Inferring Bivariate Polynomials for Homomorphic Encryption Application

Diana Maimuț \(^{1,2} \) and George Teșeleanu \(^{1,3} \)

\(^{1}\) Advanced Technologies Institute, Bucharest, Romania
\{diana.maimut, tgeorge\}@dcti.ro
\(^{2}\) Military Technical Academy, Bucharest, Romania
\(^{3}\) Simion Stoilow Institute of Mathematics of the Romanian Academy, Bucharest, Romania

Abstract. Inspired by the advancements in (fully) homomorphic encryption during the last decades and its practical applications, we conduct a preliminary study on the underlying mathematical structure of the corresponding schemes. Hence, this paper focuses on investigating the challenge of deducing bivariate polynomials constructed using homomorphic operations, namely repetitive additions and multiplications. To begin with, we introduce an approach for solving the previously mentioned problem using Lagrange interpolation for the evaluation of univariate polynomials. This method is well-established for determining univariate polynomials that satisfy a specific set of points. Moreover, we propose a second approach based on modular knapsack resolution algorithms. These algorithms are designed to address optimization problems where a set of objects with specific weights and values is involved. Finally, we give recommendations on how to run our algorithms in order to obtain better results in terms of precision.

Keywords: bivariate polynomial, Lagrange interpolation, modular knapsack problem, lattice reduction

1 Introduction

The concept of homomorphic encryption [19] has been an area of active research and development since the introduction of the RSA cryptosystem in the late 1970s [48]. Homomorphic encryption is a cryptographic technique that enables operations to be performed directly on encrypted data, without requiring decryption first. This allows for calculations on sensitive data without revealing information to the party performing the computation.

The development of the previously mentioned area has been driven by the need for privacy-preserving computation in various fields such as healthcare, finance, and data analysis. Cloud computing has revived the interest of researchers in homomorphic encryption (HE) given that it promises the potential to allow organizations to perform analyses and calculations on sensitive data while maintaining the privacy of the individuals’ whose data is being studied.
Partially homomorphic cryptosystems, which allow for computation of only specific operations on encrypted data, have been known for decades. However, a fully homomorphic encryption scheme (FHE), which enables arbitrary computations to be performed, was only first detailed in 2009 by Gentry in [26]. This breakthrough has opened up new possibilities for privacy-preserving processing and has led to further research and development. Besides Gentry’s proposal, another first generation FHE scheme was published in [21]. The second generation FHE schemes were presented in [9–11,23], the third generation ones in [12,13,27] and, last but not least, fourth generation FHE schemes were detailed in [16,38]. Various corresponding libraries were developed since 2009 [3].

Banking-related applications of HE may be found in [31,55]. To provide the reader with a basic example, let us consider a banker Bob which maintains a ciphertext \( f(m) \) of Alice’s bank account balance \( m \). In this scenario, homomorphic encryption enables Bob to perform operations on Alice’s bank account balance without ever having to decrypt the ciphertext and exposing the original value of \( m \). This means that Bob can perform operations such as crediting the account with a certain amount \( f(m + a) \) or applying an interest rate \( f(m \cdot a) \) without ever having access to the actual value of \( m \).

Another example of a HE application can be considered in healthcare, more precisely for analyzing medical records [6, 8, 15, 28, 43, 56]. Medical records often contain sensitive and confidential information about patients, such as their medical history, test results, and personal identifying information. By using homomorphic encryption, medical researchers and healthcare providers can analyze encrypted medical records without ever having to decrypt the data and expose the patients’ private information. For example, HE could be used to analyze medical records to identify patterns or trends in certain diseases or conditions. This information could be used to improve patient outcomes, develop new treatments, and advance medical research. Another healthcare scenario would be to securely share medical records between providers, such as doctors and hospitals, while still ensuring that the sensitive information remains confidential and protected.

Other classical HE applications are discussed in [18, 20, 22, 39]: cloud computing, multi-party computation, authenticated encryption, Internet of Things and so on.

As we will see, in a number of interesting cases it is possible, given the ciphertext, to infer the operations done on the cleartext.

Our Results. The paper proposes two types of algorithms for finding a polynomial \( P \) such that \( P(a, b) = r \), given the natural numbers \( a, b, r \). The first algorithm is based on modular Lagrange interpolation, which is a technique used for finding a polynomial that passes through a given set of points [32]. The second algorithm is inspired by (modular) knapsack resolution algorithms, which are used for solving optimization problems involving a set of objects with certain weights and values [7,17,30,34–36,45,46,52].

