$, on the rare occasion that they are competitive with neural distinguishers.

6.2 Classification Scheme *n***-***m***-***T* **-***E* **for Neural Distinguishers**

The abundance of different settings used to train neural distinguishers sometimes makes it difficult to compare two results. In $[\text{BGH}^+23]$, the authors propose a classification of neural distinguishers based on their distinctive features, labeled *n, m, T*, and *E*. We use that classification in our review.

6.2.1 Number of ciphertexts per sample: *n*

In [\[Goh19a\]](#page-24-1), the scores output by a distinguisher trained to recognize single pairs are combined for multiple pairs with the same labels during the key recovery process, effectively increasing the strength of the signal and resulting classification accuracy. In [\[GLN22\]](#page-24-3), the authors note that this notion was rediscovered in several papers and propose a score combining formula to transform a single pair classifier into a multiple pair classifier, while other works, such as $[BGPT21]$, used the less effective score averaging. In $[SSL+24]$ $[SSL+24]$, the authors propose to replace scores aggregation with an [MLP](#page-9-1) to classify based on the scores of multiple pairs.

In this classification, we consider the number of ciphertexts per sample used in the distinguisher training, independently of external scores aggregation through averaging or otherwise. This notion was introduced in [\[BGPT21\]](#page-21-1), who built a neural distinguisher accepting multiple pairs at once. The Multiple Output Difference (MOD) format, introduced in [\[HRC21c\]](#page-25-8), consists in concatenating not multiple pairs, but their respective differences, i.e., $C_0 \oplus C_1||C_2 \oplus C_3 \ldots$ In [\[CSYY23\]](#page-23-8), two different settings are explored: one where the *k* pairs that form a sample share the same key and one where they do not. The authors note that compared to [\[GLN22\]](#page-24-3), no additional features seem to be learned by gathering multiple pairs, compared to a single pair distinguisher and score aggregation. They also propose the data reuse strategy, in which the number of multi-pair samples created from a set of pairs is increased through picking with replacement. In [\[ZWC23\]](#page-33-14), the authors raise the question of the number of samples to use when the number of pairs per sample increases and consider two scenarios for training: one where the number of pairs is fixed to 10^7 and one where the number of (multi-pair) samples is set to 10^7 . The authors conclude that fixing the number of pairs to $10⁷$ (and hence obtaining a training set with $\frac{10^7}{n}$ entries) leads to overfitting, fluctuations in validation accuracy, and slow convergence of the model. Finally, in e.g., $[SSL+22]$ $[SSL+22]$, the authors consider polytopic samples with multiple input differences, where the used plaintexts are $(P, P \oplus \delta_0, P \oplus \delta_1, \ldots)$, effectively building k relevant pairs from $k+1$ plaintexts. A similar technique is referred to as mixture differential in $[WQW^+24]$ $[WQW^+24]$.

6.2.2 Number of input differences: *m*

Baksi *et al.* [\[BB22\]](#page-20-4) explore a setting where a set of *m* input differences are considered. This setting was applied to various permutations: KNOT, ASCON, CHASKEY, and GIMLI, with $m = 2$ for GIMLI. Su *et al.* [\[SZM21\]](#page-31-12) introduced a model called polytope differential neural network distinguisher. In this model, multiple differences are used, keeping one plaintext fixed among the differences and changing the other. In $[WTZ^+22]$ $[WTZ^+22]$, propose a multiple input difference scheme called ND*am*, where the first ciphertext is the encryption of a random plaintext P_0 , each subsequent ciphertext C_i is the encryption of $P_{i-1} \oplus \Delta_{i-1}$ so that $n = m + 1$.

6.2.3 Feature engineering type: *T*

Feature engineering is often used in machine learning to derive advanced features from the raw dataset, e.g., [\[GBC17\]](#page-24-13). A natural feature to use for differential neural cryptanalysis is to replace the ciphertext pairs $(T = \text{CT})$ by their XOR difference $(T = \delta)$. This approach, used by works such as Baksi *et al.* [\[BB22\]](#page-20-4), Zezhou *et al.* [\[HRC21c\]](#page-25-8), and Yadav *et al.* [\[YK21a\]](#page-33-11), simplifies the training process, at the cost of losing some information.

Advanced types of feature engineering $(T = A)$ include, e.g., partial decryption of the ciphertexts. For instance, in the case of SPECK32, the right half of the previous round state can be computed without the key by XORing the two halves and rotating. This type of feature engineering was used in [\[BGPT21\]](#page-21-1). A similar technique permits the retrieval of the difference in the previous round for SIMON-like ciphers; $[BGL^+22]$ $[BGL^+22]$ showed that this transformation could significantly improve the accuracies of neural distinguishers, and $[LLS+24]$ $[LLS+24]$ exhibited even better distinguishers on SIMON by exploiting inferred information from two rounds ahead; their data format is composed of the two ciphertexts, the difference at the previous round, and the difference two rounds before using subkey 0 for decryption. We refer to such types of feature engineering as A for Advanced. Finally, in [\[LRCL23\]](#page-27-11), two formats labeled by the authors as MRMSD (Multiple Rounds Multiple Splicing Differences) and MRMSP (Multiple Rounds Multiple Splicing Pairs) use partial decryption with a random key for one round; in the first case, the output difference and this estimated previous round difference are given to the neural distinguisher; in the second case, the corresponding ciphertexts are given. In [\[YW23\]](#page-33-12), the authors use data format $(R_{r-1}, R'_{r-1}, d_l, C_0, C_1)$ for SPECK, where d_l is an estimation of the difference in the left part at round $r - 1$, computed as $((L_r \boxminus R_{r-1}) \oplus (L'_r \boxminus R'_{r-1})$, equivalent to partial decryption with key 0.

6.2.4 Type of distinguishing experiment: *E*

In the initial setting $[Goh19b]$ ($E = R$), the samples are $E_K(P_0)||E_K(P_0 \oplus x)$, and the label is $x = \delta$. Gohr additionally defines the *real ciphertext* experiment $(E = R_M)$, where the samples are $E_K(P_0) \oplus x||E_K(P_0 \oplus \delta) \oplus x$, and the label is $x \stackrel{?}{=} 0$, i.e., the distinguisher determines whether the ciphertext pair has been XORed with a random mask. The success of neural distinguishers in this experiment shows that information beyond a simple XOR difference is learned.

In [\[BB22\]](#page-20-4)'s model 1, the samples are formed as $(E_K(P) \oplus E_K(P \oplus \delta_i)), i \in [0; m-1]$, and the label is i ($E = D$).

In [\[BR21\]](#page-22-10), the samples are built using modular addition difference, rather than XOR, to analyze the ciphers TEA and RAIDEN $(E = R^+)$.

In [\[EGP23\]](#page-23-11), the samples are built through rotational-XOR differences rather than XOR, which we denote by $E = R^+$.

6.3 Comparative Review

Based on the full body of research in Neural Differential Cryptanalysis [\(Subsection 3.1\)](#page-3-2), this section provides a comparative review of all best published neural distinguishers, classified according to the previously introduced scheme, together with their neural net-work architecture [\(Subsection 6.1\)](#page-8-0). The comparative review for all symmetric primitives [\(ASCON,](#page-34-5) [CHASKEY,](#page-35-0) [DES,](#page-35-1) [FF1 and FF3,](#page-35-2) [GIFT,](#page-36-0) [GIMLI,](#page-36-1) [HIGHT,](#page-37-1) [KATAN,](#page-37-0) [KNOT,](#page-38-2) [LBCIoT,](#page-38-0) [LEA,](#page-38-1) [PRESENT,](#page-39-0) [PRIDE,](#page-39-2) [SHA3,](#page-39-1) [SIMECK,](#page-40-0) [SIMON,](#page-41-0) [SKINNY,](#page-41-1) [SLIM,](#page-42-0) [SPECK,](#page-43-0) [TEA and XTEA,](#page-44-0) [TinyJAMBU\)](#page-44-1) can be found in the appendix. Here, we show several examples.

The neural differential distinguishers of each publication were selected as follows: *i)* We present the *best* result of each work, either the standard setting $(2-1-CT-R)$ or $2-1-\delta-R$ or an alternative setting $(n-m-T-E)$. If additionally a result in the standard setting is given, we will present it as well. *ii)* In most works, no error margins on the results are provided, preventing us from displaying them. Ideally, the accuracies shown should be test accuracies on sets of several fresh samples. However, in many works, only the validation accuracy is reported. *iii)* Some works, such aa [\[YK21a\]](#page-33-11), consider the concatenation of an *r*-round probabilistic differential distinguisher and an *s*-round neural distinguisher. In

this table, we focus solely on the neural distinguisher part. Note that from a machine learning and a statistical perspective, the number of training and validation samples is very important. However, from a cryptographic perspective, the number of needed encryptions, i.e., ciphertexts, is more relevant. Accordingly, the numbers reported in the following under **Trn.** (training data) and **Val.** (validation data) are the number of *ciphertexts*.

6.3.1 ASCON

ASCON is an SPN-based permutation with an input size of 320 bits. It can be used within a sponge construction to build the authenticated ciphers ASCON-128 and ASCON-128a, both using 128 bit keys and 12 rounds in the initialisation, and respectively 64 and 128 bit messages, and 6 and 8 rounds in the encryption process. The hash function ASCON-hash, also based on sponge construction, hashes 64-bit messages over 12 rounds. ASCON was announced as the winner of the NIST Lightweight Cryptography Competition in February 2023.

[\[SSL](#page-31-11)+24] train neural differential distinguishers for the 4-round ASCON-PERMUTATION with an accuracy of 0.5069 in the standard setting $(2-1- δ -R)$, and can improve the accuracy to 0.6925 by training another neural network to classify based on the distribution of multiple scores. We do not include this result in the table, as it is a system where the neural distinguisher part is run separately on single pairs rather than a neural distinguisher accepting multiple pairs.

Table 1: Overview of the Differential Neural Distinguishers for ASCON.

Primitive	Arch.	Class	Trn.	Val.	AutoND	Rounds	Acc.	Ref.
ASCON-PERM MLP		$2 - 2 - \delta - D$ 1.1M		T I M			0.9861	[BB22]
			Classical ML $2-2-6-D$ 64K $(2 \cdot 2^{14.96})$ 16K $(2 \cdot 2^{12.96})$					BBD^+23
	MLP	$2 - 1 - \delta - R$	20M	20M			0.5069	$[SSL + 24]$
ASCON (Rate) Classical ML 2-2-5-D 64K $(2 \cdot 2^{14.96})$ 16K $(2 \cdot 2^{12.96})$								0.916 BBD +23

Class: *n*-*m*-*T*-*E*, from [Subsection 6.2.](#page-9-0) Under this convention, Gohr's initial experiments are 2-1-CT-R, and the results obtained in greyed out settings *n*-*m*-*T*-*E* are not directly comparable. **AutoND:** indicates if the neural distinguisher was automatically generated (\checkmark) or is the result of an elaborate, manually designed training procedure (-).

