Design of Blockchain-Based Many-to-Many Anonymous Data Sharing Scheme

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1. Introduction

Sharing information among different groups while preserving confidentiality and privacy is a challenging problem, especially in the case of traceability and linkability checks were necessary. We may divide the methods that share data into three main categories; one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-many. In one to many pattern one of the users, usually the data owner, shares the corresponding data with several number of receivers. On the other hand, many-to-many pattern allows multiple senders to establish an appropriate consensus and relay information to multiple recipients. Due to its wide range of usage areas, one-to-one and one-to-many data sharing schemes have been studied for years, and there are thousands of articles written on this subject, such as [1, 2, 3, 4]. Though there exist many up-to-date studies [5, 6] enabling transmission of the data in the same group in a many-to-many pattern, only a few recent studies focused on many-to-many data sharing among different groups.

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One common approach is integrating a group signature scheme [7] into the system to ensure data confidentiality. Group members can perform the transmission by signing the information of the relevant data using the group signature assigned to them by an authority, sometimes a group manager, or a certificate center. In the case that anonymity is required, leaked information is limited to the signature of an unknown member of that group. In most cases, however, the group manager has the authority to reveal the signer’s identity when deemed necessary. This means tough users can access the data anonymously; only the group manager can trace it when a dispute occurs. This approach results in giving excessive power to the group manager, which we do not want in such a decentralized consensus.

As an example of many-to-many data sharing, consider a scenario of large data collection based on survey results. Different institutions carry out filling in questionnaires forms and data processing. Members of a group of people want to share a form containing confidential information while hiding their identities from some members of another group of people. Each person is required to fill out the relevant questionnaire once in order to conduct an accurate data analysis. If someone tries to submit more than one form, they are trying to forge the system by pretending to be someone else so that their identity needs to be revealed. However, since
the people who share and the forms they share are completely confidential, such a restriction is a very challenging problem. This scenario gets more complicated when we restrict the potential receivers to some members of a defined group or ring of users. Another challenging problem is malicious users need to be revoked from the system so that dynamic user registration needs to be allowed.

Another example is to ensure that employees in an institution make a confidential complaint to a higher authority, keeping their identities completely hidden. Since the persons filing the complaint and the complaint petitions are secret, the person should be prevented from pretending to be another person in the same group and filing the same complaint.

One trivial solution that comes to mind for such problems is to use an anonymous signature scheme [8], more precisely, using a group signature with a group manager and carrying out these operations by a trusted party. However, we do not want to assign a manager or trusted third party to achieve a fully decentralized system.

Besides the privacy concerns, while dealing with large-scale data, it is necessary to consider the efficiency problems that may arise in the overall system [9]. Sharing large-scale data on the blockchain causes network delays, inefficient bandwidth utilization, and an inability to make controls promptly. Therefore, it is preferred to share only the necessary information to access the data and perform the relevant security checks on the blockchain network.

1.1. Our Contributions

In order to solve the problem of sharing sensitive data, which can be a form or questionnaire, in the many-to-many pattern for different groups, such as different institutes or organizations, we offer a novel data-sharing scheme that outsources the encrypted data and shares the encapsulation of the symmetric key together with a signature on the blockchain network. The contributions of our scheme are as follows:

- We introduce a data-sharing framework that achieves data confidentiality and user anonymity while preserving secure access control by data owners on the shared data. First time in the literature, our framework suggests using traceable ring signatures and key encapsulation mechanisms to solve data privacy and access control in sharing data in many-to-many pattern among different groups without trusting a third party.
- We provide a detailed explanation of our proposed scheme together with a comprehensive security analysis. Moreover, we presented the complexity analysis and comparisons with state-of-art.
- We provide the implementation of our scheme and give the performance analysis. Results show that the running time of our protocol increases logarithmically in the size of the ring. For real-world scenarios, our framework is applicable.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review of the subject and gives an overview of some related works. In Section 3, we give preliminaries to the subject and introduce the subprotocols we used in our framework. Section 4 describes our proposed architecture. Section 4 gives the corresponding security definitions and analyses the security, i.e., gives the proof of correctness and security. In Section 5, we tabulate the complexity of our scheme and give the performance analysis of our implementation with comparisons.