Our work is a preliminary step in reverse engineering proprietary algorithms which fall in the category of homomorphic encryption by analyzing the opera-
tions done on data, even though the data is encrypted. Through the proposed
techniques, it is possible to identify the exact polynomial used by the system,
even if it is custom. Therefore, the algorithms should be better protected by
either limiting the amount of data being analyzed or by increasing the density
of the polynomial coefficients.

Related Work. To the authors’ knowledge this is the first paper to study the
problem of inferring polynomials resulted from repetitive use of homomorphic
encryption. Therefore, in this section we only address papers that are related to
polynomial interpolation and knapsack resolution algorithms.

Multivariate polynomial interpolation is a fundamental technique in many ar-

eas of applied mathematics, including cryptography. In the literature, there are
several methods for interpolating multivariate polynomials, each with their ad-

vantages and disadvantages. A review of these techniques can be found in [32].
One of the most important methods is the generalization of Newton’s tech-

nique [42], which allows for the automatic adjustment of the degree of a poly-

nomial when new points are added or removed. This is accomplished by adding
or removing terms that correspond to new points, without having to discard al-
ready existing terms. This is a significant advantage over Lagrange’s technique,
which is easier to implement but requires recomputing the entire polynomial
each time new points are added [51]. Overall, choosing which method to use de-

pends on the specific application and the trade-offs between efficiency and ease
of implementation.

The subset sum problem [17, 25, 36] and the knapsack problem [7, 30, 40, 46]
were studied in the past and continue to be interesting topics for applied mathe-

matics. The modular knapsack problem is a mathematical optimization problem
that has been extensively studied in cryptography due to its potential appli-
cations in creating secure cryptosystems. The hardness of this problem makes
it a good candidate for use in creating encryption schemes that rely on the
computational difficulty of solving the problem. Some well-known examples of
cryptosystems based on the modular knapsack problem include one of the ear-
liest public key encryption algorithm, published in [41]. Several methods have
been proposed for solving the (modular) knapsack problem, including lattice re-
duction techniques and the meet-in-the-middle attack. Cryptographic systems
based on the modular multiplicative knapsack problem were also proposed [44].
We provide the reader with more insight on the previously mentioned related
problems in Section 2.

Moreover, the modular knapsack problem has particularly caught the atten-
tion of various researchers since more than three decades ago [14, 50] and it is
of particular interest for the current work as we propose an algorithm based on
modular knapsack resolution algorithm.

Structure of the Paper. Section 2 recalls technical details regarding the modular
knapsack problem and methods of solving it, especially lattice reduction-based
resolution algorithms. In Section 3 we provide the reader with the mathematical
background necessary to better understand the problem that we aim to solve.
We give a first type of solution for polynomial evaluation in Section 4. Moreover, we propose a second kind of method for the discussed matter in Section 5. We present the results of our implementations in Section 6. We conclude and tackle future research directions in Section 7.

2 Preliminaries

Notations. Throughout the paper, the notation \( \#S \) denotes the cardinality of a set \( S \). The assignment of value \( y \) to variable \( x \) is denoted by \( x \leftarrow y \). The subset \( \{0, \ldots, s\} \in \mathbb{N} \) is denoted by \([0, s]\). A vector \( v \) of length \( n \) is denoted either \( v = (v_0, \ldots, v_{n-1}) \) or \( v = \{v_i\}_{i \in [0, n-1]} \).

2.1 Modular Knapsack Problems

The subset sum problem [25] is a well-known NP-complete computational problem in computer science that seeks to find a subset of a given set of integers whose sum equals a given target value. The subset sum problem is considered to be very important in computational complexity theory and has various applications in cryptography.

The knapsack problem [40] is another widely-known computational problem in computer science that involves selecting a subset of items with maximum value while adhering to a weight constraint. The problem has various real-world applications including cryptography (as already stated in Section 1). The knapsack problem is also NP-complete.

There are some key differences between the subset sum problem and the knapsack problem. The first one focuses on finding a subset that adds up to a specific value, while the second focuses on maximizing the value of a subset subject to a weight constraint.

Within the current paper we are particularly interested in the modular knapsack problem. The modular knapsack problem is an important variation of the knapsack problem where items have a value, a weight, and a modular coefficient. The goal is to select a subset of items that maximizes the total value while respecting a weight constraint and a modular constraint. The problem has applications in cryptography, as already stated in Section 1.

