Tagged Chameleon Hash from Lattice
and Application to Redactable Blockchain

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Abstract. Chameleon hash (CH) is a trapdoor hash function. Generally it is hard to find collisions, but with the help of trapdoor, finding collisions becomes easy. CH plays an important role in converting a conventional blockchain to a redactable one. However, most of the existing CH schemes are too weak to support redactable blockchain. The currently known CH schemes serving for redactable blockchain have the best security of so-called "full collision resistance (f-CR)", but they are built either on random oracle model or rely on heavy tools like the simulation-sound extractable non-interactive zero-knowledge (SSE-NIZK) proof system. Moreover, up to now there is no CH scheme with post-quantum f-CR security in the standard model. Therefore, no CH can support redactable blockchain in a post-quantum way without relying on random oracles.

In this paper, we introduce a variant of CH, namely tagged chameleon hash (tCH). Tagged chameleon hash takes a tag into hash evaluations and collision finding algorithms. We define two security notions for tCH, collision resistance (CR) and full collision resistance (f-CR), and prove the equivalence between CR and f-CR when tCH works in the one-time tag mode. We propose a tCH scheme from lattice without using any NIZK proof, and prove that its collision resistance is (almost) tightly reduced to the Short Integer Solution (SIS) assumption in the standard model. We also show how to apply tCH to a blockchain in one-time tag mode so that the blockchain can be compiled to a redactable one. Our tCH scheme provides the first post-quantum solution for redactable blockchains, without resorting to random oracles or NIZK proofs. Besides, we also construct a more efficient tCH scheme with CR tightly reduced to SIS in the random oracle model, which may be of independent interest.

Keywords: Tagged Chameleon Hash · Lattice · Redactable blockchain.

1 Introduction

The chameleon hash (CH) was first introduced by Krawczyk and Rabin [21] and it can be seen as a trapdoor collision resistant hash function. Informally, a CH is associated with a public parameter pp and a trapdoor td. With pp, one can efficiently evaluate the hash value for any given message, and with td, one can efficiently find collisions for any target hash value. The fundamental
security requirement of a chameleon hash, namely the collision resistance, assures that any adversary without the knowledge of \( td \) cannot find collisions. Since its introduction, chameleon hash has developed different security notions, serving for a wide range of applications. There are mainly four kinds of security notions for CH, as we summarized below.

**Weak collision resistance.** The weak collision resistance (w-CR) for CH is the basic security requirement formalized in [21] and it assures the infeasibility of finding a collision \((h^*, m^*, r^*, m'^*, r'^*)\) s.t., \( m^* \neq m'^* \) but \( h^* = \text{Hash}(m^*; r^*) = \text{Hash}(m'^*; r'^*) \) without the trapdoor. The w-CR CH is often used to construct chameleon signatures [21] and lift non-adaptively secure signatures to adaptively secure ones [19,23,26]. However, most of CH schemes with w-CR suffer from a so-called key-exposure problem, that is, anyone can recover the trapdoor after seeing only one collision with two different messages. A sequence of works [10,4,9] have identified this problem and proposed different CHs with key-exposure freeness. However, such CHs are still not sufficient for the security requirements asked from more complicated applications.

**Enhanced collision resistance.** The enhanced collision resistance (e-CR) was first proposed by Ateniese et al. [3] as a strengthening of the weak collision resistance. It assures the infeasibility of finding a collision \((h^*, m^*, r^*, m'^*, r'^*)\) if no collision for this specific \( h^* \) has ever been revealed to the adversary before. A chameleon hash with e-CR was suggested to construct a redactable blockchain [3,20,29], but in fact, e-CR is still not strong enough to deal with attacks on a redactable blockchain system as we will discuss later.

**Standard collision resistance.** The standard collision resistance (s-CR) was introduced by Camenisch et al. [8] and it assures the infeasibility of finding a collision \((h^*, m^*, r^*, m'^*, r'^*)\) if no collision involving the target message \( m^* \) has ever been revealed to the adversary before. A CH with s-CR can be used to construct sanitizable signatures [8] and redactable blockchains. However, s-CR is still insufficient for the security requirements asked by a redactable blockchain.

**Full collision resistance.** The full collision resistance (f-CR) was introduced by Derler, Samelin and Slamanig [12] as a combination of e-CR and s-CR. It assures the infeasibility of finding a collision \((h^*, m^*, r^*, m'^*, r'^*)\) if no collision for the target hash-message pair \((h^*, m^*)\) has ever been revealed to the adversary before. To the best of our knowledge, f-CR is the strongest one among all security notions of a chameleon hash, and it is adequate for most of the applications of chameleon hash, especially for redactable blockchain.

Redactable blockchain is an important application of a chameleon hash and it has high requirements for CH. Recall that blockchain was originally designed to satisfy immutability, i.e., the infeasibility of tampering the messages stored in the blocks. However, rigid immutability might not be friendly for healthy developments of blockchain. For example, once some illegal or malicious information is stored in blocks, it is hardly to be erased any more. In fact, the European

\(^1\) According to [12], e-CR and s-CR are incomparable, which means that neither e-CR implies s-CR nor s-CR implies e-CR.
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has suggested the “right to be forgotten”. Therefore, researches on technical tools for changing or deleting sensitive information stored in blocks draw more attentions in the academic society. This yields the so-called redactable blockchain. In a redactable blockchain, immutability becomes flexible in the sense that a trusted regulation party (or multi-parties) can use a trapdoor to redact the chain by rewriting blocks in the chain according to the well-accepted regulation rules. We refer readers to [3] for more discussions about the necessity of a redactable blockchain.

Given the concept of redactable blockchain, how to do the redactions in a secure and controlled way has become a critical problem to be solved. Atieniese et al. [3] first suggested to construct redactable blockchains with the help of CH. Below we briefly describe the suggestion of constructing a redactable blockchain from a chameleon hash in [3] and show the security requirements of CH.

**Redactable blockchain from CH.** A conventional blockchain can be converted to a redactable one by replacing one of the hash functions used to construct blocks with a chameleon one [3]. Let \( \mathcal{H} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Hash}, \text{Adapt}) \) be a chameleon hash, where the setup algorithm is used to generate the public parameter and trapdoor, i.e., \( (pp, td) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^n) \), the hash algorithm is used to evaluate the hash value for a given message with some randomness, i.e., \( h \leftarrow \text{Hash}(m; r) \), and the adaptation algorithm is used to find a collision with \( td \), i.e., \( r' \leftarrow \text{Adapt}(td, h, m, r, m') \) s.t., \( h = \text{Hash}(m; r) = \text{Hash}(m'; r') \).

For a CH-based redactable blockchain, a trusted regulation party is granted to generate \( (pp, td) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^n) \) and then publish \( pp \). A miner collects the message \( m \), evaluates \( h \leftarrow \text{Hash}(m; r) \), constructs a valid block \( B \) containing the triple \( (h, m, r) \) as well as other information required, and finally appends it to the blockchain. When an adaptation is required from \( m \) to \( m' \) in some block \( B^2 \), the trusted authority computes \( r' \leftarrow \text{Adapt}(td, h, m, r, m') \), replaces \( (m, r) \) stored in \( B \) with \( (m', r') \) while keeping other information unchanged, and finally publishes the redacted block. In this way, we obtain a redactable blockchain.

**Security requirements of CH in redactable blockchain.** In a redactable blockchain, each block \( B_j \) records information of \( (h_j, m_j, r_j) \) and we denote it by \( B_j = (h_j, m_j, r_j) \). Adaptations for block \( B_j \) result in multiple new adapted blocks \( \{B'_j^i\}_{i \in [n_j]} \) s.t., \( h_j = \text{Hash}(m_j; r_j) = \text{Hash}(m'_j; r'_j) \) for \( i \in [n_j] \). Now we consider the adversary’s attack on redactions in a redactable blockchain. The adversary sees all original blocks \( B_1, B_2, B_3, \ldots \) and all corresponding adapted blocks \( \{B'_1^i\}_{i \in [n_1]}, \{B'_2^i\}_{i \in [n_2]}, \{B'_3^i\}_{i \in [n_3]}, \ldots \), where each \( n_j = \text{poly}(n) \) denotes the number of adaptations for block \( B_j \). The aim of an adversary is to redact the chain by adapting some block \( B_j = (h_j, m_j, r_j) \) to a new one \( B^* = (h^*, m^*, r^*) \) s.t., \( h^* = h_j = \text{Hash}(m_j; r_j) = \text{Hash}(m^*; r^*) \), where \( m^* \) is a new message satisfying \( m^* \notin \{m_j\}_{i \in [n_j]} \cup \{m'_j\}_{i \in [n_j]} \), in other words, \( (h^*, m^*) \) is fresh w.r.t. \( B_j \) and \( \{B'_j^i\}_{i \in [n_j]} \). Note that we do not exclude the possibility that \( m^* \) belongs to \( \{m_j\}_{i \in [n_j]} \cup \{m'_j\}_{i \in [n_j]} \) with \( j \neq j' \). See Fig. 1.

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[2] Here, adaptations are only allowed for blocks considered to be settled in the redactable blockchain system.
Fig. 1. Possible attack on redactions in a redactable blockchain. The adversary sees all gray blocks and tries to create the red one. The blocks link to a chain in the way that previous hash value $h_i$ constitutes a part of message $m_{i+1}$ in the next block. The down-arrows in dark-blue denote authorized adaptations done by the trusted regulation party and the arrow in red denotes an attack.

Obviously, to make sure that the adversary succeeds in redacting blocks with negligible probability, it suffices for a chameleon hash to be full collision resistant. In contrast, e-CR and s-CR are not sufficient. Firstly, the adversary can obtain multiple adapted blocks \( \{ B_i = \langle h_j, m_{ij}, r_{ij} \rangle \} \) for the target hash value $h_j = h^\ast$, so, e-CR is not enough for CH. Secondly, the adversary may obtain some adapted block $B_i' = \langle h_j', m'^{}, r_{ij}' \rangle$ with $j \neq j'$, and hence s-CR is not enough either.

To the best of our knowledge, only a CH with f-CR security is sufficient to the security requirements of a redactable blockchain. However, existing CH schemes with f-CR \([11,12]\) are all generic constructions relying on some heavy building blocks like the simulation-sound extractable non-interactive zero knowledge (SSE-NIZK) proof system \([12]\). Besides, almost all instantiations of CH with f-CR security are based on pairings or the discrete logarithm (DL) assumption, and hence are not secure against quantum adversaries. The only known post-quantum instantiation is based on the learning parity with noise (LPN) assumption in the random oracle (RO) model \([11]\). Then a natural question arises:

"Can we construct a post-quantum chameleon hash function serving for a redactable blockchain in the standard model (especially without relying on a NIZK proof system)?"

In this paper, we provide a new approach to this problem. We take into considerations some nice properties of a redactable blockchain so that the security requirements for CH can be weakened. That makes possible simpler constructions of CH serving for a secure redactable blockchain. In more details, we have the following three observations for a CH-based redactable blockchain.

- **Observation 1.** Each settled block can be uniquely indexed by a unique identifier $\tau$ (like the timestamp, the hash value of its previous block or its
position in the chain). Taking $\tau$ into account results in blocks of the form $B = (\tau, h, m, r)$.

- **Observation 2.** Each block has a chameleon hash value $h$ and identifier $\tau$, and adaptations towards that block keep $h$ and $\tau$ unchanged. Together with observation 1, we know that each tag $\tau$ is uniquely bound with one block (and hence the chameleon hash value $h$).

- **Observation 3.** All adaptations towards a specific block are made with fresh messages. In a redactable blockchain, this can be easily accomplished by appending a unique (e.g. increasing) counter value to the adapted message.

Now we additionally take $\tau$ as input for chameleon hash evaluations and adaptations, and this results in a new variant of CH, namely the tagged CH (tCH). Next we consider the full collision resistance for a tagged CH. The adversary can see many tuples $(\tau, h, m, r)$ as well as their adaptations $(\tau, h, m', r')$. Let $Q$ record tuples $(\tau, h, m)$ and the adapted tuples $(\tau, h, m')$. The adversary wins if it comes up with $(\tau^*, h^*, m^*, r^*)$ such that

$$h^* = \text{Hash}(\tau^*, m^*; r^*) = \text{Hash}(\tau^*, m'^*; r'^*), \ m^* \neq m'^*, \ (\tau^*, h^*, m^*) \notin Q. \quad (1.1)$$

Obviously, the full collision resistance of tCH is sufficient for a redactable blockchain. But actually, the three observations can help to change the security requirements of tCH to a weaker variant. Note that in (1.1), we have

$$(\tau^*, h^*, m^*) \notin Q$$

$$\iff ((\tau^*, h^*, m^*) \notin Q \land (\tau^*, m^*) \notin Q) \lor ((\tau^*, h^*, m^*) \notin Q \land (\tau^*, m^*) \in Q)$$

$$\iff ((\tau^*, m^*) \notin Q \land (\tau^*, m^*) \notin Q) \lor ((\tau^*, m^*) \notin Q \land (\tau^*, h^*, m^*) \in Q),$$

where “$\iff$” holds obviously, and “$\Rightarrow$” holds due to the observation 2. By observation 2, for any adapted blocks with $(\tau^*, h^*, m^*)$ we know that $\tau^*$ is uniquely bound with $h^*$, so $(\tau^*, h^*, m^*) \notin Q \Rightarrow (\tau^*, m^*) \notin Q$ and $(\tau^*, m^*) \in Q \Rightarrow (\tau^*, h^*, m^*) \in Q$ (otherwise, $\tau^*$ corresponds to both $h^*$ and some $h \neq h^*$ in the blockchain system, which is impossible).

Define a predicate $\text{Valid}$ as $\text{Valid}(\tau^*, h^*, m^*, m'^*) = 1$ if $((\tau^*, m^*) \notin Q \land (\tau^*, m'^*) \notin Q) \lor ((\tau^*, m^*) \notin Q \land (\tau^*, h^*, m'^*) \in Q)$. Now (1.1) becomes:

$$h^* = \text{Hash}(\tau^*, m^*; r^*) = \text{Hash}(\tau^*, m'^*; r'^*), \ m^* \neq m'^*, \ \text{Valid}(\tau^*, h^*, m^*, m'^*) = 1.$$

According to observation 2 again, it is reasonable to assume that there do not exist $(\tau, h, \cdot)$ and $(\tau, h'', \cdot)$ with $h \neq h''$ among those tuples and adapted tuples contained in $Q$. Furthermore, according to observation 3, we can require that all adapted messages w.r.t. a block (and hence a unique $\tau$) are distinct.

Hence for redactable blockchain, we arrive at a security requirement for tCH which is weaker than the full collision resistance. We call such a security requirement collision resistance (see Fig. 2 for its formal definition). Now the problem can be simplified as follows.

"Can we construct a post-quantum tagged chameleon hash function with collision resistance in the standard model (especially without relying on a NIZK proof system)?"
1.1 Our Contributions

In this paper, we answer the above question in the affirmative and have made the following three contributions.