6.3.2 GIFT

GIFT is a PRESENT-inspired SPN cipher, using 128-bit keys to encrypt 64-bit (GIFT64) or 128-bit (GIFT128) blocks for 28 and 40 rounds, respectively. GIFT was one of the finalists of the NIST Lightweight Cryptography Competition.

In $[ZZY^+21]$ $[ZZY^+21]$ [†], the authors claim a distinguisher on 7 rounds because the training accuracy is 0.6487, despite the validation accuracy being non-significant (0.5002); in the table, we report this 7 rounds distinguisher as it is the best one claimed by the authors, but also their 6-round distinguisher, which has a significant validation accuracy.

In $[MPKM+22]$ $[MPKM+22]$ [†], the authors claim a full round distinguisher on GIFT-64 with over 90% accuracy, using 2^{20} polytopic samples (composed of 3 ciphertexts each) in total, of which 15% are kept for validation, respectively testing, and a simple [MLP](#page-9-1) architecture; they also claim a full round distinguisher on PRIDE with 100% accuracy. Full-round attacks on modern and reputable ciphers are an extraordinary claim and require extraordinary evidence, which the author's manuscript does not provide.

In [\[RRSM22a\]](#page-30-8), only 10K samples are used for training and testing; as a result, the distinguishers in Table 5 exhibit significant overfitting (e.g., 92% training accuracy and 25% testing accuracy for M1 on 6 rounds).

Primitive	Arch.	Class	Trn.	Val.	AutoND	Rounds	Acc.	Ref.
GIFT-64	MLP	$2-1-\delta-R$	67M $(2 \cdot 2^{25})$	67M	$\overline{}$		0.65	YK21al
	LSTM	$3-2-CT-R$	$17M (2 \cdot 2^{23})$	$4M (2 \cdot 2^{21})$			0.5754	$[SSL+22]$
	MLP	$3 - 2 - \delta - R$	2.2M	0.5M		FULL.	0.96	$NPKM+22$ [†]
GIFT-128	MLP	$2 - 1 - \delta - R$	20M	2M	$\overline{}$		0.5542	$[SSL+24]$
TweGIFT-128	MLP	$2-1-CT-R$	2M	200K	-		0.5675	[ZZY+21]
	MLP	$2-1-CT-R$	2M	200K	-		0.5002	$[ZZY^+21]$
GIFT-COFB	MLP	$2 - 4 - \delta - D$	20K	20K			0.615	[RRSM22a]

Table 2: Overview of the Differential Neural Distinguishers for GIFT.

Class: *n*-*m*-*T*-*E*, from [Subsection 6.2.](#page-9-0) Under this convention, Gohr's initial experiments are 2-1-CT-R, and the results obtained in greyed out settings *n*-*m*-*T*-*E* are not directly comparable. **AutoND:** indicates if the neural distinguisher was automatically generated (\checkmark) or is the result of an elaborate, manually designed training procedure (-).

† A critical discussion of these results is provided in the text.

6.3.3 KATAN

KATAN is a family of FSR-based block ciphers with block sizes 32, 48, or 64, key size 80, and 254 rounds. For KATAN32, [\[BGH](#page-21-0)+23] reaches statistically significant accuracies up to 69 rounds in an automatically generated distinguisher, and note that this can be improved to a 71-round distinguisher with 0.5034 ± 0.0002 accuracy using their simple polishing step. In contrast, [\[LCLH22\]](#page-27-8) reaches 51 rounds in the standard setting, and 59 when using 64 pairs. In [\[LLHC23,](#page-27-9) [LCLH22\]](#page-27-8), the authors prepend a conditional probability 1 differential on *r* rounds (which holds based on conditions on the equality of some plaintext and key bits) to an *s* rounds neural distinguisher. For these distinguishers, we write $(r + s)$ to highlight which part is purely neural. In [\[LLHC23\]](#page-27-9), these distinguishers lead to practical key recovery on 97, 82, 70 rounds of KATAN32, 48 and 64 in the single key model. In [\[LCLH22\]](#page-27-8), practical key recoveries are obtained for 125, 106 and 95 rounds respectively, in the related key scenario. Single-key conditional neural distinguishers are also mentioned in [\[LCLH22\]](#page-27-8) for 85, 72 and 61 rounds respectively, but the $r + s$ decomposition is not given so we omit them in the table.

Primitive	Arch.	Class	Trn.	Val.	AutoND	Rounds	Acc.	Ref.
KATAN32	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_\mathrm{Gohr}$	$2-1-\delta-R$	20M	2M	\overline{a}	51	0.533	[LCLH22]
	$N\mathcal{D}_{\rm Gohr}$	$64 - 1 - \delta - R$	64M	6.4M		$(26+58)$ 84*	0.602	LLHC23
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$128 - 1 - \delta - R$	1280M	128M		59	0.575	LCLH22
	DBitNet	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M		69	0.505	$[BGH^+23]$
$\text{KATAN}32^{\,\text{RK}}$	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$128 - 1 - \delta - R$	1280M	128M		$66 + 46$ $112*$	0.647	LCLH22
KATAN48	$\mathcal{ND}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$64 - 1 - \delta - R$	64M	6.4M		$72*(25+47)$	0.5820	LLHC23
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_\mathrm{Gohr}$	$2-1-\delta-R$	20M	2M	-	40	0.58	[LCLH22]
	$N\mathcal{D}_{\rm Gohr}$	$96 - 1 - \delta - R$	960M	96M		50	0.54	LCLH22
$\text{KATAN48}^{\, \text{RK}}$	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$48 - 1 - \delta - R$	960M	96M		$96*(57+39)$	0.625	LCLH22
KATAN64	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$64 - 1 - \delta - R$	64M	6.4M		$61^{\circ}(25+26)$	0.6130	LLHC23
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_\mathrm{Gohr}$	$2-1-\delta-R$	20M	2M	-	31	0.718	[LCLH22]
	$\mathcal{ND}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$128 - 1 - \delta - R$	1280M	128M		36	0.548	LCLH22
KATAN64 ^{RK}	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$128 - 1 - \delta - R$	1280M	128M		$(54+32)$ $86*$	0.728	LCLH22

Table 3: Overview of the Differential Neural Distinguishers for KATAN.

Class: *n*-*m*-*T*-*E*, from [Subsection 6.2.](#page-9-0) Under this convention, Gohr's initial experiments are 2-1-CT-R, and the results obtained in greyed out settings *n*-*m*-*T*-*E* are not directly comparable. **AutoND:** indicates if the neural distinguisher was automatically generated (\checkmark) or is the result of an elaborate, manually designed training procedure (-).

 $\prescript{\text{RK}}{}$ Related key setting.

 $*(r + s)$ means an *s*-round neural distinguisher with *r* are prepended rounds.

6.3.4 PRESENT

PRESENT is an SPN-based block cipher, encrypting 64-bit blocks with 80 (PRESENT-80) or 128-bit keys (PRESENT-128) for 31 rounds.

In $[BGH^+23]$ $[BGH^+23]$, a 9-round distinguisher with an accuracy of 0.5092 is given, which favorably compares to the 7-round distinguishers of [\[CSYY23\]](#page-23-8), despite [\[CSYY23\]](#page-23-8) using 4 pairs per sample; on the other hand, [\[ZW22a\]](#page-33-2) obtains a slightly higher accuracy, at the cost of using 32 ciphertexts per samples. In comparison, the best differential characteristic for PRESENT reduced to 9 rounds has probability 2^{-36} [\[Wan07\]](#page-32-14).

Table 4: Overview of the Differential Neural Distinguishers for PRESENT.

Primitive	Arch.	Class	Trn.	Val.	AutoND	Rounds	Acc.	Ref.
PRESENT	CNN	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2М			0.533	WWH21]
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M			0.563	GLN22
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$8-1$ -CT-R	20M	2M			0.5853	CSYY23
	CNN.	$2 - 2 - \delta - D$	20M	2M			0.515	WWH21
	DBitNet	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M		8	0.512	$[BGH^+23]$
	INC-	$32-1-CT-R$	320M	32M			0.5416	ZWC23
PRESENT-64/80 ^{RK}	MLP	$6-1-\delta-R$	$6.3M*$	$1.6M*$		5	0.614	$\left[$ PSM23 $\right]$
___	CNN	$2 - 2 - \delta - D$	20M	2M			0.517	WWH21

 R_K Related key setting.

[\[PSM23\]](#page-29-12) uses 2^{20} samples, each composed of 3 pairs, i.e., 6.3M ciphertexts for training, and one quarter as many pairs, i.e., 1.6M ciphertexts for validation.

Class: *n*-*m*-*T*-*E*, from [Subsection 6.2.](#page-9-0) Under this convention, Gohr's initial experiments are 2-1-CT-R, and the results obtained in greyed out settings *n*-*m*-*T*-*E* are not directly comparable. **AutoND:** indicates if the neural distinguisher was automatically generated (\checkmark) or is the result of an elaborate, manually designed training procedure (-). The work [\[GLN22\]](#page-24-3) of Gohr, Leander, and Neumann was not peer-reviewed.

6.3.5 SPECK

SPECK is a family of ARX block ciphers, denoted SPECK-B/K, that encrypt blocks of size *B* with a key of size *K*. SPECK-32/64, SPECK-48/96, SPECK-64/128, SPECK-96/96, and SPECK-128/256 have 22, 23, 27, 29, and 34 rounds, respectively. Neural differential distinguishers have been built for a versions of SPECK.

For SPECK-32, the best accuracies are reported when multiple the number of ciphertexts *n* is increased, as is done in [\[BBD](#page-21-8)+23] $(n = 2)$, [\[HRC21c,](#page-25-8) [CSYY23\]](#page-23-8) $(n = 64)$, [\[LRCL23\]](#page-27-11) $(n = 128)$. Currently, the best accuracy of 93.9% in round 8 of SPECK-32 is obtained by [CSYY23] [CSYY23] [CSYY23] when using $n = 64$. In the standard setting $(2-1-CTR)$ [\[BGH](#page-21-0)^{+23]} reach the same accuracy as [\[Goh19b\]](#page-24-14) with an automated pipeline that is not dedicated to $SPECTS³$ $SPECTS³$ $SPECTS³$. In terms of larger state experiments, two automated pipelines reach 7, respectively 8 rounds of SPECK-64 [\[WW21,](#page-32-10) [BGH](#page-21-0)⁺23]. The 8-round accuracies can be improved when increasing the number of ciphertext pairs to $n = 128$, respectively $n = 256$, and using MRMSD feature engineering [\[HRC21c,](#page-25-8) [LRCL23\]](#page-27-11). For SPECK-96, [\[CSY23\]](#page-22-11) obtains the first 7-round distinguisher, while for SPECK-128, $[BGH⁺23]$ $[BGH⁺23]$ obtains the first 10-round neural distinguisher in an automated pipeline.

