Protecting Quantum Procrastinators with Lifted Signatures: a Case Study in Cryptocurrencies

Or Sattath\textsuperscript{1} and Shai Wyborski\textsuperscript{1,2}

\textsuperscript{1}Computer Science Department, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
\textsuperscript{2}School of Computer Science and Engineering, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

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Abstract

Current solutions to quantum vulnerabilities of widely used cryptographic schemes involve migrating users to post-quantum schemes before quantum attacks become feasible. This work deals with protecting quantum procrastinators: users that failed to migrate to post-quantum cryptography in time.

To address this problem in the context of digital signatures, we introduce a technique called signature lifting, that allows us to lift a deployed pre-quantum signature scheme satisfying a certain property to a post-quantum signature scheme that uses the same keys. Informally, the said property is that a post-quantum one-way function is used “somewhere along the way” to derive the public-key from the secret-key. Our constructions of signature lifting relies heavily on the post-quantum digital signature scheme Picnic (Chase et al., CCS’17).

Our main case-study is cryptocurrencies, where this property holds in two scenarios: when the public-key is generated via a key-derivation function or when the public-key hash is posted instead of the public-key itself. We propose a modification, based on signature lifting, that can be applied in many cryptocurrencies for securely spending pre-quantum coins in presence of quantum adversaries. Our construction improves upon existing constructions in two major ways: it is not limited to pre-quantum coins whose ECDSA public-key has been kept secret (and in particular, it handles all coins that are stored in addresses generated by HD wallets), and it does not require access to post-quantum coins or using side payments to pay for posting the transaction.
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1 Introduction

The canonical solution for quantum attacks on widely used cryptographic schemes is to migrate users to post-quantum schemes before quantum attacks become feasible. The focus of this work is *quantum procrastinators*, namely, users who remain dependent on the security of pre-quantum cryptography in the era of scalable quantum computation.

There are many possible reasons for procrastinators to exist:

- Most notably, the tendency of individuals and organizations to procrastinate: some users would not act in a timely manner. Even after the vulnerability is identified and a solution is available, it might take a long time for organizations to adapt to changes due to security risks. For example, recall the WEP standard for securing local wireless networks. Even though the vulnerabilities of WEP to were identified and fixed by the succeeding WPA standard within months, it took about a decade for the majority of systems their systems due to critical vulnerabilities. Criminals were able to exploit these delays to steal millions of credit cards [Bar21, Section 6.2.1].

- An unexpected technological breakthrough, perhaps done in secret, could make quantum attacks faster than expected.

- Post-quantum technologies have not been battle-tested and scrutinized to a fraction of the extent widely used cryptographic schemes have, and are still rapidly evolving and improving in terms of security and performance, which incentivizes delaying adoption.

In this work, we focus on users who rely on pre-quantum signature schemes whose public-key is known to the adversary. To help such procrastinators, we introduce post-quantum *signature lifting*: a technique for lifting an already deployed pre-quantum signature scheme to a post-quantum signature scheme *with the same keys*, given that a post-quantum one-way function is applied “somewhere along the way” when computing the public-key from the secret-key. This property does not hold for commonly used signature schemes such as ECDSA or Schnorr signatures. However, there are several applications of digital signature that could be recast such that it does hold. The two scenarios we consider are a) when a hash of the public-key is provided rather than the public-key itself, and b) when the secret-key is generated using a key-derivation function.

1.1 Case Study: Cryptocurrency Procrastinators

Bitcoin, Ethereum, and most other cryptocurrencies rely on the security of signature schemes that are susceptible to quantum attacks, such as the ECDSA and Schnorr signature schemes. Even an unspent transaction (UTXO) whose public-key is kept secret, while only its hash is available on the blockchain, is susceptible to attacks while the transaction spending it is in the mempool [But13].

The canonical solution for quantum attacks on widely used cryptographic schemes is to migrate users to post-quantum schemes before quantum attacks become feasible. The focus of this work is *quantum procrastinators*, namely, users who remain dependent on the security of pre-quantum cryptography in the era of scalable quantum computation.

We consider the following question:

**Question 1:** how can cryptocurrencies maximize the number of coins that procrastinators could securely spend?

\[1\]and cryptographers
We say that a method to spend pre-quantum UTXOs is quantum-cautious if it is secure even in the presence of quantum adversaries. Current quantum-cautious spending methods [BM14, SIZ+18, IKS19] allow cautiously spending pre-quantum UTXOs that are hashed, that is, whose public-key has not leaked (e.g., leakage can occur by using the same address for several UTXOs and only spending some of them). However, these methods have a considerable drawback: to pay a fee to the miner for including the transaction, the user must either use a side payment or have access to post-quantum UTXOs.

Our cautious spending methods provide two major improvements. First, they allow cautiously spending hashed pre-quantum UTXOs without requiring a side-payment or a post-quantum UTXO. Second, they extend the set of cautiously spendable UTXOs to include:

- UTXOs whose address was generated by an HD wallet (see Appendix B), even if the public-key has leaked,

- UTXOs whose public-key has leaked even if it was not generated by a key-derivation function, as long as the adversary is unaware that the public-key was not generated by a key-derivation function, and

- UTXOs whose secret-key was lost, but the fact that it was lost was kept secret by the user.

The protocol is designed such that attempting to recover a UTXO of the second or third type requires leaving a deposit that can be claimed by the true owner of the UTXO if it happens to be of the first type, making it costly for an attacker to attempt stealing arbitrary transactions, hoping to land on a stealable UTXO.

To make the latter two types spendable, all procrastinators who own pre-quantum UTXOs whose public-keys have been leaked must be online periodically (e.g., once a year) to notice attempts at stealing their coins. Allowing only spending the first type avoids this drawback while still considerably increasing the set of cautiously-spendable UTXOs.

We stress that a large majority of bitcoin arguably resides in UTXOs whose address is a derived public-key (or a hash thereof). In particular, all UTXOs generated by a Hierarchical Deterministic (HD) wallet [Wui13] fall under this category. As of 2022, all bitcoin.org recommended wallets are HD wallets, and have been HD wallets since as early as 2015\(^2\). According to an analysis by CryptoQuant [Cry22], as of September 2022, UTXOs generated during and after 2015 contain more than 16.5 million bitcoins.

Furthermore, in the newly deployed Bitcoin update Taproot [WNT20], the public-key of the owner of a UTXO is posted to the blockchain in the clear. Hence, current methods are unable to quantum-cautiously spend UTXOs generated by following the Taproot specification, whereas our methods can. Taproot was deployed in November 2021, and its adoption has been steadily increasing since. As of May 2023, about 30% of Bitcoin’s transaction throughput is spent to Taproot addresses [Tra23].

Our methods can be deployed in either restrictive mode, in which some funds of honest procrastinators are effectively burned, or permissive mode, in which those funds are spendable but require a large deposit as well as a very long challenge period (during which anyone can challenge the transaction by posting a fraud proof). Hence, it is desirable to defer deploying these methods as much as reasonable. Furthermore, since the current state of affairs is that quantum computers are not an immediate concern, users will tend to procrastinate as they will only realize that quantum threats are relevant after their coins are stolen. Both considerations motivate the next question:

\(^2\)As could be verified by tediously looking them up one by one.
Question 2: how can we warn users in advance that quantum adversaries will emerge in the near future? Can we make this warning in consensus?

Towards this goal, we present quantum canaries, a mechanism for signaling the emergence of quantum adversaries in a way that could be read off the blockchain. Quantum canaries are puzzles designed to be infeasible for classical computers but solvable for quantum computers whose scale is significantly smaller than required to attack ECDSA signatures. We propose to use quantum canaries to determine the block from which restrictions on spending pre-quantum UTXOs will take effect.

Even though we try to be as general as possible, some of our results may be hard to adjust, for example, when considering cryptocurrencies with advanced smart-contract capabilities, such as Ethereum, which may have more complicated logic; or privacy-oriented cryptocurrencies, such as Zerocash [Ben14], where special attention is given to privacy and anonymity—aspects which we completely ignore in this work.

1.2 Types of UTXOs

In this paper, we discuss several methods for quantum cautious spending of UTXOs. Each method is only applicable to UTXOs satisfying some conditions, so we first identify several useful subsets of the UTXO set, defined by the information available to the owner of the UTXO and to an adversary trying to steal the coins in the UTXO. When considering addresses that were derived by an HD wallet (see Appendix B), we always assume that the adversary has no access to the seed used to generate the address of the UTXO (that is, we consider anyone holding the derivation seed an “owner” of the UTXO). We summarize the properties of these sets in Table 1.

- **Hashed**: a UTXO whose secret-key is known to the owner and whose public-key is not known to the adversary.
- **Derived**: a UTXO whose owner knows a derivation seed from which the signature keys were derived (see Appendix B).
- **Naked**: a UTXO whose public-key is known to the adversary, and whose owner knows the secret-key but not the derivation seed (either because it was lost or because the public-key is non-derived), yet the adversary does not know that the owner does not have access to the derivation seed.
- **Lost**: a UTXO whose secret-key is not known to anyone, but whose public-key is known to the adversary, yet the adversary does not know the user does not know the secret-key. Some of our methods allow owners of lost UTXOs to recover their funds (see Section 4.4).
- **Stealable**: a UTXO whose derivation seed is not known to the owner (either because they lost it or because the signature keys were not derived from a key-derivation function), and whose public-key is known to the adversary as well as the fact that the owner does not have the derivation key. Such UTXOs are called stealable as they would be stolen by a quantum adversary if unrestrictive FawkesCoin is implemented (see Section 4.3). If permissive FawkesCoin is implemented (see Section 4.4), these funds would also be stolen by classical adversaries.

3For an overview of the UTXO model and blockchains in general, we refer the reader to [NBF+16]
- **Doomed**: a UTXO whose secret-key and public-key are unknown to anyone. We call such UTXO doomed as no one (including a quantum adversary) can spend these with any of our methods.

**Remark 1.** Note that most pairs of the two sets above are disjoint, with hashed and derived UTXOs being the only exception. If a UTXO is both hashed and derived, the user could treat it as any of the two when spending it.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Derivation Seed</th>
<th>Secret-Key</th>
<th>Public-Key</th>
<th>Stealable</th>
<th>Doomed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>✓ □ □ □</td>
<td>✓ □ □ (□)</td>
<td>✓ □ □ (□)</td>
<td>□ □ (□)</td>
<td>□ □ (□)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ady.</td>
<td>Public-Key</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>□ □ (□)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-derived/lost</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>□ □ (□)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: The different types of UTXOs are defined by the information available to the owner and an adversary. Each column represents a subset of the UTXO set, and each row represents a particular datum regarding this UTXO and whether it is known to the owner/adversary. The non-derived/lost row, in particular, represents a scenario where the adversary knows that one of the following holds: either the UTXO address was not generated by an HD wallet, or the owner lost access to the corresponding secret-key (note these scenarios are not mutually exclusive). ✓ indicates that the property described in the corresponding row is irrelevant to the type defined by the column (e.g., a UTXO whose public-key is known to the user but not known to the adversary is hashed regardless of whether it was derived or not), a value is parenthesized to indicate that it could be inferred from other rows in the same column (e.g., in a derived UTXO the owner knows the derivation seed, so they can derive the secret- and public-keys).

### 1.3 Signature lifting

A key ingredient in our proposed solutions is a novel technique we call *signature lifting*. While we apply this technique to cryptocurrencies, it is useful in various scenarios and therefore is of independent interest. We overview lifted signatures in the current section and defer a more formal treatment to Section 2.

Chase et al. [CDG⁺17] present **PICNIC**: a construction that transforms any post-quantum one-way function \( f \) into a post-quantum signature scheme **PICNIC(\( f \))**. In the scheme **PICNIC(\( f \))**, the secret-key is generated by uniformly sampling a point \( x \) in the domain of \( f \), and the corresponding public-key is \( f(x) \).

Our contribution is the observation that in some cases, by instantiating the **PICNIC** scheme with an appropriate function, we can *lift* an existing pre-quantum signature scheme to a post-quantum signature scheme *with the same keys*. Loosely speaking, the required property is that...
a post-quantum one-way function is applied “somewhere along the way” when generating the public-key from the secret key.

One setting where this property holds is hashed UTXOs, which (as we explain in Section 2.2) can be interpreted as a slight modification of ECDSA: instead of using the ECDSA public-key $pk$ as a public-key, the hash thereof $H(pk)$ is used; when signing a message, $pk$ is attached to the ECDSA signature $\sigma$. Since we assume the hash function is post-quantum one-way, we can lift the resulting scheme to obtain a quantum-cautious method for hashed UTXOs. We call this method key lifting.

In Section 2.3 we introduce seed lifting – an application of signature lifting towards cautiously spending derived UTXOs. The idea is to instantiate PICNIC with the key-derivation function used to generate the master secret-key (see Appendix A.2.2). We call this method seed lifting.

1.4 Lifted FawkesCoin

As we explain in Section 2.4, one problem with lifted signatures is that the size of such a signature is at least a few dozen kilobytes. Consequently, using such signatures directly will be expensive and will have a strong detrimental effect on the throughput of the network.

We overcome this by combining signature lifting with the FawkesCoin protocol of [BM14] to obtain a method we call lifted FawkesCoin.

The core idea of the FawkesCoin protocol is that the payer first posts a post-quantum commitment to their transaction, then she waits a predetermined number of blocks, and only then does she reveal the transaction. Since the public-key is only leaked during the reveal phase, the payer obtains security against a front-running adversary, as the adversary would have to complete an entire commit-wait-reveal phase before the revealed transaction is posted to the blockchain.

The FawkesCoin protocol (along with follow-up work leveraging it towards quantum cautious spending [SIZ+18, IKS19]) has a prohibitive limitation: it does not provide a spam-secure way to pay the miner for including the commitment (see Section 3 for an in-depth discussion of FawkesCoin and the limitations thereof).

Lifted FawkesCoin solves this problem: instead of using a standard signature, the payer uses a lifted signature. The signature can be verified by the miner, but is only posted on the blockchain in case the user fails to reveal the transaction in time. Thus, as long as all parties are honest, lifted FawkesCoin requires as much storage as vanilla FawkesCoin, while protecting miners from spammers.

We fully review the Lifted FawkesCoin protocol for hashed UTXOs in Section 3. Combined with seed lifting, the Lifted FawkesCoin could be similarly used for spending derived UTXOs (see Section 3.1).

1.5 Restrictive and Permissive FawkesCoin

Restrictive FawkesCoin is an extension of Bonneau’s and Miller original algorithm (or rather, their proposed application of this algorithm to Bitcoin) that additionally allows spending derived UTXOs, using the derivation seed rather than the ECDSA public-key as the secret hashed data.

A pleasant consequence of signature lifting is that it allows us to extend the applicability of the original (non-lifted) FawkesCoin protocol to spend derived, naked, and even lost UTXOs.

The idea is simple: allow anyone to spend any UTXO without providing any proof of ownership. However, transactions spending a UTXO this way must provide a deposit and wait a long challenge period during which the owner of the UTXO is allowed to post a lifted signature as a proof of ownership. If they do so, the transaction is invalidated, and the deposit is paid to the owner of the UTXO.
The advantage of the honest user over the adversary is that the adversary cannot know whether a UTXO is derived or not. An adversary attempting to steal a UTXO will lose the deposit unless the UTXO is non-derived or lost.

We flesh out the permissive FawkesCoin protocol in full detail in Section 4. Unrestrictive FawkesCoin is a compromise between Permissive and restrictive Fawkescoin, allowing to spend naked UTXOs but not lost UTXOs. Its advantage over permissive FawkesCoin is that it can be implemented in a soft-fork (see Table 2).

We note that these solutions do not allow using the spent UTXO to pay the transaction fees (we discuss this further in Section 3). This motivates us to propose a combined solution that allows FawkesCoin and Lifted FawkesCoin to work together (see Section 1.8).

Remark 2. The proof of ownership in both permissive and lifted FawkesCoin is an example of a fraud-proof. That is, instead of prohibiting foul play we design the protocol such that a fraud is detectable and provable. This allows us to penalize foul play. Fraud-proofs have been used before in cryptocurrencies, so for example Al-Bassam et al. [ASBK21].

1.6 Quantum Canaries

A necessary precaution against quantum looters is to decide on a point in time after which pre-quantum spending is no longer allowed. The simplest way to do so is for the community to agree on an arbitrary point. However, since disabling pre-quantum spending effectively implies burning many coins, isolating such a point could be a source of great contention. Moreover, since the progress of quantum technologies is very hard to predict, the chosen time might be too early (leading to unnecessary loss of coins) or too late (allowing quantum adversaries to loot the chain). We propose quantum canaries, a mechanism designed to detect, and respond to, increasing quantum capabilities in consensus. We stress that our spending methods are agnostic to how the time to initiate them was determined.

In the early 19th century, miners used caged canaries to notice leakages of deadly gasses that were otherwise hard to detect. The miners would go into the mine carrying a cage with a canary, and as long as the canary lived, they would assume that the air was safe to breathe. Using canaries over human beings had two advantages: loss of canary life was considered much preferable to loss of human life, and canaries were more sensitive to lethal gasses such as carbon monoxide, so the death of a canary signified the presence of hazardous gasses well before the human holding the cage would be exposed to a lethal dosage.

Inspired by this solution, in Appendix D we propose to set up quantum canaries on the blockchain. Quantum canaries are bounties locked away behind classically infeasible challenges devised to require quantum computers considerably smaller than those required to steal unsafe coins. The cost of paying the bounty (be it by raising funds from the community or by a hard-fork to mint bounty funds) is far smaller than the consequences of a full-blown quantum thief capable of stealing unsafe coins. Killing the canary (that is, claiming the bounty) requires a much smaller “dosage” of quantum capability. Most importantly, the canary would act as a global beacon providing a warning that quantum adversaries are about to emerge.

Entities capable of killing the canary and claiming the bounty might rather wait for their quantum technology to ripen sufficiently for stealing coins. However, while they wait, another entity could emerge that would kill the canary, depriving the original entity of both the bounty and the loot. This dynamic incentivizes quantum entities to claim the bounty. We provide an analysis of this dynamic in Appendix D.5.

Since this act of ornithicide is recorded on the blockchain, policies could be implemented with respect to the well-being of the canary, such as ‘do not accept transactions spending naked UTXOs if the canary has been dead for at least ten thousand blocks.’
Remark 3. While completing this work, we became aware that quantum canaries were already proposed by Justin Drake in the Ethereum research forum [Dra18] as a general method to protect the network from exploits discovered in widely used cryptographic primitives. We retain the discussion about canaries as it is useful for our overall solution, and since we expand upon the discussion in [Dra18] in two regards: in Appendix D.2 we argue that canaries need to be as similar as possible to the scheme they are protecting, pointing out existing research particularly relevant to the special case where the canary is used to protect ECDSA signatures from quantum adversaries; in Appendix D.5 we provide a game theoretic analysis of entities competing for the bounty furnished by the quantum canaries. We also borrowed the name “quantum canaries” from [Dra18] and adapted the text accordingly. We thank Andrew Miller for bringing this to our attention.

The idea of posting UTXOs that could be spent by solving a cryptographic challenge was already suggested and implemented by Peter Todd in [Tod13]. He created several UTXOs, each only spendable by providing a collision in a particular hash function, including SHA1, RIPEMD-160, SHA-256 and several compositions thereof. Of these UTXOs, only the first has been claimed so far.

1.7 Properties and Comparison of Spending Methods

In this work we provide several different quantum cautious spending methods, that can be compared to each other through several different properties. In this section we describe the properties we consider relevant, which are summarized in Table 2.

We use Bitcoin as the baseline for our comparison. In particular, we consider the number of confirmation blocks in the “current state” to be six blocks, which is the default number of blocks required by the standard Bitcoin wallet.

We stress that the properties stated in Table 2 are correct under the assumption that no two solutions are implemented together. In Section 5.2 we discuss how combining different solutions might render them insecure, and propose ways to combine them securely.

Cautiously Spendable A pre-quantum UTXO is considered cautiously-spendable with respect to a given method if implementing this method allows spending it in a way that is not vulnerable to quantum attackers. We use ✓ to denote the subtle scenario where a UTXO can be stolen, but an attempt to do so requires the adversary to take a considerable monetary risk. This happens in unrestrictive and permissive FawkesCoin for naked and lost UTXOs. If an adversary claims such a UTXO, they will manage to steal the coins therein. However, if an adversary claims a non-hashed derived UTXO, the rightful owner of the UTXO would post a fraud-proof, and the adversary would lose her deposit. Hence, the owners of naked and lost UTXOs are protected by the adversary’s inability to distinguish them from derived UTXOs.

Confirmation Times The number of blocks a user must wait after a transaction has been posted to the network before the transaction is considered confirmed. We write the multiplicative factor by which the number of blocks increases compared with the current state (where we consider the current confirmation times in Bitcoin to be 6 blocks). In methods where spending a UTXO requires posting two messages to the blockchain (a commit and a reveal), we count the number of blocks since the first message.