**New concept of tagged chameleon hash (tCH).** We introduce a new primitive, named tagged chameleon hash (tCH), which additionally takes as input a tag \( \tau \) for hash evaluations and adaptations. We provide two CR security notions for our tCH. One is the full collision resistance (f-CR) and the other is the collision resistance (CR). The full collision resistance is defined similar to that of a tag-free CH \cite{12}. That is, it is infeasible to find \((\tau^*, h^*, m^*, r^*, m'^*, r'^*)\) s.t., \(m^* \neq m'^*\) and \(h^* = \text{Hash}(\tau^*, m^*; r^*) = \text{Hash}(\tau^*, m'^*; r'^*)\) even if the adversary sees many adaptation outputs \(r'\) by issuing queries \((\tau, h, m, r, m')\) of its choice. The only limitation is that \((\tau^*, h^*, m^*)\) does not appear in its queries. Collision resistance is weaker than the full one in the sense that the adversary’s winning condition is further restricted. Meanwhile, we also require statistical indistinguishability from tCH which asks that the hash value and randomness are statistically close to the adapted ones.

We show that if tCH works in the one-time tag mode, the two CR security notions are equivalent to each other. Here the one-time tag mode requires that each invocation of hash evaluation takes a fresh tag as input.

**Constructions of tCH from lattice.** We provide two constructions of tCH from lattice and prove their CR security.

- Our first tCH construction achieves the collision resistance in the standard model. The collision resistance of our tCH is tightly reduced to the SIS assumption and the pseudorandomness of a pseudorandom function (PRF). Given the LWE-based PRFs with almost tightness like \cite{5,22}, our construction yields the first collision resistant tCH scheme from LWE and SIS in the standard model. Moreover, it enjoys almost tightness.
- Our second tCH construction achieves the collision resistance in the random oracle model. It is more efficient than the first one and is tightly reduced to the SIS assumption.

According to the relation between f-CR and CR, both of our two tCH schemes can provide security guarantee as good as f-CR when working in the one-time tag mode. We stress that our tCH schemes are free of NIZK proof systems.

**Application of tCH in redactable blockchain.** Each settled block can be uniquely indexed by a unique identifier \( \tau \) in the redactable blockchain. When a tCH is applied to the blockchain, we can take \( \tau \) as the tag of tCH to compute hash values for messages stored in blocks, and hence each hash value (for a settled block) is computed from a distinct tag. Note that, adaptations are made only for those settled blocks. In this way, the tCH already works in the one-time tag mode for the redactable blockchain. Therefore, our tCH schemes with collision resistance serve for redactable blockchains perfectly.
1.2 Related Works

Chameleon hash. Krawczyk and Rabin [21] proposed two CH constructions with w-CR based on the claw-free trapdoor permutations [18] and the Pedersen’s commitment scheme [27] respectively. Chen, Zhang and Kim [10] proposed the first key-exposure free CH from the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption based on the gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) group. Ateniese and de Medeiros [4] also proposed several key-exposure free CHs from various assumptions like the RSA and the discrete logarithm (DL) assumptions. Later in 2017, Ateniese et al. [3] proposed a generic way to lift a CH from w-CR to e-CR with helps of a CPA secure public key encryption (PKE) and a true-simulation extractable non-interactive zero knowledge (tSE-NIZK) proof system. Ateniese et al. [3] instantiated the generic construction from the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model, and from k-linear assumption in the standard model, respectively. Since then, several efficient CH schemes with e-CR have been proposed from various assumptions. Khalili, Dakhilalian and Susilo [20] proposed two CHs with e-CR: one is constructed by combining a weak CH with Groth-Sahai NIZK proof and Cramer-Shoup PKE, and the other is constructed with the ZK-SNARKs. Wu, Ke and Du [29] gave two CH schemes from the lattice-based assumptions in the generic group model (GGM) and in the random oracle model (ROM), respectively. As for s-CR, Camenisch et al. [8] proposed an s-CR secure CH based on the one-more RSA assumption in the random oracle model. Recently, Derler, Samelin and Slamanig [12] suggested f-CR as a more desirable security notion for a CH, and proposed a generic construction of a f-CR secure CH with building blocks a CPA secure PKE and a simulation-sound extractable non-interactive zero knowledge (SSE-NIZK) proof. Derler, Samelin and Slamanig [12] provided instantiations of the generic construction based on the DDH assumption in ROM, and based on the symmetric external Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) assumption in the standard model, respectively. Later, Derler et al. [11] proposed a relatively simpler generic f-CR secure CH construction with building blocks a non-interactive commitment scheme and also an SSE-NIZK. Derler et al. [11] instantiated the generic construction from the DL assumption in ROM, and from the LPN assumption in ROM, respectively.

2 Preliminaries

Notations. In this paper, column vectors are denoted by bold lower-case letters like $\mathbf{x}$ and the $i$-th component of $\mathbf{x}$ is denoted by $x_i$. Specifically, let $0^k$ denote the $k$-dimensional zero vector $(0, 0, \ldots, 0)^T \in \mathbb{Z}_q^k$. For two bit strings $\mathbf{x}_1 \in \{0,1\}^n$ and $\mathbf{x}_2 \in \{0,1\}^m$, let $\mathbf{x}_1 || \mathbf{x}_2 \in \{0,1\}^{n+m}$ denote the concatenation of $\mathbf{x}_1$ and $\mathbf{x}_2$. Matrices are denoted by bold upper-case letters like $\mathbf{A}$ and the $i$-th column of $\mathbf{A}$ is denoted by $\mathbf{a}_i$. The transpose of $\mathbf{A}$ is denoted by $\mathbf{A}^T$. Let $\mathbf{I}_k \in \{0,1\}^{k \times k}$ denote the $k$-dimensional identity matrix. For matrices $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ and $\mathbf{B} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{k \times s}$, denote by $\mathbf{A} \otimes \mathbf{B}$ the Kronecker product of $\mathbf{A}$ and $\mathbf{B}$. For a vector $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n)^T \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, let $\| \mathbf{x} \| := (\sum_{i \in [n]} x_i^2)^{1/2}$ denote the $\ell_2$ norm of $\mathbf{x}$. For a
matrix $A = (a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_m) \in \mathbb{Z}^{n \times m}$ with $a_i \in \mathbb{Z}^n$, let $\|A\| := \max_{i \leq m} \|a_i\|$ denote the $\ell_2$ norm of $A$, $\hat{A}$ denote the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of $A$, and $s_1(A) := \max_{\|x\|=1} \|Ax\|$ the singular value of $A$.

For an integer $n \in \mathbb{N}$, let $[n]$ denote the finite set $\{1, 2, \ldots, n\}$. For a distribution (or a random variable) $X$, let $x \leftarrow X$ denote the process of sampling $x$ according to $X$. For a finite set $X$, let $x \xleftarrow{\dagger} X$ denote the process of sampling $x$ from $X$ uniformly at random.

Let $\kappa$ denote the security parameter and $\text{poly}(\kappa)$ denote the polynomial function. An algorithm is efficient if it runs in $\text{poly}(\kappa)$-time. Let $\text{negl} : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{R}$ denote the negligible function, i.e., for any polynomial $\text{poly}(n)$, there exists an $n' \in \mathbb{N}$ s.t., for all $n > n'$, $\text{negl}(n) < 1/\text{poly}(n)$. For a primitive $XX$ and a security notion $YY$, we denote by $\text{Exp}_{XX,A}(\kappa) \Rightarrow b$ a security experiment interacting with adversary $A$ and returning a bit $b$. Furthermore, we denote by $\text{Adv}_{XX,A}(\kappa)$ the advantage of $A$ in $\text{Exp}_{XX,A}(\kappa)$, and define $\text{Adv}_{XX}(\kappa) := \max_{A} \text{Adv}_{XX,A}(\kappa)$.

Let $X$ and $Y$ be two random variables over support $S$, then the statistical distance between $X$ and $Y$ is defined by $\text{SD}(X, Y) = 1/2 \cdot \sum_{x \in S} |\Pr[X = x] - \Pr[Y = x]|$. We say that $X$ and $Y$ are statistically indistinguishable and denote it by $X \approx_s Y$ if $\text{SD}(X, Y) \leq \text{negl}(\kappa)$.

**Definition 1 (Average min-entropy[13]).** Let $X$ and $Y$ be two random variables. The min-entropy of $X$ is defined as $H_\infty(X) := -\log (\max_x \Pr[X = x])$. The average min-entropy of $X$ given $Y$ is defined as $H_\infty(X | Y) := -\log (\mathbb{E}_{y \leftarrow Y} (\max_x \Pr[X = x | Y = y]))$.

**Lemma 1 ([13]).** Let $X, Y$ be two random variables and $Y$ has at most $2^\ell$ possible values, then $H_\infty(X | Y) \geq H_\infty(X) - \ell$.

### 2.1 Lattice Background

Let $k, n, m, q$ be positive integers. Given $k$ linearly independent basis vectors $a_1, \ldots, a_k \in \mathbb{R}^n$, let $A := (a_1, \ldots, a_k)$, then the $n$-dimensional lattice $\Lambda(A)$ generated by $A$ is $\Lambda(A) = \{ y \in \mathbb{R}^n \mid y = Ax, x \in \mathbb{Z}^k \}$. For an integer $q$, matrix $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ and $u \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ define “orthogonal” lattice $\Lambda_q(A) := \{ x \in \mathbb{Z}^m \mid Ax = 0 \mod q \}$ and “shifted” lattice $\Lambda_q^u(A) := \{ x \in \mathbb{Z}^m \mid Ax = u \mod q \}$.

**Definition 2 (Discrete Gaussian distribution).** The Gaussian function with parameter $s$ and center $c \in \mathbb{R}^n$ is defined as $\rho_{s,c} : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}$, $\rho_{s,c}(x) := \exp(-\pi \|x-c\|^2/s^2)$. For a countable set $S \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$, the discrete Gaussian distribution $D_{S,s,c}$ parameterized with $s$ and $c$ is defined as $D_{S,s,c}(x) := \rho_{s,c}(x)/\sum_{x \in S} \rho_{s,c}(x)$ for $x \in S$ and $D_{S,s,c}(x) := 0$ for $x \notin S$. Usually, $s$ is omitted when $s = 1$ and $c$ is omitted if $c = 0$.

**Lemma 2 (Trapdoor generation [2]).** Let $q, n, m$ be positive parameters s.t., $q$ is odd, $q \geq 3$ and $m = O(n \log q)$. There exists a PPT algorithm $\text{TrapGen}(1^n, 1^m, q)$ that outputs matrices $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ and $T_A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times m}$ s.t., the distribution of $A$ is statistically close to a uniform rank $n$ matrix in $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ and matrix $T_A$ is a
trapdoor for $A$ (i.e., a basis for $A^\perp_q(A)$) satisfying $\|\tilde{T}_A\| \leq O(\sqrt{n \log q})$ and $\|T_A\| \leq O(n \log q)$ with all but $2^{-n}$ probability.

Lemma 3 (Preimage sampling [15]). Let $q, n, m, \gamma$ be positive parameters s.t., $q \geq 2$. Let $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ be a matrix with a trapdoor $T_A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times m}$. Let $\gamma \geq \|T_A\| \omega(\sqrt{\log m})$. For any $u \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, there exists a PPT algorithm $\text{SamplePre}(A, T_A, u, \gamma)$ that outputs $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ with distribution statistically close to $D_{A^\perp_q(A)}\gamma$.

Lemma 4 (Randomness extraction [15,1]). Let $q, u, m$ be positive integers s.t., $q$ is a prime and $m \geq 3n \log q$. Then:

- If $A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n \times m$, $s \leftarrow \{1, -1\}^m$ and $u \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, then $\text{SD}((A, As), (A, u)) \leq 2^{-n}$.
- If $A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n \times m$, $s \leftarrow D_{Z_m \gamma}$ and $u \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, then $\text{SD}((A, As), (A, u)) \leq 2^{-n}$.

Lemma 5 ([15]). Let $n, m, q$ be integers and $\gamma > 2\sqrt{n \log q}$, then for all but negligible probability over $(A, T_A) \leftarrow \text{TrapGen}(1^n, 1^m, q)$, it holds that

$$\{(A, h, e) \mid h \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n, e \leftarrow \text{SamplePre}(A, T_A, h, \gamma)\} \approx_s \{(A, h, e) \mid e \leftarrow D_{Z_m \gamma}, h := A e\}.$$

In this paper, we use the G-trapdoor defined by Micciancio and Peikert in [23]. Let $q, m, n$ be integers and define $w := n \lfloor \log q \rfloor$. A G-trapdoor for a matrix $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ is a matrix $R \in \mathbb{Z}^{(m-w) \times w}$ s.t., $A \cdot [-R^\top I_w^\top] = G$, where $G$ is the gadget matrix defined below. Given matrices $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ and $R \in \mathbb{Z}^{m \times w}$, it is easy to see that $R$ is a G-trapdoor for matrix $[A | AR + G]$. We recall the definition of gadget matrix and the G-to-Basis Lemma which were first introduced in [23].

Definition 3 (Gadget matrix [23]). For any integer modulus $q$, the gadget vector over $\mathbb{Z}_q$ is defined as $g^\top := (1, 2, 4, \ldots, 2^{\lfloor \log q \rfloor - 1}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{1 \times \lfloor \log q \rfloor}$. Let $w := n \lfloor \log q \rfloor$, the gadget matrix $G$ with full row rank is defined as:

$$G = I_n \otimes g^\top = \begin{pmatrix}
g^\top & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & g^\top & 0 & 0 \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
0 & 0 & 0 & g^\top
\end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times w}.$$

Lemma 6 (G-to-Basis [23]). Let $n, m, q$ be positive integers and define $w := n \lfloor \log q \rfloor$. Let $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ be a matrix with a G-trapdoor $R \in \mathbb{Z}^{(m-w) \times w}$. There exists a PPT algorithm $G_{\text{toBasis}}(R)$ that returns a trapdoor $T_A$ of $A$ (i.e., a basis for $A^\perp_q(A)$). Moreover, the trapdoor $T_A$ satisfies $\|T_A\| \leq \sqrt{5}(s_1(R) + 1)$.

Lemma 7 (Homomorphic evaluation [16,6,7]). Let $q, n, m, \ell$ and $k$ be positive integers and define $w := n \lfloor \log q \rfloor$. Let $G \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times w}$ be the gadget matrix. Given a NAND boolean circuit $C : \{0, 1\}^\ell \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k$ with circuit depth $d$, vector $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_\ell)^\top \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$, and matrices $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}, \{A_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times w}\}_{i \in [\ell]}$ and $\{R_i \in \{\pm 1\}^{m \times w}\}_{i \in [\ell]}$, there exist two efficient deterministic algorithms.
• Algorithm $\text{Eval}_{\text{pub}}(C, A, (A_i)_{i \in [t]})$ that takes as input the circuit $C$ and matrices $A$, $(A_i)_{i \in [t]}$, and outputs a matrix $A_C \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times k w}$.
• Algorithm $\text{Eval}_{\text{prf}}(C, A, x, (R_i)_{i \in [t]})$ that takes as input the circuit $C$, matrix $A$, vector $x$ and matrices $(R_i)_{i \in [t]}$, and outputs a matrix $R_C \in \mathbb{Z}^{m \times k w}$.

**Homomorphism.** If $A_i = A \cdot R_i + x_i \cdot G \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times w}$ for all $i \in [t]$, $A_C \leftarrow \text{Eval}_{\text{pub}}(C, A, (A_i)_{i \in [t]})$ and $R_C \leftarrow \text{Eval}_{\text{prf}}(C, A, x, (R_i)_{i \in [t]})$, then we have $A_C = A \cdot R_C + C(x) \otimes G$, where $s_1(R_C) \leq O(4^d \cdot m^2)$. Particularly, when $C$ is in the circuit class $\text{NC}^1$, i.e., $C$ is of depth $d = c \log t$ for some constant $c$, we have $s_1(R_C) \leq O((2^c \cdot m^2)$.

