When Messages are Keys: Is HMAC a dual-PRF?

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Abstract

In Internet security protocols including TLS 1.3, KEMTLS, MLS and Noise, HMAC is being assumed to be a dual-PRF, meaning a PRF not only when keyed conventionally (through its first input), but also when "swapped" and keyed (unconventionally) through its second (message) input. We give the first in-depth analysis of the dual-PRF assumption on HMAC. For the swap case, we note that security does not hold in general, but completely characterize when it does; we show that HMAC is swap-PRF secure if and only if keys are restricted to sets satisfying a condition called feasibility, that we give, and that holds in applications. The sufficiency is shown by proof and the necessity by attacks. For the conventional PRF case, we fill a gap in the literature by proving PRF security of HMAC for keys of arbitrary length. Our proofs are in the standard model, make assumptions only on the compression function underlying the hash function, and give good bounds in the multi-user setting. The positive results are strengthened through achieving a new notion of variable key-length PRF security that guarantees security even if different users use keys of different lengths, as happens in practice.

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Contents

1	Introduction1.1Background1.2Swap-PRF Security of HMAC1.3PRF Security of HMAC1.4Auxiliary Contributions and Technical Overview	3 3 4 6 6
2	Related Work	8
3	Notation and Definitions3.1Notation and Conventions3.2Standard Definitions3.3New Definitions	9 9 10 10
4	Background and Modularization of HMAC	12
5	Dual-PRF Security of NMAC 5.1 vkl-PRF Security of NMAC [⇒] 5.2 Strong Multi-user PRF Security of NMAC	16 16 20
6	Dual-PRF Security of HMAC 6.1 Composition Theorem 6.2 Analysis of HSKD 6.3 vkl-PRF Security of HMAC 6.4 vkl-PRF Security of HMAC	33
7	Proofs for the rka-PRF Security of h^{\leftrightarrows} 7.1 Φ -rka-PRF Security of h^{\leftrightarrows} 7.2 Φ -rka-PRP Security of Block Ciphers in ICM	
A	Dual-PRF Assumptions on HMAC in Prior Work	44
В	Proofs for the Strong PRF Security of the Cascade B.1 Proof of Lemma 1 B.2 Proof of Lemma 2 B.3 Related Work and Techniques	48

1 Introduction

HMAC [8] is a hash-function-based construct taking two inputs to return a fixed-length output. It was designed to be PRF-secure, a usage in which the first input is the key and the second is the message. It is standardized by the IETF [39] and NIST [46] and widely used, including in IPsec, SSH, and TLS. However, its conventional use as a PRF is now being supplemented with another type of use, as a key combiner, which (additionally) assumes that it is a swap-PRF, meaning a PRF when keyed by the second input, with the first input regarded as the message. This is happening in various Internet security protocols including TLS 1.3 [27, 24], KEMTLS [52], hybrid key-exchange designs [17, 53], post-quantum versions of WireGuard [35] and Noise [2], and Message Layer Security (MLS) [23]. Overall, then, HMAC is being assumed to be a dual-PRF; as defined in [5, 6] this means being both a PRF and a swap-PRF.

But is this assumption well-founded? The extensive real-world usage represented by the above protocols makes this question crucial. Yet, it has not been seriously investigated. And as an indication that the gap is more than academic, we note that there are concerns on *both* sides of the dual-PRF coin, meaning for both swap-PRF and conventional PRF security, as follows.

 \triangleright HMAC is not swap-PRF secure, but may be for restricted inputs. Simple attacks (described below) show that HMAC is actually *not* swap-PRF secure. Luckily, due to the specific inputs used, these attacks do not endanger the protocols listed above. But that doesn't mean these usages are secure. We want to know for what inputs one can prove security and under what assumptions, and whether current usage assuming swap-PRF security can be validated with proofs.

 \triangleright PRF security of HMAC has only been proved for one key length. Meanwhile, our work lead us to realize that there is a gap in the literature even with regard to the conventional PRF security of HMAC, namely that it has only been proven for keys of length equal to the block length [5, 6]. Yet, in practice, and in the above applications, HMAC is often used with keys shorter than the block length, and the standards allow keys of any length. We want to know whether proofs of PRF security are possible for all allowed key lengths, and under what assumptions.

<u>CONTRIBUTIONS IN BRIEF.</u> Our contribution is to identify and fill the above gaps. To capture restrictions on inputs, we let $\mathsf{HMAC}[S]$ denote HMAC restricted to keys being drawn from a subset S of its keyspace. As the more novel and interesting case, we first consider swap-PRF security, in which case S is a subset of the message space. We give necessary and sufficient conditions on S for $\mathsf{HMAC}[S]$ to be swap-PRF secure, justifying the sufficiency by proof and the necessity by attack. Sets used in current applications meet our sufficient conditions, hence our proofs provide guarantees for these usages. Turning to the conventional PRF security of HMAC , we prove it for keys of any (sufficiently large) length. Our results hold even when different users use keys of different and adaptively-chosen lengths, as captured formally by a new definition, of a variable key-length PRF (vkl-PRF), that we give as an auxiliary contribution. In summary, we emerge with a full picture of the security of HMAC as a dual-PRF.

We stress that all our proofs for HMAC are in the standard model (no idealized assumptions) and make assumptions only on the compression function underlying the hash function. Also, for the first time for HMAC, we prove multi-user security with good bounds, for all of our results. We now look at all this in more detail. A summary of our and prior results is in Table 1; notation used there is explained below.

1.1 Background

<u>THE FUNCTIONS.</u> The starting point is a compression function $h: \{0,1\}^c \times \{0,1\}^b \to \{0,1\}^c$, taking a *c*-bit chaining variable and *b*-bit block to return a *c*-bit result, where c < b. Briefly, one starts with the cascade h^* [9], which takes a *c*-bit key, and message whose length is a multiple of *b*, and iterates h to return a *c*-bit result. (See Figure 3 later in Section 4 for full details.)

The hash function $H: \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^c$ associated to h by the **MD** transform [44, 25] is $H(M) = h^*(IV, \overline{M})$ where $IV \in \{0,1\}^c$ is a fixed initial vector and \overline{M} pads M out to a length that is a multiple of b bits. (The details of the padding, which do matter, are in Section 4.) This is the design underlying the SHA-2 function family [47], including SHA-256 (c = 256, b = 512), SHA-384 (c = 384, b = 1024), and SHA-512 (c = 512, b = 1024).

The simplest version of HMAC is $\text{HMAC}_b \colon \{0,1\}^b \times \{0,1\}^c \to \{0,1\}^c$, taking a *b*-bit key and defined by

$$\mathsf{HMAC}_b(K_b, M) = \mathsf{H}((K_b \oplus \mathsf{opad}) \| \mathsf{H}((K_b \oplus \mathsf{ipad}) \| M)),$$

where ipad, opad $\in \{0,1\}^b$ are distinct constants specified in the standards. The "full" HMAC: $\{0,1\}^* \times \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^c$ as standardized [8, 39, 46] takes a key of arbitrary length and is defined by HMAC $(K, M) = \text{HMAC}_b(\text{PoH}_b(K), M)$, where the "Pad or Hash" function $\text{PoH}_b: \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^b$ is defined by

$$\mathsf{PoH}_b(K) = \begin{cases} K \| 0^{b-|K|} & \text{if } |K| \le b \\ \mathsf{H}(K) \| 0^{b-c} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

To facilitate analysis, Section 4 unravels the above definitions of HMAC_b and HMAC to view the functions in a more modular way. The core is NMAC [8], which is applied to the message with keys derived from the given key via a subkey derivation function HSKD.

<u>PRFs</u>, <u>SWAP-PRFs</u> AND <u>DUAL-PRFs</u>. Recall that the definition of a function family $F: \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y} \to \mathcal{Z}$ being a PRF views the first input as a key and the second input as a message: we ask that oracles for $F(X, \cdot)$ and a random function $g: \mathcal{Y} \to \mathcal{Z}$ be indistinguishable when $X \leftarrow \mathcal{X}$ is not known to the attacker [31]. The *swap* of F is the function family $F^{\leftrightarrows}: \mathcal{Y} \times \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Z}$ defined by $F^{\leftrightarrows}(Y, X) = F(X, Y)$. We say that F is a swap-PRF if F^{\leftrightarrows} is a PRF. (That is, F is a PRF when keyed by the second, or message, input.) The concept of a dual PRF was introduced in [5, 6]. F is a dual-PRF if F is both a PRF and a swap-PRF. That is, it is a PRF when keyed as usual by the first input, but also if keyed by the second input.

<u>PRIOR WORK.</u> A primary line of work has focused on proving PRF security of HMAC-related functions in the standard model and making assumptions only on the compression function. First, BCK [8] showed that NMAC is PRF-secure if the compression function h is PRF-secure and collision resistant. Bellare [5, 6] showed that PRF security of h alone suffices for the conclusion, and better bounds were given by GPR [30]. Further [5, 6] showed that HMAC_b is PRF-secure assuming NMAC is PRF-secure and h is swap-PRF secure under a simple form of related-key attack. (This prior work is summarized in Table 1.) We briefly note some gaps that will be addressed below. Namely, there are no proofs (1) of swap-PRF security for any of NMAC, HMAC_b, HMAC, (2) of PRF security of HMAC itself (only of HMAC_b), (3) with good bounds in the multi-user setting.

<u>USAGE.</u> Key derivation in some prominent Internet security protocols involves combining a pair of keys K_1, K_2 into a single key via $K \leftarrow \mathsf{HMAC}(K_1, K_2)$. The intent is that (1) if K_1 is good (uniformly random and unknown to the attacker) then so is K regardless of K_2 and (2) vice versa. Requirement (1) is satisfied if HMAC is a PRF, and requirement (2) if HMAC is a swap-PRF. That is, jointly, the assumption is that HMAC is a dual-PRF. Specifically, this is happening in TLS 1.3 [27, 24], KEMTLS [52], hybrid key-exchange designs [17, 53], post-quantum versions of WireGuard [35] and Noise [2], and Message Layer Security (MLS) [23], representing a large number of real-world use cases. In light of this, it is crucial to evaluate the dual-PRF security of HMAC.

1.2 Swap-PRF Security of HMAC

<u>ATTACKS</u>. We first note that there are simple attacks showing HMAC is in fact *not* swap-PRF secure. The issue is the well-known fact that the "Pad or Hash" function PoH_b is not collision

Function	Goal	Assumptions	Comments
$HMAC_b$	PRF	h is PRF, h^{\leftrightarrows} is Φ_{io} -rka-PRF	[5, 6]
НМАС	vkl-PRF	h is PRF, h [≒] is PRF, h [≒] is Φ _{zio,α} -rka-PRF	Theorem 10
$HMAC[\mathcal{S}]^{\leftrightarrows}$ (for \mathcal{S} feasible)	vkl-PRF	h is PRF, h^{\leftrightarrows} is $\Phi_{pad,a}$ -rka-PRF, h is CR	Theorem 11
NMAC	PRF	h is PRF	[5, 6, 30], Theorem 5
NMAC [≒]	vkl-PRF	h is PRF, h^{\leftrightarrows} is $\Phi_{pad,a}$ -rka-PRF	Theorem 4
h⇔	Φ -rka-PRF	E is Φ -rka-PRP	Proposition 12

Table 1: Summary of prior results (in the single-user setting) and our (multi-user) results proving security for HMAC_b , HMAC , $\mathsf{HMAC}[\mathcal{S}]$, and NMAC , as well as results supporting assumptions made for these.

resistant. (This is also the source of attacks on the indifferentiability of HMAC for arbitrary keys [26], and the reason for an erratum filed for the HMAC RFC [43, 29].) For example if K_1, K'_1 are keys of length strictly less than b bits such that $K'_1 = K_1 || 0^{\ell}$ for some $\ell \ge 1$, then $\mathsf{PoH}_b(K_1) = K_1 || 0^{b-|K_1|} = K'_1 || 0^{b-|K'_1|} = \mathsf{PoH}_b(K'_1)$, so $\mathsf{HMAC}(K_1, K_2) = \mathsf{HMAC}(K'_1, K_2)$ for any K_2 . An adversary can now violate PRF security of $\mathsf{HMAC}^{\hookrightarrow}$ by using K_1, K'_1 as messages: it calls its oracle on K_1 and K'_1 and declares "real" if the outputs are the same and "random" otherwise.¹ Likewise, if K_1 has length more than b, then $\mathsf{HMAC}(K_1, K_2) = \mathsf{HMAC}(\mathsf{H}(K_1), K_2)$ for any K_2 , leading again to an attack on the swap-PRF security of HMAC using $K_1, \mathsf{H}(K_1)$ as messages.

While this disallows an unqualified assumption of swap-PRF security on HMAC, it does not negatively impact the security of any of the aforementioned usages of HMAC as a swap-PRF. This is because, in those uses, the HMAC keys (messages for $HMAC^{\leftrightarrows}$) are limited in some way, for example prescribed to be of a fixed length, and this precludes the trivial weak-key pairs exploited above. So the question of practical significance that emerges is whether we can prove security in these cases.

<u>SWAP-PRF SECURITY OF HMAC[S]</u>. To formalize the question, let HMAC[S]: $S \times \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^c$ denote the restriction of HMAC to keys from a set $S \subseteq \{0,1\}^*$. Then the question is, for what choices of S can we prove swap-PRF security of HMAC[S]? We answer this question by giving a complete characterization of the class of sets S for which swap-PRF security of HMAC[S] holds. We restrict the attention to sets that are length closed, meaning if $L \in S$ then $\{0,1\}^{|L|} \subseteq S$, a natural condition desirable for applications. Now define S to be *feasible* if either $(1) S = \{0,1\}^{\ell}$ for some $\ell \leq b$ or (2) S contains no strings of length $\leq b$. Then, in Section 6, we show:

 $\mathsf{HMAC}[\mathcal{S}]$ is swap-PRF secure **if and only if** \mathcal{S} is feasible.

The "if" is proven (Theorem 11), under assumptions on h discussed below, and the "only if" is shown by attacks (Proposition 9).

<u>ASSUMPTIONS.</u> Indifferentiability results on HMAC [26] will imply swap-PRF security of HMAC[S] for S the set of all keys of a fixed length $\ell < b$, but these results are in the random-oracle model, meaning they assume a truly random compression function. However, as noted above, prior

¹For a running-code example of two distinct messages (one vs. two 0-bytes, as key input) colliding under the same key $(0^{256}, as message input)$ for HMAC^{± 3}, type:

^{\$} python3 -c 'import hmac, hashlib; print(hmac.new(b"\x00" , b"\x00"*32, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest(), "=", hmac.new(b"\x00\x00", b"\x00"*32, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest())'

proofs [8, 5, 6, 30] have shown (conventional) PRF security of NMAC and HMAC_b in the standard model while making assumptions only on the compression function h. Ideally, one would do the same in proofs of swap-PRF security. Our proofs for the "if" above meet this bar. For any feasible S, Theorem 11 establishes swap-PRF security of HMAC[S] under three assumptions on h. The first two are from the prior works [8, 5, 6, 30] and can be considered standard, namely that h is PRF secure and collision resistant (CR). Now recall that the proof of PRF security of HMAC_b from [5, 6] assumes h^{\doteq} is a PRF under related-key attack (rka) as defined in [11], for a related-key-deriving (RKD) function we denote Φ_{io} . Our third assumption, in the same vein, also assumes rka-PRF security of h^{\doteq}, but for a different RKD function $\Phi_{pad,a}$. Roughly, the function $\Phi_{pad,a}$ allows the adversary to overwrite a suffix of length at most b - a bits of the *b*-bit key with padding. The assumption is new but we will validate it through auxiliary proofs. Intuitively it arises because key material of length $\ell < b$ can now be part of the message, which is padded to block length. We summarize the assumptions in Table 1.

1.3 PRF Security of HMAC

We turn next to the other side of dual-PRF security, asking about the (conventional) PRF security of HMAC.

<u>THE GAP.</u> There appears at first to be no question here; PRF security of HMAC is broadly assumed and seen as established in prior work [8, 5, 6, 30]. There is, however, a noteworthy gap in prior results, namely that they only prove security with keys of full block length. More precisely, in the notation introduced above, what is proved in [5, 6] is PRF security of HMAC_b, not HMAC itself. Yet, in practice, HMAC is almost never used with b bit keys. Take for example HMAC-256, i.e., HMAC instantiated with SHA-256: Its output is c = 256 bits long. When using it in a protocol for key derivation, it is hence natural to use 256-bit keys throughout. However, the block length of SHA-256 is b = 512, meaning that 256-bit keys lead to HMAC being keyed with keys of length *less* than the block length. This is precisely what is done in protocols like TLS [49], meaning that even their usage of HMAC as a regular PRF falls outside of the security guarantees provided in the literature.

<u>FILLING THE GAP.</u> Theorem 10 proves PRF security of HMAC with keys of any (sufficiently large, of course) length. With regard to assumptions, recall that those made for PRF security of HMAC_b were that h is PRF secure and h^{\doteq} is Φ_{io} -rka-PRF secure. We likewise assume that h is PRF secure and h^{\doteq} is $\Phi_{zio,a}$ -rka-PRF secure, for a function $\Phi_{zio,a}$ that allows the adversary to overwrite an at most b - a bits long suffix of the b-bit key with zeroes (cf. $\Phi_{pad,a}$ for our HMAC^{\doteq} result) and then to XOR with **ipad** or **opad**. This again arises because of key material of length $\ell < b$ bits, to which (in contrast to HMAC⁼) the XOR is applied in HMAC. As before we will validate the new assumption through auxiliary proofs. We clarify that unlike in the swap-PRF case, here there is no restriction of the keys or messages to some subset S; for both keys and messages, any length is allowed, as per the definition of the full HMAC.

1.4 Auxiliary Contributions and Technical Overview

We obtain the above results via a modular approach that treats swap and conventional PRF security in a unified way. Along the way we give some definitions and auxiliary results of independent interest.

<u>VKL-PRFS</u>, <u>A NEW DEFINITION</u>. Recall that the definition of $F: \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y} \to \mathcal{Z}$ being PRF secure picks a key $X \leftarrow \mathcal{X}$ at random. But for HMAC: $\{0,1\}^* \times \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^c$, the keyspace, $\{0,1\}^*$, contains keys of many different lengths and it is not clear under what distribution a random one would be chosen. The first and natural answer, and the one assumed above, is that one has fixed a key length ℓ and is drawing a key from $\{0,1\}^{\ell}$ at random. But this fails to capture different users using HMAC with keys of different lengths, which occurs in practice. These considerations lead us to introduce (in Section 3) a new definition, of a *variable key-length* PRF (vkl-PRF). The definition is inherently in the multi-user setting. The adversary can, for each user, adaptively pick a key length, and the game initializes the key for that user to a uniformly random string of the chosen length. The rest is as one would expect from the usual multi-user PRF setting [9]. (A subtle point is that we cannot expect security for too-short keys. This is handled by having theorems assume a minimum key length.)

Our proof of PRF security for HMAC (Theorem 10) actually proves vkl-PRF security. For swap-PRF security for HMAC[S], Theorem 11 likewise proves vkl-PRF security of HMAC[S]^{\leq}: $\{0,1\}^* \times S \rightarrow \{0,1\}^c$. This means that in both cases we give a guarantee that is strong and better models real-world usage, namely that security holds even when different users use keys of different and adaptively-chosen lengths.

<u>RESULTS FOR NMAC.</u> As in prior works, we start with NMAC (Section 5). Beginning with the swap case, we prove in Theorem 4 that $\mathsf{NMAC}^{\leftrightarrows}: \{0,1\}^* \times \{0,1\}^{2c} \to \{0,1\}^c$ is vkl-PRF secure. Unlike for $\mathsf{HMAC}[\mathcal{S}]^{\leftrightarrows}$, this NMAC result involves no restrictions of inputs to any set \mathcal{S} , but rather holds for all inputs for which the function is defined. The assumptions made are PRF security of h and $\Phi_{\mathsf{pad},a}$ -rka-PRF security of $\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows}$, with the proof leveraging a lemma (Lemma 1) that we give on the strong multi-user PRF security of the 2-tier cascade defined in [7]. Due to targeting vkl-PRF security, the result is directly in the multi-user setting, and the bound in Theorem 4 is good. That is, it does not degrade with the number of users.

Turning now to the conventional PRF security of NMAC, the proofs in prior works [8, 5, 6, 30] are for the single-user setting, and it has remained open if one can show security in the multiuser setting with a bound that does not degrade with the number of users. We resolve this and give such a proof (Theorem 5). We follow the approach used in GPR [30] to prove single-user security, but while the latter relied on a lemma on random systems from [42], we give a quite simple, self-contained game-playing proof, establishing multi-user security.

<u>A DUAL COMPOSITION THEOREM.</u> To lift the above results to HMAC, we give a dual composition theorem (Theorem 6, in Section 6). HMAC(X, Y) can be seen as deriving keys $X_i || X_o \leftarrow$ HSKD(X) for NMAC via a key-derivation function HSKD (shown in Figure 3) and then returning NMAC $(X_i || X_o, Y)$. We write this as HMAC = **Comp**[NMAC, HSKD]. Theorem 6 implies that

- (1) if NMAC is PRF secure and HSKD is a variable seed-length (vsl) PRG, then HMAC = Comp[NMAC, HSKD] is vkl-PRF secure, and
- (2) if NMAC^{\leftrightarrows} is vkl-PRF secure, and the restriction HSKD[\mathcal{S}] of HSKD to inputs in set \mathcal{S} is collision resistant, then HMAC[\mathcal{S}]^{\backsim} = **Comp**[NMAC, HSKD[\mathcal{S}]]^{\backsim} is vkl-PRF secure.

Let us explain. It is folklore understanding that the composition preserves PRF security assuming PRG security of the key-derivation. Result (1) casts this in our variable key-length setting, which involves introducing the definition of a vsl-PRG, but we see the result as expected. Result (2) is more interesting, saying that the composition equally well preserves swap-PRF security if we switch the assumption on key-derivation to collision resistance Put together, we get a simply-stated, unified result, saying that the composition preserves dual-PRF security assuming key-derivation is a collision-resistant PRG.

SECURITY OF THE HSKD KEY-DERIVATION FUNCTION. To complete the circle we need to establish the security assumed of HSKD in the composition theorems, which we also do in Section 6. Proposition 7 shows vsl-PRG security of HSKD assuming PRF security of h and h^{\ominus}, and $\Phi_{zio,a}$ -rka-PRF security of h^{\ominus}. The function is *not* collision resistant on its full domain (leading to the above-discussed attacks on the swap-PRF security of HMAC), but Proposition 8 shows collision resistance of HSKD[S] for all feasible S, assuming collision resistance of h. Putting all the above together gives our results on the PRF and swap-PRF security of HMAC.

<u>VALIDATION OF RKA-PRF ASSUMPTIONS ON h^{\leftarrow} .</u> HMAC is mainly used with the SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 hash functions. Here the compression function is a Davies–Meyer one,

 $h(X, L) = E(L, X) \oplus X$ for a block cipher E: $\{0, 1\}^b \times \{0, 1\}^c \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^c$. Resistance to related-key attacks is a commonly studied goal for block ciphers, see e.g. [14, 38, 36, 11, 48, 34, 15, 28, 55, 16, 37, 19, 18, 4], so we ask if this assumption implies ours. Curiously, being in the swap setting helps us here and enables such a reduction. The reason is that when considering rka-PRF security of h^{\ominus} , the key L, which is the message for h, becomes the key for E. Exploiting this, Proposition 12 (in Section 7) shows that if E is Φ -rka-PRP secure, then h^{\ominus} is also Φ -rka-PRF secure.

These results are strengthened by introducing (in Section 3) an extension of the singleuser rka-PRF/PRP definitions of [11] to a multi-user setting; the novel element is that the RKD functions have a user-dependent input. Finally, one must be careful that, due to attacks from [11], Φ -rka-PRP security of the block cipher E does not hold for all Φ , so we need to verify it for the functions we introduce and use. This final step is done through an analysis that models E as an ideal cipher. We stress that idealized assumptions are made only on E and limited to this one step; all other security proofs are in the standard model.

Organization

Section 2 provides a more extensive discussion of related work. Section 3 introduces notation and definitions (including our new vkl-PRF notion). Section 4 introduces the modularization of HMAC functions we use in our analysis, as well as some basic results on cascades of h. We then turn to our main results. Section 5 studies the dual-PRF security of NMAC. Based on this, Section 6 takes on the dual-PRF security of HMAC, along the way establishing the necessary properties of the subkey derivation function HSKD, including the characterization of the feasible key sets for which HMAC is swap-PRF secure. Finally, in Section 7, we validate the assumptions on h^{\leftrightarrows}, showing that it is an rka-PRF for the RKD functions $\Phi_{pad,a}$ and $\Phi_{zio,a}$.

2 Related Work

<u>DUAL-PRF ASSUMPTIONS ON HMAC.</u> Several works [27, 24, 52, 17, 53, 35, 23] (as indicated above) have explicitly or implicitly assumed dual-PRF security of HMAC. For example, for TLS 1.3, [27, Section 2.4] says "we however need to deploy stronger assumptions which we recap here. The first assumption is concerned with the use of HMAC as a dual PRF (cf. [5, 6])." While the cited paper [5, 6] introduces dual-PRF security, it does not establish swap-PRF security for HMAC, and as we noted, not even conventional PRF security for all key sizes. For KEMTLS, SSW [52], in the context of their proof of Theorem 4.1, perform game hops "under the PRF-security or dual-PRF-security [5, 6] of HKDF", the latter in this mode is HMAC. In Appendix A, we give an account of where dual-PRF assumptions on HMAC show up in prior work and when they are supported by our results.