Transaction Size Increase The size of a transaction, compared with the size of a current transaction spending ECDSA signed UTXOs. Multiplicative notation \( \times x \) means that the size of a transaction is \( x \) times that of a current transaction. Additive notation \( +x \) means that spending
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cautiously Spendable</th>
<th>Confirmation Times</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hashed/Derived Naked Lost</td>
<td>Hashed/Derived Naked Lost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current State</td>
<td>✗ ✗ ✗ ×</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FawkesCoin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictive</td>
<td>✓ ✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrestrictive</td>
<td>✓ ✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permissive</td>
<td>✓ ✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifted Spending</td>
<td>✓ ✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifted FawkesCoin</td>
<td>✓ ✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: A comparison of the quantum-cautious spending methods with the current state as a baseline. Each row represents a method, and the columns represent different properties of the methods reviewed below the table. Each method is compared to the preceding method, except the “Lifted Spending” method is compared with restrictive FawkesCoin, as indicated by the arrow. Green circles and red boxes designate what we consider the most significant advantages and disadvantages respectively of each method with respect to the method it is being compared to. Cells that are not applicable (e.g., using the current state to spend a lost UTXO) are left blank. The meaning of each column is discussed below. The ✗ symbol indicates that the property corresponding to the column is partially satisfied in a manner explicated in the description of the relevant column. The table headers and cells hyperlink to relevant sections in the text. All methods below “Current State” are original to the current work. The FawkesCoin protocol was first introduced in [BM14], but even our most restrictive version expands on the original protocol by allowing spending derived UTXOs. See Section 1.10 for details.

Several UTXOσs is possible by adding a fixed amount of data larger than a current transaction by a factor of x. In particular, the amount of added data does not depend on the number of UTXOσs spent.

**Spendability Threshold** The minimal value a UTXO should have so it could be spent using this method without the user or the miner risking losing money. The values in the table represent the factor of increase compared to the current spendability threshold. In most methods, this is the same as the cost of spending the transaction (i.e., the transaction fee). However, in Lifted
FawkesCoin, the spendability threshold is actually much higher. This follows since the UTXO must be valuable enough to cover the costs of posting a proof of ownership in case the user fails to reveal the transaction. In methods where many UTXOs may be spent at once (e.g., in non-Lifted FawkesCoin, one can post many commitments in the payload of a single post-quantum UTXO), we consider the threshold in the “many UTXOs” limit. We stress that spendability threshold is not the same as dust (see Appendix A.3.3): dust refers to UTXOs whose value is in the same order of magnitude as it would cost to spend them, regardless of what method is used; on the other hand, a UTXO could be valuable enough to be above the spendability threshold of one method while being below the spendability threshold of another method.

**Works Without Post-Quantum UTXOs** Some of our methods require the user to have a post-quantum UTXO (namely, a UTXO whose address is associated with a post-quantum signature public key), for paying fees or deposits. Such methods are marked with✗, while methods that work even without a post-quantum UTXO are marked with✓.

**No Delay Attacks** A delay attack is a way to make an arbitrary UTXO unspendable for a fixed but meaningful period of time (say, a few hours) at a low cost (say, the cost of posting a transaction on the blockchain). We do not consider methods that allow cheap delay attacks suitable. Hence, no row in Table 2 has✗ in this column. Lifted FawkesCoin is the only method marked with✓ to indicate that in this method, delay attacks are possible but are automatically detected, and the subject of the attack is compensated by the perpetrator.

**Can be implemented in a Soft-fork** It is true if the method can be implemented as a soft-fork, that is, in a way that does not require the entire network to upgrade their nodes (see Appendix A.3.2).

**Offline Users not Risked** Some methods require owners of derived UTXOs which are not hashed to monitor the network for attempts to spend their coins. We use✓ in methods for which this is not the case.

### 1.8 Putting it all Together

It is evident from Table 2 that different protocols provide different trade-offs, which are both suitable for different users. However, combining solutions carelessly can render them insecure. For example, allowing spending pre-quantum UTXOs as they are spent today renders FawkesCoin insecure, since once the transaction is revealed the adversary can use the public-key without having to wait. For identical reasons, implementing lifted spending also renders FawkesCoin insecure. We therefore recommend not to implement lifted spending.

Security issues also arise when trying to combine FawkesCoin and lifted FawkesCoin together. In Section 5.3 we explain in detail how FawkesCoin and Lifted FawkesCoin can be securely combined by dividing the network into epochs, during which only one protocol is allowed.

We propose to implement a quantum canary. The death of the canary would initiate a countdown, after which the consensus rules of the quantum era are enforced:

- FawkesCoin and Lifted FawkesCoin are activated and rotated in epochs.
- Directly spending pre-quantum UTXOs becomes prohibited.
- Permissive FawkesCoin is allowed for naked UTXOs whose address was not posted to the blockchain prior to 2013.
In Section 5 we specify a fully fleshed protocol and provide and motivate concrete values for the canary bounty, countdown length, epoch lengths, etc.

1.9 Paper organization

The paper is organized to introduce the technique of signature lifting, followed by an application thereof to construct the lifted FawkesCoin protocol. In Appendix A.1 and Appendix A.3 we provide a brief exposition of digital signatures and blockchains, respectively, sufficient to render the current version self-contained. In Section 2 we define the notion of a signature lifting, and apply it to two common types of signature schemes: schemes with a hashed public-key, and schemes whose secret-key was created by a key-derivation function. In Section 3 we introduce and thoroughly discuss the lifted FawkesCoin protocol. In Section 4 we present permissive FawkesCoin, and discuss its advantages and disadvantages over lifted FawkesCoin. Finally, in Section 5, we propose a holistic solution by carefully combining quantum canaries, permissive FawkesCoin, and lifted FawkesCoin into a concrete protocol.

This text is a summarized version of our work, where many details and discussions were omitted for the sake of brevity, with the full version available online [SW23]. While the current version is mostly self-contained, the full version provides a more in-depth discussion of most aspects of our work, including a more complete discussion of the quantum threats on blockchain and the solutions proposed so far, a fully detailed proof of the security of seed-lifting (provided with a formal introduction and treatment of key-derivation functions and HD wallets), and an extended discussion of quantum canaries and the game theory of the incentives thereof. Throughout the text, we provided references to the full version when applicable.

1.10 Related Works

The loot currently waiting for a quantum adversary on the Bitcoin network was explored in [IKK20].

The observation that secure signature schemes could be constructed from a one-way function (not necessarily a cryptographic hash function) given reliable time-stamping (or append-only log) was first made by Anderson et al. [ABC+98], who used it to construct Fawkes signatures. A crucial property of this construction is that the signature only requires a single preimage as a key and a single image as a signature, unlike Lamport signatures and similar hash-based one-time signatures whose signatures are typically much larger.

FawkesCoin was first introduced by Bonneau and Miller [BM14], who realized that the blockchain itself could be used as a reliable time-stamping service (at least for blocks sufficiently temporally separated) and thus can be used to implement Anderson et al.’s Fawkes signatures. Bonneau and Miller concede that the security properties of Bitcoin are preferable to their protocol (especially in the way it responds to chain forks) but argue that their protocol could be combined with Bitcoin to mitigate “a catastrophic algorithmic break of discrete log on the curve P-256 or rapid advances in quantum computing.” The authors note the problem of paying fees for transfer messages and suggest a few possible solutions. However, these solutions do not prevent denial-of-service attacks, as we discuss in Section 3.

As was noted in [But13], spending hashed UTXOs directly is not quantum-cautious, as a quantum adversary listening to the mempool could recover the public-key from the transaction and use it to post a competing transaction spending the same UTXO. Applying the ideas of [BM14] to solve the problem of safely migrating funds from a pre-quantum to a post-quantum UTXO was first discussed in [SIZ+18, IKS19] (the authors thereof point out several threads from Twitter and the Bitcoin developer mailing list to which they attribute first suggesting this approach) by means of key surrogacy. They use the techniques of [BM14] to build a mechanism
allowing a user to publicly attach to any existing pre-quantum public-key a post-quantum surrogate key, so that the network would expect UTXOs signed with the pre-quantum key to pass verification with respect to the post-quantum key. This approach achieves some minor improvements upon FawkesCoin but still only allows spending hashed UTXOs and fails to address the problem of paying the fees from the pre-quantum UTXO.

Coladangelo and Sattath [CS20, Section 4.1] originally proposed the idea of allowing users to claim lost coins by leaving a deposit, which could be claimed by the rightful owner in case of a theft attempt. We use the same approach in unrestrictive and permissive FawkesCoin (see Section 4).

The technique of using arbitrary post-quantum one-way functions to construct post-quantum digital signatures was presented in [CDG+17], we review this work in more depth Section 2. A follow-up work [KZ20] reduces the signature size considerably.

The canary introduced in Section 1.6 has some shared features with bug bounties. Breidenbach et al. [BDTJ18] introduces Hydra, a systematic approach for bug bounties for smart-contracts. Their approach is tailored to finding implementation bugs in smart contracts and, therefore, cannot be used in our setting. Ref. [RMD+21] presents and analyzes a framework for prediction markets, which can be used to estimate the future risk of an attack on ECDSA, which would break a cryptocurrency. The motivation and goals for their prediction market are far removed from the quantum canary discussed in this work.

1.11 Acknowledgements

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2 Signature Lifting and Lifted Spending

Chase et al. [CDG+17] introduce a signature scheme called PICNIC, that could be instantiated using any post-quantum one-way function f to obtain a signature scheme which is post-quantum EUF-CMA secure in the QROM (see Appendix A.2). In the obtained scheme, a secret-key is a random point x in the domain of f, and the corresponding public key is f(x).

In Section 1.3 we gave an overview of how this might be useful to protect procrastinators. The purpose of the current section is to provide an explicit construction and formally treat its security properties.

We stress that while the resulting method is secure, it is highly inefficient in terms of block space (see Section 2.4). Therefore, we do not recommend using it directly, but we rather use it as a building block for the lifted FawkesCoin protocol we present in Section 3.

2.1 Lifting Signature Schemes

Recall that a correct signature scheme is a tuple of three polynomial time procedures DS =
(KeyGen, Sign, Ver) such that if \((pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)\) then it holds for any \(m\) that if \(\sigma \leftarrow \text{Sign}_sk(m)\) then \(\text{Ver}_{pk}(m, \sigma)\) accepts (see Appendix A.1).

**Definition 1.** Let \(\text{DS} = (\text{KeyGen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Ver})\) be a correct digital signature scheme. A lifting of \(\text{DS}\) is two procedures \(g\,\text{Sign}\) and \(f\,\text{Ver}\) such that \((\text{KeyGen}, g\,\text{Sign}, f\,\text{Ver})\) is a correct digital signature scheme.

In Appendix A.1 we described the notion of EUF-CMA security, we extend this notion in a way appropriate for liftings:

**Definition 2.** Let \(\text{DS} = (\text{KeyGen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Ver})\) and let \((g\,\text{Sign}, f\,\text{Ver})\) be a lifting, we define the EUF-LCMA security game as follows:

- The challenger \(C\) samples \((sk, pk) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)\) and gives \(pk\) and \(1^\lambda\) as input to the adversary \(A\).
- \(A\) is allowed to make classical queries both the oracles \(\text{Sign}_sk\) and \(g\,\text{Sign}_sk\).
- \(A\) outputs a tuple \((m, \sigma)\).
- \(A\) wins the game if \(g\,\text{Sign}_sk\) was never queried on \(m\), and \(f\,\text{Ver}_{pk}(m, \sigma)\) accepts.

Note that if we remove the access to the oracle \(\text{Sign}_sk\) we recover the post-quantum EUF-CMA game (see Appendix A.1.1) for the scheme \((\text{KeyGen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Ver})\).

The lifting is a post-quantum (strong) lifting if the winning probability of \(A\) in the EUF-CMA game (EUF-LCMA game) is \(\text{negl}(\lambda)\) for any QPT \(A\).

### 2.2 Key-lifted Signature Schemes

Let \((\text{KeyGen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Ver})\) be a correct signature scheme (e.g. the ECDSA (or Schnorr) digital signature scheme over the curve \(\text{secp256k1}\)), let \(H\) be a hash function modeled as a random oracle, and define the following modified scheme:

- \(\text{KeyGen}'(1^\lambda)\): samples \((pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)\), and outputs \((sk, pk' = H(pk))\).
- \(\text{Sign}_sk'(m)\): outputs \(\sigma' = (\sigma, pk)\) where \(\sigma \leftarrow \text{Sign}_sk(m)\) (recall that \(pk = \text{PK}_{EC}(sk)\), see Appendix A.1.2).
- \(\text{Ver}_{pk'}(m, \sigma')\): interprets \(\sigma'\) as \((\sigma, pk)\), accepts iff \(H(pk) = pk'\) and \(\text{Ver}_{pk}(m, \sigma)\) accepts.

This modification reflects how ECDSA is used in Bitcoin, where the user typically posts a SHA-256 hash of their public-key, and only posts the public-key when signing a message.

We now define a lifting of \((\text{KeyGen}', \text{Sign}', \text{Ver}')\), using \(\text{PICNIC}(H)\) to denote the PICNIC scheme instantiated with \(H\) (see Appendix A.1.5):

- \(\text{Sign}'_sk \equiv \text{PICNIC}(H).\text{Sign}_{\text{PK}_{EC}(sk)}\)
- \(\text{Ver} \equiv \text{PICNIC}(H).\text{Ver}\)

It is straightforward to check that \((\text{Sign}', \text{Ver}')\) is a lifting of \((\text{KeyGen}', \text{Sign}', \text{Ver}')\). We call this scheme the key-lifted scheme.

**Proposition 1.** If \(H\) is modeled as a random-oracle, then \((\text{Sign}', \text{Ver}')\) is a post-quantum lifting (see Definition 2).
Proof. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an EUF-CMA adversary for $(\text{KeyGen}', \text{Sign}', \text{Ver}')$ which wins with probability $\varepsilon$, we construct an EUF-CMA adversary $\mathcal{A}_p$ for PICNIC($H$) which wins with probability $\varepsilon$.

$\mathcal{A}_p$ uses the $pk$ she received from $\mathcal{A}$ as input to $\mathcal{A}$, and responds to oracle queries on $m$ by querying her own oracle. Since $PK^{EC}$ is a bijection and $sk$ distributes uniformly it follows that $PK^{EC}(sk)$ also distributes uniformly. Hence, the view of $\mathcal{A}$ distributes identically in the simulation and in the real EUF-CMA game. Hence, with probability $\varepsilon$ the output $(\sigma, m)$ wins the EUF-CMA game for PICNIC($H$). But since $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{A}_p$ make the same queries, $(\sigma, m)$ is winning output for $\mathcal{A}$ iff it is a winning output for $\mathcal{A}_p$.

We now invoke [CLQ20, Theorem 4], which asserts that a random oracle is post-quantum one-way (even against a non-uniform QPT adversary with a quantum advice), and [CDG+17, Corollary 5.1], which asserts that PICNIC($H$) is post-quantum EUF-CMA secure whenever $H$ is post-quantum one-way, to conclude that $\varepsilon = \text{negl}(\lambda)$. \hfill $\square$

We note that $(\text{Sign}', \text{Ver}')$ is not a strong lifting, since the output of $\text{Sign}_{sk}'$ (on any message) contains a copy of $pk$, from which a QPT adversary can calculate $sk$.

### 2.3 Seed Lifted Signature Schemes

Derived UTXOs (either naked or hashed) also have the property that a post-quantum hash was applied “somewhere along the way”, namely, to produce the master secret-key from the seed (see Appendix B). This suggests that lifted signatures could also be provided to such addresses by using the seed-phrase as a secret-key.

The main difficulty in realizing this approach is that the same seed could be used to generate many different public-keys. More precisely, the function mapping the secret-key to the public-key depends on a derivation path, and we cannot reasonably assume that the adversary only has access to signatures corresponding to a particular derivation path. Security against an adversary augmented with access to signatures corresponding to many different derivation paths doesn’t follow in a black-box fashion from the security of PICNIC (indeed, PICNIC could be modified to leak a single bit of the secret-key, depending on the derivation path. This does not affect security against a standard adversary, but allows the augmented adversary to recover the secret-key completely).

Like in key-lifting, we modify the ECDSA scheme to reflect how such addresses are used in practice. Unlike key-lifting, here the public-key remains the same, whereas we modify the secret-key. Instead of using the ECDSA secret-key $sk$, we use the seed $s$ and password $pw$ used to generate the master public-key (see Appendix A.2.2) and the derivation path $P$ corresponding to $pk$ as a secret-key. Since $sk$ can be easily calculated from $(s, pw, P)$, defining the modified scheme is straightforward (given a string $s$ of even length, we use $s_L$ to denote the left half of $s$):

- $\text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$ samples $sk = (s, pw, P)$ where $s \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, and $pw$ and $P$ are chosen arbitrarily such that $P$ is independent from $(s, pw)$, sets $pk = PK^{EC}(\text{Der}(KDF(s, pw), P)_L)$, outputs $(sk, pk)$.

- $\text{Sign}_{sk}(s, pw, P)(m)$ outputs $\sigma \leftarrow \text{ECDSA.Sign}_{sk'}(m)$ where $sk' = \text{Der}(KDF(s, pw), P)_L$.

- $\text{Ver} \equiv \text{ECDSA.Ver}$

Where $KDF = H^{2048}$ (that is, 2048 applications of $H$) as in BIP-32, and $\text{Der}$ is the key-derivation function (for a formal treatment of BIP-32 and the key derivation function used therein, see the full version [SW23]).
We now define a lifting for this scheme. The lifting is constructed in such a way that its security assures that the adversary is unable to forge a signature verifiable by any key in the wallet, not just the key used by the honest user. Set $KDF^{pre} = H^{2047}$ and $KDF^{pq} = H$ (here $KDF^{pq}$ captures the “post-quantum step” we will apply signature lifting to, and $KDF^{pre}$ captures any other processing that preceded it).

**Definition 3.** The seed-lifting of the scheme above is:

- $\text{Sign}_{(s,pw,P)}$ outputs $(\sigma, \text{msk}, P)$ where $\sigma \leftarrow \text{PICNIC}(KDF^{pq})$. $\text{Sign}_{KDF^{pre}(s,pw)}(m, P)$ and $\text{msk} = KDF(s, pw)$

- $\text{Ver}_{\text{pk}}(m, (\sigma, \text{msk}, P))$ accepts if $\text{PK}_{\text{EC}}(\text{Der}(\text{msk}, P)_L) = \text{pk}$ and $\text{PICNIC}(KDF^{pq}).\text{Ver}_{\text{msk}}((m, P), \sigma)$ accepts.

We wish to prove the following:

**Theorem 4.** If $H$ is modeled as a random oracle, then the seed-lifting is a strong lifting.

We provide an overview of the proof here, and delegate a complete formal argument to Section 2.3. The crux of the argument is that the key-derivation function used in HD wallets admits a particular structure that implies that we need only consider three possibilities:

- The derivation path provided by the adversary is identical to one of the derivation paths exposed to him.
- The derivation path provided by the adversary is a suffix of one of the derivation paths exposed to him.
- The derivation path provided by the adversary is a prefix of one of the derivation paths exposed to him.

The reason for that is that any other type of output by the adversary immediately implies that the adversary can find a collision in the underlying hash function. The proof proceeds by showing that this also holds in the three cases above. The two first cases are rather straightforward, however, the third case requires proving that the PICNIC scheme admits a particular extractability property, and use it to show a collision is extractable. In particular, the proof appeals to the details of the construction and is not a black-box argument.

### 2.4 Size of Lifted Signatures

The scheme resulting from lifting a one-way function might admit prohibitively large signatures. The size of the signature is a consequence of the size of the circuit calculating the one-way function $f$.

Chase et al. [CDG+17] isolate a one-way function particularly suitable for the task (namely, the encryption circuit of a block cipher called LowMC [ARS+15]). They use this cipher to construct the Fish and PICNIC schemes. The Fish scheme has a signature length of about 120KB, but its security is only known in the ROM, whereas the signature sizes of PICNIC are about 195 KB, and it is proven to be secure in the QROM.

A follow-up work [KZ20] optimizes the PICNIC scheme with respect to the same one-way function to below 50KB.

In our setting, we are not free to choose the function. We always instantiate PICNIC with either SHA-256 or SHA-512, depending on the context. Chase et al. manage to apply their technique to SHA-256 to obtain signatures of size 618KB with 128 bits of security (the performance
of the optimized version of \cite{KZ20} when instantiated with SHA-256 is not analyzed). We are unaware of empirical data for PICNIC signature sizes when instantiated with SHA-512.