2. Related work

Many recent studies focus on the problem of secure and scalable data sharing. While the vast majority of the existing studies try to solve this problem in the cloud environment [16, 2, 17, 18], some of them propose new solutions with the distributed structure of the blockchain [19, 10, 20]. This section will briefly explain some recent studies related to our problem. The main drawback of these studies is that none focused on the anonymous transmission of encrypted information between different groups.

In 2020, up to our knowledge, for the first time in the literature, Huang et al. [10] proposed a data-sharing scheme enabling many-to-many sharing among different groups. They used a group signature to sign the hash of the data to achieve traceability. In case of misuse, the group manager has the authority to reveal the identity of the misbehaved user. To prevent the giving excessive power to group managers, they adopted a blockchain working as a trusted third party. Only the verification information are shared on the active blockchain network. However, the information to be transmitted in their scheme is not encrypted. This scheme cannot solve our problem when it comes to sending a large-scale document by protecting information privacy. Thus we consider this study as a cornerstone of our proposed system.

Agyekum et al. [11] presented pairing-based secure IoT data sharing using identity-based proxy re-encryption. They stored the IBE-based encrypted data
on the cloud to achieve data confidentiality and used IBPRE to enable only legitimate users to access shared data. Also, users have access control lists stored on the blockchain to trace authorized users. In their framework, each user assigns unique names to their data which can be replicated and saved in-network caches.

In 2022, Hu et al. [12] introduced GSChain, a sensor data sharing system in wireless sensor networks for multiple data sharers adopting a consortium blockchain, which will ensure auditability, high transaction rate, and data integrity. They encrypt the data with a sensor key and then define an asymmetric group key agreement protocol to encrypt/decrypt the sensor key, which will be shared on the blockchain together with encrypted data. Here the group key is updateable to enable group changes. Trusting an administrator to create the groups of data sharers is a method we avoid to provide anonymity in our scheme.

Song et al. [13] focused on the traceability problem of data sharing in the power material supply chain systems. Herewith, they proposed to use a single-hop unidirectional proxy re-encryption scheme to ensure security and privacy. Since anonymity was not their concern, they used timestamps to trace data shared in the blockchain network.

Yin et al. [20] adopted blockchain to data sharing in Space-Ground Integrated Network implicitly for data analysis applications for multiple service providers and multiple users. They proposed a solution to cooperative train a particular model, such as federated learning, when different devices in different types of networks are in the case. In order to eliminate the central aggregator, they conducted a blockchain, which simply acts as a proxy. Model parameters are recorded in a distributed ledger to prevent misusage, and a snapshot of the ledger is public to all participants. Unlike our scheme, through the nature of their underlying problem, anonymity and traceability were not their concern.

Recently, Liu et al. [14] focused on sharing location information in a privacy-preserving way. Thus, they proposed a multi-layer location-sharing scheme, keeping computational overhead and communication cost constant while the data integrity verification process. They give data owners the right to manage their data to avoid the possibility of a single point of failure problem. In order to ensure dynamic data uploading, they used RSA based accumulator scheme [21] and used blockchain to eliminate the trust of centralized servers. Roughly, upon receiving a request from a requester, the data manager makes the identity checks and forwards the request to the data owner. Appropriate virtual location encrypted with the public key of the requester and a piece of witness information sent to the manager. Here, the manager manages the aggregation process and transmits the data.

Xu et al. [15] proposed Healthchain to protect large-scale IoT health data. Two blockchains are deployed for fine-grained access control; Userchain allows users to upload their data via IoT sensors, while the Docchain allows doctors to share related diagnoses. They used a content-addressable distributed file system to store the data, and only the hash of the data was published on the blockchain.

3. Preliminaries

Our data-sharing scheme comprises of 3 entities: ring members, secure cloud, and blockchain network. These entities can be identified as follows:

- **Ring members** are the data owners and the receivers. Note that members represent individuals in the same or different institutions.