**Lemma 8 (Trapdoor delegation [28]).** Let $q, n, m, m'$ be positive parameters and $\bar{m} = m + m'$. Let $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ and $A' \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m'}$ be matrices and $T_A \in \mathbb{Z}^{m \times m}$ be a trapdoor for $A$. There exists a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm $\text{TrapDel}([A|A'], T_A)$ that outputs a trapdoor $T_{[A|A']} \in \mathbb{Z}^{m \times \bar{m}}$ for the matrix $[A|A']$. Besides, it holds that $\|T_{[A|A']}\| = \|T_A\|$.  

**2.2 Computational Assumption**

**Definition 4 (The SIS assumption).** Let $q, n, m$ be positive integers and $\beta$ be a positive real. The (homogeneous) short integer solution (SIS) assumption $\text{SIS}_{n, q, \beta, m}$ states that for any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$, its advantage satisfies:

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{SIS}_{n, q, \beta, m}}(\mathcal{A}, \kappa) := \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\kappa) \rightarrow \mathbf{e} : \mathbf{e} = 0^n \wedge \mathbf{e} \neq 0^m \wedge \|\mathbf{e}\| \leq \beta] \leq \text{negl}(\kappa),$$

where $\mathbf{A} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ and $0^n = (0, \ldots, 0) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$.

**Lemma 9 (The hardness of SIS [25,15,24]).** For any $m = \text{poly}(n)$ and any sufficiently large $q \geq \beta \cdot \text{poly}(n)$, solving $\text{SIS}_{n, q, \beta, m}$ with non-negligible probability is at least as hard as solving the decisional approximate shortest vector problem GapSVP, and the approximate shortest independent vector problem SIVP, in the worst case with overwhelming probability, for some $\gamma = \beta \cdot \text{poly}(n)$.

Since GapSVP and SIVP are well-studied worst-case hard problems on lattice, the reduction from GapSVP and SIVP to SIS in Lemma 9 makes the SIS assumption a widely-accepted post-quantum assumption.

**2.3 Pseudorandom Function**

**Definition 5 (Pseudorandom function family [17]).** A pseudorandom function family $\text{PRF} := \{F : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}\}$ is equipped with two polynomial time algorithms $(\text{Setup}, \text{PRF})$ defined below.

• $\text{Setup}(1^\kappa)$ takes as input the security parameter $\kappa \in \mathbb{N}$ and outputs a public parameter $pp$.
• $\text{PRF}(pp, k, x)$ takes as input the public parameter $pp$, key $k \in \mathcal{K}$ and message $x \in \mathcal{X}$, and outputs $y \in \mathcal{Y}$. For simplicity, we will omit $pp$ and just write it as $\text{PRF}(k, x)$ when the context is clear.
Pseudorandomness. Let $RF : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ be a truly random function. For any PPT adversary $A$, its advantage satisfies $\text{Adv}^{\text{prf}}_{\text{PRF}, A} (\kappa) := | \Pr[\text{PRF}(pp, k, x) \Rightarrow x] - \Pr[\text{PRF}(pp, k, x) \Rightarrow x'] | \leq \text{negl}(\kappa)$, where $pp \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\kappa), k \leftarrow \mathcal{K}$, oracle $O_{\text{PRF}}(x)$ returns $\text{PRF}(pp, k, x)$ and oracle $O_{\text{RF}}(x)$ returns $RF(x)$.

3 Tagged Chameleon Hash

In this section, we propose a new primitive named tagged chameleon hash (tCH), which is characterized by four algorithms, the setup algorithm, hash algorithm, adapt algorithm and check algorithm. The setup algorithm generates public parameters $pp$ along with a trapdoor $td$. The hash algorithm is a randomized one used for evaluating the hash value of a message $m$ w.r.t. a tag $\tau$ and it also outputs a randomness $r$ serving as the witness of hashing relation among $h, m$ and $\tau$. For simplicity, we just call $h$ the hash value of $(\tau, m, r)$. Given $(\tau, h, m, r, m')$, where $h$ is a hash value of $(\tau, m, r)$ and $m'$ is a new message, the adapt algorithm uses the trapdoor $td$ to find randomness $r'$ so that $(\tau, m, r)$ and $(\tau, m', r')$ collide at the same hash value $h$. The check algorithm is used to decide whether $h$ is the hash value of a tag-message-randomness triple $(\tau, m, r)$. For a tCH, we define the statistical indistinguishability, and provide two security notions: one is the full collision resistance (f-CR) defined following [12], and the other is a weaker one named collision resistance (CR). We show that when tCH works in the one-time tag mode, f-CR and CR are equivalent.

Definition 6 (Tagged chameleon hash). Let $\mathcal{M}$ be the message space and $\mathcal{T}$ be the tag space. A tagged chameleon hash (tCH) $tCH$ consists of four polynomial time algorithms $tCH = (\text{Setup}, \text{Hash}, \text{Adapt}, \text{Check})$ defined as follows.

- Setup$(1^\kappa)$ takes as input the security parameter $\kappa \in \mathbb{N}$ and returns a public parameter $pp$ and a trapdoor $td$.
- Hash$(pp, \tau, m)$ takes as input the public parameter $pp$, a tag $\tau \in \mathcal{T}$ and a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$, and returns a hash value $h$ and a randomness $r$.
- Adapt$(td, \tau, h, m, r, m')$ takes as input the trapdoor $td$, a tag $\tau \in \mathcal{T}$, a hash value $h$, a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$, a randomness $r$ and a fresh target message $m' \in \mathcal{M}$, and returns a new randomness $r'$.
- Check$(pp, \tau, h, m, r)$ takes as input the public parameter $pp$, a tag $\tau \in \mathcal{T}$, a hash value $h$, a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ and a randomness $r$, and returns a decision bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$.

For expression simplicity, we will sometimes omit the “$pp$” part in the inputs of Hash and Check, and just write them as $\text{Hash}(\tau, m)$ and $\text{Check}(\tau, h, m, r)$ respectively when the context is clear.

Correctness. For all tag $\tau \in \mathcal{T}$ and messages $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}$, for all $(pp, td) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\kappa), (h, r) \leftarrow \text{Hash}(pp, \tau, m)$ and $r' \leftarrow \text{Adapt}(td, \tau, h, m, r, m')$, we have

$$\Pr[\text{Check}(pp, \tau, h, m, r) = \text{Check}(pp, \tau, h, m', r') = 1] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\kappa).$$
2

Statistical Indistinguishability. For all tag $\tau \in \mathcal{T}$ and messages $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}$, and for $(pp, td) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\kappa)$, it holds that

$$\{ (h, r) \mid (h, r) \leftarrow \text{Hash}(pp, \tau, m) \} \approx_s \{ (h, r) \mid (h, r') \leftarrow \text{Hash}(pp, \tau, m'), r \leftarrow \text{Adapt}(td, \tau, h, m', r'), m' \}. $$

- **Full collision resistance (f-CR).** For any PPT adversary $A$, its advantage satisfies $\text{Adv}^{\text{f-CR}}_{tCH, A}(\kappa) := \text{Pr}[\text{Exp}^{\text{f-CR}}_{tCH, A}(\kappa) \Rightarrow 1] \leq \text{negl}(\kappa)$, where the experiment $\text{Exp}^{\text{f-CR}}_{tCH, A}$ is described in Fig. 2 (left).

- **Collision resistance (CR).** For any PPT adversary $A$, its advantage satisfies $\text{Adv}^{\text{CR}}_{tCH, A}(\kappa) := \text{Pr}[\text{Exp}^{\text{CR}}_{tCH, A}(\kappa) \Rightarrow 1] \leq \text{negl}(\kappa)$, where the experiment $\text{Exp}^{\text{CR}}_{tCH, A}$ is described in Fig. 2 (right).

**One-time tag mode for tCH.** In this paper, we consider a special working mode for tagged chameleon hash, where every invocation of hash evaluation takes as input a distinct tag. The special working mode is named one-time tag mode. Note that in a tCH-based redactable blockchain, tCH just works in this mode when setting the unique identifier of the block (like the timestamp, hash value of its previous block, or its position in the chain) as its tag.

Next we show that f-CR is equivalent to CR in the one-time tag mode. It is easy to see that f-CR implies CR. As for the other direction, we show in Theorem 1 that CR implies f-CR when a tCH works in the one-time tag mode.

**Theorem 1.** If a tagged chameleon hash tCH satisfies collision resistance, then it also satisfies full collision resistance when it is used in the one-time tag mode. More precisely, for any PPT adversary $A$, it holds that

$$\text{Adv}^{\text{f-CR}}_{tCH, A}(\kappa) \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{CR}}_{tCH}(\kappa).$$
A high-level idea of proof for Theorem 1 has already been described in the introduction, so the detailed proof is postponed to Section A in Appendix.

Remark. Ateniese and de Medeiros considered a chameleon hash with labels (abbrv., labeled CH) in [4]. Our tCH and labeled CH both take an extra tag/label as input, but they have different syntax, security notions and applications.

- **Syntax difference.** Labeled CH involves an additional algorithm IForge, which generates \((m'', r'')\) given a collision pair \((\tau, h, m, r, m', r')\) s.t., \(h = \text{Hash}(\tau, m''); r'' = \text{Hash}(\tau, m'; r') = \text{Hash}(\tau, m; r).\) In other words, anyone who obtains a collision for \((\tau, h)\) can freely generate a new collision for the same \((\tau, h)\). In contrast, our tCH can find a collision only with a secret trapdoor.

- **Security difference.** Labeled CH requires a weaker security named the key-exposure freeness, which assures the infeasibility of finding a collision \((\tau^*, h^*, m^*, r^*, m'^*, r'^*)\) when no collision for the specific \(\tau^*\) has been revealed. In contrast, our CR/fCR allows the adversary to see polynomial collisions for the same target tag.

- **Application difference.** Labeled CH is usually used to construct chameleon signature and it is not secure enough to be used in a redactable blockchain. Note that adversaries in a redactable blockchain may obtain multiple collisions towards one \((\tau, h)\). With labeled CH, any one is able to create collisions for \((\tau, h)\) using algorithm IForge, and then redactable blockchain becomes insecure. In contrast, our tCH with f-CR security (or CR security in one-time tag mode) serves for the security requirement from a redactable blockchain.

4 (Almost) Tight Lattice-Based Tagged Chameleon Hash

In this section, we propose two tagged chameleon hash constructions satisfying collision resistance based on the SIS assumption. In Subsect. 4.1, we give the first tCH construction with almost tight security in the standard model. In Subsect. 4.2, we give the second one with tight security in the random oracle model.

4.1 tCH with Almost Tight Security in the Standard Model

In this subsection, we propose a tCH construction from lattice, namely tCH, in the standard model.

First we introduce the building blocks and some notations used in our tCH construction. Let \(n, q, m\) be positive integers, and define \(w := n[\log q]\).

- A pseudorandom function \(\text{PRF} = (\text{PRF}\text{-Setup}, \text{PRF})\) with key space \(\{0, 1\}^k\), input space \(\{0, 1\}^x\) and output space \(\{0, 1\}^y\).

- Define a circuit \(C[x, y]: \{0, 1\}^k \to \{0, 1\}\) w.r.t. PRF as below, where \(x \in \{0, 1\}^x\) and \(y \in \{0, 1\}^y\) are hard-weired to the circuit.

\[
C[x, y](k) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } \text{PRF}(k, x) = y, \\
0 & \text{otherwise.} 
\end{cases} \quad (4.1)
\]
Our tCH construction tCH is given in Fig. 3.

**Parameter setting.** Parameters of our tCH construction include the security parameter $\kappa$, the dimension parameters $k, x, y, t, h$, the SIS parameters $n, m, q, \beta$ and the Gaussian parameter $\gamma$. Define $w := n \log q$. The afore-mentioned parameters are required to satisfy the following conditions simultaneously.

- Let $k, x, y, t, h = \text{poly}(\kappa)$ be positive integers and $x = t + h + k$.
- Let $n, q, m, \beta$ be positive parameters, $n, m, \beta, q = \text{poly}(\kappa)$ and $\beta \cdot \text{poly}(n) \leq q$ so that the SIS problem is hard according to Lemma 9.
- Let $\gamma \geq O(\kappa^c) \cdot \omega(\sqrt{m + w})$ with some constant $c$ and $\gamma \geq O(n \log q) \cdot \omega(\sqrt{m + w})$ so that Lemma 3 can be applied.
- Let $m = O(n \log q)$ and $\gamma \cdot O(\kappa^c) \cdot \sqrt{m + w} \leq \beta$ with some constant $c$ to serve for our security proof.
Theorem 2. Let PRF be a pseudorandom function. Given parameters described above, construction tCH in Fig. 3 is a tagged chameleon hash if the SIS_{q,m} assumption holds. Furthermore, collision resistance of tCH enjoys almost tight security if PRF has almost tight security.

Correctness of tCH. It follows directly from Lemma 8 (trapdoor delegation), Lemma 3 (preimage sampling) and Lemma 7 (homomorphic evaluation), and we omit the proof of it here.

Proof of statistical indistinguishability for tCH. We prove that, given tag τ and messages m, m', the distribution of (h, r) generated by Hash is statistically close to that generated by Hash-then-Adapt.

First consider the distribution of (h, r) generated by Hash, i.e., (h, r) \leftarrow Hash(τ, m). It follows the distribution $D_H$ defined below:

$$D_H := \{(h, r) = (z, y, e) | \begin{aligned} z &\sim (0,1)^n, y \sim \{0,1\}^y, e \leftarrow D_{Z^{m+w+\gamma}}, h = [A|A_{\text{prf}}] \cdot e \end{aligned}\},$$

where $A_{\text{prf}}$ is deterministically computed from τ, m, the public parameters ($A$, $\{A_i\}_{i \in [k]}$, $\{\hat{A}_i\}_{i \in [b]}$) and uniformly chosen $z, y$ (see algorithm Hash in Fig. 3).

Next consider the distribution of (h, r) generated by Hash-then-Adapt, i.e., first $(h, r' = (z', y', e')) \leftarrow Hash(τ, m')$ and then $r \leftarrow \text{Adapt}(td, τ, h, m', r', m)$. It follows the distribution $D_{H'\&A}$ defined below:

$$D_{H'\&A} := \{(h, r = (z, y, e)) | \begin{aligned} z, z' &\sim (0,1)^n, y, y' \sim \{0,1\}^y, e' \leftarrow D_{Z^{m+w+\gamma}}, h := [A|A'_{\text{prf}}] \cdot e', e \leftarrow \text{SamplePre}([A|A_{\text{prf}}], T_{A|A_{\text{prf}}, h, \gamma}) \end{aligned}\}$$

where $A_{\text{prf}}$ is computed in the same way as above, and $A'_{\text{prf}}$ is generated similar to $A_{\text{prf}}$ but with $m'$, $z'$ and $y'$.