A further advantage of the constructions in \cite{CDG17,KZ20} is that they could be instantiated with various parameters. The signature size could hence be decreased by reducing the number of bits of security. For example, in \cite{CDG17}, it is noted that the size of the signature instantiated with SHA-256 and admitting 80 bits of security is 385KB long, which is an improvement by a factor of almost a half.

We are hopeful that the scheme in \cite{KZ20} affords shorter signatures when instantiated with the functions we require, and further optimizations could further reduce signature sizes.

2.5 Lifted Spending

Lifted spending is the same as regular spending, except the lifted signature is used instead of the pre-quantum signature.

Say that a user with access to a secret-key $sk$ (and consequently, to the corresponding public-key $pk$) wants to spend a UTXO whose address is $H(pk)$ without leaking $pk$.

They can sign the transaction $tx$ with $\sigma \leftarrow \text{PICNIC}(H).\text{Sign}_{pk}(tx)$ (note that the public-key of the original scheme acts as the secret-key of the lifted scheme). The correctness of PICNIC implies that it suffices to know $H(pk)$ in order to verify $\sigma$, and Proposition 1 implies that publicly posting $\sigma$ does not compromise the security of the user. Similarly, seed lifting can be used to spend a derived UTXO, see Section 2.3.

We remind that, due to the signature sizes, we do not propose to implement lifted spending directly, but we rather use it as a building block for a larger protocol in Section 3 protocol we introduce in Section 3. For completeness, we survey the properties of lifted-spending.

Spending Hashed UTXOs To spend a hashed UTXO, the user signs it with a key-lifted signature (see Section 2.2).

Spending Derived UTXOs To spend a derived UTXO, the user signs it with a seed-lifted signature (see Section 2.3).

Remark 5. We stress that the security of lifted spending relies on the policy that key lifting could only be used to spend hashed UTXOs, and leaked UTXOs must be spent using seed lifting. This follows as quantum adversaries exposed to the public-key can compute the secret-key, which they could then use to create valid key-lifted signatures (see Section 2.2).

Hashed/Derived Confirmation Times Besides using a different signature, the spending procedure is the same as in the current state, and so it has the same confirmation times.

Transaction Size Increase As we discuss in Section 2.4, currently the size of a lifted signature is of the order of hundreds of kilobytes.

High Spendability Threshold Since the UTXO is spent directly, the only barrier to spendability is that it is valuable enough to cover the cost of a transaction fee. Since lifted signatures are several orders of magnitude larger than pre-quantum signatures (see Section 2.4), the spendability threshold for using lifted signatures also grows several orders of magnitude larger.

\footnote{Technically, the definition of a signature scheme does not imply that $pk$ can be computed from $sk$ alone. However, this property holds in all signature schemes the authors are aware of, and in particular in all signature schemes used in Bitcoin. We hence use this assumption freely. See the discussion in Appendix A.1.2}
Works Without Post-Quantum UTXO  The fee for spending coins is taken from the spent UTXO exactly like it is currently, so no additional coin is required.

Requires a hard-fork  Recall that in ECDSA the public-key is recoverable from a signature, whereby it is insecure to include an ECDSA signature in the transaction\textsuperscript{5}. This means that valid lifted spending transactions can not be shaped as valid ECDSA transactions. Hence a hard-fork is required.

3 Lifted FawkesCoin

The Lifted FawkesCoin method combines FawkesCoin (see Section 4) and signature lifting (see Section 2) to allow spending hashed and derived UTXOs without using a side payment or a post-quantum UTXO, while keeping the transaction size small.

As briefly touched upon in Section 4, a major difficulty in FawkesCoin is dealing with denial-of-service attacks. Namely, we need to prevent adversaries from cheaply spamming the blockchain. However, we need to allow users to post commitments, and at the time of commitment, it is not known what the commitment is for and if it will ever be revealed. Since the user is only charged a fee during the reveal, this opens up attacks where fake commitments are posted, or commitments for the same UTXO are posted several times, wasting valuable blockchain space for free.

In Section 4, we will explain how to overcome this issue by requiring the user to pay at commitment time by using a post-quantum UTXO. However, it is desirable that users without access to post-quantum UTXOs could quantum-cautiously spend their money.

Bonneau and Miller [BM14] propose two approaches to the denial-of-service problem, but both fall short of solving the problem:

- **Zero-Knowledge**  The authors suggest that the user sends a ZK proof to the miner that the UTXO is valid and pays a “useful amount” of fees. However, as long as the transaction has not been revealed, there is nothing forcing the user to finalize the transaction or preventing them from committing to the same UTXO several times.

- **Merkle Trees**  The authors suggest that the miner arranges all commitments in a Merkle tree and only posts the root, requiring users to post Merkle proofs in their reveal message. In this scenario, a spammer can not increase the size of the Merkle root, but by spamming the miner, they could increase the size of a Merkle proof.

We propose a way to avoid denial-of-service attacks by using signature lifting. The idea is to limit the time the user has to post a commitment. If a user fails to post a commitment within this time, the miner can post the signature as a proof and claim the coin the user tried to spend as their own. To prevent users from committing to the same UTXO on several blocks, we require the user to reveal in advance the UTXO they are spending, and the miner has to post a proof of ownership. If no other commitments for that UTXO will be accepted as long as the commitment does not expire. To prevent miners from abusing this power to censor UTXOs, if the user failed to reveal a transaction spending \textit{u}, the miner is \textit{required} to post a proof of ownership. If a commitment to a UTXO was posted, but neither a reveal nor a proof of ownership was posted before the UTXO expired, we assume the miner delayed the UTXO and penalize them to compensate the owner.

\textsuperscript{5}In contrast, in some implementations of the Schnorr signature scheme, including the one used in Bitcoin, recovering the public-key from a valid signature requires inverting a hash function and is thus considered infeasible, even for quantum adversaries.
After the commitment has been posted, the spender has a limited time to post a reveal of the commitment to the blockchain. If they fail to do so, the miner can post the proof of ownership to claim the entire UTXO, making spam attempts costly. Note that the proof of ownership is never posted to the blockchain if both parties are honest and follow the protocol. Hence, the transaction size is about the same size as current transactions spending pre-quantum UTXOs.

However, the protocol described so far has a different problem: it allows censoring UTXOs. Note that a miner can commit a UTXO even without a proof of ownership, preventing the owner from spending it. To prevent this, we limit the time the miner has to post a proof of ownership, and require the miners to leave a deposit proportional to the value of the UTXO, that will be awarded to the owner of the UTXO if the miner fails to post the proof. The deposit makes such delay attacks extremely costly for the miner, and reimburses the aggrieved user, effectively eliminating this drawback.

The resulting protocol for spending a UTXO $u$ is as follows:

1. (Spender creates transaction) The spender prepares a transaction $tx$ spending $u$ and paying fees as usual.
2. (Spender creates commitment) The spender prepares $(H(tx), \sigma, u, \alpha)$, where $\alpha$ is the amount of fees paid by $tx$, and $\sigma$ is a lifted signature on $(H(tx), \alpha)$ which acts as a proof of ownership of $u$. The type of the signature $\sigma$ depends on the type of UTXO being spent, as explained below.
3. (Spender broadcasts commitment) The spender broadcasts $(H(tx), H(u), \alpha)$ to the mempool.
4. (Miners validate commitment) If $H(u)$ appears in a previous commitment that has not yet expired (that is, $u$ is locked), the transaction is invalid. Moreover, if $\sigma$ is a key lifted (i.e. not seed lifted) signature and $u$ is not hashed (or—more accurately—not leaked, see Section 5.1), the transaction is also considered invalid.
5. (Miners include commitment) The miner posts $(H(tx), H(u), \alpha)$ to the blockchain. The miner does not get a fee at this point, and the source of the fee is not yet determined, but an honest miner is guaranteed they will either get the fee or will have a chance to post $\sigma$ in order to claim all the coins in $u$.
6. (Spender waits) After $(H(tx))$ is posted to the blockchain, the user waits for 100 blocks.
7. (Spender broadcasts reveal) The user must broadcast $tx$ to the mempool soon enough so it will be included within the following 100 blocks. $tx$ is considered invalid if it does not include a fee of $\alpha$. The fee paid for including $tx$ is split equally between the miner who included $tx$ and the miner who included $(H(tx))$.
8. (Receiver waits for confirmation) The receiver considers the transaction $tx$ completed six blocks after the reveal was posted.
9. (Miner posts proof of ownership) If the user fails to have $tx$ included to the blockchain within 100 blocks, the miner must post the proof of ownership $\sigma$ to the blockchain within 100 blocks. If the miner posts the proof of ownership, they are given the entire value of $u$.
10. (Compensation of delayed UTXOs) If the miner fails to post the proof of ownership in time, they pay 3.35% of the value of $u$ to the address of $u$.

The disadvantage of Lifted FawkesCoin over FawkesCoin is that miners are not likely to include transactions whose value is less than the fee required to post a proof of ownership, as
they risk losing money in case the commitment is not revealed. Hence, the spendability threshold (see p. 11) of this method remains as high as the cost of posting a lifted signature.

Another issue that has to be addressed is obtaining commitment fees. The payment a miner earns for including a commitment is typically lower than the cost of posting a transaction, making it unspendable. Hence, creating a new UTXO paying the fee for every resolved commitment would increase the amount of dust (see Appendix A.3.3). To address this, we propose ways to aggregate the payment of commitment fees in Section 3.2.

3.1 Properties of Lifted FawkesCoin

Spending **Hashed** UTXOs To spend a hashed UTXO, the user follows the protocol above using a key-lifted signature (see Section 2.2). Additionally, the miner has to verify that the UTXO is not leaked (see Section 5.1).

Spending **Derived** UTXOs To spend a derived UTXO, the user follows the protocol above using a seed-lifted signature (see Section 2.3), and includes $\text{msk}, P$ in the payload of $\text{tx}$. It must hold that $\text{PK}_{\text{EC}}(\text{Der}(\text{msk}, P)) = \text{pk}$ for the revealing transaction to be considered valid.

**Hashed/Derived** Confirmation Times The confirmation times are the same as in regular FawkesCoin.

**Transaction Size Increase** The transaction size is the same size of a regular pre-quantum transaction plus 64 bytes for commitment and the hash of the UTXO.

**Spendability Threshold** While transaction sizes are small, they should be valuable enough to cover the cost of posting the proof of ownership. Including a less valuable UTXO imposes a risk on the miner, so it will probably not be included. We further discuss the size of lifted signatures in Section 2.4.

**Works Without Post-Quantum UTXO** The protocol makes it secure to pay the fees from the original UTXO, so no additional coin is required.

**Limited Delay Attacks** A miner can delay spending an arbitrary UTXO by posting its hash alongside a fake commitment. However, once the transaction is expired, they will compensate the user.

**Requires a Hard-Fork** In case the user fails to reveal the transaction in time, the miner is awarded the coins in the UTXO even though they do not have access to a valid signature. This requires nodes to consider a transaction valid even though it does not contain a signature for the UTXO it is trying to spend. As we explain in Appendix A.3.2, this requires a hard-fork.

**Offline Users Not Risked** Derived UTXO are only spendable using the derivation seed, so **naked** and **lost** UTXOs can not be spent using this method.

3.2 Obtaining Commitment Fees

When processing a block, it is impossible to know how much fee the miner accrued for including Lifted FawkesCoin commitment. The most straightforward solution is, once the transaction is revealed, to create a UTXO spending the fee to an address specified in the block which
contains the commitment. The problem with this solution is that it creates many UTXOs whose value is comparable to the cost of spending them, thereby increasing the amount of dust (see Appendix A.3.2).

We propose to overcome this by delaying the coinbase processing. The Lifted FawkesCoin protocol guarantees that the exact amount of fees accrued by the miner is resolved after the expiry period is over (which amounts to 300 blocks using the 100 blocks waiting time we recommend in Section 4.6). Hence, processing the coinbase transaction of the block could be delayed for this length of time. This could be implemented by having the coinbase transaction of each block pay to the block that appears three waiting periods before it, if that block contains Lifted FawkesCoin commitments. The Kaspa cryptocurrency resolves a similar situation (where the final transaction fees are not known at the time the blocks are created) by implementing such an approach (see relevant documentation). Note that coinbase cooldown starts to take effect only after the expiry period is finished.

A disadvantage of this approach is that the elongated wait times hold for the entire coinbase transaction, including the block reward and the fees for transactions not made using Lifted FawkesCoin. This could be resolved by allowing the coinbase transaction to include the block reward and all fees except the Lifted FawkesCoin fees, and having each block reward Lifted FawkesCoin fees to the block appearing three wait periods before it (if there are any).

3.3 Increasing Lifted FawkesCoin’s Throughput

In the current design, a miner only has a limited time to post the proof of ownership. This has the effect that the number of commitments risk-averse miners will agree to include is, at most, the number of fraud-proofs the network can support. Otherwise, the miners take the risk that they would have to post more fraud-proofs than possible, eventually causing them to pay delay fines albeit being honest.

Given that fraud proofs are much larger than commitments, this greatly decreases the commitment throughput. For example, if a block can only contain one fraud-proof, then no more than 300 commitments will be included during a 500 blocks long FawkesCoin epoch.

Our approach to increasing the throughput is by extending the expiry time of Lifted FawkesCoin commitments in scenarios where many fraud-proofs are posted. If at the end of the Lifted FawkesCoin epoch (see Section 5.3) sufficiently many fraud-proofs were posted, a new Lifted FawkesCoin epoch starts immediately, during which fraud-proofs for commitments from previous epochs are allowed. We refer to this new epoch as an extension.

In more detail, we propose the following:

- Currently, if the spender failed to post a reveal, the miner has a period of 100 blocks to post a fraud-proof. We modify this rule such that the miner is allowed to post the fraud-proof at any time up to the end of the epoch. However, we still do not allow commitments to be posted within the last 300 blocks of the epoch, to allow miners a period of at least 100 blocks to post a proof.

- Say that 100 blocks can contain up to $k$ fraud-proofs. At the end of the epoch:
  - If more than $k/2$ fraud-proofs were posted in the last 100 blocks, then:
    - Do not pay the miner’s deposits to the users,
    - Start a new Lifted FawkesCoin epoch,
    - During this epoch, allow miners to post fraud-proofs for any unrevealed commitment that has not yet expired (even if the commitment was included in a previous epoch).
– Else:
    * For each non-expired unsettled commitment, pay the fine left for that commitment to the address of the UTXO, and consider the commitment expired.
    * Do not initiate a new Lifted FawkesCoin epoch, but rather allow the epoch rotation to continue.

More generally, one can set the threshold to trigger an extension at $kp$ fraud-proofs for any $0 < p < 1$. However, we now discuss possible attacks on this mechanism and conclude that $p = 1/2$ is a natural choice (or more precisely, that $p$ should be at most $1/2$, but should not be set too low either).

There are two ways to abuse the extension mechanism: either by forcing or by denying an extension.

In order to force an extension, an adversary must post $kp$ fraud proofs. The consequence of such an attack is threefold:

- It prevents users from using non-lifted FawkesCoin and in particular prevents spending lost UTXOs.
- Inability to use non-lifted FawkesCoin also makes it impossible to spend pre-quantum UTXOs whose value is below the cost of posting a fraud-proof.
- It extends the length of ongoing delay attacks without increasing the delay attack fine eventually paid to the owners of the attacked UTXO.

Note that during the attack, users can still use Lifted FawkesCoin and spend post-quantum UTXOs.

The adverse effects of this attack are disruptive but do not last once the attack is over, and maintaining the attack is very expansive: note that the total size of the maximal amount of fraud-proofs a block can contain is at least half a block, hence, the cost of posting $kp$ fraud-proofs is at least as high as the fee for consuming a space equivalent to $50p$ blocks (moreover, maintaining such an attack for an extended period wastes a lot of space, plausibly increasing the cost of posting fraud-proofs). In particular, if $p = 1/2$, the cost of forcing each extension is at least as high as the cost of block space equivalent to 25 blocks. Setting $p$ too low might make such attacks affordable. We point out that the cost of an extension forcing attack could also be increased by increasing the length of the lifted FawkesCoin epoch, whereby increasing $k$.

An extension denying attack is more dangerous since it may be profitable. On the other hand, it can only be carried by a miner with a fraction of $q > 1 - p$ of the total hash rate. Such an adversarial miner can deny an extension by simply refusing to include fraud-proofs in her blocks. The adversarial miner can post many commitments to the mempool, so that they would be included by honest miners, and then deny the extension. By the end of the epoch, at most $(1 - q)k$ of the corresponding fraud proofs will have been posted, and the adversarial miner would gain the delay attack fines for the remaining commitments.

Hence, we strongly recommend setting $p \leq 1/2$. This assures that such an attack can be only carried by > 50% attackers (recall that such powerful attackers can already severely damage the network in many other ways.

### 3.4 Delay Attack Fines

The fine for delay attacks should reflect the damage done to the user. However, it should not be chosen too large, as it would make it hard for miners to include commitments on highly valuable

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UTXOs. We propose setting the fine to be the equivalent of an annual 100% interest, paid over the period the transaction was delayed.

Note that if rotation is employed with the periods we proposed in Section 5, then a delay attack actually prevents the user from spending their UTXO in the current Lifted FawkesCoin epoch, forcing them to wait as much as 2,500 blocks. Hence, we propose that the interest should be calculated as an annual interest of 100% accrued over a period of 25,000 minutes, which is 3.35% of the value of the UTXO.

The miner should be able to cover delay fines for all UTXOs whose hash is used in a Lifted FawkesCoin commitment. Let the guaranteed coinbase value be the value of the block reward and all transactions which are not Lifted FawkesCoin commitments (this is a lower bound on the block reward in case the miner is honest. Obviously, the final block reward could be lower if the miner performs delay attacks). If the guaranteed coinbase value is lower than the sum of all required deposits, then the miner needs to include an additional transaction covering the difference.

4 Restrictive and Permissive FawkesCoin

FawkesCoin [BM14] is a blockchain protocol that avoids public signature schemes altogether by employing the Fawkes signatures of [ABC+98]. The core idea is that in order to spend a UTXO the user commits to a certain transaction and reveals the transaction once some predetermined period of time has passed (we further discuss the considerations for choosing the waiting time in Section 4.6, where we propose a waiting time of 100 blocks). The security of the protocol follows from the observation that if the waiting time is chosen long enough, then after revealing the transaction, an attacker has a negligible chance to complete a commit-wait-reveal cycle before the honest user manages to include the revealed transaction in the blockchain.

In the original FawkesCoin design, the secret-key is a random string $r$, and the public address for spending to this key is $H(r)$, where $H$ is some agreed upon collision-resistant hash function. In order to spend a UTXO with address $H(r)$ to another address $H(s)$, the user posts $H(r, H(s))$ as a commitment, and $r$ as a reveal. Given $r$ and $H(s)$, anyone can verify that $H(r)$ and $H(r, H(s))$ evaluate correctly.

Bonneau and Miller note that their solution could be integrated into Bitcoin and that a UTXO could be spent by using a hash of a valid transaction as a commitment and the transaction itself as a reveal. This allows cautious spending of pre-quantum hashed UTXOs. They point out that this approach could mitigate “a catastrophic algorithmic break of discrete log on the curve P-256 or rapid advances in quantum computing.”

The main obstacle to adopting FawkesCoin is in incentivizing miners to include commitment messages in the blocks in the first place. However, this issue could be completely circumvented if the user already has access to post-quantum UTXOs that they could use to pay the fees. In this section, we assume that it is the case.

While it is desirable that users could use the committed transaction to pay the miner fee, achieving this feature without allowing denial-of-service attacks proves far from trivial. In Section 3 we introduce Lifted FawkesCoin, a variation of FawkesCoin which allows paying the transaction fee out of the spent UTXO by using lifted signatures (see Section 2).

However, non-lifted FawkesCoin has its own benefits. Mainly, it has a lower spendability threshold so it is more suitable for small transactions. Also, using lifted signatures allows us to extend the applicability of non-lifted FawkesCoin to extend the set of spendable UTXOs to also include naked and lost UTXOs, we call the extended protocol permissive FawkesCoin. We stress that while both permissive FawkesCoin and lifted FawkesCoin are constructed by combining FawkesCoin and lifted signatures, they are inherently different protocol. In particular,
in permissive FawkesCoin neither the user nor the miner have to post a lifted signature at any point. Lifted signatures are only used in cases where there is an attempt to steal a UTXO.

4.1 Overview of FawkesCoin modes

We extend the FawkesCoin protocol by adding two new modes of operation, namely unrestrictive and permissive modes. These modes allow spending UTXOs that are not cautiously spendable using the original (restrictive) design of FawkesCoin. The two new modes of operation work similarly to optimistic rollups [Eth22], so we follow the terminology used therein.

The original application of FawkesCoin to quantum cautious spending presented in [SIZ+18] is equivalent to restrictive FawkesCoin further restricted to spending only hashed UTXOs.