Definition 1 (The 0–1 modular knapsack problem). Let \( a_1, \ldots, a_n \) be positive integers and \( M, S \in \mathbb{Z} \). The modular knapsack problem consists of finding \( e_1, \ldots, e_n \in \{0, 1\} \) such that

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i e_i \equiv S \pmod{M}.
\]

Remark 1. The generic modular knapsack problem is mainly the same as the problem in Definition 1, except that \( e_1, \ldots, e_n \) are not necessarily 0 or 1.
Under some assumptions we have an equivalence between solving the classical subset sum problem and the modular subset sum problem. When we are not dealing with polynomial factors, basically, any algorithm that solves one of the problems can be used to find solutions for the other. More precisely, given an algorithm that solves a knapsack problem over the integers we have the following:

– Consider Equation (1) with $a_i \in [0, M - 1]$;
– It follows immediately that any sum of at most $n$ numbers is in $[0, nM - 1]$ (e.g. $a_i$);
– If $S \in [0, M - 1]$, then solving $n$ knapsacks over the integers with target sums $S, S + M, \ldots, S + (n - 1)M$ means solving the modular knapsack given by Equation (1).

**Definition 2 (The Density of Subset Sum Algorithms.).** The density of a set $\{a_1, \ldots, a_n\}$ of weights is defined as

$$d = \frac{n}{\log_2 \max(a_i)}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

In order to solve low-density knapsacks, lattice reduction is a very useful tool. According to e.g. [7], lattice reduction-based solutions are not an option when the density of the knapsack is close to one.

### 2.2 Lattice Reduction: a Tool for Solving Modular Knapsacks

We refer the reader to [29] for basic definitions and properties of lattices as these concepts exceed the scope of our paper.

Two of the fundamental computational problems associated with a lattice are the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) and the Closest Vector Problem (CVP).

**Definition 3 (SVP).** Find a shortest nonzero vector in a lattice $L$, i.e. find a nonzero vector $v \in L$ that minimizes the Euclidean norm $\|v\|$.

**Definition 4 (CVP).** Given a vector $w \in \mathbb{R}^n$ that is not in $L$, find a vector $v \in L$ that is closest to $w$, i.e. find a vector $v \in L$ that minimizes the Euclidean norm $\|w - v\|$.

**Remark 2.** If a lattice $L$ has a basis consisting of vectors that are pairwise orthogonal it’s easy to solve both SVP and CVP.

As this is not the usual case, in order to solve SVP and CVP for $L$ we must find a basis in which the vectors are sufficiently orthogonal to one another. This leads to lattice basis reduction (finding a basis with short, nearly orthogonal vectors). Gauss’s lattice reduction [5] is efficient when dealing with a lattice of dimension 2, but as the dimension increases, CVP and SVP become computationally difficult. When the dimension grows we can’t have a unique definition of a reduced lattice. A widely known example of a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a good basis in the high dimension case is LLL [37].

The first lattice algorithms developed for solving knapsacks considered reductions of the given problem to the SVP [17]. In [46] it was shown that a knapsack problem can be reduced to the CVP. However, it was stated that in the case of low-weight knapsacks CVP and SVP are not notably different.
2.2.1 Lattice Reduction-Based Algorithms for Solving Modular Knapsacks

In the case of random knapsack problems the attack in [36] can solve knapsacks with density \( d < 0.64 \), given an oracle solving the SVP in lattices. For legacy purposes, we recall the Lagarias-Odlyzko algorithm for solving modular knapsack problems as presented in [36]. We further refer to Algorithm 1 as SV.

Algorithm 1: Algorithm SV.

Input: A vector \( a = (a_1, \ldots, a_n) \) of positive integers and an integer \( S \).

Output: A feasible solution \( e = (e_1, \ldots, e_n, 0) \) to a knapsack in accordance with Definition 1.

1. Take the following vectors as a basis \([b_1, \ldots, b_{n+2}]\) for an \( n + 2 \)-dimensional integer lattice \( L \):

   \[
   b_1 = (1, 0, \ldots, 0, -a_1) \\
   b_2 = (0, 1, \ldots, 0, -a_2) \\
   \vdots \\
   b_n = (0, \ldots, 1, 0, -a_n) \\
   b_{n+1} = (0, \ldots, 0, 1, S)
   \]

   Find a reduced basis \([b_1^*, \ldots, b_{n+2}^*] \) of \( L \) using the LLL algorithm.

2. Check if any \( b_i^* = (b_{i,1}^*, \ldots, b_{i,n+2}^*) \) has all \( b_{i,j}^* = 0 \) or \( \lambda \) for some fixed \( \lambda \) for \( 1 \leq j \leq n \). For any such \( b_i^* \) check whether \( e_j = \lambda^{-1}b_{i,j}^* \) for \( 1 \leq j \leq n \) gives a solution to the knapsack, and if so, stop. Otherwise, continue.

3. Repeat steps 1-3 with \( S \) replaced by \( S' = \sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i - S \), then stop.