³We note that [\[BLYZ23\]](#page-22-0) states that "the simple training pipeline [of [\[BGH](#page-21-0)⁺23]] did not produce $\mathcal{N}Ds$ with the same accuracy as Gohr's on 8-round Speck32/64; it needs a further polishing step to achieve similar accuracy, demanding more time and data" which is not entirely correct: While in [\[BGH](#page-21-0)+23], a polishing step is indeed needed to achieve the same accuracy, the polishing step is a *highly simplified* version of the 8-round training scheme used by Gohr (in conclusion, it does *not* demand more time or data).

Primitive	Arch.	Class	Trn.	Val.	AutoND	Rounds	Acc.	Ref.
SPECK-32	MLP	$2-1-\delta-R$	209M	105M		3	0.79	[YK21a]
	Quantum	$2-1-CT-R$		$2\mathrm{K}$		$\overline{5}$	0.53	$\rm [KJL^{+}23]^{+}$
	CNN	$2-2-\delta-D$	20M	2M		5	0.959	WWH21
	$\mathcal{ND}_{\text{Gohr}}^{\text{ensmbl.}}$	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M		6	0.781	HGH+23]
	МLP	$2-1-\delta-R$	20M	2M		6	0.72	ERP22
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$100 - 1 - A - R$	20M	2M		6		BGPT21
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}^{\rm pruned}_{\rm Gohr}$	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M		7	0.596	BBP22
	DenseNet	$2-1-\delta-R$	2M	2M		7	0.531	[SM23b]†
	CNN	$2-2-\delta-D$	20M	2M		7	0.599	WWH21
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\text{Gohr}}$	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M	✓	7	0.614	WW21]
	$\mathcal{ND}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}^{\mathrm{atitin.}}$	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M		7	0.6169	DCC23l
	CNN	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M		7	0.618	WWH21]
	$ND^{\text{attntn}}_{\alpha}$ Sephr _{ony}	16-1-CT-R	160M	16M		7	0.728	DCC23
	Gohr	8-1-CT-R	80M	8M		7	0.6939	LRC23
	INC	$64-1-PD-R$	64M	6.4M		7	0.9713	YW23]
	MLP	$2 - 2 - \delta - D$	21M	12M		8	0.51413	$BBD+23$
	INCfreeze	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M		8	0.5135	[BLYZ23]
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_\mathrm{Gohr}$	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M		8	0.514	Goh19b
	DBitNet	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M	✓	8	0.514	BGH^+23
	MLP	$2 - 2 - \delta - D$	14M	8M		8	0.515	BBD+23
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$64 - 1 - \delta - R$ $-NRMSD-R$	64M			0.64M	0.564	H R.C21c
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$ $\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathsf{Gohr}}$	$64-1$ -CT-R	128M 20M	12.8M 2M		8 8	0.6502 0.939	YL 23
${\rm SPECK\text{-}32\,^{\rm RK}}$	CNN	$2-2-\delta-D$	20M	2M		7	0.559	WWH21
	CNN	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M		7	0.576	WWH21
	$\mathrm{INC}^{\mathrm{freeze}}$	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M	ä,	10	0.5562	BLYZ23
SPECK-48	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M	\checkmark	7	0.726	[WW21]
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	96-1-MRMSD-R	96M	9.6M		8	0.5462	LRCL23
SPECK-64	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_\mathrm{Gohr}$	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M	✓	7	0.632	WW21]
	DBitNet	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M	√	8	0.537	BGH+23]
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$128 - 1 - \delta - R$	128M	1.28M		8	0.632	$\rm HRC21c$
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	128-1-MRMSD-R	128M	12.8M		8	0.7181	LRCL23
SPECK-96	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M	\blacksquare	7	$0.850*$	[CSY23]
SPECK-128	DBitNet	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M	✓	10	0.593	$[BGH+23]$

Table 5: Overview of the Differential Neural Distinguishers for SPECK.

RK Related key setting. */* means unknown.

‡ In [\[CSY23\]](#page-22-11), the accuracy of the teacher network for SPECK-96 was not given, but we were able to retrieve it by running the model on the authors' repository; we give the average of 10 runs, each with 10^6 samples.

† [\[KJL](#page-26-11)+23]report an accuracy of 53% (round 5) on only 1,000 validation samples. The experimental mean or standard deviation is not given. For a binomial experiment on 1k samples, the statistically expected standard deviation is not given. For a binomial experiment on its samples, the statistically expected standard deviation is $1/(2\sqrt{n}) = 1.6\%$. Therefore, the reported result is only 1.9*σ* away from random and is likely not statistically significant. [\[SM23b\]](#page-31-10)report an accuracy of 53.1% (round 7) on 2M training, respectively validation samples, and provide a comparison in which [DenseNet](#page-8-2) outperforms $N D_{\text{Gohr}}$ $N D_{\text{Gohr}}$. At such a small number of training samples, both networks show heavy overfitting ([\[SM23b,](#page-31-10) Table 2]), and the authors themselves call the result only "marginal".

[†] In [\[BBP22\]](#page-21-10), the authors evaluate several pruned neural distinguishers; we report the smallest one, Gohr's $N_{D_{\text{Gohr}}}$ with depth 1, 7 channels removed from C1, 21 from C2, 25 from C3, 46 neurons from D₁, and 36 from D₂.

6.3.6 SIMON

SIMON is a family of AND-RX block ciphers, denoted SIMON-B/K, that encrypt blocks of size *B* with a key of size *K*. SIMON-32/64, SIMON-48/96, SIMON-64/128, and SIMON-128/256 have 32, 36, 44, and 72 rounds, respectively. For the case of SIMON, some authors experimented with a vast amount of data: $[HRC21c]$ uses 2^{25} (33.6M) pairs for training, and [\[BGL](#page-21-9)+22] obtain an 11-round distinguisher for SIMON32 at the cost of staged trained in two steps, with respectively 2^{28} (268M) and 2^{30} (1074M) pairs. In [\[BGH](#page-21-0)⁺23], the authors propose a polishing step, retraining a neural distinguisher initially trained with 10⁷ pairs with an additional 10^9 pairs. In [\[LLS](#page-27-12)⁺24], Lu *et al.* use advanced feature engineering and 320M ciphertexts $(2 \cdot 10^7 \text{ samples}, \text{each composed of 8 pairs}),$ and reach 12 rounds of SIMON32 in the single-key scenario. In the related key scenario, the same authors reach 13 rounds, whereas [\[EGP23\]](#page-23-11) only reaches 11 rounds with a rotational XOR distinguisher.

Table 6: Overview of the Differential Neural Distinguishers for SIMON.

Primitive	Arch.	Class	Trn.	Val.	AutoND	Rounds	Acc.	Ref.
SIMON-32/64	MLP	$2-1-\delta-R$	67M	8M		5	0.570	YK21al
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_\mathrm{Gohr}$	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M	÷	9	0.5907	HRC21cl
	$\mathcal{ND}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M			0.6263	SZM21
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_\mathrm{Gohr}$	$2-1-CT-R$			$\bar{ }$	9	0.6320	TH ₂₁
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_\mathrm{Gohr}$	$4-3-CT-R$	40M	4M			0.6373	SZM21
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathsf{Gohr}}$	$4-3-CT-R$	40M	4M		9	0.923	WQW^+24
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_\mathrm{Gohr}$	$64 - 1 - \delta - R$	640M	6.4M		10	0.6109	HRC21cl
	SENet	$2-1-A-R$	2684M	268.435M	\sim	11	0.517	$BGL+22$
	DBitNet	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M	✓	11	0.518	$[BGH^+23]$
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$64 - 1 - MRMSD-R$	640M	64M	٠	11	0.6081	LRCL23
	SE-ResNet	$16-1-A-R$	320M	32M		12	0.514	$LLS+24$
SIMON-32/64 RK	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathsf{Gohr}}$	$2\text{-}1\text{-}\mathrm{CT}\text{-}\mathrm{R}^{RX}$	20M	2M		11	0.5445	EGP23
	SE-ResNet	$16-1-A-R$	320M	32M	\sim	13	0.5262	$[LLS+24]$
SIMON-48/96	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_\mathrm{Gohr}$	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M		10	0.5789	HRC21cl
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$96 - 1 - \delta - R$	960M	9.6M		11	0.6143	HRC21c
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathsf{Gohr}}$	96-1-MRMSD-R	960M	96M	$\overline{}$	12	0.6159	LRCL23
SIMON-64/128	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_\mathrm{Gohr}$	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M	٠	11	0.59.72	HRC21c
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathsf{Gohr}}$	$128 - 1 - \delta - R$	1280M	12.8M	\sim	12	0.6957	HRC21c
	DBitNet	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M	✓	13	0.518	$[BGH+23]$
	$\mathcal{ND}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	128-1-MRMSD-R	1280M	128M		13	0.701	LRCL23
	SE-ResNet	$16-1-A-R$	320M	32M		14	0.519	$\left[{\rm LLS}^{+}24\right]$
$\mathrm{SIMON\text{-}64/128}^{RK}$	$\mathcal{ND}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$2\text{-}1\text{-}\mathrm{CT}\text{-}\mathrm{R}^{RX}$	20M	2M		13	0.5151	EGP23
	SE-ResNet	$16-1-A-R$	160M	16M	\sim	14	0.5788	$[LLS+24]$
SIMON-128/256	DBitNet	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M	✓	20	0.507	$\left[\text{B} \text{G} \text{H}^+ \text{23} \right]$
$\mathrm{SIMON\text{-}128}/256^{RK}$	$\mathcal{ND}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$2\text{-}1\text{-}\mathrm{CT}\text{-}\mathrm{R}^{RX}$	20M	2M		16	0.5062	EGP23

Class: *n*-*m*-*T*-*E*, from [Subsection 6.2.](#page-9-0) Under this convention, Gohr's initial experiments are 2-1-CT-R, and the results obtained in greyed out settings *n*-*m*-*T*-*E* are not directly comparable. **AutoND:** indicates if the neural distinguisher was automatically generated (\checkmark) or is the result of an elaborate, manually designed training procedure (-). */* means unknown.