- **Restrictive (Section 4.1)** This mode allows users to spend hashed UTXOs using the public-key, and derived UTXOs using the derivation seed. The advantage of this mode of operation is that it minimizes quantum loot. The disadvantage is that it can only support spending hashed and derived UTXOs (so implementing restrictive FawkesCoin as the only way to spend pre-quantum UTXOs will make all pre-quantum UTXOs which are neither hashed nor derived unspendable indefinitely).

- **Unrestrictive (Section 4.3)** This mode further allows users to spend naked UTXOs. However, to do so they are required to provide a deposit as large as the value of the UTXOs, and then the transaction goes into a long challenge period (in Section 4.7 we discuss the length of the waiting period and propose to set it to one year) during which the rightful owner can claim the coins in the UTXO and the deposit by posting a fraud proof showing that they hold the derivation seed. The purpose of the deposit is to make it risky to try stealing a UTXO not known to be stealable.

The disadvantage of unrestrictive mode is that owners of derived UTXOs that are not hashed have to occasionally (e.g. at least once a year) scan the blockchain for attempts to spend their money.

- **Permissive (Section 4.4)** This mode further allows users to spend lost UTXOs. To achieve this, we allow users to claim naked UTXOs without signing the transaction. This allows recovering of lost UTXOs. Like in unrestrictive mode, we require a deposit for spending a naked UTXO, making it risky to try to claim a naked UTXO without knowing that it is lost. Permissive mode has the advantage that lost UTXOs are no longer quantum loot. This method allows spending UTXOs without presenting a signature, whereby implementing it requires a hard-fork.

Using restrictive mode minimizes the quantum loot available to a quantum adversary. One might argue that even though unrestrictive and permissive modes allow more honest users to spend their coins, they have a negative side-effect, namely, unrestrictive and permissive modes increase the available quantum loot over restrictive mode. However, this is not quite the case, since holders of derived UTXOs can falsely declare their UTXOs lost with the purpose of baiting attackers to place a deposit they could claim. We discuss this further in Section 4.5. Note that permissive mode could be modified to allow spending hashed UTXOs whose keys were lost. However, we advise against this approach as it would require all holders of pre-quantum UTXOs, including hashed UTXOs, to be actively cautious against attempts on their money. Also note that permissive mode could be implemented regardless of quantum adversaries as means for recovering lost funds, though this approach also has the drawback of requiring users to be online to maintain the safety of their money.
4.2 Restrictive FawkesCoin

Restrictive FawkesCoin allows spending a hashed UTXO by creating a transaction spending it, posting the hash of the transaction as a commitment, and posting the transaction itself to reveal it. It also allows spending any UTXO by committing to a derivation seed instead.

**Spending a Hashed UTXO**  The protocol for spending a Hashed UTXO $u$ is as follows:

1. (Spender creates transaction) The spender creates a transaction $tx$ spending $u$, which includes a standard fee.
2. (Spender creates commitment) The spender creates a transaction having $H(tx)$ as its payload, which is signed and pays fees using a post-quantum UTXO. We refer to this committing transaction as $ctx$.
3. (Spender posts commitment) The spender posts $ctx$ to the mempool.
4. (Miners include commitment) The miners include $ctx$ in their blocks, the fee for $ctx$ goes to the miner who included it first, as usual.
5. (Spender waits) Once $ctx$ is included in the blockchain, the spender waits for 100 blocks to be mined above it (see Section 4.6).
6. (Spender posts reveal) The spender posts $tx$ to the mempool.
7. (Miners validate) The miners verify that:
   - $H(tx)$ appears in the payload of a committing transaction $ctx$ at least 100 blocks old, and
   - the UTXO was hashed when the commitment was posted: the public-key used to sign $tx$ does not appear in the blockchain before $ctx$.

If $tx$ does not satisfy both conditions, it is considered invalid.

8. (Miners include reveal) The miners include $tx$ in their block. The fee for $tx$ goes to the miner who included it first, subject to the two conditions above.
9. (Receiver waits for confirmation) The receiver considers the transaction completed once $tx$ accumulated six confirmations.

**Spending a Derived UTXO**  To spend a derived UTXO whose address is $pk$ (or a hash thereof), we require the user to commit and reveal a parent extended secret-key $xsk_{par}$ and a derivation path $P$ such that $PK_{EC}(\text{Der}(xsk_{par}, P)) = pk$ (see Appendix A.1.2 and Appendix B). We stress that once $xsk_{par}$ is revealed, anyone could use FawkesCoin to spend any UTXO whose address has been derived from $xsk_{par}$. Hence, to maintain the safety of their funds, the user must commit to all UTXOs whose addresses were derived from $xsk_{par}$ before they start revealing them.

The protocol for spending a derived UTXO $u$ whose address corresponds to a public-key $pk$ is as follows (the differences with the protocol for spending a hashed UTXO are underlined):

1. (Spender creates transaction) The spender creates a transaction $tx$ spending $u$, which contains in its payload $(xsk_{par}, P)$ such that $PK_{EC}(\text{Der}(xsk_{par}, P)) = pk$ and includes a standard fee.
2. (Spender creates commitment) The spender creates a transaction having $H(\text{tx})$ as its payload, which is signed and pays fees using a post-quantum UTXO. We refer to this committing transaction as $\text{ctx}$.

3. (Spender posts commitment) The spender posts $\text{ctx}$ to the mempool.

4. (Miners include commitment) The miners include $\text{ctx}$ in their blocks, the fee for $\text{ctx}$ goes to the miner who included it first, as usual.

5. (Spender waits) Once $\text{ctx}$ is included in the blockchain, the spender waits for 100 blocks to be mined above it (see Section 4.6).

6. (Spender posts reveal) The spender posts $\text{tx}$ to the mempool.

7. (Miners validate) The miners verify that:
   - $H(\text{tx})$ appears in the payload of a committing transaction $\text{ctx}$ at least 100 blocks old, and
   - $\text{PK}^{\text{EC}}(\text{Der}(\text{xsk}_{\text{par}}, P)) = \text{pk}$

If $\text{tx}$ does not satisfy both conditions, it is considered invalid.

8. (Miners include reveal) The miners include $\text{tx}$ in their block. The fee for $\text{tx}$ goes to the miner who included it first, subject to the two conditions above.

9. (Receiver waits for confirmation) The receiver considers the transaction completed once $\text{tx}$ accumulated six confirmations.

Remark 6. Note that when spending a derived UTXO, the pre-quantum signature is not actually required for validation, as suffices to verify $\text{PK}^{\text{EC}}((\text{xsk}_{\text{par}})(i,p)) = \text{pk}$. We include the signature in $\text{tx}$ so that restrictive FawkesCoin could be implemented as a soft-fork (see Appendix A.3.2). If FawkesCoin is implemented in a hard-fork, the signature could be removed to conserve space.

Hashed/Derived Confirmation Times The confirmation time is the length of a single commit-wait-reveal cycle (which we propose setting to 100 blocks in Section 4.6), followed by waiting the current number of confirmation blocks once the reveal message is included (e.g., six blocks in Bitcoin).

Transaction Size Increase The component of the transaction dominating its size is the signature of the post-quantum UTXO, which is about an order of magnitude larger than transaction spending a pre-quantum UTXO (see Appendix A.3.5). However, a single post-quantum transaction can be used to spend several pre-quantum UTXOs (either by committing to several transaction, or by committing to a transaction spending several UTXOs), making the size increase additive.

Spendability Threshold Since the fee is paid using the post-quantum UTXO, the only obstruction to spendability is if the UTXO is less valuable then the fees required to post it. Disregarding the post-quantum UTXO (see p. 11), the size of a FawkesCoin transaction is slightly larger than spending it usually (exactly by how much depends on whether the transaction spends a hashed or derived UTXO, and on whether we are in a soft- or hard-fork), whereby the spendability threshold stays the same up to a factor close to 1.
Requires a Post-Quantum UTXO  A post-quantum UTXO is required in order to pay the transaction fee.

Can be Implemented in Soft-Fork  Commitments are ordinary post-quantum transactions whereas reveals are ordinary pre-quantum transactions, whereby they would also be accepted by outdated nodes. However, a hard-fork implementation could conserve block space as the pre-quantum signature can be removed from derived UTXOs.

4.3 Unrestrictive FawkesCoin

Unrestrictive mode extends the functionality of restrictive mode by providing a way to spend a naked UTXO. Naked UTXOs are spent like hashed UTXOs, except the user must leave a deposit as valuable as the UTXO they are trying to spend. After the transaction is revealed, it goes into a long challenge period during which any user can post a fraud proof by spending that same transaction in FawkesCoin using the derivation seed. If a fraud proof is posted, the revealed transaction is considered invalid, and the deposit goes to the address of the user who posted the fraud proof.

Spending Naked UTXOs  The protocol for spending a naked UTXO $u$ is as follows:

1. (Spender creates transaction) The spender creates a transaction $tx$ spending $u$, which also spends a post-quantum UTXO $d$ called the deposit. The value of $d$ must be at least the value of $u$ plus the fees paid for including $tx$.

2. (Spender creates commitment) The spender creates a transaction having $H(tx)$ as its payload, which pays fees using a post-quantum UTXO. We refer to this committing transaction as $ctx$.

3. (Spender posts commitment) The spender posts $ctx$ to the mempool.

4. (Miners include commitment) The miners include $ctx$ in their blocks, the fee for $ctx$ goes to the miner who included it first, as usual.

5. (Spender waits) Once $ctx$ is included in the blockchain, the spender waits for 100 blocks to be mined above it (see Section 4.6).

6. (Spender posts reveal) The spender posts $tx$ to the mempool.

7. (Miners validate) The miners verify that $H(tx)$ appears in the payload of a committing transaction $ctx$ at least 100 blocks old. If $tx$ does not satisfy both conditions, it is considered invalid.

8. (Miners include reveal) The miners include $tx$ in their block. The fee for $tx$ goes to the miner who included it first, subject to the condition above.

9. (Challenge period start) The transaction $tx$ enters a challenge period of one year.

10. (Owner can post fraud proof) During that period, any user holding the derivation seed for the address of $u$ can post a fraud proof: a transaction $fp$ spent using the FawkesCoin protocol for derived UTXOs spending the UTXO $u$. If a fraud proof is posted, the transaction $tx$ is considered invalid. The miner is paid the fee they were supposed to for posting $tx$ from the deposit, and the rest of the deposit goes to same address $fp$ is spent to.
11. (Receiver waits for confirmation) If no fraud proof was posted, the receiver consider the
transaction tx completed six blocks after the challenge period is over.

Remark 7. For simplicity, we presented the method in a manner that requires a hard-fork: if
a fraud proof is posted, then the deposit needs to be spent to a different address than the one
specified in its output. This could be rectified by instead requiring that the deposit output is
spent to an anyone-can-spend address, as explained in Appendix A.3.2.

Naked Confirmation Times  The challenge period is very large to allow honest users ample
time to notice if anyone attempted to steal their transactions and respond accordingly (see
Section 4.7).

Offline Users Risked  Users holding naked derived UTXOs have to monitor the network for
attempts to spend their money. In particular, if an adversary knows of a user that would not be
online for a duration longer than a dispute period (say, if he’s denied modern society and became
a recluse, joined an Amish community, or is just forever trapped beyond the event horizon of a
black hole), they can safely steal their naked derived UTXOs.

4.4 Permissive FawkesCoin

Permissive mode extends the functionality of unrestricted mode by providing a way to spend
any leaked UTXO without providing any proof of ownership. That is, we allow anyone to spend
any leaked UTXO. However, to spend a leaked UTXO without providing a valid signature or
a derivation seed, the spender must provide a deposit and wait for a lengthy challenge period,
exactly like naked UTXOs are spent in unrestricted mode. The deposit acts to deter adversaries
from attempting to steal UTXOs, as they can not know whether the owner of the UTXO they
are trying to steal can produce a fraud proof.

Spending Lost UTXO  The protocol for spending a lost UTXO u is as follows:

1. (Spender creates transaction) The spender creates a transaction tx spending u, which also
spends a post-quantum UTXO d called the deposit. The UTXO need not include a signature
on u. The value of d must be at least the value of u plus the fees paid for including tx.

2. (Spender creates commitment) The spender creates a transaction having H(tx) as its pay-
load, which pays fees using a post-quantum UTXO. We refer to this committing transaction
as ctx.

3. (Spender posts commitment) The spender posts ctx to the mempool.

4. (Miners include commitment) The miners include ctx in their blocks, the fee for ctx goes
to the miner who included it first, as usual.

5. (Spender waits) Once ctx is included in the blockchain, the spender waits for 100 blocks
to be mined above it (see Section 4.6).

6. (Spender posts reveal) The spender posts tx to the mempool.

7. (Miners validate) The miners verify that H(tx) appears in the payload of a committing
transaction ctx at least 100 blocks old. If tx does not satisfy both conditions, it is considered
invalid.
8. (Miners include reveal) The miners include tx in their block. The fee for tx goes to the miner who included it first, subject to the condition.

9. (Challenge period start) The transaction tx enters a challenge period of one year.

10. (Owner can post fraud proof) During that period, any user holding the derivation seed for the address of u can post a fraud proof: a transaction fp spent using the FawkesCoin protocol for derived UTXOs spending the UTXO u. If a fraud proof is posted, the transaction tx is considered invalid. The miner is paid the fee they were supposed to for posting tx from d, and the remaining coin in d goes to the same address fp is spent to.

11. (Receiver waits for confirmation) If no fraud poof was posted, the receiver consider the transaction tx completed six blocks after the challenge period is over.

Remark 8. In the specification above we chose the value of the deposit d to be as high as the value of the spent UTXO u (plus the fees for including tx). This implies that an adversary has a negative expected profit from such an attack as long as they can’t make an educated guess that a particular UTXO is lost with a probability higher than 1/2. It might be the case that such educated guesses are feasible, and if so the value of the deposit should be increased appropriately. Setting the value of the deposit to \( \frac{p}{1-p} \) times the value of the spent output implies that attempting to steal a UTXO using permissive FawkesCoin has negative expected profit, unless knows that UTXO is lost with probability at least p. Increasing p makes such attacks less feasible at the cost of making spending lost UTXOs less affordable.

Lost Confirmation Times  Same as naked confirmation times.

Requires hard-fork  This method allows spending UTXOs without producing a signature, which can not be implemented in a soft-fork (see Appendix A.3.2).

4.5 Salvaged Coins and Loot

In the current state, all but post-quantum and hashed UTXOs can be stolen by a quantum adversary (and hashed UTXOs cannot be spent cautiously). After FawkesCoin kicks in, all hashed and derived UTXOs can be spent cautiously. The fate of a naked, lost, or stealable UTXO depends on the chosen mode of FawkesCoin, where each such UTXO can be in one of the following statuses:

- Burnt: no longer spendable by anyone.
- Spendable: spendable by the owner. A (quantum) adversary can successfully steal the UTXO, but would not do that due to the risk of losing their deposit. Hence, spendable UTXOs are less secure than cautiously spendable UTXOs.
- Loot: the UTXO will be stolen.
- Quantum loot: the UTXO will be stolen by a quantum adversary.

Table 3 summarizes the status naked UTXOs according to the FawkesCoin variant.

One of the purposes of the canary mechanism is to decrease the set of spendable UTXOs, and the purpose of the deposit and fraud-proof mechanism is to create risk for adversaries attempting to steal them:
Table 3: The status of different types of naked UTXOs according to the variant of FawkesCoin used (see Section 4.5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Naked</th>
<th>Lost</th>
<th>Stealable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Restrictive</td>
<td>Burnt</td>
<td>Burnt</td>
<td>Burnt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrestrictive</td>
<td>Spendable</td>
<td>Unspendable</td>
<td>Quantum Loot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permissive</td>
<td>Spendable</td>
<td>Spendable</td>
<td>Loot</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- As long as the protocol did not kick in, an owner of a stealable UTXO who knows the secret-key can migrate their funds to a UTXO that is not stealable. They could be incentivized to do so by providing sufficient heads-up, e.g. in the form of a killed canary.

- Lost UTXOs are protected by the observation that an adversary cannot tell them apart from any other naked UTXO, so attempting to steal them incurs a risk of losing their deposit.

To conclude, the different modes of Fawkes coin provide the following tradeoffs:

- Unrestrictive FawkesCoin allows spending naked UTXOs, but stealable UTXOs will be stolen by quantum adversaries.

- Permissive FawkesCoin further allows spending lost UTXOs, but implementing the permissive mode requires a hard-fork whereas the unrestrictive mode only requires a soft-fork.

We note that while stealable UTXOs become loot in unrestrictive and permissive mode, this loot can only be safely exploitable if the adversary has great confidence that the transaction is indeed stealable. This is augmented by the fact that UTXOs can be falsely announced stealable to bait the adversary to lose their deposit.

4.6 The Wait Time

In the specifications above, we used a default value of 100 blocks for the length of a commit-wait-reveal cycle. Longer waiting times make the economy more secure but less usable.

The main consideration when choosing the wait time is forking security: the wait time should be longer than any plausible reorganization of the blockchain. Recall that the discussion in p. 45 points out that coinbase transactions require a considerably longer confirmation than a standard transaction. The justification for that is that if a reorganization reverts a coinbase transaction, then all transactions which spend money minted by that coinbase transaction become invalid too. By setting the cooldown time of a coinbase transaction high enough to guarantee that a coinbase transaction is never reverted, it is guaranteed that no reorganization can make a valid transaction invalid (as long as the owners of the UTXOs used as input therein do not attempt double spending them).

Our considerations are more similar to coinbase transactions. Once a reveal is posted, an attacker could use it to post competing commit and reveal messages. If the reorg is deep enough to revert the honest commit message, then it is possible that the adversarial commit and reveal will be included itself, making the honest transaction invalid.

Thus, taking a cue from Bitcoin, we propose a 100 blocks waiting time.

One might argue that 100 waiting blocks is too long as it slows down the spending time too much. It is also arguable that this concern becomes more pressing as it applies to many users (whereas coinbase cooldown only applies to miners). We have several responses to this objection:
• It is better to err on the side of caution. The consequence of choosing the wait time too short is that spending pre-quantum UTXOs becomes insecure, and quantum-cautious spending becomes impossible. This is arguably more detrimental to the economy than a predictable slowdown.

• The effects of quantum mining on fork rates and reorganization depths are still not yet understood. There is evidence that quantum mining increases the orphan rate [LRS19, Sat20], and it could be the case that there are more consequences we are not yet aware of.

• Even if no forks occur, there is still the risk that a quantum attacker will somehow manage to postpone the inclusion of the reveal message in the blockchain long enough for her to post a competing commit and reveal. Such scenarios could also occur e.g. if congestion causes transactions to stall in the mempool for extended periods of time.

• Users who prefer short waiting times over small transaction sizes (that is, prefer paying faster over paying less) could use post-quantum signatures at confirmation speeds similar to today.

• It is possible to allow users to set their own waiting time when creating the UTXO. It is important to impose a default waiting time to prevent front-running attacks. However, there is no harm in allowing users to set a lower waiting time if they choose (conversely, users who feel that the 100 blocks waiting time is insufficient could specify higher waiting times).

4.7 Length of the Challenge Period

We propose a challenge period of one year. We argue that the challenge period should be very long for two reasons:

• We want to prevent a situation where a UTXO was successfully stolen because the user did not notice an attempted steal in time or had no time to gather the resources required to post a proof of fraud. A year-long period would give users ample time to notice the attempt and make preparations.

• Any UTXO that could be spent in restrictive mode could still be spent in the other modes without any challenge period. Even if an adversary is trying to steal the UTXO, proving fraud is just done by regularly spending the UTXO. The only effect of allowing permissive mode on leaked derived UTXO is that a steal attempt might force a user to spend a UTXO earlier than they desired to, and in that case, a long period allows the user more flexibility choosing when to spend it.

5 Our Proposed Protocol

In this section, we review considerations crucial for combining FawkesCoin, lifted FawkesCoin and quantum canaries into a cohesive and concrete protocol which arguably answers the two questions posed in the introduction.

5.1 Leaked UTXOs

So far, we have made a distinction between hashed and nonhashed UTXOs (which we further divided into several sets). In particular, some quantum-cautious spending methods treat hashed UTXOs differently than other UTXOs.
The problem with this is that the operation of any spending method should only depend on data available on the blockchain. However, it is impossible to read off the fact that a UTXO is 
hashed from the blockchain (as its public-key may have been leaked in other ways).

We thus approximate the set of non-hashed UTXO by using the set of leaked UTXOs. A UTXO is considered leaked if its public-key appears anywhere on the blockchain. For the rest of the section, we use the term hashed UTXO to mean a UTXO which is not leaked.

To account for the gap between the definitions, we propose a good Samaritan mechanism which allows users to post public-keys not already on the blockchain to the mempool, and Samaritan miners to include them on the blockchain, thus transforming non-leaked UTXOs into leaked ones. The miners obtain no fees for including the public-keys. By allocating 1 Kilobyte for good Samaritan reports, each block could contain about 30 reported addresses. The increase in both block size and the computational overhead of verifying the block is negligible.