- **Secure cloud** is the place we store our encrypted data. With using pre-defined algorithms, traceability, and linkability checks are done. Also, all shares in the blockchain are made from the cloud.

- **Blockchain network** is where the cloud shares the related information to reach out to the stored. A snapshot of the ledger is available to all users whenever they want to access it.

For convenience, we first introduce the underlying cryptographic sub-protocols and then explain the overall scheme.
The traceable ring signature we used in our proposal is proposed by Fujisaki and Suzuki [22]. Fujisaki and Suzuki presented the idea of a traceable ring signature to trace the signature if it is signed by the same user. In the scheme, there is a tag value \( L \) for every signature, including the ring members’ public keys and an issue that stands for an election, survey, etc. The signer signs with his/her secret key and tag \( L \). There are three options for the output of the trace function (Algorithm 4):

- **Linked**: If the signer uses the same tag to sign two same messages.
- **Revealing of signer’s public key**: If the signer uses the same tag to sign two different messages.
- **Independent**: If the signer uses different tags to sign different messages.

The key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) we used in our proposal is presented by Smart [23]. It is an efficient key encapsulation mechanism between multiple parties and so-called mKEM. Using mKEM-encapsulation (Algorithm 2), the user can obtain a common key \( K \) and encapsulated value \( C \) by taking public keys of receivers as inputs and using this key \( K \) to encrypt a message. In order to decrypt this message, receivers need to reach the common key \( K \). For this purpose, each receiver uses the decapsulation algorithm (Algorithm 6) with inputs \( C \) and his/her secret key.

In our scheme, \( G \) is a multiplicative group of order \( q \) with generator \( g \). \( H : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow G, H' : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow G \) and \( H'' : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q \) are hash functions. Notations are given in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( q )</td>
<td>prime number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( g )</td>
<td>generator of ( G )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( N )</td>
<td>( {1, \ldots, n} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \ast \in S )</td>
<td>pick a random value ( \ast ) from the set ( S )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDF</td>
<td>key derivation function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( (sk_i, pk_i) )</td>
<td>the key pair of ( i )th user</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( pk_N )</td>
<td>( {pk_1, pk_2, \ldots, pk_n} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( M )</td>
<td>message (data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( L )</td>
<td>tag, i.e., ( \text{issue} \parallel pk_N )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( fID )</td>
<td>file id</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( T_{out} )</td>
<td>output of traceability check algorithm</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Proposed scheme

The overall workflow of our data sharing scheme is demonstrated in Figure 1. Every user picks a random value \( sk \) over \( \mathbb{F}_q^* \) as a secret key and computes his public key \( pk = g^{sk} \) by using Algorithm 1. \( (sk_i, pk_i) \) is the key pair of \( i \)th user.

![Figure 1: Overall workflow of proposed architecture](image_url)

**Algorithm 1 Key Generation**

**Input**: \( g \in G \)

1. \( sk \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q^* \)
2. \( pk = g^{sk} \)
3. **return** \((sk, pk)\)

Suppose one of the members of a ring, say \( R_1 \), wants to share secret information with some members of the other ring, say \( R_n \), where \( n \in \{1, 2, \ldots, n\} \).

1. The \( i \)th user of the ring, say user \( A \), calls Algorithm 2 to encapsulate the keys of multiple receivers. This algorithm takes the public keys of \( t - 1 \) receivers and the public key of user \( A \) as input for our case. The results of the algorithm are encapsulated key \( K \) and the value \( C \). \( K \) is the common key for symmetric encryption, and receivers can use the value \( C \) for computing the common key.

2. Using symmetric encryption key \( K \), the data owner encrypts the corresponding data \( M \) as \( E = \text{Enc}(K; M) \).

3. For our case, tag \( L \) is important because it simply covers the relation of the secret data and receivers. For example, if the encrypted form is related to a
breast cancer issue set as this information. The tag set is as L = (cancer || pkN), where N = {1, ..., n}, and pkN is the list of public keys of R1, i.e., ring including the data sender. After that, user A generates ring signature σ on (L, E) via Algorithm 3.