The previously mentioned attack was improved in [17] for densities up to \( d < 0.94 \). This can be achieved by a simple modification on SV. The main difference between the algorithm in [36] and the method in [17] consists of the lattice \( L \) for which a reduced basis must be found: the vector \( b_{n+1} = (0, \ldots, 0, S) \) is replaced by \( b_{n+1}^* = (\frac{1}{2}, \ldots, \frac{1}{2}, S) \). In SV, the solution vector of the knapsack problem was in \( L \) but in this case it is not. Instead of the solution vector \( \vec{e} = (e_1, \ldots, e_n, 0) \) we have the vector \( \vec{e}' = (e_1 - \frac{1}{2}, \ldots, e_n - \frac{1}{2}, 0) \).

In order to modify the SV algorithm and its version presented in [17] to solve modular knapsack problems, only a straightforward modification is required: having the modulus \( M \) as an input and adding a vector \( b_{n+2} = (0, \ldots, M) \) in the lattice basis.

Another type of algorithm for solving knapsacks with density almost 1 was presented in [54]. Given that this algorithm is less practical and does not meet the needs of our proposed ideas, we do not recall it. A more practical version of the previously mentioned algorithm was given in [30]. Its structure is particularly simple and clear (see Algorithm 2). The techniques developed before were extended in [7].

**Input:** The knapsack elements $a_1, \ldots, a_n$, the knapsack sum $S$ and the parameter $\beta$.

**Output:** A feasible solution $e = (e_1, \ldots, e_n)$ to a knapsack in accordance with Definition 1.

1. Let $M$ be a random prime close to $2^{\beta n}$.
2. Let $R_1, R_2$ and $R_3$ be random values modulo $M$.
3. Solve the $1/8$-unbalanced knapsack modulo $M$ with elements $a$ and target $R_1$.
4. Solve the $1/8$-unbalanced modular knapsack with target $R_2$.
5. Solve the $1/8$-unbalanced modular knapsack with target $R_3$.
6. Solve the $1/8$-unbalanced modular knapsack with target $S - R_1 - R_2 - R_3 \mod M$. Create the 4 sets of non-modular sums corresponding to the above solutions.
7. Do a 4-way merge (with early abort and consistency checks) on these 4 sets.
8. Rewrite the obtained solution as a knapsack solution.

As stated in [7], in practice, the shortest vector oracle is replaced by a lattice reduction algorithm, e.g. LLL or BKZ [53]. We turn our attention to LLL-based algorithms especially for implementing our proposed algorithm. Hence, we further mention the latest developments regarding LLL variations whose purpose is mainly speeding up the previous versions.

Further developments were made and, until recently, the state-of-the-art lattice reduction algorithm used in practice was the $L^2$ algorithm [45] implemented in fpLLL [2]. Other approaches have been presented in [33–35, 52]. The newest breakthrough in terms of lattice reduction is presented in [49]. However, note that the main concern of the researchers was to create faster algorithms rather than improving their precision (which is our main interest in the current paper).

3 A New Look at Homomorphic Encryption

3.1 Constructing Polynomials based on Homomorphic Operations

Let $a$ and $b$ be two symbolic variables. We define the sets of arithmetic expressions $G_k$ obtained by combining $a$ and $b$ as follows

$$G_0 = \{a, b\}$$

$$G_k = \{a + b, a, b \in G_{k-1}\} \cup \{a \cdot b, a, b \in G_{k-1}\}$$

(3)
An automated construction of such sets yields

\[ G_1 = \{2a, a^2, 2b, ab, b^2, a + b\} \]

\[ G_2 = \{4a, 4a^2, 2a + a^2, 2a^3, b + 3a, 2ab + 2a^2, 2a + ab, 2a^2b, 2a + 2b, 4ab, 2a + b^2, 2ab^2, 2a^2, a^4, a + a^2 + b, a^2b + a^3, ab + a^2, a^3b, 2b + a^2, a^2 + b^2, a^2b^2, a^2 + b^2 + 2ab, a + b + ab, ab^2 + a^2b, 3b + a, 2b^2 + 2ab, a + a^2 + b, b^3 + ab, 2ab, 2b + ab, b^2 + ab, ab^3, 4b, 4b^2, 2b + b^2, 2b^3, 2b^2, b^4\} \]

\[ \#G_3 = 1124 \]

\[ \ldots \]

Ignoring collisions we can derive an upper bound for \( \#G_k \). More precisely, starting from \( G_{k-1} \) and using additions we can construct \( \#G_{k-1}(\#G_{k-1} + 1)/2 \) new elements. The same number of elements are obtained using multiplication. Therefore, we have

\[ \#G_k \leq \#G_{k-1}(\#G_{k-1} + 1). \]