<u>HKDF.</u> The extraction mode of Krawczyk's HKDF [40] uses HMAC with a salt as first input and key material as second input. This has computational extraction properties under certain assumptions, including that the first input (the salt) is random [40]. However, it does not justify key-combiner usage of HMAC in protocols, because here the first input to HMAC may be adversarially influenced. Swap-PRF security of HMAC, in contrast, allows the first input to be adversarially chosen. This is where swap and dual-PRF security shows up in protocols built on HKDF, motivating our study.

We note that in HKDF's extraction mode, the key-material in the second input may be a non-uniformly-distributed source of entropy such as a Diffie–Hellman shared secret in a key exchange protocol, and HMAC is supposed to return a computationally uniform key. Our results do not cover such usage; in dual-PRF security, keys are assumed to be uniformly distributed.

<u>MULTI-USER SECURITY</u>. The setting of protocols like TLS involves many users and it is well understood that this is better modeled by multi-user (mu) security than by single-user security (su). For most primitives, su implies mu via a hybrid argument, but the adversary advantage grows by a factor of the number u of users [41]. This has led to dedicated analyses and schemes for many primitives, aiming to show mu security with good bounds, meaning degradation of the advantage with u is avoided [21, 33, 7]. Our work follows this, aiming for, and obtaining, good bounds in the mu setting. In particular we fill a gap in the literature by showing PRF security of NMAC with good mu bounds in Theorem 5. We also show vkl-prf of HMAC with good mu bounds in Theorem 10.

<u>UNIFORM AND NON-UNIFORM ASSUMPTIONS.</u> The conference version of Bellare's work [5] showed (su) PRF security of NMAC and HMAC (with good bounds) assuming PRF security of the compression function against non-uniform adversaries. The journal version [6] added proofs under uniform assumptions but with a degraded bound. The gap was filled by Gaži, Pietrzak and Rybár [30], who showed (su) PRF security with bounds as good as in [5] but under uniform assumptions. All our results use uniform assumptions and are shown with blackbox reductions. The proofs explicitly build adversaries against the assumptions from the given adversary against the target.

<u>BUILDING NEW DUAL-PRFS.</u> A new template for building dual-PRFs was given in BL [12]. It combines a computational extractor with a collision-resistant function and can be instantiated to obtain dual-PRFs assuming collision-resistant functions or One-Way Permutations (OWP)s. The BL template was extended in ADKPRY [3] to add an output transformation, leading to further instantiations. However, what is in use in the real world as a dual-PRF is HMAC and thus we focus on it rather than on new constructions. We note that determining the dual-PRF security of HMAC is stated as an open question in ADKPRY [3] and resolved in our work.

On the theoretical side, while the existence of One-Way Functions (OWF)s is known to imply the existence of PRFs [32], it is not known whether OWFs imply dual-PRFs. This is an intriguing open question.

3 Notation and Definitions

We recall some notation, including for game-playing, recap some standard definitions, and then give our new ones, namely variable key-length PRFs (vkl-PRFs), variable seed-length PRGs (vsl-PRGs) and multi-user rka-PRF security.

3.1 Notation and Conventions

Let $\mathbb{N} = \{0, 1, 2, ...\}$ be the set of non-negative integers. Let ε be the empty string. For $n \in \mathbb{N}$ let $\{0, 1\}^n$ be the set of all strings of length n, $\{0, 1\}^{>n}$ the set of all strings of length $g = \{X \in \{0, 1\}^* : |X| \mod b = 0\}$ be the set of all strings of any length $n \ge 0$. For $b \in \mathbb{N}$ let $\{0, 1\}^{b*} = \{X \in \{0, 1\}^* : |X| \mod b = 0\}$ be the set of all strings whose length is a multiple of b. If a is a string, then |a| denotes its length, a[i] denotes its i-th bit and $a[i...j] = a[i] \ldots a[j]$. (The last is the empty string ε when j < i.) Similarly, if \mathbf{X} is a vector then $|\mathbf{X}|$ denotes its length (the number of its coordinates) and $\mathbf{X}[i]$ its i-th element. The empty vector has length 0 and is also written ε . We let $\mathbf{X}[1..i]$ denote $(\mathbf{X}[1], \ldots, \mathbf{X}[i])$ for $1 \le i \le |\mathbf{X}|$. If i = 0 then $\mathbf{X}[1..i] = \varepsilon$. For a string $A \in \{0, 1\}^{b*}$ the operator $\stackrel{b}{\leftarrow}$ splits it into b-bit blocks and places them in a vector. For example, if $|A| \ge 2b$, then $\mathbf{X} \stackrel{b}{\leftarrow} A$ results in $\mathbf{X}[1] = A[1..b]$ and $\mathbf{X}[2] = A[b + 1..2b]$, etc.

We say that a set $S \subseteq \{0,1\}^*$ is *length closed* if for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$ it is the case that $S \cap \{0,1\}^n$ is either $\{0,1\}^n$ or \emptyset . This condition is made on key and message spaces. For sets S_1 and S_2 , let $\mathsf{FUNC}[S_1, S_2]$ denote the set of all functions $f: S_1 \to S_2$ and $\mathsf{PERM}[S_1]$ the set of all permutations on S_1 . The shorthand $S_1 \stackrel{\smile}{\leftarrow} S_2$ denotes $S_1 \leftarrow S_1 \cup S_2$.

For a finite set S, we let $x \leftarrow S$ denote sampling x uniformly at random from S. We let $y \leftarrow A(x_1, \ldots; r)$ denote executing algorithm A on inputs x_1, \ldots and coins r and letting y be the

result. We let $y \leftarrow A(x_1, \ldots)$ be the result of picking r at random and letting $y \leftarrow A(x_1, \ldots; r)$. Algorithms are randomized unless otherwise indicated. Running time is worst case.

We use the code-based game playing framework of [13]. (See Fig. 1 for an example.) Games have procedures, also called oracles, with INIT and FINALIZE being optional. In executing an adversary \mathcal{A} with a game G, oracle INIT, if present, executes first. Then the adversary, given the outputs of INIT, can query other oracles at will. If FINALIZE is present, only one query to it is allowed, and this must be the last query the adversary makes. The output of the execution is defined as the output of FINALIZE if the latter is present and the output of the adversary otherwise. By $G(\mathcal{A}) \Rightarrow y$ we denote the event that the execution of game G with adversary \mathcal{A} results in output y. We write $\Pr[G(\mathcal{A})]$ as shorthand for $\Pr[G(\mathcal{A}) \Rightarrow 1]$, the probability that the execution returns 1. We write $\mathbb{Q}^{OR}(\mathcal{A})$ for the number of queries made by adversary \mathcal{A} to an oracle OR in the game with which \mathcal{A} is executed. Our convention is that running time of an adversary executed with some game includes the time for the game procedures to respond to oracle queries.

In writing game or adversary pseudocode, it is assumed that Boolean variables are initialized to 0, integer variables are initialized to 0, and set-valued variables are initialized to the empty set \emptyset . The distinguished symbol \bot stands for "undefined" and is used as a placeholder value for uninitialized variables and to signal errors. Table entries are assumed initialized to \bot . Let [[cond]] denote the boolean (1 or 0) result of evaluating condition cond. For example, [[$d^* = 1$]] returns 1 if variable d^* equals 1, and 0 otherwise.

3.2 Standard Definitions

<u>COLLISION RESISTANCE.</u> A collision for a function $F: \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$ is a pair of distinct points $X, X' \in \mathcal{X}$ such that F(X) = F(X'). Let game $\mathbf{G}_{\mathsf{F}}^{\operatorname{CR}}$ consist only of procedure FINALIZE that given $X, X' \in \mathcal{X}$, returns 1 if X, X' are a collision for F , and 0 otherwise. We define the advantage of an adversary \mathcal{A} against the CR security of F as $\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{F}}^{\operatorname{CR}}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr\left[\mathbf{G}_{\mathsf{F}}^{\operatorname{CR}}(\mathcal{A})\right]$. The probability is over the coins of the adversary.

To accurately model cryptographic hash functions like SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, which are keyless, our syntax is also keyless. The theoretical issue of existence of an adversary that violates CR security by hard-wiring a collision into its code is circumvented in the usual way. Namely, those of our results which assume CR of some F give explicit constructions of CR adversaries based on the given adversary, so a practical attack against the scheme leads to a practical attack against F. This was popularized as the "human ignorance" approach in [50].

<u>PRFs.</u> Let $\mathsf{F}: \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y} \to \mathcal{Z}$ be a function family, where \mathcal{X} and \mathcal{Y} are length closed sets. We recall the definition of it being a PRF via the games on the left of Figure 1. They are parameterized by a bit $d \in \{0, 1\}$, with d = 1 indicating the "real" game and d = 0 the "random" game. We let $\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{F}}^{\mathsf{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr[\mathbf{G}_{\mathsf{F}}^{\mathsf{PRF}-1}(\mathcal{A})] - \Pr[\mathbf{G}_{\mathsf{F}}^{\mathsf{PRF}-0}(\mathcal{A})]$ be its advantage. This definition is in the multi-user setting [9], with the original single-user setting [31] recovered by considering adversaries making only one NEW query.

3.3 New Definitions

<u>VKL-PRFS.</u> We extend the usual definition of PRF security to allow keys of variable, adversarydetermined length, in the multi-user setting. Let $F: \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y} \to \mathcal{Z}$ be a function family as above, where \mathcal{X} and \mathcal{Y} are length closed sets. Consider games $\mathbf{G}_{\mathsf{F}}^{\text{vkl-PRF}}$ in the middle of Figure 1, parameterized by $d \in \{0, 1\}$ as above. The advantage of an adversary \mathcal{A} is defined as $\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{F}}^{\text{vkl-PRF}}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr[\mathbf{G}_{\mathsf{F}}^{\text{vkl-PRF-1}}(\mathcal{A})] - \Pr[\mathbf{G}_{\mathsf{F}}^{\text{vkl-PRF-0}}(\mathcal{A})]$. Let us now explain. The game is in the multi-user setting. By calling NEW with a length ℓ , the adversary initializes a new user with a key whose length ℓ is determined by the adversary. The game checks that ℓ is in the set of allowed key lengths F.KL, which we define to be $\mathsf{F}.\mathsf{KL} = \{\ell : \{0,1\}^{\ell} \cap \mathcal{X} \neq \emptyset\}$. That is, F.KL is the set of integers which appears as lengths of keys in the key space of F . The FN

Game $\mathbf{G}_{F}^{\mathrm{PRF}\text{-}d}$:	Game $\mathbf{G}_{F}^{\text{vkl-PRF}-d}$:	Game $\mathbf{G}_{G}^{\text{vsl-PRG-}d}$:
NEW	$\underline{\operatorname{New}}(\ell)$	$Fn(\ell)$
1 $n \leftarrow n+1$	1 Assert: $\ell \in F.KL$	1 Assert $\ell \in G.KL$
2 $X_n \leftarrow X$	2 $n \leftarrow n+1$	2 $s \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell}; r_1 \leftarrow G(s)$
	3 $\ell_n \leftarrow \ell$; $X_n \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\ell$	3 $r_0 \leftarrow \mathfrak{R}$
$\overline{\mathrm{FN}(i,Y)}$	FN(i, Y)	4 Return r_d
3 If $T[i, Y] = \bot$ then:	4 If $T[i, Y] = \bot$ then:	
4 If $d = 1$ then:	5 If $d = 1$ then:	
5 $T[i, Y] \leftarrow F(X_i, Y)$	6 $T[i, Y] \leftarrow F(X_i, Y)$	
6 Else T $[i, Y] \leftarrow \mathfrak{Z}$	7 Else T $[i, Y] \leftarrow \mathfrak{Z}$	
7 Return $T[i, Y]$	8 Return $T[i, Y]$	

Figure 1: Left and middle: PRF and variable key-length PRF security games $(d \in \{0, 1\})$ for function family $F: \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y} \to \mathcal{Z}$. Right: Variable seed-length PRG games $(d \in \{0, 1\})$ for PRG $G: S \to \mathcal{R}$.

oracle as usual allows the adversary to obtain either results of F on a chosen message under a previously initialized key, or random strings. Note that the lengths of keys can be determined by the adversary adaptively.

<u>MINIMAL AND MAXIMAL KEY LENGTH.</u> The vkl-PRF game allows keys of any length. In particular, it does not preclude even a one-bit key, as long as such keys are in the keyspace of F. But clearly, if very short keys are allowed, no practically useful security is achieved. This is not a problem with the definition or to be dealt with here; it is handled, rather, in theorems. There, we will as usual consider various resource parameters for an adversary \mathcal{A} , such as the number of queries to the oracles. Now, additionally, there will be a *minimal key length* $\ell_{\min}(\mathcal{A})$, defined as the shortest ℓ for which it makes a NEW(ℓ) query. Bounds in the theorem statement will be a function of $\ell_{\min}(\mathcal{A})$. In practice, we would then ask that applications use key lengths for which the bounds are good, which in particular will dictate large-enough choices of minimal key length. We may also speak of a *maximal key length*, denoted $\ell_{\max}(\mathcal{A})$, of a given adversary, which affects the resources of adversaries constructed from it.

<u>VSL-PRGS.</u> A variable seed-length pseudorandom generator (PRG) is a function $G : S \to \mathcal{R}$. We assume that the seed space S is length closed and let the set of allowed seed lengths of G be $G.KL = \{\ell : \{0,1\}^{\ell} \cap S \neq \emptyset\}$.

Analogously to vkl-PRF security, we extend the usual definition of PRG security [20, 54] to allow seeds of variable, adversary-determined length. The games defining this new notion are on the right of Figure 1, again for $d \in \{0, 1\}$. We let the advantage of an adversary \mathcal{A} against the vsl-PRG security of G be defined as $\mathbf{Adv}_{G}^{\text{vsl-PRG}}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr[\mathbf{G}_{G}^{\text{vsl-PRG-1}}(\mathcal{A})] - \Pr[\mathbf{G}_{G}^{\text{vsl-PRG-0}}(\mathcal{A})].$

As for vkl-PRFs, the vsl-PRG security provided by G in some usage will depend crucially on the length of the shortest allowed seed. To quantify, we define the *minimal seed length* $\ell_{\min}(\mathcal{A})$ of an adversary \mathcal{A} to be the shortest ℓ for which the adversary makes a FN(ℓ) query. Also the *maximal seed length* $\ell_{\max}(\mathcal{A})$, defined as the longest ℓ for which the adversary makes a FN(ℓ) query, will arise in resource considerations.

<u>RKA DEFINITIONS.</u> We extend the definitions of PRF and PRP security under related-key attacks [11] (rka-PRF resp. rka-PRP) to the multi-user setting, beginning with rka-PRF.

Let $F: \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y} \to \mathcal{Z}$ be a function family, and $\Phi: \Lambda_1 \times \Lambda_2 \times \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{X} \cup \{\bot\}$ a function. We call Φ the *related-key-deriving* function. It takes as input two parameters, which specify the transformation that will be applied to the key $X \in \mathcal{X}$. The multi-user aspect is captured by

Game $\mathbf{G}_{\Phi,F}^{\mathrm{rka-PRF}-d}$:	Game $\mathbf{G}_{\Phi,E}^{\mathrm{rka-PRP}-d}$:
$\underline{\operatorname{NeW}(\alpha)}$	$\overline{\text{New}(\alpha)}$
$1 n \leftarrow n+1; X_n \leftarrow \mathcal{X}; \alpha_n \leftarrow \alpha$	1 $n \leftarrow n+1$; $L_n \leftarrow \mathcal{K}; \alpha_n \leftarrow \alpha$
$\mathrm{Fn}(i,eta,Y)$	2 For all $L \in \mathcal{K}$ do:
$\frac{1}{2} \text{ Assert: } \Phi_{\alpha_i,\beta}(X_i) \neq \bot$	3 $\Pi_{n,L} \leftarrow PERM[\mathcal{X}]$
з $X' \leftarrow \Phi_{lpha_i,eta}(X_i) \ /\!\!/$ Derived key	$\overline{\mathrm{Fn}(i,eta,X)}$
4 If $T[i, X', Y] \neq \bot$ then:	4 Assert: $\Phi_{\alpha_i,\beta}(L_i) \neq \bot$
5 Return $T[i, X', Y]$	5 $L' \leftarrow \Phi_{lpha_i,eta}(L_i) \ /\!\!/$ Derived key
6 If $d = 1$ then: $T[i, X', Y] \leftarrow F(X', Y)$	6 If $d = 1$ then:
7 Else T $[i, X', Y] \leftarrow \mathfrak{Z}$	7 Return $E(L', X)$
8 Return $T[i, X', Y]$	8 Else return $\Pi_{i,L'}(X)$

Figure 2: Left: Related-key attack PRF security game $(d \in \{0, 1\})$ for function family $\mathsf{F} \colon \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y} \to \mathcal{Z}$ and RKD function Φ . Right: Related-key attack PRP security game $(d \in \{0, 1\})$ for a block cipher $\mathsf{E} \colon \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{X}$ and RKD function Φ .

the first parameter, $\alpha \in \Lambda_1$, which will depend on the user. The second parameter $\beta \in \Lambda_2$ in turn specifies the function within the function family belonging to each user. Mapping back to [11], for each $\alpha \in \Lambda_1$ and $\beta \in \Lambda_2$, we let $\Phi_{\alpha,\beta} : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{X}$ be the related-key deriving function $\Phi(\alpha, \beta, \cdot)$.

The rka-PRF security game $\mathbf{G}_{\Phi,\mathsf{F}}^{\text{rka-PRF}-d}$ $(d \in \{0,1\})$ shown in Figure 2, provides the adversary with two oracles: NEW and FN. Oracle NEW takes as input $\alpha \in \Lambda_1$, setting the RKD parameter α_i associated to the new user instance *i*. Oracle FN takes as input a user index *i*, a $\beta \in \Lambda_2$, and a function input $Y \in \mathcal{Y}$. It returns $\mathsf{F}(\Phi_{\alpha_i,\beta}(X_i), Y)$ if d = 1 or a consistently sampled random string from \mathcal{Z} if d = 0. We define the advantage of an adversary \mathcal{A} against the PRF security under Φ -restricted related-key attacks as $\mathbf{Adv}_{\Phi,\mathsf{F}}^{\mathrm{rka-PRF}}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr[\mathbf{G}_{\Phi,\mathsf{F}}^{\mathrm{rka-PRF}-1}(\mathcal{A})] - \Pr[\mathbf{G}_{\Phi,\mathsf{F}}^{\mathrm{rka-PRF}-0}(\mathcal{A})].$

Analogously, we extend the single-user rka-PRP definition from [11] to the multi-user/key setting. For a block cipher $\mathsf{E} \colon \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{X}$, the resulting game $\mathbf{G}_{\Phi,\mathsf{E}}^{\mathrm{rka-PRP}-d}$ $(d \in \{0,1\})$ is shown on the right in Figure 2, and the corresponding advantage of an adversary \mathcal{A} defined as $\mathbf{Adv}_{\Phi,\mathsf{E}}^{\mathrm{rka-PRP}}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr[\mathbf{G}_{\Phi,\mathsf{E}}^{\mathrm{rka-PRP}-1}(\mathcal{A})] - \Pr[\mathbf{G}_{\Phi,\mathsf{E}}^{\mathrm{rka-PRP}-0}(\mathcal{A})].$

4 Background and Modularization of HMAC

Our analyses rely on seeing HMAC as built from lower-level functions in a particular modular way. Here we present this view of HMAC. Then we state results on some tools that we will use in our proofs.

<u>PADDING.</u> We fix integers c, b representing the chaining-variable length and block length, respectively, and assume b > c. HMAC-related functions may pad inputs to lengths a multiple of b. We discuss the padding in some detail because it matters to ensure that the modular and standard definitions of HMAC are indeed the same. Also it needs to be handled explicitly in analyses of swap-PRF security. (This was not the case for prior analyses of PRF security [8, 5, 6, 30].)

We fix a padding function pad, parameterized by a maximum encoding length $le \in \mathbb{N}$. Function pad takes as input a length $\ell < 2^{le}$ and returns a string $pad(\ell)$ such that $\ell + |pad(\ell)|$ is a positive multiple of b. The canonical method is $pad(\ell) = 10^* \langle \ell \rangle$ where $\langle \ell \rangle$ is the encoding of integer ℓ in le bits and 0^* denotes the minimum number i of zeros to ensure that $\ell + 1 + i + le$ is a multiple of b, where the length encoding le is another parameter. Thus $|pad(\ell)|$ is always in the range $\{1 + le, \ldots, b + le\}$. For $X \in \{0, 1\}^*$ we denote by $\overline{X} = X \|pad(|X|) \in \{0, 1\}^{b*}$.

 $h^*(L,S) //$ Cascade of compression function h $\triangleright h^*: \{0,1\}^c \times \{0,1\}^{b*} \to \{0,1\}^c$ $\mathbf{S} \xleftarrow{^{b}} S ; n \leftarrow |\mathbf{S}|$ $C_0 \leftarrow L$; For i = 1 to n do: $C_i \leftarrow h(C_{i-1}, \mathbf{S}[i])$ Return C_n H(M) // Hash function H = MD[h] [44, 25] $\triangleright \mathsf{H}: \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^c$ Return $h^*(IV, M \parallel pad(|M|))$ $\mathsf{NMAC}(K_i || K_o, M) /\!\!/ \mathsf{NMAC}$ [8] ▷ NMAC: $\{0,1\}^{2c} \times \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^c$ $X \leftarrow \mathsf{h}^*(K_i, M \| \mathsf{pad}(b + |M|))$; Return $\mathsf{h}(K_o, X \| \mathsf{pad}(b + c))$ $\mathsf{HSKD}_b(K_b) /\!\!/ \mathbf{Subkey}$ derivation function of HMAC_b \triangleright HSKD_b: $\{0,1\}^b \to \{0,1\}^{2c}$ $K_i \leftarrow h(IV, K_b \oplus ipad); K_o \leftarrow h(IV, K_b \oplus opad); Return K_i || K_o$ $\mathsf{HMAC}_b(K_b, M) /\!\!/ \mathsf{HMAC} \mathsf{ with } b\mathsf{-bit keys}$ [8] \triangleright HMAC_b: $\{0,1\}^b \times \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^c$ $K_i || K_o \leftarrow \mathsf{HSKD}_b(K_b)$; Return $\mathsf{NMAC}(K_i || K_o, M)$ $\mathsf{PoH}_b(K) /\!\!/ \mathbf{Derive} \ \mathbf{a} \ b$ -bit key for HSKD_b from an HMAC key $K \in \{0,1\}^*$ $\triangleright \mathsf{PoH}_b: \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^b$ If $|K| \leq b$ then $K_b \leftarrow K \parallel 0^{b-|K|}$ else $K_b \leftarrow \mathsf{H}(K) \parallel 0^{b-c}$ Return K_b $\mathsf{HSKD}(K) /\!\!/ \mathbf{Subkey}$ derivation function of HMAC \triangleright HSKD: $\{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{2c}$ $K_b \leftarrow \mathsf{PoH}_b(K) ; K_i || K_o \leftarrow \mathsf{HSKD}_b(K_b) ; \text{Return } K_i || K_o$ HMAC(K, M) // "Full" HMAC [39, 46] ▷ HMAC: $\{0,1\}^* \times \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^c$ $K_i \| K_o \leftarrow \mathsf{HSKD}(K) ; \operatorname{Return} \mathsf{NMAC}(K_i \| K_o, M)$

Figure 3: HMAC and friends built from compression function $h: \{0,1\}^c \times \{0,1\}^b \to \{0,1\}^c$.

Concretely, for SHA-256, the parameters are (c, b, le) = (256, 512, 64) and for SHA-384 and SHA-512 they are (c, b, le) = (512, 1024, 128). We assume b - c > le, as is true for SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512, so that if $|M| \mod b \leq c$ then for any ℓ its padded version $M || \text{pad}(\ell)$ is $\lceil |M|/b \rceil$ blocks long, meaning no extra block of padding is created. In particular, if $|M| \leq c$ then $M || \text{pad}(\ell)$ is just one block, which is relevant in ensuring that the modular form of HMAC written below matches with the original.

<u>MESSAGE AND KEY LENGTHS.</u> The upper limit of le on the binary length of an input ℓ to pad means that the maximum length of an input to the hash function H is $Le = 2^{le}$. This translates into restrictions on the maximum length of both keys and messages for HMAC. However in practice Le is very large (at least 2^{64} in the above examples), making this a theoretical limitation. Thus, in the remainder of this paper we write $\{0, 1\}^*$ for domains of functions that are actually limited to inputs of lengths Le. It is understood that in any theorems about these functions, there is an implicit assumption that adversary queries do not exceed the maximum allowed lengths.