Algorithm 3 Signature generation

Input: (E, pkN, L)
1: h = H(L), σi = h^{sk_i}
2: A0 = H’(L, E) and A1 = (σi/A0)1/i
3: for j = 1 to n do
4: if j ≠ i then
5: σj = A0A1j ∈ G
6: end if
7: end for
8: w_i = Z_q, a_i = g^{w_i}, b_i = h^{w_i} ∈ G
9: for j = 1 to n do
10: if j ≠ i then
11: z_j, c_j ∈ Z_q
12: a_j = g^{c_j}p_k^j
13: b_j = h^{c_j}σ_j ∈ G
14: end if
15: end for
16: c = H’’(L, A_0, A_1, a_N, b_N)
17: c_i = c - \sum_{j} c_j \mod q, z_i = w_i - c_i\mod q
18: return (A_1, CN, z_N) on (L, E)

4. User A sends the data file F = (E, C, L, σ) to the secure cloud server.

5. The file F is temporarily stored by the server as it arrives. Before storing it permanently, a traceability check is done between the received pair (E, σ) and every pair (E’, σ’) that has been stored before with the same tag L. The output of the traceability check (Algorithm 4) can be pk_i (revealing of user’s public key), linked, or independent.

Algorithm 4 Traceability check

Input: (E, σ) and (E’, σ’)
1: Parse L as L = (cancer || pkN).
2: for all i do
3: A0 = H’(L, E), σ_i = A_0A_1
4: end for
5: for all i do
6: A_0’ = H’(L, E’), σ_i’ = A_0’A_1
7: end for
8: for all i do
9: if σ_i ≠ σ_i’ then
10: Store pk_i in TList
11: end if
12: end for
13: if TList = \{pk_i\} then
14: return "linked"
15: end if
16: if TList = pkN then
17: return "indep"
18: end if
19: if 1 < #TList < n then
20: return "unknown"
21: end if

If the output is linked where the input is (E, σ) and any pair (E’, σ’), the server removes the request. If the algorithm returns pk_i for the input: (E, σ) and any pair (E’, σ’) or "indep" for every input, i.e., (E, σ) and each pair (E’, σ’), then the server stores the file F permanently.

6. If the returned value indicates independence, then it is a valid request. Thus the server stores the file in its permanent location. Then cloud generates a transaction including (L, f_ID, σ, C, T_out).

7. Users from other rings can learn whether the appended transaction is relevant to them from the issue part of the tag L, with a simple ledger check. For instance, considering an institute collecting data of breast cancer from user forms, expecting user forms, from the bcancer tag, may understand that this transaction is related to them.

8. Therefore, user from other ring R*, say B, reads the file F located at f_ID shared in the same transaction. After that B has (L, f_ID, σ, C, T_out).

9. User B verifies signature by using Algorithm 5
with the values $\sigma, E, L$. If the signature $\sigma$ is valid, then user continues with next step.

**Algorithm 5** Signature verification

**Input:** $\sigma = (A_1, c_N, z_N), pk_N, E, L$

1. Parse $L$ as $(\text{cancer} \ || \ pk_N)$
2. for all $i$
3. check $g, A_1 \in G, c_i, z_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q, pk_i \in G$
4. end for
5. $h = H(L), A_0 = H'(L, E)$
6. for all $i$
7. $c_i = A_0 A_i^t \in G$
8. $a_i = g^{c_i} pk_i^{z_i}$
9. $b_i = h^{c_i} \sigma_i$
10. end for
11. if $H''(L, A_0, A_1, a_N, b_N) = \sum_{c_i \in N} c_i \mod q$ then
12. return "Valid signature"
13. end if

10. To be able to decrypt the ciphertext $E$, authorized users need to have access to the secret symmetric key by key decapsulation. The key decapsulation algorithm (Algorithm 6) takes $C$ and $sk_x$, i.e., secret key of user $B$, as inputs and outputs encapsulated key $K$ where $x \in \{1, \ldots, t\}$.