We define the following recurrence

\[ V_0 = \#G_0 = 2, \]

\[ V_k = V_{k-1}(V_{k-1} + 1). \]  \hspace{1cm} (4)

Using the methods developed in [4], Knuth computed [1] that \( V_k \leq \theta^{2^k+1} - 1/2 \), where \( \theta \approx 1.597910218 \). Thus, we obtain

\[ \#G_k \leq \theta^{2^k}. \]  \hspace{1cm} (5)

**Lemma 1.** Let \( k \geq 1 \). If

\[ P(a, b) = \sum_{i,j} c_{i,j} a^{u_{i,j}} b^{v_{i,j}} \in G_k, \]

then

\[ u_{i,j} + v_{i,j} \leq 2^k \quad \text{and} \quad c_{i,j} \leq 2^{2^k-1}. \]

**Proof.** We will prove this lemma using induction. Let \( \max_k(u_{i,j} + v_{i,j}) \) be the maximum degree of monomials in \( a \) and \( b \) for any \( P(a, b) \in G_k \). Also, let \( \max_k(c_{i,j}) \) be the largest coefficient of any \( P(a, b) \). When \( k = 1 \) we have that \( \max_1(u_{i,j} + v_{i,j}) = 2^1 \) and \( \max_1(c_{i,j}) = 2^2 \). When \( k = 2 \) we obtain that \( \max_2(u_{i,j} + v_{i,j}) = 2^2 \) and \( \max_2(c_{i,j}) = 2^3 \). We assume that the lemma is true for \( k \) and we prove it for \( k + 1 \). The only strategy that maximizes the degree of a monomial from \( G_{k+1} \) is to choose a maximal monomial from \( G_k \) and multiply it by itself. For example, we can choose \( 2^{2^{k-1}} a^x b^y \in G_k \). Therefore, we have \( \max_{k+1}(u_{i,j} + v_{i,j}) = 2^k + 2^k = 2^{k+1} \). We can also see that multiplying \( 2^{2^{k-1}} a^x b^y \) to itself leads to \( \max_{k+1}(c_{i,j}) = 2^{2^{k-1}} \cdot 2^{2^{k-1}} = 2^{2^{k}} \). \( \square \)
3.2 Defining the Problem

In this subsection we describe a high level description of the protocol used to infer the polynomial $P(x, y)$. More precisely, for a given $k \in \mathbb{N}$, Alice (the malicious user) and Bob (the victim) exchange information that can be used by Alice (without Bob’s consent) to compute the polynomial $P$:

1. Bob chooses a polynomial $P \in G_k$.
2. Alice chooses two numbers $a, b \in \mathbb{N}^*$ and sends them to Bob.
3. Bob computes $r = P(a, b)$ using the values received from Alice and then sends the result to Alice.
4. Given $r$ Alice tries to infer $P$ from $r$.
5. If Alice is not successful, then she repeats steps 2 and 3, until she accumulates enough data to guess $P$.

We provide the reader with a graphical representation of the overall process in Figure 1. The objective of our paper is to propose a series of algorithms that solve the problem of inferring $P$ in the aforementioned scenario.

![Fig. 1. The overall process.](image-url)
4 Interpolating Bivariate Polynomials

The intuition behind our proposed algorithm (see Algorithm 3) is the following: Alice starts by considering $r$ modulo $a$. This makes all the $P(a, b)$ terms $c_{i,j}a^ib^j$ for which $i > 0$ vanish. Hence, the positive integer $r$ can be regarded as the evaluation modulo $a$ of a univariate polynomial:

$$\sum c_{0,j}b^j \mod a.$$ 

Remark 3 (Parameter selection). Note that in the first iteration of the while loop of Algorithm 3, after computing $L_0$, we have that

$$R_t = \sum_{i,j} c_{i,j}a^ib^j = \sum_j c_{0,j}b^j + \sum_{i\neq 0,j} c_{i,j}a^ib^j = L_0(b_t) + a^d \cdot P'(a, b_t).$$

When we extract the largest power of $a$ (denoted by $d_s$), there is a case when $d_s$ is larger than the correct exponent $d$. That happens when $a\mid P'(a, b_t)$ for all $t$. This automatically implies that we must have $a \leq P'(a, b_t)$ for all $t$ due to the construction of $G_k$. Hence, the probability of $a$ not to divide $P'(a, b_t)$ for a given $t$ is

$$1 - \frac{P'(a, b_t)}{aP'(a, b_t)} \geq 1 - \frac{P'(a, b_t)}{aP'(a, b_t)} = 1 - \frac{1}{a},$$

and is non-negligible if $a$ is large enough.