7 Neural Distinguisher Training: Best Practices

Neural network training is not a deterministic process: It is subject to significant variations in the outcome that are caused, for example, by the (random) network parameter initialization process, and the batch process of training data and corresponding differing movement through the optimization plane. Further, the training outcome is heavily influenced by the chosen hyperparameters and neural network architectures.

To interpret the success of neural network training correctly, it is important to carefully distinguish between training, validation, and test data. Each dataset has an important role: The *training data* is used to calculate the loss of the model and to update the model parameters. However, the goal of neural network training is not good performance (low loss) on known data but instead, generalization to previously unseen data. To monitor the performance of the model on previously unseen data during training, *validation data* is used. To accurately measure the model's performance on unseen data, it is crucial never to train it on the validation data. A commonly observed phenomenon during neural network training is *overfitting*. At some point during the training, the model does not learn new generalizable features of the training data but instead uses its parameters to learn the training dataset "by heart". This leads to an increasing validation data loss. Instead of using the model that has been trained for the maximum number of epochs, in this case, one better uses the model with the minimum *validation data loss*. However, now the validation data has been used in model optimization, and can no longer be used to characterize the performance on previously unseen data. For the final characterization, fresh *testing data* should be used instead. For example, Gohr first trains on 10^7 samples, and after each epoch, the training success is validated on 10^6 validation samples. After 200 epochs, the distinguisher with the best accuracy on the validation data is tested on several fresh sets of 10⁶ test samples. The result is a neural distinguisher with minimal overfitting and a robust accuracy including error margins, e.g., 0*.*788 ± 8*.*17 · 10[−]⁴ [\[Goh19a,](#page-24-1) Table 2], on previously unseen test data.

The number of parameters of a deep neural network *does not* relate to its computational training cost in a straightforward way. Instead, it depends on the computations required by the particular layers used in the network model. The computational training cost should be measured in terms of the required number of FLOPs (floating point operations) or MACs (multiply-accumulate operations). Popular deep learning libraries such as TensorFlow and PyTorch provide routines to obtain neural network parameter counts as well as FLOPs. For example, FLOPs can be evaluated with the TensorFlow Keras module keras-flops, and the TensorFlow native routine model.count_params() provides the parameter count.

Summary of Best Practices for Neural Distinguisher Training

- 1. **Results Reporting I:** Clearly indicate the results obtained on training, validation, and test datasets, as well as the size of each dataset.
- 2. **Results Reporting II:** Denote accuracy (or any other metrics) with error margins on multiple sets of *freshly generated* testing data.
- 3. **Neural Network Reporting:** Indicate the network's memory requirements using FLOPs and the number of neural network parameters, and training time per epoch on the specific computational environment (e.g., number and type of GPUs or CPUs).
- 4. **Open Reproducibility:** Publish the code and trained model parameters to enable review, replication, and future comparisons.

8 Future Challenges

8.1 The Benchmarking Challenge

As the field of neural cryptanalysis grows, it is becoming more difficult to compare different works on a given primitive due to significant variability in the architectures used, training regimes, distinguishing experiments, or feature engineering. In order to gain a better understanding of neural distinguisher, we see the creation of a benchmarking platform as an important challenge in the medium term. The goal of such a platform would be to compare neural architectures submitted by authors on sets of standard problems and compare them in a leaderboard. This objective is, however, not straightforward, and we discuss some friction points below.

Defining Problems In a broad sense, a problem can be defined as an $n - M - T - E$ configuration, a primitive, a training pipeline, and a dataset size. A first step would be to

run all the models on the initial SPECK32 problem in the 2-1-CT-R setting to gain a better overview of which architectures perform best when given the same conditions and training data. However, changing the input format of architecture may not be trivial $[BGH^+23]$ $[BGH^+23]$, so an effort would be required from developers to provide instructions on running their model with a generic input size. From there, problems with various input sizes and cardinality could be compared.

While neural distinguishers' learning features from multiple pairs have not been demonstrated yet [\[GLN22,](#page-24-3) [CSYY23\]](#page-23-8), feature engineering techniques have been shown to have a strong impact on the distinguisher's performance $[LLS+24]$ $[LLS+24]$. Such features include partial decryption or mixing ciphertext values and difference-related features; standardizing them and building the corresponding benchmarking instances would provide valuable insight.

In addition, the training regime of a neural distinguisher has been known to be critical from the start: in [\[Goh19a\]](#page-24-1), an advanced training pipeline is presented as required to reach 8 rounds. In this pipeline, a neural distinguisher is pre-trained on the most likely difference after some rounds and then re-trained for the whole number of rounds with 100 times more samples than the other distinguishers. Further research often uses a similar polishing step on the final round to improve accuracy. There is, therefore, a distinction between raw performance, where the neural distinguisher is trained from scratch for each round in the same conditions, and enhanced accuracy, where techniques such as pretraining [\[Goh19b\]](#page-24-14), freezing layers [\[GLN22\]](#page-24-3), retraining of the previous rounds distinguishers [\[BR21\]](#page-22-10), or increased number of samples in the last rounds may be used. For these reasons, the design of a standard, generic pipeline to compare enhanced distinguishers would be beneficial.

In addition to training pipelines, the number of samples is another choice to make. A lot of the literature follows the reasonable choices of $[Goh19a]$ (10⁷ samples for training, 10⁶ for testing), as lowering these numbers seems to have a dramatic effect on performance. However, neural distinguishers trained on multiple-pair samples (e.g., [\[BBCD20\]](#page-21-2)) are less easy to compare. On the one hand, one can choose to fix the number of samples; in this case, the neural distinguisher will see more pairs than one with single-pair samples, which provides an unfair advantage. On the other hand, one can fix the number of pairs; in this case, the resulting distinguisher may have an unfair disadvantage, as it is trained on fewer samples. An extreme example would be samples composed of 10⁷ pairs; in that case, the second distinguisher is trained on a single sample and has little chance of learning anything. While some works use over 1 billion ciphertexts during training, little has been studied on using that order of magnitude of data in the 2-1-CT-R scenario (as compared to multiple pairs per sample), and it would be interesting to include this axis in a benchmarking study.

Metrics The first challenge to comparing different models is to define what is to be compared. As of now, the main metrics used to compare neural distinguishers are accuracy, true positive rate, and true negative rate. More recently $[BGH⁺23]$ $[BGH⁺23]$, the number of floating point operations (FLOPS) of a neural network was added as an additional metric. It relates to the complexity of evaluating inputs to the neural network, which itself has an impact on the training time and complexity of the corresponding key recovery attack. What is missing is a metric that relates the accuracy of the neural distinguisher with its performance, which is related to accuracy per flop. This metric should say something about the final complexity of the key recovery and answer questions such as: *Does doubling the FLOPS to gain 1% accuracy improve the attacks?*. Furthermore, an important notion in key recovery attacks is the *wrong key response profile*, which relates the confidence of the distinguisher with the error in the decryption of the last round with the wrong key. It has not been studied how it correlates with other metrics of a neural distinguisher, and it is unclear whether a slightly worse (in terms of accuracy) neural distinguisher may become slightly better for key recovery due to a better wrong key response profile. Finally, it is

not clear how to weigh the ability of a distinguisher to be extended by probabilistic rounds to reach a longer key recovery.

8.2 The AI- \mathcal{ND} Challenge

The neural network architectures currently employed in Neural Differential Cryptanalysis have origins that trace back several years. For instance, the Inception Module by Google researchers was introduced in a seminal paper in 2014 [\[SLJ](#page-30-10)⁺15]. Similarly, Kaiming He *et al.* [\[HZRS16\]](#page-25-11) won the ILSVRC (ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge) 2015 using ResNet. Attention was introduced in "Attention is all you need" at NeurIPS 2017 [\[VSP](#page-32-0)⁺17], and Squeeze-and-Excitation Networks at CVPR 2018 [\[HSS18\]](#page-25-12).

In recent years, deeper and more complex models led to a larger parameter count. [Figure 3](#page-19-0) illustrates the general trend of the increasing parameter count in deep learning models. This is particularly evident in the case of Large Language Models (LLMs) like GPT, which contain billions of parameters. The deep learning models used to date in Neural Differential Cryptanalysis have low parameter counts when compared to more modern "Deep Learning Era" models. Challenges when increasing the parameter count of the models are higher computational load, longer training times, and overfitting.

Figure 3: Adapted from [\[Epo24\]](#page-23-12) with added data for Gohr's $N\mathcal{D}_{\text{Gohr}}$ on [SPECK,](#page-43-0) and [DBitNet](#page-8-3) on [GIMLI](#page-36-1) from [\[BGH](#page-21-0)⁺23, Table 5].

However, the advancement of AI technologies such as transformers and reinforcement learning, coupled with increased computational power, holds significant potential for enhancing cryptographic neural differential distinguishers. Transformers, with their capability to handle long-range dependencies and their effectiveness in capturing complex patterns, offer a robust framework for analyzing cryptographic data. Reinforcement learning, on the other hand, provides a powerful approach for optimizing neural network performance through iterative feedback and learning from interactions. These advanced AI methodologies, when applied to cryptographic neural differential distinguishers, can lead to more accurate models. The increased computational power available today allows for training deeper and more complex networks, which can explore a larger hypothesis space and uncover subtle cryptographic weaknesses that simpler models might miss.

Up until now, cryptographers have mainly attempted to apply AI models. As illustrated in [The Benchmarking Challenge,](#page-17-1) a leaderboard with cryptographically meaningful metrics should be established. Based on the existence of transparent metrics, the **AI-**ND [Chal](#page-19-1)**[lenge](#page-19-1)** aims at (i) motivating cryptographers to use more advanced AI technologies, but also at (ii) motivating cryptographers to establish an AI -competition^{[4](#page-20-6)} to allow AI researchers and engineers to apply state-of-the-art methods to Neural Differential Cryptanalysis.

9 Conclusion

In this paper, we perform a systematic review of the follow-ups to Gohr's seminal paper on neural distinguishers. In the process, we identify and classify works focusing on training neural distinguishers. This systematic review uncovered a young, yet vast body of research, and a need for common methodological guidelines to grow the field, which we attempt to provide. We also identified two challenges, namely that of comparing neural distinguisher results and that of scaling up to much larger and ambitious architecture.

Over the past 5 years, multiple new settings have been explored for differential cryptanalysis, using multiple pairs per sample or polytopic differences, with the same or varied keys across samples. In addition, various types of feature engineering, particularly through partial inversion, have been explored. These address the question of what clues we can give the neural distinguisher, and multiple avenues are left to explore in that direction. But more fundamentally, what matters perhaps more is what question we ask the neural distinguisher, given this clue, or said differently, what task we ask the neural network to perform. So far, a large portion of the literature has focused on differential-based property for one pair and one input difference, but many variations could be built, as well as tasks related to different types of cryptanalysis or entirely new distinguishing experiments.