First we show that $h := [A|A'_{\text{prf}}] \cdot e'$ in $D_{H'\&A}$ is statistically close to the uniform distribution over $Z_q^n$. Note that

$$h := [A|A'_{\text{prf}}] \cdot e' = A e_1' + A'_{\text{prf}} e_2' \approx_s u' + A'_{\text{prf}} e_2' \equiv u,$$

where $u', u \sim Z_q^n, e' = (e_1'|e_2') \leftarrow D_{Z^{m+w+\gamma}}, e_1' \in Z_q^m$ and $e_2' \in Z_w^q$. The "\approx_s" follows from Lemma 4 and "\equiv_s" follows from the uniformity of $u'$. Therefore, it holds that $D_{H'\&A} \approx_s D'_{H'\&A}$, where

$$D'_{H'\&A} := \{(h, r = (z, y, e)) | \begin{aligned} z &\sim (0,1)^n, y \sim \{0,1\}^y, h \sim Z_q^n, e \leftarrow \text{SamplePre}([A|A_{\text{prf}}], T_{A|A_{\text{prf}}, h, \gamma}) \end{aligned}\}$$

Then according to Lemma 5, $D_H \approx_s D'_{H'\&A}$. Therefore, $D_H \approx_s D_{H'\&A}$ by triangle inequality and this proves the statistical indistinguishability of tCH.

Proof of collision resistance for tCH. We define a sequence of hybrid games $G_0 \sim G_4$, where $G_0$ is identical to $\text{Exp}_{\text{CH}, A}(κ)$ defined in Fig. 2. We show that games $G_i$ and $G_{i-1}$ are indistinguishable for all $i \in [4]$, and in $G_4$, the adversary wins with negligible probability. The differences between adjacent games are highlighted in blue. Assume that $A$ makes at most $Q$ adaptation queries.

Game $G_0$. Game $G_0$ is identical to $\text{Exp}_{\text{CH}, A}(κ)$ defined by Fig. 2.
0. The challenger $\mathcal{C}$ initializes set $Q_{\text{Adapt}} := \emptyset$.

1. During the setup phase, the challenger $\mathcal{C}$ proceeds as follows.
   - Generate $pp_{\text{prf}} \leftarrow \text{PRF.Setup}(1^k)$.
   - Generate $(A, T_A) \leftarrow \text{TrapGen}(1^n, 1^m, q)$.
   - Sample $A_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times w}$ for $i \in [k]$. Sample $\hat{A}_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times w}$ for $i \in [h]$.
   - $pp := (pp_{\text{prf}}, A, \{A_i\}_{i \in [k]}, \{\hat{A}_i\}_{i \in [h]}), \; td := (pp, T_A)$ and send $pp$ to $\mathcal{A}$.

2. Upon an adaptation query $(\tau, h, m, r, m')$ from $\mathcal{A}$, $\mathcal{C}$ proceeds as follows.
   - If $(\tau, h', m) \in Q_{\text{Adapt}} \land h' \neq h$, or $(\tau, \cdot, m') \in Q_{\text{Adapt}}$, or $\text{Check}(\tau, h, m, r) = 0$ holds, return $\bot$; otherwise, continue.
   - Sample $z' \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^k$ and set $x' := \tau \| m' \| z'$.
   - Sample $y' \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^y$ and construct $C[x', y']$ as defined by (4.1).
   - $C_{\text{prf}}' := \text{Eval}_{\text{pub}}(C[x', y'](\cdot), A, \{A_i\}_{i \in [k]})$ and $B_{\text{prf}}' := \sum_{i \in [k]} m_i A_i$.
   - Set $A_{\text{prf}}' := C_{\text{prf}}' + B_{\text{prf}}'$. Delegate $T_{A_{\text{prf}}'} \leftarrow \text{TrapDel}(A_{\text{prf}}', T_A)$.
   - $e' = (e'_1, e'_2) \leftarrow \text{SamplePre}([A/|A_{\text{prf}}'], T_{A_{\text{prf}}'}, h, \gamma)$ s.t., $e'_2 \neq 0^w$.
   - Send $r' := (z', y', e')$ to $\mathcal{A}$ and $Q_{\text{Adapt}} := Q_{\text{Adapt}} \cup \{((\tau, h, m), (\tau, h, m'))\}$.

3. On receiving the forgery $(\tau^*, h^*, m^*, r^*, m'^*)$, $\mathcal{C}$ makes the following checks, and returns $0$ if any of them fails. Otherwise, $\mathcal{C}$ returns $1$.
   - Check if $\text{Check}(\tau^*, h^*, m^*, r^*) = \text{Check}(\tau^*, h^*, m'^*, r'^*) = 1$.
   - Check if $m^* \neq m^*$ and $\text{Valid}(\tau^*, h^*, m^*, m'^*) = 1$.

By definition, we have $\Pr[G_0 \Rightarrow 1] = \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{CH}, A}^\mathcal{G}(\kappa) \Rightarrow 1]$.

**Game $G_1$**. Game $G_1$ is similar to $G_0$ except for the generation of $y'$ in the adaptation query phase. In $G_0$, $y'$ is sampled uniformly at random for each adaptation query. In $G_1$, $y'$ is computed by PRF, i.e., $y' \leftarrow \text{PRF}(k, x')$, where key $k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^k$ is sampled in the setup phase.

1'. During the setup phase, the challenger $\mathcal{C}$ proceeds as follows.
   - Generate $pp_{\text{prf}} \leftarrow \text{PRF.Setup}(1^k)$ and sample $k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^k$.
   - Generate $(A, T_A) \leftarrow \text{TrapGen}(1^n, 1^m, q)$.
   - Sample $A_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times w}$ for $i \in [k]$. Sample $\hat{A}_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times w}$ for $i \in [h]$.
   - $pp := (pp_{\text{prf}}, A, \{A_i\}_{i \in [k]}, \{\hat{A}_i\}_{i \in [h]}), \; td := (pp, T_A)$ and send $pp$ to $\mathcal{A}$.

2'. Upon an adaptation query $(\tau, h, m, r, m')$ from $\mathcal{A}$, $\mathcal{C}$ proceeds as follows.
   - If $(\tau, h', m) \in Q_{\text{Adapt}} \land h' \neq h$, or $(\tau, \cdot, m') \in Q_{\text{Adapt}}$, or $\text{Check}(\tau, h, m, r) = 0$ holds, return $\bot$; otherwise, continue.
   - Sample $z' \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^k$ and set $x' := \tau \| m' \| z'$.
   - Compute $y' \leftarrow \text{PRF}(k, x')$ and construct $C[x', y']$ as defined by (4.1).
   - $C_{\text{prf}}' := \text{Eval}_{\text{pub}}(C[x', y'](\cdot), A, \{A_i\}_{i \in [k]})$ and $B_{\text{prf}}' := \sum_{i \in [k]} m'_i A_i$.
   - Set $A_{\text{prf}}' := C_{\text{prf}}' + B_{\text{prf}}'$. Delegate $T_{A_{\text{prf}}'} \leftarrow \text{TrapDel}(A_{\text{prf}}', T_A)$.
   - $e' = (e'_1, e'_2) \leftarrow \text{SamplePre}([A/|A_{\text{prf}}'], T_{A_{\text{prf}}'}, h, \gamma)$ s.t., $e'_2 \neq 0^w$.
   - Send $r' := (z', y', e')$ to $\mathcal{A}$ and $Q_{\text{Adapt}} := Q_{\text{Adapt}} \cup \{((\tau, h, m), (\tau, h, m'))\}$.

**Lemma 10.** Games $G_1$ and $G_2$ are computationally indistinguishable due to the pseudorandomness of PRF, i.e., $|\Pr[G_1 \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[G_2 \Rightarrow 1]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{PRF}}^\text{Sec}(\kappa) + 2^{-O(\kappa)}$. 
Proof of Lemma 10 (sketch). Note that $z' \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^k$ is sampled uniformly at random for each adaptation query, then all $x' = \tau\|m'\|z'$ constructed for the adaptation queries are different from each other with probability $1 - 2^{-O(n)}$. Now according to the pseudorandomness of PRF, we know that the distribution of $y' \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^n$ is computationally indistinguishable from that of $y' \xleftarrow{\$} \text{PRF}(k,x')$ and this proves Lemma 10. 

**Game G₂.** Game G₂ is similar to G₁ except for the generations of $\{A_i\}_{i \in [k]}$ and $\hat{A}_i$'s when answering each adaptation query. In G₂, $A_i$ and $\hat{A}_i$ are computed by $A_i := AR_i + k_iG$ and $\hat{A}_i := AR_i$ with $R_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{\pm 1\}^{m \times w}$ and $\hat{R}_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{\pm 1\}^{m \times w}$ in the setup phase, and $A'_{prf}$ is computed by Eval$_{pub}$ from $A_i$'s and $\hat{A}_i$'s.

1". During the setup phase, the challenger $C$ proceeds as follows.

- Generate $pp_{prf} \leftarrow \text{PRF.Setup}(1^n)$ and sample $k \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^k$.
- Generate $(A, T_A) \leftarrow \text{TrapGen}(1^n, 1^m, q)$.
- Sample $R_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{\pm 1\}^{m \times w}$ and set $A_i := AR_i + k_iG$ for $i \in [k]$. Sample $\hat{R}_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{\pm 1\}^{m \times w}$ and set $\hat{A}_i := AR_i$ for $i \in [k]$.

2". Upon an adaptation query $(\tau, h', m, r, m')$ from $A$, $C$ proceeds as follows.

- If $\exists (\tau, h', m) \in Q_{\text{Adapt}} \land h' \neq h$, or $\exists (\tau, m') \in Q_{\text{Adapt}}$, or Check($\tau, h, m, r) = 0$ holds, return $\bot$; otherwise, continue.
- Sample $z' \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^k$ and set $x' := \tau\|m'\|z'$.
- Compute $y' \leftarrow \text{PRF}(k, x')$ and construct $C[x', y']$ as defined by (4.1).
- $S_{prf} := \text{Eval}_{prf}(C[x', y'](\cdot), A, k, \{R_i\}_{i \in [k]})$ and $P_{prf} := \sum_{i \in [k]} m_i' R_i$.
- Set $R'_{prf} := S_{prf} + P_{prf}$ and $A'_{prf} := AR'_{prf} + G$. Delegate $T_A|A'_{prf} \leftarrow \text{TrapDel}([A|A'_{prf}], T_A)$.
- $e' = (e'_1, e'_2) \leftarrow \text{SamplePre}([A|A'_{prf}], T_A|A'_{prf}, h, \gamma)$ s.t., $e'_2 \neq 0^w$.
- Send $r' := (z', y', e')$ to $A$ and $Q_{\text{Adapt}} := Q_{\text{Adapt}} \cup \{(\tau, h, m), (\tau, h, m')\}$.

**Lemma 11.** Games G₁ and G₂ are statistically indistinguishable and $|\Pr[G₁ \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[G₂ \Rightarrow 1]| \leq 2^{-O(n)}$.

**Proof of Lemma 11.** For each $i \in [k]$, we have

$$A_i := AR_i + k_iG \text{ (in G₂)} \approx_s U_i + k_iG \equiv U'_i := A_i \text{ (in G₁)} ,$$

where $R_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{\pm 1\}^{m \times w}$ and $U_i, U'_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{\pm 1\}^{n \times w}$. The “$\approx_s$” follows from Lemma 4 (randomness extraction) and the triangle inequality. The “$\equiv$” holds due to the uniformity of $U_i$. Similarly, we can prove that the distribution of $\{A_i\}_{i \in [k]}$ in G₁ is statistically indistinguishable from that of $\{\hat{A}_i\}_{i \in [k]}$ in G₂ by

$$\hat{A}_i := AR_i \text{ (in G₂)} \approx_s U_i := \hat{A} \text{ (in G₁)} ,$$
where $R_i \leftarrow \{\pm 1\}^{m \times w}$ and $U_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times w}$.

Next we show that $A'_{prf}$ computed by $Eval_{pub}$ from $A_i$'s and $A_i$'s in $G_1$ is identical to that computed by $Eval_{prf}$ from $R_i$'s and $R_i$'s in $G_2$. Given $A_i = AR_i + k_iG$ for $i \in [k]$, we have $C'_{prf} := AS'_{prf} + C[x', y'](k) \cdot G = AS'_{prf} + G$ with $C'_{prf} \leftarrow Eval_{pub}(C[x', y'](\cdot), A_i \{A_i\}_{i \in [k]})$ and $S'_{prf} \leftarrow Eval_{prf}(C[x', y'](\cdot), A, k, \{R_i\}_{i \in [k]})$ due to Lemma 7 (homomorphic evaluation) and the fact that $y' = PRF(k, x')$.

Besides, given $A_i = AR_i$, we have $B'_{prf} := \sum_{i \in [k]} m_i' A_i = A \sum_{i \in [k]} m_i' R_i = AP'_{prf}$. Then it holds that $A'_{prf} := C'_{prf} + B'_{prf} = AS'_{prf} + G + AP'_{prf} = AR'_{prf} + G$ with $R'_{prf} = S'_{prf} + P'_{prf}$. This completes the proof.

**Game G3.** Game $G_3$ is similar to $G_2$ except for the generation of the trapdoor $T_{A_{|A'_{prf}}}$ in the adaptation query phase. In $G_2$, $T_{A_{|A'_{prf}}}$ is delegated from $T_A$. In $G_3$, $T_{A_{|A'_{prf}}}$ is generated from a G-trapdoor of $[A|A'_{prf}]$.

2°. Upon an adaptation query $(\tau, h, m, r, m')$ from $A$, $C$ proceeds as follows.
- If $\exists (\tau, h', m) \in Q_{adapt} \wedge h' \neq h$, or $\exists (\tau, \cdot, m') \in Q_{adapt}$, or Check$(\tau, h, m, r) = 0$ holds, return $\perp$; otherwise, continue.
- Sample $z' \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ and set $x' := \tau || m || |z'|$.
- Compute $y' \leftarrow PRF(k, x')$ and construct $C[x', y']$ as defined by (1.1).
- $S'_{prf} \leftarrow Eval_{prf}(C[x', y'](\cdot), A, k, \{R_i\}_{i \in [k]})$ and $P'_{prf} := \sum_{i \in [k]} m_i' R_i$.
- Set $R'_{prf} := S'_{prf} + P'_{prf}$ and $A'_{prf} := AR'_{prf} + G$. Generate $T_{A_{|A'_{prf}}} \leftarrow \text{GtoBasis}(R'_{prf})$.
- $e' = (e_1', e_2') \leftarrow \text{SamplePre}([A|A'_{prf}], T_{A_{|A'_{prf}}}, h, \gamma)$ s.t., $e_2' \neq 0^\kappa$.
- Send $r' := (x', y', e')$ to $A$ and $Q_{adapt} := Q_{adapt} \cup \{(\tau, h, m), (\tau, h, m')\}$.

**Lemma 12.** Games $G_2$ and $G_3$ are statistically indistinguishable and $\left| \text{Pr}[G_2 = 1] - \text{Pr}[G_3 = 1]\right| \leq 2^{-\kappa}$.