Figure 4: Illustration of how we modularize $\mathsf{HMAC}(X, Y)$ and its swap $\mathsf{HMAC}^{=}(Y, X)$ as the composition of subkey derivation function HSKD (highlighted in orange) and $\mathsf{NMAC}(X_1 || X_2, Y)$ resp. $\mathsf{NMAC}^{=}(Y, X_1 || X_2)$ (in blue). In turn, NMAC and $\mathsf{NMAC}^{=}$ are modularized as the composition of h (in green) and h^{*} (in yellow). The dashed h invocations may be omitted depending on the length of \overline{Y} .

<u>MODULARIZATION OF HMAC FUNCTIONS.</u> The starting point is a compression function h: $\{0,1\}^c \times \{0,1\}^b \rightarrow \{0,1\}^c$ taking a *c*-bit chaining variable and *b*-bit block to return a *c*-bit result. Figure 3 now specifies various functions that we will consider; for an illustration of how we modularize HMAC, see also Figure 4.

The cascade $h^*: \{0,1\}^c \times \{0,1\}^{b*} \to \{0,1\}^c$ [9] takes a *c*-bit key *L* and an input *S* whose length is assumed a multiple of *b*, and returns a *c*-bit output as shown. Note that $S = \varepsilon$ could be the empty string, in which case n = 0 in the code and thus what is returned is C_0 , meaning $h^*(L, \varepsilon) = L$.

Fixing an initial vector $IV \in \{0,1\}^c$, one can then define the hash function $H: \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^c$ as per the Merkle–Damgård transform [44, 25], $H(M) = h^*(IV, M \parallel pad(|M|))$.

Next is NMAC: $\{0,1\}^{2c} \times \{0,1\}^{b*} \to \{0,1\}^c$ [8], an abstraction useful in the study of HMAC. Its 2*c*-bit key is viewed as split into an "inner" key K_i and "outer" key K_o . Here $M \in \{0,1\}^*$ needs to be padded to length a multiple of *b* to run h^{*}. The obvious padding \overline{M} would append pad(|M|). Instead, we define NMAC to pad *M* with pad(b + |M|) and similarly pad *X* with pad(b + c) rather than pad(*c*). As explained below, this is to accurately capture HMAC_b and HMAC, where the *b*-bit keys are prepended to the message resp. *X*, adding to the overall hash function input length. We note that traditionally NMAC has been defined and analyzed as taking unpadded messages in $\{0,1\}^{b*}$ [8, 5, 6, 30], which is sufficient when considering PRF security, but for swap-PRF security the padding will matter.

The first, basic version of HMAC is $\mathsf{HMAC}_b: \{0,1\}^b \times \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^c$ which takes a *b*-bit key K_b . It is defined as $\mathsf{HMAC}_b(K_b, M) = \mathsf{H}((K_b \oplus \mathsf{opad}) || \mathsf{H}((K_b \oplus \mathsf{ipad}) || M))$, where ipad , $\mathsf{opad} \in \{0,1\}^b$ are distinct constants defined in [8, 39, 46]. The modular rendition first applies the shown subkey derivation function $\mathsf{HSKD}_b: \{0,1\}^b \to \{0,1\}^{2c}$ to the key and then calls NMAC on the derived keys and the message, again as shown. It is in order for the main and modular forms here to indeed be the same function that NMAC is carefully defined to pad in a way that accommodates an extra first block.

Finally, to obtain "full" HMAC, consider the subkey derivation function HSKD: $\{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{2c}$. It first maps an arbitrary-length key K down to a b-bit key K_b via PoH_b and then maps K_b to an NMAC key $K_i || K_o$ via HSKD_b. The definition of HMAC: $\{0,1\}^* \times \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^c$

from [8, 39, 46] is $\mathsf{HMAC}(K, M) = \mathsf{HMAC}_b(\mathsf{PoH}_b(K), M) = \mathsf{H}((\mathsf{PoH}_b(K) \oplus \mathsf{opad}) || \mathsf{H}((\mathsf{PoH}_b(K) \oplus \mathsf{ipad}) || M))$. Figure 3 shows the modular form. Again, the choice of padding in the definition of NMAC is important to ensure that the modular and standard forms of HMAC are indeed the same function.

<u>LEMMAS ON CASCADE AND 2-TIER CASCADE.</u> Our proofs will use the 2-tier cascade, a generalization of the cascade from [7]. In addition to the function family $h: \{0,1\}^c \times \{0,1\}^b \to \{0,1\}^c$ underlying h^* , we have another function family $f: \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{X} \to \{0,1\}^c$. The 2-tier cascade associated to f, h is the function family $2\mathsf{CSC}[f,h]: \mathcal{K} \times (\mathcal{X} \times \{0,1\}^{b*}) \to \{0,1\}^c$ defined as follows:

$$\frac{2\mathsf{CSC}[\mathsf{f},\mathsf{h}](J,(A,S))}{L \leftarrow \mathsf{f}(J,A) \; ; \; X \leftarrow \mathsf{h}^*(L,S) \; ; \; \mathrm{Return} \; X} \quad \mathcal{X} \times \{0,1\}^{b*}$$

Let \mathcal{A} be a PRF adversary attacking $2\mathsf{CSC}[\mathsf{f},\mathsf{h}]$. We say that it is prefix-free if for all *i* there do not exist distinct (A, S) and (A', S') among the $\mathsf{FN}(i, \cdot)$ queries such that A = A' and S is a prefix of S'. (Note that there are no restrictions on queries across different users *i*.) This is a necessary condition for PRF security. The following says that it is also sufficient, and furthermore the result is in the multi-user setting with good bounds, meaning security does not degrade linearly with the number of users. The proof is a simple extension of a proof in [7] and is given in Appendix B.

Lemma 1 (PRF security of 2CSC). Let $f: \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{X} \to \{0,1\}^c$ and $h: \{0,1\}^c \times \{0,1\}^b \to \{0,1\}^c$ be function families. Let 2CSC: $\mathcal{K} \times (\mathcal{X} \times \{0,1\}^{b*}) \to \{0,1\}^c$ be the 2-tier cascade function family associated to f, h as above. Let \mathcal{A}_{2CSC} be a prefix-free adversary against the PRF security of 2CSC. Assume the second components of each pair in the second argument of its queries to FN have at most n blocks. Then we can construct adversaries $\mathcal{A}_f, \mathcal{A}_h$ such that

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{2\mathsf{CSC}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}}) \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{f}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{f}}) + n \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}}).$$
(1)

Adversary \mathcal{A}_{f} makes $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{New}}(\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}})$ queries to NEW and $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}})$ to FN. Adversary \mathcal{A}_{h} makes at most $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}})$ queries to NEW and $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}})$ to FN. The running times of the constructed adversaries are about the same as that of $\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}}$.

The cascade h^* itself is known to be a PRF under prefix-free queries assuming h is a PRF [9]. (And attacks show prefix-freeness is necessary.) This is in the single-user setting, which implies multi-user security with a loss in advantage that is a factor of the number of users. The following lemma gives instead a good bound, not degrading with the number of users. Here a PRF adversary \mathcal{A} against h^* is said to be prefix-free if for all *i* there do not exist distinct Xand X' among the $FN(i, \cdot)$ queries such that X is a prefix of X'. This is obtained as a simply corollary of Lemma 1 using the technique of [7] of setting the first tier of the 2-tier cascade to a random function. For completeness details are in Appendix B, where we also discuss related work and techniques.

Lemma 2 (Multi-user PRF security of h^{*}). Let h: $\{0,1\}^c \times \{0,1\}^b \rightarrow \{0,1\}^b$ be a function family. Let h^{*}: $\{0,1\}^c \times \{0,1\}^{b*} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^c$ be the cascade function family associated to h as per Figure 3. Let \mathcal{A}_{h^*} be a prefix-free adversary against the PRF security of h^{*}. Assume that the second arguments of its queries to FN have at most n blocks. Then we can construct an adversary \mathcal{A}_h such that

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}^*}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}^*}) \le n \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}}) .$$
⁽²⁾

Adversary \mathcal{A}_h makes $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{h^*})$ queries to NEW and $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{h^*})$ to FN. The running time of \mathcal{A}_h is about the same as that of \mathcal{A}_{h^*} .

<u>ADVERSARY MERGING LEMMA.</u> Sometimes we want to merge two PRF adversaries into a single PRF adversary whose advantage is a desired weighted sum of the advantages of the given adversaries. The following shows how this works.

Lemma 3 (Merging Lemma). Let $F: \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y} \to \mathcal{Z}$ be a function family. Let $w_1, w_2 \geq 1$ be integers. Let $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ be PRF adversaries. Then we can build a PRF adversary \mathcal{A} such that

$$w_1 \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{F}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_1) + w_2 \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{F}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_2) = (w_1 + w_2) \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{F}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}) .$$
(3)

Resources translate as $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}) = \max(\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_1), \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_2))$ and $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{NeW}}(\mathcal{A}) = \max(\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{NeW}}(\mathcal{A}_1), \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{NeW}}(\mathcal{A}_2))$, and the running time of \mathcal{A} is the maximum of the running times of $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ plus overhead linear in the lengths of w_1, w_2 .

Proof of Lemma 3. Adversary \mathcal{A} picks $v \leftarrow \{1, \ldots, w_1 + w_2\}$. If $v \leq w_1$ then it lets $i \leftarrow 1$ and otherwise lets $i \leftarrow 2$. It now runs \mathcal{A}_i , responding to its oracle queries with its own oracles, and returns whatever \mathcal{A}_i returns. Then for both d = 0 and d = 1 we have

$$\Pr[\mathbf{G}_{\mathsf{F}}^{\operatorname{PRF}-d}(\mathcal{A})] = \frac{w_1}{w_1 + w_2} \cdot \Pr[\mathbf{G}_{\mathsf{F}}^{\operatorname{PRF}-d}(\mathcal{A}_1)] + \frac{w_2}{w_1 + w_2} \cdot \Pr[\mathbf{G}_{\mathsf{F}}^{\operatorname{PRF}-d}(\mathcal{A}_2)]$$

Subtracting case d = 0 from d = 1, we get

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{F}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}) = \frac{w_1}{w_1 + w_2} \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{F}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_1) + \frac{w_2}{w_1 + w_2} \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{F}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_2) .$$

Re-arranging terms yields Equation (3).

While the running time of \mathcal{A} is, as stated, about the max of the individual running times of \mathcal{A}_1 and \mathcal{A}_2 , a blackbox use of the lemma will result in its code (description) size being the sum of the individual ones. Put another way, if we use circuit size rather than running time as the metric, then the circuit size of \mathcal{A} is the sum of those of \mathcal{A}_1 and \mathcal{A}_2 , plus some overhead. This means that it isn't meaningful to apply Lemma 3 more than a constant number of times. In our usages, we will apply it at most twice. But also, in our usages, the doubling in code size is avoided because $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ are both built from some underlying adversary \mathcal{B} that is the same in both cases, and each adds little overhead to \mathcal{B} , so the code (or circuit) for the merged \mathcal{A} can include just one copy of \mathcal{B} and have size about the max of the sizes of $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$.

5 Dual-PRF Security of NMAC

We now have all the definitions and modularizations in place to turn to our main results, on NMAC (in this section) and, based on these, HMAC (in the next). To understand the PRF security of HMAC^{\leftrightarrows} and HMAC, it is instructive to start with their (swapped) core, i.e., NMAC^{\oiint} and NMAC. Recall from Figure 3 that NMAC takes two keys $K_i \parallel K_o$ of length c bits each and a message $M \in \{0, 1\}^*$ as input. It first processes the padded message using the cascade h^{*} keyed with K_i , then applies h keyed with K_o to the cascade's padded output.

5.1 vkl-PRF Security of NMAC^{\Rightarrow}

Swapping key and message input means that $\mathsf{NMAC}^{\leftrightarrows}$ takes as input a single arbitrary-length key K and two (concatenated) messages $M_1 \parallel M_2$ of length c bits each. The latter "key" the upper and the lower cascade, the former is padded to $K \parallel \mathsf{pad}(b + |K|)$ and enters the upper cascade through the block inputs.

It is conducive to single out the first and last invocation of h: the first takes the leading (up to b) bits of the key K (possibly padded), the last the (padded) output of the cascade, through the block input. In our security analysis, we will treat both as invocations of $h^{=}$ and rely on rka-PRF security to capture the padding. Figure 5 shows NMAC⁼ modularized in this way.

<u>SECURITY OF NMAC</u>: We show that NMAC is a vkl-PRF if $h^{i_{i_{i_{j}}}}$ is rka-PRF secure and h is a PRF. The RKD functions of interest for $h^{i_{i_{j}}}$ are those which allow the adversary to overwrite a




Figure 5: Illustration of and code for NMAC^{\doteq}, viewed as the composition of h^{\doteq} (highlighted in green) and h^* (in yellow). The purple asterisks \star indicate that the *P* part of the key padding may be empty (namely, if k = b) or that the cascade **G** may be omitted (if $|\overline{K}| = b$).

suffix of the full, block-length key with padding. In the reduction, we will use this to simulate the padding in lines 3 and 5 of Figure 5.

We define $\Phi_{\mathsf{pad},a}: \{0,\ldots,b\} \times \{\varepsilon\} \times \{0,1\}^b \to \{0,1\}^b \cup \{\bot\}$, on input ℓ,ε,K , to return \bot if $\ell < a$ and $K[1..\ell] \parallel \mathsf{pad}(b+\ell)[1..b-\ell]$ otherwise. In more detail:

$$\begin{split} & \underline{\Phi_{\mathsf{pad},a}(\ell,\varepsilon,K)} \\ & \text{If } \ell < a \text{ then return } \bot \\ & P \leftarrow \mathsf{pad}(b+\ell)[1..b-\ell] \text{ ; } L \leftarrow K[1..\ell] \parallel P \\ & \text{Return } L \end{split}$$

That is, $\Phi_{\mathsf{pad},a}(\ell, \varepsilon, K)$ overwrites the suffix of K with the first $b - \ell$ bits of padding specified by $\mathsf{pad}(b + \ell)$, where pad is defined as per Section 4. The function requires that $\ell \ge a$, otherwise the output is \bot . That is, at least a bits of key prefix are left intact in the transformation. Note that the second input to $\Phi_{\mathsf{pad},a}$ is empty, meaning that for each user, there is only a single RKD function; namely, the one applying the appropriate-length padding.

We justify the assumption that h^{\leftrightarrows} is a PRF under related-key attacks when restricted to $\Phi_{\mathsf{pad},a}$ in Section 7.

Theorem 4 (vkl-PRF security of NMAC^{\doteq}). Let c, b, and pad be as in Section 4, let h, h^{*} be defined as in Figure 3. Let \mathcal{A} be an adversary against the vkl-PRF security of NMAC^{\doteq} whose NEW queries have minimal and maximal key length $\ell_{\min}(\mathcal{A})$ resp. $\ell_{\max}(\mathcal{A})$. Let $n = \lceil \ell_{\max}(\mathcal{A})/b \rceil$ be the block length of the maximum-length key used by \mathcal{A} and let $a = \min(c, \ell_{\min}(\mathcal{A}))$. Then we can construct adversaries $\mathcal{A}_{h^{\pm}}, \mathcal{A}_{h}$ such that

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{NMAC}^{\rightrightarrows}}^{\mathrm{vkl-PRF}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq 2 \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\Phi_{\mathsf{pad},a},\mathsf{h}^{\ddagger}}^{\mathrm{rka-PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}^{\ddagger}}) + n \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}}) .$$
(4)

Adversary $\mathcal{A}_{h^{\rightrightarrows}}$ makes at most $\max(\mathbf{Q}^{\operatorname{NeW}}(\mathcal{A}), \mathbf{Q}^{\operatorname{FN}}(\mathcal{A}))$ to oracle New and at most $\mathbf{Q}^{\operatorname{FN}}(\mathcal{A})$ to oracle FN. \mathcal{A}_{h} makes $\mathbf{Q}^{\operatorname{FN}}(\mathcal{A})$ queries to each of oracle New and FN. The running times of both adversaries are approximately that of \mathcal{A} .

Games G₀-G₅: $\underbrace{\operatorname{NEW}(\ell)}_{1} /\!\!/ \operatorname{Game} \operatorname{G}_{0}$ $1 n \leftarrow n+1$ $/\!\!/ \operatorname{Pre-computation of NMAC^{\leftrightarrows} \operatorname{key values; cf. Figure 5, lines 1-2}$ $2 K_{n} \leftarrow \ast \{0,1\}^{\ell} ; k \leftarrow \min(\ell,b) ; \overline{K}_{n} \leftarrow K_{n} \| \operatorname{pad}(b+\ell)$ $3 L_{n,1} \leftarrow K_{n}[1..k] ; P_{n} \leftarrow \overline{K}_{n}[k+1..b] ; S_{n} \leftarrow \overline{K}_{n}[b+1..|\overline{K}_{n}|]$ $\underbrace{\operatorname{NEW}(\ell)}_{4} /\!\!/ \operatorname{Games} \operatorname{G}_{1}, \operatorname{G}_{2}, \operatorname{G}_{3}$ $4 n \leftarrow n+1 ; k \leftarrow \min(\ell, b)$ $5 K_{n} \leftarrow \ast \{0,1\}^{\ell} ; \overline{K}_{n} \leftarrow K_{n} \| \operatorname{pad}(b+\ell) ; S_{n} \leftarrow \overline{K}_{n}[b+1..|\overline{K}_{n}|]$ $\underbrace{\operatorname{NEW}(\ell)}_{6} /\!\!/ \operatorname{Games} \operatorname{G}_{4}, \operatorname{G}_{5}$ $6 n \leftarrow n+1$

Figure 6: The NEW oracles for games in the proof of Theorem 4.

Proof of Theorem 4. We use a sequence of games G_0-G_5 . All are executed with \mathcal{A} , and hence provide the oracles named in game $\mathbf{G}_{\mathsf{NMAC}}^{\mathsf{vkl}-\mathsf{PRF}-d}$. The NEW oracles of the games are shown in Figure 6. This allows further descriptions to focus on the FN oracle.

▷ Replacing the first invocation of h^{\doteq} with a random function. We begin with game G₀ being $\mathbf{G}_{\mathsf{NMAC}^{\ddagger}}^{\mathsf{vkl}-\mathsf{PRF}-1}(\mathcal{A})$. That is, G₀ is the "real" vkl-PRF game.

The first game hop, to game G_1 , replaces the first evaluation of h^{\ominus} in NMAC^{\ominus} (on line 3 of Figure 5) by consistent random sampling. Consequently, $L_{n,1}$ is not used anymore and the corresponding first k bits of K_n become superfluous in the NEW oracle (Figure 6). The FN oracles of games G_0, G_1 reflecting this change are in Figure 7. They differ only in that line 4 is only in G_0 and line 5 is only in G_1 . By standard equation rewriting

$$\Pr[\mathbf{G}_{\mathsf{NMAC}}^{\mathsf{vkl}-\mathsf{PRF}-1}(\mathcal{A})] = \Pr[\mathsf{G}_0(\mathcal{A})] = \Pr[\mathsf{G}_1(\mathcal{A})] + (\Pr[\mathsf{G}_0(\mathcal{A})] - \Pr[\mathsf{G}_1(\mathcal{A})]).$$
(5)

We build an adversary $\mathcal{A}_{h^{\leftrightarrows},1}$ such that

$$\Pr[G_0(\mathcal{A})] - \Pr[G_1(\mathcal{A})] \le \mathbf{Adv}_{\Phi_{\mathsf{pad},a},\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows}}^{\mathrm{rka-PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows},1}).$$
(6)

Adversary $\mathcal{A}_{h^{i=1}}$ simulates G_0 for \mathcal{A} , with two changes: First, it does not sample K_n itself in the NEW oracle of G_0 , but instead issues a NEW(k) query to its $\mathbf{G}_{\Phi_{\mathsf{pad},a},\mathbf{h}^{\square}}^{\mathrm{rka-PRF}}$ game, where $k = \min(\ell, b)$. This initializes a b-bit key for h^{\leftrightarrows} and fixes the RKD parameter for user n to $\alpha_n = k$. If $\ell > b$, adversary $\mathcal{A}_{h=1}$ then samples the remaining $\ell - b$ bits of K_n uniformly at random. It then applies the (remaining) padding to compute S_n . Second, instead of computing $\mathfrak{h}^{\leftrightarrows}$ in line 4 of G_0 (Figure 7) in response to a query $\operatorname{FN}(i, M_1 || M_2)$ from \mathcal{A} , adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\mathfrak{h}^{\leftrightarrows}, 1}$ queries its FN oracle on (i, ε, M_1) and uses the result for $T_{\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows},1}[i, M_1]$. Note that for each user index *i*, the same RKD function $\Phi_{\mathsf{pad},a}(\alpha_i,\varepsilon,\cdot)$ is always applied. Hence it is sufficient to index the table by (i, M_i) , as these uniquely determine the output from oracle FN in the rka-PRF game. Furthermore, since $h^{i=}(L_{i,1}||P_i, M_1)$ on line 4 of Figure 7 is computed only once per pair $(i, M_1), \mathcal{A}_{\mathfrak{h}^{\Rightarrow}, 1}$ makes at most one FN query for each of the $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A})$ FN queries made by \mathcal{A} . Its NEW queries are all with an input $k \ge a$, since the minimal k on which NEW is called is $k = \min(\ell_{\min}(\mathcal{A}), b) \geq \min(\ell_{\min}(\mathcal{A}), c) = a$. This is by virtue of $\ell_{\min}(\mathcal{A})$ being the smallest key length ℓ queried by \mathcal{A} , and the assumption that b > c (see Section 4). Adversary $\mathcal{A}_{h^{\Leftrightarrow},1}$ soundly simulates $G_{(1-d)}$ when playing game $\mathbf{G}_{\Phi_{\mathsf{pad},a},h}^{\mathsf{rka}-\mathsf{PRF}-d}$, for $d \in \{0,1\}$, which yields the bound in Equation (6).

 $FN(i, M) // Games G_0, G_1$ 1 If $T[i, M] \neq \bot$ then return T[i, M]2 $M_1 || M_2 \leftarrow M /| |M_1| = |M_2| = c$ 3 If $T_{h^{i_{n}},1}[i, M_1] = \bot$ then $\mathbf{T}_{\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows},1}[i,M_1] \leftarrow \mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows}(L_{i,1} \| P_i, M_1)$ // G0 5 $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{h} \leftrightarrows \mathbf{1}}[i, M_1] \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^c$ // G1 6 $L_{i,2} \leftarrow \mathsf{h}^*(\mathsf{T}_{\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows},1}[i,M_1],S_i)$ 7 $T[i, M] \leftarrow \mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows}(L_{i,2} \| \mathsf{pad}(b+c), M_2)$; Return T[i, M] $FN(i, M) // Games G_2, G_3$ 1 If $T[i, M] \neq \bot$ then return T[i, M]2 $M_1 || M_2 \leftarrow M /| |M_1| = |M_2| = c$ 3 If $T_{h \rightleftharpoons ,1}[i, M_1] = \bot$ then $T_{h \hookrightarrow ,1}[i, M_1] \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^c$ 4 If $T_{h^*}[i, M_1] = \bot$ then 5 $\mathbf{T}_{\mathsf{h}^*}[i, M_1] \leftarrow \mathsf{h}^*(\mathbf{T}_{\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows}, 1}[i, M_1], S_i)$ // G2 6 $T_{h^*}[i, M_1] \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^c$ // G3 7 $T[i, M] \leftarrow \mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows}(T_{\mathsf{h}^*}[i, M_1] \| \mathsf{pad}(b + c), M_2)$; Return T[i, M] $\underline{\operatorname{Fn}(i,M)} /\!\!/ \operatorname{Games} \operatorname{G}_4, \operatorname{G}_5$ 1 If $T[i, M] \neq \bot$ then return T[i, M]2 $M_1 || M_2 \leftarrow M || M_1 |= |M_2| = c$ 3 If $T_{h^*}[i, M_1] = \bot$ then $T_{h^*}[i, M_1] \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^c$ 4 If $T_{h^{i_{n}},2}[i, M_1, M_2] = \bot$ then $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{h}^{\leftrightarrows},\mathbf{n}_{2}}[i,M_{1},M_{2}] \leftarrow \mathbf{h}^{\leftrightarrows}(\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{h}^{*}}[i,M_{1}]\|\mathbf{pad}(b+c),M_{2})$ // G4 6 $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{h}\overset{\circ}{=},2}[i, M_1, M_2] \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^c$ // G5 7 $T[i, M] \leftarrow T_{h \rightleftharpoons .2}[i, M_1, M_2]$; Return T[i, M]

Figure 7: The FN oracles for games G_0-G_5 in the proof of Theorem 4.

▷ Replacing h^{*} with a random function. We simplify the FN oracle from G₁ to G₂. Note that storing the values $L_{i,2}$ in $T_{h^*}[i, M_1]$ and computing them only once (lines 4 and 5 of G₂) is sound since S_i is fixed per key *i*, so for each $T_{h^{=},1}[i, M_1]$, the inputs to h^{*} are fixed.