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⁴Small AI-competitions are hosted on platforms such as [Kaggle,](https://www.kaggle.com/) while large AI-competitions include the *"Makrikadis"* time series forecasting competition [\[MSA20\]](#page-29-13), or ILSVRC [\[RDS](#page-30-11)+15].

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A Comparative Review of all Differential Neural Distinguishers

A.1 ASCON

ASCON is an SPN-based permutation with an input size of 320 bits. It can be used within a sponge construction to build the authenticated ciphers ASCON-128 and ASCON-128a, both using 128 bit keys and 12 rounds in the initialisation, and respectively 64 and 128 bit messages, and 6 and 8 rounds in the encryption process. The hash function ASCON-hash, also based on sponge construction, hashes 64-bit messages over 12 rounds. ASCON was announced as the winner of the NIST Lightweight Cryptography Competition in February 2023.

 $[SSL⁺24]$ $[SSL⁺24]$ train neural differential distinguishers for the 4-round ASCON-PERMUTATION with an accuracy of 0.5069 in the standard setting $(2-1-\delta-R)$, and can improve the accuracy to 0.6925 by training another neural network to classify based on the distribution of multiple scores. We do not include this result in the table, as it is a system where the neural distinguisher part is run separately on single pairs rather than a neural distinguisher accepting multiple pairs.

Table 7: Overview of the Differential Neural Distinguishers for ASCON.

Primitive	Arch.	Class	Trn.	Val.	AutoND	Rounds	Acc.	Ref.
ASCON-PERM MLP		$2 - 2 - \delta - D$ 1.1M		1.1 M				0.9861 [BB22]
			Classical ML $2-2-6-D$ 64K $(2 \cdot 2^{14.96})$ 16K $(2 \cdot 2^{12.96})$					BBD ⁺²³
	MLP	$2 - 1 - \delta - R$ 20M		20M	-		0.5069	$[SSL + 24]$
ASCON (Rate) Classical ML 2-2- δ -D 64K (2 · 2 ^{14.96}) 16K (2 · 2 ^{12.96})								0.916 [BBD ⁺ 23]

Class: *n*-*m*-*T*-*E*, from [Subsection 6.2.](#page-9-0) Under this convention, Gohr's initial experiments are 2-1-CT-R, and the results obtained in greyed out settings *n*-*m*-*T*-*E* are not directly comparable. **AutoND:** indicates if the neural distinguisher was automatically generated (\checkmark) or is the result of an elaborate, manually designed training procedure (-).

A.2 CHASKEY

CHASKEY is a 128-bit ARX-based permutation on 8 rounds.

In [\[CSYY23\]](#page-23-8), the best distinguisher uses 16 pairs per sample, though the authors present a valid single-pair distinguisher for CHASKEY as well.

Table 8: Overview of the Differential Neural Distinguishers for CHASKEY.

	Class	Trn.	Val.	AutoND	Rounds	Acc.	Ref.
CHASKEY		$N\mathcal{D}_{\text{Gohr}}$ 2-1-CT-R 17M $(2 \cdot 2^{23})$	$40K(2\cdot 2^{14.3})$			0.6161	BB22
	ND_{Gohr} 2-1-CT-R	20M	2M	۰.		0.6161	[CSYY23]
	ND_{Gohr} 32-1-CT-R 320M		32M			0.7712	ICSYY23
INC.	$16-1$ -CT-R $20M$		10M			0.5181	ZWC23

Class: *n*-*m*-*T*-*E*, from [Subsection 6.2.](#page-9-0) Under this convention, Gohr's initial experiments are 2-1-CT-R, and the results obtained in greyed out settings *n*-*m*-*T*-*E* are not directly comparable. **AutoND:** indicates if the neural distinguisher was automatically generated (\checkmark) or is the result of an elaborate, manually designed training procedure (-).

A.3 DES

DES (Data Encryption Standard) is a 16-round SPN block cipher working with 56-bit keys and 64-bit blocks.

Table 9: Overview of the Differential Neural Distinguishers for DES.

Class: *n*-*m*-*T*-*E*, from [Subsection 6.2.](#page-9-0) Under this convention, Gohr's initial experiments are 2-1-CT-R, and the results obtained in greyed out settings *n*-*m*-*T*-*E* are not directly comparable. **AutoND:** indicates if the neural distinguisher was automatically generated (\checkmark) or is the result of an elaborate, manually designed training procedure (-).

A.4 FF1 and FF3

FF1 and FF3 are format-preserving encryption algorithms, with respectively 10 and 8 rounds, respective block size of 32 and 128 bits, and key size 128 bits. We use the notations FFX-D when the domain is digits, and FFX-L when the domain is lowercase characters.

In $[KKJ+24]$ $[KKJ+24]$, the authors perform neural cryptanalysis of FF1 and FF3, for digits (FFX-D) and lowercase letters (FFX-L). We report the best results in the 2-1-CT-R setting but note that the authors additionally performed experiments in the *m*-2-CT-D setting, with similar, yet not directly comparable, results. The number of samples for training and testing is not given, nor the source code (*/*-entries in [Table 10\)](#page-35-2).

Table 10: Overview of the Differential Neural Distinguishers for FF.

Primitive	Arch.	Class	Trn.	Val.	AutoND	Rounds	Acc.	Ref.
FF1-D	MLP	$2-1-CT-R$			$\overline{}$	ш	0.85	[KKJ+24
$FF1-I$	MLP	$2-1-CT-R$					0.522	$\rm KKJ^{+}24$
$FF3-D$	MLP.	$2-1-CT-R$			$\overline{}$		0.98	[KKJ ⁺ 24
$FF3-L$	MLP	$2-1-CT-R$					0.55	

Class: *n*-*m*-*T*-*E*, from [Subsection 6.2.](#page-9-0) Under this convention, Gohr's initial experiments are 2-1-CT-R, and the results obtained in greyed out settings *n*-*m*-*T*-*E* are not directly comparable. **AutoND:** indicates if the neural distinguisher was automatically generated (\checkmark) or is the result of an elaborate, manually designed training procedure (-). */* means unknown.

A.5 GIFT

GIFT is a PRESENT-inspired SPN cipher, using 128-bit keys to encrypt 64-bit (GIFT64) or 128-bit (GIFT128) blocks for 28 and 40 rounds, respectively. GIFT was one of the finalists of the NIST Lightweight Cryptography Competition.

In $[ZZY^+21]$ $[ZZY^+21]$ [†], the authors claim a distinguisher on 7 rounds because the training accuracy is 0.6487, despite the validation accuracy being non-significant (0.5002); in the table, we report this 7 rounds distinguisher as it is the best one claimed by the authors, but also their 6-round distinguisher, which has a significant validation accuracy.

In $[MPKM+22]$ $[MPKM+22]$ [†], the authors claim a full round distinguisher on GIFT-64 with over 90% accuracy, using 2^{20} polytopic samples (composed of 3 ciphertexts each) in total, of which 15% are kept for validation, respectively testing, and a simple [MLP](#page-9-1) architecture; they also claim a full round distinguisher on PRIDE with 100% accuracy. Full-round attacks on modern and reputable ciphers are an extraordinary claim and require extraordinary evidence, which the author's manuscript does not provide.

In [\[RRSM22a\]](#page-30-8), only 10K samples are used for training and testing; as a result, the distinguishers in Table 5 exhibit significant overfitting (e.g., 92% training accuracy and 25% testing accuracy for M1 on 6 rounds).

Primitive	Arch.	Class	Trn.	Val.	AutoND	Rounds	Acc.	Ref.
GIFT-64	MLP	$2-1-\delta-R$	67M $(2 \cdot 2^{25})$	67M			0.65	[YK21a]
	LSTM	$3-2-CT-R$	$17M (2 \cdot 2^{23})$	$4M (2 \cdot 2^{21})$			0.5754	$[SSL+22]$
	MLP	$3-2-\delta-R$	2.2M	0.5M		FULL	0.96	$NPKM+22$ [†]
GIFT-128	MLP.	$2-1-\delta-R$	20M	2M	$\overline{}$		0.5542	$[SSL+24]$
TweGIFT-128	MLP	$2-1-CT-R$	2M	200K	$\overline{}$		0.5675	[ZZY+21]
	MLP.	$2-1-CT-R$	2M	200K	$\overline{}$		0.5002	[ZZY+21]
GIFT-COFB	MLP	$2 - 4 - \delta - D$	20K	20K			0.615	[RRSM22a]

Table 11: Overview of the Differential Neural Distinguishers for GIFT.

Class: *n*-*m*-*T*-*E*, from [Subsection 6.2.](#page-9-0) Under this convention, Gohr's initial experiments are 2-1-CT-R, and the results obtained in greyed out settings *n*-*m*-*T*-*E* are not directly comparable. **AutoND:** indicates if the neural distinguisher was automatically generated (\checkmark) or is the result of an elaborate, manually designed training procedure (-).

† A critical discussion of these results is provided in the text.

A.6 GIMLI

GIMLI is a 24-round permutation acting on 384 bits, from which a hash function GIMLI-HASH and an authenticated cipher GIMLI-CIPHER are derived.

Table 12: Overview of the Differential Neural Distinguishers for GIMLI.

Primitive	Arch.	Class	Trn.	Val.	AutoND	Rounds	Acc.	Ref.
GIMLI	MLP. DBitNet	$2 - 2 - \delta - D$ $2-1-CT-R$	20M	$0.4M - 0.04M$ 2M			0.510 0.524	$\left \text{BB22} \right $ $[BGH^+23]$
GIMLI-HASH	MLP.	$2-2-\delta-D$ 0.4M 0.04M			the contract of the		0.5219	[BB22]
GIMLI-CIPHER	– MLP	$2 - 2 - \delta - D$		$0.4M - 0.04M$	the control of the		0.5099	BB22

Class: *n*-*m*-*T*-*E*, from [Subsection 6.2.](#page-9-0) Under this convention, Gohr's initial experiments are 2-1-CT-R, and the results obtained in greyed out settings *n*-*m*-*T*-*E* are not directly comparable. **AutoND:** indicates if the neural distinguisher was automatically generated (\checkmark) or is the result of an elaborate, manually designed training procedure (-).

A.7 HIGHT

HIGHT is a 32-round ARX-based block cipher, operating on 64-bit blocks and 128-bit keys.