**Algorithm 6** Decapsulation

**Input:** $(C, sk_x)$

1. Parse $C$ as $(c_0, c_1, \ldots, c_t)$
2. $k = c_0 / c_t$
3. $r = H(k)$
4. if $c_0 \neq g^r$, return $\bot$ and halt
5. $K \leftarrow KDF(k)$
6. return $K$

11. Since only the authorized users by the sender can only get the symmetric key $K$, only they can decrypt the ciphertext. User $B$ receives the hidden message as $\text{Dec}(K, E) = M$ using the key $K$.

5. Security analysis

In this section, we first define the security features that our framework achieves. Then as a subsection, give the thread model by defining a security game for security analysis. In the last subsection, we prove the security of our scheme by applying the formal security game.

5.1. Security Requirements

We will discuss the security features that need to be obtained in our proposed scheme.

- Confidentiality: Public keys of the potential receivers are encapsulation using Algorithm 2. Resulted $K$ is used as a symmetric key to encrypt data $M$ to achieve confidentiality. Since we restricted accessibility to $K$ to achieve confidentiality, no malicious user will ever be able to access the encapsulated symmetric key.

- Integrity: Since the encrypted data is stored on a cloud server using a symmetric key and then signed via traceable ring signature, the data owner could decrypt it using the corresponding secret encryption key to check integrity at any time.

- Anonymity: Our proposed scheme satisfies user anonymity, i.e., it is difficult to reveal the identity of the data sharers and the receivers from used sub-protocols.

- Traceability: Since we used a traceable ring signature as a sub-protocol, public keys of the misbehaved users are released and published on the blockchain network.

- Authentication: Through the key encapsulation mechanism we used as a sub-protocol, users are required to prove their identity as a prerequisite to being allowed access to resources in an information system. So that the authentication is achieved.

5.2. Security Model

The definition of underlying hard problem of our scheme in this paper is discrete logarithm assumption (DLA) given below.

**Definition 1. Discrete Logarithm Assumption (DLA):**

Let $G$ be a cyclic group of prime order $p$ with generator $g$. The Discrete Logarithm Assumption states that for any efficient algorithm $\mathcal{A}$, the probability of $\mathcal{A}$ computing $x$ given $y = g^x$ is negligible, denoted as $\text{DLA}_{\mathcal{A}}$:

$$\text{DLA}_{\mathcal{A}} \overset{\text{def}}{=} \Pr[\mathcal{A}(y) = x | y = g^x] \leq \text{negl} (\lambda),$$

where $\lambda$ is the security parameter.

The security is based on the indistinguishability against secret encapsulated symmetric key and chosen-plaintext attack (CPA). IND-CPA. To this aim, we define a security game, which has 4 stages. The game is run between the challenger $\mathcal{C}$ and the adversary $\mathcal{A}$. 

1. **Setup phase:** Challenger runs the algorithm related to set up and obtains the public parameters \( pp \), and gives \( pp \) to the adversary. Also, chooses a random coin \( c \in \{0,1\} \), and keeps \( c \) secret.

2. **Find phase:** The adversary makes the following queries. Note that \( A \) is not authorized to choose random integers in a way that enabling trivial decapsulation of the \( m \) or trivial signature verification.

   **Encapsulation query** \( Q_{\text{enc}} = (pk_N,m,i) \), \( A \) chooses an identity index \( i \) of a target receiver and a message \( m \) from message space. Sends these values to \( \mathcal{C} \). Upon receiving values, \( \mathcal{C} \) retrieves the corresponding \( pk_i \). Runs the Algorithm 2, computes \( (K,C) \), and returns \( C \). Otherwise, forces \( A \) to choose a random coin \( c \in \{0,1\} \).

   As the result of find phase \( A \) selects a \( pk_r \) and \( m_0,m_1 \).

3. **Challenge phase:** \( \mathcal{C} \) computes the following query and submits it to the \( A \).