In G₃ (Figure 7), we replace the computation of $h^*(T_{h = ,1}[i, M_1], S_i)$, originally in line 4 of Figure 5, by (consistent) random sampling. By rewriting,

$$\Pr[G_1(\mathcal{A})] = \Pr[G_2(\mathcal{A})] = \Pr[G_3(\mathcal{A})] + (\Pr[G_2(\mathcal{A})] - \Pr[G_3(\mathcal{A})]).$$
(7)

We construct an adversary \mathcal{A}_{h^*} such that

$$\Pr[G_2(\mathcal{A})] - \Pr[G_3(\mathcal{A})] \le \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}^*}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}^*}).$$
(8)

Observe that in game G₂, values $T_{h^{\leftrightarrows,1}}[i, M_1]$ in the FN oracle are random *c*-bit strings. Adversary \mathcal{A}_{h^*} simulates G₂, except for two differences: Instead of sampling $T_{h^{\boxminus,1}}[i, M_1] \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^c$ in line 3 of G₂ (Figure 7), \mathcal{A}_{h^*} issues a NEW query to set up a new key with index *j* in its $\mathbf{G}_{h^*}^{PRF-d}$ game and stores $T_{h^{\boxminus,1}}[i, M_1] \leftarrow j$. Further, instead of computing $h^*(T_{h^{\boxminus,1}}[i, M_1], S_i)$ itself in line 5 of G₂, it queries $(T_{h^{\vdash,1}}[i, M_1], S_i)$ to its FN oracle, using the result as $T_{h^*}[i, M_1]$. It thus makes at most $\mathbf{Q}^{FN}(\mathcal{A})$ queries to its NEW oracle, and one FN query under each key (since each $T_{h^*}[i, M_1]$ is only computed once), each of whose second component is at most $n = \lceil \ell_{\max}(\mathcal{A})/b \rceil$ blocks long. (Note that n + 1 is an upper bound on the number of blocks of the *padded* key \overline{K}

of NMAC^{\leftrightarrows}. The input *S* to the cascade in any FN query is hence at most *n* blocks.) Depending on the challenge bit *d* in $\mathbf{G}_{h^*}^{\mathrm{PRF}-d}$, \mathcal{A}_{h^*} soundly simulates either G₂ or G₃, yielding Equation (8). \triangleright Replacing the second h^{\leftrightarrows} with a random function. We again first simplify the FN oracle from G₃ to G₄ (cf. Figure 7), sampling $T_{h^*}[i, M_1]$ directly and omitting the no longer needed table $T_{h^{\leftrightarrows},1}$. Next, in G₅ (also Figure 7), we sample the output of the second call to h^{\leftrightarrows} (Figure 5, line 5), stored in $T_{h^{\leftrightarrows},2}[i, M_1, M_2]$, (consistently) at random instead of computing it as $h^{\leftrightarrows}(T_{h^*}[i, M_1] \| \mathsf{pad}(b + c), M_2)$.

Rewriting equations, we get

$$\Pr[G_3(\mathcal{A})] = \Pr[G_4(\mathcal{A})] = \Pr[G_5(\mathcal{A})] + (\Pr[G_4(\mathcal{A})] - \Pr[G_5(\mathcal{A})]).$$
(9)

We bound the introduced probability difference via an adversary $\mathcal{A}_{h^{\leftrightarrows},2}$ as

$$\Pr[G_4(\mathcal{A})] - \Pr[G_5(\mathcal{A})] \le \mathbf{Adv}_{\Phi_{\mathsf{pad},a},\mathsf{h}^{\vDash}}^{\operatorname{rka-PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows},2}).$$
(10)

Adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows},2}$ acts as the challenger in G_4 with the following two modifications: First, for any $T_{\mathsf{h}^*}[i, M_1]$ value sampled in line 3 of Figure 7, $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}^{\boxminus},2}$ queries NEW(c) and stores the key index in a table $T_{\mathsf{h}^*}[i, M_1]$. Second, instead of computing $\mathsf{h}^{\boxminus}(T_{\mathsf{h}^*}[i, M_1]||\mathsf{pad}(b+c), M_2)$ in line 5, $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}^{\boxminus},2}$ queries its FN oracle on $(T_{\mathsf{h}^*}[i, M_1], \varepsilon, M_2)$. Note that $\Phi_{\mathsf{pad},a}$ will never return \bot here since by definition $a = \min(\ell_{\mathsf{min}}(\mathcal{A}), c)$, so $c \ge a$. This results in at most $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathsf{FN}}(\mathcal{A})$ queries to each of $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}^{\boxminus},2}$'s oracles NEW and FN. Depending on bit d in $\mathbf{G}^{\mathsf{rka}\operatorname{-PRF}d}_{\Phi_{\mathsf{pad},a},\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows}}$, $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows},2}$ soundly simulates either G_4 (d = 1) or G_5 (d = 0), yielding Equation 10.

Finally we claim that

$$\Pr[G_5(\mathcal{A})] = \Pr[\mathbf{G}_{\mathsf{NMAC}}^{\mathsf{vkl}-\mathsf{PRF}-0}(\mathcal{A})], \tag{11}$$

which results from observing that $T_{h^*}[i, M_1]$ is not used anymore in G_5 , and the FN oracle in G_5 responds with (consistently-sampled) random strings. Hence G_5 equals $\mathbf{G}_{\mathsf{NMAC}}^{\mathsf{vkl}-\mathsf{PRF}-0}$.

Combining Equations (5)-(11) gives

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{NMAC}}^{\mathrm{vkl-PRF}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq 2 \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\Phi_{\mathsf{pad},a},\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows}}^{\mathrm{rka-PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows}}) + \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}^{*}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}^{*}}) , \qquad (12)$$

where $\mathcal{A}_{h^{\leftrightarrows}}$ is formed by picking $\gamma \leftarrow \{1, 2\}$ and running $\mathcal{A}_{h^{\leftrightarrows}, \gamma}$. Adversary $\mathcal{A}_{h^{\hookrightarrow}}$ makes at most $\max(\mathbf{Q}^{\operatorname{New}}(\mathcal{A}), \mathbf{Q}^{\operatorname{Fn}}(\mathcal{A}))$ to oracle NEW and at most $\mathbf{Q}^{\operatorname{Fn}}(\mathcal{A})$ to oracle FN.

 \triangleright Applying Lemma 2. Lastly, we invoke Lemma 2 on the multi-user PRF security of the cascade. This gives us an adversary \mathcal{A}_{h} such that

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathbf{h}^{*}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathbf{h}^{*}}) \leq n \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathbf{h}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathbf{h}}) , \qquad (13)$$

where \mathcal{A}_{h} makes $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{h^*}) = \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A})$ queries to each of oracle NEW and FN.

5.2 Strong Multi-user PRF Security of NMAC

PRF security for NMAC was already established in [8, 5, 6, 30] for the single user setting. By the usual hybrid argument [9] one can conclude multi-user PRF security with advantage degraded by the number of NEW queries. We are interested in strong multi-user PRF security, meaning bounds that do not suffer such degradation and instead are as good as in the single-user setting.

Let us first review the proof of single-user PRF security of GPR [30]. Here the starting point is the proof of BCK [8] which first exploits PRF security of the outer application of h to reduce to the hidden-key collision-resistance of h^{*}. Now, if h^{*} was a general PRF, it would imply it is also hidden-key collision resistant. But it is only a prefix-free PRF. The technique of GPR [30] is to exploit a random systems lemma by Maurer [42] that allows us to first reduce to a non-adaptive setting. Then, one can use a trick of appending a new block to colliding messages. This preserves collisions but breaks prefix-ness.

Games G_0, G_1 :		Games $\overline{G_2}$, G_3 :
NEW		NEW
1 $n \leftarrow n+1$; $K_{n,1} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^c$		1 $n \leftarrow n+1$; $K_{n,1} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^c$
2 $K_{n,2} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^c$	$/\!\!/ \ G_0$	${ m Fn}(i,M)$
$\underline{\mathrm{Fn}(i,M)}$		2 $X \leftarrow h^*(K_{i,1}, M \ pad(b + M))$
3 $X \leftarrow h^*(K_{i,1}, M \ pad(b + M))$		3 $Y \leftarrow \{0,1\}^c$
4 If $T[i, X] = \bot$ then		4 If $T[i, X] \neq \bot$ then
5 $T[i, X] \leftarrow h(K_{i,2}, X \ pad(b + c))$	$/\!\!/ ~G_0$	5 bad $\leftarrow 1$; $Y \leftarrow T[i, X]$
6 $\operatorname{T}[i, X] \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^c$	$/\!\!/ \ G_1$	6 $T[i, X] \leftarrow Y$; Return $T[i, X]$
7 Return $T[i, X]$		

Game G₄:

$$\underbrace{\text{NEW}}_{1 \quad n \leftarrow n + 1}$$

$$\underbrace{\text{FN}(i, M)}_{2 \quad m_i \leftarrow m_i + 1 ; M_{i,m_i} \leftarrow M \| \text{pad}(b + |M|) \\ 3 \quad Y \leftarrow \$ \{0, 1\}^c ; \text{Return } Y$$

$$\underbrace{\text{FINALIZE}(d^*)}_{4 \quad \text{For } i = 1, \dots, n \text{ do}}$$

$$5 \quad K_{i,1} \leftarrow \$ \{0, 1\}^c$$

$$6 \quad \text{For } j = 1, \dots, m_i \text{ do}$$

$$7 \quad C_{i,j} \leftarrow h^*(K_{i,1}, M_{i,j})$$

$$8 \quad \text{If } (\exists \alpha \neq \beta : C_{i,\alpha} = C_{i,\beta}) \text{ then bad} \leftarrow 1$$

$$9 \quad \text{Return bad}$$

Figure 8: Games for the proof of Theorem 5. The boxed code in line 5 is only in G_2 and not in G_3 .

We give a simple, direct proof that establishes strong multi-user security with good bounds: The bound in Equation (14) below shows no degradation with the number of NEW queries. We do not use the random systems lemma. Instead we directly use game playing to move to a non-adaptive game. Finally we exploit our Lemma 2 showing strong multi-user PRF security of the cascade. The proof is quite simple and it is surprising this was not noted before.

Theorem 5. Let $h: \{0,1\}^c \times \{0,1\}^b \to \{0,1\}^c$ and let NMAC be as defined in Figure 3. Let \mathcal{A} be an adversary against the PRF security of NMAC. Assume each of its FN queries has length at most L, and let $m = 1 + \lceil L/b \rceil$. Let $q_f = \mathbf{Q}^{\text{FN}}(\mathcal{A})$ and assume $m \cdot q_f < 2^b$. Then we can construct an adversary \mathcal{A}_h such that

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{NMAC}}^{\mathsf{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}) \le (m+2) \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}}^{\mathsf{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}}) + \frac{q_f(q_f-1)}{2^{c+1}} .$$
(14)

Adversary \mathcal{A}_h makes $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A})$ queries to FN and $\max(\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{NeW}}(\mathcal{A}), \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}))$ to NeW, and its running time is about the same as that of \mathcal{A} .

Proof of Theorem 5. Consider the games in Figure 8. Then

$$Pr[\mathbf{G}_{\mathsf{NMAC}}^{\mathrm{PRF-1}}(\mathcal{A})] = \Pr[G_0(\mathcal{A})]$$

= $\Pr[G_1(\mathcal{A})] + (\Pr[G_0(\mathcal{A})] - \Pr[G_1(\mathcal{A})]) .$

It is easy to build an adversary $\mathcal{A}_{h,1}$ such that

$$\Pr[G_0(\mathcal{A})] - \Pr[G_1(\mathcal{A})] \le \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h},1}) .$$
(15)

Namely, $\mathcal{A}_{h,1}$ initializes $n \leftarrow 0$ and runs \mathcal{A} . When \mathcal{A} makes a NEW query, $\mathcal{A}_{h,1}$ lets $n \leftarrow n+1$, lets $K_{n,1} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^c$ and queries its own NEW oracle. When \mathcal{A} makes a FN(i, M) query, $\mathcal{A}_{h,1}$ lets $X \leftarrow h^*(K_{i,1}, M \| \mathsf{pad}(b + |M|))$, queries its own FN oracle with $i, X \| \mathsf{pad}(b + c)$ and returns the response to \mathcal{A} . Eventually \mathcal{A} halts with some output, and $\mathcal{A}_{h,1}$ returns the same as its own output. When $\mathcal{A}_{h,1}$ is playing game $\mathbf{G}_{h}^{\mathrm{PRF-1}}$, the key chosen for user i plays the role of $K_{i,2}$ in game \mathbf{G}_{0} , hence $\mathrm{Pr}[\mathbf{G}_{h}^{\mathrm{PRF-1}}(\mathcal{A}_{h,1})] = \mathrm{Pr}[\mathbf{G}_{0}(\mathcal{A})]$. Also $\mathrm{Pr}[\mathbf{G}_{h}^{\mathrm{PRF-0}}(\mathcal{A}_{h,1})] = \mathrm{Pr}[\mathbf{G}_{1}(\mathcal{A})]$. This justifies Eq. (15). Next

$$\Pr[G_1(\mathcal{A})] = \Pr[G_2(\mathcal{A})] = \Pr[G_3(\mathcal{A})] + (\Pr[G_2(\mathcal{A})] - \Pr[G_3(\mathcal{A})]) .$$

Now we have

$$\Pr[G_3(\mathcal{A})] = \Pr[\mathbf{G}_{\mathsf{NMAC}}^{\mathsf{PRF-0}}(\mathcal{A})]$$

Also games G_2 and G_3 are identical-until-bad, so by the fundamental lemma of game playing [13]

$$\Pr[G_2(\mathcal{A})] - \Pr[G_3(\mathcal{A})] \le \Pr[G_3(\mathcal{A}) \text{ sets bad}].$$

We construct game G_4 such that

$$\Pr[G_4(\mathcal{A})] = \Pr[G_3(\mathcal{A}) \text{ sets bad}],$$

where, thanks to the hop to G_3 , the responses to FN queries from adversary \mathcal{A} are now all independent random strings, assuming (without loss of generality) that the queries \mathcal{A} makes to its FN oracle are all distinct. That is, we assume that no pair *i*, *M* is repeated. Then, the responses from oracle FN are non-adaptive, meaning they do not depend on the inputs from \mathcal{A} . This allows us to apply the trick of adding a block to messages which cause collisions for the cascade, to circumvent prefix queries. Then, we can build an adversary \mathcal{A}_{h^*} such that

$$\Pr[\mathbf{G}_4(\mathcal{A})] \le \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}^*}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}^*}) + \frac{q_f(q_f - 1)}{2^{c+1}} .$$
(16)

The important thing is to ensure that \mathcal{A}_{h^*} is prefix free, meaning, for any user, no query is a prefix of another. This needs to be true even though such a condition may not be true of the FN queries \mathcal{A} makes. We will then conclude by applying Lemma 2 (on the multi-user PRF security of h^*).

Adversary \mathcal{A}_{h^*} can be seen as having two phases. In its first phase, it runs \mathcal{A} , replying to NEW, FN queries as per game G₄, meaning at random, to obtain the messages $M_{i,j}$ that \mathcal{A} queries. In this phase, it makes no queries to its own NEW or FN oracles. In more detail, \mathcal{A}_{h^*} initializes $n \leftarrow 0$. When \mathcal{A} queries NEW, adversary \mathcal{A}_{h^*} lets $n \leftarrow n+1$ and initializes $m_n \leftarrow 0$. When \mathcal{A} queries FN(i, M), adversary \mathcal{A}_{h^*} lets $m_i \leftarrow m_i + 1$ and records the queried message as $M_{i,m_i} \leftarrow M$. Then it picks $Y \leftarrow \{0,1\}^c$ and returns Y to \mathcal{A} as the response to its query. Note that the $M_{i,j}$ messages are distributed exactly as in game G₄, regardless of whether \mathcal{A}_{h^*} is playing in its own real or random game.

Once \mathcal{A} has halted, \mathcal{A}_{h^*} enters its second phase. It starts by making n queries to its own NEW oracle. It is now useful, for a string $X \in \{0,1\}^{b*}$, to let $\operatorname{Bl}(X)$ be the set of all b-bit blocks in X; formally $\operatorname{Bl}(X) = \{X[1], \ldots, X[m]\}$ where $X[1] \ldots X[m] \stackrel{b}{\leftarrow} X$. Then \mathcal{A}_{h^*} does the following:

Adversary \mathcal{A}_{h^*} , second phase

$$\begin{aligned} d \leftarrow 0 \\ \text{For } i &= 1, \dots, n \text{ do} \\ \mathcal{M}_i \leftarrow \text{Bl}(\text{M}_{i,1}) \cup \dots \cup \text{Bl}(\text{M}_{i,m_i}) \\ \# \mathcal{M}_i \text{ is the set of all } b\text{-bit blocks in messages } \text{M}_{i,1}, \dots, \text{M}_{i,m} \\ \text{Pick } X_i \in \{0,1\}^b \setminus \mathcal{M}_i \\ \# \text{ The assumption } m \cdot q_f < 2^b \text{ means } \{0,1\}^b \setminus \mathcal{M}_i \neq \emptyset \\ \text{For } j &= 1, \dots, m_i \text{ do} \\ P_{i,j} \leftarrow \text{M}_{i,j} \| X_i \\ C_{i,j}^* \leftarrow \text{FN}(i, P_{i,j}) \ \# \text{ Here } \mathcal{A}_{h^*} \text{ queries its own FN oracle} \\ \text{If } (\exists \alpha \neq \beta : C_{i,\alpha}^* = C_{i,\beta}^*) \text{ then } d \leftarrow 1 \\ \text{Return } d \end{aligned}$$

Due to the choice of X_i , the queries $i, P_{i,j}$ that adversary \mathcal{A}_{h^*} makes to its FN oracle are prefix free. Suppose \mathcal{A}_{h^*} is playing in its "real" PRF game, namely $\mathbf{G}_{h^*}^{\mathrm{PRF-1}}$. If $h^*(K_{i,1}, \mathbf{M}_{i,\alpha}) =$ $h^*(K_{i,1}, \mathbf{M}_{i,\beta})$, then also $h^*(K_{i,1}, \mathbf{P}_{i,\alpha}) = h^*(K_{i,1}, \mathbf{P}_{i,\beta})$, where $K_{i,1}$ represents the key chosen for user i in game $\mathbf{G}_{h^*}^{\mathrm{PRF-1}}$. Thus $\Pr[\mathbf{G}_{h^*}^{\mathrm{PRF-1}}(\mathcal{A})] \geq \Pr[\mathbf{G}_4(\mathcal{A})]$. On the other hand, because \mathcal{A} 's queries to its FN oracle were assumed distinct, we have $\Pr[\mathbf{G}_{h^*}^{\mathrm{PRF-0}}(\mathcal{A})] \leq q_f(q_f - 1) \cdot 2^{-c-1}$ by the birthday bound. The bound applies since the $C_{i,j}^*$ values are uniformly random strings of length c in this case. This gives Eq. (16). Now, the number of blocks in $\mathbf{P}_{i,j}$ is at most m + 1. (It is one more than the number in $M_{i,j}$, and the latter is at most m.) So any FN query of \mathcal{A}_{h^*} is at most m + 1 blocks long. Now Lemma 2 gives us an adversary $\mathcal{A}_{h,2}$ such that

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathbf{h}^{*}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathbf{h}^{*}}) \le (m+1) \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathbf{h}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathbf{h},2}) .$$
(17)

Finally we merge adversaries $\mathcal{A}_{h,1}, \mathcal{A}_{h,2}$ using Lemma 3 with weights $w_1 = 1$ and $w_2 = m + 1$ to get an adversary \mathcal{A}_h such that

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h},1}) + (m+1) \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h},2}) \leq (m+2) \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}}) \ .$$

Putting together all the above concludes the proof.

6 Dual-PRF Security of HMAC

Here we obtain what we consider our main result, namely to settle the dual-PRF security of the full HMAC via two, complementary results. (1) In the swap-PRF case, we give necessary and sufficient conditions on the set S of keys (messages for HMAC^{\leftrightarrows}) for which HMAC^{$\stackrel{\leftarrow}{\rightarrow}$} is vkl-PRF secure. (2) For the PRF case, we prove vkl-PRF security of HMAC for all (long enough) key lengths.

As illustrated in Figure 4, we can see HMAC (resp. HMAC^{\subseteq}) as the composition of a subkey derivation function HSKD deriving the keys for NMAC (resp. NMAC^{\subseteq}). We leverage this to reduce the security of HMAC to that of NMAC and HSKD. The first step below is a general composition theorem. The second step below is to analyze HSKD to show the attributes asked for by the composition theorem. Then we can conclude by applying our results for NMAC from Section 5.

For the PRF security of HMAC, this approach is not new; it is the same taken in [8, 5, 6]. But we will see that it is also handy for analyzing HMAC^{\leftrightarrows}. See Table 2 for an overview and Figure 9 for an illustration of the details for HMAC^{\backsim}.

6.1 Composition Theorem

Let MAC: $\{0,1\}^{2c} \times \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^c$ be a given function family. (In our application it will be NMAC.) Let \mathcal{F} be a length closed-set and let SKD: $\mathcal{F} \to \{0,1\}^{2c}$ be a function that we call the

Function	Goal	Assumption	Comments
$Comp[MAC, SKD]$ $(HMAC_b = Comp[NMAC, HSKD_b])$	PRF	MAC is PRF, SKD is PRG	[6]
$\begin{array}{l} \mathbf{Comp}[MAC,SKD] \\ (HMAC = \mathbf{Comp}[NMAC,HSKD]) \end{array}$	vkl-PRF	MAC is vkl-PRF, SKD is vsl-PRG	Theorem 6.1
$\begin{array}{l} \mathbf{Comp}[MAC,SKD] \\ (HMAC^{\leftrightarrows} = \mathbf{Comp}[NMAC^{\leftrightarrows},HSKD]) \end{array}$	vkl-PRF	$MAC \stackrel{\leftarrow}{\Rightarrow}$ is vkl-PRF, SKD is CR	Theorem 6.2
HSKD	vsl-PRG	h is PRF, h [≒] is PRF, h [≒] is Φ _{zio,a} -rka-PRF	Proposition 7
HSKD	\mathbf{CR}	h is CR	Proposition 8

Table 2: Overview of the composition results for HMAC_b , HMAC , and HMAC^{\ominus} , modularly obtained by viewing them as composition of a function family MAC and a subkey derivation function SKD.

subkey derivation function. We define their composition $\mathsf{F} = \mathbf{Comp}[\mathsf{MAC},\mathsf{SKD}] \colon \mathcal{F} \times \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^c$ by

 $\frac{\mathsf{F}(K,M)}{K_i \| K_o \leftarrow \mathsf{SKD}(K) \ \text{ // Derive a } 2c\text{-bit subkey}}$ Return $\mathsf{MAC}(K_i \| K_o, M)$

The following allows us to deduce both normal and swap-PRF security of F from the corresponding security of MAC. What differs is the assumption on the subkey derivation function SKD: (1) If SKD is a vsl-PRG then the transform preserves PRF security and (2) if SKD is CR then the transform preserves swap-PRF security. Notably, we can show both results for *variable-key length* (swap-)PRF security. This is made precise in Theorem 6. Through (1), our result fills a gap left in prior work, namely HMAC's security for keys of non-full block length.

We first state the composition result and then study the assumptions on SKD in Section 6.2.

Theorem 6 (Composition theorem). Let MAC: $\{0,1\}^{2c} \times \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^c$ be a function family and SKD: $\mathcal{F} \to \{0,1\}^{2c}$ a function. Let $\mathsf{F} = \mathbf{Comp}[\mathsf{MAC},\mathsf{SKD}]$: $\mathcal{F} \times \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^c$ be their composition as above.

1. [Composition transfers vkl-PRF security if SKD is a vsl-PRG] Let A_F be an adversary against the vkl-PRF security of F. Then we can construct adversaries A_{MAC} , A_{SKD} such that

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{F}}^{\mathrm{vkl-PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{F}}) \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{MAC}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{MAC}}) + \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{SKD}}^{\mathrm{vsl-PRG}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{SKD}}) .$$
(18)

Also $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{SKD}}) = \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{NeW}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{F}})$ and $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{SKD}}$ has minimal (resp. maximal) seed length $\ell_{\mathsf{min}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{F}})$ (resp. $\ell_{\mathsf{max}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{F}})$).

2. [Composition transfers swap-vkl-PRF security if SKD is CR] Let \mathcal{A}_{F} be an adversary against the vkl-PRF security of $\mathsf{F}^{\leftrightarrows}$. Then we can construct adversaries $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{MAC}}, \mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{SKD}}$ such that

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{F}}^{\mathrm{vkl-PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{F}}) \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{MAC}}^{\mathrm{vkl-PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{MAC}}) + \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{SKD}}^{\mathrm{CR}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{SKD}}) .$$
(19)

In both cases, adversary \mathcal{A}_{MAC} has the same query counts and in 2. the same minimal/maximal key lengths as \mathcal{A}_{F} . The constructed adversaries have about the same running time as \mathcal{A}_{F} .

We prove each sub-theorem separately.




Figure 9: Illustration of how $\mathsf{HMAC}^{\leftrightarrows}(K, M)$ can be seen as the composition of HSKD (highlighted in orange) and NMAC^{\backsim} (in blue).