Primitive Arch.	Class	Trn.	Val. AutoND Rounds Acc. Ref.		
HIGHT.	DBitNet $2-1-CT-R$ $20M$ $2M$			10	0.751 [BGH ⁺ 23]
$_{\rm HIGHT\,RK}$	DBitNet $2-1$ -CT-R $20M$ $2M$				0.563 [BGH+23]

Table 13: Overview of the Differential Neural Distinguishers for HIGHT.

RK Related key setting.

Class: *n*-*m*-*T*-*E*, from [Subsection 6.2.](#page-9-0) Under this convention, Gohr's initial experiments are 2-1-CT-R, and the results obtained in greyed out settings *n*-*m*-*T*-*E* are not directly comparable. **AutoND:** indicates if the neural distinguisher was automatically generated (\checkmark) or is the result of an elaborate, manually designed training procedure (-).

A.8 KATAN

KATAN is a family of FSR-based block ciphers with block sizes 32, 48, or 64, key size 80, and 254 rounds. For KATAN32, $[**BGH** + 23]$ reaches statistically significant accuracies up to 69 rounds in an automatically generated distinguisher, and note that this can be improved to a 71-round distinguisher with 0.5034 ± 0.0002 accuracy using their simple polishing step. In contrast, [\[LCLH22\]](#page-27-8) reaches 51 rounds in the standard setting, and 59 when using 64 pairs. In [\[LLHC23,](#page-27-9) [LCLH22\]](#page-27-8), the authors prepend a conditional probability 1 differential on *r* rounds (which holds based on conditions on the equality of some plaintext and key bits) to an *s* rounds neural distinguisher. For these distinguishers, we write $(r + s)$ to highlight which part is purely neural. In [\[LLHC23\]](#page-27-9), these distinguishers lead to practical key recovery on 97, 82, 70 rounds of KATAN32, 48 and 64 in the single key model. In [\[LCLH22\]](#page-27-8), practical key recoveries are obtained for 125, 106 and 95 rounds respectively, in the related key scenario. Single-key conditional neural distinguishers are also mentioned in [\[LCLH22\]](#page-27-8) for 85, 72 and 61 rounds respectively, but the $r + s$ decomposition is not given so we omit them in the table.

Primitive	Arch.	Class	Trn.	Val.	AutoND	Rounds	Acc.	Ref.
KATAN32	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_\mathrm{Gohr}$	$2-1-\delta-R$	20M	2M	-	51	0.533	[LCLH22]
	$N\mathcal{D}_{\text{Gohr}}$	$64 - 1 - \delta - R$	64M	6.4M		$(26+58)$ 84*	0.602	LLHC23
	$\mathcal{ND}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$128 - 1 - \delta - R$	1280M	128M		59	0.575	LCLH22
	DBitNet	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M		69	0.505	$[BGH^+23]$
$\text{KATAN}32^{\,\text{RK}}$	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$128 - 1 - \delta - R$	1280M	128M		$(66+46)$ $112*$	0.647	LCLH22
KATAN48	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$64 - 1 - \delta - R$	64M	6.4M		$72^{\degree}(25+47)$	0.5820	LLHC23
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_\mathrm{Gohr}$	$2-1-\delta-R$	20M	2M		40	0.58	[LCLH22]
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$96 - 1 - \delta - R$	960M	96M		50	0.54	LCLH22
KATAN48 ^{RK}	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\text{Gohr}}$	$48 - 1 - \delta - R$	960M	96M		$96*(57+39)$	0.625	[LCLH22]
KATAN64	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$64 - 1 - \delta - R$	64M	6.4M		$61^{\circ}(25+26)$	0.6130	LLHC23
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_\mathrm{Gohr}$	$2-1-\delta-R$	20M	2M		31	0.718	[LCLH22]
	$N\mathcal{D}_{\rm Gohr}$	$128 - 1 - \delta - R$	1280M	128M		36	0.548	LCLH22
KATAN64 RK	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$128 - 1 - \delta - R$	1280M	128M		$(54+32)$ $86*$	0.728	LCLH22

Table 14: Overview of the Differential Neural Distinguishers for KATAN.

Class: *n*-*m*-*T*-*E*, from [Subsection 6.2.](#page-9-0) Under this convention, Gohr's initial experiments are 2-1-CT-R, and the results obtained in greyed out settings *n*-*m*-*T*-*E* are not directly comparable. **AutoND:** indicates if the neural distinguisher was automatically generated (\checkmark) or is the result of an elaborate, manually designed training procedure (-).

 $\overline{\text{Rk}}$ Related key setting.

 $*(r + s)$ means an *s*-round neural distinguisher with *r* are prepended rounds.

A.9 KNOT

KNOT is an SPN-based permutation acting on a 256, 384, or 512-bit state; when used in a MonkeyDuplex construction to build a cipher, it uses 28 to 52 rounds, depending on the version. In [\[BB22\]](#page-20-4), the authors use a neural distinguisher to recognize whether a 1 difference is introduced in the first or the second byte.

Primitive Arch. Class Trn. Val. AutoND Rounds Acc. Ref.				
KNOT-256 MLP 2-2- δ -D 1.048M 1.048M - 10 0.5912 [BB22]				
KNOT-512 MLP 2-2- δ -D 1.048M 1.048M - 12 0.6032 [BB22]				

Table 15: Overview of the Differential Neural Distinguishers for KNOT.

Class: *n*-*m*-*T*-*E*, from [Subsection 6.2.](#page-9-0) Under this convention, Gohr's initial experiments are 2-1-CT-R, and the results obtained in greyed out settings *n*-*m*-*T*-*E* are not directly comparable. **AutoND:** indicates if the neural distinguisher was automatically generated (\checkmark) or is the result of an elaborate, manually designed training procedure (-).

A.10 LEA

LEA is an ARX-based block cipher, encrypting 128-bit plaintexts with 128-, 192- or 256-bit keys for 24, 28, or 32 rounds, respectively. For LEA, $[{\rm B} \rm{GH}^+23]$ propose the first neural differential distinguisher, reaching 11 rounds with accuracy 0*.*5109. In comparison, the proposal of LEA $[HLK+14]$ $[HLK+14]$ presents a differential characteristic with probability 2^{-98} for 11 rounds, and 2^{-128} for 12 rounds.

Table 16: Overview of the Differential Neural Distinguishers for LEA.

Primitive Arch.	Class		Trn. Val. AutoND Rounds Acc. Ref.		
LEA-128	DBitNet 2 -1-CT-R $20M$ $2M$		\checkmark 11		0.512 [BGH+23]
Class:					$n-m-T-E$, from Subsection 6.2. Under this convention, Gohr's initial experiments are 2-1-CT-
					R, and the results obtained in greyed out settings $n-m-T-E$ are not directly comparable. AutoND:
					indicates if the neural distinguisher was automatically generated (\checkmark) or is the result of an elaborate,
	manually designed training procedure (-).				

A.11 LBCIoT

LBCIoT is a 32-round block cipher encrypting 32-bit plaintexts with an 80-bit key. In [\[TTJ23\]](#page-32-8), the authors propose a neural distinguisher on 7 rounds and build a practical key recovery attack for 8 rounds.

Table 17: Overview of the Differential Neural Distinguishers for LBCIoT.

Primitive Arch. Class Trn. Val. AutoND Rounds Acc. Ref.				
LBC-IoT $\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\text{Gohr}}$ 2-1-CT-R 2M 200K -				0.607 [TTJ23]

Class: *n*-*m*-*T*-*E*, from [Subsection 6.2.](#page-9-0) Under this convention, Gohr's initial experiments are 2-1-CT-R, and the results obtained in greyed out settings *n*-*m*-*T*-*E* are not directly comparable. **AutoND:** indicates if the neural distinguisher was automatically generated (\checkmark) or is the result of an elaborate, manually designed training procedure (-).

A.12 PRESENT

PRESENT is an SPN-based block cipher, encrypting 64-bit blocks with 80 (PRESENT-80) or 128-bit keys (PRESENT-128) for 31 rounds.

In $[BGH^+23]$ $[BGH^+23]$, a 9-round distinguisher with an accuracy of 0.5092 is given, which favorably compares to the 7-round distinguishers of [\[CSYY23\]](#page-23-8), despite [\[CSYY23\]](#page-23-8) using 4 pairs per sample; on the other hand, [\[ZW22a\]](#page-33-2) obtains a slightly higher accuracy, at the cost of using 32 ciphertexts per samples. In comparison, the best differential characteristic for PRESENT reduced to 9 rounds has probability 2^{-36} [\[Wan07\]](#page-32-14).

Primitive	Arch.	Class	Trn.	Val.	AutoND	Rounds	Acc.	Ref.
PRESENT	CNN	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M			0.533	[WWH21]
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_\mathrm{Gohr}$	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	$2\mathrm{M}$			0.563	GLN22
	$\mathcal{ND}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$8-1-CT-R$	20M	2M			0.5853	CSYY23
	CNN	$2 - 2 - \delta - D$	20M	2M			0.515	WWH21
	DBitNet	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M			0.512	$[BGH+23]$
	INC .	$32-1-CT-R$	320M	32M			0.5416	ZWC231
PRESENT-64/80 ^{RK}	MLP	$6 - 1 - \delta - R$.	$6.3M*$	$1.6M*$		5.	0.614	PSM23
	CNN	$2 - 2 - \delta - D$	20M	-2M		\bot ()	0.517	WWH21'

Table 18: Overview of the Differential Neural Distinguishers for PRESENT.

Related key setting. ∗

[\[PSM23\]](#page-29-12) uses 2^{20} samples, each composed of 3 pairs, i.e., 6.3M ciphertexts for training, and one quarter as many pairs, i.e., 1.6M ciphertexts for validation.

Class: *n*-*m*-*T*-*E*, from [Subsection 6.2.](#page-9-0) Under this convention, Gohr's initial experiments are 2-1-CT-R, and the results obtained in greyed out settings *n*-*m*-*T*-*E* are not directly comparable. **AutoND:** indicates if the neural distinguisher was automatically generated (\checkmark) or is the result of an elaborate, manually designed training procedure (-). The work [\[GLN22\]](#page-24-3) of Gohr, Leander, and Neumann was not peer-reviewed.

A.13 PRIDE

PRIDE is a 20-round SPN cipher using 64-bit blocks and 128-bit keys. In [\[MPKM](#page-28-12)⁺22], the authors claim a full-round distinguisher on the cipher with 100% accuracy, which seems likely to be attributed to a methodology issue than an actual break, as a perfect accuracy is often a sign of, especially considering the lack of evidence provided in the paper.

Table 19: Overview of the Differential Neural Distinguishers for PRIDE.