Let $\deg_b(P)$ represent the degree of $P(x)$ with respect to the variable $b$. When running Algorithm 3 we encounter the following possible cases

Case 1: When $a$ is larger than all of $P$’s coefficients and the number of pairs $n$ is equal to $\deg_b(P) + 1$, then the algorithm will always output the correct polynomial.

Case 2: When $a$ is less than all of $P$’s coefficients and the number of pairs $n$ is equal to $\deg_b(P) + 1$, then the algorithm will output a polynomial $P$, but it will not be the correct one.

Case 3: When $n$ is less than $\deg_b(P) + 1$ it is possible that some of the $R_i$ values (see Algorithm 3) become negative, and thus the algorithm will return ⊥ since it is clear that the computed polynomial is not the right one.

Since Alice does not know the exact degree$^4$ of $P$, she uses Algorithm 4 to compute the exact $P$. Therefore, she avoids Case 3. More precisely, Alice queries Bob until Algorithm 3 returns a polynomial that maps $j$ points into $r_j$ and also satisfies the supplementary condition $P(a, j + 1) = r_j$. This condition is used to avoid the case in which $n \leq \deg_b(P)$ and all the $R_i$ values become 0. Note that on line 7 we have an additional check in order to avoid the case when $a$ divides any of $P$’s coefficients. More precisely, if $j = a + k$ then $j - k$ will not be invertible when computing the $\ell_j(y)$ polynomial.

$^4$ We do not consider the case $\deg_b(P) = 1$ as it is trivial.
Algorithm 3: Tries to compute a polynomial \( P \) such that \( r = P(a, b) \).

**Input:** A prime \( a \) and \( n \) positive integer pairs \( \{b_i, r_i\}_{i \in [0,n]} \).

**Output:** A bivariate polynomial \( P(x, y) \) such that \( r_i = P(a, b_i) \).

\[
\begin{align*}
1 & \quad j \leftarrow 0 \\
2 & \quad \{R_i\}_{i \in [0,n]} \leftarrow \{r_i\}_{i \in [0,n]} \\
3 & \quad \textbf{while} 1 \quad \textbf{do} \\
4 & \quad \quad \text{Compute using Lagrange interpolation} \\
5 & \quad \quad \quad L_j(y) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} R_i \cdot \ell_i(y) \mod a, \\
6 & \quad \quad \quad \text{where} \\
7 & \quad \quad \quad \quad \ell_i(y) = \prod_{t=0 \atop t \neq i}^{n} \frac{y - b_t}{b_i - b_t} \mod a. \\
8 & \quad \quad \text{Compute} \quad \{R_i\}_{i \in [0,n]} \leftarrow \{R_i - L_j(R_i)\}_{i \in [0,n]}.
9 & \quad \quad \textbf{if} \quad \text{all} \quad R_i = 0 \quad \textbf{then} \\
10 & \quad \quad \quad \textbf{break} \\
11 & \quad \quad \textbf{if} \quad \text{any} \quad R_i < 0 \quad \textbf{then} \\
12 & \quad \quad \quad \textbf{return} \quad \bot \\
13 & \quad \quad \text{Compute the largest} \quad d_j \quad \text{such that} \quad a^{d_j} \quad \text{divides all} \quad R_i \\
14 & \quad \quad \text{Compute} \quad \{R_i\}_{i \in [0,n]} \leftarrow \{R_i/a^{d_j}\}_{i \in [0,n]} \\
15 & \quad \quad j \leftarrow j + 1 \\
16 & \quad \textbf{return} \quad P(x, y)
\end{align*}
\]

Example 1. Let \( a = 17 \) and
\[
P(x, y) = x^5 y + 3x^3 y + x^2 y^3 + 17xy^5 + 15x + y^2 + 58.
\]
Note that we are in Case 2. Then, Algorithm 4 will return the following polynomial
\[
P'(x, y) = x^5 y + 3x^3 y + x^2 y^5 + x^2 y^3 + x^2 + x + y^2 + 7.
\]

To avoid Case 2, we must query Bob on a point \((a', 1)\), where \(a' \neq a\), and check if Bob’s answer coincides with the evaluation of the computed polynomial. If the two values do not coincide, then we must run Algorithm 4 with a larger \(a\).

Remark 4. When working with polynomials from a set \(G_k\), if Alice knows the value of \(k \geq 1\), then she can choose \(a > 2^{2^{k-1}}\) such that is a prime number. Otherwise, she chooses a large enough \(k\), and if Algorithm 4 fails, she increases \(k\) and tries again until finding the correct \(P\).
Algorithm 4: Probes Bob until it finds the correct $P$.