Note that the good Samaritan mechanism should only be available in the pre-quantum era, as a quantum adversary could listen for reported public-keys and attempt to steal them.

The purpose of the good Samaritan mechanism is twofold. First, it allows users to report public-keys they encountered outside the blockchain. Second, it allows users who lost their secret-key but still hold their public-key to report it, making their UTXO lost so they could spend it using permissive FawkesCoin when the quantum era arrives (see Section 4.3).

5.2 Compatibility of Methods

The properties in Table 2 only hold when each method is implemented separately. Carelessly implementing several methods together might compromise their security. For example, allowing lifted spending and FawkesCoin simultaneously renders FawkesCoin insecure: a quantum attacker who sees the revealed FawkesCoin transaction in the mempool can try to front-run by creating a competing lifted signature transaction.

Another example is when using FawkesCoin and Lifted FawkesCoin together. Spending a derived UTXO in Lifted FawkesCoin requires revealing the master secret-key $msk$. An adversary listening to the mempool can use $msk$ to derive parent-keys she could use to spend any UTXO in the wallet using FawkesCoin. Hence, if FawkesCoin and Lifted FawkesCoin are implemented together, FawkesCoin must be modified such that the seed from which $msk$ was derived must be posted instead of the parent key, which has the disadvantage of requiring the user to commit to their entire wallet before they can start revealing it.

For that purpose, we propose not to implement lifted spending directly, and to segregate FawkesCoin and Lifted FawkesCoin into epochs, where in each epoch only one of the solutions is available.

We further require users of lifted FawkesCoin to complete a commit-wait-reveal cycle within the epoch. This acts to prevent users from committing to a UTXO during a lifted FawkesCoin epoch, and then spending it during a non-lifted FawkesCoin epoch, denying compensation form the miner who posted their lifted FawkesCoin commitment. We recall that in non-lifted FawkesCoin the user pays for the commitment as it is posted, regardless of whether the transaction is eventually revealed, so requiring that non-lifted FawkesCoin transactions are committed and revealed in the same epoch is unnecessary.

As the example above shows, segregating the solutions into epochs is insufficient, and some more steps are required for safely combining them. We discuss this further in Section 5.3.

We stress that as long as any method that requires users to be online is implemented, this requirement holds even if other methods without this requirement are implemented.
5.3 Combining FawkesCoin and Lifted FawkesCoin

As will be briefly touched upon in Section 5.2, allowing FawkesCoin and Lifted FawkesCoin to operate in tandem compromises their security. To overcome this problem, we suggest segregating the operation of these solutions into epochs, where we expect Lifted FawkesCoin users to complete a commit-wait-reveal cycle within an epoch.

However, this still allows a vulnerability when spending derived transactions using Lifted FawkesCoin, since such a spend requires exposing $msk$, which could then be used to spend any other transaction created by the same wallet using non-Lifted FawkesCoin.

The most immediate solution to that is to modify non-Lifted FawkesCoin such that spending a derived UTXO requires committing and revealing the seed. But this has the unfortunate implication that a user must commit to their entire wallet before they could reveal it.

To avoid this issue, we keep a registry of known keys in the hierarchy. Let $xsk_{par}$ be a key used to spend a derived transaction (either as a parent key in non-Lifted FawkesCoin or as $msk$ in Lifted FawkesCoin). It is considered invalid to use any key derivable from $xsk_{par}$ to spend a derived UTXO in non-Lifted FawkesCoin.

The problem is that it is impossible to exhaust the entire space of derivable keys. Typically, hardware wallets use a very limited space of addresses. We can thus agree on a reasonably small set of regular derivation paths $D$ assuming that most derived addresses of the blockchain are of the form $msk_P$ where $P \in D$ and $msk$ is a master secret-key of an existing HD wallet.

To account for users who might have a UTXO whose derivation path is not in $D$, we can allow users to post messages of the form $(H(xsk), P_1, \ldots, P_k)$ to the blockchain. Once the key $xsk$ is revealed, the paths $P_1, \ldots, P_k$ will be checked along with the regular derivation paths. Let $D_{xsk}$ contain the set $D$ along with any irregular path which appeared alongside $H(xsk)$ on the blockchain, and let $K_{xsk}$ contain all keys of the form $xsk_{P'}$ where $P'$ is a prefix of some $P \in D_{xsk}$. The registry will store a list of tuples of the form $(K_{xsk}, b_{xsk})$ where $b_{xsk}$ is the height of the block where $xsk$ was included. Any FawkesCoin transaction spending a derived UTXO using the key $xsk_{par}$ will be considered invalid if there is some $xsk$ such that $xsk_{par} \in K_{xsk}$ and the transaction was committed in a block whose height is at least $b_{xsk}$.

In addition, any UTXO whose $pk$ is in $K_{xsk}$ for some $xsk$ is considered leaked, and cannot be spent as if it is hashed.

5.4 The Final Protocol

The purpose of this section is to propose a concrete solution to questions 1 and 2 above by combining the methods described above.

We propose the following:

- Set up a quantum canary (see Appendix D) with a bounty of 20,000 BTC. The bounty should be freshly minted for that purpose.

- Define the quantum era to the period starting 8,000 blocks (about two months) after the canary is killed.

- Once the quantum era starts:
  - Activate FawkesCoin (see Section 4) and Lifted FawkesCoin (see Section 3). Set up a rotation (see Section 5.2) such that the FawkesCoin epoch is 1,900 blocks long and the Lifted FawkesCoin epoch is 500 blocks long.

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6We stress once again that the quantum canaries could be replaced with any other method to determine when the quantum era has started. Doing so does not affect the rest of the specification.
Directly spending pre-quantum UTXOs becomes prohibited. That is, FawkesCoin and Lifted FawkesCoin become the only methods for spending pre-quantum UTXOs.

The mode of operation for FawkesCoin is restrictive for any naked UTXO whose address was posted to the blockchain prior to 2013, and permissive for the rest of the UTXOs.

A core component in our solution is Lifted FawkesCoin, which requires a hard-fork (see Appendix A.3.2). The hard-fork could be implemented at any stage and does not require waiting for the quantum era. A hard-fork is also required to implement permissive FawkesCoin, and makes it easier to set up the bounty for the canary (see Appendix D.3).

Once the quantum era commences, all naked UTXOs whose public-keys leaked before 2013 would be burned, unless they were spent before the quantum era. Hence, the number of blocks we should wait for after the canary has been killed before the quantum era should be sufficient for all such UTXOs to be migrated. On the other hand, we do not want to wait too long since longer waiting times increase the risk that the quantum adversary will scale sufficiently to loot pre-quantum UTXOs before the quantum era starts. At the start of 2013, the entire UTXO set included about 4 million UTXOs. We hence use 4 million as a rough upper bound on the number of UTXOs at risk of being burned. Assuming about half of the block space is spent on signatures (see Appendix A.3.5), spending 4 million UTXOs should require about 800 blocks. However, we should not spend the waiting time too close to 800 blocks since 1. we should account for a possible increase in the number of UTXOs whose public-keys leaked before 2013, and 2. it is plausible that once the canary is killed, there will be a rush to spend pre-quantum UTXOs (including those who are not at the risk of burning) to post-quantum addresses, and there should be sufficient leeway for owners of soon-to-be-burned UTXOs to spend them in this scenario. We thus suggest a waiting period of 8,000 blocks (or about two months) as, on the one hand, it seems unreasonable that quantum computers will increase in scale during this period, and on the other, it gives owners of soon-to-be-burned UTXOs ample time to spend their transactions.

The 1,900 block epoch for FawkesCoin gives a 1,800 block window for posting commitments. Commitments can not be posted during the last 100 blocks, as this will not leave enough blocks in the epoch to complete the required waiting time.

For similar reasons, the last 300 blocks of a Lifted FawkesCoin epoch could not contain reveals since we have a 100 blocks wait period, 100 blocks during which the user can post a reveal, and 100 blocks during which the miner can post a proof of ownership in case the user failed to post a reveal. Thus, a 500 blocks Lifted FawkesCoin period gives a 200 block window for posting commitments.

We propose implementing FawkesCoin along with Lifted FawkesCoin, with the intention that a user with no access to post-quantum UTXOs could use Lifted FawkesCoin initially to migrate pre-quantum UTXOs to post-quantum UTXOs, and then use these post-quantum UTXOs to pay the FawkesCoin fees in future transactions. We thus expect that users will gradually shift from using Lifted FawkesCoin to using non-Lifted FawkesCoin.

We do not recommend enabling permissive mode before the quantum era since that would require users to be online (see Section 4.3). We stress that permissive (or even unrestrictive) mode should not be used at all for UTXOs prior to 2013 since HD wallets were only introduced in 2013, so all naked UTXOs prior to 2013 are known to be non-derived and are thus stealable.

Enabling unrestrictive mode in the quantum era for UTXOs made after 2013 is desirable, as it increases the set of spendable pre-quantum UTXOs while not increasing the available quantum loot (see Section 4.5). Since unrestrictive mode already requires users to be online and Lifted FawkesCoin already requires a hard-fork, there is no downside to enabling permissive mode.

Note that we do not recommend directly implementing lifted spending, as this method does
not provide a meaningful benefit over Lifted FawkesCoin, and is incompatible with non-Lifted FawkesCoin (see Section 5.2).

Remark 9. For concreteness, our proposal contains some “magic numbers” such as the length of the delay period for FawkesCoin, the funding of the canary, the length of the dispute period, the delay between claiming the canary and commencing the quantum era, etc. We have done our best to pick reasonable values and justify their magnitude (based on the magic numbers used in Bitcoin, estimations of the size of the UTXO set and post-quantum signatures, and so on). We note that all these values could be easily tuned, as they only mildly affect the functionality and security of the network.

6 Open Questions and Further Research

- Reducing the size of lifted signatures The most pressing issue is the size of lifted signatures, discussed in Section 2.4. The size of the signature directly determines the spendability threshold one using Lifted FawkesCoin. Estimating and optimizing the sizes of the signatures we use is an important next step toward implementing our solution.

- Seed-lifting without exposing msk The seed-lifted scheme we present in Section 2.3 requires exposing the master secret-key of the HD wallet. While this requirement does not affect the security of our solution, it does cause some inconveniences, so devising a method for cautiously spending derived UTXOs without exposing msk might be desirable. There are two main drawbacks to exposing msk. First, exposing msk implies that once a single commitment has been revealed, the entire wallet must be spent using lifted FawkesCoin (see Section 5.3). Another concern is that HD wallets use the same seed to derive keys to many different cryptocurrencies, so carelessly exposing msk on one currency might compromise UTXOs from different currencies whose address was derived from the same seed.

The most direct approach to spend a derived UTXO with derivation path \( P \) is to instantiate PICNIC with the function \( \text{Der}(\text{KDF}(\cdot), P) \). However, this requires PICNIC to be secure when using the same secret-key in different instantiation. It is unclear whether PICNIC is secure against such attacks, though it is very easy to modify PICNIC such that it remains EUF-CMA secure, but becomes completely broken against such attacks (e.g. by modifying the signature to contain the \( i \)th bit of the secret-key, where \( (i, s) \) is the first step in \( P \)). Hence, making this approach secure requires introducing a formal security notion that prohibits such attacks, and proving that PICNIC (or some modification thereof) satisfies this stronger form of security. We point out that another drawback of this approach is that it greatly increases signature sizes.

We leave the problem of removing the need to expose msk, either following the approach above or by coming up with a different solution, to future research.

- Instantiating the canary The discussion in Appendix D.2 suggests that the canary puzzle should be forging a signature of an ECDSA scheme instantiated with an elliptic curve similar to secp256k1. However, it still remains to choose a particular curve, and provide a way to sample a nothing-up-my-sleeve public-key for that curve.

- Further analysis of canary entities Our game theoretic analysis in Appendix D.5 assumes the parties have perfect information about their adversary’s capabilities. One step towards a more realistic model is to consider the game theory of canaries in the setting of imperfect information.
References


A Preliminaries and Definitions

A.1 Digital Signatures

A digital signature scheme is a cryptographic primitive that allows users to sign messages such that only they can sign the message, but anyone can verify the authenticity of the message. In digital signature schemes, the signer creates a secret signature key that can be used to sign messages and a public key that can be used to verify these messages.

A.1.1 Security of Digital Signatures

The security notion we consider is existential unforgeability under chosen message attack (EUF-CMA). In this notion, the adversary is given access to the public key as well as access to a signing oracle which she could use to sign any message she wants. Her task is to produce a signature for any message she did not use the oracle to sign. A scheme is EUF-CMA secure if an efficient adversary cannot achieve this task with more than negligible probability (for a more formal treatment of the security of digital signatures we refer the reader to [Gol04, KL14]).

Extending the security notions of digital signatures to accommodate general quantum adversaries is not quite straightforward. The main difficulty is in the setting where the adversary has access to sign messages of their own, and they can sign a superposition of messages. The established classical notions of security do not generalize directly to this setting, since the notion of “a message she did not use the oracle to sign” becomes ill-defined when discussing superimposed queries.

However, in the setting of cryptocurrencies, the signature oracle reflects the adversary’s ability to read transactions signed by the same public-key off the blockchain. This ability is captured even when assuming that the adversary, albeit quantum, may only ask the oracle to sign classical messages. A scheme that remains secure against quantum adversaries with classical oracle access is called post-quantum EUF-CMA secure. For brevity, we use the term EUF-CMA security to mean post-quantum EUF-CMA security, unless stated otherwise.

A.1.2 Elliptic Curve based Signatures

The ECDSA and Schnorr signature schemes are based on a particular mathematical object called an elliptic curve. Bitcoin uses the ECDSA signature scheme instantiated with the secp256k1 curve, which is considered to admit 128-bit security against classical attackers [Bit22a]. The Taproot update [WNT20] replaces ECDSA with Schnorr signatures instantiated with the same secp256k1 curve, which is also considered to admit 128-bit security [WNR20].

While the way signatures are produced and verified in both these schemes is beyond the scope of the current work, we do require some understanding of how keys are generated. Fortunately,
the key generation procedure is the same for ECDSA and Schnorr signatures (provided they were instantiated with the same curve and the same basis point).

Given an elliptic curve, one can give the element of the curve the structure of an abelian group known as the elliptic curve group. Recall that given any group \( \Gamma \), we can define for any element \( G \in \Gamma \) and any natural number \( n \) the group element \( n \cdot G \) by defining \( 0 \cdot G = 0_\Gamma \) (where \( 0_\Gamma \) is the identity element of \( \Gamma \)) and \( n \cdot G = (n-1) \cdot G + G \). We let \( o(\Gamma) \) be the order of the group and say that \( G \) is a generator of \( \Gamma \) if \( \{ n \cdot G \mid n = 0, \ldots, o(\Gamma) \} = \Gamma \). The \text{secp256k1} curve has the property that it has a prime order, whereby any element besides the identity is a generator.

Instantiating a signature scheme requires specifying not only an elliptic curve group \( \Gamma \), but also a fixed generator \( G \) of the group. Given the curve and generator, the secret-key is a uniformly random number \( sk \leftarrow \{0, \ldots, o(\Gamma)\} \) and the matching public-key is \( pk = sk \cdot G \). As we further discuss in Appendix D.2, the considerations behind choosing the curve and generator are highly involved, and are relevant both to the security and the efficiency of the resulting scheme.

To recover the public-key from a secret-key, one needs to be able to compute \( sk \) from \( G \) and \( pk = sk \cdot G \). Differently stated, one needs to compute the discrete logarithm \( \log_G(pk) \). The hardness of discrete logarithm is the assumption that solving such equations is infeasible in the average case. As we’ll shortly review, quantum computers disobey this assumption, which is the root of the problem at hand.

In practice, elements of ECDSA are encoded into binary strings, for a group element \( H \in \Gamma \), let \( H \) denote its binary representation. We define the function \( \text{PK}^{\text{EC}}(sk) = sk \cdot G \) and note that it is an injective function with domain \( \{0, \ldots, o(\Gamma)\} \). Furthermore, \( \text{PK}^{\text{EC}} \) is a group homomorphism from \( \mathbb{Z}_{o(\Gamma)} \) to \( \Gamma \): \( \text{PK}^{\text{EC}}(k + l) = (k + l) \cdot G = k \cdot G + l \cdot G = \text{PK}^{\text{EC}}(k) + \text{PK}^{\text{EC}}(l) \).

In practice the secret key \( sk \) is not sampled uniformly from \( \{0, \ldots, o(\Gamma)\} \) but from \( \{0, 1\}^{\log_2 o(\Gamma)} \) (that is from strings of the minimal length required so that each possible number in \(0, \ldots, o(\Gamma)\) has a unique representation. However, the elliptic curve group is typically chosen such that almost all keys have a unique representation. For example, in the \text{secp256k1} curve \( sk \) is given as a string of 256 bits whereas there are more than \( 2^{256} - 2^{64} \) group elements, so the fraction of elements of \( \mathbb{Z}_{o(\Gamma)} \) which admit two representations is smaller than \( 2^{-192} \). In practice, this is overlooked and a key is generated by choosing a uniformly random string. We also overlook this detail and assume that \( \text{PK}^{\text{EC}} \) is injective.

The binary representation \( H \) of a curve point \( H \) has several different formats with different properties. In practice in general, and Bitcoin in particular, different formats appear in different contexts. Most of the current work work is agnostic to how the string is actually formatted, and treat \( \text{PK}^{\text{EC}} \) as a bijection onto its domain. The only place where we appeal to the format is in Appendix B, where we use the fact that in HD wallets following the specification of BIP-32 [Wui13], \( sk \) is encoded as a 32 byte string whereas \( pk \) is encoded as a 33 byte string (and in particular it is impossible that \( sk = \text{PK}^{\text{EC}}(sk) \)).

A.1.3 Quantum Attacks on ECDSA

Shor’s algorithm [Sho94] was the first to break previously considered unbreakable cryptographic schemes by efficiently factoring large numbers. Shor’s techniques were generalized in [BL95] to solve the discrete logarithm problem in arbitrary groups, including elliptic groups, thus proving that ECDSA and Schnorr signatures are not post-quantum (i.e., the number of bits of security of these schemes over any group is polylogarithmic in the number of bits required to describe an arbitrary element of the group). We refer the reader to [LK21] for a fairly comprehensive survey of the state-of-the-art algorithms optimized to solve the discrete logarithm problem in several
types of elliptic curve groups\(^7\).

When designing quantum canaries (see Appendix D), we are concerned with curves similar to the secp256k1 curve used in Bitcoin. The secp256k1 curve is over a prime field and is given in Weierstrass form. Fortunately, quantum algorithms for solving discrete logarithms over prime curves given in Weierstrass form were analyzed by several authors. The first concrete cryptanalysis is given by Roetteler et al. \cite{RNSL17}, which provide an explicit algorithm optimized to minimize the required number of logical qubits. The algorithm in \cite{RNSL17} is vastly improved by Häner et al. \cite{HJN+20}, who provide a more efficient algorithm and also consider space-time trade-offs. They provide algorithms minimizing either the number of logical qubits, the number of \(T\) gates, or the depth of the circuit. Unfortunately, \cite{HJN+20} do not analyze any of these metrics as a function of the size of the field, but rather compute them for several known curves and compare the result with \cite{RNSL17}.

### A.1.4 Post-Quantum Signature Schemes

To address the quantum vulnerability of contemporary signature schemes, the United States National Institute of Standards and Technology (\textsc{NIST}) invited protocol designers to submit post-quantum signature schemes. In July 2022, \textsc{NIST} announced that three post-quantum signatures will be standardized: CRYSTALS-Dilithium \cite{DKL+18}, FALCON \cite{FHK+18}, and SPHINCS+ \cite{BHK+19}.

A survey of the chosen schemes and their performance is available in \cite{RWC+21}. The blog posts \cite{Wes21, TC22, Wig22} provide a more approachable (yet less formal) survey of the state-of-the-art post-quantum signature schemes in general, as well as the \textsc{NIST} standardized schemes.

### A.1.5 Picnic Signatures

The principal tool we use for signature lifting is the \textsc{PICNIC} signature scheme of Chase et al. \cite{CDG+17}. The \textsc{PICNIC} scheme signature scheme can be instantiated using any post-quantum one-way function \(f\) to obtain a signature scheme which is post-quantum EUF-CMA secure in the QROM (recall Appendix A.2). In the obtained scheme, a secret-key is a random point \(x\) in the domain of \(f\), and the corresponding public key is \(f(x)\).