   **Challenge query for encapsulation** Upon receiving the \( \{\text{choice},pk_r,m_0,m_1\} \) from \( A \), \( \mathcal{C} \) computes the following query:

   \[
   Q_{\text{ch}} = (pk_N,m_\ast,i_\ast) \quad \mathcal{C} \text{ checks that:}
   \]

   - if \( pk_r \notin pk_N \), \( \mathcal{C} \) selects randomly generated values \( (K^\ast,C^\ast) \), and returns \( C^\ast \).
   - if \( pk_r \in pk_N \), calls Algorithm 2 for \( m_\ast \) computes \( (K^\ast,C^\ast) \), and returns \( C^\ast \).
   - otherwise, forces \( A \) to output a random coin \( c \in \{0,1\} \). If \( c = 0 \), computes \( (K^\ast,C^\ast) \), and returns \( C^\ast \). Otherwise, selects randomly generated values as \( (K^\ast,C^\ast) \), and returns \( C^\ast \).

4. **Guess phase:** The adversary repeats the Encapsulation query. At the end of this phase, \( A \) provides \( c^\ast \). \( A \) wins the game in the case of \( c^\ast = c \). Suppose \( Q_{\text{enc}} \) and \( Q_{\text{enc}} \) queries in find and guess phases. We define the adversary’s advantage as

   \[
   \text{Adv}_{\text{Game1}}^A(\lambda) = \Pr[H \leftarrow 1] - 1/2. \]

   We say that the scheme is IND-CPA secure if \( \text{Adv}_{\text{Game1}} \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \) for all ppt algorithms \( A \).

5.3. **Security Proof**

**Theorem 1.** The proposed system is IND-CPA secure in the random oracle model under the DLog assumption.

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**Figure 2: IND-CPA security diagram**

**Proof.** In Figure 2, we depicted the interaction between the adversary and the challenger. \( A \) is considered as a p.p.t algorithm with non-negligible advantage \( \epsilon \) in \( e^{\text{IND-CPA}} \). \( A \) is engaged to define another algorithm \( \mathcal{C} \) having a non-negligible advantage in solving DLA. We show the interaction between \( A \) and \( \mathcal{C} \) as follows.

The random oracle \( G \leftarrow H,H' : \{0,1\}^n \) is simulated by \( \mathcal{C} \) as follows: When an encapsulation query is received, a random number \( \mu \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^\ast \) is selected, and a random coin flipped \( v \rightarrow 1 \), with probability \( \mathcal{A} \). Otherwise, \( v \rightarrow 0 \), \( r \) set as \( g^\mu \), otherwise setted as \( (g^\mu)^h \).

Note that resulted \( r \) has random distribution. \( \mathcal{C} \) continues to simulate the random oracle \( H',H'' \) returning random elements in \( G \) and \( \mathbb{Z}_q \), respectively.

1. **Setup phase:** \( A \) is given \( pp = (G,H,H',g,g^\ast) \) by \( \mathcal{C} \). Chooses a random coin \( c \in \{0,1\} \), and keeps it secret.

2. **Find phase:** \( A \) sends the encapsulation query \( Q_{\text{enc}} = (pk_N,m,i) \). After receiving \( Q_{\text{enc}} \), \( \mathcal{C} \) evaluates \( pk_i \), calls Algorithm 2 and computes \( (K,C) \), and sends the corresponding \( C \). Later, \( \mathcal{C} \) sends the query \( Q_{\text{sign}} = (E,pk_N,L) \) for a pre-determined tag \( L \). As the result of \( Q_{\text{sign}} \), \( \mathcal{C} \) returns \( \sigma \).

3. **Challenge phase:** \( A \) outputs \( pk_r,m_0,m_1 \), where the public key \( pk_r \) corresponds to which user is not trivial. \( \mathcal{C} \) selects \( c \leftarrow \{0,1\} \). Then encapsulation \( (K^\ast,C^\ast) = (KEM,(c_i)) \), where \( K \) is the symmetric key used to encrypt \( m \), is sent to \( A \).

4. **Guess phase:** \( A \) sends encapsulation queries same as the find phase. \( A \) outputs its guess \( c^\ast \in \{0,1\} \).