Games G_0 , G_1 , G_2 :	Adversary \mathcal{A}_{SKD} :	Adversary \mathcal{A}_{MAC} :
$\underline{\operatorname{NeW}}(\ell)$	$\overline{\mathrm{New}^*(\ell)}$	$\overline{\operatorname{New}^*(\ell)}$
1 Assert: $\ell \in F.KL$	1 Assert: $\ell \in F.KL$	1 Assert: $\ell \in F.KL$
2 $n \leftarrow n+1$; $\ell_n \leftarrow \ell$	2 $n \leftarrow n+1$; $\ell_n \leftarrow \ell$	2 NEW()
3 $s \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell}$	$\exists K_n \leftarrow \operatorname{Fn}(\ell)$	${ m Fn}^*(i,M)$
$4 K_n \leftarrow SKD(s) //$	$\begin{bmatrix} G_0 \\ C \end{bmatrix} = \frac{FN^*(i, M)}{FN^*(i, M)}$	$\overline{3 \text{ Return }} \operatorname{Fn}(i, M)$
5 $K_n \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2c}$ // G_1	$G_2 \xrightarrow{1 \text{ (i)}, M} 4 \text{ If } T[i, M] \neq \bot \text{ then:}$	
$\underline{\mathrm{Fn}(i,M)}$	5 Return $T[i, M]$	
6 If $T[i, M] \neq \bot$ then:	6 $T[i, M] \leftarrow MAC(K_i, M)$	
7 Return $T[i, M]$	7 Return $T[i, M]$	
8 $T[i, M] \leftarrow MAC(K_i, M)$ // G_0	$_{0},G_{1}$	
9 T[i, M] \leftarrow s $\{0, 1\}^c$ //	G_2	
10 Return $T[i, M]$		

Figure 10: Games and adversaries for the proof of Theorem 6.1.

Proof of Theorem 6.1. The proof proceeds by a sequence of games G_0-G_2 , shown in Figure 10. We begin with G_0 , which runs adversary \mathcal{A}_{F} , providing oracles NEW and FN of the vkl-PRF game. Upon the *n*th query NEW(ℓ) from adversary \mathcal{A}_{F} , the game samples a random seed *s* of length ℓ from \mathcal{F} and then applies SKD(*s*) on line 4 to compute a key K_n for MAC. Oracle FN(*i*, *M*) computes MAC(K_i, M). Since SKD is a deterministic function, the fact that it is computed once per seed in NEW instead of for each FN query makes no difference. This means that G_0 is equivalent to $\mathbf{G}_{\mathsf{F}}^{\text{vkl-PRF-1}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{F}})$.

Game G_1 only differs from G_0 in oracle NEW, where line 4 is only in G_0 and line 5, which instead samples a new 2*c*-bit key uniformly at random, is only in game G_1 . We construct an adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{SKD}}$ such that

$$\Pr[G_0(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{F}})] - \Pr[G_1(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{F}})] \le \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{SKD}}^{\mathsf{vsl-PRG}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{SKD}}).$$
(20)

Adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{SKD}}$, shown in the middle of Figure 10, acts as the challenger in game G₀, except that instead of computing $K_n \leftarrow \mathsf{SKD}$ in response to the *n*th NEW(ℓ) query, adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{SKD}}$ forwards the query to the its vsl-PRG game (see Figure 1) to obtain $K_n \leftarrow \mathsf{FN}(\ell)$. This ensures that $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{SKD}}$ soundly simulates G_{1-d} for \mathcal{A}_{F} when playing game $\mathbf{G}_{\mathsf{SKD}}^{\mathrm{vsl}\operatorname{-PRG}-d}$, where $d \in \{0,1\}$, establishing the bound in Equation (20).

Next, game G_2 is identical to game G_1 , except that in oracle FN, the response to each query is a consistent, randomly sampled string in $\{0,1\}^c$ instead of the output of MAC. We construct an adversary \mathcal{A}_{MAC} such that

$$\Pr[G_1(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{F}})] - \Pr[G_2(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{F}})] \le \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{MAC}}^{\mathsf{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{MAC}}).$$
(21)

Adversary \mathcal{A}_{MAC} , shown on the right in Figure 10, simulates game G_1 for \mathcal{A}_F , acting as the challenger, except in two ways. First, instead of sampling a key itself in oracle NEW, adversary \mathcal{A}_{MAC} issues a query to oracle NEW() in its PRF game. Second, instead of computing MAC in response to a FN query, adversary \mathcal{A}_{MAC} forwards the query to its own FN oracle. This way, \mathcal{A}_{MAC} simulates G_1 for \mathcal{A}_F when playing game \mathbf{G}_{MAC}^{PRF-1} and G_2 when playing game \mathbf{G}_{MAC}^{PRF-0} . This yields Equation (21).

We note that game G_2 is equivalent to $\mathbf{G}_{\mathsf{F}}^{\text{vkl-PRF-0}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{F}})$, and hence by definition of the advantage and the established equations we reached the claim

$$\begin{split} \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{F}}^{vkl-PRF}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{F}}) &= \Pr[G_0(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{F}})] - \Pr[G_2(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{F}})] \\ &= \Pr[G_0(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{F}})] - \Pr[G_1(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{F}})] + \Pr[G_1(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{F}})] - \Pr[G_2(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{F}})] \\ &\leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{SKD}}^{vsl-PRG}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{SKD}}) + \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{MAC}}^{PRF}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{MAC}}). \end{split}$$

Proof of Theorem 6.2. The proof proceeds by a sequence of games G_0-G_3 , shown in Figure 11. We begin with game G_0 being $\mathbf{G}_{\mathsf{F}}^{\mathrm{vkl}-\mathrm{PRF}-1}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{F}})$. That is, G_0 is the "real" vkl-PRF game, with the functionality of $\mathsf{F}^{=} = \mathbf{Comp}[\mathsf{MAC}^{=},\mathsf{SKD}]$ made explicit. The game keeps a table T for the FN oracle query results, indexed by $M_1 || M_2 = \mathsf{SKD}(M)$ (Figure 11, line 3).

The first game hop, to game G_1 , replaces the evaluation of MAC^{\simeq} in line 4 of Figure 11 by consistent random sampling. Games G_0, G_1 in Figure 11 only differ in that line 4 is only in G_0 and line 5 is only in G_1 . We build an adversary \mathcal{A}_{MAC} such that

$$\Pr[G_0(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{F}})] - \Pr[G_1(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{F}})] \le \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{MAC}}^{\mathsf{vkl-PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{MAC}}).$$
(22)

Adversary \mathcal{A}_{MAC} simulates G_0 for \mathcal{A}_F by forwarding the queries from adversary \mathcal{A}_F to the corresponding oracles in its $\mathbf{G}_{MAC}^{vkl-PRF}$ game, replacing M in FN queries by $M_1 || M_2$ obtained by evaluating SKD(M). Adversary \mathcal{A}_{MAC} soundly simulates $G_{(1-d)}$ when playing game $\mathbf{G}_{MAC}^{vkl-PRF-d}$, for $d \in \{0, 1\}$, which yields the bound in Equation (22).

We now rewrite G_1 as G_2 . In G_2 , the table T is indexed by the input messages M (Figure 11 line 2). An additional table T_{SKD} , indexed by $M_1 || M_2$, keeps track of collisions in the output of SKD. For already seen values of M, the game returns early, while for new values of M the game ensures consistent random sampling by only sampling a new value in T_{SKD} if one was not set before (line 5). Additionally, game G_2 sets a **bad** flag whenever a collision in the output of SKD occurs (line 5).

Since G_1 and G_2 are semantically equivalent, we have

$$\Pr[G_1(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{F}})] = \Pr[G_2(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{F}})].$$
(23)

In the final game hop to G_3 , we always sample new values in T_{SKD} , whether a collision in the output of SKD occurred or not. Games G_2, G_3 in Figure 11 only differ when the bad flag is set (line 5). By the fundamental lemma of game playing [13], we have

$$\Pr[G_2(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{F}})] = \Pr[G_3(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{F}})] + (\Pr[G_2(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{F}})] - \Pr[G_3(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{F}})])$$
(24)

$$\leq \Pr[G_3(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{F}})] + \Pr[G_2(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{F}}) \text{ sets bad}].$$
(25)

 $FN(i, M) // Games G_0, G_1$ 1 Assert: $M \in \mathcal{F}$ 2 $M_1 || M_2 \leftarrow \mathsf{SKD}(M) /| |M_1| = |M_2| = c$ 3 If $T[i, M_1 || M_2] \neq \bot$ then return $T[i, M_1 || M_2]$ 4 $T[i, M_1 || M_2] \leftarrow \mathsf{MAC}^{\leftrightarrows}(K_i, M_1 || M_2)$ // G0 5 T[$i, M_1 || M_2$] \leftarrow \$ {0, 1}^c // G1 6 Return $T[i, M_1 || M_2]$ $F_N(i, M) // Games G_2, G_3$ 1 Assert: $M \in \mathcal{F}$ 2 If $T[i, M] \neq \bot$ then return T[i, M] $M_1 \| M_2 \leftarrow \mathsf{SKD}(M)$ 4 If $T_{\mathsf{SKD}}[i, M_1 || M_2] \neq \bot$ then: $/\!\!/ T[i, M] = \bot$, but $T_{\mathsf{SKD}}[i, M_1 || M_2] \neq \bot$: collision for SKD 5 bad $\leftarrow 1$; $T_{\mathsf{SKD}}[i, M_1 || M_2] \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^c$ 6 Else: $T_{SKD}[i, M_1 || M_2] \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^c$ 7 $T[i, M] \leftarrow T_{\mathsf{SKD}}[i, M_1 || M_2]$ 8 Return T[i, M] $New(\ell)$ 1 Assert: $\ell \in MAC^{\leftrightarrows}.KL$ 2 $n \leftarrow n+1$; $\ell_n \leftarrow \ell$; $K_n \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\ell$

Figure 11: The FN and NEW oracles for games G_0-G_3 in the proof of Theorem 6.2. The boxed code is only in game G_3 .

We can now build an adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{SKD}}$ such that:

$$\Pr[G_2(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{F}}) \text{ sets bad}] \le \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{SKD}}^{\mathsf{CR}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{SKD}}), \tag{26}$$

based on the following observation: bad is only set to true in line 5 if in an FN query, (i, M) is new, but (i, M_1, M_2) is not. (Otherwise the oracle returns already in line 2).) Hence, the only way to set bad is via two queries (i, M) and (i, M') such that $M \neq M'$, yet $\mathsf{SKD}(M) = M_1 || M_2 =$ $\mathsf{SKD}(M')$. In other words, setting bad amounts to a collision for function SKD . Adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{SKD}}$ acts as the challenger in G₃. Additionally, $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{SKD}}$ keeps track of queried messages in a table by setting $T_{Coll}[i, M_1, M_2] \leftarrow M$ at the end of each query $\mathsf{FN}(i, M)$ from \mathcal{A}_{F} . If adversary \mathcal{A}_{F} makes a query $\mathsf{FN}(i, M^*)$ which sets bad, $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{SKD}}$ computes $M_1^* || M_2^* \leftarrow \mathsf{SKD}(M^*)$ and outputs M^* and $T_{Coll}[i, M_1^*, M_2^*]$ as the collision for SKD , establishing Equation (26).

We observe that G_3 is the "random" vkl-PRF game $\mathbf{G}_{\mathsf{F}}^{\text{vkl-PRF-0}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{F}})$. Combining the equations, we obtain the bound in the theorem statement.

6.2 Analysis of HSKD

In order to deduce security for HMAC and HMAC^{\subseteq} via the composition result from Theorem 6, we need to analyze the properties of HMAC's subkey derivation function HSKD shown in Figure 3. We rewrite it, unfolding PoH_b and HSKD_b:

 $\begin{array}{l} \underline{\mathsf{HSKD}(K)} \mathrel{\triangleright} \mathsf{HSKD} \colon \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^{2c} \\ \hline \mathrm{If} \ |K| \leq b \ \mathrm{then} \ K_b \leftarrow K \| \ 0^{b-|K|} \ \mathrm{else} \ K_b \leftarrow \mathsf{H}(K) \| \ 0^{b-c} \ \ /\!\!/ \ \mathsf{PoH}_b \\ \hline K_i \leftarrow \mathsf{h}(\mathtt{IV}, K_b \oplus \mathtt{ipad}) \ ; \ K_o \leftarrow \mathsf{h}(\mathtt{IV}, K_b \oplus \mathtt{opad}) \ \ /\!\!/ \ \mathsf{HSKD}_b \\ \mathrm{Return} \ K_i \| K_o \end{array}$

We will next justify HSKD both as a variable seed-length PRG (for HMAC) and as a collision-resistant function under restricted inputs (for HMAC^{\leq}).

<u>HSKD IS A VSL-PRG.</u> To prove that HSKD is a variable-seed-length PRG, we rely on properties of its two building blocks, H and h. First, H is the MD hash function defined as $H(K) = h^*(IV, K || pad(|K|))$, which, given that it is only applied in the case that |K| > b, can be viewed as an instantiation of the 2-tier cascade 2CSC, where the first tier is $h^{=}$. Viewed this way, we have

 $\begin{array}{l} \underline{\mathsf{H}}(K) \mathrel{\triangleright} \mathrel{\Vdash} : \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^c \\ \overline{\overline{K}} \leftarrow K \parallel \mathsf{pad}(|K|); \; S \leftarrow \overline{K}[b+1..|\overline{K}|] \\ \mathrm{Return} \; \mathsf{2CSC}[\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows},\mathsf{h}](K[1..b],(\mathsf{IV},S)) \end{array}$

We will use the result from Lemma 1 to bound the probability of distinguishing the replacement of the output of H(K) by a random *c*-bit string by the advantage of an adversary against the PRF security of $h^{i=i}$ and h, respectively.

Next, we study the remaining invocations of h in $K_i \leftarrow h(IV, K_b \oplus ipad) = h^{\ominus}(K_b \oplus ipad, IV)$ and $K_o \leftarrow h(IV, K_b \oplus opad) = h^{\ominus}(K_b \oplus opad, IV)$. Here, we reduce the distinguishing probability of replacing K_i and K_o by uniformly sampled random strings in $\{0, 1\}^c$ to the advantage of an adversary against the PRF security of h^{\ominus} under related-key attacks.

The RKD function of interest is $\Phi_{\mathsf{zio},a} : \{0, \ldots, b\} \times \{\mathsf{ipad}, \mathsf{opad}\} \times \{0, 1\}^b \to \{0, 1\}^b \cup \{\bot\}$ defined as follows: on inputs ℓ , io, K, it returns \bot if $\ell < a$ and $(K[1..\ell] \parallel 0^{b-\ell}) \oplus \mathsf{io}$ otherwise. In more detail:

$$\begin{split} & \underline{\Phi_{\mathsf{zio},a}(\ell,\mathsf{io},K)} \\ & \text{If } \ell < a \text{ then return } \bot \\ & K' \leftarrow K[1..\ell] \parallel 0^{b-\ell} \\ & L \leftarrow K' \oplus \mathsf{io} \text{ ; Return } L \end{split}$$

That is, $\Phi_{\mathsf{zio},a}$ is the related-key-deriving function that overwrites a $b - \ell$ -bit long suffix of the key with zeros, and then XORs the result with ipad or opad. The parameter *a* specifies the length of the shortest prefix of the key which must be left unchanged before the XOR, otherwise the function returns \perp .

PRF security of h^{\leftrightarrows} under related-key attacks, together with regular PRF security of h^{\leftrightarrows} and h then yield the following result.

Proposition 7 (vsl-PRG security of HSKD). Let HSKD: $\{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^{2c}$ be as defined in Figure 3. Let \mathcal{A} be an adversary against the vsl-PRG security of HSKD. Let $n = \lceil \ell_{\mathsf{max}}(\mathcal{A})/b \rceil$ be the block length of the maximal-length seed queried by \mathcal{A} and let $a = \min(c, \ell_{\mathsf{min}}(\mathcal{A}))$. Then we can construct adversaries \mathcal{A}_{f} , \mathcal{A}_{h} and $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows}}$ such that

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{HSKD}}^{\mathrm{vsl-PRG}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{f}}) + n \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}}) + \mathbf{Adv}_{\Phi_{\mathsf{zio},a},\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows}}^{\mathrm{rka-PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}^{\hookrightarrow}}) .$$
(27)

Adversaries \mathcal{A}_{f} and \mathcal{A}_{h} each make at most $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A})$ queries to NEW and at most $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A})$ queries to FN. Adversary $\mathcal{A}_{h^{\leftrightarrows}}$ makes $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A})$ queries to oracle NEW and $2 \cdot \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A})$ queries to oracle FN.

Proof of Proposition 7. The proof uses a sequence of games, G_0 - G_3 , all shown in Figure 12.

▷ Replacing 2CSC with a random function. The first game G_0 , is equivalent to the real vsl-PRG game $\mathbf{G}_{\mathsf{HSKD}}^{vsl-PRG-1}$. Game G_1 only differs from G_0 in that the invocation of $2\mathsf{CSC}[\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows},\mathsf{h}]$ on line 5 in Figure 12 is replaced by random sampling from $\{0,1\}^c$ on line 6.

We construct an adversary \mathcal{A}_{2CSC} such that

$$\Pr[G_0(\mathcal{A})] - \Pr[G_1(\mathcal{A})] \le \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{2CSC}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{2CSC}}) .$$
(28)

Adversary \mathcal{A}_{2CSC} , shown in Figure 12, simulates game G_0 for \mathcal{A} , acting as the challenger, except in two ways. First, if \mathcal{A} issues a $FN(\ell)$ query with $\ell > b$, then instead of sampling the whole ℓ -bit key itself, adversary \mathcal{A}_{2CSC} calls oracle NEW in the $\mathbf{G}_{2CSC}^{PRF-d}$ game to initialize a new b-bit key for 2CSC. It then samples the remaining $\ell - b$ bits of the key for HSKD, applies the padding function and sets S to be the padded suffix of the key. Next, instead of computing 2CSC itself, adversary \mathcal{A}_{2CSC} queries its own FN oracle under the newly created key on input IV and S.

This way, adversary $\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}}$ simulates game $G_{(d-1)}$ $(d \in \{0,1\})$ for \mathcal{A} when playing game $\mathbf{G}_{2\mathsf{CSC}}^{\mathrm{PRF}-d}$ itself. This gives the bound in Equation (28). $\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}}$ makes at most $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A})$ NEW queries and at most one FN query under each key (hence they are all trivially prefix free). The second component S in each FN query is at most $n = \lceil \ell_{\mathsf{max}}(\mathcal{A})/b \rceil$ blocks, since S consists of all but the first block of the padded key \overline{K} and $|\overline{K}|/b \leq \lceil \ell_{\mathsf{max}}(\mathcal{A})/b \rceil + 1$, since $|K| \leq \ell_{\mathsf{max}}(\mathcal{A})$ and the padding adds at most one extra block.

Hence, by definition of G_0 and applying Equation (28), we have

$$\Pr[\mathbf{G}_{\mathsf{HSKD}}^{\mathrm{vsl-PRG-1}}(\mathcal{A})] = \Pr[\mathbf{G}_{0}(\mathcal{A})]$$

= $(\Pr[\mathbf{G}_{0}(\mathcal{A})] - \Pr[\mathbf{G}_{1}(\mathcal{A})]) + \Pr[\mathbf{G}_{1}(\mathcal{A})]$
 $\leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{2CSC}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{2CSC}}) + \Pr[\mathbf{G}_{1}(\mathcal{A})].$ (29)

 \triangleright Replacing h^{\leftrightarrows} with a random function. Next, we simplify G₁ to the semantically equivalent G₂, shown in Figure 12. Game G₃, also in Figure 12, is identical to G₂, except that lines 3 and 4 are replaced by line 5. We construct an adversary $\mathcal{A}_{h^{\Box}}$ such that

$$\Pr[G_2(\mathcal{A})] - \Pr[G_3(\mathcal{A})] \le \mathbf{Adv}_{\Phi_{\mathsf{zio},a},\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows}}^{\mathsf{rka}-\mathsf{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows}}) .$$
(30)

Adversary $\mathcal{A}_{h^{\leftrightarrows}}$, shown in Figure 12, runs adversary \mathcal{A} , acting as the challenger in G₂, except in two ways. First, instead of sampling X on its own as on lines 1 and 2, adversary $\mathcal{A}_{h^{\boxminus}}$ calls oracle NEW in game $\mathbf{G}_{\Phi_{zio,a},h^{\boxminus}}^{\text{rka-PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{h^{\boxminus}})$ on input ℓ if $\ell \leq b$ and else on c. Then, instead of invoking h^{\leftrightarrows} to create K_i and K_o as on lines 3 and 4 in Figure 12, $\mathcal{A}_{h^{\leftrightarrows}}$ calls its FN oracle under the new key and second RKD parameter **ipad** and **opad**, respectively.

When adversary \mathcal{A} halts and returns, adversary $\mathcal{A}_{h} =$ also halts and returns the same output. This way, adversary $\mathcal{A}_{h} =$ soundly simulates G_{2} and G_{2} when playing game $\mathbf{G}_{\Phi_{zio,a},h}^{rka-PRF-d}$, with d = 1 and d = 0, respectively. Here, $a = \min(c, \ell_{\min}(\mathcal{A}))$ is the smallest value on which $\mathcal{A}_{h} =$ calls oracle NEW while simulating the game for \mathcal{A} . This justifies the claimed bound in Equation (30).

Furthermore, game G_3 is equivalent to the "random" vsl-PRG game $\mathbf{G}_{\mathsf{HSKD}}^{vsl-PRG-0}(\mathcal{A})$. Hence, putting the above together, we have

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{HSKD}}^{\mathsf{vsl-PRG}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{2CSC}}^{\mathsf{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{2CSC}}) + \mathbf{Adv}_{\Phi_{\mathsf{zio},a},\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows}}^{\mathsf{rka-PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows}}) .$$
(31)

 \triangleright Applying Lemma 1. We now apply Lemma 1 to bound $\mathbf{Adv}_{2\mathsf{CSC}}^{\mathsf{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}})$ in Equation (31) by the advantages of two adversaries \mathcal{A}_{f} and \mathcal{A}_{h} , both constructed as in the proof of Lemma 1.

This gives

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{2\mathsf{CSC}}^{\mathsf{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}}) \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows}}^{\mathsf{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{f}}) + n \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}}^{\mathsf{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}}).$$
(32)

Adversary \mathcal{A}_{f} makes $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{NeW}}(\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}}) \leq \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A})$ queries to NEW and $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}}) \leq \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A})$ to FN. Adversary \mathcal{A}_{h} makes at most $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}}) \leq \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A})$ queries to NEW and $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}}) \leq \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A})$ to FN.

Combining Equation (31) and Equation (32) gives the claimed bound in Equation (27) of the Theorem statement. \Box

<u>HSKD IS COLLISION RESISTANT FOR FEASIBLE INPUT SPACES.</u> As already pointed out in the introduction, it is easy to find colliding messages for $HMAC^{\ominus}$, due to how short key inputs (now

$\underline{\operatorname{Fn}}(\ell) \ /\!\!/ \ \operatorname{Games} \operatorname{G}_0, \operatorname{G}_1$	$FN(\ell) \ /\!\!/ \ Games \ G_2, \ G_3$
1 $K \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\ell$	1 If $\ell \leq b$ then $X \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell}$
2 If $\ell \leq b$ then $K_b \leftarrow K \parallel 0^{b-\ell}$	2 Else $X \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^c$
3 Else:	3 $K_i \leftarrow h^{\leftrightarrows}(X \ 0^{b - X } \oplus \mathtt{ipad}, \mathtt{IV}) \ /\!\!/ \ \mathrm{G}_2$
4 $\overline{K} \leftarrow K \ pad(\ell); S \leftarrow \overline{K}[b+1 \overline{K}]$	4 $K_o \leftarrow h^{\leftrightarrows}(X \parallel 0^{b - X } \oplus \texttt{opad}, \texttt{IV}) \ /\!\!/ \ \mathrm{G}_2$
5 $X \leftarrow 2CSC[h^{\leftrightarrows},h](K[1b],(\mathrm{IV},S))$ // \mathbb{G}_0	5 $K_i \ K_o \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2c}$ // G_3
6 $X \leftarrow \{0,1\}^c$ // \mathbb{G}_1	6 Return $K_i K_o$
$7 K_b \leftarrow X \parallel 0^{b-c}$	
$\hspace{1.5cm} \hspace{0.1cm} \hspace{0m} \hspace{0.1cm} 0m$	
9 Return $K_i \ K_o$	
Adversary $\mathcal{A}_{2CSC}()$:	Adversary $\mathcal{A}_{h}=()$:
$\overline{\mathrm{Fn}^*(\ell)}$	$\overline{\mathrm{Fn}^*(\ell)}$
1 $n \leftarrow n+1; K \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell}$	1 $n \leftarrow n+1$
2 If $\ell \leq b$ then $K_b \leftarrow K \parallel 0^{b-\ell}$	2 If $\ell \leq b$ then $\operatorname{NEW}(\ell)$
3 Else:	3 Else NEW (c)
4 New() ∥ Initialize b-bit key for 2CSC	4 $K_i \leftarrow \operatorname{FN}(n, \operatorname{ipad}, \operatorname{IV})$
5 $\overline{K} \leftarrow K \ pad(\ell); S \leftarrow \overline{K}[b+1 \overline{K}]$	5 $K_o \leftarrow \operatorname{FN}(n, \operatorname{opad}, \operatorname{IV})$
6 $X \leftarrow \operatorname{Fn}(n,(\operatorname{IV},S))$	6 Return $K_i K_o$
$7 K_b \leftarrow X \parallel 0^{b-c}$	
8 $K_i \leftarrow h(\mathtt{IV}, K_b \oplus \mathtt{ipad})$	
-1.1 $(1.1, 1.0)$ $(1.1, 1.0)$	
9 $K_o \leftarrow h(IV, K_b \oplus opad)$	

Figure 12: Games and adversaries for the proof of Proposition 7. Both adversary \mathcal{A}_{2CSC} (left) and $\mathcal{A}_{h^{\ddagger}}$ (right) run adversary \mathcal{A} , simulating access to oracle FN through subroutines FN^{*} and returning with the output of \mathcal{A} . Functions h^{\models} and h^* are the swapped function and cascade construction, respectively, associated to the compression function $h: \{0,1\}^c \times \{0,1\}^b \to \{0,1\}^c$, as defined in Figure 3. IV, ipad and opad are public constants.

messages, under adversarial control) are padded with zeros and long key inputs are hashed down (then padded). Indeed, these trivial collisions are instances of bigger classes of collisions that exist for HSKD, which for $HMAC^{\leftrightarrows}$ is applied to the message input. Since such collisions in HSKD immediately yield PRF attacks on $HMAC^{\backsim}$, the natural question thus is: for which input spaces is HSKD collision resistant?