The \textsc{PICNIC} scheme, instantiated with a particular block cipher called \textit{LowMC}, was submitted to \textsc{NIST} for standardization. Their designed prevailed the first two rounds of the competition. It was decided that \textsc{PICNIC} will not proceed to the third round due to the novelty of techniques it applies compared with other candidates, however, it was decided to retain \textsc{PICNIC} as an alternative candidate \cite{AASA+20}. This means that, while \textsc{PICNIC} was not chosen to be \textsc{NIST} standardized, it successfully withstood heavy scrutiny.

### A.2 The Random Oracle Model

When considering the security of constructions which involve explicit hash functions such as SHA-256 or SHA-512, it is difficult to make formal arguments about their security. A common way to overcome this is using the random oracle model. The random oracle model assumes that there is an oracle \(H\) accessible to anyone, such that \(H(x) = f_n(x)\) where for each \(n\) the function \(f_n\) was uniformly sampled from the set of functions from \(\{0, 1\}^n\) to \(\{0, 1\}^\ell\) (where \(\ell\) is fixed). The quantum random oracle model further assumes that users have access to the unitary \(|x, y\rangle \mapsto |x, y \oplus H(x)\rangle\).

\(^7\)The “type” of a curve is determined by the field it is defined above, the form in which the parametric equation is given, and the types of coordinates used
It is common practice in cryptography to analyze constructions assuming that random oracles are used instead of hash functions, and then instantiate them with hash functions considered secure for the application at hand. For a more extensive introduction to the random oracle model and the quantum random oracle model we refer the reader to [BS20, Section 8.10.2] and [BDF+11] respectively.

Random oracles have a particularly useful property that if applied to a "sufficiently random" distribution, the output is indistinguishable from uniformly random. The measure of randomness appropriate for our settings is that of **guessing probability**:

**Definition 4 (Guessing probability).** Let \( S \) be a finite distribution, the guessing probability of \( S \) is \( \gamma_S = \max_t \mathbb{P}[t = s \mid t \leftarrow S] \).

That is, the guessing probability is the probability of the most likely output of sampling from \( S \). It is called the guessing probability as it is also the best probability with which an adversary can guess the outcome of sampling from \( S \), as one can prove that always guessing the most likely outcome is an optimal strategy.

Note that a distribution can have a very small guessing probability and still be easily distinguishable from uniformly random. For example, consider the distribution over \( (s, pw) \) where \( s \) is a uniformly random string of length \( n \) and \( pw \) is some fixed string of length \( k \). Then \( \gamma_{(s,pw)} = 2^{-n} \), though it is easily distinguishable from a random string of length \( n + k \).

**Proposition 2 ([BS20] Theorem 8.10, adapted).** Let \( S \) be a finite distribution. If \( H \) is modeled as a random oracle and \( \gamma_S = \text{negl}(\lambda) \) then the distribution \( H(S) \) is computationally indistinguishable from a random distribution.

Throughout this work, we use \( H \) to represent the hash used in the construction we analyze (which is always either SHA-256 or SHA-512), and assume \( H \) is modeled as a random oracle. In practice, SHA-256 and SHA-512 are based on a construction called the Merkle–Damgård transform, which is known to be an unsuitable replacement for a random oracle in some particular settings. In Appendix A.2.1 we expand on the properties of Merkle–Damgård and justify our modeling thereof as a random oracle.

### A.2.1 Merkle–Damgård as a Random Oracle

In Appendix A.2, we stated that throughout this paper we replace the SHA-256 and SHA-512 hashes with a random oracle \( H \). More generally, these hashes are constructed by applying a technique called the **Merkle–Damgård transform**, which transforms a collision-resistant compressing function \( f \) (e.g., \( f : \{0,1\}^{2n} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n \)) to a collision-resistant function \( H_f \) with a variable input length.

The purpose of this appendix is to isolate the properties we require of \( H \), and argue that they also hold for \( H_f \), when \( f \) is modeled as a random oracle.

The “bad” property of \( H_f \) is that it admits a **length extension attack**: given a hash \( H_f(m) \) of some unknown string \( m \), and oracle access to \( f \), an adversary can easily compute \( H_f(m || m') \) for a large variety of strings \( m' \). One can easily abuse this property to construct a scheme that is secure in the ROM but becomes broken when \( H_f \) replaces the oracle (see e.g. the “prepend the key” MAC construction in [BS20, Section 8.7]).

Our analysis appeals to two properties of a random oracle: that it is collision-resistant and that the output of a “sufficiently random” input is indistinguishable from uniform.

The original purpose for the Merkle–Damgård transform was to provide collision resistance, and it is indeed known to hold (see [BS20, Theorem 8.3]).

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8Readers familiar with the min-entropy function \( H_{\min} \) might notice that \( \gamma_S = 2^{-H_{\min}(S)} \)
We assume the second property two cases: for key derivation from a seed (see Appendix A.2.2) where it is known that the input starts with sufficiently many random bits, and when hashing a string sampled from a distribution known to be indistinguishable from uniform (typically generated in the first case). Hence, it suffices to prove the following:

**Proposition 3.** Let $f : \{0, 1\}^{2^n} \to \{0, 1\}^n$ be a random function. Let $S$ be a distribution of strings of length at least $n$ such that the distribution on the first $n$ bits is computationally indistinguishable from uniform, then $H_f(S)$ is computationally indistinguishable from uniform for an adversary with oracle access to $f$.

**Proof.** We first observe that if a distribution $\mathcal{T}$ on strings of length $n$ is indistinguishable from uniform then $\gamma_\mathcal{T} = \negl(n)$: say that $\mathbb{P}_\mathcal{T}(x) = \alpha$, and consider an adversary $A$ that samples $x'$ and outputs 1 iff $x' = x$. Clearly $\mathcal{A}$ is polynomial, and we have $\mathbb{P}[\mathcal{A}(\cdot) = 1] = 1/\alpha$ and $\mathbb{P}[\mathcal{A}(\cdot) = 1] = 2^{-n}$. By hypothesis we have that $|1/\alpha - 2^{-n}| = \negl(n)$. It follows that $\mathbb{P}_\mathcal{T}(x) = \negl(n)$ for all strings $x$, hence $\gamma_\mathcal{T} = \negl(n)$.

We also observe that if $\mathcal{T} = (\mathcal{T}_1, \mathcal{T}_2)$, then $\gamma_\mathcal{T} \leq \gamma_{\mathcal{T}_1}$: let $(x_1, x_2)$ that maximizes $\mathbb{P}_\mathcal{T}[(x_1, x_2)]$, then $\gamma_{\mathcal{T}_1} \geq \mathbb{P}_{\mathcal{T}_1}[x_1] = \sum_{x_2} \mathbb{P}_{\mathcal{T}_1}[(x_1, x_2)] \geq \mathbb{P}_\mathcal{T}[(x_1, x_2)] = \gamma_\mathcal{T}$.

Recall that the first step of applying Merkle-Damgård to an input $x$ is to create a padded $\hat{x}$ whose length is a multiple of $n$ (the specifics of the padding are crucial for collision resistance, but irrelevant to the current proof), and writing $\hat{x} = x_1 \ldots \parallel x_k$ where each $x_i$ is a string of length $n$. Crucially, if $|x| \geq n$ then $x_1$ is exactly the first $n$ bits of $x$.

We then compute $y_1 = f(0^n, x_1)$ and $y_j = f(y_{j-1}, x_j)$ for $j = 2, \ldots, k$, until finally we obtain $H_f(x) := y_k$.

By hypothesis if $x \leftarrow S$ then $\gamma_{x_1} = \negl(n)$. From the observation above, we get that $\gamma_{(0^n, x_1)} = \negl(n)$. Since $f$ is random it follows from Proposition 2 that $y_1 = f(0^n, x_1)$ is indistinguishable from uniform. Hence $\gamma_{y_1} = \negl(n)$, so we can repeat the argument to get that $\gamma_{(y_1, x_2)} = \negl(n)$ and $y_2$ is indistinguishable from random. We repeat the process $k$ times to obtain that $y_k = H_f(x)$ is also indistinguishable from uniform. \qed

For completeness, we point out the places where we use the assumption that $H$ is modeled as a random oracle, and observe that we only use the two properties above:

- In Appendix A.2.2 we argue that 2048 successive applications of SHA-512 constitute a PBKDF. By successive applications of Proposition 3 we get that SHA-512$^{2048}$ is indeed a PBKDF, as long as we assume that the first $n$ bits of the input are indistinguishable from uniform. In practice, the key-generation procedure of HD wallets uses an input that starts with a long uniform string, so this assumption is justified.

- Throughout Appendix B we prove that if $H$ is a random oracle, then several functions derived from $H$ have some collision resistance properties. These arguments are readily adaptable to the weaker assumption that $H$ is collision-resistant.

- In Section 2 we assume that $H$ is modeled as a random oracle. We only use this fact directly to argue that PICNIC(H) is secure, which only requires $H$ that is one-way. The fact that $H$ is one-way already follows from the assumption that it is collision-resistant. All other appeals to the randomness of $H$ are to apply the statements of Appendix A.2.2 and Appendix B.

### A.2.2 Key-Derivation functions

A password-based key-derivation function (PBKDF) is a function used to derive a secret-key for a cryptographic application from a string that is not necessarily uniformly random (e.g. the key...
also contains a user selected password, without assuming anything about the distribution the password was sampled from) called the seed. For a formal introduction we refer the reader to [BS20, Section 8.10].

The property we require from a PBKDF is that the resulting key is indistinguishable from random, provided that the input seed was sampled from a distribution with sufficient guessing probability (recall Definition 4). Proposition 2 establishes that a random oracle is a PBKDF.

Most Bitcoin wallets use a particular PBKDF specified in [PRVB13], where the seed is comprised of a user-chosen password and a uniformly random binary string (encoded in the form of a mnemonic phrase for the sake of human readability). The PBKDF therein serves another purpose: to provide some protection for the user from an adversary which has access to the binary string but not to the password (as the string is usually stored inside the wallet, but the user is required to input the password with each use). This is achieved by making the PBKDF computationally heavy to make dictionary attacks on the password less feasible. Towards this end, the PBKDF described therein applies 2048 iterations of SHA-512 to the input.

A.3 Bitcoin and Blockchain

In this section, we overview some of the aspects of Bitcoin relevant to our discussion. We assume the reader is familiar with core concepts of Bitcoin such as transactions and UTXOs, chain reorganizations, etc. For a review of these concepts, we refer the reader to [NBF +16].

A.3.1 Coinbase Cooldown

In a reorg scenario, most transactions removed by the reorg can be rebroadcast to the mempool, and any transaction broadcast by an honest user will eventually be included in the new chain. The only scenario where a transaction becomes invalid is if a dishonest user attempts a double spend by broadcasting conflicting transactions to the two sides of the fork. However, this is no longer the case for reverted coinbase transactions, as their validity relies on the block that included them. Reverting a coinbase transaction renders it, and all transactions spending coins minted in that coinbase transaction, invalid. To avoid a scenario where a valid transaction made by an honest user becomes invalid, Bitcoin imposes a cooldown of one hundred blocks before the coinbase transaction can be spent (see the Bitcoin developer guide).

A.3.2 Software Forks

A software fork is a change to the code that nodes are expected to run that affects the conditions under which a block is considered valid. There are two types of software forks, a soft-fork and a hard-fork. The difference is that in a hard-fork, there exist blocks that the new version considers valid while the old version does not. In order to adopt a soft-fork, only the miners are required to update their nodes, and non-mining nodes will operate correctly even with the outdated version. A hard-fork, on the other hand, causes the chain to split into two separate chains that can not accept each other’s blocks. Notable examples of hard-forks include Bitcoin Cash (forked from Bitcoin) and Ethereum Classic (forked from Ethereum).

We illustrate the two types of forks with two scenarios which occur in our methods:

• Paying the coin in a UTXO to a different address than the one specified in the transaction (e.g., paying the UTXO of a non-revealed commitment to a miner who posted a proof of ownership in Lifted FawkesCoin, see Section 3). This behavior can be implemented in a soft-fork by not spending to transaction to its intended address, but rather spending it to a new anyone-can-spend UTXO. Updated miners who enforce the rules of the protocol will know to consider attempts to spend the anyone-can-spend UTXO to any address but
the one dictated by the protocol invalid. However, from the point of view of non-updated nodes, spending the UTXO to any address is valid.

- Spending a UTXO without including a valid signature (e.g., spending a lost UTXO in permissive FawkesCoin, see Section 4.4). This scenario can not be implemented in a soft-fork, as currently there is no way to spend a UTXO without including a signature.

A.3.3 Dust

UTXOs whose value is too small to cover the costs of spending them are called Dust. The difference between dust and unspendability is that a UTXO can be spendable with respect to one spending method but not the other. For a UTXO to be considered dust, it must not be spendable using any method available. Since the transaction fees fluctuate, the set of dust UTXOs changes in time.

Any changes to the operation of Bitcoin that increase the transaction sizes will also incur an increase in the amount of dust. In particular, current post-quantum signature schemes require much larger keys and/or signature sizes than the ECDSA scheme currently used in Bitcoin. Moreover, variations on the Bitcoin protocol can cause the dust threshold to increase beyond the transaction fee, as indeed happens in Lifted FawkesCoin (see Section 3).

A.3.4 Quantum Threats on Blockchains

Roughly speaking, quantum computers affect Bitcoin on two different fronts: quantum mining and attacks on pre-quantum cryptography.

A common misconception is that quantum computers have no drastic effects on Bitcoin mining (beyond increased difficulty due to Grover’s quadratic speedup). This was debunked in [Sat20, LRS19]. Our work is orthogonal to aspects related to quantum mining, especially since quantum attacks on secp256k1 are projected to occur a few years before quantum mining starts [ABL+18].

The most immediate risk is in the form of UTXOs with leaked public-keys. A quantum adversary could use the public-key to sign arbitrary messages and, in particular, spend any UTXO whose address is this public-key. The public-key can be exposed in a variety of ways, including (but not limited to):

- P2PK UTXOs: when Bitcoin just launched, all transactions would contain the ECDSA public-key of the recipient. Hence, all UTXOs in the UTXO set would contain the public-key used to verify transactions spending them. That is, none of the UTXOs were hashed. In 2009, in order to conserve space, P2PKH transactions which only contain a hash of the public-key were introduced. P2PKH soon became the standard, and as of today, no P2PK UTXOs are created. However, the UTXO set still contains a few old P2PK UTXOs whose balance totals about 2 million bitcoin [Del22].

- Reused addresses: while considered bad practice, reusing the same address for several UTXOs is a very common habit. A reused address in itself is not quantumly compromised, but once such a UTXO is spent, the remaining UTXOs with the same address become compromised. A survey by Deloitte estimates [Del22] that at least 2 million bitcoins are stored in reused UTXOs whose key has been exposed this way. A survey by BitMex [Bit22b] estimates that about half of the Bitcoin transaction throughput is to reused addresses.

\footnote{It should be noted that reusing addresses poses security risks beyond quantum vulnerabilities – particularly compromising the anonymity of users – and is generally considered a bad security practice.}
• Taproot: the Taproot update to Bitcoin [WNT20] uses a new form of UTXO called P2TR in which the public-key itself is posted like in P2PK UTXOs. Taproot was created with the intention to become the new standard and replace other spending methods, which might greatly increase the amount of leaked public-keys. Since its deployment in November 2021 the adoption of Taproot has been steadily increasing and as of August 2023, about 23% of newly created UTXOs are P2TR [Tra23].

• Software forks: when a chain forks into two independent chains (such as Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash, or Ethereum and Ethereum classic), any UTXO from before the splitting point coexists on both chains. Thus, in order to spend money on one of the chains, the owner must expose her key, which could be used by an attacker to spend the owner’s corresponding UTXO on the other chain. See [IKK20] for an analysis of address reuse across Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash.

A.3.5 Using Post-Quantum Signatures on the Blockchain

The most straightforward way to address quantum threats is to introduce post-quantum signatures. However, this requires that all users migrate their UTXOs to post-quantum UTXOs before a quantum adversary emerges.

According to bitcoinvisuals.com, the average Bitcoin transaction in the last two years is about 600 bytes long and contains three inputs. Each such input contains a compressed ECDSA signature and an ECDSA public-key whose combined length is at most 103 bytes. Hence, at full capacity, about half of the block space is used for signature data.

As of the time of writing, there are about 85 million UTXOs in the Bitcoin UTXO set [Blo22]. Assuming a block size of one megabyte and a block delay of 10 minutes, it follows that migrating every single UTXO to a post-quantum address would require about five months. Though, even if it was possible to rally all users to migrate their UTXOs, a quantum adversary could still loot lost UTXOs.

Another crucial aspect of post-quantum signature schemes is their increased storage and computational requirements compared to current signatures. The most immediate consequence is the increase in public-key and signature lengths, which directly decreases the throughput of Bitcoin.

The most space-efficient post-quantum signature endorsed by NIST is the Falcon512 scheme, whose combined public-key and signature size is 1532 bytes, which is about 15 times larger than the ECDSA equivalent, making the average transaction about eight times larger. Crystal-DILITHIUM is the second-best scheme in terms of combined public-key and signature storage, with a combined length of 2740 bits, inflating the size of an average transaction by a factor of about 14.

Remark 10. One concern about implementing post-quantum primitives too soon is that they have not undergone the same scrutiny as contemporary cryptosystems, and weaknesses might be revealed therein. One solution for that is to use an hybrid approach, where (as long as pre-quantum cryptography is still considered safe), the signer must produce both an ECDSA (or any other widely used signature scheme) and a signature produced by the newly implemented post-quantum scheme. This way, users are still protected by the pre-quantum scheme should such vulnerabilities arise. Using a hybrid approach to transition to post-quantum cryptography was discussed in [BHMS17]. Such a hybrid approach was recently applied in [GKP+22].
B Hierarchical Deterministic wallets

Bitcoin HD wallets [Wui13] allow a user to only store one master secret-key from which many ECDSA key-pairs can be derived. The master secret-key itself is usually derived using a PBKDF (see Appendix A.2.2). In this appendix, we present and analyze the construction of [Wui13]. Our goal is proving Proposition 6, which is essential for proving Theorem 4, establishing the security of seed-lifting.

All keys derived by an HD wallet are actually extended keys. An extended secret-key is of the form xsk = (sk,c) where sk is an ECDSA secret-key and c is a pseudo-random string. The corresponding public-key is xpk = (pk,c) where pk = PK^EC(sk) (recall ).

Given a parent extended secret-key, xsk = (sk,c) we define the ith non-hardened child H^{nh}(xsk) as following:

- Let H be collision resistant with output length 512 (BIP-32 uses SHA-512).
- Let H_L and H_R be the first 256 bits and last 256 bits of H respectively.
- Set c_i = H_R(c,pk,i) and sk_i = H_L(c,pk,i) + sk mod N where N = |secp256k1|.
- Set pk_i = PK^EC(sk_i).

In ith hardened child H^h(xsk) is defined similarly except sk is used instead of pk in the third step.

Differently stated, we define H^h(c,x,i) = (H_L(c,x,i) + x,H_R(c,x,i)) and H^{nh}(c,x,i) = (H_L(c,PK^EC(x),i) + x,H_R(c,PK^EC(x),i)) and get that xsk_i = H^h(c,x,i) in the hardened case and xsk_i = H^{nh}(c,x,i) in the non-hardened case.

We call a pair s = (i,p) where p ∈ {h,nh} a derivation step. A derivation path P is a sequence of derivation steps. We recursively define xsk_0 = msk and xsk_{P,(i,p)} = H^P(xsk_{P,i}). For each derivation step s = (i,p) we define H^*(x) = H^P(x,i). Finally, for each derivation path P we define H^P recursively as H^P(x) = x and H^{P,*}(x) = H^*(H^P(x)).

Note that given xpk = (c,pk) one can compute pk^{nh} = PK^EC(H_L(c,pk,i)+sk) = PK^EC(H_L(c,pk,i)) + PK^EC(sk) = PK^EC(H_L(c,pk,i)) + sk (where we used the fact that PK^EC is a group homomorphism). Also note that given sk^{nh} and xpk = (c,pk) one can compute sk = sk_i − H_L(c,pk,i), so it is not secure to provide an extended public-key along with a non-hardened non-extended child secret-key.

We will need the following:

**Proposition 4.** If H is a random oracle and s is a derivation step then H^* is a random oracle.

*Proof. Let s = (i,p). By assumption, H is random, which implies that H_L is random. Since PK^EC is injective, it follows that (c,x,i) → H_L(c,PK^EC(x),i) = H_R^{nh} is also random. Finally, we note that if f is uniformly random and g is fixed then f + g is uniformly random, from which it follows that H_R^{nh} is also random. It follows that H^{nh} is random as needed. The proof for H^h is similar.