Note that in this game, it is infeasible for \( A \) to distinguish simulation because \( A \) cannot recognize the randomly generated \( C^\ast \), and a result of that cannot distinguish the \( K^\ast \). Therefore, the only chance of \( \mathcal{C} \) is to choose a random coin \( c^\ast \). At the end of this game \( A \) outputs a guess coin \( c^\ast \). By definition, the probability of the \( \mathcal{A} \) to win the game is:
\[ \text{Adv}^A_{\text{IND-CPA}}(\lambda) = |Pb[c = c^* - 1/2]| = \epsilon, \quad (1) \]

if \( m^c \) is correctly encrypted using symmetric key \( k \), and \((K^*, C^*)\) is a correctly formed encapsulation of \( k \). Consequently, \( \epsilon^c \)'s probability to select a \( c^* \) such that \( c = c^* \) is negligible.

6. Complexity analysis

The complexity of our proposed data sharing scheme is based on modular exponentiations, and the scheme does not contain any expensive pairing operations. So, we count the number of modular exponentiations in the encapsulation (Encap), signature generation (SignGen), traceability check (Trace), signature verification (SignVer), and decapsulation (Decap) algorithms. Since the encryption method that can be used may vary according to the preference of security needs, the costs of symmetric encryption and decryption are neglected.

Table 3: The cost of algorithms in our proposed scheme and their average time in CPU seconds (for 32 ring size)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algorithm</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>CPU time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Encap</td>
<td>((t + 1)\eta + t_\rho)</td>
<td>0.350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SignGen</td>
<td>((5n + 1)\eta + t_\rho + t_\gamma + 2t_\rho)</td>
<td>1.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trace</td>
<td>((2n)\eta + (2n)\rho)</td>
<td>0.370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SignVer</td>
<td>((5n)\eta + t_\rho + t_\gamma + t_\rho)</td>
<td>0.989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decap</td>
<td>(t_\eta + t_\rho)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Let \( t_e \) be the cost of modular exponentiation, \( t_H \), \( t_H^\prime \), \( t_P \), \( t_P^\prime \) be the cost of hash functions \( H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow G \), \( H^\prime : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \hat{G} \), \( H^\prime^\prime : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_{q^2} \), respectively, and finally \( t_b \) be the total cost of all hash functions. \( n \) is the number of parties in the ring of the signer, and \( t \) is the number of parties with whom the signer is willing to share the data. Table 3 shows the cost of algorithms in our proposed scheme and for 32 ring size their average time in CPU seconds. From Table 3, we can say that there is a positive correlation between costs and CPU times of algorithms. We have tabulated the comparison of two closely related studies in Table 4.

Table 4: Complexity comparisons of known constructions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SignGen + Encap</th>
<th>Our Scheme</th>
<th>Huang et al.</th>
<th>Agyekum et al.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>((5n + t)\eta + 2n + t_\rho + t_\gamma + t_\rho)</td>
<td>(12t_\eta + t_\rho)</td>
<td>(t_\eta + t_\rho + 2t_\eta)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trace</td>
<td>((2n)\eta + (2n)\rho)</td>
<td>(t_\eta)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SignVer + Decap</td>
<td>((5n + 1)\eta + 2n + t_\rho + t_\gamma + t_\rho)</td>
<td>(11t_\eta + t_\rho)</td>
<td>(3t_\eta + 2t_\rho)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the scheme of Huang et al. [10], the cost of signature generation, signature verification, and tracing are \(12t_e + t_H \), \(11t_e + t_H \), and \(t_e \), respectively where \( t_H \) is the cost of the hash function \( H_1 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_{q^2} \). In their scheme, the user generates the signature, group manager verifies the signature and traces the user. In the proposed scheme, users generate and verify the signature, and the server traces the user. Compared to our scheme, SignGen, SignVer, and Trace algorithms need more modular exponentiation. On the other hand, we eliminated the trusted third party like the manager by using the traceable ring signature, and we added a key encapsulation mechanism to send data encrypted with multiple parties. Therefore we need few modular exponentiations and hash operations. Also, the cost of our scheme bears a resemblance to Huang et al. for small \( n \).