**Proof of Lemma 12.** Note that the changes in $G_3$ only influence the sampling of $e'$ during the adaptation query phase, then it suffices to show that the distribution of $e'$ in $G_3$ is identical to that in $G_2$. In $G_2$, $T_{A_{|A'_{prf}}}$ is delegated from $T_A$ and of norm $\|T_{A_{|A'_{prf}}}\| = \|T_A\| \leq O(\sqrt{n \log q})$ according to Lemma 8 (trapdoor delegation). Together with Lemma 3 (preimage sampling) and the parameter setting that $\gamma > O(\sqrt{n \log q}) \cdot \omega(\sqrt{m + w})$, the vector $e'$ sampled in $G_2$ follows the distribution $D_{A_{|A'_{prf}}}^{|(A)\gamma|}$. In $G_3$, we have $A_{|A'_{prf}} = AR'_{prf} + G$, and hence $R_{prf}$ is a G-trapdoor for $[A|A'_{prf}]$ according to [23]. Then according to Lemma 6 (G-to-basis), $T_{A_{|A'_{prf}}}$ generated from the G-trapdoor $R_{prf}$ is also a trapdoor for $[A|A'_{prf}]$ with norm $\|T_{A_{|A'_{prf}}}\| = \sqrt{5}(s_1(R'_{prf}) + 1) \leq O(\kappa^c)$ for some constant $c$. Together with Lemma 3 (preimage sampling) and the parameter setting that $\gamma \geq O(\kappa^c) \cdot \omega(\sqrt{m + w})$, the vector $e'$ sampled in $G_3$ also follows the distribution $D_{A_{|A'_{prf}}}^{|(A)\gamma|}$. This completes the proof.

**Game G4.** Game $G_4$ is similar to $G_3$ except for the generation of $A$ in the setup phase. In $G_3$, $A$ is generated by algorithm $(A, T_A) \leftarrow \text{TrapGen}(1^n, 1^m, q)$. In $G_4$, $A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ is sampled uniformly at random.
During the setup phase, the challenger \( C \) proceeds as follows.

- Generate \( pp_{prf} \leftarrow \text{PRF.Setup}(1^k) \) and sample \( k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^k \).
- Sample \( A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m} \).
- Sample \( R_i \leftarrow \{ \pm 1 \}^{m \times w} \) and set \( A_i := AR_i + k_iG \) for \( i \in [k] \). Sample \( \hat{R}_i \leftarrow \{ \pm 1 \}^{m \times w} \) and set \( \hat{A}_i := \hat{A}R_i \) for \( i \in [h] \).
- \( pp := \langle pp_{prf}, A, \{ A_i \}_{i \in [k]}, \{ \hat{A}_i \}_{i \in [h]} \rangle, td := (pp, \bot) \) and send \( pp \) to \( A \).

**Lemma 13.** \( G_3 \) and \( G_4 \) are statistically indistinguishable and \( |\Pr[\text{Games } G_3 \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[\text{Games } G_4 \Rightarrow 1]| \leq 2^{-\kappa} \).  

**Proof of Lemma 13.** We consider \( A(I) \) and \( A(II) \) separately.

First, we prove that if there exists a PPT \( A(I) \) that wins in \( G_4 \), then we construct a PPT algorithm \( B(I) \) to solve the SIS problem.

**Algorithm** \( B(I) \). Given an SIS instance \( A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m} \), \( B(I) \) aims to obtain a non-zero short vector \( v \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m \) s.t., \( Av = 0^m \). It proceeds as follows.

0. The algorithm \( B(I) \) initializes sets \( \mathcal{Q}_{\text{Adapt}} := \emptyset \) and \( Q_r := \emptyset \).

1. During the setup phase, the challenger \( B(I) \) proceeds as follows.
   - Generate \( pp_{prf} \leftarrow \text{PRF.Setup}(1^k) \) and sample \( k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^k \).
   - Sample \( R_i \leftarrow \{ \pm 1 \}^{m \times w} \) and set \( A_i := AR_i + k_iG \) for \( i \in [k] \). Sample \( \hat{R}_i \leftarrow \{ \pm 1 \}^{m \times w} \) and set \( \hat{A}_i := \hat{A}R_i \) for \( i \in [h] \). (Note that \( A \) is the SIS instance.)
   - Send \( pp = \langle pp_{prf}, A, \{ A_i \}_{i \in [k]}, \{ \hat{A}_i \}_{i \in [h]} \rangle \) to \( A(I) \).

2. Upon an adaptation query \( (\tau, h, m, r, m') \) from \( A(I) \), \( B(I) \) proceeds as follows.
   - If \( \exists (\tau, h', m) \in \mathcal{Q}_{\text{Adapt}} \wedge h' \neq h \), or \( \exists (\tau', \cdot, m') \in \mathcal{Q}_{\text{Adapt}} \), or \( \text{Check}(\tau, h, m, r) = 0 \) holds, return \( \bot \); otherwise, continue.
   - Sample \( z' \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^w \) and set \( \tau = ||m'||z' \).
   - Compute \( y' \leftarrow \text{PRF}(k, z') \) and construct \( C[x', y'] \) as defined by (4.1).
   - \( S'_{prf} \leftarrow \text{Eval}_{prf}(C[x', y'], A, k, \{ R_i \}_{i \in [k]}) \) and \( P'_{prf} := \sum_{i \in [h]} m_iR_i \).
   - Set \( R'_{prf} := S'_{prf} + P'_{prf} \) and \( A'_{prf} := AR_{prf} + G \). Generate \( T_{A'|A_{prf}} \leftarrow \text{GtoBasis}(R'_{prf}) \).
\[ e' = (e'_1, e'_2) \leftarrow \text{SamplePre}([A | A'_{prf}], T_A | A'_{prf}, h, \gamma) \text{ s.t., } e'_2 \neq 0^w. \]

- Send \( r' = (z', y', e') \) to \( A(I) \). Set \( Q_{Adapt} := Q_{Adapt} \cup \{(r, h, m), (r, h, m')\} \) and \( Q_r := Q_r \cup \{(r, h, m, r')\} \).

3. Upon a forgery tuple \((\tau^*, h^*, m^*, r^*, m^*, r^*)\), if \( A(I) \) wins, it holds that \( m^* \neq m^* \) and \( \text{Check}(\tau^*, h^*, m^*, r^*) = \text{Check}(\tau^*, h^*, m^*, r^*) = 1 \) and \( (\tau^*, m^*) \notin Q_{Adapt} \land (\tau^*, h^*, m^*) \in Q_{Adapt} \). Find \( (\tau^*, h^*, m^*) \in Q_{Adapt} \) s.t., \( (\tau^*, h^*, m^*, r^*) \in Q_r \). Check \((\tau^*, h^*, m^*, r^*) = 1 \) and \( m^* \) is never queried to \( O_{Adapt} \) as the new message w.r.t. tag \( \tau^* \). Then \( B(I) \) computes a SIS solution as follows.

- Parse \( \hat{r} = (\hat{z}, \hat{y}, \hat{e}) \) and \( r^* = (z^*, y^*, e^*) \).

- Set \( \hat{x} := \tau^* m^* / \hat{z} \) and \( x^* := \tau^* m^* / z^* \). Construct \( C[\hat{x}, \hat{y}] \) and \( C[x^*, y^*] \).

- \( C_{prf} \leftarrow \text{EvalPub}(C[\hat{x}, \hat{y}]\{i\}, A, \{A_i\}_{i \in k}) \) and \( B_{prf} := \sum_{i \in k} m_i \hat{A}_i \).

- \( S_{prf} \leftarrow \text{EvalPre}(C[\hat{x}, \hat{y}]\{i\}, A, \{R_i\}_{i \in k}) \) and \( P_{prf} := \sum_{i \in k} m_i \hat{R}_i \).

- Set \( A_{prf} := C_{prf} + B_{prf} \) and \( R_{prf} := S_{prf} + P_{prf} \).

- Compute and return \( v := [I_m | R_{prf}] e^* - [I_m | R_{prf}] \hat{e} \) to its own challenger.

We show the existence of tuple \((\tau^*, h^*, m^*) \in Q_{Adapt} \) in step 3. The adversary may issue multiple adaptation queries centered around \((\tau^*, h^* \), but there must be a root tuple \((\tau^*, h^*, \bar{m}, \bar{r}) \) such that all other tuples \((\tau^*, h^*, \cdot) \) are adapted from it directly or indirectly. According to the specification of \( O_{Adapt} \), all the target new messages w.r.t. \( \tau^* \) are different from the root message \( \bar{m} \). Consequently, tuple \((\tau^*, h^*, \bar{m}, \bar{r}) \) satisfies \((\tau^*, h^*, \bar{m}, \bar{r}) \in Q_r \), \( \text{Check}(\tau^*, h^*, \bar{m}, \bar{r}) = 1 \) and \( \bar{m} \) is never queried to \( O_{Adapt} \) as a new message w.r.t. \( \tau^* \).

Next we show that \( v \) is a valid solution to the SIS problem. Note that \((\tau^*, m^*) \notin Q_{Adapt} \) is never queried to the adaptation oracle, then nothing about \( \text{PRF}(k, x^*) \) with \( x^* = \tau^* m^* / z^* \) is revealed to \( A(I) \). For \( y^* \) chosen by \( A(I) \), \( y^* = \text{PRF}(k, x^*) \) hardly holds due to the pseudorandomness of \( \text{PRF} \). Then with overwhelming probability, \( C[x^*, y^*](k) = 0 \) and

\[
A^*_{prf} = A R^*_{prf} + C[x^*, y^*](k) \cdot G = AR^*_{prf} + 0 \cdot G = AR^*_{prf}.
\]

Besides, since \((\tau^*, h^*, \bar{m}) \in Q_{Adapt} \) and \( \bar{m} \) is never queried to \( Q_{Adapt} \) as a target new message under tag \( \tau^* \) before, we know that \((\tau^*, h^*, \bar{m}, \bar{r}) \) is generated by \( A(I) \) itself and \( \text{PRF}(k, \bar{x}) \) with \( \bar{x} = \tau^* m^* / \bar{z} \) is never obtained by \( A(I) \). Through an analogous analysis, we know that with overwhelming probability,

\[
\hat{A}_{prf} = \hat{A} R_{prf} + C[\hat{x}, \hat{y}](k) \cdot G = \hat{A} R_{prf} + 0 \cdot G = \hat{A} R_{prf}.
\]

Furthermore, since \( \text{Check}(\tau^*, h^*, m^*, r^*) = \text{Check}(\tau^*, h^*, \bar{m}, \bar{r}) = 1 \), we have

\[
[ A | \hat{A}_{prf} ] \cdot e^* = h^* = [ A | \hat{A}_{prf} ] \cdot \hat{e} \Leftrightarrow [ A | \hat{A}_{prf} ] \cdot e^* - [ A | \hat{A}_{prf} ] \cdot \hat{e} = 0^w \Leftrightarrow A ([ I_m | R_{prf} ] \cdot e^* - [ I_m | R_{prf} ] \cdot \hat{e}) = 0^w,
\]

\[ = v \in \mathbb{Z}_q^w \]
where \( e^* = (e^*_1, e^*_2), \|e^*\| \leq \gamma \sqrt{m+w}, e^*_2 \neq 0^m, \tilde{e} = (e_1, e_2), \|\tilde{e}\| \leq \gamma \sqrt{m+w} \) and \( e_2 \neq 0^m \). Together with our parameter setting that \( \gamma \cdot O(\kappa \cdot \sqrt{m+w} \leq \beta \), we have \( \|v\| \leq O(\kappa \cdot \gamma \sqrt{m+w}) \leq \beta \) for some constant \( c \).

It remains to show that \( v = ([I_m | R^*_m \cdot e^* - [I_m | R^*_p | \cdot \tilde{e}] \neq 0^m \). Denote by \( r^*_i \) (resp., \( r^*_1, r^*_2, \ldots, r^*_i, \ldots, r^*_p \)) and \( \{\tilde{r}_{j,i} \}_{1 \leq j \leq |h|} \) the \( i \)-th column of \( R^*_m \) (resp., \( R^*_p \), \( S^*_m \), \( P^*_m \) and \( \{\tilde{R}_j \}_{j \in [h]} \)), and \( e^*_2,i \) the \( i \)-th item of \( e^*_2 \). Recall that \( r^*_i = s^*_i + p^*_i = s^*_i + \sum_{j \in [h]} m^*_j \tilde{r}_{j,i}. \) Since \( \tau^* \cdot m^* \notin Q_{\text{Adapt}} \) and \( \tau^*, h^*, m^* \in Q_{\text{Adapt}} \), we know that \( m^* \neq m^* \) and hence there must exist some index \( i \in [h] \) s.t., \( m^*_i \neq m^*_i \) for l.o.g., let \( m^*_i = 0 \) and \( m^*_i = 1 \). Besides, since \( e^*_2 \neq 0^w \), there must exist some index \( \nu \in [w] \) s.t., \( e^*_2,\nu \neq 0 \). Now we show that \( v = 0^m \) holds with negligible probability. Note that

\[
v = e^*_1 + R^*_p e^*_2 - \tilde{e}_1 - R^*_p \tilde{e}_2 = 0^m \nRightarrow \tilde{r}_{i,\nu} = (e^*_1 + R^*_p e^*_2 - e^*_1 - \sum_{j \neq \nu} r^*_i e^*_2,i)/e^*_2,i - s^*_i \sum_{j \neq \nu} m^*_j \tilde{r}_{j,\nu}. \quad (4.2)
\]

Recall that \( \tilde{r}_{i,\nu} \) is sampled uniformly from \( \{1,-1\}^m \) and the only information of \( \tilde{r}_{i,\nu} \) revealed to \( A^{(1)} \) is \( u = A \tilde{r}_{i,\nu} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n \). Together with Lemma 1 and the parameter setting that \( m \geq O(n \log q), H_\infty(\tilde{r}_{i,\nu} \cdot u) \geq H_\infty(\tilde{r}_{i,\nu}) - n \log q \geq m - n \log q \geq \kappa \) and \( \tilde{r}_{i,\nu} \) still has high entropy. Further since “\( W \)” in equation (4.2) is independent of \( \tilde{r}_{i,\nu} \), we have \( \tilde{r}_{i,\nu} = W \) with probability \( 2^{-\kappa} \). Then equation (4.2) holds with a negligible probability and \( v = 0^m \) holds with negligible probability.

Now we have proved that \( v \) is a valid solution for SIS and \( \Pr[A_G \Rightarrow 1 | A^{(1)}] \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{sise}}_{\text{PRF}}(\kappa) \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{SIS}}_{\text{PRF}}(\kappa) + 2^{-\kappa} \).

Next, we prove that if there exists a PPT \( A^{(1)} \) that wins in \( G_4 \), then we construct a PPT algorithm \( B^{(1)} \) to solve the SIS problem. The algorithm \( B^{(1)} \) is similar to \( B^{(1)} \) except for the step 3, as described below.

3. Upon a forgery tuple \((\tau^*, h^*, m^*, r^*, m^*, r^*)\), if \( A^{(1)} \) wins, it holds that \( m^* \neq m^* \). Check \((\tau^*, h^*, m^*, r^*) = \text{Check}(\tau^*, h^*, m^*, r^*) = 1 \) and \( (\tau^*, m^*) \notin Q_{\text{Adapt}} \wedge (\tau^*, m^*) \notin Q_{\text{Adapt}} \). Then \( B^{(1)} \) computes a SIS solution as follows.

- Parse \( r^* = (z^*, y^*, e^*) \) and \( r^* = (z^*, y^*, e^*) \). Set \( \mathbf{x}^* := \tau^* \cdot m^* \cdot \|z^*\| \) and \( \mathbf{x}^* := \tau^* \cdot m^* \cdot \|z^*\| \). Construct \( C[\mathbf{x}^*, y^*] \) and \( C[\mathbf{x}^*, y^*] \).