**Input:** A prime $a$.

**Output:** A bivariate polynomial $P(x,y)$.

1. $L \leftarrow \emptyset$, $j \leftarrow 3$
2. Interrogate Bob on points $\{(a, i + 1)\}_{i \in \left[0, j\right]}$ and receive $\{r_i\}_{i \in \left[0, j\right]}$
3. Use Algorithm 3 with input $(a, \{i+1, r_i\}_{i \in \left[0, j-1\right]})$ and receive an answer $P$
4. if $P \neq \bot$ and $P(a, j+1) = r_j$ then
   5. return $P$
6. while $1$ do
   7. if $j > a$ then
      8. return $\bot$
   9. $j \leftarrow j + 1$
10. Interrogate Bob on points $(a, j+1)$ and receive $r_j$
11. Use Algorithm 3 with input $(a, \{i+1, r_i\}_{i \in \left[0, j-1\right]})$ and receive an answer $P$
12. if $P \neq \bot$ and $P(a, j+1) = r_j$ then
   13. return $P$

5 Other Approaches for Reconstructing Bivariate Polynomials

We consider again $P \mod a$, and thus the positive integer $r$ can be regarded as the evaluation modulo $a$ of a univariate polynomial:

$$\sum c_{i,j} b^{u_{i,j}}. \quad (6)$$

It can easily be observed that we are tackling a modular knapsack problem that can be solved provided that specific conditions are met (see Section 2). Hence, Alice can use Algorithm 5 to infer $P$.

If, in addition, we restrict $k$ to a value such that $a > 2^{2^{k-1}}$ then we are assured that the $c_{i,j}$ values found by solving the modular knapsack are also valid in $\mathbb{Z}$. Hence, the integer value from Equation (6) can be subtracted from $r$ to reveal a polynomial that can be divided by a proper power of $a$ before applying the above process iteratively. When the value zero is reached the algorithm is run backwards to reconstruct the polynomial $P$.

Note that we use the first if of Algorithm 5 for efficiency purposes given that the modular knapsack resolution algorithm is not needed when the polynomial $P(x,y)$ does not have monomials only in $y$.

**Remark 5 (Parameter selection).** Let us further assume that we are using a lattice reduction-based algorithm for solving the modular knapsack problem. As already discussed in Section 2, lattice reduction-based algorithms applied for such purposes are suitable in the low-density case (smaller than 1). It is easy to observe that in some particular cases our Algorithm 5 does not fulfill this requirement. To be more specific, we consider the case in which $d \geq 1$. Thus, we
Algorithm 5: Tries to compute a polynomial $P$ such that $r = P(a, b)$.

**Input**: A prime $a$ and a positive integer pair $\{b, r\}$.

**Output**: A bivariate polynomial $P(x, y)$ such that $r = P(a, b)$.

1. if $r \mod a = 0$ then
2.  Compute the largest $d_k \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $a^{d_k}$ divides $r$
3.  Compute $r' \leftarrow r/a^{d_k}$
4.  $j \leftarrow 0$
5.  $r_0 \leftarrow r'$
6. while $r_j \neq 0$ do
7.     Solve
8.         

\[
    r_j = \sum_{i=1}^{n} t_{j,i} \cdot b^i \mod a \text{ for } \{t_{j,i}\}
\]

using a modular knapsack resolution algorithm
9.  Compute $r_{j+1} \leftarrow r_j - \sum_{i=1}^{n} t_{j,i} \cdot b^i$
10. Compute the largest $d_j \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $a^{d_j}$ divides $r_{j+1}$
11. Compute $r_{j+1} \leftarrow r_{j+1}/a^{d_j}$
12. $j \leftarrow j + 1$
13. $P(x, y) \leftarrow 1$
14. for $\ell \leftarrow j - 1$ downto 0 do
15.     Compute the polynomial
16.     

\[
    P(x, y) \leftarrow P(x, y) \cdot x^{d_\ell} + \sum_{i=1}^{n} t_{\ell,i} y^i
\]
17. $P(x, y) \leftarrow x^{d_k} \cdot P(x, y)$
18. return $P(x, y)$

have that $\frac{2^k}{\log_2 \max(b_i)} \geq 1$. Using Lemma 1 we obtain

\[
    2^k \geq \log_2 \max(b_i) \iff 2^k \geq \log_2 2^{2^{k-1} \deg_b(P)} \iff \\
    2^k \geq \log_2 2^{2^{k-1} + \deg_b(P)} \iff 2 \geq \log_2 2 + \frac{\log_2 \deg_b(P)}{2^{k-1}} \iff \\
    1 \geq \frac{\log_2 \deg_b(P)}{2^{k-1}} \iff 2^{k-1} \geq \log_2 \deg_b(P)
\]

It follows from Equation (7) that $d \geq 1$ when the number of bits in $b$ is smaller than $\frac{2^{k-1}}{\deg_b(P)}$.  