Let $\mathsf{HSKD}[S]: S \to \{0,1\}^{2c}$ be the restriction of HSKD to the input space S, corresponding to $\mathsf{HMAC}[S]$, i.e., restricting the key space of HMAC to S. Focusing on length-closed sets, we now give a complete characterization of the class of *feasible* sets for which we will show $\mathsf{HSKD}[S]$ to be collision resistant (enabling swap-PRF security of $\mathsf{HMAC}[S]$). For all other sets, we will give attacks against swap-PRF security of $\mathsf{HMAC}[S]$. Together with our attack results on $\mathsf{HMAC}^{\leftrightarrows}$ below, this will establish that $\mathsf{HMAC}[S]^{\leftrightarrows}$ is vkl-PRF secure *if and only if* S is feasible.

We can write any finite length-closed set as $S = \{0, 1\}^{\ell_1} \cup \cdots \cup \{0, 1\}^{\ell_n}, \ell_1 < \cdots < \ell_n$, for $n, \ell_1, \ldots, \ell_n \in \mathbb{N}$. Then S belongs to (exactly) one of the following classes:

1. $S \subseteq \{0,1\}^{>b}$: The class of <u>feasible</u> sets of only <u>"long" keys</u> (of lengths > b), denoted S_L .

2. $S \subseteq \{0,1\}^{\leq b}$: We distinguish between

- (2a) n = 1: The class of <u>feasible</u> sets of the form $\{0,1\}^{\ell}$ (for some $\ell \leq b$) of <u>"short"</u>, <u>fixed-length keys</u>, denoted S_S .
- (2b) n > 1: We give <u>0-padding attacks</u> for these sets.
- 3. $\exists i, j \in [1, n] : \ell_i \leq b \land \ell_j > b$: We distinguish between
 - (3a) $c \leq \ell_i \leq b$: We give <u>hash-confusion attacks</u> for these sets.
 - (3b) $\ell_i < c$: We give <u>hash-suffix attacks</u> for these sets. (Note that a key length smaller than the *c*-bit output length of the compression function is an unnatural choice of keys. We nevertheless discuss attacks.)

We now first establish that $\mathsf{HSKD}[S]$ is collision resistant for the classes of *feasible* sets of "short", fixed-length keys $S_S = \{0, 1\}^{\ell}$ (for some $\ell \leq b$) and only "long" keys $S_L \subseteq \{0, 1\}^{>b}$, assuming collision resistance of the compression function h. Essentially, keys from feasible sets colliding under HSKD requires a collision under one of the internal h calls. Notably, our results for feasible sets mean that HSKD is collision-resistant whenever *fixed-length* keys are used (no matter the length). This in particular covers the dual-PRF usage of HMAC in practice, since protocols like TLS 1.3 [49], KEMTLS [52] and MLS [23] use fixed-length key inputs; see Appendix A for a detailed discussion.

In Proposition 9, we then complete this characterization by giving attacks on the PRF security of $\mathsf{HMAC}^{\leftrightarrows}$ for all other (*infeasible*) input sets, which generically emerge through finding collisions in HSKD.

Proposition 8 (CR security of $\mathsf{HSKD}[S]$). Let h and HSKD be defined as in Figure 3. Let $\mathsf{HSKD}[S]: S \to \{0,1\}^{2c}$ be the restriction of HSKD to a feasible set S of type S_S or S_L defined above. Let A be a CR adversary for $\mathsf{HSKD}[S]$. Then we can construct an adversary \mathcal{A}_h such that

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{HSKD}[\mathcal{S}]}^{\mathrm{CR}}(\mathcal{A}) = \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}}^{\mathrm{CR}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}}) .$$
(33)

The running time of the constructed adversary is about the same as that of \mathcal{A} .

Proof of Proposition 8. Recall the definition of HSKD in Figure 3, unfolding PoH_b and HSKD_b . For inputs K from \mathcal{S}_S , we are in the case $|K| \leq b$, for inputs from \mathcal{S}_L , we are in the case |K| > b, so:

 $\begin{array}{l} \displaystyle \underset{K_{b} \in \mathcal{S}}{\mathsf{HSKD}[\mathcal{S}](K)} \\ \displaystyle \underset{K_{b} \in \mathcal{S}_{S} \text{ then } K_{b} \leftarrow K \parallel 0^{b-|K|} \ \text{ // } \mathsf{PoH}_{b} \\ \displaystyle \underset{K_{i} \in \mathcal{S}_{L} \text{ then } K_{b} \leftarrow \mathsf{H}(K) \parallel 0^{b-c} \ \text{ // } \mathsf{PoH}_{b} \\ \displaystyle K_{i} \leftarrow \mathsf{h}(\mathtt{IV}, K_{b} \oplus \mathtt{ipad}) \ ; \ K_{o} \leftarrow \mathsf{h}(\mathtt{IV}, K_{b} \oplus \mathtt{opad}) \ \text{ // } \mathsf{HSKD}_{b} \\ \displaystyle \text{Return } K_{i} \parallel K_{o} \end{array}$

▷ Case S_S . We construct \mathcal{A}_h as follows: \mathcal{A}_h simulates the CR game for \mathcal{A} . When \mathcal{A} outputs (K, K') such that $\mathsf{HSKD}[\mathcal{S}_S](K) = \mathsf{HSKD}[\mathcal{S}_S](K')$, \mathcal{A}_h computes $K_b = (K || 0^{b-\ell}) \oplus \mathsf{ipad}$, $K'_b = (K' || 0^{b-\ell}) \oplus \mathsf{ipad}$, and outputs $((\mathsf{IV}, K_b), (\mathsf{IV}, K'_b))$. Since $K, K' \in \mathcal{S}_S = \{0, 1\}^\ell$ (for fixed $\ell \leq b$), both keys get padded with the same number of zero bits. Hence, if $K \neq K'$, then $K_b \neq K'_b$, and $\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{HSKD}[\mathcal{S}]}^{\mathrm{CR}}(\mathcal{A}) = \mathbf{Adv}_h^{\mathrm{CR}}(\mathcal{A}_h)$.

▷ Case S_L . If \mathcal{A} outputs a collision (K, K') such that $\mathsf{HSKD}[S_L](K) = \mathsf{HSKD}[S_L](K')$, it follows that $\mathsf{h}(\mathsf{IV}, K_b \oplus \mathsf{ipad}) = \mathsf{h}(\mathsf{IV}, K'_b \oplus \mathsf{ipad})$, and likewise for opad. Since $K, K' \in S_L \subseteq \{0, 1\}^{>b}$, both keys get hashed and then padded to obtain $K_b \leftarrow \mathsf{H}(K) \parallel 0^{b-c}$ resp. $K'_b \leftarrow \mathsf{H}(K') \parallel 0^{b-c}$. This means that either $K_b \neq K'_b$, and there was a collision in the outputs of h , or that $K_b = K'_b$, and there was a collision in the outputs of H .

We construct \mathcal{A}_{h} as follows: Run \mathcal{A} to obtain an HSKD collision (K, K'), and compute $K_b \leftarrow \mathsf{PoH}_b(K)$ and $K'_b \leftarrow \mathsf{PoH}_b(K')$. If $K_b \neq K'_b$, output $((\mathsf{IV}, K_b), (\mathsf{IV}, K'_b))$ as a collision

for h. Otherwise, following the proof of CR for H as the Merkle–Damgård [45, 25] iteration of h, trace backwards through the computation of H(K) = H(K') to find the compression function calls that collide on the output for distinct input values in H(K) = H(K') and output those colliding values. (Such collision must exist since $K \neq K'$.) Hence, \mathcal{A}_h outputs a collision for h when \mathcal{A} outputs one for HSKD, justifying Equation (33).

Proposition 9 (PRF-insecurity of HMAC[S]^{\doteq} for infeasible S). Consider HMAC^{\doteq}[S_i]: $\{0,1\}^* \times S_i \rightarrow \{0,1\}^c$ for the following infeasible S_i from the characterization above:

- 1. S_1 (case 2b), with $\{0,1\}^{\ell_i} \cup \{0,1\}^{\ell_j} \subseteq S_1$ for $\ell_i \neq \ell_j$ and $\ell_i < \ell_j \leq b$,
- 2. S_2 (case 3a), with $\{0,1\}^{\ell_i} \cup \{0,1\}^{\ell_j} \subseteq S_2$ for $c \leq \ell_i \leq b$ and $\ell_j > b$, and
- 3. S_3 (case 3b), with $\{0,1\}^{\ell_i} \cup \{0,1\}^{\ell_j} \subseteq S_3$ for $\ell_i < c$ and $\ell_j > b$.

Then HMAC^{\subseteq} $[S_i]$ is <u>not</u> PRF secure. Concretely, we construct adversaries A_i such that

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{HMAC}^{\leftrightarrows}[\mathcal{S}_1]}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_1) = \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{HMAC}^{\leftrightarrows}[\mathcal{S}_2]}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_2) = 1 - 2^{-c} , and$$
(34)

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{HMAC}^{\Xi}[\mathcal{S}_3]}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_3) = 2^{\ell_i - c} - 2^{-c} , \qquad (35)$$

which make one NEW and two FN queries and run in small, constant time. The bound for A_3 conservatively assumes H behaves like a random oracle.

Note that for the rather unnatural set S_3 (case 3b), the adversary A_3 we construct has advantage proportional to 2^{ℓ_i-c} . If $|\ell_i - c|$ is small, then the adversary has high probability of winning the PRF game. If $|\ell_i - c|$ is large, this means ℓ_i is much smaller than the compression function output length, in which case a better strategy for attacking the PRF security via exhaustive key search (taking about 2^{ℓ_i} time for keys of length ℓ_i) might come in reach.

Proof of Proposition 9. Recall that $\mathsf{HMAC}[\mathcal{S}]^{\leftrightarrows} = \mathbf{Comp}[\mathsf{NMAC}^{\backsim}, \mathsf{HSKD}[\mathcal{S}]].$

We start by observing that an adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{SKD}}$ against the collision resistance of $\mathsf{HSKD}[\mathcal{S}]$ can directly be used to build an adversary \mathcal{A} against the PRF security of $\mathsf{HMAC}[\mathcal{S}]^{\leftrightarrows}$. Adversary \mathcal{A} runs $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{SKD}}$ to obtain a collision (M, M')—that is, $M \neq M'$ with $\mathsf{HSKD}[\mathcal{S}](M) = \mathsf{HSKD}[\mathcal{S}](M')$. It then issues a NEW() query and two FN queries, $Y \leftarrow \mathsf{FN}(1, M)$ and $Y' \leftarrow \mathsf{FN}(1, M')$, to its PRF game, and outputs 1 if Y = Y'. In the real world (b = 1), we always have $Y = \mathsf{HMAC}^{\leftrightarrows}(K, M) = \mathsf{HMAC}^{\leftrightarrows}(K, M') = Y'$; in the random world (b = 0), Y, Y' are drawn at random from $\{0, 1\}^c$, colliding with probability 2^{-c} . Hence,

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{HMAC}[\mathcal{S}]^{\pm}}^{\mathsf{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}) = \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{HSKD}[\mathcal{S}]}^{\mathsf{CR}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{SKD}}) - 2^{-c}.$$
(36)

Let us now examine the three choices of S_i separately, and describe the collision-finding strategy for $\mathsf{HSKD}[S_i]$ in each case.

▷ 0-padding attacks in S_1 . Define $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{SKD}}$ to pick any $M \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell_i}$, set $M' = M \parallel 0^{\ell_j - \ell_i}$, and output (M, M'). Due to PoH_b zero-padding both messages to b bits, (M, M') is a collision for HSKD with probability 1. Via Eq. (36), this yields the claim for S_1 .

▷ Hash-confusion attacks in S_2 . Define $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{SKD}}$ to pick any $M \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell_j}$, set $M' = \mathsf{H}(M) \parallel 0^{b-c}$, and output (M, M'). Due to PoH_b hashing down and then zero-padding keys longer than b bits, (M, M') is a collision for HSKD with probability 1. Via Eq. (36), this yields the claim for S_2 .

▷ Hash-suffix attacks in S_3 . As for S_2 , let $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{SKD}}$ pick any $M \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell_j}$, set $M' = \mathsf{H}(M) \parallel 0^{b-c}$, and output (M, M'). Due to PoH_b hashing down and then zero-padding keys longer than b bits, (M, M') is a collision for HSKD if the last $c - \ell_i$ bits of $\mathsf{H}(M)$ are zeros. Conservatively assuming H behaves like a random oracle, the probability for this is $2^{c-\ell_i}$. Via Eq. (36), this yields the claim for S_3 .

6.3 vkl-PRF Security of HMAC

Existing proofs of PRF security of HMAC assume a *b*-bit key [8, 5, 6], i.e., they actually only hold for HMAC_b. As standardized [39, 46], HMAC however allows keys of varying length. Combining Theorem 6.1 with our results on multi-user PRF security of NMAC (Theorem 5) and vsl-PRG security of HSKD (Proposition 7), we establish vkl-PRF security for HMAC through the composition HMAC = **Comp**[NMAC, HSKD], assuming dual-PRF security of h and rka-PRF security of h^{\subseteq} .

Theorem 10 (vkl-PRF security of HMAC). Let c, b, and pad be as in Section 4, and functions h, HMAC be as defined in Figure 3. Let \mathcal{A} be an adversary against the vkl-PRF security of HMAC. Assume each of its FN queries has length at most L, and let $m = 1 + \lceil L/b \rceil$. Let $q_f = \mathbf{Q}^{\text{FN}}(\mathcal{A})$ and assume $m \cdot q_f < 2^b$. Assume \mathcal{A} 's queries to NEW have minimal and maximal key length $\ell_{\min}(\mathcal{A})$ resp. $\ell_{\max}(\mathcal{A})$. Let $n = \lceil \ell_{\max}(\mathcal{A})/b \rceil$, $a = \min(c, \ell_{\min}(\mathcal{A}))$, and $\Phi_{\text{zio},a}$ be the "zero-pad-then-xor" RKD function defined in Section 6.2. Then we can construct adversaries \mathcal{A}_h , \mathcal{A}_f and $\mathcal{A}_{h}=$ such that

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{HMAC}}^{\mathsf{vkl}-\mathsf{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq (m+2+n) \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}}^{\mathsf{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}}) + \frac{q_f(q_f-1)}{2^{c+1}} + \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows}}^{\mathsf{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{f}}) + \mathbf{Adv}_{\Phi_{\mathsf{zio},a},\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows}}^{\mathsf{rka}-\mathsf{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}^{\hookrightarrow}}) .$$
(37)

Adversary \mathcal{A}_{h} makes $\max(\mathbf{Q}^{NEW}(\mathcal{A}), \mathbf{Q}^{FN}(\mathcal{A}))$ queries to each of NEW and FN. Adversaries \mathcal{A}_{f} , $\mathcal{A}_{h^{\leftrightarrows}}$ make $\mathbf{Q}^{NEW}(\mathcal{A})$ queries to NEW, \mathcal{A}_{f} makes at most $\mathbf{Q}^{NEW}(\mathcal{A})$ queries to FN, and $\mathcal{A}_{h^{\leftrightarrows}}$ makes $2 \cdot \mathbf{Q}^{NEW}(\mathcal{A})$ to FN. The running times of adversaries $\mathcal{A}_{h}, \mathcal{A}_{f}$ and $\mathcal{A}_{h^{\leftrightarrows}}$ are about the same as that of \mathcal{A} .

Proof of Theorem 10. Applying Theorem 6.1 to $\mathsf{HMAC} = \mathbf{Comp}[\mathsf{NMAC}, \mathsf{HSKD}]$ gives us adversaries $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{MAC}}$ and $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{SKD}}$ such that

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{HMAC}}^{\mathrm{vkl-PRF}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{NMAC}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{MAC}}) + \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{HSKD}}^{\mathrm{vsl-PRG}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{SKD}}) \; .$$

In terms of oracle queries, we have $\mathbf{Q}^{\text{NeW}}(\mathcal{A}_{MAC}) = \mathbf{Q}^{\text{NeW}}(\mathcal{A})$ and $\mathbf{Q}^{\text{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{MAC}) = \mathbf{Q}^{\text{FN}}(\mathcal{A})$, while \mathcal{A}_{SKD} makes one FN query for each of the $\mathbf{Q}^{\text{NeW}}(\mathcal{A})$ users and has minimal and maximal seed length $\ell_{\min}(\mathcal{A})$ resp. $\ell_{\max}(\mathcal{A})$.

We next apply Theorem 5 to obtain

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{NMAC}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{MAC}}) \leq (m+2) \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h},1}) + \frac{q_f(q_f-1)}{2^{c+1}}$$

for $q_f = \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{MAC}}) = \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A})$ and an adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h},1}$ with $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{NeW}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h},1}) = \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h},1}) = \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h},$

We then apply Proposition 7, yielding

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{HSKD}}^{\mathrm{vsl-PRG}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{SKD}}) \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{f}}) + n \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h},2}) + \mathbf{Adv}_{\Phi_{\mathsf{zio},a},\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows}}^{\mathrm{rka-PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows}})$$

for adversaries \mathcal{A}_{f} , $\mathcal{A}_{h,2}$, $\mathcal{A}_{h} =$ and terms $n = \lceil \ell_{\max}(\mathcal{A})/b \rceil$ (the block length of the maximallength key) and $a = \min(c, \ell_{\min}(\mathcal{A}_{SKD})) = \min(c, \ell_{\min}(\mathcal{A}))$ (the shortest RKA key-prefix).

In terms of oracle queries, we have

$$\begin{split} \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{NeW}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{f}}) &= \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{NeW}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h},2}) = \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{NeW}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows}}) = \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{SKD}}) = \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{NeW}}(\mathcal{A}) \ ,\\ \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{f}}), \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h},2}) &\leq \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{SKD}}) = \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{NeW}}(\mathcal{A}), \ \mathrm{and} \\ \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows}}) &= 2 \cdot \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{SKD}}) = 2 \cdot \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{NeW}}(\mathcal{A}) \ . \end{split}$$

Finally we merge adversaries $\mathcal{A}_{h,1}$, $\mathcal{A}_{h,2}$ using Lemma 3 with weights $w_1 = m+2$ and $w_2 = n$ to get an adversary \mathcal{A}_h such that

$$(m+2) \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h},1}) + n \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h},2}) \le (m+2+n) \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}})$$

with oracle query counts $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_h) = \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{NeW}}(\mathcal{A}_h) = \max(\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}), \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{NeW}}(\mathcal{A})).$

Summing the terms and collecting the adversary resources yields the claim.

6.4 vkl-PRF Security of $HMAC^{\Rightarrow}$

We finally turn to the swap-PRF security of HMAC. Letting $\mathsf{HMAC}[\mathcal{S}]^{\leftrightarrows} : \{0,1\}^* \times \mathcal{S} \to \{0,1\}^c$ denote the restriction of $\mathsf{HMAC}^{\sqsubseteq}$ to keys from a set \mathcal{S} , we establish vkl-PRF security of $\mathsf{HMAC}[\mathcal{S}]^{\leftrightarrows}$ for the *feasible* key input spaces of the forms $\mathcal{S}_S = \{0,1\}^{\ell}$ (for some $\ell \leq b$) and $\mathcal{S}_L \subseteq \{0,1\}^{>b}$.

Again, we obtain this result via Theorem 6.2 for the composition $\mathsf{HMAC}[\mathcal{S}]^{\leftrightarrows} = \mathbf{Comp}[\mathsf{NMAC}^{\leftrightarrows}, \mathsf{HSKD}[\mathcal{S}]]$. Leveraging our vkl-PRF security result of NMAC^{\backsim} (Theorem 4) and collision resistance of HSKD for feasible \mathcal{S} (Proposition 8), we establish vkl-PRF security for $\mathsf{HMAC}[\mathcal{S}]^{\backsim}$ assuming PRF security of h, rka-PRF security of h^{\Lefta}, and collision resistance of h.

One might note that CR of h is *not* assumed in the proofs of PRF security for HMAC_b [5, 30]. So why extra assumptions for $\mathsf{HMAC}^{\leftrightarrows}$? The answer is that collisions in the hash function H lead to attacks violating PRF security of HMAC^{\backsim} , as mentioned before and detailed in Section 6.2. Collision resistance of h rules this out.

Theorem 11 (vkl-PRF security of HMAC[S]^{\simeq}). Let c, b, and pad be as in Section 4, and functions h, HMAC^{\simeq} be as defined in Figure 3. Let S be a feasible key input space as defined in Section 6.2 and HMAC[S]^{\simeq}: {0,1}* × $S \rightarrow$ {0,1}^c be the swap of HMAC restricted to keys from S. Let A be an adversary against the vkl-PRF security of HMAC[S]^{\simeq} whose NEW queries have minimal and maximal key length $\ell_{\min}(A)$ resp. $\ell_{\max}(A)$. Let $n = \lceil \ell_{\max}(A)/b \rceil$, $a = \min(c, \ell_{\min}(A))$, and $\Phi_{pad,a}$ be the "padding" RKD function defined in Section 5.1. Then we can construct adversaries $A_{h^{\simeq}}$, $A_{h,1}$, $A_{h,2}$ such that

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{HMAC}[\mathcal{S}]^{\leftrightarrows}}^{\mathrm{vkl-PRF}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq 2 \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\Phi_{\mathsf{pad},a},\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows}}^{\mathrm{rka-PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows}}) + n \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h},1}) + \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}}^{\mathrm{CR}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h},2}) .$$
(38)

Adversary $\mathcal{A}_{h^{\Xi}}$ makes at most $\max(\mathbf{Q}^{\operatorname{NeW}}(\mathcal{A}), \mathbf{Q}^{\operatorname{FN}}(\mathcal{A}))$ queries to NEW and at most $\mathbf{Q}^{\operatorname{FN}}(\mathcal{A})$ to FN. $\mathcal{A}_{h,1}$ makes $\mathbf{Q}^{\operatorname{FN}}(\mathcal{A})$ queries to each of NEW and FN. The running times of the constructed adversaries are about the same as that of \mathcal{A} .

Proof of Theorem 11. We apply Theorem 6.2 to $\mathsf{HMAC}[\mathcal{S}]^{\leftrightarrows} = \mathbf{Comp}[\mathsf{NMAC}^{\backsim}, \mathsf{HSKD}[\mathcal{S}]]$ which yields adversaries $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{MAC}}$ and $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{SKD}}$ such that

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{HMAC}[\mathcal{S}]^{\leftrightarrows}}^{\mathrm{vkl-PRF}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{NMAC}^{\leftrightarrows}}^{\mathrm{vkl-PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{MAC}}) + \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{HSKD}[\mathcal{S}]}^{\mathrm{CR}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{SKD}}) .$$
(39)

In terms of oracle queries, we have $\mathbf{Q}^{\text{NeW}}(\mathcal{A}_{MAC}) = \mathbf{Q}^{\text{NeW}}(\mathcal{A})$ and $\mathbf{Q}^{\text{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{MAC}) = \mathbf{Q}^{\text{FN}}(\mathcal{A})$.

We next apply Theorem 4 to obtain

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{NMAC}}^{\mathsf{vkl}-\mathsf{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{MAC}}) \le 2 \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\Phi_{\mathsf{pad},a},\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows}}^{\mathsf{rka}-\mathsf{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows}}) + n \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}}^{\mathsf{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h},1}) .$$
(40)

for adversaries $\mathcal{A}_{h^{rightarrow}}$ and $\mathcal{A}_{h,1}$ with

$$\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{New}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}^{\leftrightarrows}}) = \max(\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{New}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{MAC}}), \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{MAC}})) = \max(\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{New}}(\mathcal{A}), \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}))$$

and $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{h^{\leftrightarrows}}) \leq \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A})$, and adversary $\mathcal{A}_{h,1}$ with

$$\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{New}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h},1}) = \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h},1}) = \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{MAC}}) = \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}).$$

We then apply Proposition 8 to obtain, for any feasible key input space S,

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{HSKD}[\mathcal{S}]}^{\mathrm{CR}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{SKD}}) \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}}^{\mathrm{CR}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h},2}) .$$
(41)

Summing the terms and collecting the adversary resources yields the claim. \Box

7 Proofs for the rka-PRF Security of h^{\leftrightarrows}

We study the assumption of rka-PRF security of h^{\ominus} , needed for the vkl-PRF security of NMAC^{\ominus} (Theorem 4) and the vsl-PRG security of HSKD (Proposition 7) when h is the Davies-Meyer hash function. That is, we let $h(X, L) = E(L, X) \oplus X$, where $E: \{0, 1\}^b \times \{0, 1\}^c \to \{0, 1\}^c$ is the underlying block cipher with b-bit key and c-bit input and output.