- Set \( C_{\text{prf}} := \text{Eval}_{\text{pub}}(C[\mathbf{x}^*, y^*](), A, \{A_i \}_{i \in [k]}) \) and \( B_{\text{prf}} := \sum_{i \in [k]} m^*_i A_i \).

- Set \( A_{\text{prf}} := C_{\text{prf}} + B_{\text{prf}} \) and \( R_{\text{prf}} := S_{\text{prf}} + P_{\text{prf}} \).

Then we show that \( v \) is a valid solution to the SIS problem. Note that \((\tau^*, m^*) \notin Q_{\text{Adapt}} \) and \((\tau^*, m^*) \notin Q_{\text{Adapt}} \) are not queried to the adaptation oracle, so nothing about \( \text{PRF}(k, \mathbf{x}^*) \) and \( \text{PRF}(k, \mathbf{x}^*) \) with \( \mathbf{x}^* = \tau^* \cdot m^* \cdot \|z^*\| \)
and \( x^* = \tau^* | m^* | z^* \), has ever been revealed to \( A^{(I)} \), and hence \( \text{PRF}(k, x^*) \) and \( \text{PRF}(k, x^*) \) are pseudorandom due to the pseudorandomness of \( \text{PRF} \). As a consequence, neither \( y^* = \text{PRF}(k, x^*) \) nor \( y^* = \text{PRF}(k, x^*) \) holds except for negligible probability, where \( y^* \) and \( y^* \) are chosen by \( A^{(II)} \), and this leads to \( C[x^*, y^*](k) = 0 \) and \( C[x^*, y^*](k) = 0 \). Therefore,

\[
\begin{align*}
A_{\text{prf}}^* &= AR_{\text{prf}}^* + C[x^*, y^*](k) \cdot G = AR_{\text{prf}}^* + 0 \cdot G = AR_{\text{prf}}^* \\
A_{\text{prf}}^* &= AR_{\text{prf}}^* + C[x^*, y^*](k) \cdot G = AR_{\text{prf}}^* + 0 \cdot G = AR_{\text{prf}}^*.
\end{align*}
\]

Through an analogous analysis as before, \( v := [I_m | R_{\text{prf}}^*] \cdot e^* - [I_m | R_{\text{prf}}^*] \cdot e^* \) is a valid SIS solution with overwhelming probability. Now we obtain \( \text{Pr}[G_4 \Rightarrow 1 | A^{(I)}] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{prf}}^{\text{pse}}(\kappa) + \text{Adv}_{\text{SIS}}^{\text{SIS}}(n, q, \beta, m)(\kappa) + 2^{-\kappa} \).

From Lemma 14, we have

\[
\text{Pr}[G_4 \Rightarrow 1] = \text{Pr}[G_4 \Rightarrow 1 | A^{(I)}] \text{Pr}[A^{(I)}] + \text{Pr}[G_4 \Rightarrow 1 | A^{(II)}] \text{Pr}[A^{(II)}] \\
\leq \text{Adv}_{\text{prf}}^{\text{pse}}(\kappa) + \text{Adv}_{\text{SIS}}^{\text{SIS}}(n, q, \beta, m)(\kappa) + 2^{-O(\kappa)}.
\]

Finally combining Lemmas 10, 11, 12, 13 and (4.3), it holds that

\[
\text{Pr}[\text{Exp}_{\text{CH}, A}^\text{cr}(\kappa) \Rightarrow 1] \\
\leq | \text{Pr}[G_0 \Rightarrow 1] - \text{Pr}[G_1 \Rightarrow 1] | + | \text{Pr}[G_1 \Rightarrow 1] - \text{Pr}[G_2 \Rightarrow 1] | \\
+ | \text{Pr}[G_2 \Rightarrow 1] - \text{Pr}[G_3 \Rightarrow 1] | + | \text{Pr}[G_3 \Rightarrow 1] - \text{Pr}[G_4 \Rightarrow 1] | + \text{Pr}[G_4 \Rightarrow 1] \\
\leq \text{Adv}_{\text{SIS}}^{\text{pse}}(n, q, \beta, m)(\kappa) + 2 \text{Adv}_{\text{prf}}^{\text{pse}}(\kappa) + 2^{-O(\kappa)}.
\]

By (4.4), it is easy to see that the CR security of \( \text{tCH} \) can be tightly reduced to the SIS assumption and the pseudorandomness of \( \text{PRF} \).

If the underlying \( \text{PRF} \) is instantiated with the almost tight secure LWE-based \( \text{PRF} \) [5,22], then our \( \text{tCH} \) enjoys CR with almost tight security based on the SIS and LWE assumptions.

### 4.2 tCH with Tight Security in ROM

In this subsection, we provide another lattice-based \( \text{tCH} \), with CR security proved in the random oracle model. Compared with the \( \text{tCH} \) construction in Fig. 3, our second \( \text{tCH} \) construction replaces the underlying homomorphic evaluations and \( \text{PRF} \) with a hash function (which is modeled as a random oracle), and hence achieves better efficiency and tightness. Let \( H : \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m} \times \{0,1\}^x \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times w} \) be a hash function. Our \( \text{tCH} \) scheme \( \text{tCH}' \) is given in Fig. 4.

**Parameter setting.** Parameters of \( \text{tCH}' \) include the security parameter \( \kappa \), the dimension parameters \( x, t, h, \) the SIS parameters \( n, m, q, \beta \) and the Gaussian parameter \( \gamma \). Define \( w = n \lfloor \log q \rfloor \). The afore-mentioned parameters are required to satisfy the following restrictions simultaneously.
Let $A, T_A \leftarrow \text{TrapGen}(1^n, 1^m, q)$ with $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$.
2. Return $pp := A$ and $td := \langle pp, T_A \rangle$.

$(h, r) \leftarrow \text{Hash}(pp, \tau \in \{0,1\}^n, m \in \{0,1\}^h)$.

1. Parse $pp = A$.
2. Sample $z \in \{0,1\}^x$ and set $x := \tau |m| |z \in \{0,1\}^x$.
3. Compute $A_h = H(A, x)$ with $A_h \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times w}$.
4. Sample $e = \{e_1, e_2\} \leftarrow D_{h+w, \gamma}$ with $e_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n}$ and $e_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m}$ s.t., $e_2 \neq 0^m$.
5. Return $h = [A|A_h]|e \in \mathbb{Z}_q^h$ and $r = (z,e)$.

$r' \leftarrow \text{Adapt}(td, \tau \in \{0,1\}^n, h, m \in \{0,1\}^h, r, m' \in \{0,1\}^h)$.

1. Parse $td = \langle pp, T_A \rangle$ and $pp = A$.
2. If $\text{Check}(pp, \tau, h, m, r) = 0$, return $\bot$. Otherwise, continue.
3. Sample $z' \in \{0,1\}^x$ and set $x' := \tau |m' |z' \in \{0,1\}^x$.
4. Compute $A_h' = H(A, x')$ with $A_h' \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times w}$.
5. Delegate $T_{A|A_h} \leftarrow \text{TrapDel}(\langle A|A_h\rangle, T_A)$.
6. Sample $e' = \{e_1, e_2\} \leftarrow \text{SamplePre}(\langle A|A_h\rangle, T_{A|A_h}, h, \gamma)$ with $e_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n}$ and $e_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m}$ s.t., $e_2 \neq 0^m$.
7. Return $r' = (z', e')$.

0/1 $\leftarrow \text{Check}(pp, \tau \in \{0,1\}^n, h, m \in \{0,1\}^h, r)$.

1. Parse $pp = A$ and $r = (z,e)$. Set $x := \tau |m| |z \in \{0,1\}^x$.
2. Compute $A_h = H(A, x)$ with $A_h \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times w}$.
3. Parse $e = \{e_1, e_2\}$ with $e_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n}$ and $e_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m}$. If $h = [A|A_h]|e, |e| \leq \sqrt{m+w}$ and $e_2 \neq 0^m$, return 1; otherwise, return 0.

Fig. 4. Tagged chameleon hash $tCH'$ in the random oracle model.

- Let $x, t, h = \text{poly}(\kappa)$ be positive integers and $x = t + h + \kappa$.
- Let $n, q, m, \beta$ be positive parameters, $n, m, \beta, q = \text{poly}(\kappa)$ and $\beta \cdot \text{poly}(n) \leq q$ so that the SIS problem is hard according to Lemma 9.
- Let $\gamma \geq \omega(\sqrt{m(m+w)})$ so that Lemma 3 can be applied.
- Let $m = O(n \log q)$ and $2\gamma \sqrt{m(m+w)} \leq \beta$ to serve for our security proof.

**Theorem 3.** Let $H : \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m} \times \{0,1\}^x \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times w}$ be a hash function modeled as a random oracle. Given parameters described above, construction $tCH'$ in Fig. 4 is a tagged chameleon hash if the SIS$_{n,q,\beta,m}$ assumption holds. Furthermore, collision resistance of $tCH'$ enjoys tight security.

**Correctness of $tCH'$.** It follows directly from Lemma 8 (trapdoor delegation) and Lemma 3 (preimage sampling), and we omit the proof of it here.

**Proof of statistical indistinguishability for $tCH'$.** We prove that, given tag $\tau$ and messages $m, m'$, the distribution of $(h, r)$ generated by Hash is statistically close to that generated by Hash-then-Adapt. According to our construction, $(h, r)$ generated by Hash follows the distribution $D_H$, and $(h, r)$ generated by Hash-
otherwise, send Delegate $e$. If there exists Sample $A$ (note that in ROM, Check if $H$)

$A_{h}$ is deterministically computed from $A$, $\tau$, $m$ and $z$, and $A'_{h}$ is generated similar to $A_{h}$ but with $m'$ and $z'$.

Similarly, we can prove $D_{HkA} \approx_s D_{HkA}'$ by Lemma 4 (randomness extraction), where

$$D_{HkA} := \left\{ (h, r = (z, e)) \mid z \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^{c}, e \leftarrow D_{Z^{m+w}}(\gamma), h := [A|A_{h}] \cdot e \right\}.$$ 

According to Lemma 5, $D_{H} \approx_s D_{HkA}$. Therefore, $D_{H} \approx_s D_{HkA}$ by triangle inequality and this proves the statistical indistinguishability of $tCH'$.

**Proof of collision resistance for $tCH'$**. We define a sequence of hybrid games $G_{0} \sim G_{3}$, where $G_{0}$ is identical to $\text{Exp}_{CH',A}^{cr}(\kappa)$ defined in Fig. 2 (note that in ROM, $A$ has an additional access to the random oracle $O_{H}$). We show that games $G_{i}$ and $G_{i-1}$ are indistinguishable for all $i \in [3]$, and in $G_{3}$, the adversary wins with negligible probability. The differences between adjacent games are highlighted in blue. Assume that $A$ makes at most $Q$ adaptation queries.

**Game $G_{0}$**. Game $G_{0}$ is identical to $\text{Exp}_{CH',A}^{cr}(\kappa)$ defined by Fig. 2.

1. The challenger $C$ initializes a set $Q_{\text{Adapt}} := \emptyset$ and a list $L_{h} := \emptyset$.
2. During the setup phase, the challenger $C$ proceeds as follows.
   - Generate $(A, T_{A}) \leftarrow \text{TrapGen}(1^{n}, 1^{m}, q)$.
   - Set $pp := A$ and $td := (pp, T_{A})$, and send $pp$ to $A$.
3. On receiving a hash query $(H, x_{h})$, the challenger $C$ proceeds as follows.
   - If there exists $A_{h}$ s.t., $(H, x_{h}, A_{h}, \bot) \in L_{h}$, send $A_{h}$ to $A$.
   - Otherwise, send $A_{h} \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} Z_{q}^{n+w}$ to $A$ and append $(H, x_{h}, A_{h}, \bot)$ to $L_{h}$.
4. Upon an adaptation query $(\tau, h, m, r, m')$ from $A$, $C$ proceeds as follows.
   - If $\exists (\tau, h', m) \in Q_{\text{Adapt}} \land h' \neq h$, or $\exists (\tau, \cdot, m') \in Q_{\text{Adapt}}$, or $\text{Check}(\tau, h, m, r) = 0$ holds, return $\bot$; otherwise, continue.
   - Sample $z' \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^{c}$ and set $x' := \tau || m' || z'$ s.t., $(A, x', \cdot, \cdot) \notin L_{h}$ (note that this holds with probability $1 - 2^{\cdot\Omega(\kappa)}$ since $z'$ is sampled uniformly at random).
   - Sample $A'_{h} \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} Z_{q}^{n+w}$ and append $(A, x', A'_{h}, \bot)$ to $L_{h}$.
   - Delegate $T_{A|A'_{h}} \leftarrow \text{TrapDel}([A|A'_{h}], T_{A})$.
   - $e' := (e'_{1}, e'_{2}) \leftarrow \text{SamplePre}([A|A'_{h}], T_{A|A'_{h}}, h, \gamma)$ s.t., $e'_{2} \neq 0^{w}$.
   - Send $r' := (z', e')$ to $A$ and $Q_{\text{Adapt}} := Q_{\text{Adapt}} \cup \{(\tau, h, m), (\tau, h, m')\}$.
5. On receiving the forgery tuple $(\tau^{*}, h^{*}, m^{*}, r^{*}, m'^{*}, r'^{*})$, $C$ makes the following checks, and returns 0 if any of them fails. Otherwise, $C$ returns 1.
   - Check if $\text{Check}(\tau^{*}, h^{*}, m^{*}, r^{*}) = \text{Check}(\tau^{*}, h^{*}, m'^{*}, r'^{*}) = 1$. 

Check if $m^* \neq m'$ and $\text{Valid}(\tau^*, h^*, m^*, m^*) = 1$.

By definition, we have $\Pr[G_0 \Rightarrow 1] = \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{CH}, A}(\kappa) \Rightarrow 1]$.

**Game $G_1$.** Game $G_1$ is similar to $G_0$ except for the computations of $A_h$ for each random oracle query $(A, x_h)$, and $A_h'$ for each adaptation query. In $G_0$, $A_h \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_Q^{n \times w}$ and $A_h' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_Q^{n \times w}$ are sampled uniformly at random. In $G_1$, $A_h$ is computed by $A_h := AR_h$ with $R_h \xleftarrow{\$} \{\pm 1\}^{m \times w}$ for each random oracle query $(A, x_h)$, and $A_h'$ is computed by $A_h' := AR_h' + G$ with $R_h' \xleftarrow{\$} \{\pm 1\}^{m \times w}$ for each adaptation query.

2'. On receiving a hash query $(H, x_h)$, the challenger $C$ proceeds as follows.
- If $\exists A_h$ s.t., $(H, x_h, A_h, \cdot) \in \mathcal{L}_h$, send $A_h$ to $A$; otherwise, continue.
- If $H \neq A$, sample $A_h \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_Q^{n \times w}$, append $(H, x_h, A_h, \cdot)$ to $\mathcal{L}_h$, and send $A_h$ to $A$.
- Otherwise, sample $R_h \xleftarrow{\$} \{\pm 1\}^{m \times w}$, compute $A_h := AR_h$, append $(H, x_h, A_h, R_h)$ to $\mathcal{L}_h$, and send $A_h$ to $A$.