On the other hand, in the framework presented by Agyekum et al. [11], for \( t_G, t_P \) are the costs of group operation, pairing operation, the complexities of the encryption, re-encryption, decryption-1 and decryption-2 are \( t_G + t_P \), \( t_P \), \( t_G \), and \( 2t_G \) respectively. The data owner’s and proxy server’s signatures are checked for authenticity checks. Since they have not specified the signature method to be used, we denote the cost of the related signature as \( t_s \). Note that traceability checks can be conducted partially by checking timestamped block. Thus, in Table 4, the cost of it is not included. In this scheme, they preferred to use proxy re-encryption method to share data which is different than our approach. Note that while our scheme enables a many-to-many data sharing pattern among different groups, this one allows one-to-one data sharing.

7. Performance analysis

We have implemented our data-sharing protocol in Python using the cryptographic features of SageMath. The group has been defined over the curve secp256k1. AES256 CBC mode with a random initialization vector of size 16-byte is used for encryption. We implemented SHA256 for our hash functions and obtained the results on the curve or field. The codes are available as open-source on GitHub\(^1\).

We tested the implementation for 256 signers and ring sizes 8, 16, 32, 64, and 128, and gathered the profiling and bench results for all the single operations, block generation, and signature generation. Tests are run on macOS Ventura 13.4 working on an Apple M1 Pro machine with 16 GB of RAM. The following figures provide the time spent (minimum, average, and maximum) in CPU seconds for the single operations and overall flows for the ring size \(2^3, \ldots, 2^7\).

\(^1\) See, https://github.com/curicrypt/many2many_decentralized_anonymous_data_sharing.git.
Figure 3 gives the overall running time of block generation where it implements signature file generation, traceability check, and block generation (if the number of transactions is enough to generate a block). The overall running time to verify a signature that covers finding the related signatures from the blockchain, signature verification, decapsulation, and decryption is given in Figure 4.

![Figure 3: Total time spent in CPU seconds for block generation (signature file generation, traceability check, and block generation).](image3)

The time spent in CPU seconds for traceability check, signature file generation, collecting related signatures for verification, and verification of a signature (including decapsulation and decryption) are given in Figures 5, 6, 7, and 8, respectively.

![Figure 5: Time spent in CPU seconds for traceability check.](image5)

![Figure 6: Time spent in CPU seconds for signature generation.](image6)

The figures show that the running time of our protocol increases logarithmically in the size of the ring.

Note that Figure 5 states traceability check and Figure 6 sign file generation; the summation of these graphics needs to be equal to the results of Figure 3, which states block generation. For the system with ring size 32, the time value equals approximately 1 CPU clock cycle so that the results are consistent.

On the other hand, the clock size summation of Figure 7, i.e., collecting related signatures, and Figure 8, i.e., verifying a signature, need to be equal to values of Figure 4 for consistency. These graphs are also consistent.
Furthermore, in an efficient system, approximate running times of block generation and signature verifications are desired to be similar. Our results show that our system achieves this properly. Note that our implementation is proof of concept work, and further optimizations are possible.

8. Conclusion

We designed a blockchain-based many-to-many data sharing scheme that is anonymous and traceable. Our framework enables sharing of data from members of one ring to the selected members of another ring. We deployed a blockchain structure to eliminate the need for a group manager as a trusted party. We explained sub-protocols used in the scheme, i.e., traceable ring signature, and key encapsulation mechanism. Security features of our proposed scheme, which are confidentiality, integrity, anonymity, traceability, and authentication are stated and we proved that our scheme achieves IND-CPA security. We represented the complexity cost of our scheme, compared our scheme with similar works, and implemented our scheme in Python using SageMath, which is shared as open source. Time spends of algorithms are given in CPU seconds for the ring size 8, 16, 32, 64, and 128.

CRediT authorship contribution statement

Ehra Günsay: Conceptualization, Methodology, Investigation, Complexity analysis, Visualization, Security analysis, Simulation results analysis, Writing - Review & Editing.

Burcu E. Karakaş: Methodology, Complexity analysis, Simulation results analysis, Writing & Editing.

N. Gamze Orhon Kılıç: Software, Simulation results analysis, Visualization, Writing.

Oğuz Yayla: Methodology, Simulation results analysis, Editing, Supervision.

9. Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

References