Note that in the case of Algorithm 5, the probabilistic argument presented in Remark 3 still holds if $a$ is large enough such that $1/a$ is negligible.
Example 2. Let $a = 913$ and $b = 2$

$$P(x, y) = 2xy + y^2.$$ 

Note that we are in Case 2. Then, Algorithm 5 will return the following polynomial

$$P'(x, y) = y^2 + xy^2$$

6 Implementation

In order to validate our hypotheses and algorithms we developed a set of reference implementations (unoptimized versions). We ran the code for Algorithm 4 on a standard Desktop using Ubuntu 20.04.5 LTS OS, with the following specifications: CPU Intel i7-4790 4.00 GHz and 16 Gigabytes of RAM. The programming language we used for implementing our Lagrange interpolation-based algorithms was Python. We used Mathematica 13.2 online for implementing our lattice reduction-based Algorithm 5. Given that our scope was to provide the reader proof of concept algorithms for inferring bivariate polynomials of certain form, we implemented the attack in [7]. Again, we stress that we wish to use modular knapsack resolution algorithms with density as close to 1 as possible. The newest developments in the field of lattice reduction [49] are less important for our current work than this aspect given that researchers’ main struggle is to make algorithms more efficient in terms of complexity.

6.1 Performance Analysis

In Table 1 we present the number of queries needed to recover the polynomial $P$ and the corresponding computational complexity. Note that $\deg(P)$ represents the highest degree of the polynomial $P(x)$, while $\deg_a(P)$ and $\deg_b(P)$ represent the degree of $P(x)$ with respect to the variables $a$ and $b$, respectively.

In the case of classical bivariate interpolation, the number of queries differs from the one given in [32, 51] since we need an extra point to verify that we deduced the correct $P$. Note that the extra query is performed to check if the degree of $P$ is bigger than anticipated. Regarding Algorithm 4, if $a$ is larger than the biggest coefficient of $P$, then we need $\deg_b(P) + 1$ points to recover $P$ and an

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algorithm</th>
<th>Number of Queries</th>
<th>Complexity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Classical bivariate interpolation [32, 51]</td>
<td>$\frac{(\deg(P)+1)(\deg(P)+2)}{2}$ + 1</td>
<td>$\bigO(\deg(P)^4)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algorithm 4</td>
<td>$\deg_b(P) + 2$</td>
<td>$\bigO\left(\deg_a(P)\deg_b(P)\left(\frac{\deg_a(P)}{2} + \deg_b(P)\right)\right)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algorithm 5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$\bigO\left(\deg_a(P)\left(\frac{\deg_a(P)}{2} + O\right)\right)$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
extra verification point. Lastly, Algorithm 5 only needs a point to infer \( P \) and an extra verification point.

To compute the complexity of Algorithm 3, we used the fact that the complexity of the Lagrange interpolation is \( O(\text{deg}_b(P)^2) \) (according to [47]). For our knapsack based solution Algorithm 5, we denoted by \( O = O(A) \), where \( A \) is a modular knapsack resolution algorithm.

### 6.2 Recommendations

For reducing the number of queries to Bob, we recommend first running Algorithm 5 and, if it fails, Algorithm 4. In the improbable case of obtaining the wrong polynomial, there are two strategies to be used by Alice: either change \( a \) and try again or use a classical bivariate interpolation algorithm (e.g. [51]). A graphical representation of the recommended process is given in Figure 2, where CBI denotes a classical bivariate interpolation algorithm.

![Fig. 2. The recommended process.](image)

### 7 Conclusions

The main focus of this paper is to address the problem of inferring bivariate polynomials with a specific form required for homomorphic encryption. To solve this problem, the paper proposes two methods. The first method is based on Lagrange interpolation, which is a well-known technique for polynomial evaluation. The second method is based on modular knapsack resolution algorithms, which are commonly used in cryptography to solve similar problems. Additionally, the paper offers guidance on how to use these algorithms to obtain better accuracy. This guidance may be useful for practitioners who wish to apply these algorithms in real-world scenarios.
Future Work. An interesting research direction would be to extend our proposed methods to multivariate polynomials and to look into other ways of solving the problem of inferring polynomials. For example, the PSLQ algorithm introduced in [24] is a method for finding integer relations. In certain cases, PSLQ might be significantly better than some of the algorithms based on lattice reduction in terms of implementation performance and precision.

Using artificial intelligence techniques for obtaining better solutions is a general direction nowadays. However, such ideas are beyond the scope of our paper and we leave them as future work.

Acknowledgement. The authors would like to thank David Naccache for the very useful comments on their paper.

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