We now note that H^{(i,p)} is simply H^P(·,i), but the result of fixing a part of the input of a random function is also a random function (with a smaller domain), which completes the proof. □

From this follows by induction:

**Corollary 1.** If H is a random oracle and P is a non-empty derivation path then H^P is collision-resistant.
Finally we define the function $\text{Der}(\text{msk}, P) = H^P(\text{msk})$. The function $\text{Der}$ is not collision-resistant: if $P_1$ and $P_2$ are two non-empty derivation paths, and $P = P_1 || P_2$ is their concatenation, then it holds for any $\text{msk}$ that $\text{Der}(\text{msk}, P) = \text{Der}(\text{Der}(\text{msk}, P_1), P_2)$. However, these are the only forms of collision a bounded adversary could feasibly produce. This property will be useful to us in Section 2.3, so we define and prove it formally.

**Definition 5.** Let $f(x, y)$ be a two-variable function. A point $(x', y')$ is an $f$-suffix of $(x, y)$ if there exists $y''$ such that $y = y'' || y'$ and $x' = f(x, y'')$.

A pair of inputs $(x, y), (x', y')$ is a non-suffix collision if $f(x, y) = f(x', y')$ but neither of the input is an $f$-suffix of the other.

The function $f$ is collision resistant up to suffixes if it is infeasible to find a non-suffix collision.

**Proposition 5.** If $H$ is a random oracle then $\text{Der}$ is collision resistant up to suffixes.

**Proof.** Let $A$ be a QPT adversary which outputs a non-suffix collision $(\text{msk}, P), (\text{msk}', P')$ with probability $\varepsilon$. We prove that we can recover from $(\text{msk}, P), (\text{msk}', P')$ a collision in a function known to be a random-oracle, and in particular collision-resistant. From this will follow that $\varepsilon = \text{negl}(\lambda)$, completing the proof.

In most cases, we will find a collision in $H^Q$ for some non-empty path $Q$, which is a random oracle by Corollary 1. In the remaining case we will find a collision in $H_L$, which is a random oracle by the hypothesis that $H$ is a random oracle.

If $P = P'$ we get that $\text{msk} \neq \text{msk}'$ is a collision for $H^P$. Assume that $P \neq P'$.

If there is a $P''$ such that $P = P'' || P'$, then by the assumption that $(\text{msk}, P), (\text{msk}', P')$ is non-suffix we have that $\text{msk}' \neq H^{P''}(\text{msk})$. However it does hold that $H^{P''}(\text{msk}') = H^{P''}(H^{P''}(\text{msk}))$, so we found a collision in $H^{P''}$.

The remaining case is that neither $P, P'$ is a suffix of the other. Let $S$ be the longest shared suffix of $P, P'$. Let $Q, Q'$ be paths such that $P = Q || S$ and $P' = Q' || S$ (note that both $Q$ and $Q'$ are necessarily non-empty). If $H^Q(\text{msk}) \neq H^Q'(\text{msk}')$ then these points constitute a collision of $H^S$. Otherwise, let $s$ and $s'$ be the last steps in $Q$ and $Q'$ respectively, and let $\tilde{Q}$ and $\tilde{Q}'$ be $Q$ and $Q'$ with the last step removed. By the maximality of $S$ we have that $s \neq s'$. However, we have that $H^S(H^Q(\text{msk})) = H^Q(\text{msk}) = H^Q'(\text{msk}') = H^S(H^Q'(\text{msk}'))$. Let $s = (i, p)$ and $s' = (i', p')$. If $p = p'$ we get from $s \neq s'$ that $i \neq i'$, and since $H^P(H^Q(\text{msk}), i) = H^P(H^Q'(\text{msk}'), i')$ we found a collision in $H^P$. If $p \neq p'$ assume without loss that $p = h$ and $p' = nh$, and also set $H^Q(\text{msk}) = H^Q'(\text{msk}') = (sk, c)$, then we have that $H_R(c, sk, i) = H_R(c, \text{PK}^{\text{EC}}(sk), i')$. However, recall that in [Wui13] secret-keys are encoded as 32 byte strings whereas public-keys are encoded as 33 byte strings (see Appendix A.1.2), whereby $(c, sk, i) \neq (c, \text{PK}^{\text{EC}}(sk), i')$ so we found a collision in $H_R$. \hfill $\square$

So far we have considered $H$ to have fixed output length of 512 bits. The next property we require is stated more naturally when we think of $H_\ell$ as having output length $2\ell$ and of $\text{PK}^{\text{EC}}_\ell$ as an arbitrary efficiently computable injection from $\{0, 1\}^\ell$ to $\{0, 1\}^{\ell+c}$ for some $c > 0$ (when instantiated with $H = \text{SHA-512}$ and $\text{PK}^{\text{EC}}$ specified in BIP-39 we have that $\ell = 256$ and $c = 8$). For a string $x \in \{0, 1\}^{2\ell}$ we use $x_L$ and $x_R$ to denote its first and last $\ell$ bits respectively.

**Proposition 6.** Fix a path $Q$. Let $A$ be a QPT adversary with oracle access to $H_\ell$ that gets as input $x \in \{0, 1\}^{2\ell}$ and outputs a path $Q$ and a string $x'$ of length at least $\ell$. If $H_\ell$ is a random oracle, then

$$\mathbb{P}[H_\ell(x) = H^Q_\ell(x') \mid x \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{2\ell}, (x', Q) \leftarrow A(x)] = \text{negl}(\ell).$$
Proof. We show that this is infeasible for $Q$ which only contains a single hardened derivation step. The proof is identical for a non-hardened derivation step and easily extends to a general $Q$ by induction, which is omitted.

For the sake of readability let $H$ denote $H_\ell$. Suppose an adversary finds $i$ such that $H(x) = H^{(i,h)}(x')$. Then in particular $H_R(x) = H_R(x',i)$. Since $H_R$ is a random oracle and is thus collision-resistant, it follows that with overwhelming probability $x = (x',i)$. Thus, to have an equality, we must have that $H_L(x) = H_L(x) + x_L$, implying that $x_L = 0$. However, since $x$ is uniformly random, this only happens with probability $2^{-\ell} = \text{negl}(\ell)$.

\section{Seed Lifting Security Proof}

We provide a full proof in Theorem 4. Loosely speaking, Proposition 5 implies that we need only consider three types of attacks:

- The adversary can create their own seed and master secret-key, and find a derivation path from their master secret-key to an existing public-key. We show that such an attack implies a collision in the hash function.

- The adversary manages to \emph{extend} the derivation path. This is similar to the previous attack, except the derivation path in the signature is a \emph{suffix} of the derivation path produced by the adversary. The analysis of this attack is similar to the previous one.

- In the third type of attack, the adversary \emph{truncates} the given derivation path. That is, the derivation path they provide is a \emph{suffix} of the derivation path in the signature. Given a derivation path and a master secret-key, it is trivial to create a master secret-key for a suffix (by only applying a part of the path), so the argument used in the previous forms of attack does not carry over. In order to prove this attack infeasible, we first prove in Appendix C.1 that given an adversary that can forge a \textsc{Picnic} signature, it is possible to extract a preimage of the master secret-key with respect to the key-derivation function. We use this property to show that in this scenario it is also possible to recover a collision in the hash function.

\subsection{Preimage Extractability from \textsc{Picnic} Signatures}

In the next section, we introduce \emph{seed-lifted} schemes. As we explain therein, the seed-lifted scheme is constructed such that an adversary with access to valid signatures with respect to some keys can’t feasibly create a signature that is valid with respect to a different (but related) public-key. This type of security can not be implied by the EUF-CMA security of \textsc{PICNIC} alone, as such security only prohibits creating signed documents verifiable by the same public-key. In order to overcome this, we want to exploit the relations between the two public-keys – the one given to the adversary, and the one with respect to which their output passes verification – to produce a collision in a function known to be collision resistant. However, to do that, we need to compute the secret-key corresponding to the public-key produced by the adversary.

Roughly speaking, the property we need is that if it is feasible to produce a signature verifiable by some public-key, then it is also feasible to produce the corresponding secret-key.

To see this holds for the scheme \textsc{PICNIC}(f), we note that in this scheme a signature is an accepting transcript of a slightly modified version of the Unruh transform [Unr15], applied to a particular $\Sigma$-protocol used as an argument of knowledge for a preimage of $f$ used to instantiate
the scheme\textsuperscript{10}. The purpose of the modification is twofold: to incorporate the message $m$ into the transcript, and to slightly generalize Unruh’s transform, whose original formulation does not apply to the particular $\Sigma$-protocol used in [CDG+17].

In particular, part of the proof of [CDG+17, Corollary 5.1] extends [Um15, Theorem 18], proving that for any post-quantum one-way function $f$, a valid PICNIC($f$) signature (on any message) is an argument of knowledge whose error is negligible in the length of the input.

We summarize this discussion in the following:

**Proposition 7 (PICNIC extractability).** Let $f$ be a post-quantum one-way function with input length $\lambda$. Assume there exists a QPT adversary $A$ that, on a uniformly random input $pk \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\lambda}$, outputs with probability $\epsilon$ a signed document $(m, \sigma)$ such that PICNIC($f$).\texttt{Ver}_{pk}(m, \sigma) accepts. Then there exists a QPT extractor $E$ that, on a uniformly random input $pk \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\lambda}$, outputs $sk$ such that $f(sk) = pk$ with probability $\epsilon - \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

### C.2 Security Proof

In this section we prove Theorem 4. We do so in two steps: we show that the seed-lifting is a post-quantum lifting, and then infer from that that it is actually a strong lifting. The first step requires most of the effort, so we start with the short and straightforward second step.

**Proposition 8.** If the seed-lifting is EUF-CMA secure, then it is EUF-LCMA secure.

**Proof.** The idea is that all signatures provided by the seed-lifted schemes contain information that could be used to perfectly simulate the signature oracle of the modified scheme.

Let $A$ win the EUF-LCMA game with probability $\epsilon$, and consider the adversary $A'$ for the EUF-CMA game which operates as follows:

- $A'$ initiates the simulation of $A$ by providing her the $pk$ she obtained from the challenger.
- $A'$ queries the signature oracle (recall that since $A'$ is an EUF-CMA adversary, she only has access to the signature oracle of the lifting) on a uniformly random $m_0 \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\lambda}$ to obtain $(\sigma, msk, P)$.
- $A'$ resumes simulation of $A$, using her own oracle access to answer queries on $\text{Sign}_{sk}$, and responding to queries of the form $\text{Sign}_{sk}(m)$ with $\sigma \leftarrow \text{ECDSA.\text{Sign}_{Der}(msk, P)}(m)$.
- Outputs the output of $A$

Note that the view of $A$ in the real and simulated games is identical.

By hypothesis, $A$ outputs $(\sigma, m)$ such that Ver$_{pk}(m, \sigma)$ accepts and $A$ never made a query on $m$ is $\epsilon$. In this event, $A'$ wins the game unless $m = m_0$. However, since $m_0$ was chosen uniformly, and the view of $A$ is independent of $m_0$, it follows that $m \neq m_0$ with overwhelming probability. Hence $A_p$ wins the EUF-CMA game with probability $\epsilon - \text{negl}(\lambda)$. But by hypothesis the seed lifting is post-quantum, so it follows that $\epsilon = \text{negl}(\lambda)$, whereby the lifting is strong. □

The first step is the following statement:

**Proposition 9.** If $H$ is modeled as a random oracle, the seed-lifting is EUF-CMA secure.

**Proof.** We prove this by a sequence of hybrids.

The first hybrid $H_0(A, 1^\lambda)$ is just a restatement of the EUF-CMA game, explicated for the seed-lifting:

\textsuperscript{10}For an overview of $\Sigma$-protocols and how they are used to construct signature schemes, we refer the reader to [Kat10, Chapter 8]
1. C samples (sk, pk) ← KeyGen(1^λ) where sk = (s, pw, P)
2. Set sk_p = KDF^{pre}(s, pw)
3. Set msk = KDF^pq(sk_p), note that by definition pk = Der(msk, P)
4. C sends pk to A
5. Let q be the number of queries made by A, for i = 1, ..., q:
   (a) A sends m_i to C
   (b) C computes σ ← PICNIC(KDF^pq).Sign_{sk_p}(m, P)
   (c) C sends (σ, msk, P) to A
6. A sends (m, (σ, msk', P')) to C
7. if ∃i : m_i = m, output 0
8. if Der(msk', P') ≠ pk, output 0
9. output 1 if PICNIC(KDF^pq).Ver_{mk}'(m, P', σ) accepts, 0 otherwise.

In the next hybrid H_1(\mathcal{A}, 1^λ) we choose sk_p uniformly at random:

2. Set sk_p = KDF^{pre}(s, pw)
   C samples sk_p ← \{0, 1\}^\ell (where ℓ is the secret-key length)

Claim 1. For any QPT A it holds that |P[H_0(\mathcal{A}, 1^λ) = 1] − P[H_1(\mathcal{A}, 1^λ) = 1]| = negl(λ).

Proof. Consider the distributions \mathbb{D}_0 and \mathbb{D}_1 where \mathbb{D}_0 is uniform on \{0, 1\}^\ell and \mathbb{D}_1 is sampled by sampling (sk = (s, pw, p), pk) ← KeyGen(1^λ) and outputting KDF^{pre}(s, pw).

Recall that KDF^{pre} = H^{2047}. That H is uniformly random does not imply that KDF^{pre} is uniformly random. However, [BDD+17] prove that the distribution of iterateg a random function (with an exponentially large domain) a constant number of times is computationally indistinguishable from uniformly sampling a function. Combined with the fact that γ(s, pw) = negl(λ) (recall Definition 4) we get that if from Proposition 2 that |P[\mathcal{A}_D(1^λ) = 1] − P[\mathcal{A}_{D'}(1^λ) = 1] = negl(λ), where \mathcal{A}_{D'} is any QPT procedure that is given oracle access to a distribution \mathbb{D}.

Now consider the following procedure \mathcal{A}_D(1^λ):

- \mathcal{A}_D samples sk_p ← \mathbb{D}
- \mathcal{A}_D samples (sk, pk) ← KeyGen(1^λ), she discards all data but P
- \mathcal{A}_D computes msk = KDF^pq(sk_p) and pk = Der(msk, P)
- \mathcal{A}_D simulates the EUF-CMA game with A by exactly emulating C, and outputs the output of C

Note that the view of A in the simulation carried by \mathcal{A}_D(1^λ) is identical to the view in the hybrid H_0(\mathcal{A}, 1^λ). Hence P[H_0(\mathcal{A}, 1^λ) = 1] = P[\mathcal{A}_D(1^λ) = 1] and it follows that |P[H_0(\mathcal{A}, 1^λ) = 1] − P[H_1(\mathcal{A}, 1^λ) = 1]| = negl(λ).

□

In the hybrid H_2 we add a new failure condition that trivially never holds, it will be useful for the following hybrids:

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7. ...

8. if $\text{Der}(\text{msk}', P') \neq \text{pk}$, output 0

9. Set $E = \text{True}$

10. if $E = \text{False}$, output 0

11. output 1 if $\text{PICNIC}(\text{KDF}^{pq}).\text{Ver}_{\text{msk}'}((m, P'), \sigma)$ accepts, 0 otherwise.

Since $E$ is always true, it follows that $H_1$ and $H_2$ execute identically, proving:

**Claim 2.** For any QPT $\mathcal{A}$ it holds that $\mathbb{P}[H_1(\mathcal{A}, 1^\lambda) = 1] = \mathbb{P}[H_2(\mathcal{A}, 1^\lambda) = 1]$.

In the hybrid $H_3$ we decompose $E$ into a conjunction of several events $E_1, \ldots, E_4$:

9. Set $E = \text{True}$

   Set $E = E_1 \lor E_2 \lor E_3 \lor E_4$ where:

   (a) $E_1 = \text{True}$ if $(\text{msk}, P) \neq (\text{msk}', P')$ and neither is a Der-suffix of the other

   (b) $E_2 = \text{True}$ if $(\text{msk}, P)$ is a Der-suffix of $(\text{msk}', P')$

   (c) $E_3 = \text{True}$ if $(\text{msk}', P')$ is a Der-suffix of $(\text{msk}, P)$

   (d) $E_4 = \text{True}$ if $(\text{msk}, P) = (\text{msk}', P')$

10. if $E = \text{False}$, output 0

**Claim 3.** For any QPT $\mathcal{A}$ it holds that $\mathbb{P}[H_3(\mathcal{A}, 1^\lambda) = 1] = \mathbb{P}[H_4(\mathcal{A}, 1^\lambda) = 1]$.

   **Proof.** It suffices to show that in $H_3$ it holds with certainty that $E = \text{True}$.

   Consider the strings $(\text{msk}, P)$, $(\text{msk}', P')$. If they are equal, then $E_4 = \text{True}$. If $\text{Der}(\text{msk}, P) \neq \text{Der}(\text{msk}', P')$ then neither can be a suffix of the other (since a suffix is a type of collision), so $E_1 = \text{True}$. If $\text{Der}(\text{msk}, P) = \text{Der}(\text{msk}', P')$ then they constitute a collision in $\text{Der}$. If it is a suffix collision, then either $E_2 = \text{True}$ or $E_3 = \text{True}$ (depending on which of the strings is a suffix of the other). If it is not a suffix collision, then $E_1 = \text{True}$. □

In the hybrid $H_4$ we set $E_1$ to false:

9. Set $E = E_1 \lor E_2 \lor E_3 \lor E_4$ where:

   (a) $E_1 = \text{False}$ if $(\text{msk}, P) \neq (\text{msk}', P')$ and neither is a Der-suffix of the other

   (b) $E_2 = \text{True}$ if $(\text{msk}, P)$ is a Der-suffix of $(\text{msk}', P')$

   (c) $E_3 = \text{True}$ if $(\text{msk}', P')$ is a Der-suffix of $(\text{msk}, P)$

   (d) $E_4 = \text{True}$ if $(\text{msk}, P) = (\text{msk}', P')$

10. if $E = \text{False}$, output 0

**Claim 4.** For any QPT $\mathcal{A}$ it holds that $|\mathbb{P}[H_3(\mathcal{A}, 1^\lambda) = 1] - \mathbb{P}[H_4(\mathcal{A}, 1^\lambda) = 1]| = \text{negl}(\lambda)$.  

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Proof. We note that $H_3$ conditioned on $E_1 = \text{False}$ is identical to $H_4$. Hence, $|\mathbb{P}[H_3(\mathcal{A}, 1^\lambda) = 1] - \mathbb{P}[H_4(\mathcal{A}, 1^\lambda) = 1]|$ is at most the probability that $E_1 = \text{True}$ in $H_3$.

Consider a QPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that perfectly simulates $H_3(\mathcal{A}, 1^\lambda)$ until receiving an output. $\mathcal{A}$ then outputs $((\text{msk}', P), (\text{msk}'', P'))$ where $(\text{msk}'', P')$ was taken from $\mathcal{A}$’s output. The event that $((\text{msk}, P), (\text{msk}'', P'))$ is a non-suffix collision in Der is exactly the event that $E_1 = \text{True}$. Proposition 5 asserts this event has negligible probability. □

Proposition 5 asserts this event has negligible probability. □

In the hybrid $H_5$ we set $E_2$ to false:

9. Set $E = E_1 \lor E_2 \lor E_3 \lor E_4$ where:

(a) $E_1 =$ False

(b) $E_2 =$ True if $(\text{msk}, P)$ is a Der suffix of $(\text{msk}', P')$

(c) $E_3 =$ True if $(\text{msk}', P')$ is a Der-suffix of $(\text{msk}, P)$

(d) $E_4 =$ True if $(\text{msk}, P) = (\text{msk}', P')$

10. if $E =$ False, output 0

Claim 5. For any QPT $\mathcal{A}$ it holds that $|\mathbb{P}[H_4(\mathcal{A}, 1^\lambda) = 1] - \mathbb{P}[H_5(\mathcal{A}, 1^\lambda) = 1]| = \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

Proof. Like in the previous claim, we have that $|\mathbb{P}[H_4(\mathcal{A}, 1^\lambda) = 1] - \mathbb{P}[H_5(\mathcal{A}, 1^\lambda) = 1]|$ is bound by the probability that $E_2 = \text{True}$ in $H_4$.

Consider the following adversary $\mathcal{A}_s$ that given a uniformly random $\text{sk}_p$ does the following:

- calculates $\text{msk} = \text{KDF}^{pq}(\text{sk}_p)$
- uses KeyGen to sample a path $P$
- calculates $\text{pk} = \text{Der}(\text{msk}, P)$
- simulates $\mathcal{A}$ using $\text{pk}$ as input and $\text{sk}_p, P$ to answer oracle calls
- recovers $(\text{msk}', P')$ from the output of $\mathcal{A}$
- if $(\text{msk}, P)$ is a Der-suffix of $(\text{msk}', P')$, let $Q$ such be a path such that $P' = Q \parallel P$, and output $(\text{msk}', Q)$, otherwise output $\perp$.