The assumption that h^{\ominus} is rka-PRF secure has already been made [5, 6] in the single-user setting for what, in our notation is the RKD function $\Phi_{io}: \{\varepsilon\} \times \{ipad, opad\} \times \{0, 1\}^b \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^b$ defined by $\Phi_{io}(\varepsilon, io, L) := L \oplus io$ for $io \in \{ipad, opad\}$. (Here we recast the single-user definition of [11] in our multi-user notation and define the RKD function as a multi-variable function, where the second variable defines the behavior of the function, rather than define a set of RKD functions which each only take the key as input.)

As we noted in the introduction, Section 1.4, the PRF security of h^{\leftrightarrows} is arguably a *milder* assumption than the PRF security of h itself. This is because in the Davies-Meyer construction, the key X for h is the message for E. But if we consider $h^{\leftrightarrows}(L, X) = \mathsf{E}(L, X) \oplus X$ as a PRF, the key L is actually the block cipher key. Thus (rka-)PRF security follows from (rka-)PRP security of E. This is not true for h.

In the following, we show that for any RKD function Φ , the Φ -rka-PRF security of h^{\pm} follows from the Φ -rka-PRP security of E. Then, in Section 7.2, we justify the assumption that E is rka-PRP secure for the RKD functions $\Phi_{\mathsf{pad},a}$ and $\Phi_{\mathsf{zio},a}$ needed for our results.

7.1 Φ -rka-PRF Security of h^{\Rightarrow}

Proposition 12 (rka-PRF security of h^{\leftrightarrows} under rka-PRP assumptions). Let $\mathsf{E} \colon \{0,1\}^b \times \{0,1\}^c \to \{0,1\}^c$ be a block cipher. Let the $h^{\leftrightarrows} \colon \{0,1\}^b \times \{0,1\}^c \to \{0,1\}^c$ be defined by $h^{\leftrightarrows}(L,X) = \mathsf{E}(L,X) \oplus X$. Let \mathcal{A} be an adversary against the Φ -rka-PRF security of h^{\backsim} . Then

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\Phi,\mathsf{h}^{\pm}}^{\mathrm{rka-PRF}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \frac{\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A})^2}{2^c} + \mathbf{Adv}_{\Phi,\mathsf{E}}^{\mathrm{rka-PRP}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{E}})$$
(42)

for an adversary \mathcal{A}_{E} making $\mathbf{Q}^{N_{\mathrm{EW}}}(\mathcal{A})$ queries to oracle NEW and $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A})$ queries to oracle FN.

The idea of the proof is to first replace the block cipher invocation in h^{\leftrightarrows} by random permutations, a hop which is bounded by the advantage of adversary \mathcal{A}_{E} against the rka-PRP security of E . Then, the permutations are replaced by random functions, incurring the additive term in the bound (cf. the multi-user PRP/PRF switching lemma in [10]).

Proof of Proposition 12. The proof uses a sequence of games $G_0 - G_3$, shown in Figure 13. The games are all executed with adversary \mathcal{A} .

 \triangleright Replacing E with random permutations. We begin with game G₀ being $\mathbf{G}_{\Phi,h}^{\mathrm{rka-PRF}-1}(\mathcal{A})$. That is, G₀ is the "real" rka-PRF game. The first game hop, to game G₁, replaces the evaluation of the blockcipher E in oracle FN by the evaluation of a random permutation. That is, G₀ and G₁ differ only in oracle FN, where line 6 is only in G₀ and line 7 is only in G₁. By standard equation rewriting

$$\Pr[\mathbf{G}_{\Phi,h^{\leftrightarrows}}^{\mathrm{rka-PRF}-1}(\mathcal{A})] = \Pr[\mathbf{G}_{0}(\mathcal{A})]$$

=
$$\Pr[\mathbf{G}_{1}(\mathcal{A})] + (\Pr[\mathbf{G}_{0}(\mathcal{A})] - \Pr[\mathbf{G}_{1}(\mathcal{A})]).$$
(43)

We build an adversary \mathcal{A}_{E} such that

$$\Pr[G_0(\mathcal{A})] - \Pr[G_1(\mathcal{A})] \le \mathbf{Adv}_{\Phi,\mathsf{E}}^{\mathrm{rka-PRP}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{E}}).$$
(44)

Game G_0, G_1 :	Game G_2, G_3 :
$\underline{\operatorname{New}}(\alpha)$	$\underline{\operatorname{New}}(\alpha)$
1 $n \leftarrow n+1; L_n \leftarrow \{0,1\}^b; \alpha_n \leftarrow \alpha$	1 $n \leftarrow n+1; L_n \leftarrow \{0,1\}^b; \alpha_n \leftarrow \alpha$
2 For all $L \in \{0,1\}^b$ do:	$F_N(i, \beta, X)$
3 $\Pi_{n,L} \leftarrow PERM[\{0,1\}^c]$	$2 \text{ Assert: } \Phi_{\alpha_i,\beta}(L_i) \neq \bot$
$\overline{ ext{Fn}(i,eta,X)}$	$\exists L'_i \leftarrow \Phi_{\alpha_i,\beta}(L_i)$
4 Assert: $\Phi_{\alpha_i,\beta}(L_i) \neq \bot$	4 If $T[i, L'_i, X] \neq \bot$ then:
5 $L_i' \leftarrow \Phi_{lpha_i,eta}(L_i)$	5 Return $T[i, L'_i, X]$
6 $Z \leftarrow E(L'_i, X)$ // \mathbb{G}_0	6 $Z \leftarrow \{0,1\}^c$
7 $Z \leftarrow \Pi_{i,L'_i}(X)$ // G_1	7 If $Z \in T[i, L'_i, \cdot].\mathcal{R}$ then:
$\circ \operatorname{Return} Z \oplus X$	8 bad $\leftarrow 1$
	9 $Z \leftarrow \{0,1\}^c \setminus \mathrm{T}[i,L_i',\cdot].\mathcal{R}$ // G_2
	10 $T[i, L'_i, X] \leftarrow Z$
	11 Return $\mathrm{T}[i,L_i',X]\oplus X$

Figure 13: Games G₀-G₃ for the proof of Proposition 12. $T[i, L'_i, \cdot]$. \mathcal{R} is the set of all $Z \in \{0, 1\}^c$ such that $Z = T[i, L'_i, X]$ for some X.

Adversary \mathcal{A}_{E} runs \mathcal{A} , acting as the challenger in G_0 , except that it relays NEW and FN queries from \mathcal{A} to its own corresponding oracles in the $\mathbf{G}_{\Phi,\mathsf{E}}^{\mathrm{rka-PRP}}$ game. Hence, adversary \mathcal{A}_{E} makes one NEW query for each of the $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{NeW}}(\mathcal{A})$ NEW queries made by \mathcal{A} and one FN query for each of the $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A})$ FN queries made by \mathcal{A} . This way, adversary \mathcal{A}_{E} soundly simulates $G_{(1-d)}$ when playing game $\mathbf{G}_{\Phi,\mathsf{E}}^{\mathrm{rka-PRP}-d}$, for $d \in \{0,1\}$. When adversary \mathcal{A} halts, \mathcal{A}_{E} halts and returns the same output. This yields the bound in Equation (44).

▷ Replacing the random permutations with random functions. We rewrite game G_1 as G_2 on the right in Figure 13, replacing the permutations sampled in oracle NEW by consistent lazy sampling in the FN oracle. For each new query $FN(i, \beta, X)$, the oracle initially samples $Z \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^c$. If the sampled value violates the permutation condition, meaning that Z was already sampled in response to an earlier FN query under the same derived key for some $X' \neq X$, then a flag bad is set to 1 and Z is sampled again from the set of unused strings in $\{0, 1\}^c$. Since G_2 is syntactically different, but semantically equivalent to G_1 , we have $\Pr[G_1(\mathcal{A})] = \Pr[G_2(\mathcal{A})]$, giving

$$\Pr[\mathbf{G}_{\Phi,\mathbf{h}^{\boxminus}}^{\mathrm{rka-PRF-1}}(\mathcal{A})] \leq \Pr[\mathbf{G}_{2}(\mathcal{A})] + \mathbf{Adv}_{\Phi,\mathsf{E}}^{\mathrm{rka-PRP}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{E}})$$

$$= \Pr[\mathbf{G}_{3}(\mathcal{A})] + (\Pr[\mathbf{G}_{2}(\mathcal{A})] - \Pr[\mathbf{G}_{3}(\mathcal{A})]) + \mathbf{Adv}_{\Phi,\mathsf{E}}^{\mathrm{rka-PRP}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{E}}).$$

$$(45)$$

by combining Equation (43) and Equation (44) and rewriting.

Next, game G_3 is identical to game G_2 , except that Z is not resampled after the bad flag is set to 1. That is, we replace the lazily sampled random permutations in G_2 by random functions in G_3 . Because G_2 and G_3 are identical-until-bad, we have

$$\Pr[G_2(\mathcal{A})] - \Pr[G_3(\mathcal{A})] \le \Pr[G_3 \text{ sets bad}]$$
(46)

by the fundamental lemma of game playing [13]. Furthermore, G₃ is equivalent to $\mathbf{G}_{\Phi,h^{\ominus}}^{\text{rka-PRF-0}}(\mathcal{A})$, since each FN query with a new (i, L'_i, X) -tuple is responded to by $Z \oplus X$, where Z is a randomly sampled string in $\{0, 1\}^c$ and XOR preserves the uniform probability distribution.

Therefore, by combining Equation (45) and Equation (46) we have

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\Phi,\mathsf{h}^{\rightrightarrows}}^{\mathrm{rka-PRF}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \Pr[\mathrm{G}_3 \text{ sets bad}] + \mathbf{Adv}_{\Phi,\mathsf{E}}^{\mathrm{rka-PRP}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{E}}).$$
(47)

We claim that $\Pr[G_3 \text{ sets bad}] \leq (\mathbf{Q}^{F_N}(\mathcal{A}))^2/2^c$, where $\mathbf{Q}^{F_N}(\mathcal{A})$ is the number of FN queries made by adversary \mathcal{A} , yielding the bound in Proposition 12. Next we proceed to prove the claim.

We are trying to bound the collision probability of randomly sampled c-bit strings within each set $T[i, L'_i, \cdot]$. \mathcal{R} for every (i, L'_i) pair. Put differently, we want to apply a multi-user version of the PRP/PRF switching lemma, where each user corresponds to a pair (i, L'_i) , with the goal of bounding the probability that an adversary can distinguish the switch from random permutations to random functions.

At any point in time, the maximum size of $T[i, L'_i, \cdot]$. \mathcal{R} is at most $\mathbf{Q}^{FN}(\mathcal{A})$ for any (i, L'_i) , since each table entry is the result of a query to oracle FN. Hence, when sampling $Z \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^c$, the probability that $Z \in T[i, L'_i, \cdot]$. \mathcal{R} is at most $\mathbf{Q}^{FN}(\mathcal{A})/2^c$, and this is also an upper bound on the probability that this query sets bad to 1. Since there are at most $\mathbf{Q}^{FN}(\mathcal{A})$ queries to oracle FN which can set bad in total, this gives $\Pr[G_3 \text{ sets bad}] \leq (\mathbf{Q}^{FN}(\mathcal{A}))^2/2^c$, by the union bound.

Note that this bound is somewhat loose, but gets close to the actual probability in the case when all FN queries by adversary \mathcal{A} are to the same (i, L'_i) pair. The bound then would be the usual $(\mathbf{Q}^{\text{FN}}(\mathcal{A}))^2/2^{c+1}$ from the PRP/PRF switching lemma.

7.2 **Φ-rka-PRP Security of Block Ciphers in ICM**

To validate the assumption on the block cipher E in Proposition 12, we prove the Φ -rka-PRP security of E modeled as an ideal cipher for the RKD functions $\Phi_{\mathsf{pad},a}$ and $\Phi_{\mathsf{zio},a}$.

<u>DISCUSSION.</u> BK [11] give conditions on an RKD function which they show suffice for rka-PRP security of an ideal cipher. (An extension of their result is given by AFPW [1].) So one approach that may be suggested for our goal would be to show that $\Phi_{pad,a}$ and $\Phi_{zio,a}$ meet these conditions and then invoke the BK result. However, the BK and AFPW results are in the single-user (su) setting and our definitions are in our, new, multi-user (mu) setting. We could ask if a hybrid argument would reduce mu security to su security, but it is not clear how to do this in an effective way because we allow the RKD functions to be different across users. Instead, we give direct proofs that give explicit bounds.

So far, the parameter a to the RKD functions has been carried around through the proofs, seemingly without any effect. However, since a corresponds to the minimal key length of the adversaries against our higher level primitives, e.g. in the proofs of vkl-PRF security of HMAC (Thm. 10) and HMAC^{\leftrightarrows} (Thm. 11), it clearly cannot be arbitrarily small. Now, it finally shows up in the following Proposition statements, as a factor in the rka-PRP advantage. Indeed, the advantage bounds directly show that security relies on a being large enough.

<u>DEFINITIONS.</u> We first extend our multi-user definition of rka-PRP security of a block cipher $\mathsf{E}: \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{X}$ to the ideal cipher model by adding oracles E and E⁻¹ to the game in Figure 2, giving the adversary access to the ideal cipher (and its inverse). Additionally, the game replaces the use of E in oracle FN by a call to oracle E. For each $K \in \mathcal{K}$, a permutation Π_k is drawn at random from PERM[\mathcal{X}]. Oracle E takes as input a pair $(k, x) \in \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{X}$ and returns $\Pi_k(x)$, while oracle E⁻¹ takes as input a pair $(k, y) \in \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{X}$ and returns $\Pi_k^{-1}(y)$. The resulting game $\mathbf{G}_{\mathcal{K},\mathcal{X}}^{\mathrm{rka-PRP}}$, parameterized by \mathcal{K}, \mathcal{X} and $d \in \{0, 1\}$ is shown in Figure 14. We define the advantage of an adversary \mathcal{A} by

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\Phi,\mathcal{K},\mathcal{X}}^{\mathrm{rka}\operatorname{-PRP}}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr[\mathbf{G}_{\Phi,\mathcal{K},\mathcal{X}}^{\mathrm{rka}\operatorname{-PRP}-1}(\mathcal{A})] - \Pr[\mathbf{G}_{\Phi,\mathcal{K},\mathcal{X}}^{\mathrm{rka}\operatorname{-PRP}-0}(\mathcal{A})].$$

 $\underline{\Phi_{\mathsf{pad},a}\text{-}\mathsf{RKA}\text{-}\mathsf{PRP}} \xrightarrow{\text{SECURITY OF IDEAL CIPHERS.}} \text{Recall from Section 5.1 that } \Phi_{\mathsf{pad},a} : \{0,\ldots,b\} \times \{\varepsilon\} \times \{0,1\}^b \to \{0,1\}^b \cup \{\bot\} \text{ takes input } \ell, \varepsilon, K \text{ to return } \bot \text{ if } \ell < a \text{ and } K[1..\ell] \parallel \mathsf{pad}(b+\ell)[1..b-\ell] \text{ otherwise.}}$ Note that the bound in Eq. (48) in the following Proposition does not depend on the number $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A})$ of FN queries of the adversary \mathcal{A} .

Game $\mathbf{G}_{\Phi,\mathcal{K},\mathcal{X}}^{\mathrm{rka-PRP}-d}$:	$ $ <u>New(α)</u>
Init()	5 $n \leftarrow n+1$; $L_n \leftarrow \mathcal{K}; \alpha_n \leftarrow \alpha$
1 For each $k \in \mathcal{K}$ do:	6 For all $L \in \mathcal{K}$ do:
2 $\Pi_k \leftarrow PERM[\mathcal{X}]$	7 $\Pi_{n,L} \leftarrow sPERM[\mathcal{X}]$
$\underline{\mathrm{E}}(k,x)$	$\overline{\mathrm{Fn}(i,eta,X)}$
з Return $\Pi_k(x)$	8 Assert: $\Phi_{\alpha_i,\beta}(L_i) \neq \bot$
$\mathbf{F}^{-1}(\mathbf{h}, \mathbf{x})$	9 $L' \leftarrow \Phi_{lpha_i,eta}(L_i) otin ext{Derived key}$
$\frac{\mathrm{E}^{-1}(k,y)}{1-1}$	10 If $d = 1$ then return $E(L', X)$
4 Return $\Pi_k^{-1}(y)$	11 Else return $\Pi_{i,L'}(X)$

Figure 14: Related-key attack PRP security games $(d \in \{0, 1\})$ in the ICM for block cipher $\mathsf{E} \colon \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{X}$ and RKD function Φ .

Proposition 13 ($\Phi_{\mathsf{pad},a}$ -rka-PRP security in the ideal cipher model). Let a, c < b be integers. Let $\mathcal{K} = \{0,1\}^b$ and $\mathcal{X} = \{0,1\}^c$. Let \mathcal{A} be an ICM rka-PRP adversary. Let $q_{ic} = \mathbf{Q}^{\mathsf{E}}(\mathcal{A}) + \mathbf{Q}^{\mathsf{E}^{-1}}(\mathcal{A})$ and let $u = \mathbf{Q}^{\mathsf{New}}(\mathcal{A})$. Then

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\Phi_{\mathsf{pad},a},\mathcal{K},\mathcal{X}}^{\mathrm{rka-PRP}}(\mathcal{A}) \le \frac{u \cdot q_{ic}}{2^a} + \frac{u(u-1)}{2^{a+1}} \,. \tag{48}$$

Proof of Proposition 13. Let us call Π a family of permutations if $\Pi_k \in \mathsf{PERM}[\mathcal{X}]$ for each $k \in \mathcal{K}$. We visualize Π as a table with $|\mathcal{K}|$ rows and $|\mathcal{X}|$ columns, the row k column x entry in the table being $\Pi_k(x)$. Our proof will consist entirely of manipulations of table rows. Manipulations include rows being swapped across different tables, or resampled.

Proceeding, consider the games of Figure 15. It is assumed that a NEW(ℓ) query satisfies $\ell \geq a$ and that the second input to oracle FN is always ε , allowing us to drop the "Assert" conditions. Game G₀ rewrites $\mathbf{G}_{\Phi,\mathcal{K},\mathcal{X}}^{\text{rka-PRP-1}}$, moving as many steps as possible from oracles into INIT(). We have

$$\Pr[\mathbf{G}_{\Phi,\mathcal{K},\mathcal{X}}^{\mathrm{rka-PRP-1}}(\mathcal{A})] = \Pr[\mathbf{G}_0(\mathcal{A})].$$
(49)

The intent now is to move to game G₃. Here, two families of permutations, Δ and Γ , are sampled. Queries to E and E⁻¹ are answered via Δ , and queries to FN via Γ , with the claim that the adversary cannot distinguish the change, except with small probability. To formalize and prove this claim we consider games G₁, G₂, where the former includes the boxed code and the latter does not. The game starts out aiming to answer queries to E and E⁻¹ via Δ , and queries to FN via Γ . The boxed code however, conflates rows where a difference would be visible to the adversary. Thus in G₁, for each key k, either Δ_k or Γ_k answers all queries involving key k. Even though the choice between the two is dynamically determined, it is static once made, so that a single random permutation answers all queries for row k, just as in G₀. So we have

$$\Pr[G_0(\mathcal{A})] = \Pr[G_1(\mathcal{A})].$$
(50)

Games G_1, G_2 are identical-until-bad so by the Fundamental Lemma of Game Playing [13] we have

$$\Pr[G_1(\mathcal{A})] = \Pr[G_2(\mathcal{A})] + (\Pr[G_1(\mathcal{A})] - \Pr[G_2(\mathcal{A})])$$
(51)

 $\leq \Pr[G_2(\mathcal{A})] + \Pr[G_2(\mathcal{A}) \text{ sets bad}].$ (52)

The probability that **bad** is set at lines 5 or 7 is at most $uq_{ic} \cdot 2^{-a}$, so

$$\Pr[G_2(\mathcal{A}) \text{ sets bad}] \le \frac{u \cdot q_{ic}}{2^a} .$$
(53)

Game G_0 :	Games $\overline{G_1}$, G_2 :
INIT()	INIT()
¹ For each $k \in \mathcal{K}$ do:	1 For each $k \in \mathcal{K}$ do:
2 $\Pi_k \leftarrow PERM[\mathcal{X}]$	2 $\Delta_k \leftarrow PERM[\mathcal{X}]; \Gamma_k \leftarrow PERM[\mathcal{X}]$
3 For $i = 1,, u$ do:	3 For $i = 1,, u$ do:
4 $L_i \leftarrow \mathfrak{K}$	4 $L_i \leftarrow \mathcal{K} ; J_i \leftarrow L_i[1a]$
$\mathrm{E}(k,x)$	$\mathrm{E}(k,x)$
5 Return $\Pi_k(x)$	5 If $(\exists i : k[1a] = J_i)$ then bad $\leftarrow 1$; $\Delta_k \leftarrow \Gamma_k$
$E^{-1}(k,x)$	6 Return $\Delta_k(x)$
6 Return $\Pi_k^{-1}(x)$	$\mathrm{E}^{-1}(k,y)$
$\operatorname{New}(\ell)$	7 If $(\exists i : k[1a] = J_i)$ then bad $\leftarrow 1$; $\Delta_k \leftarrow \Gamma_k$
$\frac{1}{7} \frac{1}{n} \frac{1}$	8 Return $\Delta_k^{-1}(y)$
$ \ \ \ L_n' \leftarrow L_n[1\ell] \ pad(b+\ell) [1b-\ell] $	$\operatorname{NeW}(\ell)$
$\mathrm{Fn}(i,arepsilon,X)$	$\boxed{ \ \ 9 \ n \leftarrow n+1 \ ; \ L_n' \leftarrow L_n[1\ell] \ pad(b+\ell)[1b-\ell] }$
9 Return $\Pi_{L'_i}(X)$	$\operatorname{Fn}(i,arepsilon,X)$
•	10 Return $\Gamma_{L'_i}(X)$
Game G ₃ :	Games $\overline{[G_4]}, G_5$:
Init()	INIT()
1 For each $k \in \mathcal{K}$ do:	1 For each $k \in \mathcal{K}$ do:
2 $\Delta_k \leftarrow PERM[\mathcal{X}] ; \Gamma_k \leftarrow PERM[\mathcal{X}]$	2 $\Delta_k \leftarrow PERM[\mathcal{X}]$
3 For $i = 1, \ldots, u$ do: $L_i \leftarrow \mathcal{K}$	3 For $i = 1, \ldots, u$ do: $L_i \leftarrow \mathfrak{K}$
${ m E}(k,x)$	$\mathrm{E}(k,x)$
4 Return $\Delta_k(x)$	4 Return $\Delta_k(x)$
$\mathrm{E}^{-1}(k,y)$	$\mathrm{E}^{-1}(k,y)$
5 Return $\Delta_k^{-1}(y)$	$_{5}$ Return $\Delta_k^{-1}(y)$
$\operatorname{New}(\ell)$	$\operatorname{New}(\ell)$
$\overline{}_{6}$ $n \leftarrow n+1$	$\boxed[\hline 6 n \leftarrow n+1; \ L'_n \leftarrow L_n[1\ell] \ pad(b+\ell)[1b-\ell]$
7 $L'_n \leftarrow L_n[1\ell] \ pad(b+\ell)[1b-\ell]$	$7 \ \gamma_n \leftarrow PERM[\mathcal{X}]$
$\mathrm{Fn}(i,arepsilon,X)$	8 If $(\exists j < n : L'_j = L'_n)$ then
$\frac{\Gamma N(i, \varepsilon, X)}{8 \text{ Return }} \Gamma_{L'_i}(X)$	9 bad $\leftarrow 1$; $[\gamma_n \leftarrow \gamma_j]$
	$\mathrm{Fn}(i,arepsilon,X)$
	$\boxed{ 10 \text{Return } \gamma_i(X) }$

Figure 15: Games for proof of Proposition 13.