		Primitive Arch. Class Trn. Val. AutoND Rounds Acc. Ref.		
		MLP $2-1-\delta-R$ 734K 157K - 20		1 $[MPKM^+22]^\dagger$

Class: *n*-*m*-*T*-*E*, from [Subsection 6.2.](#page-9-0) Under this convention, Gohr's initial experiments are 2-1-CT-R, and the results obtained in greyed out settings *n*-*m*-*T*-*E* are not directly comparable. **AutoND:** indicates if the neural distinguisher was automatically generated (\checkmark) or is the result of an elaborate, manually designed training procedure (-).

† A critical discussion of these results is provided in the text.

A.14 SHA3

SHA3-256 is a 24-round sponge-based hash function with an output size of 256.

Class: *n*-*m*-*T*-*E*, from [Subsection 6.2.](#page-9-0) Under this convention, Gohr's initial experiments are 2-1-CT-R, and the results obtained in greyed out settings *n*-*m*-*T*-*E* are not directly comparable. **AutoND:** indicates if the neural distinguisher was automatically generated (\checkmark) or is the result of an elaborate, manually designed training procedure (-).

A.15 SIMECK

SIMECK is a variant of SIMON using a key schedule similar to that of SPECK. SIMECK-32/64, SIMECK 48/96, and SIMECK-128/256 have 32, 36, and 44 rounds, respectively.

In [\[ZLWL23\]](#page-33-13), the authors use an inception-based architecture, and *m* samples per pair (between 1 and 256), with format $(\Delta x_r, \Delta y_r, x_r, y_r, x'_r, y'_r, \Delta y_{r-1}, p\Delta y_{r-2})$; the training is done on $2 \cdot 10^7$ samples. Their best distinguisher reaches 13 rounds of SIMECK32. In $[WTZ^+22]$ $[WTZ^+22]$, the authors investigate 2 variations of a multiple input differences scenario, where the samples are the concatenations of pairs with differences δ_i . In ND_{*rm*}, a sample is the concatenation of a pair of ciphertexts for each difference (resulting in $n = 2m$); in ND_{am} , the first ciphertext is the encryption of a random plaintext P_0 , each subsequent ciphertext C_i is the encryption of $P_{i-1} \oplus \Delta_{i-1}$ so that $n = m + 1$. The distinguishers are trained on 2^{24} (16.8M) samples, and tested on 2^{18} (0.3M). The accuracy of 50.42% may not be statistically significant, and should be indicated with a mean and standard deviation on fresh sets of test samples.

Primitive	Arch.	Class	Trn.	Val.	AutoND	Rounds	Acc.	Ref.
SIMECK-32	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$2-1-CT-D$	20M	2M		10	0.5407	[LTZ22b]
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_\mathrm{Gohr}$	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M		10	0.5438	[LTZ22b]
	$\mathcal{ND}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$4-3-ND_{am} - R$	67M	1 M		11	0.5042	WTZ^+22
	INC.	$16-1-A-R$	320M	32M		12	0.5161	ZLWL23
	INC.	$512 - 1 - A - R$	1024M	124M		13	0.5086	ZLWL23
$\mathrm{SIMECK}\text{-}32^{\mathrm{(Unkeyed)}}$	MLP	$2-2-\delta-$ D	66k	66k		9	0.526	$[BBD+23]$
$SIMECK-32/64RK$	SE-ResNet	$16-1-A-R$	160M	16M		15	0.5467	$[LLS+24]$
	$\mathcal{ND}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$2-1$ -CT-R RX	20M	2M		15	0.5134	[EGP23]
$SIMECK-48/96RK$	$\mathcal{ND}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	2 -1-CT-R RX	20M	2M		17	0.5206	EGP23
$SIMECK-64^{(Unkeyed)}$	MLP	$2 - 2 - \delta - D$	33k	33k		14	0.55	$[{\rm BBD^{+}23}]$
$SIMECK-64/128RK$	SE-ResNet	$16-1-A-R$	160M	16M		22	0.5180	$[LLS+24]$
	$\mathcal{ND}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$2-1$ -CT-R RX	20M	2M		20	0.5212	EGP23

Table 21: Overview of the Differential Neural Distinguishers for SIMECK.

Class: *n*-*m*-*T*-*E*, from [Subsection 6.2.](#page-9-0) Under this convention, Gohr's initial experiments are 2-1-CT-R, and the results obtained in greyed out settings *n*-*m*-*T*-*E* are not directly comparable. **AutoND:** indicates if the neural distinguisher was automatically generated (\checkmark) or is the result of an elaborate, manually designed training procedure (-).

A.16 SIMON

SIMON is a family of AND-RX block ciphers, denoted SIMON-B/K, that encrypt blocks of size B with a key of size K . SIMON-32/64, SIMON-48/96, SIMON-64/128, and SIMON-128/256 have 32, 36, 44, and 72 rounds, respectively. For the case of SIMON, some authors experimented with a vast amount of data: $[\text{HRC21c}]$ uses 2^{25} (33.6M) pairs for training, and $[**BGL**+22]$ obtain an 11-round distinguisher for SIMON32 at the cost of staged trained in two steps, with respectively 2^{28} (268M) and 2^{30} (1074M) pairs. In [\[BGH](#page-21-0)⁺23], the authors propose a polishing step, retraining a neural distinguisher initially trained with 10⁷ pairs with an additional 10⁹ pairs. In [\[LLS](#page-27-12)⁺24], Lu *et al.* use advanced feature engineering and 320M ciphertexts $(2 \cdot 10^7 \text{ samples}, \text{each composed of 8 pairs}),$ and reach 12 rounds of SIMON32 in the single-key scenario. In the related key scenario, the same authors reach 13 rounds, whereas [\[EGP23\]](#page-23-11) only reaches 11 rounds with a rotational XOR distinguisher.

Primitive	Arch.	Class	Trn.	Val.	AutoND	Rounds	Acc.	Ref.
$\mathrm{SIMON}\text{-}32/64$	MLP	$2-1-\delta-R$	67M	8M		5	0.570	YK21a
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_\mathrm{Gohr}$	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M		9	0.5907	HRC21c
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_\mathrm{Gohr}$	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M			0.6263	SZM21
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_\mathrm{Gohr}$	$2-1-CT-R$				9	0.6320	TH21
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$4-3-CT-R$	40M	4M		Q	0.6373	SZM21
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathsf{Gohr}}$	$4-3-CT-R$	40M	4M			0.923	WQW^+24
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$64 - 1 - \delta - R$	640M	6.4M		10	0.6109	HRC21cl
	SENet	$2 - 1 - A - R$	2684M	268.435M		11	0.517	$BGL+22$
	DBitNet	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M	\checkmark	11	0.518	$\left[\text{BGH}^{+}23\right]$
	$\mathcal{ND}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	64-1-MRMSD-R	640M	64M		11	0.6081	LRCL23
	SE-ResNet	$16-1-A-R$	320M	32M		12	0.514	$[LLS+24]$
SIMON-32/64 ^{RK}	$\mathcal{ND}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$2-1$ -CT-R RX	20M	2M		11	0.5445	EGP23
	SE-ResNet	$16-1-A-R$	320M	32M		13	0.5262	$[LLS+24]$
SIMON-48/96	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_\mathrm{Gohr}$	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M	÷.	10	0.5789	HRC21c
	$\mathcal{ND}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$96 - 1 - \delta - R$	960M	9.6M		11	0.6143	HRC21c
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	96-1-MRMSD-R	960M	96M		12	0.6159	LRCL23
SIMON-64/128	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_\mathrm{Gohr}$	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M	ä,	11	0.59.72	HRC21c
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathsf{Gohr}}$	$128 - 1 - \delta - R$	1280M	12.8M		12	0.6957	HRC21c
	DBitNet	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M	✓	13	0.518	$\left[\text{BGH+23}\right]$
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathsf{Gohr}}$	128-1-MRMSD-R	1280M	128M		13	0.701	LRCL23
	SE-ResNet	$16-1-A-R$	320M	32M		14	0.519	$LLS+24$
$\mathrm{SIMON}\text{-}64/128^{RK}$	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathsf{Gohr}}$	2-1-CT-R^{RX}	20M	2M		13	0.5151	EGP23
	SE-ResNet	$16-1-A-R$	160M	16M		14	0.5788	$[LLS+24]$
SIMON-128/256	DBitNet	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M	✓	20	0.507	$\rm [BCH^{+}23]$
$\mathrm{SIMON\text{-}128}/256^{RK}$	$\mathcal{ND}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$2\text{-}1\text{-}\mathrm{CT}\text{-}\mathrm{R}^{RX}$	20M	2M		16	0.5062	EGP23

Table 22: Overview of the Differential Neural Distinguishers for SIMON.

Class: *n*-*m*-*T*-*E*, from [Subsection 6.2.](#page-9-0) Under this convention, Gohr's initial experiments are 2-1-CT-R, and the results obtained in greyed out settings *n*-*m*-*T*-*E* are not directly comparable. **AutoND:** indicates if the neural distinguisher was automatically generated (\checkmark) or is the result of an elaborate, manually designed training procedure (-). */* means unknown.

A.17 SKINNY

SKINNY is an SPN-based block cipher; SKINNY128 processes 128-bit plaintexts with 128, 256, and 384-bit keys for 40, 48, and 56 rounds, respectively.

In $[BBD+23]$ $[BBD+23]$, the authors reach 6 rounds of SKINNY-128; however, this result is obtained on an unkeyed version of the cipher, and using a classical machine learning algorithm rather than deep learning.

Table 23: Overview of the Differential Neural Distinguishers for SKINNY.

Class: *n*-*m*-*T*-*E*, from [Subsection 6.2.](#page-9-0) Under this convention, Gohr's initial experiments are 2-1-CT-R, and the results obtained in greyed out settings *n*-*m*-*T*-*E* are not directly comparable. **AutoND:** indicates if the neural distinguisher was automatically generated (\checkmark) or is the result of an elaborate, manually designed training procedure (-).

A.18 SLIM

SLIM is a 32-round block cipher encrypting 32-bit plaintexts with an 80-bit key.

In [\[RLS23\]](#page-30-7), the authors perform experiments with low key entropy (10 and 100 keys respectively, for 1M samples), as well as with one random key per sample. We report the last one for comparability and note that the results were very close in the 3 cases. In $[TTJ23]$ [†], the reported accuracy is 0.5036 on 10⁵ samples, which corresponds to less than 3 standard deviations and has a probability over 1% of occurring for distinguisher making predictions at random; we question the relevance of this result, as testing on more data is required to prove statistical significance.

Primitive Arch.	Class	Trn.	Val.	AutoND Rounds Acc.		Ref.
SLIM	$N\mathcal{D}_{\text{Gohr}}$ 2-1-CT-R 2M $N\mathcal{D}_{\text{Gohr}}$ 2-1-CT-R 2M		200K 2M	\sim \sim	0.814	0.5036 [TTJ23] [†] RLS23]

Table 24: Overview of the Differential Neural Distinguishers for SLIM.