3'. Upon an adaptation query $(\tau, h, m, r, m')$ from $A$, $C$ proceeds as follows.
- If $\exists (\tau, h', m) \in \mathcal{Q}_{\text{Adapt}} \land h' \neq h$, or $\exists (\tau', \cdot, m') \in \mathcal{Q}_{\text{Adapt}}$, or $\text{Check}(\tau, h, m, r) = 0$ holds, return $\perp$; otherwise, continue.
- Sample $z' \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^k$ and set $x' := \tau||m'||z'$ s.t., $(A, x', \cdot, \cdot) \notin \mathcal{L}_h$.
- Sample $R_h' \xleftarrow{\$} \{\pm 1\}^{m \times w}$, set $A_h' := AR_h' + G$, and append $(A, x', A_h', R_h')$ to $\mathcal{L}_h$.
- Delegate $T_{A|A_h'} \leftarrow \text{TrapDel}([A|A_h'], T_A)$.
- Set $e' := (e_1', e_2') \leftarrow \text{SamplePre}(A|A_h', T_{A|A_h'}, h, \gamma)$ s.t., $e_2' \neq 0^w$.
- Send $r' := (z', e')$ to $A$ and $\mathcal{Q}_{\text{Adapt}} := \mathcal{Q}_{\text{Adapt}} \cup \{(\tau, h, m), (\tau, h, m')\}$.

**Lemma 15.** Games $G_0$ and $G_1$ are statistically indistinguishable and $|\Pr[G_0 \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[G_1 \Rightarrow 1]| \leq 2^{-O(\kappa)}$.

**Lemma 15** follows from **Lemma 4** (randomness extraction).

**Game $G_2$.** Game $G_2$ is similar to $G_1$ except for the generation of the trapdoor $T_{A|A_h'}$ in the adaptation query phase. In $G_2$, $T_{A|A_h'}$ is delegated from $T_A$. In $G_3$, $T_{A|A_h'}$ is generated from a G-trapdoor of $[A|A_h']$.

3''. Upon an adaptation query $(\tau, h, m, r, m')$ from $A$, $C$ proceeds as follows.
- If $\exists (\tau, h', m) \in \mathcal{Q}_{\text{Adapt}} \land h' \neq h$, or $\exists (\tau', \cdot, m') \in \mathcal{Q}_{\text{Adapt}}$, or $\text{Check}(\tau, h, m, r) = 0$ holds, return $\perp$; otherwise, continue.
- Sample $z' \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^k$ and set $x' := \tau||m'||z'$ s.t., $(A, x', \cdot, \cdot) \notin \mathcal{L}_h$.
- Sample $R_h' \xleftarrow{\$} \{\pm 1\}^{m \times w}$, set $A_h' := AR_h' + G$, and append $(A, x', A_h', R_h')$ to $\mathcal{L}_h$.
- Generate $T_{A|A_h'} \leftarrow \text{GtoBasis}(R_h')$.
- Set $e' := (e_1', e_2') \leftarrow \text{SamplePre}(A|A_h', T_{A|A_h'}, h, \gamma)$ s.t., $e_2' \neq 0^w$.
- Send $r' := (z', e')$ to $A$ and $\mathcal{Q}_{\text{Adapt}} := \mathcal{Q}_{\text{Adapt}} \cup \{(\tau, h, m), (\tau, h, m')\}$.

**Lemma 16.** Games $G_1$ and $G_2$ are statistically indistinguishable and $|\Pr[G_1 \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[G_2 \Rightarrow 1]| \leq 2^{-\kappa}$. 
Note that for each adaptation query \((\tau, h, m, r, m')\), the corresponding \(A'\) is computed as \(A'_h = AR'_h + G\). Hence \(R'_h\) is a G-trapdoor for \([A|A'_h]\). Now the proof of Lemma 16 is analogous to that of Lemma 12.

**Game** \(G_3\). Game \(G_3\) is similar to \(G_2\) except for the generation of \(A\) in the setup phase. In \(G_2\), \(A\) is generated by algorithm \((A, TA) \leftarrow \text{TrapGen}(1^n, 1^m, q)\). In \(G_3\), \(A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}\) is sampled uniformly at random.

1’. During the setup phase, the challenger \(C\) proceeds as follows.
- Sample \(A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times w}\).
- Set \(pp := A\) and \(td := (pp, \perp)\) and return \(pp\) to \(A\).

**Lemma 17.** Games \(G_2\) and \(G_3\) are statistically indistinguishable and \(|\Pr[G_2 \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[G_3 \Rightarrow 1]| \leq 2^{-\kappa}\).

Lemma 17 holds directly from Lemma 2 (trapdoor generation).

Next we show that any PPT adversary \(A\) wins in \(G_3\) with negligible probability. To do this, we classify the adversaries into two types, \(A^{(I)}\) and \(A^{(II)}\).

- **Type I:** \(A^{(I)}\) finally submits a forgery \((\tau^*, h^*, m^*, r^*, m'^*)\) satisfying the first valid condition, i.e., \((\tau^*, m^*) \notin Q_{\text{Adapt}} \land (\tau^*, h^*, m'^*) \in Q_{\text{Adapt}}\).
- **Type II:** \(A^{(II)}\) finally submits a forgery \((\tau^*, h^*, m^*, r^*, m'^*, r'^*)\) satisfying the second valid condition, i.e., \((\tau^*, m^*) \notin Q_{\text{Adapt}} \land (\tau^*, h^*, m'^*) \notin Q_{\text{Adapt}}\).

Next we show in Lemma 18 that \(A^{(I)}\) and \(A^{(II)}\) hardly win in \(G_3\).

**Lemma 18.** For any PPT adversary \(A^{(T)}\) with \(T \in \{I, II\}\), it holds that \(\Pr[G_3 \Rightarrow 1] \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{SIS}}_{[n, q, \beta, m]}(\kappa) + 2^{-\kappa}\).

**Proof of Lemma 18.** We consider \(A^{(I)}\) and \(A^{(II)}\) separately.

First, we prove that if there exists a PPT \(A^{(I)}\) that wins in \(G_3\), then we construct a PPT algorithm \(B^{(I)}\) to solve the SIS problem.

**Algorithm** \(B^{(I)}\). Given an SIS instance \(A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}\), \(B^{(I)}\) aims to obtain a non-zero short vector \(v \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n}\) s.t., \(Av = 0^w\). It proceeds as follows.

0. The algorithm \(B^{(I)}\) initializes sets \(Q_{\text{Adapt}} := \emptyset, Q_r := \emptyset\) and a list \(L_h := \emptyset\).
1. During the setup phase, the algorithm \(B^{(I)}\) sends \(pp := A\) to \(A^{(I)}\) (note that \(A\) is the SIS instance).
2. Upon a hash query \((H, x_h)\), the algorithm \(B^{(I)}\) proceeds as follows.
   - If \(\exists A_h\) s.t., \((H, x_h, A_h, \perp) \in L_h\), send \(A_h\) to \(A^{(I)}\); otherwise, continue.
   - If \(H \neq A\), sample \(A_h \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times w}\), append \((H, x_h, A_h, \perp)\) to \(L_h\) and send \(A_h\) to \(A^{(I)}\).
   - Otherwise, sample \(R_h \leftarrow \{\pm 1\}^{m \times w}\), compute \(A_h := AR_h\), append \((H, x_h, A_h, R_h)\) to \(L_h\) and send \(A_h\) to \(A^{(I)}\).
3. Upon an adaptation query \((\tau, h, m, r, m')\) from \(A^{(I)}\), \(B^{(I)}\) proceeds as follows.
   - If \(\exists (\tau, h', m) \in Q_{\text{Adapt}} \land h' \neq h\), or \(\exists (\tau, m') \in Q_{\text{Adapt}}\), or \(\text{Check}(\tau, h, m, r) = 0\) holds, return \(\perp\); otherwise, continue.
- Sample $z' \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$ and set $x' := \tau \cdot m' \cdot z'$ s.t., $(A, x', \cdot, \cdot) \notin \mathcal{L}_h$.
- Sample $R'_h \leftarrow \{\pm 1\}^{m \times w}$, set $A'_h := AR'_h + G$, append $(A, x', A'_h, R'_h)$ to $\mathcal{L}_h$.
- Generate $T_{A\mid A'_h} \leftarrow \text{GtoBasis}(R'_h)$.
- $e' = (e'_1, e'_2) \leftarrow \text{SamplePre}([A\mid A'_h], T_{A\mid A'_h}, h, \gamma)$ s.t., $e'_2 \neq 0^w$.
- Send $r' := (z', e')$ to $A^{(I)}$. Set $Q_{\text{Adapt}} := Q_{\text{Adapt}} \cup \{(\tau, h, m), (\tau, h, m')\}$ and $Q_r := Q_r \cup \{(\tau, h, m, r), (\tau, h, m', r')\}$.

4. Upon a forgery tuple $(\tau^*, h^*, m^*, r^*)$, if $A^{(I)}$ wins, it holds that $m^* \neq m^*$, $\text{Check}(\tau^*, h^*, m^*, r^*) = \text{Check}(\tau^*, h^*, m^*, r^*) = 1$ and $\gamma \neq m^*$ if $\text{QAdapt} \setminus (\tau^*, h^*, m^*) \notin \text{QAdapt}$. Find $(\tau^*, h^*, m^*) \in \text{QAdapt}$ s.t., $(\tau^*, h^*, m^*, r^*) \in Q_r$. Check$(\tau^*, h^*, m^*, r^*) = 1$ and $m^*$ is never queried to $Q_{\text{Adapt}}$ as the new message w.r.t. tag $\tau^*$. Then $E^{(I)}$ computes a SIS solution as follows.
- Parse $\tilde{r} = (z, e)$ and $r^* = (z^*, e^*)$. Set $\bar{x} := \tau^* \cdot m^* \cdot z$ and $x^* := \tau^* \cdot m^* \cdot z^*$.
- If $(A, x^*, \cdot, \cdot) \notin \mathcal{L}_h$, $E^{(I)}$ samples $R_h \leftarrow \{\pm 1\}^{m \times w}$, computes $A_h = AR_h$, and appends $(A, x^*, A_h, R_h)$ to $\mathcal{L}_h$. Otherwise, $E^{(I)}$ retrieves $A_h$ and $R_h$ from $(A, x^*, A_h, R_h) \in \mathcal{L}_h$. Similarly, $B^{(I)}$ generates or retrieves $A_h$ and $R_h$.
- Compute and return $v := [I_m | R_h^\dagger] \cdot e^* - [I_m | \tilde{R}_h] \cdot \bar{e}$ to its own challenger.

The existence of such $(\tau^*, h^*, \tilde{m})$ in $Q_{\text{Adapt}}$ is proved exactly the same as that in the proof of Lemma 14.

Next we show that $v$ is a valid solution to the SIS problem. Since $(\tau^*, \cdot, m^*) \notin Q_{\text{Adapt}}$ is never queried to the adaptation oracle, matrix $A_h = H(A, x^*)$ with $x^* = \tau^* \cdot m^* \cdot z^*$ corresponding to the forgery $(\tau^*, h^*, m^*, r^*)$ cannot be generated during the adaptation query phase, and hence it must be computed by $A_h = AR_h$. Besides, since $(\tau^*, h^*, \tilde{m}) \in Q_{\text{Adapt}}$ but $\tilde{m}$ is never queried to $Q_{\text{Adapt}}$ as the new message w.r.t. tag $\tau^*$, we know that $(\tau^*, h^*, \tilde{m}, \tilde{r})$ is generated by $A^{(I)}$ itself, and hence the corresponding $\tilde{A}_h = H(A, \tilde{x})$ can only be computed by $\tilde{A}_h = AR_h$. Furthermore, since $\text{Check}(\tau^*, h^*, m^*, r^*) = \text{Check}(\tau^*, h^*, \tilde{m}, \tilde{r}) = 1$, we have

$$[A\mid A_h^\dagger] \cdot e^* = h^* = [A\mid \tilde{A}_h] \cdot \bar{e}$$

where $e^* = (e'_1, e'_2)$, $||e^*|| \leq \gamma \sqrt{m + w}$, $e'_2 \neq 0^w$, $\bar{e} = (e_1, e_2)$, $||\bar{e}|| \leq \gamma \sqrt{m + w}$ and $e_2 \neq 0^w$. Together with our parameter setting that $2\gamma \sqrt{m(m + w)} \leq \beta$, we have $||v|| \leq 2\gamma \sqrt{m(m + w)} \leq \beta$.

It remains to show that $v := [I_m | R_h^\dagger] \cdot e^* - [I_m | \tilde{R}_h] \cdot \bar{e} \neq 0^m$. Denote by $r_i^*$ (resp., $\tilde{r}_i$) the $i$-th column of $R_h^\dagger$ (resp., $\tilde{R}_h$), and $e_{2, i}$ the $i$-th item of $e_2^*$. Since $e_2^* \neq 0^w$, there must exist some index $\nu \in [w]$ s.t., $e_{2, \nu}^* \neq 0$. Now we show that $v = 0^m$ holds with negligible probability. Note that

$$v = e^*_1 + R_h^\dagger e^*_2 - \bar{e}_1 - \tilde{R}_h \bar{e}_2 = 0^m$$

$$\Rightarrow r_i^* = (\bar{e}_1 + \tilde{R}_h \bar{e}_2 - e^*_1 - \sum_{\nu \neq \nu} r_i^* e_{2, i}^*)/e_{2, \nu}^*.$$  \hspace{1cm} (4.5)
Note that \( r^*_v \) is sampled uniformly and independently from \( \{ \pm 1 \}^m \) and the only information of \( r^*_v \) revealed to \( A^{(I)} \) is \( u = Ar^*_v \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n \). Together with Lemma 1 and the parameter setting that \( m \geq O(n \log q) \), we have \( H_{\infty}(r^*_v | u) \geq H_{\infty}(r^*_v) = n \log q = m - n \log q \geq \kappa \), so \( r^*_v \) still has high entropy. Further since \( W \) in equation \( (4.5) \) is independent of \( r^*_v \), the probability that \( r^*_v = W \), i.e., \( (4.5) \) holds, is at most \( 2^{-\kappa} \). Consequently, \( v = 0^m \) holds with probability at most \( 2^{-\kappa} \). Hence \( v \) is a solution to the SIS problem and \( \Pr[G_3 \Rightarrow 1 | A^{(I)}] \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{SIS}}_{n,q,\beta,m}(\kappa) + 2^{-\kappa} \).

Next, we prove that if there exists a PPT \( A^{(II)} \) that wins in \( G_3 \), then we construct a PPT algorithm \( B^{(II)} \) to solve the SIS problem. The algorithm \( B^{(II)} \) is similar to \( B^{(I)} \) except for the step 4, as described below.

4. Upon a forgery tuple \((\tau^*, h^*, m^*, r^*, m'^*, r'^*)\), if \( A^{(II)} \) wins, it holds that \( m^* \neq m'^* \), Check\((\tau^*, h^*, m^*, r^*) = \text{Check}(\tau^*, h^*, m'^*, r'^*) = 1 \) and \((\tau^*, m^*) \notin Q_{\text{Adapt}} \wedge (\tau^*, m'^*) \notin Q_{\text{Adapt}} \). Then \( B^{(II)} \) computes a SIS solution as follows.