Note that the event that $E_2 = \text{True}$ in $H_4$ is exactly the event that $\mathcal{A}_s$ didn’t output $\perp$. In this case, the output $(\text{msk}', Q)$ if $\mathcal{A}$ satisfies that $\text{Der}(\text{msk}', Q) = \text{KDF}^{pq}(\text{sk}_p)$. Recalling that $\text{sk}_p$ is uniformly random, $\text{KDF}^{pq} = \text{H}$ and $\text{Der}(\text{msk}', Q) = \text{H}'(\text{msk}')$, it follows from Proposition 6 that this could only happen with negligible probability. □

In the hybrid $H_6$ we set $E_3$ to false:

9. Set $E = E_1 \lor E_2 \lor E_3 \lor E_4$ where:

(a) $E_1 =$ False

(b) $E_2 =$ False

(c) $E_3 =$ True if $(\text{msk}', P')$ is a Der-suffix of $(\text{msk}, P)$

(d) $E_4 =$ True if $(\text{msk}, P) = (\text{msk}', P')$

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10. if $E = \text{False}$, output 0

**Claim 6.** For any QPT $\mathcal{A}$ it holds that $|\mathbb{P}[H_5(\mathcal{A}, 1^\lambda) = 1] - \mathbb{P}[H_6(\mathcal{A}, 1^\lambda) = 1]| = \negl(\lambda)$.

**Proof.** Keeping the same line of reasoning, it suffices to show that the event that $E_3 = \text{True}$ in $H_5$ has negligible probability.

The event $E_3$ is the event that $\mathcal{A}$ managed to produce an output $((\sigma, \text{msk}', P'), m)$ with the following properties:

- $(\text{msk}', P')$ is a Der-suffix of $(\text{msk}, P)$. That is, there is some non-empty path $Q$ such that $P = Q\|P'$ and $\text{msk}' = \text{Der}(\text{msk}, Q)$.
- $\text{PICNIC}(\text{KDF}^pq)\text{.Ver}_{\text{msk}'}((m, P'), \sigma)$ accepts.
- $\mathcal{A}$ has never made a signature query on $m$.
- $\text{Der}(\text{msk}', P') = \text{pk}$.

Say this happens with probability $\varepsilon$. Since $P$ is sampled independently of $\text{sk}_p$, there has to be a particular path $\tilde{P}$ such that the probability of $E$ conditioned on $P = \tilde{P}$ is at least $\varepsilon$.

Let $q + 1$ be the length of $P$ (recall that $P$ must have length at least two for the event $E_3$ to hold), for any $t = 1, \ldots, q$ let $P_t$ be the suffix of $\tilde{P}$ of length $t$. Then there must exist some $t$ such that $P' = P_t$ with probability at least $\varepsilon/q$.

Let $\mathcal{A}_z$ be the procedure that on input $\text{sk}_p$ does the following:

- Calculates $\text{msk} = H(\text{sk}_p)$ and $\text{pk} = \text{PK}^{EC}(\text{Der}(\text{msk}, \tilde{P})_L)$ and gives $\text{pk}$ as input to $\mathcal{A}$
- Simulates the hybrid $H_5$ responding to signature queries with $(\sigma, \text{msk}, \tilde{P})$ where $\sigma \leftarrow \text{PICNIC}(\text{H})\text{.Sign}_{\text{sk}_p}(m, P)$
- Resumes operations until obtaining output $((\sigma, \text{msk}', P'), m)$.
- Outputs $\sigma$ if all the following hold: $P' = P_t$, $\text{msk}' = \text{Der}(\text{msk}, Q)$ where $\tilde{P} = Q\|P'$, $m$ was never the input to a query and $\text{PICNIC}(\text{H})\text{.Ver}_{\text{msk}'}((m, P), \sigma)$ accepts. Otherwise, output $\perp$.

By design. If $\text{sk}_p$ is uniformly random, then the probability that $\mathcal{A}_z$ doesn’t output $\perp$ is at least $\varepsilon/q$. In this case, $\mathcal{A}_z$ managed to output a signature that passes the $\text{PICNIC}(\text{H})$ verification with respect to the public-key $\text{msk}'$.

It follows from Proposition 7 that there exists an extractor $\mathcal{E}$ which outputs an $\text{H}$-preimage $x$ of $\text{msk}'$ with probability $\varepsilon/q - \negl(\lambda)$. We thus have that $H(x) = H^{Q}(\text{msk})$. By Proposition 6 this can only happen with negligible probability. We get that $\varepsilon/q - \negl(\lambda)$ is negligible and so $\varepsilon$ is also negligible.

In the last hybrid $H_7$ we set $E_4 = \text{False}$:

9. Set $E = E_1 \lor E_2 \lor E_3 \lor E_4$ where:

(a) $E_1 = \text{False}$
(b) $E_2 = \text{False}$
(c) $E_3 = \text{False}$
(d) $E_4 = \text{True}$ if $(\text{msk}, P) = (\text{msk}', P')$

$E_4 = \text{False}$
10. if $E = \text{False}$, output 0

Claim 7. For any QPT $\mathcal{A}$ it holds that $|\Pr[H_5(\mathcal{A}, 1^\lambda) = 1] - \Pr[H_6(\mathcal{A}, 1^\lambda) = 1]| = \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

Proof. Keeping the same line of reasoning, it suffices to show that the event that $E_4 = \text{True}$ in $H_6$ has negligible probability.

Let $\varepsilon$ be the probability that $E_4 = \text{True}$ in $H_6$, let $\mathcal{A}_p$ be the following EUF-CMA adversary for PICNIC(KDF$_{pq}$):

- Let $(sk_p, pk_p)$ denote the keys generated by $C$.
- After receiving $pk_p$, $\mathcal{A}_p$ samples $((s, pw, P), pk) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$ and discards all data but $P$ (recall that $P$ is sampled independently of $(s, pw)$).
- $\mathcal{A}_p$ uses $pk = \text{Der}(pk_p, P)$ as input to $\mathcal{A}$.
- $\mathcal{A}_p$ responds to a signature query on $m$ by querying the PICNIC(KDF$_{pq}$).Sign$_{sk_p}$ oracle on $(m, P)$ to obtain $\sigma$ and outputting $(\sigma, pk_p, P)$.
- $\mathcal{A}_p$ resumes the simulation until obtaining an output $((\sigma, msk', P'), m)$. If $(pk_p, P) = (msk', P')$, $m$ was never queried and PICNIC(KDF$_{pq}$).Ver$_{pk_p}(m, \sigma)$ accepts, $\mathcal{A}_p$ outputs $m$. Otherwise $\mathcal{A}_p$ outputs $\perp$.

Note that the view of $\mathcal{A}$ in the simulation and in $H_5$ is identical. Also note that $\mathcal{A}_p$ either wins the EUF-CMA game or outputs $\perp$, and the former happens exactly when $\mathcal{A}$ outputs a winning output. That is, the probability that $\mathcal{A}_p$ wins the game is exactly $\varepsilon$.

Now note that, since KDF$_{pq} = H$ is modeled as a random oracle, it follows from [CLQ20, Theorem 4] that it is post-quantum one-way. It then follows from [CDG+17, Corollary 5.1] that PICNIC(KDF$_{pq}$) is EUF-CMA secure. Since $\mathcal{A}_p$ is a QPT adversary that wins the EUF-CMA game for PICNIC(KDF$_{pq}$) with probability $\varepsilon$, it follows that $\varepsilon = \text{negl}(\lambda)$. □

By stringing all claims above together and applying the triangle inequality, we obtain that it holds for any QPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that $|\Pr[H_6(\mathcal{A}, 1^\lambda) = 1] - \Pr[H_7(\mathcal{A}, 1^\lambda) = 1]| = \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

We conclude the proof by noting that in $H_7$ it always holds that $E = \text{False}$, whereby, for any QPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$ we have that $\Pr[H_7(\mathcal{A}, \lambda) = 1] = 0$. It follows that $\Pr[H_6(\mathcal{A}, 1^\lambda) = 1] = \text{negl}(\lambda)$ as needed. □

D Quantum Canaries

In this section, we introduce quantum canaries: puzzles designed to be intractable for classical computers but solvable for quantum computers whose scale is significantly smaller than required to compromise ECDSA signatures. A solution to the puzzle will then act as a heads-up for the network that the quantum era is near. To incentivize quantum entities to solve the puzzle, thus alerting the network to the presence and compromising the quantum loot, we propose awarding a monetary prize to the first solver. In Appendix D.5, we provide a game theoretic analysis of two entities competing for the canary bounty and quantum loot.

Once the canaries are set up, they could be used to implement policies in consensus, such as: any non-quantum-cautious transaction posted more than 10,000 blocks after the canary puzzle was solved is considered invalid.
The idea of using cryptographic canaries to award bounties for discovering exploits was first discussed in [Dra18]. We discuss in more depth the specific application of canaries to detect quantum entities. In particular, we analyze the behavior of two entities competing for the quantum loot and discuss the option to fund the bounty for the canary based on UTXOs that would be burned.

D.1 Properties of Good Canaries

We expect a quantum canary to satisfy the following properties:

- **Similarity** The task of killing the canary should be as similar as possible to the task of forging an ECDSA signature for a selected message given access to the public-key. If the challenge we choose for killing the canary is vastly different from breaking ECDSA, it becomes more plausible that a future optimization could reduce the scale required for one task over the other, leading to a scenario where killing the canary becomes nearly as hard or even harder than breaking ECDSA, allowing a future attacker to claim the bounty and the loot. There are several incomparable complexity metrics for “hardness” in quantum computing, the most studied being the circuit size, and circuit depth (directly related to the time complexity), T-count, and T-depth (which are the important measure when dealing with certain quantum error-correcting codes, in which Clifford gates are cheap to implement) and the number of qubits (space complexity). Different problems offer different trade-offs, and since it is impossible to predict which quantum resource will develop more quickly, it is desirable that killing the canary will have trade-offs similar to breaking ECDSA.

- **Incentive** There should be a clear incentive for quantum entities that can kill the canary to actually do so, rather than hiding their quantum capabilities until they mature enough to loot pre-quantum coins.

- **Security** The mechanism for posting the solution to the challenge should be secure against forking attacks. In particular, it should be infeasible for anyone listening to the mempool to claim the solution as their own.

- **Nothing Up My Sleeve** The procedure for generating the challenge should be publicly known. Any randomness used for generating the challenge should be sampled from a verifiably random source. All steps in the generating procedure should be justified, and arbitrary choices (that could conceal backdoor solutions) should be avoided.

D.2 Choosing the Puzzle

Since our ultimate concern is entities that are able to break ECDSA signatures over the secp256k1 curve, a natural contender for a puzzle is to forge an ECDSA signature over a curve with less security\(^\text{11}\).

A necessary (but not sufficient) condition for this solution to have an untrusted setup is that we are able to generate a public-key without learning anything about the matching secret-key. Fortunately, ECDSA has the nice feature that the public-key is merely a random point on the elliptic curve. This leads to the following approach:

\(^{11}\)Another natural contender is to skip the signing mechanism and simply require the solver to solve a logarithmic equation over a suitable elliptic curve. However, it is hard to argue that the difficulty of this task scales the same as creating an ECDSA signature. An ECDSA signature contains many steps besides solving the logarithmic equation, so implementing the entire signing mechanism is better in terms of similarity.
• select an appropriate curve,
• sample a random point $pk$ on the curve and a random string $r$,
• post $(pk, r)$ to the blockchain,
• to kill the canary, post $\sigma$ which passes ECDSA verification as a signature of $r$ with respect to the chosen curve.

The missing components to fully specify the canary are the curve itself, and a method for generating a public-key which does not provide information about the corresponding secret-key.

It is desirable that the family of curves we choose from bears as much similarity as possible to secp256k1, or we risk the scenario previously described where an optimization is found to computing discrete logarithm on secp256k1 but not on the challenge curve (or vice versa).

The secp256k1 curve is a curve over a prime field whose order is also prime, given in Weierstrass form. Recent works [RNSL17, HJN+20] provide concrete cryptanalysis for computing discrete logarithms in such elliptic groups as a function of the order of the prime field above which they are defined.

The discussion above suggests that a good choice for a curve family might be the family of all Weierstrass curves over prime fields of prime order whose binary representation has length $b$, for some appropriately chosen $b$.

However, simply choosing an arbitrary curve of convenient parameters and counting our blessings is not a sensible approach. Appropriately choosing a secure elliptic curve is a very difficult task, and a carelessly chosen curve could easily exhibit classically feasible exploits (for an overview of selecting elliptic curves, see e.g. [BCLN16]). Unfortunately, our current application is unusual in the sense that we deliberately seek out curves whose bit security is intermediate, in the sense that it is lower than currently used curves but still high enough to withstand classical attacks. Virtually all available literature focuses on curves chosen to be as strong as possible.

Moreover, the secp256k1 curve was chosen partly due to its convenient parameterization, which allows for optimizing arithmetic operations over the curve group. This has no effect on the asymptotic computational cost of any algorithm computing the discrete logarithm, but has a significant impact on the constants. It is plausible that computing a discrete logarithm over secp256k1 might be more efficient than computing a discrete logarithm over a general curve with fewer bits of security due to these optimizations. The curve selection process must be aware of these nuances. It might be desirable to require that the canary curves also furnish a compact binary representation. We leave the task of choosing a concrete curve to further discussion and future work.

D.3 Funding the Bounty

The bounty could be funded from several sources: it could be raised from the community, freshly minted for that purpose, or “borrowed” from future inflation (e.g. allocating 5% of all future block rewards). Another funding source unique to our setting is the funds destined to burn. Recall that in our proposed solution (see Section 5), all UTXOs whose addresses were posted to the blockchain prior to 2013 will become forever unspendable two months after the canary is killed. The bounty for killing the canary could be taken from these funds.

However, we do not recommend using the burned funds, as there is uncertainty regarding how much of these funds will remain by the time the quantum era starts: if all users will switch to post-quantum addresses during the period between the canary is killed and the quantum era starts, no bounty will be left. This uncertainty could deter entities from claiming the bounty, and encourage them to wait for the loot.
D.4 Adaptation to Taproot

So far we implicitly assumed that quantum loot is locked behind ECDSA signatures. However, as the newly deployed Taproot update [WNT20] gains adoption, more quantum loot is accumulated behind Schnorr signatures (see Appendix A.3.4). Fortunately, the implementation of Schnorr signatures in Taproot is instantiated with the same secp256k1 curve used to instantiate the ECDSA scheme.

However, one might argue that Schnorr and ECDSA are not similar enough, and by specializing the puzzle to ECDSA we take the risk that a quantum entity will be able to loot P2TR UTXOs before they would be able to collect the bounty.

Fortunately, in both the ECDSA and Schnorr schemes, the public-key is a uniformly random point on secp256k1. Hence, a wide adoption of secp256k1-instantiated Schnorr signatures (e.g. via Taproot) could be addressed by modifying the puzzle such that a valid solution is a signature which passes either ECDSA or Schnorr verification (w.r.t. to the sampled public-key).

D.5 Game Theoretic Analysis

In this section we argue that quantum-capable entities, including dishonest ones, are incentivised to claim the bounty, even at the price of relinquishing the loot. To do so, we consider an idealized setting in which exactly two quantum entities exist. Furthermore, for each entity, it is known (to both entities) exactly when they would be able to claim the loot and the bounty.

We consider two strategies: the early strategy, in which the entity claims the bounty as soon as possible, and the late strategy, in which the entity claims the bounty as soon as possible without relinquishing the loot. That is, if an entity can claim the bounty at time $t_b$ and the loot at time $t_\ell$, then the early strategy is to try to claim the bounty at time $t_b$; whereas the late strategy is to try to claim the bounty at time $\max\{t_b, t_\ell - w\}$ and the loot at time $t_\ell$, where $w$ is the quantum adjustment period between the time the canary is killed and the time the quantum loot is burned (Of course, whether one party’s attempt is successful depends on the other party’s strategy).

Note that if $t_b > t_\ell - w$ then both strategies coincide, and the entity becomes degenerate.

In Appendix D.5 we analyze two non-degenerate entities with all their possible timelines. We use $\bullet$ and $\triangleright$ (resp. $\ll$, $\gg$) to denote the points in time in which the first (resp. second) entity is able to claim the bounty and loot, respectively. Note that by the design of the canary, $\bullet$ always happens before $\triangleright$, since killing the canary is strictly easier than forging a standard ECDSA signature, which is required for claiming (part of) the loot.

Since the pay-offs are symmetric, we assume without loss of generality that the first (faster) player is faster, and can claim the bounty before the second (slower) player. We use $\bullet$ (resp. $\blacktriangleleft$) to denote the point in time in which the entity would claim the bounty if they follow the late strategy. That is, the time difference between $\bullet$ and $\triangleright$ (resp. $\blacktriangleleft$ and $\gg$) is always $w$.

The matrices on the right column show the payoffs for each entity in each possible timeline given the strategy of both entities. The rows of the matrices represent the strategy of the fast entity, whereas the columns represent the strategy of the slow entity. The headings “E” and “L” denote the early and late strategies, respectively. The utility of the bounty is denoted by $b$ and the loot by $\ell$. The pure Nash equilibria of the payoff matrices are underlined.

We find that in the first two scenarios, the equilibria strategies do not claim the loot. Hence, the network is given the desired heads-up before quantum looting becomes feasible. Furthermore, we find that the third scenario transforms into the second scenario as we decrease $w$ or increase the bounty. Decreasing $w$ is modeled by moving $\bullet$ to the right (towards $\triangleright$) and, similarly, $\blacktriangleleft$ towards $\gg$, where both are moved the same distance and the other points remain fixed. The solid arrows show how timelines change as $w$ is decreased. We find that as $w$ decreases, all
Table 4: Best viewed in color. An analysis of two non-degenerate dishonest quantum entities with respect to all possible timelines. The timelines are grouped into scenarios, where each scenario corresponds to a different payoff matrix. Each timeline advances in time from left to right. $\ll$ (resp. $\ll$) and $\gg$ (resp. $\gg$) represent when the faster (resp. slower) entity is capable of claiming the bounty and the quantum loot respectively. $\bullet$ (resp. $\blacktriangleleft$) represents the earliest point in which the faster (resp. slower) entity can claim the bounty without forfeiting the loot, and is always at distance $w$ from $\gg$ (resp. $\gg$). The payoff matrices list the outcome of the game for both players given their timeline and the strategies they chose. The headings of the matrix rows and columns represent the strategies chosen by both players, where “E” stands for the early strategy, and “L” stands for the late strategy. The rows (resp. columns) of the matrices represent the strategy chosen by the faster (resp. slower) entity. Each entry of the matrix specifies the outcome for the faster and slower players, in that order. Pure Nash equilibria are denoted by an underline. Solid arrows describe how timelines transform as the waiting time decreases, and dotted arrows describe how timelines transform as the bounty increases. We find that in the first two scenarios, the equilibria strategies do not claim the loot.

TIMELINES | PAYOFFS
--- | ---
\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\ll & \blacktriangleleft & \gg \\
\ll & \bullet & \blacktriangleleft \\
\bullet & \ll & \ll \\
\end{array}
\] | \[
\begin{array}{cc}
E & L \\
(b, 0) & (b, 0) \\
(0, b) & (0, b + \ell) \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\ll & \bullet & \blacktriangleleft \\
\ll & \bullet & \blacktriangleleft \\
\bullet & \ll & \ll \\
\bullet & \bullet & \ll \\
\end{array}
\] | \[
\begin{array}{cc}
E & L \\
(b, 0) & (b, 0) \\
(0, b) & (b + \ell, 0) \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\bullet & \bullet & \blacktriangleleft \\
\bullet & \bullet & \blacktriangleleft \\
\bullet & \bullet & \blacktriangleleft \\
\bullet & \bullet & \blacktriangleleft \\
\end{array}
\] | \[
\begin{array}{cc}
E & L \\
(b, 0) & (b, 0) \\
(b + \ell, 0) & (b + \ell, 0) \\
\end{array}
\]

Timelines but the last converge to scenarios where equilibria strategies do not claim the loot. The last timeline models a faster entity that is strong enough to claim the loot before the slow entity is able to claim the bounty, so it will win both the bounty and the loot for any value of $w$.

However, note that increasing the bounty might cause a player to increase the investment in building a small quantum computer, sufficiently large to win the bounty. This could be interpreted as moving $\ll$ and $\ll$ to the left. Since the bounty is orders of magnitude smaller...
than the loot, increasing the bounty does not seem to expedite the emergence of looting-capable quantum entities, so $\circ$ and $\triangleright$ (and consequentially $\bullet$ and $\blacktriangle$) remain fixed. Dashed arrows describe how the different timelines change as the bounty increases. In particular, the last timeline converges to a timeline whose equilibria strategy does not claim the loot. This motivates picking a fairly large bounty, to increase the chances that this dynamic would occur.

We do not provide a detailed analysis of the scenario where one (or both) entities are degenerate, as it does not provide much insight, and degenerate entities transform to non-degenerate ones as $w$ decreases.