Class: *n*-*m*-*T*-*E*, from [Subsection 6.2.](#page-9-0) Under this convention, Gohr's initial experiments are 2-1-CT-R, and the results obtained in greyed out settings *n*-*m*-*T*-*E* are not directly comparable. **AutoND:** indicates if the neural distinguisher was automatically generated (\checkmark) or is the result of an elaborate, manually designed training procedure (-).

† A critical discussion of these results is provided in the text.

A.19 SPECK

SPECK is a family of ARX block ciphers, denoted SPECK-B/K, that encrypt blocks of size *B* with a key of size *K*. SPECK-32/64, SPECK-48/96, SPECK-64/128, SPECK-96/96, and SPECK-128/256 have 22, 23, 27, 29, and 34 rounds, respectively. Neural differential distinguishers have been built for a versions of SPECK.

For SPECK-32, the best accuracies are reported when multiple the number of ciphertexts *n* is increased, as is done in [\[BBD](#page-21-8)⁺23] $(n = 2)$, [\[HRC21c,](#page-25-8) [CSYY23\]](#page-23-8) $(n = 64)$, [\[LRCL23\]](#page-27-11) $(n = 128)$. Currently, the best accuracy of 93.9% in round 8 of SPECK-32 is obtained by [CSYY23] [CSYY23] [CSYY23] when using $n = 64$. In the standard setting $(2-1-CTR)$ [\[BGH](#page-21-0)⁺23] reach the same accuracy as [\[Goh19b\]](#page-24-14) with an automated pipeline that is not dedicated to $SPECK⁵$ $SPECK⁵$ $SPECK⁵$. In terms of larger state experiments, two automated pipelines reach 7, respectively 8 rounds of SPECK-64 [\[WW21,](#page-32-10) [BGH](#page-21-0)⁺23]. The 8-round accuracies can be improved when increasing the number of ciphertext pairs to $n = 128$, respectively $n = 256$, and using MRMSD feature engineering [\[HRC21c,](#page-25-8) [LRCL23\]](#page-27-11). For SPECK-96, [\[CSY23\]](#page-22-11) obtains the first 7-round distinguisher, while for SPECK-128, $[B_{GH}+23]$ obtains the first 10-round neural distinguisher in an automated pipeline.

⁵We note that [\[BLYZ23\]](#page-22-0) states that "the simple training pipeline [of [\[BGH](#page-21-0)⁺23]] did not produce $\mathcal{N}Ds$ with the same accuracy as Gohr's on 8-round Speck32/64; it needs a further polishing step to achieve similar accuracy, demanding more time and data" which is not entirely correct: While in [\[BGH](#page-21-0)+23], a polishing step is indeed needed to achieve the same accuracy, the polishing step is a *highly simplified* version of the 8-round training scheme used by Gohr (in conclusion, it does *not* demand more time or data).

Primitive	Arch.	Class	Trn.	Val.	AutoND	Rounds	Acc.	Ref.
SPECK-32	MLP	$2-1-\delta-R$	209M	105M		3	0.79	YK21al
	Quantum	$2-1-CT-R$		2K		5	0.53	$\rm [KJL^{+}23]^\dagger$
	CNN	$2-2-\delta-D$	20M	2M		5	0.959	WWH21
	$\mathcal{ND}_{\text{Gohr}}^{\text{ensmbl.}}$	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M		6	0.781	$HGH+23$
	MLP	$2-1-\delta-R$	20M	2M		6	0.72	ERP22
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$100 - 1 - A - R$	20M	2M		6		BGPT21
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}^{\rm pruned}_{\rm Gohr}$	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M		7	0.596	BBP22
	DenseNet	$2-1-\delta-R$	2M	2M		7	0.531	[SM23b]†
	CNN	$2-2-\delta-D$	20M	2M		7	0.599	WWH21
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\text{Gohr}}$	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M	✓	7	0.614	WW21
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\text{Gohr}}^{\text{atitin}}$	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M		7	0.6169	DCC23l
	CNN	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M		7	0.618	WWH21]
	$N\mathcal{D}_{\alpha}^{\text{attntn}}$ Gehr _{ony}	16-1-CT-R	160M	16M		7	0.728	DCC23
	Gohr	8-1-CTER	80M	8M		7	0.6939	LRC23
	INC	$64-1-PD-R$	64M	6.4M		7	0.9713	YW23
	MLP	$2 - 2 - \delta - D$	21M	12M		8	0.51413	$BBD+23$
	INCfreeze	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M		8	0.5135	BLYZ23
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M		8	0.514	Goh19b]
	DBitNet	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M	\checkmark	8	0.514	$BGH+23$
	MLP	$2 - 2 - \delta - D$	14M	8M		8	0.515	$BBD+23$
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	64-1-δ-R	64M			0.64M	0.564	H R.C21c
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$-NRMSD-R$	128M	12.8M		8	0.6502	YL 23
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathsf{Gohr}}$	$64-1$ -CT-R	20M	2M		8	0.939	
${\rm SPECK\text{-}32\,^{\rm RK}}$	CNN	$2-2-\delta-D$	20M	2M		7	0.559	WWH21
	CNN $\mathrm{INC}^{\mathrm{freeze}}$	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M		7	0.576	WWH21
		$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M	L,	10	0.5562	BLYZ23
SPECK-48	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_\mathrm{Gohr}$	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M	\checkmark	7	0.726	WW21]
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	96-1-MRMSD-R	96M	9.6M		8	0.5462	LRCL23
SPECK-64	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_\mathrm{Gohr}$	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M	\checkmark	7	0.632	WW21]
	DBitNet	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M	✓	8	0.537	$BGH+23$
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$128 - 1 - \delta - R$	128M	1.28M		8	0.632	$\rm HRC21c$
	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	128-1-MRMSD-R	128M	12.8M		8	0.7181	LRCL23
SPECK-96	$\mathcal{N}\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{Gohr}}$	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M	$\overline{}$	7	$0.850*$	[CSY23]
SPECK-128	DBitNet	$2-1-CT-R$	20M	2M	\checkmark	10	0.593	$[BGH^+23]$

Table 25: Overview of the Differential Neural Distinguishers for SPECK.

RK Related key setting. */* means unknown.

‡ In [\[CSY23\]](#page-22-11), the accuracy of the teacher network for SPECK-96 was not given, but we were able to retrieve it by running the model on the authors' repository; we give the average of 10 runs, each with 10^6 samples.

† [\[KJL](#page-26-11)+23]report an accuracy of 53% (round 5) on only 1,000 validation samples. The experimental mean or standard deviation is not given. For a binomial experiment on 1k samples, the statistically expected standard deviation is not given. For a binomial experiment on its samples, the statistically expected standard deviation is $1/(2\sqrt{n}) = 1.6\%$. Therefore, the reported result is only 1.9*σ* away from random and is likely not statistically significant. [\[SM23b\]](#page-31-10)report an accuracy of 53.1% (round 7) on 2M training, respectively validation samples, and provide a comparison in which [DenseNet](#page-8-2) outperforms $N D_{\text{Gohr}}$ $N D_{\text{Gohr}}$. At such a small number of training samples, both networks show heavy overfitting ([\[SM23b,](#page-31-10) Table 2]), and the authors themselves call the result only "marginal".

[†] In [\[BBP22\]](#page-21-10), the authors evaluate several pruned neural distinguishers; we report the smallest one, Gohr's $N_{D_{\text{Gohr}}}$ with depth 1, 7 channels removed from C1, 21 from C2, 25 from C3, 46 neurons from D₁, and 36 from D₂.

A.20 TEA and XTEA

TEA and its successor XTEA are 64-round block ciphers encrypting 64-bit plaintexts with a 128-bit key. In $[BR21]$, the authors consider modular addition-based differentials, where the input difference is injected by modular addition, which we denote by R^+ as the experiment. $[BGH^+23]$ $[BGH^+23]$ automatically finds distinguishers for both TEA and XTEA for 5 cycles (10 rounds), respectively, with accuracies 0*.*5634 and 0*.*5984; the authors note that they interestingly share the same input difference. For TEA, $[**BGH** + 23]$ reaches two more rounds than [\[BR21\]](#page-22-10).

Table 26: Overview of the Differential Neural Distinguishers for TEA and XTEA.

Primitive Arch.		Class	Trn.		Val. AutoND Rounds Acc. Ref.		
TEA	MLP.	$2 - 1 - CT - R^+$ 2M		10k	Contractor		0.545 [BR21]
		DBitNet 2-1-CT-R	20M	- 2M		10	0.563 [BGH+23]
XTEA		DBitNet 2-1-CT-R	20M 2M			10	0.598 [BGH ⁺ 23]

Class: *n*-*m*-*T*-*E*, from [Subsection 6.2.](#page-9-0) Under this convention, Gohr's initial experiments are 2-1-CT-R, and the results obtained in greyed out settings *n*-*m*-*T*-*E* are not directly comparable. **AutoND:** indicates if the neural distinguisher was automatically generated (\checkmark) or is the result of an elaborate, manually designed training procedure (-).

A.21 TinyJAMBU

TinyJambu-128 is an authenticated encryption algorithm based on a 640 rounds NLFSRbased permutation, which encrypts 128-bit blocks. TinyJambu-128 was among the ten NIST's lightweight cryptography finalists.

Table 27: Overview of the Differential Neural Distinguishers for TinyJAMBU.

R, and the results obtained in greyed out settings *n*-*m*-*T*-*E* are not directly comparable. **AutoND:** indicates if the neural distinguisher was automatically generated (\checkmark) or is the result of an elaborate, manually designed training procedure (-).

† A critical discussion of these results is provided in the text.

In $[SSL^+22]$ $[SSL^+22]$ [†], the authors claim a full-round distinguisher on TinyJambu, which we challenge. In the provided code, the ciphertexts in a sample use the same key, nonce, and associated data, which would provide a trivial distinguisher. As noted by the designers of TinyJambu^{[6](#page-44-2)}: 'When nonce is reused, an attacker is able to decrypt the ciphertext since the encryption of TinyJAMBU is somehow similar to the Cipher Feedback mode.'.

⁶[https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/lightweight-cryptography/documents/](https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/lightweight-cryptography/documents/finalist-round/updated-spec-doc/tinyjambu-spec-final.pdf) [finalist-round/updated-spec-doc/tinyjambu-spec-final.pdf](https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/lightweight-cryptography/documents/finalist-round/updated-spec-doc/tinyjambu-spec-final.pdf)