- Parse \( r^* = (z^*, e^*) \) and \( r'^* = (z'^*, e'^*) \).
- Set \( x^* := \tau^*||m^*||z^* \) and \( x'^* := \tau^*||m'^*||z'^* \).
- Check whether \((A, x^*, \cdot, \cdot) \in L_h \) if \((A, x^*, \cdot, \cdot) \notin L_h \), \( B^{(II)} \) samples \( R^*_h = \{ \pm 1 \}^{m \cdot n} \), computes \( A^*_h = AR^*_h \) and appends \((A, x^*, A^*_h, R^*_h)\) to \( L_h \). If \((A, x^*, \cdot, \cdot) \in L_h \), \( B^{(II)} \) retrieves \( A^*_h \) and \( R^*_h \) from \((A, x^*, A^*_h, R^*_h) \in L_h \).
- In the same way, \( B^{(II)} \) generates or retrieves \((A, x'^*, A'^*_h, R'^*_h)\).
- Compute and return \( v := [I_m][R^*_h] e^* - [I_m][R'^*_h] e'^* \) to its own challenger.

Then we show that \( v \) is a valid solution to the SIS problem. Since \((\tau^*, \cdot, m^*) \notin Q_{\text{Adapt}} \wedge (\tau^*, \cdot, m'^*) \notin Q_{\text{Adapt}} \) are never queried to the adaptation oracle, matrices \( A^*_h = H(A, x^*) \) with \( x^* = \tau^*||m^*||z^* \) and \( A'^*_h = H(A, x'^*) \) with \( x'^* = \tau^*||m'^*||z'^* \), corresponding to the forgery \((\tau^*, h^*, m^*, r^*) \) and \((\tau^*, h^*, m'^*, r'^*) \) respectively, cannot be generated during the adaptation query phase. Hence \( A^*_h = AR^*_h \) and \( A'^*_h = AR'^*_h \). Now through an analogous analysis as before, \( v := [I_m][R^*_h] e^* - [I_m][R'^*_h] e'^* \) is a valid SIS solution with overwhelming probability. Now we obtain \( \Pr[G_3 \Rightarrow 1 | A^{(II)}] \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{SIS}}_{n,q,\beta,m}(\kappa) + 2^{-\kappa} \).

From Lemma 18, we have

\[
\Pr[G_3 \Rightarrow 1] = \Pr[G_3 \Rightarrow 1 | A^{(II)}] \Pr[A^{(II)}] + \Pr[G_3 \Rightarrow 1 | A^{(II)}] \Pr[A^{(II)}] \\
\leq \text{Adv}^{\text{SIS}}_{n,q,\beta,m}(\kappa). \quad (4.6)
\]

Finally combining Lemmas 15, 16 and 17, and Equation (4.6), it holds that

\[
\Pr[\text{Exp}_{tCH}(\kappa) \Rightarrow 1] \leq \left| \Pr[G_0 \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[G_1 \Rightarrow 1] \right| + \left| \Pr[G_1 \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[G_2 \Rightarrow 1] \right| \\
+ \left| \Pr[G_2 \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[G_3 \Rightarrow 1] \right| + \Pr[G_3 \Rightarrow 1] \\
\leq \text{Adv}^{\text{SIS}}_{n,q,\beta,m}(\kappa) + 2^{-O(\kappa)}. \quad (4.7)
\]

By (4.7), it is easy to see that the CR security of \( tCH' \) is tightly reduced to the SIS assumption. \( \square \)
5 Application of tCH to the Redactable Blockchain

In this section, we show how to apply our tCH in constructing redactable blockchain. In Subsect. 5.1, we introduce some notations of a redactable blockchain. In Subsect. 5.2, we show how to redact a blockchain with a tCH. In Subsect. 5.3, we provide a security analysis of our redactable blockchain.

5.1 Redactable Blockchain

We follow notations of blockchain and redactable blockchain introduced in [14, 3]. According to [3], a redactable block uses two hash functions, one is a cryptographic hash and the other is a chameleon hash. Now we replace the chameleon hash with our tCH, and additionally introduce a unique identifier (like the timestamp, previous hash or position of the block in the chain) into each block to serve as the “tag $\tau$” of tCH. See Fig. 5 for a pictorial presentation.

Let $H : \{0, 1\}^* \to \mathbb{N}$ be a cryptographic hash function and $tCH = (\text{Setup}, \text{Hash}, \text{Adapt}, \text{Check})$ be a tCH. In a redactable blockchain, each block $B$ is of the form

$$B = \langle \text{nonce}, \tau, s, \langle t_r, (h, r) \rangle \rangle_m,$$

where $\text{nonce} \in \mathbb{N}$ denotes the nonce value, $\tau \in \{0, 1\}^*$ denotes a unique identifier, $s \in \mathbb{N}$ is a hash value computed by $H$, $t_r \in \{0, 1\}^x$ denotes the information stored in a block, $(h, r)$ is a hash-randomness pair computed by $\text{Hash}$ from $m := (s || t_r) \in \{0, 1\}^h$ w.r.t. $\tau$, i.e., $(h, r) \leftarrow \text{Hash}(\tau, m)$. We say that a block $B$ is valid if $\text{ValidRB}_q^D(B) = 1$ with

$$\text{ValidRB}_q^D(B) := (H(\text{nonce} || h || \tau) < D) \land (\text{Check}(\tau, h, m, r) = 1) \land (\text{nonce} < q),$$
Algorithm 1: Blockchain Redacting Algorithm

**Input:** The public parameter and trapdoor \((pp, td)\) of \(tCH\).

- A blockchain \(C\) with \(\text{len}(C) = n\).
- A sequence of target indices \(I = (i_1, \ldots, i_k) \subseteq [n]\).
- A sequence of target messages \(M = (tr_{i_1}^*, \ldots, tr_{i_k}^*)\).

**Output:** A redacted blockchain \(C'\) with \(\text{len}(C') = n\).

1. For \(i = 1, \ldots, n\) do
   2. If \(i \in I\) then
      3. Parse the \(i\)-th block \(B_i\) of \(C\) as \(B_i = \langle \text{nonce}_i, \tau_i, s_i, tr_i, (h_i, r_i) \rangle\);
      4. Compute \(r_i^* \leftarrow \text{Adapt}(td, \tau_i, h_i, s_i \parallel tr_i, r_i, s_i \parallel tr_i^*)\);
      5. Set \(B_i^* := \langle \text{nonce}_i, \tau_i, s_i, tr_i^*, (h_i, r_i^*) \rangle\);
      6. Set \(C := C^{\lceil n-i+1 \rceil} \parallel B_i^* \parallel ^1C\);
   7. Return \(C\)

where \(D \in \mathbb{N}\) is the block’s difficulty level and \(q \in \mathbb{N}\) denotes the maximum allowed number of hash queries in a round.

A redactable blockchain \(C\) is a sequence of valid blocks. The head of chain \(C\), denoted by \(\text{head}(C)\), is the rightmost block in it. The length of chain \(C\), denoted by \(\text{len}(C)\), is the number of blocks contained in it. Let \(C = \varepsilon\) if chain \(C\) is empty.

Any chain \(C'\) with head \(\text{head}(C') = \langle \text{nonce}', \tau', s', tr', (h', r') \rangle\) can be extended to a longer one by appending a new valid block \(B = \langle \text{nonce}, \tau, s, tr, (h, r) \rangle\) satisfying \(s = H(\text{nonce}' \parallel h' \parallel \tau')\), and then the head of the extended chain \(C = C' \parallel B\) is changed to \(\text{head}(C) = B\). In case \(C' = \varepsilon\), any valid block \(B\) can append to it.

For a chain \(C\) with length \(\text{len}(C) = n\) and any nonnegative integer \(k \leq n\), we denote by \(C^{\lceil k \rceil}\) the chain resulting from removing the \(k\) rightmost blocks of \(C\), and by \(k \parallel C\) the chain resulting from removing the \(k\) leftmost blocks of \(C\).

### 5.2 Redacting Blocks

In this subsection, we provide a blockchain redacting algorithm to redact blocks. Let \(n, k\) be positive integers s.t., \(k \leq n\). The algorithm takes as input the public parameter and trapdoor of a tagged chameleon hash \(tCH\), a blockchain \(C\) of length \(n\), \(k\) target indices that represent the positions of blocks in \(C\) to be redacted, and \(k\) corresponding new messages for blocks to be redacted, and finally returns a redacted blockchain \(C'\). The detailed description is given in Algorithm 1.

### 5.3 Security Analysis

In this subsection, we provide a security analysis for the resulting redactable blockchain given a \(tCH\) with CR security. Note that \(tCH\) works in the one-time tag mode in the redactable blockchain since the \(tCH\) hash value w.r.t., each settled block is computed with a unique tag and authorized adaptations are made only for those settled blocks. Then f-CR of \(tCH\) is equivalent to CR according
to Theorem 1. Therefore, all we need to do is to prove that the redactable blockchain is secure as long as tCH has f-CR security.

As we described in Subsect. 5.1, each block $B$ in the chain is of the form $B = \langle nonce, \tau, s, tr, (h, r) \rangle$. For expression simplicity, we only consider the tCH-related parts of each block and briefly write $B$ as $B = \langle \tau, h, m, r \rangle$ (note that $m = s \| tr$). Recall that in a redactable blockchain system, the adversary sees all original blocks $B_1, B_2, B_3, \cdots$ and adapted blocks $\{B_{1i}\}_{i \in [n]}, \{B_{2i}\}_{i \in [n]}, \{B_{3i}\}_{i \in [n]}$, \cdots, where each $n_j = \text{poly}(\kappa)$ denotes the number of adaptations for block $B_j$.

The aim of an adversary is to redact the chain by adapting some block $B_j = \langle \tau_j, h_j, m_j, r_j \rangle$ to a new one $B^* = \langle \tau_j, h_j, m^*, r^* \rangle$, such that $h_j = \text{Hash}(\tau_j, m_j; r_j) = \text{Hash}(\tau_j, m^*; r^*)$ and $m^* \notin \{m_j\} \cup \{m^*_{1i}\}_{i \in [n]}$ w.r.t. those $B_j$ and $\{B^*_{1i}\}_{i \in [n]}$.

We show that if there exists an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ performing the above attack successfully, then we can break the full collision resistance of tCH. If $\mathcal{A}$ wins, it must hold that $h_j = \text{Hash}(\tau_j, m_j; r_j) = \text{Hash}(\tau_j, m^*; r^*)$ and $m_j$ is fresh w.r.t. ($\tau_j, h_j$).

In this case, we find a tuple $(\tau_j, h_j, m^*, r^*, m_j, r_j)$ s.t., $h_j = \text{Hash}(\tau_j, m_j; r_j) = \text{Hash}(\tau_j, m^*; r^*)$ and $(\tau_j, h_j, m^*)$ is fresh, and hence break the f-CR of tCH.

Therefore, the security of the resulting redactable blockchain is reduced to the f-CR security of tCH. Given the equivalence of f-CR and CR in the scenario of redactable blockchain, we know that, the redactable blockchain is secure as long as the underlying tCH has CR security.

Finally with Theorems 2 and 3, both our tCH constructions in Subsect. 4.1 and Subsect. 4.2 can serve as secure compilers converting a conventional blockchain to a redactable one.

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References


A Proof of Theorem 1

**Theorem 1** If a tagged chameleon hash \( t_{CH} \) satisfies collision resistance, then it also satisfies full collision resistance when it is used in the one-time tag mode. More precisely, for any PPT adversary \( A \), it holds that
\[
\text{Adv}_{t_{CH}, A}^{fcr}(\kappa) \leq \text{Adv}_{t_{CH}}^{cr}(\kappa).
\]

**Proof of Theorem 1** Let \( t_{CH} \) work in the one-time tag mode. We show that if there exists an adversary \( A \) breaking the f-CR security of \( t_{CH} \), then we can construct an algorithm \( B \) breaking the CR security of \( t_{CH} \) as shown below.

**Algorithm B**. \( B \) is given the public parameter \( pp \) from its own challenger \( C \) and has access to the adaptation oracle \( \mathcal{O}_{Adapt} \).

1. During the setup phase, \( B \) sets \( \mathcal{Q}_{Adapt} := \emptyset \) and sends \( pp \) to \( A \).
2. On receiving an adaptation query \((\tau, h, m, r, m')\) from \( A \), \( B \) sends it to \( \mathcal{O}_{Adapt} \) as its own query and receives \( r' \) from \( C \). Note that, since \( t_{CH} \) works in the one-time tag mode, each tag \( \tau \) is hashed only once and should be uniquely bound with a hash value \( h \). Hence there does not exist triple \((\tau, h'', m)\) in \( \mathcal{Q}_{Adapt} \) s.t., \( h'' \neq h \). Due to a similar reason, given \((\tau, h, m')\) \( \notin \mathcal{Q}_{Adapt} \), we know that \((\tau, \cdot, m') \notin \mathcal{Q}_{Adapt} \) (otherwise, \( \tau \) is bound with both \( h \) and some \( h'' \neq h \)). In this case, query \((\tau, h, m, r, m')\) is valid for CR security if it is valid for f-CR security. Then \( B \) sets \( \mathcal{Q}_{Adapt} := \mathcal{Q}_{Adapt} \cup \{ (\tau, h, m), (\tau, h, m') \} \) and returns \( r' \) to \( A \).

\(^3\) W.l.o.g., we assume that for each adaptation query \((\tau, h, m, r, m')\), the adapted message \( m' \) is fresh w.r.t., \( (\tau, h) \) (see observation 3).
3. On receiving the forgery \((\tau^*, h^*, m^*, r^*, m'^*, r'^*)\), \(B\) sends \((\tau^*, h^*, m^*, r^*, m'^*, r'^*)\) to \(C\) as its own forgery.

Now we prove that if \(A\) wins, then \(B\) wins when \(t_{CH}\) is used in the one-time tag mode. According to the definition of f-CR, we know that \((\tau^*, h^*, m^*) \notin Q_{Adapt}\). Then we consider the following two cases.

- **Case 1.** \((\tau^*, h^*, m^*) \notin Q_{Adapt} \land (\tau^*, \cdot, m'^*) \in Q_{Adapt}\). Since \(t_{CH}\) works in the one-time tag mode, tag \(\tau^*\) is uniquely bound with \(h^*\). Then \((\tau^*, h^*, m^*) \notin Q_{Adapt}\) implies \((\tau^*, \cdot, m'^*) \notin Q_{Adapt}\), and \((\tau^*, \cdot, m'^*) \in Q_{Adapt}\) implies \((\tau^*, h^*, m'^*) \in Q_{Adapt}\) (otherwise, \(\tau^*\) corresponds to both \(h^*\) and some \(h \neq h^*\), which is impossible). In this case, the forgery \((\tau^*, h^*, m^*, m'^*)\) satisfies \((\tau^*, \cdot, m^*) \notin Q_{Adapt} \land (\tau^*, h^*, m'^*) \in Q_{Adapt}\), and hence \(\text{Valid}(\tau^*, h^*, m^*, m'^*) = 1\).

- **Case 2.** \((\tau^*, h^*, m^*) \notin Q_{Adapt} \land (\tau^*, \cdot, m'^*) \notin Q_{Adapt}\). For the similar reason, \((\tau^*, h^*, m^*) \notin Q_{Adapt}\) implies \((\tau^*, \cdot, m^*) \notin Q_{Adapt}\). Hence this case also implies \(\text{Valid}(\tau^*, h^*, m^*, m'^*) = 1\).

According to the above analysis, we know that if \((\tau^*, h^*, m^*, r^*, m'^*, r'^*)\) is a valid forgery for f-CR security, then it is also a valid forgery for CR. In this case, \(B\) wins whenever \(A\) wins. This completes the proof. \(\square\)