Game G_3 is obtained by dropping unused code in G_2 , so

$$\Pr[G_2(\mathcal{A})] = \Pr[G_3(\mathcal{A})].$$
(54)

Now we want to move from G_3 to game $\mathbf{G}_{\Phi,\mathcal{K},\mathcal{X}}^{\text{rka-PRP-0}}$. The difference is that the former uses the same family of permutations Γ to answer FN queries for all users, while the latter uses a different family for each user. The difference is however only detectable if there is a key collision, meaning $L'_i = L'_j$ for some $i \neq j$. To formalize this and conclude we consider games G_4, G_5 , where the former includes the boxed code and the latter does not. Family Γ is no longer picked. Instead, NEW picks a random permutation γ_n for the relevant row on line 7. In game G_4 , if $L'_n = L'_j$, then the boxed code modifies the line 7 choice to ensure $\gamma_n = \gamma_j$. The result is that γ_i plays the role of Γ'_{L_i} in G_3 , so

$$\Pr[G_3(\mathcal{A})] = \Pr[G_4(\mathcal{A})] .$$
(55)

In G₅ however, the boxed code is absent, so $\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_u$ are random, independent permutations. This implies that

$$\Pr[G_5(\mathcal{A})] = \Pr[\mathbf{G}_{\Phi,\mathcal{K},\mathcal{X}}^{\text{rka-PRP-0}}(\mathcal{A})] .$$
(56)

Games G_4, G_5 are identical-until-bad so by the Fundamental Lemma of Game Playing [13] we have

$$\Pr[G_4(\mathcal{A})] = \Pr[G_5(\mathcal{A})] + (\Pr[G_4(\mathcal{A})] - \Pr[G_5(\mathcal{A})])$$
(57)

$$\leq \Pr[G_5(\mathcal{A})] + \Pr[G_5(\mathcal{A}) \text{ sets bad}].$$
(58)

Finally

$$\Pr[G_5(\mathcal{A}) \text{ sets bad}] \le \frac{u(u-1)}{2^{a+1}} , \qquad (59)$$

since each derived key L'_j has a uniformly random prefix of at least a bits, and the probability that G_5 sets **bad** is bounded from above by the probability that any out of the at most u many such prefixes collide. Putting the above together concludes the proof.

<u> $\Phi_{\text{zio},a}$ -RKA-PRP SECURITY OF IDEAL CIPHERS.</u> Let ipad, opad $\in \{0,1\}^b$ be distinct strings. Recall from Section 6.2 that $\Phi_{\text{zio},a} : \{0,\ldots,b\} \times \{\text{ipad}, \text{opad}\} \times \{0,1\}^b \to \{0,1\}^b \cup \{\bot\}$ takes input ℓ , io, K to return \bot if $\ell < a$ and $(K[1.\ell] \parallel 0^{b-\ell}) \oplus$ io otherwise.

Proposition 14 ($\Phi_{\mathsf{zio},a}$ -rka-PRP security in the ideal cipher model). Let a, c < b be integers. Let $\mathcal{K} = \{0,1\}^b$ and $\mathcal{X} = \{0,1\}^c$. Let \mathcal{A} be an ICM rka-PRP adversary. Let $q_{ic} = \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{E}}(\mathcal{A}) + \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{E}^{-1}}(\mathcal{A})$ and let $u = \mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{NeW}}(\mathcal{A})$. Then

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\Phi_{\mathrm{zio},a},\mathcal{K},\mathcal{K}}^{\mathrm{rka-PRP}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \frac{2u \cdot q_{ic}}{2^{a}} + \frac{4u(u-1)}{2^{a+1}} \,. \tag{60}$$

The proof is similar to that of Proposition 13 and is omitted. Briefly the idea is that for each i there are now two related keys L'_i and L''_i and the rest is the same. This leads to additional factors of 2 in the bound.

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A Dual-PRF Assumptions on HMAC in Prior Work

In many analyses of real-world protocols, HMAC is assumed to be a secure dual (or swap) PRF, including works on TLS 1.3 [27, 24], KEMTLS [52], hybrid key-exchange designs [17, 53], postquantum versions of WireGuard [35] and Noise [2], and Message Layer Security (MLS) [23]. Here, we give an account of where the assumption shows up, and when it is supported by our results.

Generally speaking, our results support the dual-PRF assumption on HMAC when used with uniformly random keys in the aforementioned analyses (as keys in these real-world protocols have fixed length and, hence, are feasible). Note, however, that since our results only cover uniformly random PRF keys, they do not say anything about using HMAC to extract uniform keys from non-uniform entropy inputs (following, for example, the HKDF paradigm [40]). In this setting, dual-PRF(-like) assumptions have also been made in the cited, and other, works. TLS 1.3 [27]. In the proofs of multi-stage key exchange security of TLS 1.3's full handshake (Theorem 6.2, Game 4), and pre-shared key handshake (Theorem 6.4, Games A.4 and B.3) in [27], the handshake's early secret ES ← HKDF.Extract(0, PSK) is replaced with a random value, given that PSK is uniformly random, assuming "the dual PRF security of HKDF.Extract." Since 0 here denotes a string of zero bytes of (fixed) length of the hash function's output, treating HKDF.Extract as HMAC[⇔] keyed with PSK, our result from Theorem 11 applies.

The analysis in [27] also assumes a dual version of the PRF-ODH assumption [22] on HKDF.Extract; our results do not cover this assumption.

- TLS 1.3 [24]. The main theorem for the key schedule security of TLS 1.3 in [24] "assumes [...] dual pseudorandomness Gpr^{f-alg,b} with f-alg = xtr[†]-alg" [24, Section 3.2], similarly to [27] when arguing about the early secret in the TLS 1.3 handshake. Here, xtr[†]-alg denotes HMAC[⊆] in the agile sense of alg determining the underlying hash function H.
- **KEMTLS** [52]. In [52], the proof of Theorem 4.1 showing multi-stage key exchange security of KEMTLS involves a "sequence of game hops which, one-by-one, replace derived secrets and stage keys with random values, under the PRF-security or dual-PRF-security [5, 6] of HKDF (dual-PRF-security arises since the TLS 1.3 and KEMTLS key schedules sometime use secrets in the "salt" argument of HKDF.Extract, rather than the "input keying material argument")." Each of the dual-PRF steps applies to an HKDF.Extract = HMAC computation with two fixed-length keys as inputs (out of which the second is leveraged as the random key input), our result from Theorem 11 applies.
- Hybrid KEMs [17]. Studying hybrid key exchange, [17] introduces several KEM combiners, including dualPRF which "relies on the existence of dual pseudorandom functions [8, 5, 12] which provide security if either the key material or the label carries entropy", and N, "a nested variant of the dual-PRF combiner inspired by the key derivation procedure in TLS 1.3 and the proposal how to augment it for hybrid schemes in [51]", suggesting "The HKDF key derivation function is, for example, based on this dual principle." [17, Section 3]. In their proof of security of the dualPRF and N combiners, dual-PRF security is assumed for a generic function dPRF which takes two keys as input. Reasonably assuming that KEM key outputs have fixed lengths, these keys qualify as feasible for our results on HMAC and HMAC[S]^{\leftrightarrows} from Theorems 10 and 11; however [17] also consider (partially) quantum adversaries.
- **Post-quantum WireGuard** [35]. As component of a post-quantum proposal for the Wire-Guard VPN protocol, a "dual-PRF appears in the form of a key-derivation function $\mathsf{KDF}(X,Y) = Z$." [35, Section II.D] In the key exchange security proof, both PRF and swap-PRF assumptions are made on KDF (which in WireGuard is based on HMAC) when used with fixed-length inputs, so our results from Theorems 10 and 11 apply.
- **Post-quantum Noise** [2]. In the analysis of a post-quantum version of the Noise protocol, [2] introduces a "Noise Hash Object" as an abstraction, whose security relies on HMAC being a dual-PRF in Theorem 1. In their instantiation, HMAC in the swapped case is using an empty string or a prior output as "state" [2, Algorithm 2]; applying our results from Theorem 11 would require encoding both in same-length bitstrings.
- MLS [23]. Analyzing the key derivation in the Message Layer Security (MLS) protocol, [23] assumes "that the Extract function in Krawczyk's HKDF design [40] is a dual pseudorandom function and thus, we assume that HKDF is a dual KDF." HKDF is modeled as taking two key inputs of fixed length [23, Section V], making it amenable to our results from Theorems 10 and 11.

Games G_0, G_1, G_2 :	Adversary $\mathcal{A}_{f}()$
NEW()	1 $b \leftarrow * \mathcal{A}^{\mathrm{New},\mathrm{Fn}^*}_{2CSC}$
1 $n \leftarrow n+1; J_n \leftarrow \mathcal{K}$	2 Return b
$\underline{\mathrm{Fn}(i,(A,S))}$	$\mathrm{Fn}^*(i,(A,S))$
² If $T[i, (A, S)] = \bot$ then:	$\exists L \leftarrow \operatorname{FN}(i, A)$
3 If $T_f[i, A] = \bot$ then:	4 Return $h^*(L,S)$
4 $T_{f}[i,A] \leftarrow f(J_i,A)$	∥ G ₀
5 $\mathrm{T}_{f}[i,A] \leftarrow \mathrm{s} \{0,1\}^c$	$\# G_1$
6 $T[i, (A, S)] \leftarrow h^*(T_f[i, A], S)$	$/\!\!/ \ G_0,G_1$
7 $T[i, (A, S)] \leftarrow * \{0, 1\}^c$	// G ₂
8 Return $T[i, (A, S)]$	

Figure 16: Games G_0 - G_2 and adversary \mathcal{A}_f for the proof of Lemma 1.

B Proofs for the Strong PRF Security of the Cascade

B.1 Proof of Lemma 1

We use a sequence of games G_0-G_2 and a set of hybrid games H_0-H_n , as shown in Figures 16 and 17. All are executed with \mathcal{A}_{2CSC} , and hence provide the oracles named in game $\mathbf{G}_{2CSC}^{\mathrm{PRF}-d}$.

▷ Replacing f with a random function. We begin with game G_0 being the "real" PRF game $G_{2CSC}^{PRF-1}(\mathcal{A}_{2CSC})$. The first game hop, to game G_1 , replaces the evaluation of f in line 4 of G_0 by (consistent) random sampling in line 5. By standard equation rewriting

$$\Pr[\mathbf{G}_{2\mathsf{CSC}}^{\mathsf{PRF-1}}(\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}})] = \Pr[\mathbf{G}_0(\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}})]$$

=
$$\Pr[\mathbf{G}_1(\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}})] + (\Pr[\mathbf{G}_0(\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}})] - \Pr[\mathbf{G}_1(\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}})]).$$
(61)

We build an adversary \mathcal{A}_{f} , such that

$$\Pr[G_0(\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}})] - \Pr[G_1(\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}})] \le \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{f}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{f}}).$$
(62)

Adversary \mathcal{A}_{f} simulates G_{0} for \mathcal{A}_{2CSC} , with two changes: when adversary \mathcal{A}_{2CSC} makes its calls to oracle NEW, adversary \mathcal{A}_{f} also calls its NEW oracle. Then, when adversary \mathcal{A}_{2CSC} makes a query FN(i, (A, S)), \mathcal{A}_{f} issues query $L \leftarrow FN(i, A)$ to its own oracle and returns $h^{*}(L, S)$ to \mathcal{A}_{2CSC} . That is, \mathcal{A}_{f} simulates the function oracle by getting the key L for the cascade from the FN oracle in game \mathbf{G}_{f}^{PRF-d} and then applies the cascade to the input S. Hence, \mathcal{A}_{f} makes one NEW query and one FN query respectively for each of the $\mathbf{Q}^{NEW}(\mathcal{A}_{2CSC})$ NEW and $\mathbf{Q}^{FN}(\mathcal{A}_{2CSC})$ FN queries made by \mathcal{A}_{2CSC} .

When adversary \mathcal{A}_{2CSC} halts and returns, adversary \mathcal{A}_{f} also halts and returns the same output. With this strategy, adversary \mathcal{A}_{f} soundly simulates $G_{(1-d)}$ when playing game $\mathbf{G}_{f}^{\mathrm{PRF}-d}$, for $d \in \{0, 1\}$, yielding the bound in Equation (62).

 \triangleright Replacing h^{*} with a random function.

The second game hop, to game G_2 , replaces the invocation of the cascade on line 6 by random sampling in line 7.

Again by standard equation rewriting

$$\Pr[G_1(\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}})] = \Pr[G_2(\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}})] + (\Pr[G_1(\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}})] - \Pr[G_2(\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}})]).$$

Using a hybrid argument, we build an adversary \mathcal{A}_h against the PRF security of the compression function h, such that

$$\Pr[G_1(\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}})] - \Pr[G_2(\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}})] \le n \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}}), \tag{63}$$

Game $\mathbf{H}_{s} \not\parallel 0 \le s \le n$:	Adversary $\mathcal{A}_{h}()$
New()	1 $\omega \leftarrow \{1, \dots, n\}$
$1 \nu \leftarrow \nu + 1$	2 $b \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{2CSC}^{New^*, FN^*}()$
$\operatorname{Fn}(i,(A,S))$	3 Return b
² If $T[i, (A, \mathbf{S})] \neq \bot$ then:	$\overline{\text{New}^*()}$
3 Return $T[i, (A, S)]$	4 $\nu \leftarrow \nu + 1$
4 $\mathbf{S} \stackrel{b}{\leftarrow} S; N \leftarrow \mathbf{S} $	$\overline{\mathrm{FN}^*(i,(A,S))}$
5 If $N \leq s$ then:	5 If $T[i, (A, S)] \neq \bot$ then:
$ \begin{tabular}{l} & \mathbf{T}[i,(A,\mathbf{S})] \leftarrow & \{0,1\}^c \end{tabular} \end{tabular} \end{tabular} $	6 Return $T[i, (A, S)]$
7 Else: 8 If $T_L[i, (A, \mathbf{S}[1s])] = \bot$ then:	7 $\mathbf{S} \stackrel{b}{\leftarrow} S; N \leftarrow \mathbf{S} $
	8 If $N < \omega$ then:
9 $\mathbf{T}_L[i, (A, \mathbf{S}[1s])] \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^c$	9 $T[i, (A, S)] \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^c$
10 $C[s] \leftarrow T_L[i, (A, \mathbf{S}[1s])$ 11 For $j = s + 1$ to N do:	10 Else: (if $N \ge \omega$)
	// If $i, (A, \mathbf{S}[1\omega - 1])$ is new, init new key:
12 $C[j] \leftarrow h(C[j-1], \mathbf{S}[j])$	11 If $T_L^*[i, (A, S[1\omega - 1])] = \bot$
13 $T[i, (A, S)] \leftarrow C[N]$ 14 Return $T[i, (A, S)]$	12 $ctr \leftarrow ctr + 1; \text{NEW}()$
	13 $\mathbf{T}_{L}^{*}[i, (A, \mathbf{S}[1\omega - 1])] \leftarrow ctr$
	∥ Get key index:
	14 $u \leftarrow \mathrm{T}_{L}^{*}[i, (A, \mathbf{S}[1\omega - 1])]$
	15 $C[\omega] \leftarrow \operatorname{Fn}(u, \mathbf{S}[\omega])$
	16 For $j = \omega + 1$ to N do:
	17 $C[j] \leftarrow h(C[j-1], \mathbf{S}[j])$
	18 $T[i, (A, S)] \leftarrow C[N]$
	19 Return $T[i, (A, S)]$

Figure 17: Hybrid games H_0 - H_n and adversary \mathcal{A}_h for the proof of Lemma 1.

where n is the maximum block length of the S component in any FN(i, (A, S)) query by A_{2CSC} . To this end, we construct n + 1 hybrid games $H_0 - H_n$ as shown in Figure 17. In game H_s , the first s invocations of h in the cascade are replaced by random sampling, the remainder are computed as before. Hence, game H_0 is equivalent to G_1 and H_n to G_2 , giving

$$\Pr[G_1(\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}})] - \Pr[G_2(\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}})] = \Pr[H_0(\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}})] - \Pr[H_n(\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}})].$$
(64)

Adversary \mathcal{A}_{h} begins by sampling $\omega \leftarrow \{1, \ldots, n\}$ and then acts as the challenger in game \mathcal{H}_{ω} , with the following differences. When adversary $\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}}$ makes a new query $\operatorname{FN}(i, (A, S))$, and the number of blocks N of S is less than ω , then adversary \mathcal{A}_{h} samples a (consistent) random string in $\{0, 1\}^c$, stores the result in a table $\operatorname{T}[i, (A, S)]$ for consistency and returns the result to $\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}}$.

If instead the number of blocks N is at least ω , then adversary \mathcal{A}_{h} checks if the prefix $(A, \mathbf{S}[1..\omega - 1])$ is per-user new. If so, it calls oracle NEW to initialize a new key, and stores the index of the key in a table $\mathrm{T}_{L}^{*}[i, (A, \mathbf{S}[1..\omega - 1])]$. Otherwise it fetches the key index u from the table. Adversary \mathcal{A}_{h} then issues query $C[\omega] \leftarrow \mathrm{FN}(u, \mathbf{S}[\omega])$. If $N > \omega$, it then applies the cascade to the remaining blocks of S. It stores $\mathsf{h}^{*}(C[\omega], \mathbf{S}[\omega + 1..N])$ in table $\mathrm{T}[i, (A, S)]$ and returns the result to $\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}}$. When adversary $\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}}$ halts and returns, adversary \mathcal{A}_{h} also halts and returns the same output.

This way, adversary \mathcal{A}_{h} simulates $\mathcal{H}_{\omega-d}$ when playing game $\mathbf{G}_{\mathsf{h}}^{\mathrm{PRF}-d}$, for $d \in \{0,1\}$, making

at most $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}})$ queries to oracle NEW and $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}})$ queries to FN. Note that the assumption that the FN queries of $\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}}$ are prefix-free guarantees the soundness of the simulation, as it will never be the case that $\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}}$ sees both the response to a query $\mathrm{FN}(i, (A, S))$ with $|\mathbf{S}| = \omega - 1$ (which will be a random string sampled by \mathcal{A}_{h}) and the response to $\mathrm{FN}(i, (A, S \parallel S'))$ for some non-empty S' (which will be computed by \mathcal{A}_{h} using its FN oracle on a key index corresponding to $(A, \mathbf{S}[1..\omega - 1])$) for user i. That is, it will not be the case that \mathcal{A}_{h} is forced to both pick a random value at level $\omega - 1$, and call oracle NEW to initialize a key which should correspond to this value (something which \mathcal{A}_{h} cannot guarantee).

By the law of total probability and a telescoping sum, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}}) &= \mathrm{Pr}\left[\mathbf{G}_{\mathsf{h}}^{\mathrm{PRF-1}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}})\right] - \mathrm{Pr}\left[\mathbf{G}_{\mathsf{h}}^{\mathrm{PRF-0}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}})\right] \\ &= \frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left(\mathrm{Pr}\left[\mathrm{H}_{i-1}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{2CSC}}) \mid \omega = i\right] - \mathrm{Pr}\left[\mathrm{H}_{i}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{2CSC}}) \mid \omega = i\right]\right) \\ &= \frac{1}{n} \cdot \left(\mathrm{Pr}[\mathrm{H}_{0}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{2CSC}})] - \mathrm{Pr}[\mathrm{H}_{n}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{2CSC}})]\right).\end{aligned}$$

Combined with Equation (64), this gives the bound in Equation (63).

B.2 Proof of Lemma 2

The proof uses the insight from BBT [7] that the multi-user security of the cascade corresponds to the single-user prf-security of the 2-tier cascade when the first tier is a random function. To explain: if we let the first tier of the 2-tier cascade be the family f of *all functions* with domain $\mathcal{X} = \{1, \ldots, u\}$ and range $\{0, 1\}^c$, where $u \geq \mathbf{Q}^{\text{NEW}}(\mathcal{A}_{h^*})$ is an upper bound on the number of users initialized by adversary \mathcal{A}_{h^*} , then choosing a key for f corresponds to choosing a random function $\mathsf{kf} : \mathcal{X} \to \{0, 1\}^c$. That is, the key space \mathcal{K} of f is the set of all functions from \mathcal{X} to $\{0, 1\}^c$, and $\mathsf{f}(\mathsf{kf}, i) = \mathsf{kf}(i)$.

Sampling a new key $L \in \{0, 1\}^c$ for the cascade then corresponds to evaluating kf at a new index. Hence we can instantiate the cascade as

$$h^*(kf(i), S) = 2\mathsf{CSC}(kf, (i, S)), \tag{65}$$

and view each new invocation of h^* under a new key as an evaluation of 2CSC on the single-user instance keyed by kf. This allows us to apply the result from lemma 1 to show the prf-security of h^* .

To proceed, we construct an intermediate adversary A_{2CSC} against the single-user prfsecurity of 2CSC which works as follows.

Adversary $\mathcal{A}_{2CSC}^{\operatorname{New},\operatorname{Fn}}()$	$\overline{\mathrm{NeW}^*()}$
1 NEW()	${ m Fn}^*(i,S)$
2 $b \leftarrow * \mathcal{A}_{h^*}^{\operatorname{NEW}^*, \operatorname{FN}^*}()$	4 $X \leftarrow \operatorname{FN}(1, (i, S))$
3 Return b	5 Return X

Adversary $\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}}$ begins by calling oracle NEW to initialize the (single) key for 2**CSC**. Since 2**CSC** is instantiated with f and h, as described above, this samples a random function kf : $\{1, \ldots, u\} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^c$. Then, adversary $\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}}$ runs \mathcal{A}_{h^*} , simulating access to oracles NEW and FN via NEW^{*} and FN^{*}, respectively. When \mathcal{A}_{h^*} makes one of its $\mathbf{Q}^{\operatorname{NEW}}(\mathcal{A}_{h^*})$ many queries to oracle NEW^{*}, adversary $\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}}$ does nothing. When \mathcal{A}_{h^*} queries FN^{*}(*i*, *S*), adversary $\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}}$ responds by issuing the query FN(1, (*i*, *S*)) to its own oracle under the single key with index 1, and forwards the response to \mathcal{A}_{h^*} . When adversary \mathcal{A}_{h^*} halts and returns a guess for the hidden bit, $\mathcal{A}_{2\mathsf{CSC}}$ does the same. This way, adversary \mathcal{A}_{2CSC} perfectly simulates game $\mathbf{G}_{h^*}^{\mathrm{PRF}-d}$ when playing game $\mathbf{G}_{2CSC}^{\mathrm{PRF}-d}$ itself, and

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathbf{h}^*}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathbf{h}^*}) \le \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathrm{2CSC}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{2CSC}}).$$
(66)

Combining Equation (66) with Equation (1) from Lemma 1 now yields

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}^*}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}^*}) \le \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{f}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{f}}) + n \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{h}}^{\mathrm{PRF}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{h}}), \tag{67}$$

for adversaries \mathcal{A}_{f} and \mathcal{A}_{h} as specified in the proof of Lemma 1. (Note that the assumption that FN oracle queries from \mathcal{A}_{h^*} are prefix-free guarantees that adversary \mathcal{A}_{2CSC} only makes prefix-free queries, as needed for Lemma 1.) However, since f is the family of *all* functions mapping $\{1, \ldots, u\}$ to keys for h in $\{0, 1\}^c$, the advantage of *any* adversary against the prfsecurity of f is 0. (Any instance of f is a truly random function, and hence indistinguishable from the lazily sampled random function in \mathbf{G}_{f}^{PRF-0} in Figure 1.) Hence Equation (67) simplifies to Equation (2).

Adversary \mathcal{A}_{h} works just like in Lemma 1. That is, it makes at most $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{h^*})$ queries to NEW and $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{h^*})$ queries to oracle FN. Note that this means that the maximum number of users *u* does not show up anywhere, neither in the advantage bound nor in the resources used by adversary \mathcal{A}_{h} . How can this be? The explanation is that $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{NEW}}(\mathcal{A}_{h^*})$ is subsumed by $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{h^*})$. Indeed, in each layer of the cascade except for the first, the compression function h is invoked with at most $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{h^*})$ different keys, which is reflected in the proof by the (at most) $\mathbf{Q}^{\mathrm{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{h^*})$ many queries to oracle NEW by \mathcal{A}_{h} .

In the first layer, h is invoked with at most $u \ge \mathbf{Q}^{\text{NeW}}(\mathcal{A}_{h^*})$ distinct keys, but since each invocation is prompted by one of the $\mathbf{Q}^{\text{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{h^*})$ many queries to oracle FN, the actual number of keys used is at most $\mathbf{Q}^{\text{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{h^*})$. That is, a query to oracle NEW to initialize a key index which is subsequently never used can be safely ignored, and is in fact ignored in the reduction (since adversary \mathcal{A}_{2CSC} does nothing in response to a NEW oracle query). Put differently: we could write a reduction in which \mathcal{A}_h makes at most $\max(\mathbf{Q}^{\text{NEW}}(\mathcal{A}_{h^*}), \mathbf{Q}^{\text{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{h^*}))$ queries to oracle NEW, but w.l.o.g. we may also assume that adversary \mathcal{A}_{h^*} does not make any "unnecessary" queries to oracle NEW, so that $\mathbf{Q}^{\text{NEW}}(\mathcal{A}_{h^*}) \leq \mathbf{Q}^{\text{FN}}(\mathcal{A}_{h^*})$.

This concludes the proof.

B.3 Related Work and Techniques

In their study of AMAC, BBT [7] introduce the 2-tier cascade and augmented 2-tier cascade. They show single-user PRF security of the augmented 2-tier cascade and deduce strong multiuser PRF security for the augmented cascade. The augmentation is the application of an unkeyed output function. Setting the latter to the identity function results in the cascade, so one might think that the results of BBT [7] imply ours as a special case. But this is not true. In fact, the results of BBT [7] do not hold when the output function is the identity. Their assumption on the compression function is PRF security under leakage of the output function, which is not true when the latter is the identity. Indeed, in their result, there is no restriction on queries, meaning no requirement on prefix-freeness, an indication that the result cannot hold for the cascade itself, where we know that security will not hold without a restriction on the queries: they must be prefix-free.